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Von Doris Dialer, Andreas Maurer und Margarethe Richter

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The Liaison Committee of Historians came into being in 1982 as a result of an important international symposium that the Commission had organized in Luxembourg to launch historical research on European integration. The committee is composed of historians of the European Union member countries who work on contemporary history.

The Liaison Committee:

- gathers and conveys information about work on European history after the Second World War;
- advises the European Union on research projects concerning contemporary European history. Thus, the Liaison Committee was commissioned to make publicly available the archives of the Community institutions;
- enables researchers to make better use of the archival sources;
- promotes research meetings to get an update of work in progress and to stimulate new research: research conferences have been organized and their proceedings published.

The Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'intégration européenne – Zeitschrift für Geschichte der europäischen Integration is in line with the preoccupations of the Liaison Committee. Being the first history journal to deal exclusively with the history of European Integration, the Journal offers the increasing number of young historians devoting their research to contemporary Europe a permanent forum.

The Liaison Committee works completely independently and according to historians' critical method.

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- d'aider à une meilleure utilisation par les chercheurs des moyens de recherche mis à leur disposition (archives, sources orales...);
- d'encourager des rencontres scientifiques afin de faire le point sur les connaissances acquises et de susciter de nouvelles recherches: grands colloques ont été organisés et leur actes publiés.

L'édition du *Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'intégration européenne – Zeitschrift für Geschichte der europäischen Integration* se situe dans le droit fil des préoccupations du Groupe de liaison. Première revue d'histoire à se consacrer exclusivement à l'histoire de la construction européenne, le Journal se propose de fournir un forum permanent au nombre croissant de jeunes historiens vouant leurs recherches à l'Europe contemporaine.

Le Groupe de liaison organise ses colloques et publications en toute indépendance et conformément à la méthode critique qui est celle des historiens.

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Europe and the Mediterranean in the long 1980s

Elena CALANDRI, Simone PAOLI

Until the late 1960s, the Six held different views concerning the Community's role in the Mediterranean, but none supported bold initiatives still less a regional approach. True, protocols had been added to the Rome Treaty envisaging association agreements for Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Somalia. Then, in late 1958, the Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Wigny, thinking about a Community foreign policy, imagined a "Mediterranean circle" among other regional "circles" where the Community would stand as the point of intersection. When in summer 1959 Greece and Turkey applied for association, these applications were welcomed. But, whatever the intentions of the Guy Mollet government in 1957 were, between 1958 and 1969 Charles de Gaulle discouraged relations between the EEC and the Maghreb countries. He pushed a national policy in that area, epitomized by the withdrawal of French naval forces from NATO, and discouraged common EEC external enterprises.

The second Mediterranean member, Italy, held a rather schizophrenic position. It kept its European and Mediterranean policies strictly separate, and refused the opening of the EEC market to agricultural products (olive oil, citrus fruits, wine, tomatoes, etc.) of Mediterranean neighbours, even if, in 1964, a free trade area was proposed for industrial products. Therefore, the early Community fell back on a selective approach. The 1961 and 1963 association agreements with Greece and Turkey marked the Community's acceptance of the responsibility for stabilizing the South-Eastern periphery of the Atlantic Alliance, through development assistance, the bait of accession and inclusion in the Community political sphere. But there was no equal concern in the Southern Mediterranean saves, of course, for Israel. In spite, or maybe because of Walter Hallstein and Jean Rey's efforts, the Commission was not able to take the lead in external relations: after the troubles over Greece's association, the member states imposed a strict control even on exploratory talks and the Luxembourg compromise confirmed that foreign policy initiatives would remain under special scrutiny. External relations remained subject to national inputs and vetoes and mutual sniping vetoes and meagre achievements resulted. On their side, the Southern Mediterranean countries disliked structured and/or political bonds with the Community and only asked for trade concessions, financial aid and social rights for migrant workers. Malta, Cyprus and Libya fell within British or US defence structures and did not approach the Community until the late 1960s.

During the late 1960s however, economic, political and strategic reasons fired up a new EEC activism with the Mediterranean being identified as a special EEC concern. The late 1960s saw the signature of trade agreements with almost all Mediterranean countries, but also the gradual emergence of the conceptual bases for a new phase. The Mediterranean grew into an East-West security problem and this opened the way to a change in EC policy. The Soviet naval build-up, troubles in NATO due to France's withdrawal and US disengagement, anti-Western feelings in the Arab

world, local conflicts and the emerging politicisation of oil affected the bipolar balance and meant Mediterranean volatility. These agreements made the Six (then Nine) try and pull together their fragmented approach, and launch two foreign policy initiatives, the communitarian Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) and the intergovernmental Euro-Arab Dialogue. Together with the Lomé Convention and the CSCE, they signalled the adaptation of the Community to British membership and the Nine's attempt to sculpt an external profile and shape a new West-South relationship: this was, after all, the period when the Third World emerged with an inevitable redistribution of international power. Both the GMP and the Euro-Arab Dialogue, however, were intergovernmental in their genesis and logic.

The GMP was spelt out as a comprehensive, developmental approach to the region, including both the European and the Southern shores of the Mediterranean. It was agreed that a policy including preferential trade, financial aid and technical and cultural cooperation, would counter US criticism of the Community's preferential agreements and allay fears about EEC regional initiative motivated by oil. However, the "Global Mediterranean Policy" had other motives: namely, a double French reaction against the EPC's involvement in Mediterranean security discussions, demanded by Italy, and against a global EEC development policy, supported by Germany, the Netherlands and Britain. The result of this choice was that the EC broadened its reach; but it also demonstrated that a political role in the region was too difficult to agree upon. Predictably enough, the GMP remained entangled in preexisting bonds of members and was restrained by Britain's determined opposition. Between 1975 and 1978, the GMP succeeded in linking to the EC eight countries of the North African and Near Eastern area, while the return of democracy in Greece and Spain opened the path to their accession to the Community. A North-South political divide began to take shape in the Mediterranean.

The Euro-Arab Dialogue, initiated after the "oil shock" following the Yom Kippur War and convened in 1975-1979, saw a third potential actor in the developmental relations between the EC and the Southern shore of the Mediterranean, namely the Arab oil producing countries. This reflected the change in perceptions and perspectives in a crisis-ridden Europe, and the willingness of the Nine to establish structured bonds with the countries that enjoyed not only energy resources but also capitals, and markets for European products. European producers hoped that oil wealth would finance industrialisation, infrastructure building and modernisation, both in oil-producing countries and among their non-producing cousins in the Mediterranean and in Africa, and that structured Euro-Arab relations might steer the process to the advantage of the European economy.

General narratives of European integration, however, pay little attention to these disappointing low-key regional enterprises and, rather, look at the systemic and "high politics" impact of European Mediterranean-Middle Eastern policies. The clash with the United States in connection with the Yom Kippur War, and the ensuing internecine quarrels: undermined European Political Cooperation; frustrated European ambitions for unity and a political role in the Cold War; and demonstrated that there was no

room for EC foreign policy in the bipolar age. This systemic constraint overwhelmed European attempts to define an autonomous regional role.

The negative balance of the Nine's initial attempts in the Mediterranean was apparently confirmed by a stagnation in Euro-Mediterranean relations after the signature of the modest association agreements by eight Mediterranean countries and the interruption of the Euro-Arab Dialogue. The 1980 Venice Declaration and a new declaration on Palestine adopted in 1987 were empty policy statements. The Mediterranean-Middle East disappeared from "the front page" of Community policy for almost fifteen years.

There are a number of explanations for the relegation of the Mediterranean in Community policy for over a decade. The disappointing outcomes of the aforementioned Global Mediterranean Policy and Euro-Arab Dialogue, and the upsetting effect of the Euro-American row had done nothing to create a firm basis for EC initiatives. One might also note that, while in the 1970s a variety of conditions had motivated a regional approach, in the next decade re-fragmentation and volatility in the region discouraged multilateral initiatives. Internal EC dynamics took priority in a period that began under the gloom of Eurosclerosis and ended in the build-up to the Single Market that, once again, rescued the European states from the challenges of globalization. Looking at the international setting, the renewal of East-West tensions in the first half of the 1980s and the extraordinary evolution of the Cold War in the second half of that decade created a fast changing international environment. This environment was not suited to new initiatives in a secondary theatre such as the Mediterranean, whose strategic relevance arguably declined with the East-West conflict.

However, at the Barcelona conference in November 1995, the EU launched a comprehensive set of political, economic, social and cultural measures under the ambitious and inspiring title of "Euro-Mediterranean Partnership" (EMP). Its importance was threefold: it merged the Community and ECSP aims, competences and instruments; it relaunched a regional approach, while it affirmed the interdependence of the EU and the Mediterranean countries and acknowledged them as equal partners; and it had the ambition of giving the EU a visible role in global security through support of the Middle East Peace Process.

Realist interpretations of European integration have stressed that the EMP was designed to counterbalance the opening of the accession process in East-Central Europe. This, of course, shifted the centre of gravity of the Union to the East. The EMP would save the "Club Med" countries from peripheralization. By creating a new institutional and political multilateral framework and offering financial assistance and free trade, the EU was also reacting to its exclusion from the Middle East Peace Process. The civil war in Algeria in 1991 was another local conflict to be contained and defused. In other words, the reasons for the new EU initiative would be short-term and almost opportunistic and they were designed to contain the spread of political instability.

In fact, other arguments suggest that 1980-1995 was a period of important changes, serious challenges and interlocking transformations in the Community and

in the Mediterranean neighbourhood. A study of this period is necessary, then, to understand the aims, features and limits of the new attempt, in 1995, to shape and govern Euro-Mediterranean relations. Dramatic political events and momentous changes in the region – from the Islamic revolution in Iran to civil war in Lebanon, to the spread of terrorist attacks with Libyan and Syrian connections, to continuing Arab-Israeli attrition – affected European security beyond Cold War concerns. The accession of Greece and Spain and Italy's recovery as a stable and dynamic Community member increased the Mediterranean dimension of the EC and meant new actors and a new balance in Community policy. The diversification of Community policies, from the environment to research to the Single Market and EMU increased the external impact of the Community. Also, global and local economic and social phenomena shifted the crux of Euro-Mediterranean relations from oil and hard security to soft security and social and cultural issues. Even before the Maastricht Treaty, the Single European Act, meanwhile, reaffirmed and legitimized Community ambitions to play an international role.

In this special issue of the *Journal of European Integration History* seven articles, presented originally at a conference held at the University of Padua in November 2013, take up the challenge of elucidating this crucial period. They all investigate European approaches to the Mediterranean or Euro-Mediterranean relations from different perspectives and using different methodologies to compute the Euro-Mediterranean equation with its many variables.

A first group of articles deals with the representation of the Mediterranean. Evanthis Hatzivassiliou's article analyzes the evolution of European perceptions of the Mediterranean through NATO's International Staff's reports. The author stresses that, in the mid-1960s, the Mediterranean became, for the first time, a source of concern for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, not least because of Greco-Turkish tensions over Cyprus, Maltese independence and the appearance of Soviet warships in Mediterranean waters. Shortly afterwards, in the late 1960s, the emergence of a Soviet naval squadron in the Mediterranean contributed to NATO's growing interest in the region; despite Islamic opposition to Communism, the Arab-Israeli conflict, memories of Western imperialism and the traditional structure of Arab societies were all expected to facilitate Soviet penetration. Between the early and the late-1970s, the preoccupation with the Soviet naval presence was paralleled by a concern over the repercussions of the Libyan Revolution, tensions in Western Sahara and Lebanon and, last but not least, the economic and political consequences of the Yom Kippur War. The Cold War remained the prism through which NATO viewed the Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean. The North-South cleavage, however, began to be taken into account as well. Moreover, NATO and, more generally, the Western bloc began to lose its own internal cohesion, with the European Community searching for an autonomous role in the region. In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the Iranian Revolution and the subsequent war with Iraq, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the assassination of Anuar Sadat and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon all contributed to a significant redefinition of NATO's perceptions of the Mediterranean. This redefinition, in turn, was important in explaining the subsequent Western approach to the

region. According to the author it was, in fact, in this period that the Mediterranean became of paramount political-military relevance for NATO and that the focus of attention shifted definitively from the Maghreb to the Middle East.This was also the period in which the gulf between the Northern and the Southern shores of the Mediterranean became virtually unbridgeable. More importantly, it was the time that Islamic fundamentalism was, for the first time, perceived as an important political phenomenon albeit only a regional one.

Karin Liebhart's article starts from the same implicit assumption, that is to say the importance of perceptions in international relations, and Euro-Mediterranean relations in particular. While Hatzivassiliou's article is based on NATO reports, Liebhart's contribution focuses on the visual and discursive representations of the Mediterranean in the German weekly newspaper *Die Zeit* and the German weekly news magazine *Der Spiegel* from the mid-1960s to the late 1990s. Liebhart discovers that, during the Cold War, both these high-quality magazines looked at the Mediterranean as a "crisis region". Unsurprisingly, emphasis was put on the Soviet challenge to Western European security, with the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea receiving most coverage. That being said, from the mid-1970s, growing attention was also devoted to Southern European countries, especially Greece, Spain and Portugal. Generally speaking, all were viewed with a mixture of curiosity and suspicion; more than the Southern Mediterranean states, the Northern Mediterranean countries were also perceived as a menace to both the stability and security of Western Europe. In addition, from the mid-1980s, while the Soviet Union continued to be seen as the most dangerous challenge to the West, Islamic fundamentalism began to attract attention. According to Liebhart, the end of the Cold War did not radically change representations of the Mediterranean in the German media. The Mediterranean continued to be seen as part of a security paradigm, with the wars in the Middle East, the Maghreb and Western Balkans in the forefront. Russia, meanwhile, continued to be portrayed as an enemy. Both during and after the Cold War German magazines contributed to the building up of a disquieting image of the Mediterranean: a fragile, highly contaminated, ecosystem.

A second group of articles concerns the political dimension of Euro-Mediterranean relations from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. Sofia Papastamkou's article gives an insight into a relevant issue: the Mediterranean enlargement of the European Community and its implications for European Political Cooperation. In particular, it focuses on the Greek case from the early to the mid-1980s. The victory of the Panhellenik Socialist Movement (PASOK) in the 1981 elections brought the Centre-Left into power for the first time in Greece's post-war history. This event and the consequent appointment of PASOK's charismatic leader, Andreas Papandreou, as Greek Prime Minister made a strong impact on the country's foreign policy. His aim was to place Greece at the centre of three circles: Europe, the Balkans and the Mediterranean. The underlying idea was that the North-South confrontation was eclipsing the West-East conflict and that Greece, together with the European Community as a whole, should assume a new international role. The EC had to become, according to Papandreou, more autonomous from the United States and more sympathetic towards de-

veloping countries. As shown by Greek attitudes towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the relationship with Libya, Papandreou was initially true to his convictions. He in fact staunchly supported the Palestinian Liberation Organization, violently condemned the Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon, and was conciliatory to Gaddafi's regime in Libya. That said, as noted by Papastamkou, the Greek government was barely able to influence the foreign policies of the EC and its members; from the mid-1980s, in addition, the pressure from the United States and, to a certain extent, the European Community and the rising challenge of terrorism contributed to the normalization of Greek foreign policy.

European Political Cooperation is also at the heart of Claudia Castiglioni's article, which analyses the policy pursued by the European Community and its members towards Iran, from the 1979 Islamic Revolution to the Critical Dialogue of 1992. Although Iran is not geographically part of the Mediterranean region, the events that occurred in that country, in the long 1980s, exerted a strong impact on the dynamics of cultural and political change in the Middle East and Northern Africa and on European perceptions of the Mediterranean. Castiglioni sets out the positive political and economic relations between Iran and Western European countries, on the one hand, and between Iran and the European Community, on the other, from the late 1950s to the late 1970s. After that, the author focuses on the consequences of the Islamic Revolution, showing how badly this event affected political and economic relations between Iran and Western Europe. Castiglioni, however, also points out that the EC was able to give a coordinated response, somewhat autonomous from that of the US, on crucial issues, including the hostage crisis and sanctions against Ruhollah Khomeini's regime. Significantly, according to the author, this was due to the "hidden diplomacy" of the Ambassadors of the Nine in Teheran, rather than to the formal procedures of European Political Cooperation. The Iran-Iraq war was, in this respect, even more relevant than the Revolution. Given the conflicting interests that linked Western European countries and the belligerents and the political-economic rivalries that divided Western European countries it became, in fact, impossible for member states to keep a coherent position. As a result, the European Community was hardly able to play a role in the conflict and its members became insignificant. Only after the end of the war and the death of Khomeini in the late 1980s, did the main Western European countries re-establish positive diplomatic and economic relations with Iran, thereby paving the way for the launch of the Critical Dialogue and "normalization" in relations between the European Union and the Islamic Republic.

The prevalence of commercially-driven interests in the relations between the European Community and the Mediterranean Arab countries is emphasized in Massimilano Trentin's article. Trentin shows that oil prices were at the roots of the crisis in Arab countries in the Middle East and North Africa between the early 1980s and the early 1990s. The decrease in oil prices, in particular, reduced the resources at disposal for agro-industrial development programmes, as well as social welfare systems throughout the region; this reduction, in turn, limited any Arab hopes of addressing the challenges of the demographic transition and integration into the world economy. At the same time, the diminution of oil prices in the early 1980s and the

fall of oil prices in the mid-1980s, combined with the failure to manage its implications, exacerbated the economic divergence between the Northern and Southern shores of the Mediterranean. As Trentin argues, the European Community was unable or more accurately unwilling to fill this widening gap. As a matter of fact, all the economic policies adopted by the European Community in the Mediterranean "depended on what policy would guarantee the prominence of the EC in the region at a given period". In the 1970s, when Arab countries enjoyed the advantage of high oil prices, the EC had to hide liberalism behind development cooperation policies. In the 1980s, when Arab countries were weakened by political fragmentation and a decrease in oil prices, the EC did not need to simulate. It promoted a strong form of capitalism in the region which, in turn, increased imbalances between the two shores of the Mediterranean.

A fourth group of articles deals with migration in Euro-Mediterranean relations. Emmanuel Comte's article analyses the role played by the migration factor in relations between the Southern members of the European Community and the third Mediterranean countries from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s. Comte starts with an account of the increase in trans-Mediterranean migration flows in the 1980s. This, according to the author, was due to a combination of growing socio-economic and demographic imbalances between the two shores of the Mediterranean, the active migration policies developed by emigration countries in Northern Africa and the Middle East and armed conflicts in the Western Balkans and the Maghreb. Migration movements from the South, in the author's opinion, were not without costs for the Northern Mediterranean countries. Local unskilled workers saw deterioration in wage levels and working conditions. Governments meanwhile experienced a diminution in tax revenues. Societies generally were also affected. They saw an upsurge in crime and sometimes in violence. As a response to the troublesome interdependence created by increasing migration flows across the Mediterranean, the Southern members of the European Community adopted policies for curtailing immigration from third Mediterranean countries. First, the Southern members supported the Northern members of the EC in their violation of the 1963 agreement on the free movement of workers between the European Community and Turkey. Second, in the context of their accession to the Schengen Agreements, EC countries were pushed into strengthening border controls and imposing visas on all emigration or potential emigration countries from the South. The Mediterranean members of the EC, however, were well aware that mere closure was not enough to eliminate the costs associated with mass immigration from the South. As a consequence, they tried to persuade the Northern members of the EC to complement immigration closure with cooperation to reduce emigration pressure in origin countries. According to Comte, this plan was at the core of the Barcelona Process and the Union for the Mediterranean. At the same time, the Northern European countries' lack of interest in the Mediterranean and their consequent reluctance to provide the EC and later EU Mediterranean policy with considerable financial resources led to the failure of both the Barcelona Process and the Union for the Mediterranean.

Simone Paoli's contribution develops these ideas, by examining a relevant case study. In particular, the article analyses the process leading to Italy's entry into the Schengen agreements, with an emphasis on its implications for Italian-Maghreb relations between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s. Paoli argues that the Schengen agreements were largely motivated by a desire to protect the geopolitical core of Europe from unwanted mass immigration, especially from Southern Mediterranean countries. Accordingly, the Southern members of the European Community, including Italy, were initially excluded from the accords. Before externalizing border controls to transit countries on the geopolitical periphery of the European Community, the Northern members, especially France, wanted to ensure that the Southern flank of the EC was well patrolled. According to the founding members of Schengen, effective border controls implied restrictive immigration policies and the imposition of visas on all emigration or potential emigration countries from the South, including the Maghreb. These requests, however, were long considered as unacceptable by both the government and the Parliament in Rome. In their view, in fact, they jeopardized Italy's relationship with the Maghreb countries in a period in which such a relationship was regarded as vital for the political and economic interests of the country. In place of Schengen rules, the Italian authorities proposed a liberal immigration policy for the EC; this was functional to both the requirements of the Italian economic system and the Mediterranean ambitions of the Italian government. A reversal occurred only in the late 1980s at the conclusion of a dramatic national debate, which was significantly affected by foreign policy considerations. The Italian Parliament enacted a law which introduced, for the first time, restrictive measures against illegal immigration and the commitment to impose visas for those coming from Turkey, the Maghreb and sub-Saharan African countries. Shortly afterwards, a representative from the Italian government signed the Schengen agreements. The desire to enter the Schengen agreements took priority over the ambition to cultivate a special relationship with Maghreb countries. At the same time, at the European level, the aim of defending borders against immigration from the South mattered more than the idea of a multilateral, negotiated, approach to migration in the Mediterranean region; this was to have, naturally enough, consequences for Euro-Mediterranean relations.

The Cold War as a Frontier: The Mediterranean Cleavages and the View from NATO, 1967-1982

Evanthis HATZIVASSILIOU

Mediterranean Legacies and the Cold War

The "unity of the Mediterranean" has been one of the historiographical equivalents to the quest for the Holy Grail. Scholars have pointed to a division of the basin following the rise of Islam in the 7th century AD; others have tried to reconstruct a narrative for the whole region or even to point to elements of its essential unity.[1] Still, since the mid-19th century a further cleavage emerged between the Northern and the Southern littorals, which the Cold War deepened and formalized. As has been perceptively stressed, "the convergence of Mediterranean history with the global dynamics of the Cold War inspires the consideration of the *longue durée*".[2]

Late modernity brought about a novel division of the Mediterranean. The first stages of this process involved the impact of nationalism and the industrial revolution. The nation-state – Spain and France – had already become a model of efficiency in parts of the Northern littoral, and now proliferated in Italy, Greece and Turkey. However, the nationalist experience was not an instant or a simultaneous phenomenon in 19th and early 20th century Mediterranean: the peoples of the Northern coast were in the vanguard of this historical process, while the Southern littoral faced the interdictions of the European powers, and the imposition of colonial or quasi-colonial rule.[3] The nationalism of the South coast peaked much later, in the post-1945 period. But by then, the Northern coast had moved on, and had engaged in supranational ventures.

At the same time, the Northern states were rapidly industrializing, or at least (in the case of the Balkan countries) hoped to do so. This caused a further dramatic shift in the correlation of forces, facilitated the imposition of colonial rule in the Southern

1. See, among others, F. BRAUDEL, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* [translated by Sian Reynolds], University of California Press, Berkeley, Calif., 1995; E. MONROE, *The Mediterranean in Politics*, Oxford University Press, London, 1938; J.J. NORWICH, *The Middle Sea. A History of the Mediterranean*, Vintage books, London, 2007; D. ABULAFIA, *The Great Sea. A Human History of the Mediterranean*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011.
2. E. DI NOLFO, *The Cold War and the Transformation of the Mediterranean, 1960-1975*, in: M.P. LEFFLER, O.A. WESTAD (eds), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, vol.II, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, pp.238-257.
3. See, among others, R. HOLLAND, *Blue Water Empire. The British in the Mediterranean since 1800*, Allen Lane, London, 2012; H. LAURENS, *Orientales II. La IIIe République et l'Islam*, CNRS, Paris, 2004.

coast, and widened the division between an "advanced" Northern and an "underdeveloped" Southern coast. The French strategy of the *tache d'huile*, tested mostly in Morocco by Hubert Lyautey, presupposed a huge technological and economic preponderance, as well as a perceived intellectual supremacy over the colonial peoples.[4] The collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War allowed the French and the British to extend their control to additional parts of the Eastern Mediterranean, and in the interior of what now became the "Middle East". The peoples of the Northern coast were combatants in the Second World War; but those of the Southern shores (where major military operations also took place) remained innocent by-standers, with the partial exception of the participation of colonial troops in the fighting. The North was an actor; the South, to a large extent, a passive receiver.

The North-South cleavage was therefore already there, but the Cold War came to complete, magnify, and even formalize it.[5] The countries of the Northern littoral (with the exception of Yugoslavia) were integrated in Cold War institutions, namely the Western alliance. For them, the Cold War and their membership of the West signalled a continuation of their efforts to achieve modernization.[6] The countries of the Southern littoral, even after their independence (painfully gained in some cases, notably Algeria), became parts of the Third World. For them, the concepts of anti-colonialism, decolonization and non-alignment, or of the North-South dialogue, were means to dispute what they perceived as grave injustices in their position. Two Mediterranean countries, Egypt and Yugoslavia, became leading members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), whereas the whole of the Southern coast joined the NAM in one form or another. Moreover, by the late 1960s decolonization created a vacuum of power in the Mediterranean, which the Soviets sought to exploit. Thus, some of the major divisions of the post-war world – the one involving policy in the Cold War, and the one between the "developed" and the "less developed" – now crossed the Mediterranean horizontally.

This article will discuss the test case of NATO's conceptualizations of the region until the 1982 Lebanon War. Since the early 1950s, the alliance's International Staff provided analysis papers to the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The NATO reports aimed to reflect a transatlantic consensus, and thus were the products both of analysis

4. E. BERENSON, *Heroes of Empire. Five Charismatic Men and the Conquest of Africa*, University of California Press, Berkeley, Calif., 2011, pp.228-262.
5. See E.G.H. PEDALIU, *Fault Lines in the Post-War Mediterranean and the Birth of "Southern Europe", 1945-1979. An Overview*, in: E. CALANDRI, D. CAVIGLIA, A. VARSORI (eds), *Détente in Cold War Europe: Politics and Diplomacy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East*, I.B. Tauris, London, 2012, pp.15-31; L.S. KAPLAN, R.W. CLAWSON, *NATO and the Mediterranean Powers in Historical Perspective*, in: L.S. KAPLAN, R.W. CLAWSON, R. LURAGHI (eds), *NATO and the Mediterranean*, Scholarly Resources, Wilmington, Del, 1984, pp.3-17.
6. E.G.H. PEDALIU, *"A Sea of Confusion". The Mediterranean and Détente, 1969-1974*, in: *Diplomatic History*, 33(2009), pp.735-750; E. HATZIVASSILIOU, *Shallow Waves and Deeper Currents. The US Experience of Greece, 1947-1961. Policies, Historicity, and the Cultural Dimension*, in: *Diplomatic History*, 38(2014), pp.83-110.

but also of negotiation, incorporating national as well as international perspectives.[7] This article will focus on the politico-economic assessments about the Mediterranean by the International Staff, rather than on the documents of the Military Committee, which dealt in more detail with the defence challenges.[8] It will be argued that the NATO reports focused on the "prime" international conflict of that period, the Cold War, while important regional developments falling outside the Cold War context were not always fully appreciated or evaluated. This Cold War "lens" tended to distort the West's perceptions of the global South in general and of the Mediterranean in particular.[9]

The study of the NATO reports also points to the complementary character of NATO and European Community (EC) processes in the 1970s. Contemporary literature has shown that, by that time, the EC increasingly took into account the evolving Cold War, although its initiatives concerned mostly trade, economic relations and the stabilizing impact of its Southern enlargement.[10] Indeed, the EC-Mediterranean processes of the 1970s were shaped, even partially, by the demands of the Cold War and the need to keep in pace with the US.[11] The partial overlap between EC and NATO membership meant that, ideally, a division of labour should be established, between NATO's strategic orientation and the EC's economic focus. Admittedly, this proved a difficult arrangement in practice, and the search for a new balance proved troubled and long. Still, while assessing European processes and conceptualizations of the 1970s, it is useful to take into account deliberations in NATO.

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7. E. HATZIVASSILIOU, *NATO and Western Perceptions of the Soviet Bloc. Alliance Analysis and Reporting, 1951-69*, Routledge, London, 2014.
8. On the military reports, see D. CHOURCHOULIS, *NATO Assessments of Soviet Military and Naval Presence in Eastern Mediterranean, North Africa and the Middle East, 1964-1970*, paper presented at the Twenty-fifth annual conference of the British International History Group (BIHG), Bristol, 5-7 September 2013.
9. See mostly, O.A. WESTAD, *The Global Cold War*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007. The notion of the "Cold War lens" emerged in a study which dealt with a Mediterranean country, Algeria: M. CONNELLY, *Taking Off the Cold War Lens. Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War of Independence*, in: *American Historical Review*, 105(2000), pp.739-769.
10. N.P. LUDLOW, *An insulated Community? The Community institutions and the Cold War, 1965 to 1970*, in: N.P. LUDLOW (ed.), *European Integration and the Cold War. Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, 1965-1973*, Routledge, London, 2007, pp.137-151; S. PONS, F. ROMERO, *Europe between the Superpowers, 1968-1981*, in: A. VARSORI, G. MIGANI (eds), *Europe in the International Arena during the 1970s. Entering a Different World*, Peter Lang, Brussels, 2011, pp.85-97; A. ROMANO, *Untying Cold War Knots. The EEC and Eastern Europe in the Long 1970s*, in: *Cold War History*, 14(2014), pp.153-173; E. KARAMOUZI, *Greece, the EEC and the Cold War 19741979. The Second Enlargement*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2014.
11. E. CALANDRI, *The United States, the EEC and the Mediterranean: Rivalry or Complementarity?*, in: E. CALANDRI, D. CAVIGLIA, A. VARSORI (eds), op.cit., pp.33-48.

The Beginning of NATO Analysis on the Mediterranean, 1967-73

In 1945-52, the Americans managed to block a Soviet exit to the Mediterranean basin, and the accession of Greece and Turkey to NATO completed the Western defensive perimeter in the region.[12] However, NATO's Southern Flank could be outflanked. The Arabs did not feel threatened by Soviet policy (on the contrary, Moscow promised aid "without strings"), and thus they were not interested in Western offers of an anti-Soviet alliance; the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt in 1956 alienated them further.[13] The 1957 Eisenhower doctrine promised the Arabs support against Soviet infiltration; but as Greece and Italy noted, the Americans were offering something which did not interest the recipient states, especially Egypt.[14] After 1959, the US reached a more workable relationship with Gamal Abdel Nasser, accepting (to some extent) his non-alignment.[15] However, Soviet gains had been made in Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad.

The Western alliance was present in the basin; apart from its coastal member-states, in 1949 Algeria had been explicitly included in the guarantee of Article Five, and a NATO Mediterranean Command was set up in the early 1950s.[16] The US Sixth Fleet, although technically not a NATO force, ensured Western air and naval predominance. During the Cold War,

> "the Mediterranean basin constituted a vast communications zone which provided strategic depth to local NATO-assigned forces through the existence of an extensive network of bases and other facilities".[17]

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12. M.P. LEFFLER, *Strategy, Diplomacy and the Cold War. The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952*, in: *Journal of American History*, 71(1985), pp.807-825; E. ATHANASSOPOULOU, *Turkey. Anglo-American Security Interests, 1945-1952. The First Enlargement of NATO*, Frank Cass, London, 1999; E. CALANDRI, *Il Mediterraneo e la difesa dell' Occidente, 1947-1956. Eredità imperiali e logiche di guerra fredda*, Manent, Firenze, 1997. See also S. PAPASTAMKOU, *Les États-Unis, la Grande-Bretagne et la France face à l'adhésion de la Turquie et la Grèce à l'OTAN. Divergences et compromis entre alliés atlantiques*; A. VARSORI, *Italy's Reaction to Turkey's and Greece's Application to the Atlantic Pact*, in: G.-H. SOUTOU (ed.), *L'Europe et l'OTAN face aux défis des élargissements de 1952 et 1954*, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2005, pp.45-56 and 57-70 respectively.
13. P.L. HAHN, *Containment and Egyptian Nationalism. The Unsuccessful Effort to Establish the Middle East Command, 1950-1953*, in: *Diplomatic History*, 11(1987), pp.23-40; E. CALANDRI, *Il Mediterraneo ...*, op.cit., pp.220-289; S. PAPASTAMKOU, *La France au Proche-Orient, 1950-1958. Un intrus ou une puissance exclue?*, Ph.D. Thesis, Université de Paris 1, 2007.
14. H.W. BRANDS, *The Specter of Neutralism. The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947-1960*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1989, pp.282-289; E. HATZIVASSILIOU, *Greece and the Arabs, 1956-1958*, in: *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies*, 16(1992), pp. 49-82.
15. H.W. BRANDS, op.cit., pp.296-303; R.B. RAKOVE, *Kennedy, Johnson and the Nonaligned World*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013.
16. J.W. YOUNG, *Britain France and the Unity of Europe, 1945-1951*, Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1984, pp.103-104; D. CHOURCHOULIS, *High Hopes, Bold Aims, Limited Results. Britain and the Establishment of the NATO Mediterranean Command, 1950-1953*, in: *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 20(2009), pp.434-452.
17. D. CHOURCHOULIS, *NATO Assessments ...*, op.cit.

However, what counted for Cold War NATO was its "treaty area". The territorial waters of the member-states were part of the area, but the Southern coast was not. Cyprus was expressly exempted from the NATO area in 1951, shortly before the entry of Greece and Turkey.[18] Moreover, NATO always feared that the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East might start a crisis which could affect the treaty area, if only because Turkey might be drawn in a regional conflict triggering the guarantee of Article Five. Thus, this was a qualitatively different case, compared to other "out-of-area" regions.[19]

In 1957-68, the NATO reports on the Middle East and on Africa carefully avoided touching upon the Southern Mediterranean coast, with the exception of Egypt. This was for many reasons: any mention of the Algerian War could spark internal disagreements (over France's conduct), which NATO always wanted to avoid. But, mostly, the alliance's expert working groups were primarily interested in the Cold War in the regions they studied; and the Soviets were not yet permanently established in the Mediterranean. NATO started dealing with specific Mediterranean issues in 1964, because of the new Greek-Turkish crisis over Cyprus, the need for adjustments of its Mediterranean Command after Maltese independence, but also as the sporadic appearance of Soviet warships started. The Southern Mediterranean became a subject of special reports in 1968, only after the emergence of a Soviet naval squadron in the region.[20] A Soviet military threat needed to emerge, for the region to come into NATO's "radar".

By the late 1960s the Mediterranean basin, with its peculiar role in NATO geography and its particular tensions, raised important problems of strategy. As the British noted in 1968, the alliance had decided to adopt flexible response, but this was best applied in the Central Region; it probably was not suitable for the "fragmented situation of the Mediterranean".[21] The NATO Secretary-General, the Italian Manlio Brosio, had to balance the various pressures on the alliance structure, including the reorganization of alliance processes following the French withdrawal from the military command; at the same time, he was sceptical about détente, which also made him deeply concerned about Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean. The prospect of détente should not allow the Soviets to outflank NATO: in 1971 the Italian Permanent Representative, Felice Catalano Melilli noted that the area was an indicator of Soviet intentions.[22] In public analyses of the early 1970s, it was stressed that it was

18. TNA [The National Archives, London] FO 371/137827/1, Hood (FO) to Ewbank (Cabinet Office), 16.11.1951.
19. D. CHOURCHOULIS, *The Southern Flank of NATO, 1951-1959: Military Strategy or Political Stabilisation*, Lexington Books, Lanham, MD, 2014.
20. E. HATZIVASSILIOU, *Out-of-Area. NATO Perceptions of the Third World, 1957-1967*, in: *Cold War History*, 13(2013), pp.67-88.
21. TNA/FCO 41/253, Minute (Barnes), 24.05.1968.
22. See B. BAGNATO, *NATO in the mid-1960s. The View of Secretary-General Manlio Brosio*, in: C. NUENLIST, A. LOCHER (eds), *Transatlantic Relations at Stake. Aspects of NATO, 1956-1972*, Center for Security Studies, Zurich, 2006, pp.165-187. See also NATO [NATO Archives, International Staff, Brussels] CR(71)29, 07.06.1971.

"difficult to discover NATO's role in the Mediterranean": the alliance had not really succeeded in providing for security in the region.[23]

These pressures sparked a new NATO interest in the region. American rethinking about the area "from the Maghreb through the Middle East to the Horn of Africa" had started before the Six Day War, but now received new impetus. In September 1967, the US Permanent Representative to NATO, Harlan Cleveland, suggested that the alliance monitor Soviet penetration of the Mediterranean, especially the Soviet naval presence.[24] This view gained ground in NATO. After the Six Day War, Italy tried to approach the Arabs, and was severely concerned at Soviet penetration of the Mediterranean.[25] Thus, the Italians accepted the idea, also calling for care in order to avoid alienating the Arabs.[26] France's attitude was crucial: Paris had a strong interest in the Mediterranean; the country had clashed with the Americans and had withdrawn its forces from the NATO military command, but Cleveland's suggestion involved political consultation, in which France fully participated.[27] Last but not least, in 1968-69, following NATO reorganization according to the Harmel Report, a new balance was formed in French-NATO relations, which allowed Paris fully to participate in the discussions on the Mediterranean.[28] Still, the Canadians and the Scandinavians were against commitments outside the area, while care should be shown to avoid the impression that NATO was trying to buttress the position of the Greek dictatorship.[29] In February 1968, Brosio submitted a first document on "The Threat to NATO in the Mediterranean Area", pointing to the Soviet military presence:

> "While the ground forces threat has remained fairly constant in numbers, though improved in quality, the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean has greatly increased in each of the four last years […] the Soviet Mediterranean force has a significance out of proportion to its comparative strength. It is the only constantly deployed Soviet fleet in the NATO area and, of course, contains no ships under repair or refit. It is 100% operational and is

23. S. SILVESTRI, *NATO and the Mediterranean Situation*, in: F.A.M. ALTING v. GEUSAU (ed.), *NATO and Security in the Seventies*, Heath Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass, 1971, pp.43-57.
24. TNA/FCO 41/251, Bushell (NATO) to Parsons (FO), 04.09.1967; Burrows (NATO) to FCO, 12.10.1967.
25. D. CAVIGLIA, M. CRICCO, *La diplomazia italiana e gli equilibri Mediterranei. La politica Mediorientale dell' Italia dalla Guerra dei Sei Giorni al conflitto dello Yom Kippur (1967-1973)*, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli Catanzaro, 2006, pp.13-42.
26. TNA/FCO 41/251, Burrows to FO, 07.12.1967 and 15.12.1967.
27. M. VAÏSSE, *La grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle, 1958-1969*, Fayard, Paris, 1998, pp.381-395 and 632-646; F. BOZO, *Two Strategies for Europe. De Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance*, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, MD, 2001, pp.143-213; F. BOZO, *Chronique d'une decision annoncée. Le retrait de l'organisation militaire (1965-1967)*, in: M. VAÏSSE, P. MELANDRI, F. BOZO (eds), *La France et l'OTAN, 1949-1996*, Editions Complexe, Bruxelles, 1996, pp.331-357; J. ELLISON, *The United States, Britain and the Transatlantic Crisis. Rising to the Gaullist Challenge, 1963-1968*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2007; A. LOCHER, *Crisis? What Crisis? NATO, de Gaulle, and the Future of the Alliance, 1963-1966*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2010.
28. F. BOZO, *Two Strategies for Europe …*, op.cit., pp.219-240; M. VAÏSSE, *La grandeur …*, op.cit., pp.407-411.
29. TNA/FCO 41/251, Roberts (Bonn) to FO, 31.10.1967; Minute (Barnes), 01.11.1967.

capable of substantial reinforcement, particularly by submarines. It also has a marked political influence".[30]

As was usual in every new venture of NATO, disagreements on procedure arose: the US preferred the creation of an *ad hoc* group, but the British expected the NATO Political Committee to be responsible for the study. The Political Committee, staffed by members of the NATO delegations of the member-states, was a standing body aiming to facilitate allied consultation. The Anglo-American difference thus involved a dilemma between a lower-level (but more autonomous) expert group, or a NATO committee whose conclusions would be more safely under the control of the national delegations. In March 1968 it was agreed that the North Atlantic Council (the Permanent Representatives themselves), would lead the study.[31] This meant that, although the first drafts would be prepared by experts, consultation over the Mediterranean would take place on a high level, and the resulting documents would be formally agreed between the member-states.

The first report, of May 1968, dealt with Soviet economic activity, noting the underdevelopment of the Southern coast's economies and the population pressures. The region was dependent on Western aid and commerce, but Moscow had managed to use the familiar pattern of "a limited number of projects of great importance in the countries concerned". An expansion of economic relations of the region with the Soviet bloc would not necessarily damage Western interests; indeed, it might offer outlets for these countries' exports. However, the area should not be allowed to become dependent on the Soviet world.[32] The political report noted that the Arab-Israeli dispute, the memories of Western imperialism and the "backward and unstable internal structure of Arab societies in terms of the twentieth century" facilitated Soviet penetration. The Kremlin now gave clear indications that it regarded the Southern coast "as a major target". Still, one of the problems for the Soviets was "the strength of Islamic objections to Communism". The West hoped that religious loyalties in that region could work to its advantage. Soviet military presence did not yet pose a major military threat, but had to be monitored.[33] The June 1968 Reykjavik ministerial NAC instructed the permanent Council and the Defence Planning Committee to continue consultations regarding Soviet penetration of the Mediterranean.[34]

However, the NATO studies were soon upset by the Prague Spring. The Mediterranean was included in NATO's contingency studies following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia: the relevant document concluded that the Soviets were unlikely to incite Middle Eastern countries to war, although concern was again expressed at the Soviet naval presence behind the backs of the NATO forces.[35] The NATO military

30. NATO/PO/68/98, Brosio to Permanent Representatives, 15.02.1968.
31. TNA/FCO 41/252, Burrows to FO, 06.03.1968.
32. NATO/CM(68)15, "Economic Activities of the Communist Countries in the Mediterranean", 14.05.1968.
33. NATO/CM(68)16, "Report on the Situation in the Mediterranean", 17.05.1968.
34. TNA/FCO 41/254, Burrows to FO, 19.06.1968 and 05.07.1968.
35. NATO/CM(69)16, "Further Developments in Eastern Europe. Contingency Studies. Analysis of the Soviet Threat in Europe and the Mediterranean and Its Implications", 26.03.1969.

authorities noted the increasing capabilities of the Soviet squadron, combined with the presence of Soviet advisers and technicians in the Eastern Mediterranean.[36] The entry of a *Moskva*-class helicopter carrier in the basin was seen as important mainly in political and psychological terms. The alliance authorities suspected that Arab airplanes of Soviet origin, shadowing NATO naval forces, were manned by Soviet crews. The 1969 military coup in Libya led to the loss of the Wheelus air base for the West, which was one of the last Western facilities in North Africa.[37] However, the Permanent Representatives cautioned against alarmism.[38]

NATO analysis returned to normalcy by early 1970, when the aftershocks of the Prague Spring had been absorbed. It was thus the time to establish definite procedures to monitor the Mediterranean. This was a challenging experience. In each NATO member, the area was the subject of a variety of Foreign Ministry departments (for example Middle Eastern, North African, or Maghreb departments). This maximized the difficulties of coordination not only among NATO members, but even within individual national establishments.[39] The process involved discussions in the Political Committee, followed by drafting by an *ad hoc* group (in which national officials could participate) under the Belgian Robert Meuwis, from the NATO Division of Political Affairs. The *ad hoc* group would then receive comments by the delegations, and submit the final text to the NAC.[40] The ultimate responsibility would thus rest with the Permanent Representatives.

By the early 1970s, three sets of biannual NATO studies covered the region: reports by two expert working groups on the Maghreb and on the Middle East, and the NAC-led studies on the "situation in the Mediterranean". The latter subject was included in the ministerial NACs, together with East-West relations, under the general title "review of the international situation". Of the three sets, the NAC-approved set of documents was an unusual case. Since these reports were issued by the Council, their status was elevated. In 1977, the Secretary-General, Joseph Luns, drew a distinction between the Mediterranean and the Middle East/Maghreb reports: he said that, unlike the former, the latter represented the opinions of the experts, and were not committing NATO in any way.[41]

The functioning of these NATO working groups must be carefully assessed. Much of the work was being done by members of the national delegations in the NATO Headquarters, although the working groups could also include national officials from the Foreign Ministries of the member-states. Evidently, the national officials, coming

36. D. CHOURCHOULIS, *NATO Assessments* ..., op.cit.
37. NATO/PO/68/524, Brosio to Permanent Representatives, "The General Situation in the Mediterranean Area", 10.10.1968; PO/68/379, Brosio to Permanent Representatives, "The Situation in the Mediterranean – Defence Planning Aspects", 15.07.1968; PO/69/531, Brosio to Permanent Representatives, 06.11.1969.
38. NATO/CR(69)52, 05.12.1969.
39. TNA/FCO 41/648, Davidson (NATO) to Braithwaite (FCO), 08.01.1970.
40. NATO/CM(70)12, "Report on the Situation in the Mediterranean", 17.04.1970; TNA/FCO 41/648, Davidson to Elam, 20.01.1970; FCO 41/649, Burrows to FCO, 29.04.1970 and 07.05.1970.
41. NATO/CR(76)48, 14.01.1977; CR(77)11, 22.04.1977.

from the capitals, were the main experts; the diplomats of the delegations were better informed about NATO procedures rather than about the Mediterranean itself. Interestingly, by 1973-74 the British complained that it was mostly them, the Americans and the French that were sending national experts to the meetings; the other members tended to rely on their NATO delegations.[42] Moreover, since NATO had no intelligence-gathering capability of its own, it had to rely on submissions by the national delegations, mostly provided by the larger states. Thus, the larger members with a prime role in the region – the US, Britain, France and Italy – exerted the main influence in NATO analysis on the Mediterranean.

The NAC's Mediterranean reports focused on Soviet penetration. These documents discussed the whole of the Southern coast, Malta (but said little on Cyprus, since the Greeks and Turks constantly disagreed since the 1963-64 crisis, and no agreed position could emerge), the Arab-Israeli dispute, Yugoslavia, and often mentioned Bulgaria and even Romania. Indeed, during discussions in the NAC, the Greeks and the Turks insisted on the role of Soviet aircraft operating from Bulgaria, and wanted to include the Soviet Black Sea fleet in the estimations.[43] The reports pointed to the presence of 6,000 Soviet military advisers, technicians and instructors in the region, and to the alleged training of about 10,000 Arab military in the Soviet bloc and China. The Soviets were "well entrenched" in the area. It was also noted that the Soviet Black Sea Fleet was stronger than needed to control its area, and was probably destined to provide vessels for transfer to the Mediterranean. In the basin, "the Soviet missile-armed surface vessels and submarines have demonstrated a capability of being deployed within the range of the major units of the Sixth Fleet, particularly its carriers", which meant that the Soviets intended to use this force to prevent nuclear strikes against their territory. Still, it was also stressed that the Soviet leaders carefully avoided adventurism in the region. The need to combat terrorism was raised by the US, although the other delegations toned down the relevant references. The reports always monitored closely Soviet naval and air activity, the operational status of the Soviet naval squadron, Soviet aid and military advisers, Soviet anchorages and port facilities. Regional events, for example the state of the Arab-Israeli dispute, were examined only in relation to the opportunities that they presented to the Kremlin.[44]

The documents on the "situation in the Maghreb" were drafted by an expert working group under the French diplomat Jacques de Latour Dejean, and focused on the countries of the Southern shore, minus Egypt (which was being covered in the Middle Eastern reports). The experts expected the Maghreb countries to resist Soviet penetration, and follow the path to nationalism and to the non-aligned; the West should

42. TNA/FCO 41/1160, Minute (Williams), 08.10.1973, and minute (Brewer), 06.11.1973; TNA/FCO 41/1439, Minute (Williams), 29.04.1974.
43. See NATO/CR(71)25, 22.06.1971, and CR(71)29, 07.06.1971; TNA/FCO 41/650, Porter (NATO) to Elam, 12.11.1970.
44. Reports "The Situation in the Mediterranean", NATO/CM(70)12, 17.04.1970; CM(70)58, 16.11.1970; CM(71)29, 03.05.1971; CM(71)68revised, 11.11.1971; CR(72)53, 21.11.1972; CM(73)117revised, 06.02.1974.

encourage this trend. Soon, the experts detected a Libyan turn towards Egypt and difficulties in the "unity of the Maghreb". Habib Bourguiba was seen as firmly in control in Tunisia (a country described as a "stabilizing factor in the Arab world"), although his succession could hide dangers. Libya's Colonel Muammar Gaddafi had suffered a setback with Nasser's death in 1970, but was seen as reluctant to become a Soviet stooge (indeed, the British expressed concern that he might be replaced by "someone less zealously anti-Communist"). However, by 1973 Gaddafi's support for terrorist activities and his interventions in other Arab countries led the experts to take a more hostile attitude towards him. The rule of Houari Boumedienne in Algeria was seen as a stabilizing element in a country with a pivotal role in the region. The regional states were "among the few developing countries whose economy is relatively sound and has made marked progress". Algeria and Tunisia feared that the CSCE process might focus East-West confrontation in the Mediterranean, and expressed a desire to participate in that process. Contrary to the findings of the Mediterranean NAC reports, this expert group constantly noted that Soviet penetration in the region was not making progress. Indeed, in 1973 the experts even claimed that, with the exception of Libya, the Maghreb was in the Western orbit.[45] Thus, a partial divergence, mostly attributable to their differing terms of reference, was becoming apparent between the two sets of reports. Both examined the region in terms of the evolving Cold War, but the NAC reports focused on Soviet penetration and tended to underscore it, while the more regional perspective of the expert group allowed for a wider, perhaps less alarmist approach.

The 1973 Crisis of Consultation and the New Patterns of Analysis

The NATO analysts totally failed to predict the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The NAC's Mediterranean report of August 1973 stressed:

> "It is difficult to believe that Sadat will embark on a military adventure, it being generally agreed that the operational effectiveness of the Egyptian army sharply deteriorated following the Soviet experts' departure [in 1972]".[46]

Even in early October, the Middle East expert working group suggested that the situation in the Middle East would remain stable, only to be disclaimed immediately afterwards. The British called this a "lamentable experience", but it was not uncom-

45. Reports "The Situation in the Maghreb", NATO/CM(70)21, 11.05.1970; CM(70)45, 19.11.1970; CM(71)29, 03.05.1971; CM(72)22, 21.04.1972; CM(72)52, 19.10.1972; CM(73)44, 26.06.1973. See also TNA/FCO 41/982, Minute (Kay), 20.04.1972; M. CRICCO, *Libya, the United States and the Soviet Union. From the Rise of Qadhafi to Ronald Reagan's Policy of Pressure*, in: M. GUDERZO, B. BAGNATO (eds), *The Globalization of the Cold War. Diplomacy and Local Confrontation, 1975-1985*, Routledge, London, 2010, pp.55-70; N. BADALASSI, *Sea and Détente in Helsinki. The Mediterranean Stake of the CSCE, 1972-1975*, in: E. CALANDRI, D. CAVIGLIA, A. VARSORI (eds), op.cit., pp.61-73.

46. NATO/CM(73)49revised, "Report on the Situation in the Mediterranean", 20.08.1973.

mon in NATO analysis, which had recorded similarly impressive failures in previous years.[47]

A more serious problem arose during the Yom Kippur War, involving transatlantic relations. In the NAC, the Americans asked the Europeans to support US policies in the Middle East, contrary to NATO's practice of not seeking agreed positions on out-of-area crises. Moreover, the unilateral US decision, on 25 October, to upgrade its alert to DEFCON3 affected even the NATO treaty area and angered the Europeans.[48] On their part, the Americans were upset at what they saw as a European failure to support them in the Middle Eastern crisis, and in early 1974 bitterly complained that the EC had not consulted the NATO allies on the initiation of the Euro-Arab dialogue. The Americans and the Secretary-General of NATO, Luns, accused the EC countries for functioning as a bloc within NATO.[49] At the same time, the Pompidou government in France seemed to make a turn to "Gaullist Orthodoxy", and to be more ready to confront the Americans. Thus, as the difficulties of the first oil shock were being felt, the Mediterranean and the Middle East became one of the focal points for the ongoing difficulties of coordination between the US and the EC, which was pursuing institution-building, the development of its Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) after October 1972 and of the Euro-Arab dialogue after 1973.[50]

In view of these difficulties, in 1974 a lively discussion took place in NATO regarding the process of consultation on out-of-area problems. NATO decided not to establish new procedures: the will to consult (which, admittedly, was not always evident) was more important than process. Thus, the issuing of the Atlantic Declaration in mid-1974, focusing on the unity of the alliance, was NATO's main response to these challenges. Moreover, practical solutions were sought. Following a British suggestion, a single set of documents would now cover both the Middle East and the Maghreb in order to avoid overlaps. The unified expert working group was specifically instructed not to examine Soviet penetration in the Mediterranean, which was a subject reserved for the "proper" Mediterranean reports issued by the NAC. The British believed that these two different sets of documents still led to duplication, but

47. TNA/FCO 41/1415, Peck to FCO, 09.01.1974.
48. TNA/FCO 41/1178, Peck to FCO, 16.10.1973 and 26.10.1973; FCO 41/1179, Washington to FCO, 16.11.1973.
49. NATO/CVR(73)74, parts I and II, 10 and 11.12.1973; TNA/FCO 41/1143, Beith to FCO, 10 and 11.12.1973, Peck to FCO, 11.12.1973; FCO 41/1415, Peck to FCO, 08.01.1974; FCO 41/1416, Peck to FCO, 04.03.1974.
50. G. MIGANI, *La politique globale méditerranée de la CEE, 1970-1972*, in: A. VARSORI, G. MIGANI (eds), op.cit., pp.193-210; E. CALANDRI, *Prima della globalizzazione. L' Italia, la cooperazione allo sviluppo e la Guerra fredda, 1955-1995*, CEDAM, Padua, 2013, pp.149-154; E. CALANDRI, *The United States, the EEC and the Mediterranean*, op.cit.; A. SCOTT, *Allies Apart. Heath, Nixon and the Anglo-American Relationship*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2011, pp. 166-195; S. YAQUB, *The Weight of Conquest. Henry Kissinger and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, in: F. LOGEVALL, A. PRESTON (eds), *Nixon in the World. American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp.227-248; G.-H. SOUTOU, *Georges Pompidou and US-European Relations*, in: M. TRACHTENBERG (ed.), *Between Empire and Alliance: America and Europe during the Cold War*, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, 2003, pp.157-200.

proposals to merge them were resisted both from NATO members, such as Turkey, and the NATO officials (Meuwis himself) who stressed that these were "constitutionally" different documents, since the Mediterranean ones had been assigned to the NAC by the Ministers themselves.[51]

Now, the Middle East/Maghreb experts mostly focused on the peace process regarding the Arab-Israeli dispute, noting Anuar Sadat's professed desire for a comprehensive settlement. Sadat's effort to diversify his sources of arms was another positive development. According to this analysis, the resurgence of US prestige thanks to its leadership in the peace process, the relative decline of Soviet influence (Moscow was practically left outside the process), but also the desire of the Arabs themselves to develop their relationship with the EC opened the road for positive developments. Sadat's 1977 trip to Jerusalem and the 1978 Camp David agreements sparked much hope, although the experts also noted the huge problems of the process, especially the Arab sanctions against Egypt in 1979. The oil crisis was another major aspect of the reports, and the experts constantly stressed that the increase of oil prices caused great problems to the Third World countries. From 1975 onwards, the situation in the Lebanon and in the Western Sahara became major subjects as well. The experts noted with satisfaction Gaddafi's isolation (but they also considered that his internal position was strong, since the Libyans were not sufficiently politicized), Boumedienne's resolve and Algeria's stability, Saddam Hussein's distances from the Soviets, and followed the prospects of Bourguiba's succession. Despite their initial hopes, eventually (by 1978-79) the experts grew critical of EC policy, noting it merely tended to respond to Arab overtures, rather than take initiatives.[52]

Soviet penetration of the region was mostly the subject of the NAC Mediterranean reports. These continued to be more alarmist than the reports of the regional expert group. Thus, the NAC documents noted that the "consolidation" of Soviet influence continued. Despite the improvement in US-Egyptian relations and the suspension of Soviet arms deliveries to Egypt in 1974, the analysts cautioned that ties between Moscow and Cairo still existed. It was only in 1978-79, when the Soviets openly opposed Sadat's peace policy, that the analysts appeared satisfied. These documents focused on Soviet naval presence: composition and strength of the Soviet squadron, its port facilities and anchorages. The amphibious component of the Soviet squadron puzzled the experts: it was not strong enough to make an opposed landing, and made little sense militarily. The reports suggested that it probably aimed to justify Soviet participation in the event of peacekeeping activities in the region. The new *Kiev*-class aircraft carriers were another major concern: these were capital ships which could

51. TNA/FCO 41/1160, minute (Williams), 08.10.1973; FCO 41/1439, Staples to McLaren, 16.01.1974, Williams to Roberts, 29.04.1974, Brooke (NATO) to Roberts, 15.05.1974; FCO 41/1440, Minute (Nixon), 11.11.1974.

52. Reports "The Situation in the Middle East and the Maghreb", NATO/CM(74)21, 24.05.1974; CM(74)67, 16.10.1974; CM(75)17, 25.04.1975; CM(75)56, 27.10.1975; CM(76)37, 29.06.1976; CM(76)67, 19.11.1976; CM(77)72, 02.11.1977; CM(78)17, 14.03.1978; CM(78)60, 06.11.1978; CM(79)55, 23.10.1979. See also TNA/FCO 41/1416, Margetson (NATO) to McLaren (FCO), 31.10.1974; FCO 41/1480, Poles to Boyce (FCO), 18.11.1977.

significantly enhance Soviet capabilities and boost Soviet prestige in the region. The 1975-76 reports are not available, but the NAC discussions on them display a strong concern of the NATO authorities. In 1976, Turkey came under criticism in the NAC for allowing the *Kiev* to pass through the Straits: Ankara accepted the Soviets' description of the vessel as an "anti-submarine cruiser", whereas its configuration as an aircraft carrier would allow the Turks to refuse its passage according to the 1936 Convention. The experts monitored the *Kiev*'s short visit to the Mediterranean early in 1978, and were anxious when the *Kiev*, together with her sister ship, the *Minsk*, appeared again in the basin in early 1979.[53]

The 1979 Iranian revolution was a subject of the Middle East/Maghreb reports. The expert working group had often noted in previous years that the Shah was in full control of his country, but in late 1978 started expressing doubts: there was no evidence that the anti-Shah demonstrations were organized from outside (namely, the Soviets), but if the Iranian monarch did not succeed in devolving power, he would open the way "for an opposition which is ill-organized, divided and opposed to Westernization". In March 1979, after the collapse of the Shah's regime, the experts noted that Iran was lost to the Western powers, and repercussions would be severe on oil supplies and prices. Initially, early in 1979, they placed their hopes on the moderate Prime Minister, Mehdi Bazargan, but in October they were disappointed to note the prevalence of Ayatollah Khomeini. More importantly, they stressed that the revival of "Islamic consciousness" was an event of wider significance, and the West needed to gain a better understanding of its dynamics. Islamic revivalism involved disparate phenomena (from a genuine religious revival to the working of disparate causes for protest). In the October 1979 document, there was a separate section entitled "Islam as a political phenomenon", noting a greater confidence in the "indigenous social and cultural structures of Islamic society" in other Muslim countries besides Iran, namely, the prospect of proliferation of the upheaval. However, the experts held that it was difficult to imagine the ascent of an Islamic bloc, as these countries were too divided among themselves politically as well as religiously: Islam would not emerge as a "coordinated and global force". Moreover, Islam was not necessarily against dealings with the West, although it was opposed to Marxism. The Soviets were unable to take advantage of the crisis, and on the contrary appeared to be concerned about its impact on their own Muslim republics.[54]

This analysis should be seen in connection with NATO concepts on another level. In September 1979, NATO's Atlantic Policy Advisory Group (APAG) discussed the development of world balances. APAG was a group of high-level "planners", not

53. Reports "The Situation in the Mediterranean", NATO/CM(74)18final, 09.08.1974; CM(74)79revised, 05.12.1974; CM(77)77, 11.11.1977; CM(78)30, 29.04.1978; CM(79)29final, 23.05.1979; CR(76)36, 13.08.1976. See also TNA/FCO 93/976, Powles (FCO) to Wheeler (NATO), 05.05.1977, and Powell (FCO) to Margetson (NATO), 18.11.1977; FCO 93/1340, Cleghorn (NATO) to Powell, 19.10.1978, Cleghorn to Thompson, 26.10.1978, and Cleghorn to Boyce, 29.11.1978.
54. Reports "The Situation in the Middle East and the Maghreb", NATO/CM(78)60, 06.11.1978; CM(79)11, 15.03.1979; CM(79)55, 23.10.1979. See also the discussions in the NAC: NATO/CR(78)40, 18.12.1978; CR(79)14, 09.05.1979; CR(79)34, 27.12.1979.

merely "experts", and was meant to provide thought-provoking analysis on specific major questions. Its documents were not agreed minutes, but rather the chairman's report on the discussion. Thus, the reports were not binding on governments, and this allowed APAG to be bolder than the other NATO bodies.[55] Meeting in Athens, APAG discussed the "diffusion of power", namely the perceived process of moving from bipolarity to multipolarity. Half of the meeting dealt with the obvious case of China, and the remainder with the Third World. The analysts noted that decolonization had produced not only a "Third" World, but also a fourth and a fifth; the latter included the states which would never become viable, but had "to be kept afloat". The rise of the Third World showed that "nationalism remains one of the great motors of our time". The West needed to learn to cope with the expressions of Third World nationalism. The balance of opinion was that, although the diffusion of power was accompanied by instability and thus presented opportunities to the Soviets, it would eventually benefit the West, which was "philosophically" more ready to welcome the new prospects. Thus, the West should support the revival of the North-South dialogue. At the same time, a process of this magnitude also entailed a challenge for existing international institutions, including the UN:

> "In the future we may see the paradox of states behaving like rapacious corporations and corporations behaving like responsible states […] the relevance of the UN system – although not the basic value of its existence – is increasingly being questioned".[56]

One crisis after another, 1980-82

During the next three years, Afghanistan was invaded, Iran was in chaos, the Iran-Iraq War started, Sadat was assassinated, and Israel invaded Lebanon. In this atmosphere of breath-taking developments, the NATO reports often appeared out of date from the time of their drafting until their discussion in the NAC. Indeed, in 1981-82 the chairmen of the expert groups had to fill such gaps by making oral updates to the Council.[57] The focus of attention now shifted to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, while the Maghreb was being dealt more summarily. By late 1982, the Belgians even suggested transferring the Maghreb to the African reports, but the other delegations disagreed, as the whole of the South Mediterranean coast was of obvious strategic importance for NATO.[58]

The NAC Mediterranean reports were now combined with a new series of documents, monitoring the facilities available to the Soviet Mediterranean squadron. These reports noted that the Soviets aimed to secure access to warm seas, provide for

55. For the creation and early work of APAG, see E. HATZIVASSILIOU, *NATO and Western Perceptions* ..., op.cit., pp.108-111.
56. NATO/CM(79)84, "Diffusion of Power", 21.12.1979.
57. NATO/CR(81)42, 04.01.1982; CR(81)47, 01.12.1981; CR(82)55, 30.11.1982.
58. NATO/CR(82)55, 30.11.1982.

the forward defence of their territories, restrict Western political and military options, and establish their right to participate in a comprehensive Middle Eastern settlement. However, the expulsion of the Soviet Union from Egypt in 1972 had led to the loss of an important airfield for the Soviet air force, and thus the squadron lacked air cover and reconnaissance capabilities. Moreover, the abrogation by Egypt, in 1976, of the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship entailed the loss of maintenance facilities in Alexandria. The Soviets tried to compensate by raising the number of auxiliary ships, but there was a limit to what this could accomplish. Thus, for operational reasons, the number of Soviet diesel-powered submarines in the Mediterranean (the component that NATO feared most) was reduced. The Soviets enjoyed naval facilities in Yugoslavia, Algeria, Tunisia and Syria (Tartus and Latakia), and used various anchorages. The Soviet squadron now had no amphibious capabilities.[59] By 1980, it was the Greeks' turn to arouse adverse reactions, when they provided docking facilities in the Syros shipyard to the Soviet squadron. The Americans wanted to raise this issue, but the British discouraged them with the argument that there was little point "at the prospect of a battle in the ditches over wording in the group's report".[60]

The NAC reports on the Mediterranean noted that the Soviet Union now failed to make new inroads in the Middle East, not least because its invasion of Afghanistan had offended all Arab countries, even the pro-Soviet ones. Sadat offered asylum to the Shah, and by September 1981, at the time when he was cracking down on the opposition, also expelled the Soviet Ambassador. However, the 1980 Treaty of Friendship with Syria, and the agreements with Malta for the repair and refuelling of Soviet merchant vessels (which could also supply the Soviet squadron) were seen as major successes of Moscow. Libya was closely monitored and resented for all aspects of its policy, but Algeria's insistence on neutrality was seen as a pillar of stability in the Western Mediterranean. The Soviet proposals to turn the Mediterranean into a "zone of peace", to denuclearize it and to initiate confidence-building measures in the seas, including the Mediterranean, were considered as harmful for the alliance and were rejected. However, the Foreign Minister of the new Greek socialist government, Ioannis Haralambopoulos, made a rather confused reservation on the latter point, noting that the Alliance should consider this aim in the long term. The experts noted that the 1982 Lebanon War dealt another blow to Soviet prestige, since Moscow failed to give effective support to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).[61] Thus, the NAC's Mediterranean reports continued to focus on the subject which interested NATO most (Soviet penetration and military presence), but failed to assess the dynamic of regional developments at a time of important transitions. They saw regional developments only in relation to the main subject, Soviet penetration.

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59. See the reports "SOVMEDRON Naval Facilities", NATO/CM(80)7, 21.02.1980; CM(80)56, 14.10.1980; CM(81)26, 23.04.1981; CM(81)45, 10.08.1981; CM(82)28, 15.04.1982.
60. TNA/FCO 93/2298, Cleghorn to Smith, 18.04.1980, and Jenner to Bannermann, 13.10.1980.
61. Reports, "The Situation in the Mediterranean", NATO/CM(80)22, 22.05.1980; CM(80)68, 13.11.1980; CM(81)68final, 05.11.1981; CM(82)21final, 13.04.1982; CM(82)81final, 12.11.1982. See also NATO/CR(81)14, 04.05.1981; CR(81)47, 01.12.1981; CVR(82)27, 18.05.1982.

Although also susceptible to the Cold War lens, the reports on the Middle East and the Maghreb dealt more extensively with developments in the regional states. According to these documents, the sources of the major problems could increasingly be found in regional pressures rather than in Cold War developments. The experts now shifted their attention to the Eastern part of the region; on the Maghreb they mostly praised Algerian neutrality and lamented the lack of prospects for peace in the Western Sahara. The documents noted repeatedly that the main problem for the West was the absence of a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Even the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan "underlies the urgent need for a solution to the Arab-Israeli problem" (February 1980). Although the experts stressed that the Soviets had suffered a setback among the Arabs because of the invasion of Afghanistan, a new turn for the worse occurred with the eruption of the Iran-Iraq War in September 1980, which diverted attention from Afghanistan, and again added to the need for a solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus, the experts warmly welcomed the EC's Venice Declaration of June 1980, which signalled its effort to facilitate a settlement of that problem. The Iran-Iraq War posed an insoluble problem. Following the stalemate in the Gulf, the experts closely monitored the situation in the Gulf States, and expressed relief at the fact that there had been no escalation of the conflict. An Iraqi victory was initially considered as more probable, but it could spread Baathism in the Middle East (and would destroy the moderate Abolhassan Bani Sadr in Iran); still, an Iranian victory would allow Tehran to export the revolution. Thus the West hoped for a compromise ("a sufficient balance") between Iran and Iraq, or (implicitly) for a situation where both countries would lose. Soon it was noted with interest that the war made Iraq dependent for its supplies and for its finance on Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrein. The autumn 1981 report was drafted before Sadat's assassination (and thus the chairman of the expert group made an oral update to the NAC), but in the following reports the experts noted the continuity of Egyptian policy.[62] The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon did not come as a surprise (previous reports had pointed to dangers in that area, and Luns had spoken in the NAC about the "explosive situation" there). Once more the experts noted that the war, the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut and the massacres of Palestinian civilians proved "the insusceptibility of the Palestinian problem to solution by force". They stressed, very perceptively, that the Israelis had succeeded in eliminating the PLO as an immediate military threat, but had failed to destroy it as a political force.[63]

The Iranian parts of these reports are particularly valuable, as they allow the researcher to study NATO's perceptions of an ongoing revolution, and indeed one not directly connected with the main Cold War conflict between capitalism and communism. The analysts noted that there was no effective moderate opposition to the Khomeini regime. Still, the country was in chaos, faced huge economic problems,

62. Reports "The Situation in the Middle East and the Maghreb", NATO/CM(80)6, 22.02.1980; CM(80)54, 10.10.1980; CM(81)3, 20.02.1981; CR(80)11, 04.04.1980; CR(81)42, 04.01.1982; CR(82)19, 14.05.1982.
63. NATO/CM(82)68, "The Situation in the Middle East and the Maghreb", 12.10.1982; CR(82)19, 14.05.1982.

and was torn by conflict between extremist groups: "it was unclear to what extent even he [Ruhollah Khomeini] could control events". The release of the American Embassy hostages did not change the situation.[64] In October 1981, the expert group made another notable effort to put forward a comprehensive assessment of the Iranian revolution. The "post-revolutionary chaos" was getting worse and extremists were eliminating their moderate rivals, but support for the revolution from the urban population was still strong. The Islamic Republican Party was now the main tool of the revolution, and Tudeh, the Communist party, was side-lined. There was no prospect of change while Khomeini was alive (in the next report it was noted that even after Khomeini's death no radical change was expected). The Soviets were glad to see the West losing Iran, and probably hoped to influence Tehran's anti-Western policy (in a subsequent report the experts appeared afraid of a Soviet-Iranian anti-Western entente, but this was obviously an exaggeration). More importantly, the analysts noted that Islamic fundamentalism spread in various communities over the Middle East and the Maghreb. These communities disagreed over the use of violence, but posed a threat to regional regimes,

> "owing to the attractiveness of fundamentalist ideas for the Moslem populations, particularly young people, to say nothing of the possible role of mosques as rallying points and propaganda centres and, on the other, because these movements provide a natural centre of resistance for all disaffected elements and opponents of the regimes, whether their initial motives are claimed to be economic or political".

The experts went out of their way to stress that the West should not overreact to these developments. The Western powers still had means to influence events, such as the traditional distrust of the Muslim world for Marxism, or trade.[65] However, it is telling that when this report was discussed in the NAC, the Permanent Representatives focused on Sadat's assassination (which had occurred after the drafting of the report and did not appear in it).[66] Major political events always proved more pressing than medium-term analysis.

The 1979-82 documents, especially the assessments about the Islamic revival, are extremely interesting. The NATO studies involved the role of the region in the context of the Cold War. The experts perceptively pointed to some salient trends of the Muslim world, but tried to detect the repercussions of the Iranian revolution on a traditional level of blocs and high politics. They saw that the international system would be challenged, but could not imagine the extent and ferocity of the phenomenon. They made no reference to anti-systemic, "asymmetrical" threats by non-state actors, although we now know that this was the era when these tendencies started asserting themselves. This is also evident in the NAC discussion of the 1979 APAG report on the diffusion of power. The discussion, predictably, focused on China and the Soviet

64. Reports "The Situation in the Middle East and the Maghreb", NATO/CM(80)6, 22.02.1980; CM(81)3, 20.02.1981.
65. NATO/CM(81)59, "The Situation in the Middle East and the Maghreb", 20.10.1981. See also the similar report CM(82)9, 04.03.1982.
66. NATO/CR(81)42, 04.01.1982.

invasion of Afghanistan, while the Third World aspects were largely ignored. The French representative, Claude Arnaud, said that the second part of the paper, dealing with the Third World, "was more academic in nature and as a general principle, it might be better if APAG were to avoid consideration of excessively broad fields".[67] Even in 1981-82, the NATO experts continued to interpret the rise of Islamic fundamentalism as a regional event, which could threaten the Middle Eastern or North African regimes, and not as a phenomenon with global repercussions. In other words, the traditional "states system" approach, and the Cold War lens continued to dominate perceptions. But perhaps it was too early to expect anything else. A terrorism of unforeseen proportions – first witnessed in the bombing of the US Embassy in Mediterranean Beirut in 1983 – shocked the more systemic international actors. Later on, such tactics would acquire even more extreme forms. The Mediterranean was a breeding ground for these emerging cleavages, and was now becoming dangerous.

Conclusions

By their terms of reference, established by the NAC, the NATO experts had to focus primarily on Cold War pressures rather than on the actual situation in the Southern Mediterranean coast. Thus, their analysis left much to be desired. Still, it was an interesting process through which the West tried to understand developments south of the 'area'. The impact of these reports raises another interesting question. The documents were being submitted to the ministerial NACs, but it was clear that the Ministers had little time to discuss them. However, these documents proved extremely helpful on other levels. First, they were useful to the smaller NATO members, who lacked the intelligence resources to form a comprehensive picture of Mediterranean developments. Secondly, the officials of the member-states welcomed this lower-level consultation process, which was instrumental in allowing for a convergence of national views, and provided for early warning about possible disagreements.[68] Moreover, as the British noted for one of the meetings in 1975: "As is often the way, the corridor discussions were more instructive than those in the Group itself".[69] In the complex process of adjusting Western attitudes in the uncertain 1970s, this regular contact of officials was crucial.

Discussing the Cold War lens, however, is a complicated affair. Although we can point to the problems of European/Western policies of the 1970s and 1980s, we must not allow hindsight to cloud our understanding of the factors which motivated them. Unlike us, who "now know", the Western statesmen of that time did not, and they naturally saw the Cold War as their major challenge. It is also important to take into

67. NATO/CR(80)4, 29.02.1980.
68. For more on the role of NATO reports, see E. HATZIVASSILIOU, *NATO and Western Perceptions* ..., op.cit., pp.200-203.
69. TNA/FCO 41/1656, Minute (Wheeler), 17.10.1975.

account the internal difficulties of the West, including intra-European competition in the Mediterranean, by states which aspired to an elevated status within the West.[70] This was a period of breath-taking transitions, and the Western powers, engaged in ground-breaking forms of integration (and in a difficult political and security venture in NATO), needed to find their own pace before undertaking regional initiatives.

By the late 1970s and early 1980s, matters became even more complicated. The Soviet naval presence was a major challenge which complemented the Soviet political ties in the region. NATO's attempts to address the many opportunities and challenges in the Mediterranean were hindered (and even, at times, defeated) by the region's tremendous size, varied topography, cultural complexity and diversity, and by the sharp disagreements among NATO members, including the evolving transatlantic differences of a transitional era. The triumph of South European democracy was promising: the EC played a major stabilizing role through the negotiations for the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal; Greece's and Portugal's place within NATO was eventually secured, and Spain joined the alliance in 1982. However, the stabilization of these Southern European countries within Western institutions again widened the cleavage between the Northern and the Southern littorals. The oil shocks destroyed the feeble economies of many Third World countries, and led to a collapse of the hopes that its emergence had sparked since the Bandung conference. The Iranian revolution testified to the emergence of completely novel forces in the Third World, which resented an intensifying Western cultural interdiction, and believed that the international system was unable to accommodate their anxieties. This pointed to a new tendency in world affairs. The concepts of the Third World and the NAM were meant to allow the global South to work from within the international system in order to achieve its aims. Their failure, which was becoming evident in the 1980s, drove some forces in the Third World to opt to work from outside the system. Although the magnitude of the more unpleasant surprises could not be fully predicted in the early 1980s, it was clear that the Mediterranean cleavage needed to be healed in some way.

Thus, the end of the Cold War opened the road for the novel experiment of the EU-Mediterranean venture (but also for the NATO Mediterranean dialogue, initiated in 1994). The EU needed to show to the Southern Mediterranean peoples that they could still work from within the system. However, there were two problems regarding this initiative. First, the Mediterranean cleavage was not a creation of the Cold War: it had deeper historical roots. As a result, its healing would not necessarily become easier because of the fall of the Wall. The EU-Mediterranean venture needed to redress social trends which were going back many years – perhaps centuries – and had specific, regional causes, not necessarily affected by the end of the Cold War. Second, the model for the EU's intervention was the successful CSCE precedent, which was (again) a Cold War experience and institution, not necessarily applicable in the particular social circumstances of late-20th century Mediterranean. Yet, this was the time

70. A. BROGI, *"Competing Missions". France, Italy, and the Rise of American Hegemony in the Mediterranean*, in: *Diplomatic History*, 30(2006), pp.741-770.

when the EU, struggling through its own evolution and economic challenges, could act. And in the end of the day, the CSCE model was the only available procedure of its time. The EU needed to find its way through the process as it went along. This is a usual phenomenon in ground-breaking initiatives.

Images of the Mediterranean in Late 20th Century German Quality Press

Karin LIEBHART

The article focuses on the analysis of the media coverage of the Mediterranean region in the late 20th century. German print media have been chosen as examples due to Germany's role as a founding member of the European Economic Community, and core state of the successor organizations European Community and European Union. Discursive and visual representations of the Mediterranean in the quality weekly *Die Zeit* and the quality magazine *Der Spiegel* are analysed, while main emphasis is put on supra-national and geo-political references. Discursive patterns, textual and visual metaphors as well as selected images are examined using a range of qualitative methods as analytical tools. This contribution attempts to throw somewhat light on the symbolic level of politics, which provides a frame for the perception of political issues and decision making processes.

EEC/EC – Mediterranean relations in the late 20th century: a brief history

As early as in 1969, almost four decades before the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was launched at the 2008 EU summit in Paris, preferential accords were signed between the European Economic Community and the Maghreb countries Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia.[1] Three years later the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP, 1972–1992) was established, which concentrated on bilateral trade and co-operation agreements with third countries from the Mediterranean region (TMCs). These agree-

1. The UfM is the continuation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Euro-Med, cf. F. ATTINA, *The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Assessed: The Realist and Liberal Views*, in: *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 2(2003), pp.181-200). The UfM is also known as the Barcelona Process and refers to the 1995 approval of the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade zone. It provides a multifaceted framework for relations between the European Union and the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries. The UfM comprises 28 EU members and 15 Mediterranean partner countries from Southeast Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. It is aimed at creating and maintaining stability, peace, security, economic prosperity, environmental protection, and improving infrastructure, on the one hand, supporting democracy, civil society, human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as intercultural dialog and regional co-operation, on the other. As the Southern counterpart of the Eastern Partnership, the UfM works in parallel to the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). Cf. European Commission, Wider Europe – neighbourhood: a new framework for relations with our eastern and southern neighbours, COM (2003) 104 final, 11.03.2003. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf (January 2015); European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper, Brussels, 12.05.2004; European Commission, A new response to a changing Neighbourhood, Brussel, 2011. See http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com_11_303_en.pdf; http://ufmsecretariat.org/history and http://www.medea.be/en/themes/euro-mediterranean-cooperation/euro-mediterranean-cooperation-historical/ (January 2015).

ments comprised primarily commercial co-operation (in terms of preferential tariffs for certain agricultural products as well as exemptions from custom duties for some industrial products), financial support for the TMCs, and social co-operation in order to advance living standards and social rights of immigrant workers from North Africa and Turkey. Libya and Albania were not included in the co-operations, due to political concerns. Agreements with Greece, Turkey, Malta and Cyprus (all of them were considered potential candidates for future membership) also involved plans for a customs union. GMP agreements with the Eastern Mediterranean countries were soon to follow (Israel 1975, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia 1976, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria 1977).[2] The innovative potential of the GMP was its regional approach and the focus on already existing linkages between the Mediterranean countries. While "approaching the Mediterranean as a *de facto* region or a region-to-be" the EEC created the Mediterranean as a political region.[3] At least the economic impact was remarkable: within 15 years (from 1979 to 1994) the overall share of total Mediterranean exports of manufactured products doubled from 28% to 56%.[4]

Propelled by the entry of the Southern European countries Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986) into the European Economic Community, the first half of the 1980s saw the intensification of the EEC-TMC co-operation.[5] The three countries that became EEC members in the run of the Southern or Mediterranean enlargement challenged the EEC due to both, political as well as economic features. Firstly, the three countries were new democracies at that time; all of them shared a dictatorial past, which had only very recently been overcome. The political systems of Greece, Spain and Portugal had emerged from dictatorship and faced the need to consolidate their newly established democratic political systems. Membership in the EEC was, thus, also seen as a means to support the consolidation of democratic institutions and relating attitudes of the citizens in those countries.[6] Naturally, the EEC was interested in democratic stability in the relevant countries along its Southern borders, a fact that made membership of these Southern European countries very likely. However, more than a few representatives of the then EEC member states doubted that Spain, Portugal and Greece were yet ready to join. The scepticism corresponded to both, political maturity and economic capability. Nevertheless, the three countries were finally accepted as new members of the EEC.

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2. Cf. http://www.medea.be/en/themes/euro-mediterranean-cooperation/euro-mediterranean-cooperation-historical/ (January 2015).
3. Http://ies.berkeley.edu/research/bicchiconvergenceofciv.doc; cf. also http://www.analyticalmk.com/files/2012/01/02.pdf (January 2015).
4. Http://www.euromed-seminars.org.mt/seminar02/papers/vanhaeverbeke.htm; cf. also http://www.analyticalmk.com/files/2012/01/02.pdf (February 2015).
5. Cf., amongst others, R. GUNTHER, P.N. DIAMANDOUROS, J. PUHLE, *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1995; E. KARAMOUZI, *Greece, the EEC and the Cold War 1974-1979: The Second Enlargement (Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World)*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2014; L. MORLINO, *Democracy Between Consolidation and Crisis: Parties, Groups, and Citizens in Southern Europe*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998.
6. Cf. *Der Spiegel*, 14.07.1980, 22.06.1981 and 07.06.1982.

In the run of the Southern enlargement the Commission elaborated a plan in 1982 which aimed at furthering the development of Europe's Mediterranean countries and regions.[7] The so-called Renovated Mediterranean Policy (1992–1995), eventually formulated in 1990, disposed of an increased budget and more focused objectives as well as strategies. It comprised incentives such as softening social effects of International Monetary Fund and World Bank Programs, supporting Small and Medium Enterprises (SMUs), encouraging regional co-operation, protecting human rights, and fostering environmental protection. In addition, structural funds were available from 1988 onwards. The European Commission adopted a comprehensive approach to the Mediterranean region, which not only supported political and economic development in its new South European member states, but in the whole Mediterranean area. The EEC also assisted the establishment of the Arab-Maghreb Union, and generally improved bilateral dialogues and co-operations in the region.[8]

Eventually, the EEC (and later the EC/EU)-Mediterranean relationship further intensified in the wake of 1989 and the system change in the former single-party-states of East and Southeast Europe. Changes in the geo-political landscape that related to the end of the bipolar bloc system also affected Europe's international role and finally led to a new conception of European foreign policy.[9] These developments, in turn, impacted the perception of the Mediterranean region in terms of its political, strategic, and economic importance.

The above mentioned initiatives of the 1970s and 1980s, as well as later ones, such as the Barcelona Process, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and, more recently, the Union for the Mediterranean, have, in addition to the economic focus and attempts to facilitate political stability and the rule of law, essentially been based on security concerns. Due to the particular approach of the EC/EU to a Common Foreign and Security Policy, relevant attempts relied mainly on soft power "economic instruments to defuse security challenges".[10] However, the Mediterranean region, this regard, has been a region of interest for the European Community, its members, and membership candidates from the late 1960s onwards.[11]

Against this background, the following chapters by way of example zoom in on the media portrayal of that particular region and related political issues in quality press products in Germany. The latter was selected because it was one of the founding states of the EEC and subsequently became a predominant EC and EU member.

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7. Among the main goals was the diversification of the agricultural production to avoid over-production of goods such as wine, olive oil and citrus fruits. Cf. http://www.medea.be/en/themes/euro-mediterranean-cooperation/euro-mediterranean-cooperation-historical/ (January 2015).
8. Cf. http://www.medea.be/en/themes/euro-mediterranean-cooperation/euro-mediterranean-cooperation-historical/ (January 2015).
9. Http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/AsliSuel.pdf (February 2015).
10. Http://ies.berkeley.edu/research/bicchiconvergenceofciv.doc (January 2015).
11. Cf. H. GHESQUIERE, *Impact of European Union Association Agreements on Mediterranean Countries*, IMF Working Paper, August 1998, pp.1-26; S.M. NSOULI, O. KANAAN, A. BISAT, *The European Union's new Mediterranean strategy*, in: *Finance and Development*, 3(1996), pp. 18-22; M. ORTEGA, *Some Comments on the European Union's Mediterranean Policy*, Chaillot Paper, No.64, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2003; European Commission, Joint Communication: *A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean*, Brussels, 08.03.2011. See http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/com2011_200_en.pdf/ (January 2015).

Corpus and methodological approach

The corpus comprises all articles alluding to the Mediterranean region or referring to core Mediterranean countries, respectively, which were published in the magazine *Der Spiegel* (1293 documents) and the weekly *Die Zeit* (2849 documents) from 1966 until 1999. The time period covers the last third of the 20th century. The search key applied was "Mittelmeer".[12]

The media products chosen belong to a rather small group of German high-quality media. The weekly newspaper *Die Zeit*, first edited in 1946, is widely recognized for its journalistic quality. *Der Spiegel*, a weekly news magazine, was founded shortly after in 1947, and is seen by the *Economist* as one of Europe's most influential magazines.[13]

In order to identify the particularly relevant topics, discursive patterns and textual as well as visual representations, in a first step a quantitative approach was applied. For this purpose, the computer aided analytical tools Atlas.ti and IMatch were used to facilitate the process of organizing and structuring the collected material. In a second step, the pre-structured research material was explored using qualitative content analysis, discourse analysis, the analysis of textual and visual metaphors and – as regards selected images and graphic illustrations – also political iconography as methodological tools. These methods belong to the reconstructive and interpretative field of the methodological canon. According to the principle of methodological triangulation these qualitative approaches were combined in order to transcend shortcomings of a single method approach.[14]

Qualitative content analysis is a procedure for stepwise and often circular systematic text analysis including a lot of feedback loops. It aims at an in-depth understanding of textual material, while going beyond the analysis of the manifest content instead on latent structures of sense as well as context information. Key words, key

12. Relevant articles are available via the online archives of both selected media. Cf. http://www.spiegel.de (October 2013); http://www.zeit.de (October 2013). Though, at the first glance, *Die Zeit* provides more than twice as much text documents than *Der Spiegel*, the number comes down when eliminating all cases not relevant to the research focus.
13. Cf. P. HUMPHREYS, *Mass Media and Media Policy in Western Europe*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1996. Cf. also *Der Spiegel and Germany's press: His country's mirror*, in: *The Economist*, 16.11.2002.
14. The methodological concept draws on previous research experiences of the author. Cf. P. BERNHARDT, L. HADJ-ABDOU, K. LIEBHART, A. PRIBERSKY, *Europäische Bildpolitiken. Politische Bildanalyse an Beispielen der EU-Politik*, WUV, Vienna, 2009; K. LIEBHART, *The CEE and SEE Expansion of Austrian Banks. A Showcase Analysis of Relating Media Coverage*, in: A. AGH et al. (eds), *The ECE Region in the EU28*, Together for Europe Series, Budapest, 2013, pp.365-379; K. LIEBHART, *Discursive and Visual Representations of EU Presidencies: Austria, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in Comparison*, in: O. GYARFASOVA, K. LIEBHART, (eds), *Cultural Patterns of Politics*, LIT, Berlin-Münster-Vienna, pp.53-79; K. LIEBHART, P. MAYRHOFER, *Visual Narratives of Political Change in European History Textbooks*, in: ibid., pp.215-231; R. WODAK, R. DE CILLIA, M. REISIGL, K. LIEBHART, *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2009.

themes, and units of meaning are of particular interest in this regard. Relations and links between themes are a further concern.[15]

The interdisciplinary, constructivist approach of critical discourse analysis attempts to analyse "language-in-use", be it written or spoken. Language is understood as a kind of social practice through which meaning is constructed. Thus, discourse analysis aims at understanding and revealing those social and cultural patterns that underlie a text, respectively a statement, an argument, or an expression of believe. Special emphasis is also put on values and motivations involved in the use of language, on the one side, linguistic realizations and discursive strategies, on the other. The latter comprise, amongst others, the strategy of nomination (how are persons, objects, phenomena, events, processes and actions referred to?), the strategy of pre- dication (what features are attributed to actors, objects, phenomena and processes?), the strategy of argumentation (what arguments are employed?), and the strategy of framing (from what perspective are these nominations, attributions and arguments expressed?).[16]

The analysis of metaphors focuses on figures of speech and relating visual representations, which use concrete images to represent more complex political phenomena, to facilitate understanding of intricate issues with the help of concepts with which one is more familiar and which are therefore more easily imaginable. Thus, textual and visual metaphors (so to say visual representations of metaphorical concepts) as means of linguistic realization are of particular importance in the field of political rhetoric.[17]

Political iconography aims at the interpretation of visual content. It implies a critical "reading" of imagery to avoid rash and solely subjective interpretations. Political images which are communicated to the public always feature historical and actual linkages. This calls for an approach that focuses on the specific systems of reference

15. Cf. N.K. DENZIN, Y.S. LINCOLN, *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*, SAGE Thousand Oaks, California, 2005; U. FLICK, *An Introduction to Qualitative Research*, SAGE Thousand Oaks, California, 2009; J. RITCHIE, J. LEWIS, *Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers*, SAGE Thousand Oaks, California, 2003. Inductive and open coding was used to develop categories, and codes were derived bottom-up from the reading of the textual material.
16. N. FAIRCLOUGH, *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language*, Harlow, Essex, 2010; T.A. VAN DIJK (ed.), *Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction*, SAGE Thousand Oaks, California, 2000; R. WODAK, M. KRZYZANOWSKI, *Qualitative Discourse Analysis in the Social Sciences*, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills-Basingstoke, 2008; R. WODAK, M. MEYER, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. Introducing Qualitative Methods Series*, SAGE Thousand Oaks, California, 2009; R. WOKAK, M. REISIGL, *Discourse and Discrimination: Rhetorics of Racism and Antisemitism*, Routledge, London, 2001.
17. E. EL REFAIE, *Understanding visual metaphor: the example of newspaper cartoons*, in: *Visual Communication*, 2 (2003), http://vcj.sagepub.com (September 2013); H. MÜNKLER, *Politische Bilder – Politik der Metaphern*, C.H. Beck, Munich, 1994; R. SCHMITT, *Methode und Subjektivität in der Systematischen Metaphernanalyse*, in: *FQS*, 2(2003), http://www.qualitative-research.net/fgs/ (November 2013); R. WESEL, *Metapher als sprach- und bildtheoretisches Konzept zur Analyse symbolischer Politik?*, in: W. HOFMAN (ed.), *Bildpolitik-Sprachpolitik*, LIT, Berlin, 2006, pp. 197-216.

addressed in each case.[18] Types of representation and motifs used are of special interest in this regard.[19]

Depicting the Mediterranean region in *Der Spiegel* and *Die Zeit* from 1966 to 1999

The striking result of the analysis of the articles referring to the Mediterranean in both print media is the significance of two topics: security concerns in the wider sense and ecological as well as environmental issues. In terms of security articles published until the end of the bipolar system mainly allude to the Cold War and the bloc confrontation, on the one hand, to the role of Mediterranean NATO members (France, Spain, Italy and Turkey) within this context, on the other. Especially the French president Charles De Gaulle's controversial approach to NATO-led security policy is frequently discussed.[20] Regional conflicts, amongst them first and foremost the tensions and wars in the Middle East, but also the Cyprus secession conflict or, more recently, the wars that accompanied the process of the dissolution of Yugoslavia are also prominently covered – until the very beginning of the 1990s mainly with reference to the East-West-divide.[21] The North African countries on the Southern shore of the Mediterranean, such as Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, the Lebanon, or

18. H. DIEKMANNSHENKE, M. KLEMM, H. STÖCKL, *Bildlinguistik. Theorien-Methoden-Fallbeispiele*, Springer, Neuburg, 2011; M. DIERS, *Schlagbilder. Zur politischen Ikonographie der Gegenwart*, Fischer, Frankfurt/M, 1997; J. ELKINS, *Visual Studies: A Skeptical Introduction*, Routledge, London, 2003; M.G. MÜLLER, *Iconography and Iconology as a Visual Method and Approach*, in: E. MARGOLIES, L. PAUWELS, *The SAGE Handbook of Visual Research Methods*, SAGE Thousand Oaks, California, 2011, pp.283-297; E. PANOFSKY (ed.), *Meaning in the Visual Arts*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982; G. PAUL, *Das Jahrhundert der Bilder*, Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 2008; T. VAN LEEUWEN, C. JEWITT, *Handbook of Visual Analysis*, SAGE Thousand Oaks, California, 2001.
19. This methodological approach was developed at the beginning of the 20th century by art historians as a means of identification and classification of motifs and visual content of paintings. In *Studies in Iconology* Erwin Panofsky elaborated on the concept of three levels of art-historical understanding ("three strata of subject matter or meaning", as there are, firstly, the natural subject matter or the depiction of the elements that the painting, the photograph, the poster, the leaflet, etc. consists of; and secondly, the conventional subject matter introducing cultural knowledge. The final and third question is "What does it all mean?"). Panofsky's approach has been further developed for utilization also in social sciences (e.g., for the analysis of mass mediated images) by Marion G. Müller. She especially underscores the importance of context and frame. M.G. MÜLLER, *Iconography and Iconology …*, op.cit., pp.283-297; M.G. MÜLLER, *What is visual communication? Past and future of an emerging field of communication research*, in: *Studies in Communication Sciences*, 2(2007), pp.7-34; M.G. MÜLLER, *Grundlagen der visuellen Kommunikation. Theorieansätze und Analysemethoden*, UTB, Konstanz, 2003.
20. For example, *Der Spiegel*, 11.12.1967, 27.05.1968, 25.01.1972, 27.11.1972, 22.04.1974 and 26.08.1974; *Die Zeit*, 01.11.1968, 07.02.1970.
21. For example *Die Kriege um Israel*, in: *Der Spiegel*, 15.02.1999, *Das Jahrhundert der Kriege 5*, or *Das Gespenst von Vietnam*, in: *Der Spiegel*, 05.04.1999. Cf. also numerous other issues of *Der Spiegel* between 1967 and 1997.

Libya are mostly depicted as critical issues.[22] Until the fall of the Iron Curtain those issues are again usually framed with references to the confrontation of the two ideological and military blocs.[23]

However, there is a difference between the two media *Die Zeit* and *Der Spiegel*: While both print products all in all provide a rather multifaceted portrayal of the Mediterranean region in the last third of the 20th century, *Der Spiegel* stresses even more the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation, which provides the overall frame for the discussion of the strategic importance of the Mediterranean Sea.[24] This applies to both, the textual and the visual level. The focus on security issues first and foremost emphasises the West-East divide, the Cold War, diverse military threat scenarios and the particular significance of the Mediterranean Sea in this context. Finally, after the end of the bi-polar bloc system, new challenges to security, such as terrorism, come to the fore in the 1990s.[25]

The presence of both, the US led NATO fleet and the Warsaw Pact fleet in the Mediterranean Sea, and resultant occurrences were a major concern throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. A lot of articles deal with these issues, and are frequently illustrated with images of military vessels and other military facilities.[26] The prevalent use of such images sets up an iconographic frame for the messages conveyed and puts them into the context of a potentially violent and minatory atmosphere.

Especially the expansion of the Soviet fleet serves as a symbol for the menace raised by the face-off between the two ideological and military opponents. After years of control of the Mediterranean Sea by the US fleet and only marginal presence of Soviet merchant-ships and fishing boats, more and more USSR warships appeared in the Mediterranean towards the end of the 1960s, especially in the wake of the Middle East War. *Der Spiegel* reported in September 1967:

> „Jahrelang hatte Amerikas Sechste Flotte das Mittelmeer beherrscht. Ihre Ausguckposten machten die roten Fahnen mit Hammer und Sichel lediglich am Heck von Handelsschiffen – und zuweilen von spionierenden Fischerbooten – aus. Seit dem Nahostkrieg aber wurden insgesamt 40 sowjetische Kriegsschiffe in mediterranen Gewässern gesichtet".[27]

22. For example, *Zeitbombe vor Europas Toren*, in: *Die Zeit*, 12.10.1990. Cf. also among others: *Die Zeit*, 22.12.1972, 13.02.1976, 05.10.1984 and 02.10.1987, *Der Spiegel* 12.11.1973, 05.12.1983, 23.01.1984, 09.01.1984, 09.12.1987, 21.08.1989, 19.08.1991, 17.08.1992 and 31.05.1993.
23. For example, *Moskau rüstet Syrien auf*, in: *Der Spiegel* 31.10.1983. Cf. also *Atomwaffenfreie Zone in Nahost*, in: *Der Spiegel*, 03.08.1987; *Kriegsgeheul in der Ägäis*, in: *Die Zeit*, 07.06.1996. See also *Die Zeit*, several other issues between 1968 and 1995.
24. For example, references are also made to the history of the Mediterranean Sea and the Mediterranean region.
25. *Der Spiegel*, 18.09.1967, 13.05.1968, 27.08.1968, 23.06.1969, 21.07.1980, 22.11.1982, 05.10.1987, 10.11.1987, 01.01.1988, 20.11.1990, 18.11.1996 and 21.05.1998.
26. *Wacht vor Suez*, in: *Der Spiegel*, 18.09.1967; *Wird das Mittelmeer ein Sowjet-Meer?*, in: *Der Spiegel*, 13.05.1968; *Sowiets auf Syros*, in: *Der Spiegel*, 21.07.1980; *Tritt für Uncle Sam*, in: *Der Spiegel*, 16.11.1987.
27. *Der Spiegel*, 18.09.1967.

Nine month later, the magazine featured an interview with the commander of the NATO Armed Forces South, under the title „Is the Mediterranean Sea to become a Soviet Sea?".[28]

Alluding to the same circumstances, *Die Zeit* informed their readers that „the Red Fleet anchors in the West", and the Soviet warships in the Mediterranean cannot longer be ignored.[29] The weekly, using a metaphor taken from chess, called this a stalemate situation in the Mediterranean, which the two giant powers face.[30] What is more, *Die Zeit* underscored that not only the US was on alert because of the Soviet „invasion" – as the presence of the Red Fleet was called –, but also the NATO members France and Britain: The high profile of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean had undoubtedly introduced a new factor to the game.[31]

> „Die Präsenz starker sowjetischer Flotteneinheiten im Mittelmeer hat einen alten Russen-Traum verwirklicht und im Süden Europas eine neue strategische Lage geschaffen. Die europäische Nato-Führung erwägt zur Zeit, den Schwerpunkt ihrer Verteidigungsanstrengungen in den Mittelmeerraum zu verlagern […]. Noch stellt die russische ‚Eskadra', deren Stärke von Woche zu Woche variiert, keine militärische Bedrohung der Nato-Mächte dar, doch vermutet die US-Zeitschrift ‚U.S. News & World Report', daß die sowjetische Seemacht im Mittelmeer schon Ende dieses Sommers stärker als die Sechste US-Flotte sein wird. […] Die levantinische und nordafrikanische Küste, früher unter europäischer Kontrolle, gehört nun selbständigen Staaten, die teilweise (Syrien, Ägypten, Algerien) mit der sowjetischen Politik sympathisieren. In ihren Häfen ankern sowjetische Kriegsschiffe, den Seestreitkräften der Nato-Staaten sind sie verschlossen".[32]

Against such threat scenarios wavering confederates in the Mediterranean region are presented as a particular concern by both print media throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The question is asked whether the Southern edge of NATO would falter and eventually even burst?[33] *Der Spiegel* also blames the South European EEC member states Greece and Spain for being unconfident allies. Greece is, for example, mentioned because the Greek government and the Soviet government had previously agreed upon a deal which enabled USSR vessels to call at the port of the Greek island Syros to get the ships overhauled and purchase service quantities, fuel, water, and foods:

> "Was die Nato-Vormacht USA dermaßen aufgeschreckt hatte, war ein Geschäft der Griechen mit Moskau, das sowjetischen Schiffen Reparaturrechte auf der Griecheninsel Syros einräumt […]. Im Klartext: Die Griechen haben sich verpflichtet, die Versorgungsschiffe der 3. Sowjetischen Eskadra im Mittelmeer, dem östlichen Gegenstück zur 6. US-Flotte,

28. *Wird das Mittelmeer ein Sowjet-Meer?*, op.cit.
29. *Die Rote Flotte ankert im Westen*, in: *Die Zeit*, 02.08.1967. *Politik der kleinen Stiche*, in: *Die Zeit*, 22.11.1968. Cf. also *Der Spiegel*, 22.04.1974 and 21.03.1977.
30. *Patt der Giganten*, in: *Die Zeit*, 08.12.1967.
31. *Sind wir bedroht? Folgen der sowjetischen Invasion*, in: *Die Zeit*, 06.09.1968; *Der General blickt nach Amerika. Frankreich verfolgt die sowjetische Flottenpräsenz im Mittelmeer und die sich daraus ergebende strategische Veränderung an Europas Südflanke mit wachsender Aufmerksamkeit*, in: *Die Zeit*, 08.11.1968; *Politik der kleinen Stiche*, op.cit.: see also *Der Spiegel*, 28.07.1969.
32. *Der Spiegel*, 12.05.1968.
33. *Wenn die Flanke der Nato wankt*, in: *Die Zeit*, 26.07.1974; *Birst der Südost-Pfeiler?*, in: *Die Zeit*, 23.08.1974.

> mit Treibstoff, Wasser, Lebensmitteln und sogar Ersatzteilen zu versorgen. Früher mußten die Sowjet-Schiffe dazu meist ihre fast 1000 Seemeilen entfernten Häfen am Schwarzen Meer anlaufen".[34]

A couple of years prior to this event Greece, which was then a military dictatorship, was seen as a stable partner for NATO and the United States. According to Prime Minister Georgios Papadopoulos, Greece was considered a protector of West European civilization in that particular European edge.[35] On these grounds, the dictatorial regime in Greece was supported by the US and other NATO members, because it was seen as a firm ally.[36]

When Spain in 1987 signalled that it would probably not renew the treaty that enabled the US military base on Spanish territory, *Der Spiegel* reported that the country was kicking „Uncle Sam" and that „Washington is afraid of a domino effect". This metaphor was frequently used in regard to US international affairs during the Cold War, with reference to the so-called „domino theory".[37] The latter suggested that if the political system of one country changes to Communism this would impact other countries in that region as well and they would eventually be more likely to come under communist rule.

In view of this background the electoral successes of several South European Communist parties in the early 1970s seemed especially critical. „Communists ante portas" was the title of a story published in *Die Zeit* in 1974 which referred to the fact that some of these parties were involved in negotiations about coalition governments in the relevant countries.[38] Italy was mentioned as an example for a reliable NATO partner in principle, but, however, a bit instable due to the threat of a potential coalition government that would include the Communist Party. Against the backdrop of such scenario, NATO was said to discuss a transfer of its Southern headquarter from Italy to Greece.[39] As early as in 1975 *Die Zeit* had already asked whether Spain would be on the way to become a nightmare after the death of the dictator Francisco Franco and the end of his fascist regime. The term nightmare referred to the likely unpredictability of the new democratic regime compared to its predecessor.[40] Five months earlier the weekly had as well adverted to Spain but also to Portugal and Cyprus, which were all considered problematic cases. Portugal was mentioned to show that the country compared to Spain due to the system change, which could result in unpredictability in terms of foreign policy interests and decisions. Cyprus was referred

34. *Der Spiegel*, 21.07.1980.
35. *Der Spiegel*, 27.05.1968.
36. The EEC criticised the dictatorial regime in Greece, while the NATO supported it. Cf. *Der Spiegel*, 06.12.1966, 04.11.1968, 23.12.1968, 26.07.1971, 22.11.1971 and 18.12.1972.
37. *Tritt für Uncle Sam*, op.cit.
38. *Die Kommunisten vor der Tür. Die Kommunisten stehen vor den Türen Südeuropas. Sie steigen nicht auf revolutionäre Barrikaden, sondern sind auf dem Weg in die Regierungskoalitionen*, in: *Die Zeit*, 27.09.1974.
39. *Der Spiegel*, 31.05.1976.
40. *Wird Spanien zum Alptraum? Gefahren und Hoffnungen für Europa nach Franco*, in: *Die Zeit*, 31.10.1975.

to because of the secession conflict and relating issues.[41] "The US is looking at Spain", reported *Die Zeit*. Moreover, the entire Southern flank of NATO, which had become "the fracture of the Atlantic Alliance", was a matter of concern.[42]

The role of some Mediterranean NATO states and (potentially) future EEC/EC members such as the above mentioned ones, but particularly the variable position of France had been covered by the relevant media throughout the last 20 years of the Cold War.[43] However, also after the end of the bipolar bloc system and the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation the strategic meaning of the Mediterranean Sea remained essential. The two analysed print products unanimously communicated the persisting importance of the region in terms of geo-political issues. "The Cold War is by no means over" asserted *Die Zeit* seven years after 1989.[44] Some strange stories that refer to a supposed ongoing confrontation between the West and Russia as the successor state of the Soviet Union were also reported: the encounter between a Russian submarine and Spanish fishermen who randomly "caught" that nuclear submarine in their trawl nets was covered by *Der Spiegel* in October 1999, which in turn referred to the Spanish newspaper *El Pais*.[45]

Beyond these main topics, new issues were added to the traditional scenario after the end of the Cold War. Others – such as the cold and hot wars in the Arab region – had already been emphasized during the Cold War. The depiction of the conflict in the Middle East not only alluded to the role of Israel, the problem of the Palestine territories, and the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians, but also to other states involved in the wars and ongoing conflicts, such as Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and Syria.[46] The "pirate state" Libya and dictator Muammar Gaddafi were portrayed as a particular threat to international security and vantage point for terrorist attacks.[47]

Especially the wars on the Balkans during the 1990s were intensively covered. In the wake of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the resulting wars, the Balkan region generally was perceived as a crisis region, particularly in regard to war crimes against civilians and ethnic cleansing.[48]

41. Cf. also *Mauer auf Dauer*, in: *Die Zeit*, 25.11.1983, 18.07.1994, 03.01.1997 and *Der Spiegel*, 16.02.1998.
42. *USA schauen auf Spanien. Die Südflanke Westeuropas …*, in: *Die Zeit*, 16.05.1975. Cf. also *Die Zeit*, 26.07.1974 and *Der Spiegel*, 18.10.1974.
43. *Giscards zaghafte Offensive. Befehdete Annäherung an die Nato*, in: *Die Zeit*, 18.02.1977; *Mitterrand sucht den Weg zurück*, in: *Die Zeit*, 11.03.1988.
44. *Der Kalte Krieg ist noch lange nicht vorbei*, in: *Die Zeit*, 01.03.1996. Cf. also *Der Spiegel*, 14.10.1999.
45. *Spanische Fischer: Russisches Atom-U-Boot gefangen*, in: *Der Spiegel*, 14.10.1999.
46. *Der Spiegel*, several issues between 1966 and 1998.
47. For example, *Der Spiegel*, 28.10.1974, 16.12.1974, 14.12.1981, 05.08.1983, 06.01.1986, 03.02.1986, etc.
48. For example, *Die Zeit*, 17.07.1992, 08.04.1994, 17.06.1994, 26.05.1995; *Der Spiegel*, 17.07.1989, 13.07.1992, 10.08.1992, 20.03.1995, 12.06.1995, 16.12.1996 and 15.06.1998.

The second big theme covered by both media, *Der Spiegel* and *Die Zeit*, throughout the more than three decades relates to environmental issues, ecology, and towards the end of the 20th century from 1966 to 1999, more and more to climate change.[49] The severe pollution of the Mediterranean Sea, environmental problems of its neighbouring countries, but also national and supra-national attempts and strategies to fight (in most cases manmade) ecological disasters and protect the sea as well as its shores, were prominently featured topics over decades.[50] It has to be highlighted that in terms of severe ecological problems and resulting issues that impact the tourism industry, Italy was represented as the probably most intensively concerned Mediterranean state. This message was strongly supported by the selection of illustrations. The huge majority of images used to visualize the pollution of the Mediterranean featured manky Italian beaches throughout the country. Though it was also mentioned that countries such as Spain and Yugoslavia (respectively its successor states) were highly affected by those ecological problems and disasters, the reader gets the impression, that the situation in Italy is even worse.

The entire Mediterranean Sea was depicted in relevant articles as a fragile and endangered ecosystem, exposed to environmental pollution through industrial waste and effluent, oil from big tank ships, chemical products such as fertilizers and other toxic substances like phosphates, not filtered waste water containing bacteria, viruses, and excrements, radioactive material, and last but not least the negative impact of mass tourism. To express the poignancy of the problem, the media under scrutiny used dramatic wording and drastic imagery:

> „Das von drei Kontinenten eingerahmte Binnengewässer gilt, so die Naturschutzorganisation Greenpeace, als Meer mit den meisten Umweltproblemen der Welt. […] 430 000 Tonnen giftige Abwässer, 360 000 Tonnen Phosphate, 65 000 Tonnen Schwermetalle muß die Badewanne Europas aufnehmen, dazu die meist ungeklärten Abwässer von 120 Großstädten und die ganze Chemikalienpalette moderner Hochleistungs-Landwirtschaft".[51]

Frequently applied nominations and attributions were stinking cloaca, brown puddle or contaminated bathtub, or the play on words *mare monstrum* instead of *mare nostrum*.[52] Relating images depicted masses of tourists on over-crowded beaches, polluted, dirty, devastated landscapes, signs that prohibit bathing and swimming, perished sea dwellers, barrels containing toxic substances, and piles of rubbish:

> "Die Algenplage des vergangenen Sommers an der italienischen und jugoslawischen Adria-Küste war ein Warnzeichen, daß die Existenzgrundlage von Millionen Menschen

49. For example, *Der Spiegel*, 17.07.1989, 20.02.1995, 17.08.1998 and 13.12.1999.
50. For example *Der Spiegel*, 21.08.1972, 06.08.1979, 17.10.1983, 14.08.1989, 16.10.1989, 12.07.1990, 16.10.1990, 12.06.1991, 01.11.1998, 20.09.1999, 06.12.1999 and *Der Spiegel Special*, 11/1998. *Der Dreck der EWG*, in: *Die Zeit*, 23.07.1971. Cf. also various articles in *Die Zeit* between 1971 and 1998.
51. *Der Spiegel*, 02.07.1990.
52. *Die Zeit*, 28.09.1990. Cf. also: *Bad in der Brühe*, in: *Der Spiegel*, 17.08.1970; *Zu schmutzig und zu teuer*, in: *Die Zeit* 02.10.1970. *Italiens braunes Meer im Sonnenschein*, in: *Die Zeit*, 16.07.1971, *Warnung vor Mittelmeerfischen*, in: *Der Spiegel*, 31.03.1975, *Europas sonnigste Kloake*, in: *Der Spiegel*, 25.07.1977, *Italiens Meer gleicht einer Kloake*, in: *Der Spiegel*, 16.06.1995.

> gefährdet ist […]. Fast die gesamte Mittelmeerküste leidet bereits unter Umweltschäden: Ganze Strandzonen gelten als verseucht; natürliche Biotope wurden weitgehend zerstört, die maritimen Tier- und Pflanzenarten sind stark dezimiert".[53]

"The region is committing suicide" stated the caption of a respective image. The article referred to the popular holiday destinations Italy and Yugoslavia and warned that within the next 50 years, or even earlier, only viruses and bacteria would remain at the touristic venues:

> „Ströme wie Nil, Po, Ebro oder Rhone transportieren gewaltige Mengen von Industriemüll, Fäkalien, Düngemitteln und Pestiziden zur Kloake Mittelmeer […]: ‚Wer das Mittelmeer retten will, der muß damit in den Fabriken von Lyon, in der Kanalisation von Mailand und auf den Feldern des Sudan anfangen'".[54]

The role of tourism had already been critically assessed by the magazine *Der Spiegel* six years before. Each summer the excrements of 100 million sun worshipping tourists had added to those of 100 million residents, mostly raw sewage, reported *Der Spiegel* in 1983.[55] Another four years earlier the magazine dedicated a cover story to the pollution and damage of the Mediterranean Sea. The title page depicted a pretty young lady swimming in the sea like a mermaid. Below her, on the sandy bottom of the sea the reader could see all kind of waste and rubbish which the smiling girl apparently did not recognize. The hidden waste at the bottom of the sea not visible at the first glance, was used as a symbol for the bad quality of the seawater. The caption was „garbage dump Mediterranean".[56] The article alerts the reader to the risks of bathing and swimming in the polluted water such as acromycosis and hepatitis, while the visual representation suggested a metaphorical chain. In addition, detailed maps showed the polluted sites and indicated the contaminators.[57]

Although the responsible governments as well as supranational and international organizations eventually implemented effective measures to save the Mediterranean Sea, the problem is not solved to date. A special issue of *Der Spiegel* which was published in November 1998 focused on the pollution of all oceans and often mentioned the Mediterranean Sea. The message was unmistakable: There is "no reason to give the all-clear for Europe's coasts and seas".[58] The climate change, the numerous negative effects of mass tourism, such as piles of garbage and shortage of drinking water, and still the pollution of the sea water through chemicals and not filtered waste

53. *Kaum noch Chancen für das größte Binnenmeer der Welt*, in: *Der Spiegel*, 16.10.1989.
54. *Der Spiegel*, 17.10.1983, 06.09.1971, 14.08.1972, 21.08.1972 and 06.08.1979. Cf. also *Die Zeit*, 22.06.1984.
55. *Stinkende Pfütze. Die Uno-Umweltschutzbehörde will helfen, das ökologisch verseuchte Mittelmeer zu retten – Erfolg frühestens in 15 Jahren*, in: *Der Spiegel*, 17.10.1983. Cf. also *Der Spiegel*, 07.06.1976, 13.09.1976, 04.04.1977, 28.08.1978, 23.11.1978, 19.02.1979, 29.10.1979, 17.08.1987, 15.05.1989, 01.02.1994, 27.06.1994, 20.09.1994, 11.08.1997 and 26.07.1999, and *Der Spiegel Special "Meer und Mehr"*, (November 1998).
56. *Müllkippe Mittelmeer. Geht bloß nicht ins Wasser*, in: *Der Spiegel*, 06.08.1979.
57. *Der Spiegel*, 06.08.1979 and 17.10.1983.
58. *See in Not. Kein Grund zur Entwarnung für Europas Küsten und Meere. Ein Öko-Kataster von Susanne Liedtke*, in: *Spiegel Special*, November 1998.

water persisted continuous matters of concern.[59] An article published in November 1999 accents the role of big rivers in this regard and introduces the Nile as a bad example. The world's longest waterway carries primarily agricultural and industrial effluents as well as dirty waters from the sewage system to the sea.[60]

Conclusion

The above presented discursive and visual representations were analysed to shed light on the representation of the Mediterranean Sea in the last third of the 20th century. Those representations – and also previous ones – are still stored in the European collective memory and iconic archive. That is to say they yet impact on the public perception of political issues, political debates, agenda setting and decision making relating to the Mediterranean region. At least to some extent they still function as frames of reference.

The overall image suggests that the Mediterranean region, also called "The European South" remains a crisis region, or, at least a potential crisis region. This is especially true when it comes to the depiction of countries located on the Southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea. Beyond the involvement of some of these countries in the lasting Middle East conflict, the struggle with the rise of groups of fundamentalist Muslims, can also be mentioned in this case.

A corner-stone of all these discourses is the construction of the Mediterranean as a field of conflict between the West and a relevant antithetic power – formerly the Soviet Union, respectively Russia, currently first and foremost the "Islamic threat". The latter, however, already appeared in the media in the mid-1980s.[61] After the end of the Cold War it obviously also replaced the former main enemy USSR. *Die Zeit*, in an article published in 1993, quoted the outgoing commander-in-chief of NATO, John Galvin who characterized the Cold War, which the West had indeed won, as a 70-years-old aberrancy. He went on with stating that now "we" get back to the actual centre of conflict of the last 1,300 years, which for him was the big quarrel with Islam.[62]

Within all these threat scenarios also the question is raised whether the Mediterranean confederates are truly reliable NATO partners or not. As has already been mentioned, relating debates mainly focused on Greece, Spain and Portugal after they had overcome the dictatorships which for their part had been considered stable allies

59. *Der Spiegel*, 26.07.1999.
60. *Höchste Alarmstufe für große Flüsse*, in: *Der Spiegel*, 30.11.1999.
61. *„Steppenbrand" im Mittelmeer. Auch Italien richtet sich auf eine neue Terrorwelle Libyens ein*, in: *Die Zeit*, 04.04.1986.
62. *Der Islam – Gefahr für die Welt?*, in: *Die Zeit*, 02.04.1993. See also *Der Spiegel*, 11.06.1990, 19.08.1991 and 01.02.1993.

of the West. Italy, in contrast, was generally seen as a true ally to NATO, probably relating to the establishment of the NATO Headquarter South in Naples.

Also the second headstone, the fight against the menace of ecological disasters in the Mediterranean region is still on the political agenda. Among the six concrete projects the Ministers of Foreign Affairs who gathered in Marseilles in 2008 discussed in order to advance the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and its successor the Union for the Mediterranean, the de-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea played an important role. Corresponding measures the Ministers agreed on comprised a lot of initiatives and strategies such as good environmental governance, access to drinkable water for the general public, sustainable water management, the reduction of pollution and the protection of the Mediterranean biodiversity.[63]

Although the political terrain of the Mediterranean region has fundamentally changed in the wake of the years 1889-1991 some of the issues already discussed decades ago are yet of importance in both European and nation state politics. However, they appear in variegated form. The probably most serious problem currently related to the Mediterranean region, the humanitarian catastrophe of the boat people who desperately try to reach the Northern shore of the Mediterranean Sea and die in large numbers at the attempt, did not yet play a major role in the space of time covered in this article. [64]

63. Http://ufmsecretariat.org (January 2015).
64. *Der Spiegel*, 03.02.1997. *EU verdreifacht Mittel für Seenotrettung*, in: *Die Zeit*, 23.04.2015; *Die EU in Halbherzigkeit vereint*, in: *Die Zeit* 24.04.2015.

Greece between Europe and the Mediterranean, 1981-1986. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the Greek-Libyan Relations as Case Studies

Sofia PAPASTAMKOU

In October 1981, Andreas Papandreou, founder and charismatic leader of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), brought the Socialists into power for the first time in Greece's postwar history. He was considered to be the man of change in all domains, including foreign policy. Papandreou preached a third world neutralist stance and his pre-electoral speeches promised to readjust relations with the US, NATO and the EEC, of which Greece became full member that very year. This article examines the foreign policy of Papandreou regarding Mediterranean affairs from 1981 to 1986, principally from a European perspective. Opting for a global rather than a bilateral perspective allows us to better understand an essential aspect of Greek foreign attitudes at the time: their Europeanization. Moreover, from the point of view of European unification history, this approach helps to shed light on aspects of Euro-Arab relations in a period that followed the deadlock of the Euro-Arab dialogue but was yet far from the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. In parallel, from an international history point of view, the period covers the Second Cold War and sees the rise of the concept of war against international terrorism. It is in this context that two case studies receive special attention: the Greek-Palestinian and the Greek-Libyan connection.

The Mediterranean in Andreas Papandreou's Foreign Policy Views

According to Papandreou's views, Greece was part of three circles: Europe, the Balkans and the Mediterranean. These were the cores of his so-called "multidimensional policy", one that attached more importance to the North-South rather than to the East-West divide.[1] The term "Mediterranean" was systematically used to describe relations with "the Mediterranean people", especially "the Arab Nation", instead of the terms "Orient" and "Arab World" used by his (conservative) predecessors up until then. Greece's Arab policy traditionally took into consideration dependence on the Middle East oil provisions, the geographical proximity, the presence of Greek communities and economic activity of Greek nationals in the Arab countries, the existence of three orthodox Patriarchates (Alexandria, Jerusalem and Antioch).[2] The Cyprus

1. See the founding act of the Pasok (3 September 1974 declaration) in: K. VARELA, *Andreas G. Papandreou 1919-1981*, Hellenika Grammata, Athens, 2002, pp.186-193; PASOK (ed.), *Statement of government policy. Contract with the People*, Pasok, Athens, 1981.
2. IKK [Konstantinos Karamanlis Foundation], Karamanlis Archive, document 3A, 951.

affair and the need for Arab support in the international organizations were added to these factors from the fifties onwards.[3] What seemed new in Papandreou's views was his neutralist stance and the willingness to give substance to the idea of Greece being an integral part of the Mediterranean world, in the sense of being at once a European and a developing country, because of its troubled and rich in foreign interventions post-war history, perceived as unique for a NATO and EEC member state. Notwithstanding his dominant personality, Papandreou's neutralist stance was representative of the majority of the senior party members.[4]

Papandreou's views on international relations and the place of Greece in the world were developed under the influence of his proper intellectual orientations and career in the USA, and his experience of the Greek political arena in the sixties. Through his studies, academic career and political action in the USA, where he lived for almost twenty years until 1959, Papandreou was linked to the liberal wing of the Democrats and to a network composed of influential personalities, such as the economists John Kenneth Galbraith and Carl Kaysen, who would later serve in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.[5] During his brief political career in Greece after 1963, he was marked by the first Cyprus crisis in 1963-64 and witnessed the exercise of international politics in the Eastern Mediterranean from within, as he was present at the US-Greek contacts in Washington regarding the crisis containment.[6] As he admitted, the Cyprus crisis constituted his political awakening in international relations and forged his views on the exercise of foreign policy from the point of view of a small state. The military Junta of 1967-1974 further radicalised his political thinking. His book *Paternalistic Capitalism*, published in 1972, reflects his orientation from the orthodox economist he had been until then towards the dependency theory and more radical US intelligentsia such as neo-marxist economists Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy or Richard J. Barnett, founder of the Institute for Policy Studies.[7] According to his academic colleagues, the book was mainly a political manifesto that reflected the author's own experiences and the perspective of a small state.[8] Indeed, Papandreou's ideas on

3. I. SAKKAS, *Greece, the Cyprus Affair, and the Arab World, 1947-1974*, Patakis, Athens, 2012, p. 154.
4. Anonymous interview to the author, 22.12.2011. See also A. PAPANDREOU, *Man's Freedom*, Karanasis, Athens, 1974, pp.93-133; L. RORI, *Analyse de l'antiaméricanisme grec: le cas du PASOK de 1974 à 2002*, Mémoire de DEA inédit, IEP, Paris, 2002.
5. Papandreou studied political economy at Harvard University and eventually attained tenure in the University of California, Berkeley, where he became head of the Department of Economics in 1956. S. DRAENOS, *Andreas Papandreou. The Making of a Greek Democrat and Political Maverick*, I.B. Tauris, London, 2012.
6. Papandreou witnessed these contacts as Minister to the Prime Minister George Papandreou. On the 1963-64 Cyprus crisis see A. JAMES, *Keeping the Peace in the Cyprus Crisis of 1963-64*, Palgrave, New York, 2002.
7. A. PAPANDREOU, *Democracy at a Gunpoint*, Karanasis, Athens, 1974, pp.203-206 and A. PAPANDREOU, *Paternalistic Capitalism*, University of Minnessota Press, Minneapolis, 1972.
8. Reviews on *Paternalistic Capitalism* by K. de SCHWEINITZ Jr in: *The Journal of Politics*, 1(February 1973), pp.227-229; by H.K. BETZ in: *Journal of Economic Litterature*, (1973), pp.556-558; in: *Journal of Economic Issues*, 3(1974), pp.617-626.

international affairs were a mix of global conceptions nourished in the USA and his personal experiences at a local level.

One cannot consider the Mediterranean and Greece's place in it without encompassing the realities of the Greek-Turkish relationship and the problem of Cyprus, especially after the division of the island in 1974. The latter aspects, however, were distinctively considered as the Greek "national matters" in foreign affairs and defence, what has precisely been conceptualized as the core versus periphery policies.[9] This article focuses on aspects of the periphery Mediterranean policies, though considering the connections with the Cyprus problem and the Greek-Turkish relations, as well as the ways in which they formed part of the Greek-US relationship.

The Greek Attitude towards the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in the EPC Framework

The Greek-Palestinian connection is one domain where Andreas Papandreou showed a remarkable consistency.[10] His support of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was not separate from his *Realpolitik* concerns: it was an accessory of Greece's policy towards Turkey, as he admitted to Foreign Minister of France Claude Cheysson in 1981.[11] The common ground between Greeks and Palestinians from this point of view was very likely the support the PLO provided to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Indeed, after the 1980 military *coup d'état* in Turkey, Kurdish guerrilla forces had been installed in Lebanon where they received PLO (and Syrian) backing.[12] But ideology – anti-Americanism – and emotion were driving forces as well. Parallels were largely drawn by the PASOK militants between Israel and Turkey, perceived to be offered unconditional backing by the US in the Middle East. Another key determinant of their solidarity towards the Palestinians was the Cypriot experience of partition and exodus, and even the collective memory of Asia Minor Greeks exodus after 1922.[13]

9. T. COULOUMBIS, *PASOK's Foreign Policies, 1981-89: Continuity or Change?*, in: R. CLOGG (ed.), *Greece, 1981-89. The Populist Decade*, Macmillan Press, London, 1993, pp.113-130.
10. E. STAVROU, *A Pioneering Vision? Greek-Arab Relations During the Papandreou Era, 1981-1989*, Papazissis, Athens, 2010, pp.135-169.
11. MAE [Ministère des affaires étrangères de France], Grèce 1981-1985, 5261, "Entretien avec M. Papandreou", 12 January 1982.
12. O. BENGIO, *The Turkish-Israeli Relationship: Changing Ties of Middle Eastern Outsiders*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004, p.137; S.A. PLAKOUDAS, *The PKK and the Guerrilla Tradition of Turkey's Kurds*, in: *MERIA*, 4(2014), <http://www.rubincenter.org/2015/02/the-pkk-and-the-guerrilla-tradition-of-turkeys-kurds/> [All URL cited in this article were accessed on 4 March 2015].
13. See interviews of militants in RORI 2002, pp.111-113. For the the exodus of Asia Minor Greeks see A. JAMES, *Memories of Anatolia: generating Greek refugee identity*, in: *Balkanologie*, 1-2(2001), <http://balkanologie.revues.org/720>.

When Papandreou came to power in 1981, the PLO already had an information office in Athens but no official recognition from the Greek government. Israel, on the other hand, had been granted only *de facto* recognition from Greece since 1949, although the two countries held relations through diplomatic representations.[14] Right after his election, Papandreou invited Yasser Arafat to visit Greece in order to hold discussions on the upgrading of the PLO office in Athens to that of a diplomatic mission, indeed to the same level as Israel's. This was already annoying for the Israelis for prestige matters but their worries were far more general. Papandreou's invitation coincided with the launch of the second wave of the PLO's campaign for international recognition. The first one occurred from 1974 to 1979 and had been successful mainly in third world countries. In 1981, Arafat's efforts met with success not only in Greece, but also in the USSR and Japan, this second country being a temporary member of the UN Security Council at the time.[15] With Greece officially joining the EEC that year, Israel worried about the country becoming the voice of the PLO in the common Western European instances.

Papandreou, who was an opponent of the Camp David accords, confirmed these apprehensions shortly after his election, when the Greek government impeded the adoption of a collective European Political Cooperation (EPC) decision on the proposed participation of the UK, France, Italy and the Netherlands in the multinational force of Sinai.[16] A compromise was found by issuing a two-fold declaration. A joint one considered the decision of the four as being in accordance with the wish of the EEC to facilitate a peace settlement in the Middle East, according to the rights of all states to existence and security and the right of the Palestinians to self-determination. The second one was a common declaration between the four participating states, mentioning the Camp David Accords and the Venice Declaration.[17]

As for East-West relations, Greek views on Middle Eastern matters were expected to raise impediments to the adoption of common decisions because of PASOK's sympathy for the third world causes, including support for the PLO. However, Greek positions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were not that unique. In many ways, they

14. Israel State Archives, http://www.archives.gov.il/, Greece's Relations with Israel, 1961-1967, <http://www.archives.gov.il/archivegov_eng/publications/electronicpirsum/greece/introduction1.htm>.
15. JTA [Jewish Telegraphic Agency], Archive, www.jta.org, "News Brief", 11.12.1981, <http://www.jta.org/1981/12/11/archive/palestine-liberation-organization-leader-yasir-arafat-is-scheduled>; "Study Says PLO Exaggerates Its International Success", 22.12.1981, <http://www.jta.org/1981/12/22/archive/study-says-plo-exaggerates-its-international-success>; TNA [The National Archives], PRO FCO 9/3187, Athens to FCO, 280, 23.10.1981. M. HILL, *The Emergence of the Palestinians since 1948*, Part Two: *The Palestinians after the creation of Israel*, in: *Journal of Arabic, Islamic & Middle Eastern Studies*, 1(1999), pp.45-59.
16. TNA, PRO FCO 9/3178, Note for the file, 30.10.1981; PRO FCO 9/3189, Athens to FCO, 355, 18.11.1981; JTA Archive, www.jta.org, "Greek Objections Delay EEC Approval of Participation in Mfo", 03.11.1981, <http://www.jta.org/1981/11/03/archive/greek-objections-delay-eec-approval-of-participation-in-mfo>.
17. AEI [Archive of European Integration, <http://aei.pitt.edu/>], Statements of the Foreign Ministers and other documents. European Political Cooperation, 1981.

were parallel to the Irish views and sometimes coincided with those of the French and the Italians.[18] But as the case of the 1982 Lebanon War highlights, Greek and Irish efforts in the EEC were at best able to contribute to the adoption of severe verbal stances against the Israeli military action and reiterate basic European positions on Palestinian national rights, in accordance with the 1980 Venice Declaration, only when backed by bigger members. In particular, it was mostly France's Middle Eastern policy that produced the conditions for Greek proposals to be adopted. It would thus be interesting to see whether there was actually any substance in what was perceived to be at the time a kind of special relationship. In both countries, the Socialists had come into office almost simultaneously. François Mitterrand was the first Socialist President of the Fifth Republic and Papandreou the first Socialist Prime Minister of post-war Greece. Both of them were perceived as the men of change in their respective countries. The two parties had close contacts since the mid-seventies as parts of a network of the Southern European socialist forces that developed after the fall of dictatorships in Greece, Spain and Portugal.[19] These links were further tied after the extension of this network to the Euro-Mediterranean area following the Malta conference of 1977.[20] Four days after Papandreou's election in October, French envoys went to Athens to congratulate him on behalf of Mitterrand. When French Foreign Minister Cheysson visited Athens in December 1981, the Greek press celebrated the bond that allegedly united the two "Mediterranean, socialist and democratic" countries. According to former Minister Theodoros Pangalos, Andreas Papandreou had a special relation with Mitterrand, whom he admired, whereas the latter would keep an eye on the former because he apprehended his spontaneity – what the British called with less hesitation his "unpredictability".[21]

The basic foundations of France's foreign policy were essentially different from Greece's. France was more conscious of Cold War realities and, as a result, there was not much enthusiasm for Greece's neutralist views regarding the Balkans and the Mediterranean, except to the extent that this could be useful for issues of special French interest.[22] In the Middle East, there were fundamental differences of approach. The French Socialists, contrary to their Greek comrades, had established contacts both with the PLO representatives in France and the Israeli socialist parties (Israeli

18. TNA, PRO FCO 9/3189, Athens to FCO, 452, 24.12.1981; PRO FCO 9/3178, Minute [on] The Greek Elections, 21.10.1981. See also R. MILLER, *Ireland and the Palestine Question 1948-2004*, Irish Academic Press, Dublin, 2005.
19. *Le poing et la rose*, May 1977, p.27. According to one Mitterrand's biographers, the former sought to federate the socialist powers of Southern Europe also out of will to balance the influence of the Northern European socialist parties in the Socialist International, see F.-O. GIESBERT, *François Mitterrand, une vie*, Seuil, Paris, 1996, p.353.
20. P. AVGHERINOS, *The Change Finished Early*, Estia, Athens, 2013, p.56 (in Greek).
21. TNA, PRO FCO 9/3187, Athens to FCO, 280, 23.10.1981: MAE, Grèce 1981-1985, 5261, Athènes 592, 31.12.1981. See also T. PANGALOS, *In Europe with Andreas*, Patakis, Athens, 2011, pp.85-87 (in Greek); TNA, PRO FCO 9/3177, Minute by Wilkinson to Fergusson, 19.10.1981.
22. In the Balkans, Yugoslavia was one of them, as French were keen to support the country through a favourable EEC policy regarding the commercial balance and by providing technical assistance, see MAE, Grèce 1981-1985, 5261 Rebeyrol, Athènes 581, 31.12.1981.

Labour Party, Mapam, Moked). Mitterrand was a supporter of the Camp David accords and the matter of the multinational force of Sinai was clearly the object of French-Greek disagreement during Papandreou's visit to Paris in November 1981.[23] Mitterrand himself was a friend of Israel yet committed to an even-handed approach of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as he had plainly recognised the right of the Palestinians to self-determination since 1976. French relations with the PLO were far more complicated an issue, but Foreign Minister Cheysson publicly defended pro-Arab positions and was involved in unofficial contacts with PLO dignitaries.[24] France's Arab policy and shared militant views on the North-South divide produced the conditions for considering Papandreou a potentially useful friend regarding the Mediterranean issues, in spite of basic differences of approach. On the contrary, other – Conservative ruled – country members such as the UK and Belgium were far more reserved and even willing to isolate Greece in order not to allow Papandreou to weaken common EPC decisions.[25]

The 1982 Lebanon War

On 3 June 1982, the terrorist organisation of Abu Nidal perpetrated an attack against Shlomo Argov, the Israeli Ambassador in London. Though relations between Abu Nidal and the PLO were conflictual, Israel responded by launching operation Peace for Galilee in Southern Lebanon, with the aim of expelling all Palestinian military forces from the country in an effort to secure its Northern border.[26] Greece's official reaction condemned the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, repeated support for a global solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict following the UN Security Council resolution 242 of 1967 and the principle of the right of the Palestinians to independence, and reiterated support for the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people.[27] At the same time, Greece engaged diplomatic activity in the EEC. On 7 June, the day following the launch of the Israeli operation, the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked formally for an extraordinary EPC meeting to be held. Preliminary contacts were held at different levels (UN Representatives, Political Committee, Foreign Ministries' directors) and, on 9 June, the ten members of the EEC released a statement that condemned the invasion of Lebanon as a violation of international law

23. *Le poing et la rose*, May 1977, p.22; *Libération*, 26.11.1981.
24. See R. FRANK, *L'«effet Mitterrand» à l'étranger (1981-1982): un «état de grâce», un jeu de miroir et une politique extérieure de l'image*, in: S. BERNSTEIN, P. MILZA, J.-L. BIANCO, *François Mitterrand. Les années de changement*, Perrin, Paris, 2007, pp.123-124; R. DUMAS, *Affaires étrangères. 1981-1988*, Fayard, Paris, 2007, pp.29-32 and 40; J.P. FILIU, *Mitterrand et la Palestine*, Fayard, Paris, 2005, Kindle file; *New York Times*, 07.07.1982.
25. TNA, PRO FCO 9/3189, Richards to FitzHerbert, 21.12.1981.
26. Y. MELMAN, *Master Terrorist. The True Story of Abu-Nidal*, Adama Books, New York, 1986; P. SEALE, *Abu Nidal : A Gun for Hire*, Random House, New York, 1992; H. LAURENS, *La question de Palestine: 1967-1982*, Fayard, Paris, 2011, pp.794-796.
27. *The Greek Parliament Proceedings*, 10.05-10.06.1982, p.7182 (in Greek).

and contrary to the efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. The statement expressed support for Lebanon's territorial integrity and called for respect of UN resolutions 508 and 509 regarding an immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from the country and UNIFIL action. It finally reiterated the European position in favour of the establishment of a global peace in the region.[28]

However, this common statement did not mean real convergence towards an active European approach. This became plainly evident when the Israeli operation extended beyond Southern Lebanon and France adopted a more active stance that failed to find European support. Mitterrand's first official declarations had remained balanced towards Israeli, Palestinian and Syrian action in Lebanon, but the siege of West Beirut after 13 June incited him to undertake an intense international activity in order to preserve the PLO as an interlocutor in any peace solution. Farouk Kaddoumi, the PLO political section chief, was received in Paris where he met Premier Pierre Mauroy, Foreign Minister Cheysson and Secretary General of the Socialist Party Lionel Jospin. These contacts were part of the French activity in the UN, where concerted French-Egyptian action sought to amend the UN resolution 242 to also include the Palestinian national rights. Such French activity was opposed by the USA and found limited, if any, support among the European partners except for Greece. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the Netherlands opposed any explicit reference to the PLO in the European statements, as well as imposing serious economic sanctions on Israel.[29] Furthermore, the Lebanon War was precisely the moment when British priorities shifted in favour of the Anglo-American relationship. US support to the UK during the Falklands War, the departure of Secretary of State Lord Carrington from the Foreign Office and Margaret Thatcher's complete alignment with Ronald Reagan, determined the British policy direction in a way that British influence was used to limit European support to the PLO and align the EEC with the US in the Middle East.[30]

After Paris, Kaddoumi visited Athens where Papandreou assured him of Greece's support for the Palestinian cause. During Kaddoumi's visit, Papandreou violently condemned the Israeli military operations in Lebanon, comparing the action of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) against the Palestinian people to Nazi crimes. The use of the legacy of the Second World War was neither new nor original in the verbal wars surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. After the 1980 Venice Declaration, the Israelis compared the PLO to the SS and Arafat to Hitler. Official PLO communication assimilated Zionism – the state of Israel not being mentioned as such – to

28. MAE, CEE 1981-1985, 5004, Bruxelles COREU 2296, 07.06.1982; 2315, 08.06.1982; 2336, 09.06.1982.
29. A.-K. KREFT, *The Weight of History: Change and Continuity in German Foreign Policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, Master's Thesis, Western Washington University, 2010, p.50.
30. A.M. EAMES, *Margaret Thatcher's Diplomacy and the 1982 Lebanon War*, in: *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 4(2015), pp.27-44.

racism and nazism since the 1970s.[31] But these perceptions were further generalized during the 1982 Lebanon War and even internationalized, especially after the Sabra and Shatila massacres. The impact was felt in the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark and even the FRG. So it did in France.[32] But Papandreou was the first Greek Prime Minister to completely identify his views with these of one of the conflicting parties. By importing this kind of discourse into the Greek public space, at the highest level, he contributed to the tensions the Lebanon War gave rise to in the Greek society, mainly through a partial coverage of the event by the Greek media.[33]

What was at stake behind these diplomatic contacts and the continuing military operations in Lebanon was the evacuation of Beirut by the PLO fighters. In August, a multinational force (MNF) composed of US, French and Italian contingents arrived at the Lebanese capital in order to oversee the departure of the Palestinian armed forces, while the siege of Beirut West by Israeli forces continued. France had tried to associate a Greek contingent as well, as a means to attenuate Soviet distrust. Papandreou was positive but no formal request was made by the Lebanese government.[34] When Yasser Arafat left Beirut, aboard a Greek merchant ship, Greece was his first destination. As he declared, this was "a deliberate gesture to criticize all the Arab leaders for their stand during the Beirut siege", considering that the Greek government had been more supportive.[35] Indeed, no Arab country had shown willingness to host the PLO on its soil after its departure from Lebanon.[36] On the other hand, when Arafat landed in Athens on 1st September, Mitterrand had just started a two day visit to the Greek capital. Although, according to the Greek government, this was a coincidence, the archive of Konstantinos Karamanlis, the Greek President, echoes rumours that Papandreou had tried to arrange a meeting between Arafat and Mitterrand, something the Elysée officially and publicly excluded.[37]

In September 1982, there was fresh diplomatic activity on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On 1st September, the Reagan Plan denied support to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and excluded permanent control or annexation by Israel. The plan called for a Jordanian-Palestinian association after a five-year tran-

31. *Christian Science Monitor*, 03.09.1982 <http://www.csmonitor.com/1982/0903/090371.html>; BDIC [Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine], PLO Department of Information and Culture posters collection, 1974-1987. See also H. LAURENS, op.cit., pp.724 and 741.
32. I. GREILSAMMER, *Reflections on the Capability of the European Community to Play an Active Role in an International Crisis: The Case of the Israeli Action in Lebanon*, in: I. GREILSAMMER, J. WEILER (eds), *Europe and Israel: Troubled Neighbours*, de Gruyter, Berlin, p.297; J. BOURDON, *Le récit impossible. Le conflit israélo-palestinien et les médias*, Ina/De Boeck, Brussels, 2009, p.100.
33. *The Greek Parliament Proceedings*, 15.11.1982-10.12.1982, pp.1474-1478 (in Greek).
34. G. SHULTZ, *Turmoil and Triumph*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2010, Kindle file, emplacement 994. J.P. FILIU, op.cit., emplacement 2139-2140.
35. *Christian Science Monitor*, 03.09.1982 <http://www.csmonitor.com/1982/0903/090371.html>.
36. 8,500 PLO fighters were evacuated to Tunisia and another 2,500 to Syria, Iraq and Yemen, whereas Egypt and Saudi Arabia refused to host any, see A. SHLAIM, *The Iron Wall*, Penguin Books, London, 2001, p.413.
37. KONSTANTINOS KARAMANLIS ARCHIVE (ed.), *Events and Texts*, vol.12, *President of the Democracy 1980-1995*, Ekdotiki Athinon, Athens, 1997, p.209 (in Greek).

sitional period of self-government in the West Bank and Gaza. Consequently, the 12th Arab League summit issued a declaration at Fez, Morocco, on 9 September, calling for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and recognizing the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians.[38] These initiatives led to a new statement of the Ten. Its release was precipitated by the assassination of Bashir Gemayel, who was soon to take office as President of Lebanon, on 14 September, and the Sabra and Shatila massacres of civil Palestinians by Lebanese Christian militia soon after. The statement called for the immediate withdrawal of all Israeli forces from West Beirut and of all foreign military, except for the UNIFIL. It underlined the need for a global peace solution in the Middle East and the association of the PLO to all future negotiations. Recognition of Israel's right to a secure existence and the Palestinians' right to self-determination should be included, the statement said, in any peace solution. Finally, it approved the Reagan Plan and also mentioned the Fez Statement as an expression of the will of its signatories, including the PLO, to work for peace in the Middle East. The statement's formulation was an outcome of Greek, Irish and French amendments of a project initially prepared by the Danish who held the EEC presidency at the time. The Greeks were eager that the Fez statement be underlined and so were the Irish, who wished to see a strong condemnation of the Israeli military occupation of West Beirut and an explicit mention of the Palestinians' right to self-determination. The Irish argument was that the common European statement should take care to leave the door open to the future participation of the PLO in any peace negotiations, especially in the light of its withdrawal from Lebanon. French backing of these proposals allowed the adoption of the final text, not least because the widespread emotion the Sabra and Shatila massacres had an impact on the attitude of all the European partners.[39]

The Greek EEC Presidency, July-December 1983

The first Greek presidency of the EEC occurred in the second semester of 1983. It did not lead to any major evolution of the common European position regarding the Middle East matters. The EEC countries opted for a low profile during an international conference on the Palestinian question, held during the summer in Geneva, with Greece being the only member to fully participate. Also, Greece hosted a new session of the Euro-Arab Dialogue four years after its stalemate. However, this temporary reactivation bore no fruits, because it was clearly associated to political considerations regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

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38. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Address to the Nation on United States Policy for Peace in the Middle East, 01.09.1982, <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/90182d.htm>; *New York Times*, 10.09.1982.
39. MAE, CEE 1981-1985, 5004, Copenhague COREU 3542, 22.09.1982; 3477 and 3501, 17.09.1982; 3465, 15.09.1982; 3514, 18.09.1982.

An international conference on Palestine was held from 29 August to 7 September 1983 at the UN Office at Geneva, following previous UN General Assembly resolutions voted in 1981 and 1982.[40] Initially, the conference was to be held at the headquarters of the UNESCO in Paris. But Mitterrand was not keen to host it on French soil and was able to obtain from the PLO that the conference be held in Geneva rather than in Paris. Mitterrand was under Israeli and US pressure, but his reluctance was also a sign of a less engaged policy towards Middle Eastern affairs and of his will to avoid further social tensions, as a result of the linking of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with the anti-Semitic terrorist attack against the Goldenberg restaurant in Paris, in August 1982.[41] The Geneva declaration, issued at the end of the conference, reflected the will to give weight to the Fez Statement: a programme of action based on the Fez principles was proposed as a framework for convening a future international peace conference on the Middle East, bringing together all existing relevant UN resolutions, with a view to establish an independent Palestinian state.[42]

Of all the EEC countries Greece was the only one to participate as a full member at the conference, the rest of them assisting as observers. Although the Greek delegation expressed its full support to the conference's goals, it also distanced itself from all provisions that could harm its bilateral relations with Israel as incompatible with the common economic and trade policies of the EEC. Greece also defended the EEC, who was criticized as not having welcomed "all initiatives based on the recognition of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people", essentially the Fez plan, by reminding the conference of all the relevant European declarations. Greece's full participation in the conference showed the high price Papandreou continued to put on relations with the Arab and non-aligned countries, especially at the UN. But it also highlighted the inability of Greece to influence its European partners and to fulfil a much sought after role of bridge between Europe and the Arab states.

This was further shown during the short-lived revival of the Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD) in December of the same year. A combined result of the need to launch a global approach towards the Mediterranean countries and of the oil crisis of 1973, the establishment of the EAD was clearly seen from a political point of view by both sides from the beginning. For the EEC, it was part of the first attempts to develop the EPC. For the Arab League, it was also a means of *de facto* normalization of the PLO status in the international arena. However, the European tendency to precisely depoliticize the procedure and concentrate on the economic aspects, and the impact of

40. The relevant UNGA resolutions were the following: 36/120 C of 10 December 1981, ES-7/7 of 19 August 1982 and 37/86 C of 10 December 1982.
41. J.P. FILIU, op.cit., emplacement 2636-2670. The attack against Goldenberg occurred on 9 August 1982, provoking 6 killed and 22 injured persons. It was presumably perpetrated by the Libyan-backed organization Abu Nidal. See *Le Monde*, 04.03.2015; for the link between anti-Semitism and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict see the interview of Pierre Mendès France in *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 14.08.1982.
42. United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine (UNISPAL), http://unispal.un.org, Report of the International Conference on the Question of Palestine, Geneva, 29.08.-07.09.1983, United Nations, New York, 1983 <http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/6F71BD16D6273ABC052565C9005730E6>.

the Camp David accords, led the EAD to a stalemate after 1979.[43] The Lebanon War brought the subject back to the agenda as it was during the Summit of Fez that the Arab states agreed to try to reactivate the EAD procedure. In November 1982, contacts were held in Tunis between the Secretary General of the Arab League and the Embassy of Denmark (the country that held the EEC presidency in the second semester of 1982). The matter was handed to the German presidency in the first semester of 1983 but the Arab side delayed the process. Given the previous eagerness of the Arab League, it is probable that the delay was due to political calculations, as Greece was the next country to take over the EEC presidency.[44]

Further preparation work was undertaken by the European Coordination Group at the end of spring and was intensified in September in Athens, as the Political Committee of 11-12 July had decided that the meeting of the general commission of the EAD would be held in the Greek capital. Since the first contacts taken between the EEC and the Arab League, it was clear that the political aspects would be brought up during the dialogue next to the economic and cultural ones. The question was whether these aspects would dominate the agenda. On the one hand, the European Coordination Group wanted to fix a framework in order to contain the political side of the EAD. On the other hand, the Arab proposals wanted to bring the Europeans closer to the positions of the Fez Plan or, at least, have them publicly adopt a more independent stance vis-à-vis the Reagan Plan. Clearly, the reactivation of the EAD was associated to the search for a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, it was out of the order of the day to fundamentally modify the European position and even the explicit reiteration of the Venice Declaration – as proposed by Greece in an effort of compromise – was excluded, in order to avoid giving the EAD the aspect of a parallel negotiation forum.[45]

Before the Athens European Council of 4-6 December 1983, most countries seemed to agree on the need to make a declaration on the Middle East, but no final consensus was reached. Greece proposed to revive the effort of a global approach for the Middle East by combining the Reagan and Fez plans. The UK, on the other hand, proposed a general statement of principles in order to reassure the Arab countries that Europe had actually a role to play, to define clearly the European objectives regarding Lebanon (phased withdrawal of all foreign military forces including the MNF within a given period, national reconciliation, UNIFIL action) and to provide for further diplomatic activity in accordance with the Reagan Plan. Ireland and Italy essentially agreed with the British proposals. The FRG, on the contrary, was in favour of a more

43. G. MIGANI, *La politique globale méditerranéenne de la CEE 1970-1972*, in: A. VARSORI, G. MIGANI (eds), *Europe in the International Arena During the 1970s*, Peter Lang, Brussels, 2011, pp.193-210; M.E. GUASCONI, *Europe and the Mediterranean in the 1970s*, in: *Les cahiers Irice*, 1(2013), pp.163-175.
44. MAE, CEE 1981-1985, 5009, Copenhague COREU 4739, 29.12.1982 and 4168, 16.11.1982; Bonn COREU 741, 25.02.1983.
45. MAE, CEE 1981-1985, 5009, Bonn COREU 1901, 19.05.1983; Athens COREU 3705, 21.09.1983 and 4208, 01.11.1983 and 4287, 07.11.1983; Paris COREU to all COREU, 08.02.1984; La Haye COREU, 15.05.1984.

reserved statement. Finally, France proposed a global European-led approach, in the spirit of the conclusions of the Solemn Declaration of the European Union of 19 June 1983 in favour of the reinforcement of the EPC, and in accordance with previous French action in the UN.[46] In the end, the Athens European Council did not produce a common statement due to complete disagreement on the proposed reforms of the common agricultural policy (CAP) and to common financing mechanisms.[47] Not surprisingly, it avoided any discussion of major international matters, something that reportedly disappointed Papandreou, who also sought a strong declaration against Turkey and the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of the Northern Cyprus.[48]

Against this background, the 5th General Commission of the EAD took place in Athens on 14 December 1983. The meeting focused on future perspectives and a possible re-launch of the dialogue, but no essential progress was made. After the discussions were concluded, the EEC presidency issued a neutral statement referring to the utility of the exchanges and the agreement of both sides about the future continuation of the dialogue. No joint statement was issued though because no common ground was found regarding the political aspects of the EAD. Further technical contacts continued throughout 1984 but the pattern remained the same, with the Arab League trying to obtain some kind of political declaration on the Middle East on behalf of the EEC and the latter avoiding it.[49]

Several days after the EAD meeting, Greece, Italy and France provided logistic support, under the UN flag, for the evacuation of PLO fighters from Northern Lebanon. But it was clear already, after the terrorist attacks against the French and US contingents of the MNF in Beirut in October 1983, that France had changed tactics by a more discreet, if at all, engaging in the Middle Eastern arena, not least because it failed to lead a European policy.[50] France assured the EEC presidency in the first semester of 1984 and, as discussions held within the Political Committee show, was utterly unfavourable to any extension of the existing European declarations. After the retreat of its forces from Lebanon in March, France preferred that any initiative regarding Lebanese-Israeli security arrangements be left to the UN. Otherwise, Mitterrand was only favourable to the designation of a fact-finding mission by Italy, the country to preside the EEC in the first semester of 1985, as a sign of the EEC's willingness to help in the search of a peace solution.[51] Both François Mitterrand and Bettino Craxi, the Italian Prime Minister and head of the Italian Socialist Party, toured Arab countries in November 1984 and were in close contact. Papandreou, who had

46. HAEU [Historical Archives of the European Union], Fonds Émile Noël, Conseils européens 1975-1987, EN-1827, 04-06/12[1983], File Note: Political Cooperation: Ministerial Meeting, 22.11.1983 <http://archives.eui.eu/en/fonds/112373?item=EN.08-02-1827>.
47. AEI, The European Council [Athens Summit 1983], 04-06.12.1983.
48. *Four presidencies and one memorandum*, in: *To Vima*, 29.01.2014 <http://www.tovima.gr/vimagazino/views/article/?aid=561685>; HAEU, Fonds Émile Noël, Conseils européens 1975-1987, EN-1827, 04-06/12[1983], Athens COREU to all COREU, CPE 4628, 30.11.1983.
49. MAE, CEE 1981-1985, 5009, Athens COREU, 09.12.1983 and 15.12.1983; Dublin COREU, 25.09.1984; Dublin COREU, 01.12.1984.
50. J.P. FILIU, op.cit., emplacement 3158-3193.
51. MAE, CEE 1981-1985, 5004, 16 ANMO/3, 31.10.1984.

also visited Jordan and Syria at the same time, joined the game during the Dublin Summit of December 1984, where he asked by letter for the creation of a fact-finding mission.[52] Eventually, any reference to the designation of such a mission was deleted from the final EPC texts. The common statement released after the European Council of Dublin reaffirmed the previous official positions of the EEC in a generic way and without explicitly mentioning the rights of the Palestinians to self-determination and independence. No special role for the EEC was evoked, as had been the case in the Venice Declaration.[53] As such, the Dublin statement remained within a perimeter defined by the Reagan Plan and showed that no particular European initiative was on the agenda.

This was the line followed in 1985 by the Italian presidency. The Craxi-Mitterrand correspondence shows that they both agreed on the necessity for the EEC to keep itself limited to the exchange of views between its members within the framework of the EPC and to encourage a common Jordanian-Palestinian approach that was in progress after the meeting of the Palestine National Council in Amman in November 1984.[54] Following the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement of February 1985, the EPC meeting of 29 April 1985 in Luxembourg led to a statement expressing satisfaction and reaffirming that the EEC was willing to contribute to such a process on the basis of the principles previously expressed in the EEC statements regarding the right of all states to exist, Israel included, and the need to associate the PLO in any negotiations. In this context, Greece was too small a player to play a leading role, though the country followed closely all the relevant European activities in the Middle East countries which in any case had considerably slowed down.[55]

The rise of the Greek-Libyan Connection, 1981-1984

Andreas Papandreou met Muammar Gaddafi for the first time in 1975 in Tripoli.[56] He was encouraged to develop contacts with Libya by Vassos Lyssaridis, the leader of the Cypriot Labour Party (EDEK) and even Archbishop Michail Makarios, the President of the Republic of Cyprus. Members of the PASOK executive committee, such as Manos Kafetzopoulos, later Ambassador in Tripoli, Akis Tsohatzopoulos,

52. *To Pontiki*, 15.02.1985, p.9; *Kathimerini*, 10.11.1984.
53. HAEU, Fonds Émile Noël, Conseils européens 1975-1987, EN-1877, Note de dossier: session du Conseil européen Dublin 3-4 décembre 1984, 06.12.1984 <http://archives.eui.eu/en/fonds/112394?item=EN.08-02-1877>; Margaret Thatcher Foundation, EC, Dublin European Council (Presidency Conclusions) <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/114155>.
54. MAE, CEE 1981-1985, 5009, Dublin COREU, 21.12.1984; 13/EU, Mitterrand to Craxi, 11.01.1985.
55. Communiqué commun des ministres des affaires étrangères de la CEE en date du 29 avril 1985 sur le Moyen Orient, l'Afrique Australe, le Soudan, l'UNESCO et la réunion d'Ottawa sur les Droits de l'Homme, 1985 <http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/852006000.html>; MAE, CEE 1981-1985, 5004, Damas 265, 06.04.1985.
56. Andreas Papandreou Foundation Online Archive, <http://agp.archeio.gr/ap.php?page=ap_cv&lang=en>.

who served as Minister in several PASOK governments from 1981 to 2004, and Phaedon Metallinos, who later served in the Embassies of Paris and Luxembourg, visited Tripoli in 1976 and 1977.[57] An association of Greek-Libyan friendship was founded in 1978 by PASOK youths of the Trotskyist stream of the party. These contacts were further developed in the framework of the conferences of the Southern European and Mediterranean socialist and progressive parties from 1976 onwards. From a certain point of view, encouraged as they were by the Cypriots, Papandreou's contacts with Libya continued a tradition of relations with the non-alignment movement that Archbishop Makarios had established as a means of protection against Turkey, now placed at the level of a regional Euro-Mediterranean network where the Greek Socialists tried to gain influence and in which neither Turkish nor Israeli political formations participated. Libya was the party's privileged interlocutor in North Africa. The country seemed attractive at the time because of its socialist-inspired economic model but these perceptions were to change after 1981 when the Libyans would be severely judged as unreliable economic partners. Post-"Arab Spring" perceptions make past contacts with Arab dictators appear, to say the very least, as sins of youth for the European leaders. However, such contacts were also part of a larger Euro-Mediterranean network in which many European Socialists, who would come to power in the eighties and would later be present at the launch of the Barcelona Process in 1995, participated.[58]

To Libya, the network of the Mediterranean socialist parties represented a certain domain of international activity. Marginalised in the inter-Arab scene, out of rivalry with Egypt and Syria, and on bad terms with the US, Gaddafi's alternatives consisted in developing careful relations with the USSR and being active in three international domains: the Mediterranean region, Africa and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where he mainly backed dissident Palestinian formations that opposed Arafat, essentially the Abu Nidal Organization.[59] From this point of view, Papandreou's election in 1981 provided Gaddafi with a much needed potential connexion to the EEC, other than the important bilateral economic ties he held mainly with Germany, Italy and France.[60] Manos Kafetzopoulos, who was not a diplomat but a party member, was appointed Ambassador in Tripoli. This was a sign of the importance Papandreou attached to the Greek-Libyan relationship. But it also highlighted his distrust of the Greek diplomatic corps that often served independently of the regime's change after 1974, as the pre-

57. Interview of Manos Kafetzopoulos to the author [hereafter: Kafetzopoulos to author], 21.12.2011. Manos Kafetzopoulos, a former militant of PAK-London, was member of the executive committee of the Pasok, in charge of foreign relations, and Ambassador in Libya from 1981 to 1986. From 1986 on, he served in the Foreign Ministry as Adviser for Arab and Mediterranean affairs.
58. Anonymous interview to the author, 22.12.2011; interview of Theodoros Pangalos to the author, 19.12.2011. See also A. SCEBERRAS TRIGONA, *40 Years of Malta Libya Relations – a Brief Overview*, PL International Secretary, 2009 <http://plinternationalsecretary.blogspot.com/2009/09/highlights-of-40-years-of-malta-libya.html>.
59. Y. RONEN, *Qaddafi's Libya in World Politics*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder (Colorado), 2008, pp.11-12 and 16-18.
60. Y. ZOUBIR, *Les États-Unis, l'Europe et la Libye : de la réhabilitation de Kadhafi à son renversement*, in: *L'Année du Maghreb*, 2012, <http://anneemaghreb.revues.org/1551>.

vious Greek Ambassador in Libya had been appointed by the Colonels' Junta.[61] Kafetzopoulos was acquainted with Ahmad Shahati, chief of the Libyan Foreign Affairs Office, in the seventies, in the framework of the Mediterranean socialist conferences, but also with the Fatah section that was based in Tripoli, which made him a well-recognized actor in the bilateral relation between Tripoli and Athens. As Ambassador, he had liberty in his initiatives and direct communication with Papandreou.[62]

Right after Papandreou's election, Colonel Gaddafi seemed eager to visit Athens but the idea was entirely opposed by the Greek President Karamanlis, who was cautious to preserve Greece's relations with the USA. According to Kafetzopoulos, Papandreou was not willing to harm his relations with Karamanlis over this. So, perhaps conveniently, Gaddafi's visit in Athens was soon off the agenda. Greek-Libyan economic relations paid the price, as oil exports to Greece and payments to construction companies active in Libya (a total of 120 million dollars) ceased. However, things had returned to normal by June 1982.[63] It is not clear what made Gaddafi change his attitude, but this was probably due to Greece's activity over the Lebanon War and its links to France. Greece seemed then potentially useful in two domains that were crucial to Libya, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Africa. Gaddafi had every reason to be on good terms with Papandreou, especially since the latter was not an enemy for him. The French-Libyan relations were strained at the time because of Libya's support to the opponents of the legal government of Chad that was backed by France. According to former Foreign Minister of France, Roland Dumas, Andreas Papandreou was one of the intermediaries Gaddafi used during this period to declare himself disposed to come to terms with the French regarding Chad, the other one being Bruno Kreisky. For Greece, except for their economic aspects, the importance of relations with Libya – and the Arab countries in general – was further underlined after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) on 15 November 1983 and its search for international recognition. In accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 541, the Arab states declared themselves to be opposed to the self-proclamation of the TRNC and did not grant it diplomatic recognition nor upgraded the observer status the Cypriot-Turkish community held in the Organization of the Islamic Conference to full membership.[64]

It was against this background that a meeting between Papandreou and Gaddafi came back on the agenda in 1984. The issue reportedly raised a big debate within governmental circles. Foreign Minister Yannos Haralambopoulos, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in charge of the Mediterranean and Arab Affairs, Carolos Papoulias, Vice-Minister of Economy Costis Vaitsos and Ambassador to Tripoli Kafetzopoulos between those who were convinced about the usefulness of such a

61. On this and the main structural aspects of Papandreou's foreign policy see J.O. IATRIDES, *Papandreou's Foreign Policy*, in: T.C. KARIOTIS (ed.), *The Greek Socialist Experiment. Papandreou's Greece 1981-1989*, Pella, New York, 1992, pp.127-160.
62. Kafetzopoulos to author; *Le Monde*, 16.11.1984.
63. *To Pontiki*, 10.08.1984.
64. R. DUMAS, *Affaires étrangères*..., op.cit., p.312; J.O. IATRIDES, op.cit., p.137.

meeting and those concerned not to harm Greek-US relations. Once more, President Karamanlis objected to hosting Gaddafi in Athens.[65] On Gaddafi's invitation, it was finally Andreas Papandreou who visited Tripoli on 23-24 September 1984. The press reported at the time the signing of a bilateral economic accord that provided for co-operation in the investment banking sector, technology transfers, infrastructure construction, and commercial relations of a total value of 1 billion dollars. Several years later, the accord was still not fully implemented, in part because of the reluctance of Greek companies to develop further activities in Libya.[66] Moreover, a 75 million dollars contract regarding imports to Libya of anti-aircraft weapons made by the Greek Armament Industry did not go further because of US pressure put on Greece and Libya's backing of terrorist activities. Since its sudden announcement in mid-September, however, Papandreou's visit was mostly associated to a probable Greek mediation in Chad. France and Libya had agreed to mutually withdraw their military forces from this country following the mediation of Chancellor Kreisky on 15 September. But Gaddafi was not only interested in coming to terms with the French. He also wanted to do it in an official way by publicly meeting Mitterrand.[67] According to one source, it was the Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Tripoli who did the match-maker between Greeks and Libyans by encouraging the former to propose Papandreou's services to Gaddafi.[68] So, Papandreou's visit conveniently combined international activity with bilateral economic arrangements, but also with domestic concerns: after the congress of the PASOK (May 1984) he needed to show that the party had not lost its third road soul; and, following the European elections of June, that saw the party's electoral force diminished, he also needed to boost his voters.[69]

The meeting between Mitterrand and Gaddafi took place at Elounda, Crete, on 15 November 1984. Elounda was a convenient choice, as neither Mitterrand nor Karamanlis wished to have Gaddafi officially invited in their respective capitals. There is no official account of the meeting, but according to the Greek and French press the negotiations were lengthy and laborious.[70] The Libyan forces were still in Chad, whereas the French had already ordered the retreat of theirs (operation Manta) before the agreed deadline, which was precisely the 15 November. The French had been publicly humiliated by US revelations on the Libyan inconsistency just days after a joint communiqué had simultaneously been released by the French and the Libyan Foreign Ministries. The Chad affair did not find a solution until two years later, but, at the time, Andreas Papandreou was able to reinforce his image as a promoter of peace in the Mediterranean and as a mediator between the West and Gaddafi, as he

65. *To Pontiki*, 28.09.1984.
66. *To Vima*, 25.09.1984. See also M. XANTHAKIS, P. ALEXAKIS, C. CHRISTOPOULOS, *The Arab Countries. A Survey of Their Economies and Relations with Greece*, Foundation for Mediterranean Studies, Athens, 1989, pp.137 and 143.
67. *To Vima*, 19.09.1984 and 20.09.1984; R. DUMAS, *Affaires étrangères…*, op.cit., pp.312-313; R. DUMAS, *Tchad: histoire secrète d'une négociation*, in: *La lettre de l'Institut François Mitterrand*, 12.06.2005 <http://www.mitterrand.org/Tchad-histoire-secrete-d-une.html>.
68. Kafetzopoulos to author.
69. *To Pontiki*, 29.12.1984, pp.6-7.
70. R. DUMAS, *Tchad…*, op.cit.; *Ethnos*, 16.11.1984; *Le Monde*, 16.11.1984 and 17.11.1984.

had previously obtained the release of French (1983) and British (1984) nationals that were detained in Libya. The Elounda meeting also coincided with the decision of the Greek government to buy 40 French Dassault Mirage 2000 fighter aircraft, as part of the Greek air forces' modernization programme, decreasing by half an initial order that provided for the purchase of 80 F-16s from the USA.[71]

The dissolution of the Greek-Libyan connexion, 1985-1986

The foundations of the Greek-Libyan relationship were fragile and this soon became plainly evident. In 1985, the Reagan administration adopted a tougher stance towards international terrorism emanating from the Middle East.[72] In Greece, Karamanlis, whom the US trusted, was no longer President, after Papandreou backed Christos Sartzetakis in the presidential election of March 1985. As a consequence, direct US pressure on the Greek government regarding its relations with Gaddafi became stronger. For example, Washington made use of the threat to cancel the delivery of the 40 F-16 aircraft, something that would affect the military balance between Greece and Turkey. In June, following the hi-jack of the TWA 847 Athens to Rome flight by two members of Hezbollah, the State Department issued an instruction against travel via Athens airport. The warning stayed valid for only a month but it was effective, as companies such as Pan-American Airways went so far as to temporarily suspend all flights to and from Athens.[73]

Libyan-backed terrorist activities had indeed become a problem for Greece by 1985 (see graphic). According to data available by the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI) on incidents related to Middle East-related terrorism in Greece, out of 20 incidents occurring between 1981 and 1988, a peak was noted in 1985.[74] The year saw 9 incidents, of which 7 were linked to Libya (Black September, Abu Nidal). The Greek government had suppressed the 1978 anti-terrorist law in 1983 and although it did not pass a new one, the Greek authorities plainly cooperated with the USA and benefited from the training and equipment they were given. By April 1986, the security of Athens airport had considerably improved.[75] At the same time, relations with Libya took a different turn: by March 1986, the decision

71. *Le Monde*, 16.11.1984 and 17.11.1984; C. ESTIER, *France-Libye: les dessous d'une affaire complexe*, in: *L'Unité*, 23.11.1984. See also *To Pontiki*, 23.11.1984, pp.6-7.
72. M. TOALDO, *The Reagan Administration and the Origins of the War on Terror: Lebanon and Libya as case studies*, in: *New Middle Eastern Studies*, 2(2012) <http://www.brismes.ac.uk/nmes/archives/767>.
73. Kafetzopoulos to author. See also *LA Times*, 22.07.1985; *Chicago Tribune*, 20.06.1985.
74. <http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/search_form.php>. Selected search values: 1968-2010, Greece, international incident (true),attack claimed (true). 214 records found from 1971 to 2009. Records on incidents linked to Middle Eastern terrorism were then manually retrieved and crossed with further bibliography, mainly SEALE 1992.
75. *Ethnos*, 19.04.1986. See also A. PAPACHELAS, T. TELLOGLOU, *Folder 17 November*, Estia, Athens, 2003, pp.128-129.

was taken to replace Kafetzopoulos, who would join the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as advisor for Arab Affairs, with Vanghelis Hatzimanolis, an economist and member of PASOK's committee of foreign relations.[76] The aim was to push for implementation of the 1984 accords and apparently Greece attached more importance to the development of the economic aspects of its relations with Libya. Undoubtedly, these were also signs that the Greek government was careful to preserve its relations with the USA.

Network visualization of the main terrorist organizations that perpetrated attacks in Greece from 1981 to 1988 and the countries the attacks were related to



(Source of data: RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents. Visualization software: Gephi)

In 1986, Greek-Libyan relations were further depoliticized under the influence of the crisis between Gaddafi and the USA and the readjustment of Greek-US relations. In late March, tension between the Libyans and the Americans during a US naval exercise in the Gulf of Sidra escalated to limited military actions. At the time, Secretary of State George Shultz was in Athens (25-27 March) for discussions on the future of the US bases in Greece and Greek-US relations, with Libya also being part of the agenda. Official Greek reaction to the events was cautious and balanced and showed no support for Libyan claims in the Gulf of Sidra. The US operation was

76. *To Pontiki*, 28.03.1986, p.8.

condemned by the PASOK's committee for foreign relations, but the party abstained from the anti-US demonstrations that were organized in the Greek capital.[77]

The terrorist attack on the discotheque "La Belle" in West Berlin, on 6 April, for which the US – rightly, as was later proved – blamed Gaddafi, led to the launch of a series of US air strikes against Libya. The EEC countries, with the exception of the UK, did not allow to use their military bases in the operation against Libya. Under US pressure, they denounced Libyan involvement in terrorism and agreed to restrict freedom of movement for the country's diplomatic staff in European capitals, but did not take any economic measures against Tripoli.[78] In a speech in the Greek Parliament, Papandreou criticized the US action but, in general, Greece's attitude was along the same lines as that of all the EEC countries without trying to go it alone. The normalization of the Greek government's attitude was best shown when Greece received an unexpected – and probably unwelcome – visit of a Libyan envoy shortly after the beginning of the US bombings. Ahmad Shahati, head of the Libyan Foreign Affairs Office and an old acquaintance of the Greek socialists, landed to Athens on 17 April, where he held talks with Foreign Minister Papoulias and Papandreou. According to the official declaration of the government, Gaddafi hoped for an EEC initiative in favour of peace in the Mediterranean. But, Papandreou said, the Libyan demand did not mean that Greece would act and, if it was the case, this would only be in a European framework. Papandreou also condemned terrorism and tension in the Mediterranean. Shahati left Athens only to return again in the same evening under circumstances that remain unclear. He convoked a press conference around midnight, where he denied that Gaddafi had asked for the mediation of the EEC. The conference was brutally interrupted by Greek Police officials and Shahati was evacuated.[79] After this inglorious incident, much speculation was made about the content of the message of Gaddafi. According to Manos Kafetzopoulos, the Libyan leader had asked for the active support of Papandreou against the US operations. This meant various kinds of support: diplomatic, through an EEC action; humanitarian, by hosting Libyan children in Greece, including Gaddafi's children; and even military, by totally forbidding the use of the US bases in Greece even for interception purposes.[80] Gaddafi himself confirmed several years later that he had considered launching missile attacks against the US bases on Crete. The fact was that the April US-Libyan crisis revealed a total change in the Greek government's attitude towards Gaddafi. In July 1986, following the EEC decisions and a Greek-Libyan agreement, the Libyan Popular Office of Athens reduced its staff.[81]

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77. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Statement by Principal Deputy Press Secretary Speakes on the Gulf of Sidra Incident, 24.03.1986, <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1986/32486b.htm>. See also *To Vima*, 30.03.1986. p.25.
78. *New York Times*, 13.11.2001 <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/14/world/4-guilty-in-fatal-1986-berlin-disco-bombing-linked-to-libya.html> and *The Guardian*, 15.04.1986.
79. *To Vima*, 20 and 27.04.1986 and *Ethnos*, 18, 19 and 20.04.1986.
80. *To Pontiki*, 25.04.1986, pp.6-7.
81. *New York Times*, 08.05.1990, <http://www.nytimes.com/1990/05/08/world/qaddafi-tells-of-plan-to-attack-us-bases.html>; *To Pontiki*, 11.07.1986.

Conclusion

Greece's attitude towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the framework of the EPC from 1981 to 1985 was a conjunction of *Realpolitik* concerns, ideology and even emotional attachment to the Palestinian cause. Indeed, relevant Greek action in the EEC offers an interesting insight to the connections between foreign policy and emotional attitudes inspired by a nation's own history, collective memory and even nationalism. In particular, different European attitudes during the 1982 Lebanon War show that emotions can be a driving force in rational decision making on foreign affairs matters when *Realpolitik* concerns and the balance of power in a collective framework, in this case the EPC, allow it.[82] Greece's energy also shows that the country was quick to adapt to the EEC foreign-policy making mechanisms and to contribute to decision-making through collaboration with its partners soon after fully joining the Community. Greece was able to profit from European attitudes when these fitted its general goals and appear as a positive and effective player in the Mediterranean. However, there were limits and they became evident when bigger players that led the game – France or Italy – did not leave Greece enough space or, indeed, when Greek positions were out of time.

The case of Libya, on the other hand, shows a quick Westernisation of Greece's policy towards this country under the combined influence of three factors: US pressure on Greece, Libyan backed terrorism and the liberalisation of European and third world economies that favoured developing economic rather than political relations with Libya. In 1986, from all aspects, Greece's attitude was entirely part of a multilateral EEC approach towards the US-Libyan crisis, formalised or not, and was even claimed as such. The personal policy that Papandreou had followed up until then, in part out of domestic concerns and in part because of the nature of the relations one could have with Gaddafi, who totally dominated the exercise of Libyan foreign policy, seemed completely outdated once terrorism entered the agenda of international relations. The Papandreou-Gaddafi relationship reveals an interesting aspect of socialisation between Mediterranean leaders that developed also in the name of an updated third-worldism during the Second Cold War, only to vanish under the impact of the different evolution the Mediterranean North and South and the coming dissolution of the bipolar world.

Last but not least, the shadow of the Cyprus affair and the Greek-Turkish relations, that one finds constantly behind Greece's Arab policy and PASOK's third road approach, would in their turn be Europeanised, in the sense of a more denationalised and multilateral approach, with the adoption of a positive Greek attitude towards Turkey's EU candidature at the 1999 Helsinki Council and Cyprus's accession to the

82. For the case of Ireland see R. MILLER, *Ireland and the Palestine Question…*, op.cit.; R. MILLER, *Why the Irish Support Palestine*, in: *Foreign Policy*, 24.06.2010, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/06/24/why-the-irish-support-palestine/>; for the case of Germany see A.-K. KREFT, op.cit., pp.60-63.

EU in 2004.[83] These policies were principally led or backed by post-Papandreou socialist governments. However, the reorientation towards a European option for Cyprus appeared already on the horizon in the mid-eighties, as the dissolution of Cold War balances was coming into the picture, rendering its foreign policy's third world orientations outdated.[84]

In conclusion, Papandreou's tentative of exercising a multidimensional foreign policy during this period shows how fluid a concept the Mediterranean eventually remained when faced with *Realpolitik* and domestic concerns, continuous conflict and lack of a common European foreign policy.

83. S. ECONOMIDES, *The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy*, in: *West European Politics*, 2(2005), pp.471-491.
84. T. PANGALOS, op.cit., pp.144-145.

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The EEC and Iran: From the Revolution of 1979 to the Launch of the Critical Dialogue in 1992

Claudia CASTIGLIONI

> "What is more surprising is […] how long optimism, born of wishful thinking or diplomatic calculation, prevailed both in Iran and in the West. The primary illusion found both in Iran and in the Western European countries […] was to see bilateral relations as divorced from their more general context […] as if a better understanding here, or a diplomatic concession there, could dissolve conflicts and differences of interest that often had deeper roots".[1]

The statement above is drawn from a 1994 article on Iran–Western European relations after 1979. It is founded on two basic assumptions: on the one hand, high expectations of a European ability to play mediator in the "cold war" that broke out between Washington and Tehran after the collapse of the Pahlavi regime in 1979; on the other hand, the obstacles they encountered and the missed opportunities to establish a solid and beneficial collaboration in the aftermath of the revolution that, thirty-six years ago, irreversibly changed Iran and its role in the international community. The idea synthesised in Fred Halliday's comment – that the rapprochement between Tehran and Europe after 1979 fell short of both European and Iranian expectations – is grounded on strong evidence. Tehran's deafness to EU pleas to improve its human rights record or to reduce its support to terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas on the one hand, and European inability to distance itself from the US with regard to crucial issues such as economic sanctions on the other, indicate that the route towards a complete normalization was and still is long and complex. The obstacles and the contradictions that emerged in this path should not, however, discourage us from addressing the analysis of what Halliday labelled an "elusive normalization", but rather suggest we approach the issue in a more critical and multifaceted way.

Starting from these considerations, the article evaluates the policy pursued by the European Economic Community (hereafter EEC) and its members towards Iran, from the watershed of the 1979 revolution to the launch of the first concrete attempt at normalization, the so-called Critical Dialogue of 1992. More specifically, the study looks at the following issues: first, the impact of the revolution on economic and political collaboration between Iran and the members of the EEC; second, the initiatives undertaken by the Community in response to the Iranian events; third the level of internal cohesiveness displayed by the EEC countries when faced with the regime change and with the Iran–Iraq war; and fourth and last, the impact of Cold War constraints and transatlantic ties on the formulation of EEC policy. In addressing these issues, the paper examines both the perspectives of some individual Western European countries, and that of the EEC according to the relevance individual or collective action had in the formulation of European policy towards Iran. The EEC is regarded

1. F. HALLIDAY, *An Elusive Normalization: Western Europe and the Iranian Revolution*, in: *Middle East Journal*, 2(1994), pp.309-326, here: p.314.

as a key actor in the immediate aftermath of the hostage crisis in light of the role it played in expressing European interests, policies and priorities vis-à-vis both Washington and Tehran. Conversely, the interests, perspectives and initiatives of the major European countries are at the core of the analysis when the EEC lacked the political strength, instruments and will to act with a single voice, as in the case of the Iran–Iraq war. European initiatives and conduct are analysed both in the framework of the European Political Community (EPC) and by looking at the actions taken by European institutions such as the EEC Council of Ministers and the European Council.[2]

The article is divided into three parts: the first one examines the premises and the evolution of the strong collaboration that Tehran and some Western European countries developed from the 1960s on, as well as in the framework of EEC–Iran cooperation. The second and core part describes the EEC reaction to the two events that irreversibly changed Iran's relations with the West: the revolution of February 1979 and the storming of the American embassy in Tehran on November 4th of the same year. Particular attention is paid to the EEC response to US requests to impose sanctions targeting the newly established Islamic Republic of Iran. The third part of the article addresses the inconsistency of the EEC policy vis-à-vis Tehran during the Iran–Iraq war and up to the launch of the Critical Dialogue in 1992; European military support to the cobelligerents despite their formal neutrality in the conflict is used as a case in point to show such inconsistency and its impact on EEC–Iran relations. In some passages the analysis of EEC–Iran relations is combined with a brief examination of the broader geostrategic context, first and foremost the transatlantic alliance. Between the late 1970s and the early 1980s many Western European countries, including the key EEC members, showed increasing reluctance to lend unambiguous support to American policy in the Third World.[3] In this framework the Iranian crisis can shed some light on the changes underway in the European approach to the global arena and in new patterns in the transatlantic alliance, especially on Third World issues.

Europe and Iran: The Golden Era of Collaboration

If the West, and particularly Europe, has been fascinated with Iran since antiquity, Iran long regarded Europe as the cradle of political and economic imperialism.[4]

2. On European Political Cooperation see: M.E. SMITH, *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004.
3. On the evolution of the transatlantic alliance in this crucial decade see, among others: K.K. PATEL, K. WEISBRODE (eds), *European Integration and the Atlantic Community in the 1980s*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013. With specific reference to the Middle East see, among others: B.A. ROBERSON (ed.), *The Middle East and Europe. The Power Deficit*, Routledge, London, 1998.
4. O.H. BONNEROT, *La Perse dans la littérature et la pensée françaises au XVIIIe siècle*, Champion-Slatkine, Paris, 1988, pp.244-245.

Britain, in particular, was seen as the ultimate manifestation of Western arrogance, the mighty and distant power that condemned Iran to backwardness and semi-colonialism for decades, depriving it of its wealth and independence. Starting from the late 1950s, though, the sense of foreign interference and exploitation began to allow for emulation and, to a growing extent, collaboration.[5] As oil revenues started to fuel Iran's industrial take-off, Tehran began an intense collaboration with some of the major European countries, especially France, Britain, West Germany and Italy. The 1970s saw a further consolidation of the ties between Iran and Western Europe: Tehran's ascendency to the role of regional power in the framework of the Nixon Doctrine and the impressive rearmament that it implied, increased the strategic and economic means at the Shah's disposal in his partnership with Europe. During the decade Iran became a lender to some Western European countries, providing loans to Britain and France and investing massively in West German industry. The collaboration also came to involve the nuclear field: in the late 1970s the Shah signed contracts with French and German companies for the construction of nuclear facilities.

Among the Western European countries, Britain was the one with the strongest political and military relations with the regime of the Shah. The British military withdrawal from the territories East of Suez in 1971 created a power vacuum in the Gulf that only Mohammed Reza Pahlavi's Iran had the resources and the political ambition to fill.[6] This upgrading of Iran in the region led to an intensification of the military collaboration between the two countries. It has been argued that for London arms sales became "a means of bolstering the position of the monarch as the guarantor of British interests in the region".[7] Although the scale of British arms deals could not be compared to that of the Americans, in proportional terms they were vast: between 1973 and 1978 contracts worth £1.8 billion were signed.[8] As for France and West Germany, according to a study on Iranian foreign relations prepared by the Foreign Office in 1979, neither of them enjoyed the privileged position of Britain and the United States in Iran, but both shared "the general Western approval of the Shah's role as policeman of the area and the Western urgency to maximise exports to Iran".[9] The report also emphasised the predominance of the commercial aspect in German–Iranian relations. "Despite the weakness of the political collaboration be-

5. G.R. AFKHAMI, *The Life and Times of the Shah*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2009, p. 220.
6. On this point see W.T. FAIN III, *American Ascendancy and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf Region*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008, and F.G. GAUSE, *British and American Policies in the Persian Gulf, 1968–1973*, in: *Review of International Studies*, 4(1985), pp.247-273.
7. E. POSNETT, *Treating His Imperial Majesty's Warts: British Policy towards Iran 1977-79*, in: *Iranian Studies*, 1(2012), pp.119-137, here: p.121.
8. E. POSNETT, op.cit., p.121.
9. *British Policy on Iran, 1974-1978*, Study prepared by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/our-history/historical-publications/documents-british-policy/british-policy-on-iran-1974-1978.

tween Tehran and Bonn" – the document argued – "German businessmen regarded Iran as one of the most stable areas outside Western industrialised countries".[10]

The significance of commercial ties was also a key feature of the partnership between Tehran and Rome. In the second half of the 1970s Italy laid the foundations for a strong collaboration with the Shah's regime, especially in the economic field. Italy's Ambassador to Iran, Giulio Tamagnini, eloquently described the climate of optimism that dominated the bilateral relations when he arrived in Tehran:

> "At the time of my assignment to Tehran, in December 1977, Italian and foreign friends described Iran as the 'land of plenty', made richer and richer by oil revenues and wisely ruled by the Shah, monarch and manager of Iran".[11]

Italian firms (many of them state-owned) signed deals with the government of Tehran worth approximately $5.5 billion. Among the companies operating in Iran some well-known names standout such as: ENI (AGIP, Saipem, Snam Progetti), Italimpianti, Agusta, Italstrade and FIAT.[12] The project that most effectively embodied the partnership was the construction of the harbour of Bandar Abbas on the Persian Gulf. The project was launched in the mid-1970s by the Shah in collaboration with a group of Italian companies headed by the society "Condotte d'Acqua", with the aim of creating a big commercial harbour in the South of the country. Such a profitable collaboration translated into open appreciation for the rule of the Shah. In April 1978, on the eve of Foreign Minister Arnaldo Forlani's visit to Iran, Giulio Tamagnini depicted Mohammed Reza Pahlavi as "a mixture of a typical centralizing monarch and a great manager", motivated by the intent to "modernize the country industrially, economically, ethically, and socially".[13]

Starting from the mid-1970s Iran also developed a fruitful collaboration with some Western European countries in the nuclear field. In November 1974 Iran reached preliminary agreements with Kraftwerk Union, a subsidiary of the German firm Siemens, to build two 1,200 MW nuclear reactors near Bushehr, to be completed in 1981 and 1982, and with Framatome of France to build another two 900 MW reactors on the Karun River between Ahvaz and Khorramshahr by 1983 and 1984. The enriched uranium that would fuel Iran's nuclear reactors would be provided by EURODIF, a European conglomerate that was building an enrichment plant in France. In exchange for the concession of a $1 billion loan to help finance the construction of the plant, Iran would receive a 10% share in EURODIF and a similar share of the nuclear fuel that the plant would produce.

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10. *British Policy on Iran*, op.cit. On Iran-Germany relations from World War II to the revolution of 1979 see: S.H. MOUSAVIAN, *Iran-Europe relations: challenges and opportunities*, Routledge, London, 2008, pp.15-22.
11. G. TAMAGNINI, *La caduta dello Scià. Diario dell'ambasciatore italiano a Teheran (1978-1980)*, Edizioni Associate, Roma, 1990, p.13.
12. In 1978 FIAT's involvement in Iran was still very limited compared to other companies. According to Tamagnini, Giovanni Agnelli was expected to visit the country in 1978 to improve his relations with the Shah and pave the way for an increase in the collaboration. The meeting never took place. G. TAMAGNINI, op.cit., p.38.
13. Ibid., p.38.

Politically Iran tried to use its wealth to promote goals complementary to those of the Atlantic partners; by the end of the decade the country was regarded as a useful ally in the area not only by Washington, but also by the EEC members. The importance Iran assumed during the 1970s is well synthetized by Anthony Parson, British Ambassador to Iran between 1974 and 1979. He observed:

> "Pahlavi Iran in the Shah's last years was more attractive materially and more important politically to Western Europe than at any previous period in modern history with the possible exception of World War II".[14]

On a Community level, the years immediately before the revolution also represented a moment of intense collaboration. According to a report prepared by the European Commission in 1975, at that time the EEC was Iran's biggest supplier and biggest customer. In 1973, 44% of Iran's imports came from the EEC, and 29% of the oil exports and 33% of exports other than oil were consigned to the EEC. Iran's chief purchases from the European market were industrial products, especially motor vehicles and machinery. As for Europe, oil was by far the main Iranian export to the European Community, with other exports including carpets, cotton and caviar.[15] In 1978, on the eve of the revolution, the EEC still represented the first commercial partner of Iran, which in turn ranked sixth among the Community's trading partners. EEC exports to Iran in 1978 amounted to twice the volume of exports from America and three times those from Japan; only in the agrarian sector did American exports exceed the European ones.[16] Energy products made up 94.5% of Community imports, a fact that made Iran the Community's second-biggest supplier of energy products after Saudi Arabia, whereas nearly 83% of EEC exports to Iran consisted of transport machinery and equipment, and manufactured articles.[17] In 1977 the Community imported 78 million tons of oil from Iran, which represented 16% of total EEC oil imports and covered 8.5% of the total internal energy consumption of the Community.

By the early 1970s Iran started to pressure the Community to revise upwards the terms of the trade agreement reached in 1963.[18] In 1976, at a meeting in Brussels in the context of the new round of negotiations, EEC Commissioner Finn Olav Gundelach affirmed that in its ambitious programme of economic development, Iran needed partners with whom it had "close historical, political and cultural relations" and who were, for all these reasons, strongly interested themselves in Iran's devel-

14. A. PARSONS, op.cit., p.219.
15. AEI [Archive of European Integration at the University of Pittsburgh], The European Community and Iran. Note circulated on the occasion of the visit to Iran of Sir Christopher Soames, 12-14.05.1975, available at the: http://aei.pitt.edu/10352/1/10352.pdf.
16. TNA [The National Archives at Kew Gardens], FCO 98/830, Commission Paper on Iran Sanctions, 15.04.1980.
17. *The EEC–Iran relationship*, in: *Europe, Magazine of the European Community*, March–April(1979), p.10.
18. More specifically Tehran wanted the new agreement to eliminate all discrimination against Iranian goods and provide free access to the European Community for products made under EEC–Iran joint ventures. On the relations between Iran and the Common Market in the first years after its establishment see: R.K. RAMAZANI, *The Middle East and the European Common Market*, University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville, 1964, pp.74-78.

opment. "The Community" – he concluded – "is [in this sense for Iran] a natural partner".[19] The negotiations continued in this promising climate for a few years, before being suspended as a consequence of the revolution. They would be resumed almost twenty years later in the framework of the EU–Iran Comprehensive Dialogue.

Table 1

Iranian trade with the EEC. Total exports from Iran
(in thousand units of account)[20]

	To the Community of Six	To the Community of Nine
1964	357,399	–
1972	1,259,157	–
1973	1,755,013	2,215,760
1974	n.a.	4,660,059

Table 2

Oil exports from Iran
(in thousand units of account)

	To the Community of Six	To the Community of Nine
1964	297,051	–
1972	1,060,347	(1,356,161)
1973	(1,071,337)	n.a.

Table 3

Imports into Iran
(in thousand units of account)[21]

	From the Community of Six	From the Community of Nine
1964	175,151	–
1972	737,818	n.a.
1973	(1,032,560)	1,439,150
1974	n.a.	1,456,615

The 1979 Revolution and the Oil Shock

Given the extent of the collaboration between Tehran and its European partners, it is easy to understand the alarm when, in January 1979, after more than fifty years under Pahlavi rule and after a period of unprecedented economic growth and drastic social

19. AEI, The EC–Iran Negotiations. Opening Statement by Finn Olav Gundelach, 20.12.1976, available at: http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10868.
20. The value of an EEC unit of account in 1975 was approximately US$1.2.
21. The European Community and Iran Sanctions, 15.04.1980, op.cit.

transformations, the once all-powerful Shah was toppled by a mob of angry protesters, leaving his Western allies in Europe as much as in Washington, surprised and dismayed.[22] Six years after the embargo imposed in 1973 by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries and the consequent steep surge in oil prices, the unexpected regime change in the fourth contributor to world oil production raised fears of another oil crisis. These fears were fuelled by the widespread conviction that any political shock in the area would trigger an oil shortage and, therefore, a major energy security crisis for the West.[23] Meanwhile, the oil shock turned out to be less harmful and prolonged than expected. Iranian oil progressively started to come back onto the market; the limits of the disruption and, more importantly, the fact that other sources quickly made up for the lost output and the action of the International Energy Agency significantly smoothed the effects of the shock.

Even if the consequences of the regime change proved to be limited with regard to the energy markets, the same cannot be said for its political and economic implications. To this extent the collapse of one of the pillars of Soviet containment in the Middle East did come as a watershed for Tehran's political and commercial partners on both sides of the Atlantic. In this sense the revolution served as a chance for the West to assess its ability to cope with unexpected (and hostile) change in the Third World, as a test for the transatlantic relation, and as an opportunity for the European countries to act together or, at least, to design a common response to the crisis and to Washington's requests to its allies.

From the standpoint of Western Europe, the revolution marked a change first and foremost because of the situation of instability it created. The European capitals responded to the unexpected events taking place in Tehran with a policy of "wait and see": whilst it was broadly accepted that a return to the *status quo ante* was impossible, it was the uncertainty, not the political assessment of the revolution, that came to dominate European analyses of the crisis. In this context, few had a clear understanding of the forces on the ground and of the political struggle that was already unfolding in Tehran. "Apart from Khomeini and the ageing National Front leaders" – a report prepared by the Middle East Department in London noted –

> "the UK knows little of the opposition. The establishment of an Islamic Republic in Iran could bring the country under the influence of the Soviet Union if the young militants and the terrorist groups allied with Khomeini are not able to achieve positions of influence".[24]

22. On Europe–Iran relations from the revolution of 1979 to the end of the war with Iraq see: M.R. SAIDABADI, *Iran's European Relations since 1979*, in: A. MOHAMMADI, A. EHTESHAMI (eds), *Iran and Eurasia*, Ithaca Press, Reading, 2000, pp.59-80; K. BAYRAMZADEH, *Les enjeux principaux des relations entre l'Iran et l'Europe de 1979 à 2003. Une étude sur la sociologie politique des relations internationales*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2004, pp.78-100, here: p.13.
23. Robert Lieber defines the concept of energy security in terms of "assuring reliable and affordable supplies of energy". R. LIEBER, *The Oil Decade, Conflict and Cooperation in the West*, Praeger, New York, 1983, p.3.
24. TNA, FCO FCO 98/676, European Political Cooperation [hereafter: EPC] Political Committee, 23-24.01.1979.

Such a hypothesis, that the following weeks would have proved improbable at best, along with the predominance of Cold War language in the approach to the Iranian events, exposes the distorted perception of the crisis circulating among European commentators and policymakers – a perception shared by their American counterparts.

The volatility of the Iranian situation led the major commercial partners of Iran in Europe to adopt a low profile strategy or, to use the words of the British Ambassador Anthony Parsons, to decide "to keep it quiet".[25] Britain, France, Italy and the other Western European countries reduced their trade with Iran, though without precluding the possibility of going back to a situation of "business as usual" in case the moderate forces had the upper hand. According to a report prepared by the Commission, the Community's exports to Iran between January and April 1979 declined by 65.5% compared to the previous year, while imports reduced by 40.8%. In the same period American exports to Iran went down by almost 70% and imports by 16.5%. As regards energy products, between 1978 and 1979 the overall share of Iran in EEC imports declined from 16% in 1978 to 6% in 1979, and then to 5.5% in the first quarter of 1980. Two months later the Foreign Office wrote a report stating that during 1979 EEC exports to Iran totalled 3.3 million dollars, 4 million less than the previous year.[26]

Uncertainty also dominated the political response at the EEC level. The first issue that demanded a joint action by the Nine was the recognition of the provisional government appointed by ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini upon his return to Iran and led by Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan. The EEC countries, at London's initiative, almost immediately decided to recognise the new government, proving their intention to keep the dialogue with the new forces in power open.[27] For the rest, the consensus was for a cautious approach, centred on "allowing the Iranian Revolution to run its course" while accepting that "Iran as a market would not recover for perhaps a year". "When a firm government gets to grips with Iran" – the EEC ambassadors concluded in March – "they will need and appreciate Western support".[28] In this volatile context, the Ambassadors of the Nine in Tehran assured political coordination among the EEC countries. Whilst in Brussels attention was focused on issues such as the debate on the British contribution to the European budget and the outcome of the first direct elections to the European Parliament, the diplomatic representatives of the Nine tried their best to respond to the instability of the Iranian situation.[29] "The complex and fluid situation in Iran makes a pragmatic approach necessary" – commented the Head of the British delegation in Paris Nicholas Henderson – "In these circumstances, the

25. TNA, FCO 8/3374, Parsons' comments on a paper prepared by the Middle East Department, 12.02.1979.
26. TNA, FCO 8/3612, Report prepared by the Middle East Department of the Foreign Office, 03.06.1980.
27. TNA, FCO 98/676, EPC Political Committee, 27-28.02.1979.
28. TNA, FCO 98/676, EPC Ministerial Meeting, 12.03.1979.
29. M. GAINAR, *Aux origines de la diplomatie européenne. Les Neuf et la Coopération politique européenne de 1973 à 1980*, Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2012, p.541.

Ambassadors of the Nine will remain in close contact and will inform each other of any action which may be of interest to their colleagues".[30]

The Hostage Crisis and the Sanctions

Such a "wait and see" policy, while relatively successful in guiding European action during the moderate interlude of the Bazargan government, showed its limits when faced with the traumatic event that marked the escalation of the crisis between Iran and the West: the seizure of the US embassy on 4 November 1979. The Carter administration reacted almost immediately to the hostage taking placing, less than a week later, an embargo on Iranian oil. Though aware that the nature of the world oil market essentially limited the effect of a single embargo to a simple need for reshuffling the distribution chain, Carter felt it was politically important to eliminate the perception that oil would influence his response to the crisis.[31] Two days later the American administration combined the embargo on oil exports with the decision to freeze Iranian assets.[32]

The EEC countries did not join the US in the embargo. Nevertheless the revolution and the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran did impact the import of petroleum from Iran as they prompted some of the countries that were major importers of Iranian oil to start looking elsewhere for their energy supplies, a trend that, as we saw, had already started in the aftermath of the revolution. As it has been observed:

> "Western Europe's desire to support America in reducing their consumption of Iranian oil was probably no stronger than their general recognition that instability in Iran was making it an unreliable supplier".[33]

A relevant role in the steady decrease in European imports of Iranian oil was also played by Iranian pricing policy. In early 1980 Iran declared a $2.50 per barrel surcharge on its oil, a surcharge that oil companies refused to pay, triggering a reaction from the National Iranian Oil Company, which shut off shipments to British Petroleum and Shell. As a result of the controversy, EEC oil imports from Iran declined from $829 million in January 1980 to $100 million in October, a drop way more significant than any related to the sanctions that would be later adopted.[34]

30. TNA, FCO 98/676, Paris to FCO, 12.02.1979.
31. C. EMERY, *The Transatlantic and Cold War Dynamics of Iran Sanctions, 1979-80*, in: *Cold War History*, 3(2010), pp.371-396, here: p.372; D. YERGIN, *The Prize: the Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1991, p.702.
32. On the asset freeze, see: R. CARSWELL, *Economic Sanctions and the Iranian Experience*, in: *Foreign Affairs*, 2(1981/82), pp.247-265.
33. C. EMERY, op.cit., p.374.
34. P. SHEHADI, *Economic Sanctions and Iranian Trade*, in: *MERIP Reports*, July–August(1981), pp. 15-16.

While the EEC countries opted for a cautious approach to the oil embargo, their response was more decisive with regard to the asset freeze: France, Britain and the other major financial partners of Washington made sure that the measures adopted by the American administration also targeted Iran's deposits in the European branches of US banks.[35] From a strictly economic viewpoint, neither the freezing of assets nor the ban on oil imports particularly hurt Iran, whose situation had already deteriorated as a consequence of economic mismanagement by the new leadership in power, lack of productivity, the sabotaging actions of extremist groups, and a consistent brain drain. Still, the two initiatives proved effective as political tools aimed at communicating to the regime in Tehran the assertive and proactive attitude that Washington intended to pursue in response to the hostage crisis, along with the high degree of cohesiveness of the Western front in dealing with it.

After the adoption of the oil embargo and of the asset freeze, the Carter administration started to pressure the European countries to enact a new round of more punitive measures against Iran, including economic sanctions. In mid-December the US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, visited the major European capitals to seek their support for economic and financial measures against Iran. Fearing a Soviet veto of any US-sponsored initiative at the UN Security Council, the Carter administration viewed informal cooperation between Washington and its principal European partners as crucial to hit Iran's trade relations and curb its commercial revenues. The response Vance obtained from the European partners, though, was not the one Washington had hoped for. While unanimously supporting a UN resolution decreeing sanctions against Iran, the possibility of unilateral measures, which became the only viable option after a Soviet veto on 13 January 1980, raised questions about the effectiveness of such measures and their impact on European commercial interests. A few months after the revolution 45% of Iranian imports were still coming from the EEC, half from West Germany. Britain's existing contracts with Tehran were worth over US$1 billion and Italian state-owned companies Condotte d'Acqua and Italimpianti alone had agreements worth approximately the same amount for the expansion of the Bandar Abbas port and a steel complex.[36] In the light of such a degree of exposure, and despite the decline in trade resulting from the revolution, Western European countries were not ready to jeopardise any chance of re-establishing some form of economic collaboration with Tehran.[37]

Washington's repeated calls between December and February for the imposition of a stronger set of sanctions, also boosted by the announcement of the Carter Doctrine in January 1980, increased European criticism on the matter. According to Ambassador Tamagnini, at the meeting held in Brussels on November 20 to discuss the situation in Tehran, the Ministers of the Nine showed appreciation for European cooperation on the issue, lamenting, on the other hand, the behaviour of Washington,

35. ANF [French National Archives], VGP [Valéry Giscard d'Estaing Papers], 5AG3/2702, Dossier de Jean-Pierre Ruault.
36. H. ALIKHANI, *Sanctioning Iran. Anatomy of a Failed Policy*, I.B Tauris, London, 2000, p.71.
37. M. GAINAR, op.cit., p.545.

guilty of not addressing "the Nine as such, neither to ask for their opinion nor to show a specific interest in receiving the evaluations of the EEC ambassadors in Tehran".[38] Along the same lines was the position expressed by the British Ambassador in Iran, John Graham. Writing to the Foreign Office in December 1979, he reaffirmed the intention to help the Americans held hostage in Tehran and the American administration without reservation, but complained about their tendency to consider "what's mine is mine; what's yours is negotiable".[39] The response he received from London aptly encompasses the undeniable limits of this widespread criticism:

> "Your sentiments are understandable, and indeed widely shared among America's allies. There is no doubt that the President, for domestic reasons, has often acted first and consulted allies later. At the same time […] [b]oth the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State returned from Washington convinced that […] there were good reasons, on grounds of general Western policy, for going along with it".[40]

In the meantime, and also as a consequence of the increase in regional tensions after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the failed rescue attempt carried out by Washington in early April, and the poor outcome of the repeated attempts by the EEC to find a channel of communication with Iranian authorities, the position of the European leaders started to converge with Washington's. The shift came also as a consequence of the decreasing role of the Ambassadors of the Nine in Tehran. The growing scepticism about the impact of their repeated démarche to the Iranian government, the replacement of the France-educated Minister of Foreign Affairs Abolhassan Banisadr (later to be elected first President of the Islamic Republic) with Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, the decision by Khomeini in early April to delegate the management of crisis to the Parliament, all contributed to such a shift.[41]

In late April, after a further inconclusive meeting between the Ambassadors of the Nine and Ghotbzadeh, the EEC countries bowed to the inevitable. On 22 April the Foreign Ministers of the Community gathered in Luxemburg and passed a resolution requiring all members to impose sanctions against Iran should the American hostages not be released by 17 May.[42] The major points of the declaration were reaffirmed in the final communiqué released after the European Council held in Luxemburg on 27 April.[43] Less than a month later, with the US embassy still under Iranian occupation, European Foreign Ministers gathered in Naples voted to impose limited sanctions on the Islamic Republic to be implemented nationally. The trade restrictions, however, excluded existing contracts entered into prior to 4 November 1979, and allowed case-by-case exceptions for any new contracts. An estimated 10% of the EEC's trade with Iran would have been affected if the accord had been honoured to the letter. With the backdating provisions effectively discarded, however, the actual

38. See: G. TAMAGNINI, op.cit. p.184.
39. TNA, FCO 96/999, UK Embassy in Tehran (Graham) to FCO, 17.12.1979.
40. TNA, FCO 96/999, FCO to UK Embassy in Tehran, 07.01.1980.
41. M. GAINAR, op.cit., p.545.
42. M. GAINAR, op.cit., pp.549-550.
43. The Luxembourg European Council, 27-28.04.1980, reproduced in: the *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 4(1980).

reduction was less. In Britain the sanctions were given an especially vague formulation that allowed British exports to Iran to increase in 1980 over 1979.[44] Britain was not an exception; according to the data reported in the *Official Journal of the European Communities* in May 1981, despite the sanctions EU exports to Iran between January and November 1980 had increased by over 53%, compared to the same period in 1979.[45]

From the political standpoint, although implying a substantial acceptance of American requests, the measures adopted by the European countries, their timing and their practical details, provoked some criticism among US commentators. Georgetown Professor Robert Lieber voiced this criticism, remarking that

> "European policy towards the Iranian hostage incident exemplifie[d] the array of problems and constraints the Europeans face[d] in dealing with the Middle East [and] reflect[ed] their internal differences as well as problems in relations with the United States".[46]

Back in 1979 Lieber's arguments were quite widespread, also within the inner circle of American policymaking. "Only the direct threat of further moves by the United States" – Jimmy Carter recalled in his memoirs – "would have any real effect on some of our friends".[47] Carter's evaluation of the European approach was partly correct, for the EEC members continued to have significant economic ties to Iran and acted to protect them. Even as late as April 1980 Germany was still getting 12% of its oil imports from Iran, while Britain's monthly trade with Iran exceeded $40 million.[48] But, as has been observed, economic interests do not tell the whole story. EEC leaders also had serious doubts about the adoption of punitive measures without UN support.[49] They never questioned the adoption of sanctions *per se*, neither did they question the reasons for American hostility. What they did question was the effectiveness of the sanctions at securing the release of the hostages, and the relation between such effectiveness and the damage to their national interests.

When the EEC members eventually committed to sanctions, they did so reluctantly.[50] At the British cabinet meeting of 17 April 1980, during the debate over the adoption of sanctions, the Lord Privy Seal Sir Ian Gilmour affirmed that the proposed measures "were unlikely to contribute effectively to the release of the hostages". Yet, he continued,

> "allied action in support of the United States was widely recognized to be inevitable, given the state of American public opinion, the risk of the United States being driven to more

44. "Economic Sanctions and Iranian Trade", op.cit.
45. H. ALIKHANI, op.cit. p.83.
46. R. LIEBER, op.cit., p.63.
47. J. CARTER, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President*, Bantam Books, New York, 1982, p.466.
48. H. ALIKHANI, op.cit., p.83.
49. J. RENOUARD, D.N. VIGIL, *The Quest for Leadership in a Time of Peace: Jimmy Carter and Western Europe, 1977-1981*, in: M. SCHULZ, T.A.SCHWARTZ (eds), *The Strained Alliance: U.S.-European Relations from Nixon to Carter*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, pp. 309-332, here: p.327.
50. J. RENOUARD, D.N. VIGIL, op.cit., pp.325-326.

> drastic courses of action, and long-term damage to the cohesion of the Western Alliance".[51]

In the decision to endorse Washington's punitive action, a relevant role was, therefore, played by strategic calculations and international factors, more so than a fundamental agreement with the arguments raised by the American government. The evolution of the domestic situation in Iran further concurred with the European decision: the struggle for power in Tehran, the nationalisations of important industrial complexes and banks, and the cancellation of contracts with European companies, all contributed to making any form of commercial partnership less and less attractive for the EEC countries.

At the end of the Italian presidency of the EEC, in June 1980, Giulio Tamagnini left Iran to be replaced, five months later, by Francesco Mezzalama. Before taking office Mezzalama met with the Italian Foreign Minister, Emilio Colombo, to receive instructions regarding his new task. According to the Ambassador, Colombo

> "insisted on the necessity to persuade Tehran that the liberation of the hostages would end the impasse […] and pave the way for the relaunch of the economic cooperation".[52]

The relaunch of the collaboration was, nevertheless, made impossible as the crisis dragged on and as another event came to alter the situation in the region: Iraq's invasion of Iran in September 1980.

Europe and the Iran–Iraq War

The Iraqi invasion of Iran on 22 September 1980 brought a further escalation of the crisis. The attack and the eight-year war that followed delayed any chance of normalization between Europe and Iran and, more importantly, coincided with a return to bilateral approaches to Iran by the EEC countries. In this sense the Community's reaction to the conflict represented a step back from the timid efforts at collective action carried out in the aftermath of the revolution and in the early phases of the hostage crisis.

At the time of the Iraqi invasion most of the Western European countries had good relations with Baghdad; one more so than the others: France. In the early 1970s the two countries had signed an agreement safeguarding French oil interests in Iraq. The agreement was followed, in 1974, by a French offer to provide Iraq with Mirage fighters in exchange for the launch of civil nuclear collaboration between the two countries. By the end of the decade Iraq had become France's chief trade partner in the Middle East and its second oil supplier. Whilst the centrist Valéry Giscard d'Estaing tried in the first months of conflict to pursue a more balanced approach, pro-

51. TNA, CAB 128/67/16, Conclusions of Cabinet's Meeting, 17.04.1980.
52. F. MEZZALAMA, *L'avventura diplomatica. Ricordi di carriera*, Rubettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2006, p.207.

tecting French commercial and military ties with Iraq without totally jeopardising its relations with Tehran, his successor, François Mitterrand, embraced a more explicit pro-Iraqi stance. The new president decided to reduce French diplomatic representation in Tehran and opted for unequivocal support to Saddam in his fight against the Islamic Republic. In Italy too, pro-Iraqi sentiments were quite rooted. According to Ambassador Mezzalama, in Rome there was a strong political lobby headed by the Socialist Party and with a certain influence at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who favoured the Baathist regime and encouraged the adoption of an open, pro-Baghdad policy.[53] In the meantime Iranian–British diplomatic relations were also cooling: in April 1980 the British Ambassador, Sir John Graham, was withdrawn and in the autumn London closed the embassy and placed it under Swedish protection.

Given the sometimes conflicting interests that tied Western European countries and the belligerents, the widespread pro-Iraqi sentiment, and the overall concern to harmonize their policy with the transatlantic ally, it's easy to understand why the conflict, maybe even more than the revolution, brought to the surface ambiguities and limits in European policy and stance vis-à-vis the new government in Tehran. Although EEC countries shared almost the same fears and uncertainties in dealing with the further rise in tensions, their bilateral relations with Iran showed differences which reflected their national interests, differences that, in turn, made it impossible to design any joint initiative in response to the war. In one of the few analyses of European conduct in the conflict, Iranian scholar Ahmad Naghibzadeh provides a particularly negative assessment of European performance throughout the conflict: "Europe's inability to act collectively", he argues,

> "is nowhere more apparent than during the Iran–Iraq war. […] Because the Iran–Iraq war appeared to threaten the flow of oil to Europe, one might expect that Europe would react as a whole. Instead, European nations proved that they were primarily motivated by concerns other than communal interests".[54]

According to Naghibzadeh two factors prevented Europe from "following the EEC interests, encouraging them instead to follow the American line": namely lack of cohesion and inability to secure members' interests independent of American cooperation.[55] More sympathetic is the evaluation provided by Fred Halliday, who emphasised how,

> "given their shared interests in the Middle East and their membership in a NATO under US direction, the European countries could not, even if they were minded to, act in a manner radically at odds with the United States".[56]

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53. On Italian policy towards revolutionary Iran see: E. SALGÒ (ed.), *Leggere la rivoluzione islamica iraniana a Roma*, Alpes, Rome, 2010.
54. A. NAGHIBZADEH, *Collectively or singly: Western Europe and the War*, in: F. RAJAEE (ed.), *Iranian Perspective on the Iran–Iraq War*, University of Florida Press, Gainesville, 1997, pp.39-48, here: p.40. On European involvement and interests in the Iran–Iraq war see also: A. CORDESMAN, *The Iran–Iraq War and Western Security, 1984-1987*, Royal United Service Institute, London, 1987.
55. A. NAGHIBZADEH, op.cit., p.40.
56. F. HALLIDAY, op.cit., pp.312-313.

Even if Naghibzadeh's analysis might appear too harsh on European conduct, especially considering the constraints highlighted by Halliday, it seems fair to argue that the war was, to some extent, a missed opportunity for the Western European countries and for the European Community as a whole. Even acknowledging that their commercial interests should have been prioritised over geostrategic considerations, European action was often lacking in the assertiveness, the consistency, and the cohesion it needed.

In this sense the war brought the EEC countries back to their nationalistic instincts and to their traditional patterns of state-to-state collaboration. Britain and France showed their support to Washington, sending troops to the Persian Gulf region as reinforcement for the US presence protecting free navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. Italy and West Germany, for their part, tried to best profit from the drop in American and, to a lesser extent French, trade relations with Iran to boost their exports to the country. As has been argued:

> "Whilst most of the EEC members converged on the idea that Iran should stay within a European economic sphere of influence, bilateralism remained the dominant mode of dealing on the political and strategic levels".[57]

Even with regard to one of the key priorities shared by the Nine, the security of oil supplies, the attitude that prevailed was of *ad hoc* collective initiatives coordinated through "informal discussion among a few key countries", in most cases resulting in joint actions between Britain, France and the United States, with the occasional participation of Italy and West Germany.[58] Although it is true that the role of the International Energy Agency in responding to the disruption of oil supplies significantly curtailed the room (and the need) for action by the Community in the energy crisis, it is also true that a stronger stance by the Nine on issues such the export of arms to the parties, or on the use of international fora or political pressure on the belligerents to promote a diplomatic solution would have given more credibility to the Community's actorness in the crisis.

On the contrary, however, some European private companies seized the chance to profit from the conflict and, despite the neutrality declared by the leaders in Bonn, Rome, Paris, and London, smuggled weapons into both Iran and Iraq in defiance of international law and parliamentary controls. The transfer of weapons to the two belligerents in what one journalist has called "the biggest arms bazaar in the history of the world" epitomized the inconsistency of EEC policy during the conflict, the prevalence of commercially driven interests, and the inability of the Community's institutions to monitor the policy of the member states in such a delicate yet crucial domain.[59]

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57. E. STORNELLI, *Dialogare con Teheran, le relazioni tra Europa e Iran, dalla rivoluzione del 1979 alla questione nucleare*, in: E. SALGÒ, op.cit., pp.85-109, here: p.87.
58. TNA, PREM 19/278, Henderson (Washington) to FCO, 09.06.1980.
59. K.R. TIMMERMAN, *Europe's Arms Pipeline to Iran*, in: *The Nation*, 18-25.07.1987.

Table 4

Arms exports to Iran from 1951 to 1985
(percentages and millions of dollars)[60]

	UK	France	Rest of Europe	USA	Total (US$m)
1951–1955	0	0	0	99	54
1961–1965	0	0	0	100	1,203
1971–1975	28	2	2	67	9,774
1981–1985	10	7	3	0	1,868

In the case of France, the issue first surfaced in early 1986 with allegations of illegal shipments to Iran of nearly 500,000 artillery shells from 1983 to 1986, in violation of a ban imposed by the French President on arms sales to Iran.[61] The same happened in Italy with the unclear involvement of some Italian companies in the sale of weapons to the Islamic Republic in the second phase of the war.[62] The allegations triggered a series of hearings before the Italian Senate and before the European Parliament,[63] and induced the EP to approve a resolution that openly condemned this flow of weapons to the fighting parties.[64] Besides the clear domestic implications of these allegations, the inadequate control shown by some European governments in the implementation of the arms embargo, coupled with their lack of diplomatic assertiveness and the paucity of Community cohesiveness, stand as further proofs of the small amount of political capital the EEC countries invested in the management of the crisis.

60. Data reported in: B. MØLLER, *The EU policy towards the Persian Gulf*, in: M. KAIM (ed.), *Great Powers and Regional Orders. The United States and the Persian Gulf*, Ashgate, Farnham, 2008, pp. 197–222, here: p.203. The data are calculated by the author on the basis of figures from M. BZOSKA, F.S. PEARSON, *Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1971-1985*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987, pp.338-351.
61. On the so-called "Irangate" affair see the journalistic but still pretty accurate account: W. DE BOCK, J.-C. DENIAU, *Des armes pour l'Iran: L'Irangate Européen,* Gallimard, Paris, 1988.
62. On the allegations see a series of articles that appeared in the Italian newspaper *La Repubblica* in late 1986 and early 1987. Among them: http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1987/03/04/gli-utensili-agricoli-erano-armi-da-guerra.html; http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1986/11/19/obici-all-iraq-mitraglie-Tehran-ecco-le.html.
63. Transcripts of the allegations reported before the EP can be found at: http://www.radioradicale.it/exagora/fornitura-di-armi-alliran-0.
64. Resolution presented on 8 December 1986 before the European Parliament by EP members Jef Ulburghs and Roberto Cicciomessere on the arms shipment to Iran; the resolution was approved on 11 December 1986.

Table 5

Arms sales during the Iran–Iraq war
(percentages and millions of dollars)[65]

	Iraq	%	Iran	%
France	4.9	19	132	3.5
Netherlands	0	0	21	0.6
FRG	24	0.1	0	0
Italy	126	0.5	71	1.9
Spain	99	0.4	0	0
UK	16	0.1	180	4.8

This already embarrassing scenario for the Community and for Europe as a whole was further aggravated by the inability of the EEC to take a common position on one of the most ignominious chapters of the war: the deployment of chemical weapons by Baghdad. In March 1984 the Ten only agreed on expressing "distress at reports of these atrocities" but the Community could not reach a majority on the question of export controls on chemicals. It would take other two years for the now twelve EEC members to officially condemn the use of chemical weapons and call for an international chemical weapons ban.[66]

While throughout the conflict France persisted in its policy of open support to Baghdad and covert supply of weapons to Iran, West Germany, Britain and Italy were determined to retain, if not reinforce, their shares of Iranian imports. Even if never intended as an initial step in a collective response to the war, their commercial engagement in the country contributed to preserving a link between Iran's demand for imports and Europe's need for the country's energy supplies. In this sense the relation that German, Italian or British companies maintained with some sectors of the Iranian economy cleared the ground for the initially faint, then increasingly substantial, re-establishment of bilateral relations in the late 1980s and for the launch of a more coordinated and comprehensive plan of normalization in the early 1990s. However, obstacles remained on the road to normalization. In the case of Britain the fatwa issued in 1989 by Ayatollah Khomeini against writer Salman Rushdie represented a major impediment to the improvement of relations up until the early 1990s.[67] As for France, the dispute over Iran's involvement in the EURODIF project, together with the seizure of French hostages in Lebanon by Hezbollah, delayed the normalization of bilateral relations by almost a decade. It was only after the release of the last hostages in May 1988 that President Mitterrand ordered the resumption of diplomatic relations between Paris and Tehran. Three years later, in July 1991, he announced a visit to Tehran, the first by an EEC Head of State in such capacity since the revolution. The assassination of Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar in Paris in August 1991 and the

65. B. MØLLER, op.cit., p.205.
66. For the texts of the statements see: C. HILL, K.E. SMITH, *European Foreign Policy, Key documents*, Routledge, London, 2000, pp.328-330.
67. On Iran–Britain relations after the revolution see: C. RUNDLE, *Iran–United Kingdom Relations since the Revolution: Opening Doors*, in: A. EHTESHAMI, M. ZWEIRI (eds), *Iran's Foreign Policy: From Khatami to Ahmadinejad*, Ithaca Press, Reading, 2008, pp.89-104.

consequent cancellation of the visit only delayed the rapprochement. Between 1991 and 1992 the settlement of the EURODIF dispute and growing French interest in Iran as an export market after the Gulf War and the loss of the Iraqi one, paved the way for the gradual return to Iran of French businessmen, and for a general improvement in the bilateral relations.[68]

In the meantime Iran was also getting ready for a new chapter in its relations with the European countries and with the Community. After closing the war with Iraq in August 1988 and mourning the death of the Supreme Leader and father of the revolution Ruhollah Khomeini in the following June, the country entered a process of economic modernization and political engagement with the West. Under the leadership of the new, pragmatic president, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, elected in 1989, Tehran embraced a series of reforms aimed at liberalizing trade, encouraging foreign firms to enter into joint ventures, and inviting foreign oil companies to participate in oil operations on Iranian soil. The Iranian government also actively contributed to the release of some of the Western hostages still held in Lebanon.

In 1992 the launch of the Critical Dialogue by the European Council ratified this new phase in Europe–Iran relations, translating this progressive rapprochement between some EU countries and Iran into a European policy. The Dialogue was inaugurated on the occasion of a meeting of the European Council held in Edinburgh with the purpose of improving relations with the Islamic Republic in a number of areas, particularly human rights, and of "determining the extent to which closer relations and confidence could have been developed".[69] Both political and economic reasons drove the launch of the initiative. In 1987 the data related to the Iranian import market showed a substantial continuity compared to those of ten years before. The European Community share had remained almost constant: 44% in 1978, 45% in 1987. West Germany's share was still the largest, followed by Italy, Britain, and France. The data are even more relevant when compared with the dramatic decrease in the US share: from 24 to 1%. As stated by Parsons,

> "the statistics suggest that even a violent and disruptive political event such as the Iranian Revolution does not necessarily change traditional patterns of trade except in extreme circumstances such as the Iranian–US breach".[70]

Politically, the launch of the dialogue, presented by some analysts as an initiative grown out of German interest in further consolidating its economic relations with Iran, was actually produced by the awareness that the changes underway in Iran's domestic scene and international posture, together with the new approach embraced

68. The settlement came after France made payments of about $330 million and $300 million in 1986 and 1987, and after the release of French hostages in Beirut. Diplomatic ties were fully restored in May 1988. By 1988 Iran had already resumed its ties with all 12 members of the community including Britain, which still had hostages in Lebanon. On the high expectations and political significance of the Mitterrand visit see: *Mitterrand Will Visit Iran; Easing Tehran's Isolation*, in: *The New York Times*, 04.07.1991.
69. Conclusions of the European Council on Iran, Edinburgh, 12.12.1992, in: C. HILL, K.E. SMITH, op.cit., p.158.
70. A. PARSONS, op.cit., p.228.

by some of the EEC countries, necessitated a reformulation of European strategy vis-à-vis Tehran.[71] The general consensus that Iran was moving toward a future of modernization and political liberalization also contributed to the new climate of collaboration. The result marked the beginning of a new season, both for Iran's relations with the West, and for the Community, which, through the Dialogue, established itself as Tehran's first diplomatic and commercial interlocutor in a phase of gradual opening and reform of the Islamic Republic.

Conclusions

> "The need for greater European solidarity and the development of close cooperation in foreign policy has been highlighted by the recent increase in international tension as a result of events in Afghanistan and Iran. These events have reminded us of the weakness of a policy of isolation and of the possibilities offered by the European Community, through development of its mechanisms for Political Cooperation, to agree a common European response which may help to deal with the international crises. However limited our capacity to achieve such common positions may yet be; they are the only means by which any of the Community's Member States can significantly influence world events".[72]

These words, pronounced in May 1980 by the British journalist, businessman and politician Christopher Tugendhat, then member of the Jenkins Commission, express clearly both the limits the EEC countries encountered in coordinating their responses to the unexpected political change in Iran and the awareness that instruments such as the EPC, though weak and imperfect, represented the only means at European disposal to have some sort of influence on the global scene.

The analysis presented here has confirmed these two elements and, more generally, the contradictions that have traditionally characterized the Community's international profile. Whereas, on the one hand, the Nine showed a good deal of cohesion and coordination in the response to the hostage-taking in November 1979, and to the American pressure to impose sanctions in the following months, the instruments at their disposal proved, at most, inadequate. In this regard it is revealing that at the most critical moments of the crisis, the most efficient and timely mechanism of collaboration proved to be what historian Marie Gainar has called the "hidden diplomacy" of the Ambassadors of the Nine in Tehran.[73] Though driven by the need to protect national interests, their efforts signalled a genuine attempt to craft a common response in the face of the uncertainty of the Iranian situation and awareness of the European states' vulnerability in such a fluid context. If the Ambassadors of the Nine gave proof

71. On the origins, purposes, and outcomes of the Critical Dialogue see: V.M. STRUWE, *The policy of "critical dialogue": an analysis of European human rights policy towards Iran from 1992 to 1997*, Working Paper presented at the Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, Durham, 1998.
72. AEI, Speech by Christopher Tugendhat, 16.05.1980.
73. M. GAINAR, op.cit., p.541.

of a proactive attitude, occasionally able to make up for the weakness of the political instruments at their disposal, the picture looks gloomier at the institutional level. The EEC Council of Ministers and the European Council addressed the crisis on the occasions of meetings held between 1979 and 1980. Yet, in many cases, such meetings did nothing but harmonize the positions of the Nine and ratify decisions already taken in the ECP framework or through the informal ambassadorial coordination.

The situation appears even worse when we consider the Community's policy vis-à-vis the Iran–Iraq war. As this article has shown, the conflict marked a return of the EEC members to national approaches in their dealings with Tehran. Two elements contributed to this shift: on the one hand the further rise in international tensions made any political dialogue or structural cooperation with Iran impossible, and significantly affected any chance for the Community to draw up a common policy toward the Islamic Republic. On the other, the military support provided by some European countries to the two belligerents, which not only openly violated the policy of neutrality but also represented a breach of the European commitment to cooperation in case of crisis, greatly undermined any chance of developing a common strategy in response to the crisis. After giving proof of (relative) cohesion and assertiveness when confronted with the pressure coming from Washington, with the uncertainty of the Iranian situation, and with the resulting difficulties in the protection of their economic interests, the EEC members were not able to display the same cohesion when the priority shifted from preserving to enhancing such interests and framing them within a multilateral action.

It took the end of the war in July 1988, the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, and the settling of a series of diplomatic and economic disputes between Tehran and some European countries, to break the deadlock in EEC–Iran cooperation and to turn the bilateral collaboration that some EEC countries managed to preserve, if not to reinforce, with Iran during the 1980s into a European policy, a shift ratified by the launch of the Critical Dialogue in December 1992. The following fifteen years would be the high-water mark of European–Iranian "elusive normalization", with a further increase in commercial exchange and a consolidation of the diplomatic relations between the EU and Tehran. In this context the Critical Dialogue, later evolved in the Comprehensive Dialogue, would stand as one of the highest points in European diplomatic action in the Middle East. This phase would end in the mid-2000s with the failure of the EU3–Iran negotiations on the nuclear issue and the consequent convergence of the European and American position in condemning Tehran's defiant conduct vis-à-vis the United Nations and the international community.

Divergence in the Mediterranean. The Economic Relations Between the EC and the Arab Countries in the Long 1980s

Massimiliano TRENTIN

The patterns of trade and investment between the European Communities (EC) and the Mediterranean Arab countries during the 1980s were closely anchored to the international dynamics of oil prices. Between May 1979 and August 1980 the world price of oil rose from 18 US dollars per barrel to 39.5 US dollars at current value, whereas in 1983 it subsequently fell from around 30 US dollars per barrel to just 12.6 US dollars per barrel in March 1986.[1] Respectively, the GDP annual growth of Middle Eastern and North African countries as well as that of Western Europe declined significantly as well. Such a high volatility seriously affected the economies of the Arab countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) because it reduced the funds for the agro-industrial development programmes as well as the social welfare systems throughout the region. These were, indeed, necessary to face the challenges of demographic transition and integration into the restructuring of the world economy.

The oil crisis in the mid-1980s and relative failure to manage its dynamics showed that the re-balancing of relations between the oil exporting countries of the "South" and the consumer countries of the "North" which occurred in the previous decade was, at best, partial and temporary. It also showed that the industrialized countries of the North still had the upper hand in influencing the patterns of global trade and finance which, in turn, deeply affected the energy markets. It might also be argued that the long 1980s showed all the negative sides of the 1970s: recession, public deficits and debt crisis intertwined with major conflicts throughout the Middle East and North Africa.[2]

The economic and political crisis of the Arab world in the 1980s impacted heavily on the relations with the EC: on the one hand, the EC could restore its pre-1970s, traditional economic predominance in the Mediterranean basin, now framed within the new neoliberal doctrine; on the other hand, the Mediterranean basin lost the political and economic relevance it had enjoyed previously, and was thus relegated to the marginality of "security" concerns. Not surprisingly, in the 1980s the North and South shores of the Mediterranean basin entered those patterns of economic divergence that still endure today.

1. British Petroleum, *Statistical Abstract*, 2014.
2. It would be sufficient to mention the Israeli invasion of Lebanon (1982-1984), already plunged into civil war since 1975, the first Palestinian Intifada (1987-1991); the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), as well as the bid for power by the forces of Political Islam, notably in Iran (since 1978), Egypt (1977-1981) and Syria (1979-1982).

An Appraisal of the EC-Arab Relations in the 1970s

The relations between the Middle East countries and the EC during the 1970s were basically shaped on the criteria of security: security for the energy flows towards the industrial countries of Western Europe; security of access to the fast-growing consumption markets of the Arab world; security against the possible spill-over of the armed conflicts in the Middle East, and especially of the Arab-Israeli one.

As for politics and diplomacy, given that the Western European countries "outsourced" the strategic and military presence in the Mashreq[3] to the US since 1956-1958, both Arabs and Europeans knew well in advance that the EC members could not, and actually did not want to intervene in the Arab-Israeli conflict.[4] The only field the Europeans, both as single states and the EC, engaged effectively was the economy, because they were the main partners of most Arab states and Israel. In 1978, the EC Commission stated bluntly:

> "Even if Europe cannot play an important role in resolving the conflict, it could still have a very significant role to play once it is solved. First, by being one of the guarantors to such a settlement. And, secondly, by helping prepare the basis for the economic development of these countries".[5]

Actually, this was the basic rationale of the EC/EU policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict for the following decades.

Focusing on the political-economic dimensions of security in the Mediterranean, already in 1972 the EC Commission wrote that between EC member countries and their Mediterranean partners:

> "leur interdépendance est la condition, non seulement de la garantie de la sécurité extérieure, mais aussi celle de l'approvisionnement intérieur. Il s'agit en l'occurrence de créer des relations fondées sur le principe de la coopération excluant la dépendance".[6]

Since then, the EC authorities advanced the project for the Global Mediterranean Policy, which is worth mentioning because it set Euro-Mediterranean relations within the framework of "embedded liberalism".

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3. The Mashreq, meaning in Arabic "the East", was a category used in French Orientalism to include the countries East of the Suez Canal and North of the Arabian Peninsula: Palestine/Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Irak and Kuwait. Later on, it was widened to include Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula.
4. H. Maull, *The Strategy of Avoidance: Europe's Middle East Policies after the October War*, in: J. C. HUREWITZ, *Oil, the Arab-Israeli Dispute and the Industrial World*, Westview Press, Boulder CO, 1976, pp.110-137; D. ALLEN, A. HAURI, *The Euro-Arab Dialogue, The Venice Declaration, and Beyond: the Limits of a Distinct EC Policy, 1974-89*, in: D. MÖCKLI, V. MAUER (eds), *European-American Relations and the Middle East. From Suez to Iraq*, Routledge, London, 2011, pp.93-108.
5. HAEC [Historical Archives of the European Communities], X/34/78-EN, 169/78, Commission of the European Communities, Information Directorate-General, The European Community and the Arab World, Brussels, 1978, p.27.
6. HAEC, SEC (72) 3111 Final, Commission des Communautés Européennes, Les relations entre la Communauté et les Pays du Bassin méditerranéen, Communication de la Commission au Conseil, 27.09.1972, p.3.

> "La libre circulation des marchandises ne pourrait en effet constituer, à elle seule, le fondement d'une politique méditerranéenne propice à la stabilité et à la prospérité de la région. Elle ne saurait pallier la nécessité d'une véritable coopération contractuelle, comportant des actions cohérentes en matière de finance, de technologie, d'énergie, d'emploi, d'environnement; c'est dans la voie d'une telle coopération que les Communautés doivent s'engager décisivement, et le plus tôt possible".[7]

Accordingly, multilateralism integrated trade liberalization with the cooperation to development.[8] The energy shock of 1973-74 marked the apex of Third Worldism and "developmental politics", and Arab Countries stood at the forefront of the movement for the reform of North-South relations: namely, the contribution of industrial countries to the agro-industrial development of the so-called "global" South.[9] EC members avoided engaging in a structural reform of the larger North-South economic relations and, instead, opted for *ad hoc*, privileged, concessions to the Arab neighbours, thus fostering cleavages in the already fragmented "global" South.[10]

Essentially based on an intergovernmental, multilateral approach, the Euro-Arab Dialogue inaugurated in 1974 engaged the EC to set up a "trilateral" cooperation to development between Europeans, Arab oil-exporters and Arab non-oil exporters: in theory, mostly to the benefit of the Arab non-oil exporters.[11] Maghreb countries and Israel in 1976 and Mashreq countries in 1977 signed the Cooperation Agreements with the EC, whose unlimited duration gradually opened up the European common markets to Arab and Israeli products and, more significantly, provided them with technical and financial aid. Access to the EC market for agricultural and industrial products proved far more limited than expected. However the Cooperation Agreements implemented the "embedded liberalism" approach of 1972.[12] Eventually, such

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7. HAEC, SEC (72) 3111 Final, op.cit., p.6.
8. E. CALANDRI, *L'eterna incompiuta: la politica mediterranea tra sviluppo e sicurezza*, in: E. CALANDRI, *Il primato sfuggente: L'Europa e l'intervento per lo sviluppo (1957-2007)*, Franco Angeli, Milano, pp.89-118.
9. Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Algiers 05-09.09.1973; UN Yearbook 1974, pp.324-326; UN Yearbook 1976, pp.394-395; G. RIST, *Le Développement. Histoire d'une croyance occidentale*, Presse de la Fondation nationale, Paris, 1996, pp.145 and 234.
10. HAEC, A. ROMOLI – Rapporteur, *The EEC's External Relations – Stocktaking and consistency of Action. A Study*, Economic and Social Committee of the European Communities, Brussels, 27-28.01.1982, pp.37-47; G. GARAVINI, *L'arma del petrolio: lo «shock» petrolifero e il confronto Nord-Sud*, and F. PETRINI, *Il fallimento dell'alternativa europea: la Conferenza di cooperazione economica internazionale (1975- 1977)*, both in: D. CAVIGLIA, A. VARSORI (eds), *Dollari, petrolio e aiuti allo sviluppo. Il confronto Nord-Sud negli anni '60-70*, Franco Angeli, Milano, 2008, pp.79-108, 109-170.
11. H. JAWAD, *Euro-Arab Relations. A Study in Collective Diplomacy*, Ithaca Press, Reading, 1992, pp.259-260; S. AL MANI', *The Euro-Arab Dialogue. A Study in Associative Diplomacy*, Pinter, London, 1983; OECD, Micro OCR-IV-3, *L'aide des Pays de l'OPEP. Les efforts et les politiques des pays membres de I'OPEP et des organismes d'aide crées par eux*, Paris, 1983.
12. M. TRENTIN, *The Distant Neighbours and the Cooperation Agreements between the EEC and the Mashreq, 1977*, in: E. CALANDRI, A. VARSORI, D. CAVIGLIA (eds), *Détente in Cold War Europe: Politics and Diplomacy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East*, I.B. Tauris, London, 2013, pp.221-232.

partial overtures did not alter the balance of power in favour of the industrial countries and, arguably, accelerated the consolidation process of the EC.[13]

For the Western Europeans, there was a very clear reason to engage in dialogue and economic negotiations with the Arabs. As stated in 1978, the EC Commission recognized that

> "the countries of the Arab League are now the most important trading partners of the European Communities. This fact alone is enough to demonstrate the crucial importance of the relations between these two groups of countries".[14]

Crude oil made nearly 90 per cent of Arab sales to the EC in the years from 1975 to 1979 and, since 1974, most EC members registered deficits in their balance of trade with Arab oil-exporting countries.[15] From 1972 to 1978, the Gulf States and Libya accumulated surpluses of 5.7 up to 20 billion ECU in 1972 and 1974, respectively. Such EC deficit declined to 9.8 billion ECU in 1978 but, in parallel with the second oil shock, it rose again to 16 billion ECU in 1979 and 23 in 1980. Though this latter deficit proved lower at nominal and real levels compared to 1974, it was still a staggering signal for the EC authorities.[16] On the contrary, non-exporting countries continued to suffer from crony rising deficits with the EC: from 768 million ECU in 1974 to 5 billion ECU in 1979. Morocco and Tunisia could increase their exports of industrial goods, but the massive imports of capital, intermediate and consumption goods far exceeded the value of mineral, agricultural or textile exports, as well as migrants' remittances or European aid. As for the financial cooperation, the European Investment Bank presided over the loans to the Arab Mediterranean Countries and, until 1981, committed 382 million EUA for "economic infrastructure and agricultural projects and [for] financing small and medium-scale industrial ventures through development banks".[17] Even Egypt, whose peace with Israel and allegiance to the West in the Cold War was rewarded with massive injection of capitals, could not balance the deficits with the EC.

As for the 1970s, two basic conclusions could be drawn. Firstly, in strategic terms, once they could secure the flow of "Arab" oil, the EC still had a major advantage

13. D. BASOSI, *Finanza e petrolio. Gli Stati Uniti, l'oro nero e l'economia politica internazionale*, Edizione Studio LT2, Venezia, pp.116-124; G. GARAVINI, *After Empires, European Integration, Decolonization and the Challenge from the Global South, 1957- 1986*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, pp.190 and 249.
14. HAEC, X/34/78-EN, 169/78, Commission of the European Communities, Information Directorate-General, *The European Community and the Arab World, Europe Information Development*, Brussels, 1978, p.3.
15. HAEC, DE 38/1982, Commission of the European Communities, Directorate General for Information, *The European Community and the Arab World*, Brussels, 06.1982, pp.12-15.
16. Eurostat, Monthly Trade Bulletin reported in HAEC, X/278/80-EN, Commission of the European Communities, Information Directorate-General*, The Development of Trade Between with the European Community and the Arab League Countries*, Brussels, 1980, pp.27; HAEC, DE 38/1982, op.cit., p.14.
17. HAEC, European Investment Bank, Publications, *Financing Outside the Community. Mediterranean Countries*, 10.1978, p.2. The EUA value ranged around 1,25 US dollars between 1974 and 1979, and loans for Arab countries from EIB own resources attached a 2% interest rate.

over the Arab economies as a whole.[18] Secondly, if proximity to Europe and huge trade volumes with the EC were common features to all Arab countries, oil and energy resources were not, and this natural endowment further diversified the patterns of trade between the EC and the Arab world. Ultimately, proximity to the EC market had not develop into a "comparative advantage" for the export-led industrialization of the Arab Mediterranean countries, though the Directorate-General for Information of the EC Commission still claimed the contrary in 1982.[19]

The Political Economy of Crisis in the Middle East and North Africa

The mobilization of popular masses that led to the toppling of the Iranian Shah between 1978 and 1979 and the ensuing invasion of Iran by Iraq sparked a new rise in oil prices: from January 1979 to April 1980 the price of a barrel of oil jumped from 14.8 to 39.5 US dollars.[20] Since 1979, the political dynamics empowered by the previous "oil shocks" further radicalized. Eventually, Egypt could sign the peace agreement with Israel and recover sovereignty over the Sinai Peninsula. In doing so, it went against the diplomatic consensus of the Arab League and was consequently ousted from the organisation until 1984. Once Egypt was out, other states claimed leadership in the Middle East: Iraq had a large and well-supplied army and Saddam Hussein did not hide his regional ambitions; Saudi Arabia enjoyed its oil wealth and Islamic legitimacy; the revolutionary zeal of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's leadership moved Iran out of its nationalist posture to embrace the rest of the Middle East in the name of Political Islam; Syria was locked in a struggle with Israel and concerned with the management of the civil war in Lebanon; Muammar Gadhafi's Libya entered international politics thanks to capital investments and the sponsorship of radical, even terrorist, revolutionary groups. Quite differently, other countries tried to insulate themselves from such events. Sensing the cracking of the Third World movements, Algeria focused on domestic development; Morocco and Tunisia also tried to insulate themselves from radicalism, either socialist or Islamist, and focused on domestic development by engaging in structural reforms and partnership with the EC. In general, there was a sensible shift from the Mediterranean to the Gulf in the axis of Arab politics, with long-term consequences as for the adoption of the patterns of develop-

18. The improvement was calculated on the export-import ratio, namely the extent to which EC exports cover imports from the Arab League states, which rose from 46 to 72 between 1972 and 1979. Again, the EC scored the best results against both Maghreb and Mashreq non oil-exporters (HAEC, X/278/80-EN, op.cit., p.29).
19. HAEC, X/85/1982, DE 36, Commission of the European Communities, DG for Information, *Cooperation Agreements between the EEC and the Maghreb Countries*, Brussels, 02.1982, pp. 12-13.
20. British Petroleum, *Statistical Abstract*, 2014.

ment and the conflict between secular and Islamist forces.[21] Ultimately, any state leadership could attain neither dominion nor leadership in the region because of two main factors: on the one hand, the success of counter-hegemonic alliances to thwart any major bid for leadership; on the other hand, the intervention of foreign powers in order to prevent the emergence of a regional leadership which could jeopardize their presence and assets.[22]

In early 1982 oil prices began to drop, and between 1985 and 1986 prices fell sharply. Different factors reinforced this new trend: first and foremost, the reduction in consumption by the industrial economies that had been facing recession since late 1970s; secondly, the concomitant discovery and exploitation of new oil fields across the globe. Last but not least, intra-OPEC rivalry over the management of production quotas, market shares and prices, where Iran and Iraq pressed for higher prices to sustain their war economies at the expense of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf exporters, thus jeopardizing any sort of coordination or discipline among partners.[23] As the Western industrial world struggled with recession and stagnation, oil production far exceeded consumption. In its unparalleled position of "swing producer", Saudi Arabia could live up to lower oil prices, and eventually deployed its full production capacity of 10.5 million barrels a day: international oil prices thus fell from 30.8 US dollars per barrel in November 1985 to 12.6 in March 1986, driving out its rivals and leading them into recession.[24]

The Arab oil-exporters of the Middle East and North Africa now faced the sharp decline of their export revenues whereas their imports slightly declined or even increased until 1994.[25] On the whole, Arab states suffered from deficits in the current accounts of their Balance of Payments. The most remarkable worsening affected the Arab oil-exporters, whose balance of payments moved from a surplus of nearly 86 billion US dollars in 1980 to a deficit of 4.5 billion US dollars in 1986. They experienced a temporary rebound to surplus in 1989 and 1990 (10.4 billion US dollars), only to fall back into a staggering deficit of 52.5 billion US dollars in concomitance with the US-led war against Iraq in 1991, and the deficit remained at 3 billion US dollars until 1995. The Arab non-oil exporters continued to register minor deficits in trade accounts from 1.5 billion US dollars in 1980 to 3.8 billion US dollars in 1995,

21. A.H. DESSOUKI, *The New Arab Political Order: Implications for the 1980s*, in: M. KERR, Y.EL SAYED (eds), *Rich and Poor States in the Middle East. Egypt and the New Arab Order*, Westview Press, Boulder CO, 1982, pp.319-347; G. CORM, *Le Proche-Orient éclaté*, Gallimard, Paris, 2003, pp.409 and 558.
22. R. HINNEBUSCH, *The Middle East in World Hierarchy: Imperialism and Resistance*, in: *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 14(2011), pp.233-235.
23. F. PARRA, *Oil Politics. A Modern History of Oil*, IB Tauris, London, 2014, p. 214.
24. British Petroleum, *Statistical Abstract*, 2014, op.cit.
25. UNCTAD Statistical Database, *Export of good and services, 1980-1995* and *Import of goods and services, 1980-1995*, Arab Countries, US Dollars at current prices and current exchange rates in millions.

and never scored any surplus except for in the period of 1990-1991.[26] As for Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), Arab countries and Iran never attracted much interest, and only between 1980 and 1986 could the oil-exporters enjoy FDI for 5-10 billion US dollars.[27] The purchasing power of the Arab World was severely curbed, especially for oil-exporters, which had been the main driver of growth and internationalization over the previous decade. The redistribution of oil-rents through aid and official investments between the Arab Gulf states and their "poor" neighbours in the region fell sharply from 8.2 billion US dollars to 4.3 billion US dollars in 1980 and 1984, respectively. For example, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, by far the largest donors in the region, cut their aid to development by 49 and 72 per cent respectively between 1980 and 1988.[28]

From 1982 on, the economies of the Middle East and North Africa entered a prolonged recession. Even the oil producers could not finance all their development programmes, and had to tighten up public spending. Investments in infrastructure, industry and agriculture were targeted before current spending on social services because the latter categories were essential to the regimes' survival: first of all, because of the nature of the authoritarian social contract between ruling elites and the popular masses; secondly, because the Arab countries faced the challenge of demographic transition. From 1980 to 1987, the population of the Arab world grew by 25 per cent, from 162 to 202 million of people, and in 1981 the urban population exceeded the rural one for the first time. From this perspective, services were provided without creating many job opportunities.[29] Between 1980 and 1989 the real GDP per capita for all MENA countries declined from 7161 to 5953 US dollars, and recovering at 7040 US dollars only in 1996. The non-oil exporters remained stuck around at 4400 US dollars per capita. The magnitude of the demographic change imposed severe constraints on the reduction of public spending for health, education and food subsidies and, in general, for all imports, except for arms.[30]

The deficits in the balance of payments were funded by the state, which, in turn, had to collect money from the international financial markets. As a result, the long-term outstanding debt of all Middle East and North Africa increased from 15 billion

26. UNCTAD Statistical Database, *Balance of payments, Current account net, annual, 1980-1995*, US Dollars at current prices and current exchange rates in millions. Iran included the respective values stood at 84 and 9,7 billion US$ in 1980 and 1986; 10,7 billion US$ in 1990. Contrary to the Arab countries' deficits, Iran could strike a surplus of 5 and 3,3 billion US$ in 1994 and 1995.
27. UNCTAD Statistical Database, *Inward Foreign Direct Investments Flows, 1980-1995*, US Dollars at current prices and current exchange rates in millions.
28. R. OWEN, S. PAMUK, *A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century*, I.B. Tauris, London, 1998, Table 9.6, p.270; M. ROUIS, *Arab Development Assistance*, MENA Knowledge and Learning, Quick Notes, World Bank, Washington DC., 28(2010).
29. A. RICHARDS, J. WATERBURY, *A Political Economy of the Middle East*, Westview Press, Boulder CO, 1998, p.142; S. AITA, *Les travailleurs arabes hors la-loi. Emploi et droit du travail dans les Pays arabes de la Méditerranée. Vision des enjeux et implications du partenariat européen*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2011, pp.35 and 46.
30. WB-WDI, Middle East and North Africa, All and Developing Countries, 1960-2011, GDP per capita, (constant 2005 international US$).

US dollars in 1976 to 54 billion US dollars in 1979, from 89.4 billion US dollars in 1984 to 146.4 billion US dollars in 1987 and 160 billion US dollars in 1991. In 1989, national debts as percentage of exports stood at 328 per cent for Morocco, 249 per cent for Algeria and 137 per cent for Tunisia. For these countries the payment of interests equalled more than a quarter of the value of their imports.[31] Delay and restructuring of debts followed one another and in most cases they combined with the implementation of the famous Plans of Structural Adjustment (PSA) under the sponsorship of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Paris Club: Morocco in 1983, Tunisia and Egypt in 1987, and Jordan in 1989.[32] Coupled with the offensive of the Islamist political forces against secular regimes, the rise in social conflict in the early 1980s also originated from the erosion of the salaried workers' purchasing power, the mass layoffs in the public sectors and, not least, from the reduction of state subsidies. The massive and systematic resort to repression by the authoritarian elites, however, succeeded in dismantling opposition forces and containing dissent since mid-1980s.[33]

The fiscal crisis of the Arab states had a direct impact on the industrial capacities and capabilities of these countries. In fact, most of industrial production, previously nationalized during the 1960s and 1970s, did not perform on the criteria of maximum profitability. On the one hand, they were designed first to meet the needs of national consumption, more than profits and dividends; on the other hand, mismanagement, and disregard for labour participation combined with discontinuations in investments in machinery and research for development so as to hamper the factors productivity. As such, most of the industrial production in the region was heavily subsidized and financially supported by the central state. As soon as oil-rents and their redistribution diminished, the regimes decided to stop investments first on infrastructures, then on industrial and agricultural production. The Gross Fixed Capital Formation growth fell from 14 per cent of MENA GDP in 1982 to -11.1 in 1987, which meant the cancellation of a large part of the already planned investments.[34] In the end, the volatility of the oil rents exacerbated rather than alleviated the shortcomings of industrialization in the Arab and MENA countries: their production could not compete

31. UNCTAD Statistical Database, *MENA Debt outstanding, total long-term, 1980-1995*; HAEC, SEC (92) 401 Final, Commission of the European Communities, Communication to the Council and the European Parliament, *The Future of Relations Between the Community and the Maghreb*, Brussels, 30.04.1992, p.7.
32. J. HARRIGAN, J.R. EL-SAID, *Aid and Power in the Arab World: World Bank and IMF Policy-Based Lending in the Middle East and North Africa*, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 2009, pp. 6-7.
33. V. MENALDO, *The Middle East and North Africa's Resilient Monarchs, Social Science Research Network*, Working Paper Series, 2010, p.34; K. PFEIFER, *Social Structures of Accumulation for the Arab world: the Economies of Egypt, Jordan and Kuwait in the Regional System*, in: T. MCDONOUGH, D.M. KOTZ (eds), *Contemporary Capitalism and its Crises: Social Structure of Accumulation Theory for the 21st Century*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, pp.309-354.
34. WB-WDI, Gross Fixed Capital Formation, 1960-2010, Developing MENA; R. OWEN, S. PAMUK, op.cit., pp.96-97.

with the New Industrializing Countries (NIC) of East Asia, and thus did not profit from the further internationalization of capitals, later labelled as "globalization".

The fiscal crisis of the state had a direct impact on agriculture as well. Agricultural production had been on the rise since the agrarian reforms of the 1950s and 1960s. The overall aim of the system was to guarantee "food security" for the population, which was both on the rise and more urbanized since the 1970s. However, the costs grew expensive and proved to be a strain for the state budget, which largely subsidized domestic production and consumption. During the 1980s the Arab states limited investments on their agricultural production: productive capacities suffered from a gradual deterioration in machinery, irrigation systems and credit facilities, exposing production and peasants to the volatility of the weather. Arab elites and international partners supported export-oriented producers, who mostly supplied the oil-rich Arab states or Europe: thanks to their integration into world markets they were supposed to become more competitive and efficient, this helping to balance their deficits.[35] However, agricultural exports did not contribute much because the terms of trade still favoured industrial products and, moreover, they deprived national consumption from a major source of provision.[36] As a result, in order to meet domestic demand, Arab countries became net importer of foodstuff and agricultural products, whose international prices were low for the time being.[37]

Even by the late 1970s Arab non-oil exporters were facing a fiscal crisis. However, foreign investments by their "rich" Arab neighbours could balance their sheets. Eventually, such a solution collapsed by the mid-1980s and, under pressure from international donors, Arab elites engaged in a new round of liberalization (infitah), privatizations and fiscal austerity that endured until the late 1990s. On a minor scale, oil exporters had to restructure state budgets as well because oil prices remained low until the beginning of the XXI century, not including the 1990-1991 Gulf crises. If the economic reforms of the 1970s did not basically affect the primacy of the public sector in the Arab world, those of the 1980s had a long and lasting impact in reversing the power relationship between public and private economic actors. Slower than expected by international creditors, the public lost anyway its autonomy and was placed at the ultimate service of private actors and interests.[38]

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35. J. HARRIGAN, J.R. EL-SAID, op.cit. p.10.
36. UNCTAD Statistical Database, *Terms of trade index*, Annual, 1980-1995, for Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia.
37. Food Dependency was especially high for cereals. The self-sufficiency rate for Algeria moved from 85% in the early 1960s to 31% in the early 1980s; from 94% to 62% for Morocco; from 78% to 54% for Tunisia, from 78% to 53% for Egypt and from 57% to 16% for Jordan. Syria moved from 115% to 80% of self-sufficiency. Table 1, Annex, HAEC, COM (85) 517, Final, Commission of the European Communities, Communication to the Council, *The Community and the Mediterranean Countries: Guidelines for Economic Cooperation*, Brussels, 26.09.1985; A. RICHARDS, J. WATERBURY, op.cit., p.146.
38. Ibid., p.249. Scientific Literature agrees on the so called crony capitalists "capturing" the state. See N.N. AYUBI, *Over-Stating the Arab State. Politics and Society in the Middle East*, I.B. Tauris, London, 2006, pp.329 and 402.

The Relations Between the EC and the Arab World

As soon as oil prices began declining since 1982, the current accounts of the EC Balance of Payments with the Arab countries returned to a surplus: from a deficit of 2.2 billion US dollars in 1983 they moved on positive ground at 4.8 and 6.5 billion US dollars in 1982 and 1986, respectively. Later on, they increased their surpluses to all-time heights of 28 billion US dollars in 1989 and 58 billion US dollars in 1990, to then return to the "modest" surpluses of 7.8 billion US dollars in 1991 and 9.6 billion US dollars in 1994.[39] The values of their industrial and consumer products far exceed the value of imports from MENA countries, and the EC was able to offset its oil deficit with increased sales to the Maghreb and Mashreq countries. Again, differentiation among Arab countries in their relationship with the EC continued unabatedly during the 1980s. The EC current accounts registered an overall balance with the Arab oil-exporting countries, with surpluses in 1983 and 1986 as well as from 1990 to 1994. Against the oil "poor" Arab countries, the EC continued its surpluses, from 2 to 5.6 billion US dollars between 1980 and 1986, and an average of 4 billion US dollars until 1994. The 38.5 billion US dollars surplus in 1990 proved to be the peak of a general trend.

The overall positive balance, however, hid a general decline in trade between the EC and the Arab world. The latter's fiscal crisis impacted heavily on European exporters, which were by far the major suppliers of industrial machinery and intermediate products. Despite occasional upsurges like in 1990, the value of EC exports declined significantly from 42.7 billion US dollars in 1982 to nearly 29 billion US dollars in 1986. The temporary increase at 77 billion US dollars in 1990 was just an exception due to the oil prices boost and by the years 1991 and 1994 EC exports to the Arab World had declined to 27 and 24.3 billion US dollars, respectively. As for the Arab oil-exporting countries, the EC exports increased from 27 to 34 billion US $ between 1980 and 1982, and then declined to an average of 22 billion US$ until 1994, with occasional peaks in 1989 and 1993. As for the Arab oil "poor" countries, the EC exports followed the trends of their "rich" neighbours: from 7.4 to 8.5 billion US dollars between 1980 and 1982 and an average of 4 billion US dollars until 1994, when they recovered to 7.3 billion US dollars. The decline of EC imports from the Arab states was even more pronounced: from 38.7 to 22.4 billion US dollars between 1982 and 1986, and from 19 to 16.6 billion US dollars from 1990 to 1994. The oil-exporting countries saw the value of their exports decline from 34 to 21 billion US dollars 1982 and 1986, and from 19 to 14.7 billion US dollars from 1990 to 1994. On a lower scale the oil "poor" Arab countries followed the same trend: from nearly 3 to 1 billion US dollars between 1982 and 1986, to remaining below one billion US dollars up until 1994.[40]

39. Author's data elaboration from United Nations, *International Trade Statistics Yearbook*, Trade by Principal Country of Production and Consignment, Imports C.I.F, Export F.O.B, New York, vol. 1980-1996.
40. Ibid.

Facing the revolution in Iran and the second oil shock, Western European politics reacted with initial disorientation. At the EU Council in 27-28th April 1980 they expressed concerns of over the inflationary and disrupting effects of the recent increase in oil prices, which could trigger a "general recession in demand": North-South Dialogue, collaboration with private capital markets and the further development of international financial institutions would combine with the recycling of oil surplus to lessen "disequilibria" in the balance of payments. The reduction of the GNP/energy consumption ratio was also conceived as a solution to what was eventually labelled as an "intolerable burden for industrialized regions" and "an obvious threat to international stability".[41] Despite earlier concerns, however, the members of the European Communities could then enjoy a general amelioration in their posture vis-à-vis the Arab countries. The latters' role as a leading force in the Third World vanished along with their fragmentation and infightings. Hence, no more did they pose a concrete threat to industrial countries.

As for the EC economic policy towards the Arab world, and their Mediterranean countries in particular, two stages seem to emerge. At first, from 1980 to 1984 the EC was concerned with the impact of the new oil shock, but actually did not develop any new strategy, in part because they did not have any single or leading partner with which to negotiate: the platform of the Euro-Arab Dialogue was suspended after Egypt was ousted from the Arab League, and its renewal in the mid-1980 proved simply ephemeral as long as Arab leaders disagreed on plans and agendas.[42] Rather, the EC focused more attention on regional sub-units, like the Maghreb. Since the mid-1980s, however, the EC hardened its stance and aligned itself with the politics of economic restructuring advocated by international institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. The "debt burden" of Arab states was deemed to be a "fundamental obstacle to financial retrenchment and economic resurgence", as well as to the payment of imports from the EC. If in the early 1970s liberalism was to be "embedded" by multilateral, political negotiations, now Arab partners should expose themselves directly to the "disciplines of competition": in concrete, to open up their markets to EC exporters while making use of their supposed "comparative advantages". Development, integration and more balanced relations in the Mediterranean were no longer points of discussion or negotiation because "the market" would enact them.[43]

After expressing their concerns over the sudden rise of oil prices in 1979, the EC Commission continued to consider the Cooperation Agreements of 1976 and 1977 as the best engines to foster trade and economic relations with the Arab world. In 1980, attention was given to the impact that enlargement of the Communities first to

41. HAEC, *Summary by the Presidency of the Proceedings of the European Council*, Brussels, 18.06.1980.
42. HAEC, X/177/1982, DE38/1982, Commission of the European Communities, DG for Information, *The European Community and the Arab World*, Brussels, 06.1982, pp.33-35.
43. HAEC, SEC (92) 401 Final, Commission of the European Communities, Communication to the Council and the European Parliament, *The Future of the Relations Between the Community and the Maghreb*, Brussels, 30.04.1992, p.7.

Greece in 1981 and then to the Iberian states in 1986 would have on partners in the South. The membership of Spain was deemed more problematic, because:

> "At present, these countries compete with Spain on the EEC market. They produce the same type of agricultural goods and their industrialization is following the traditional patterns adopted earlier by Spain, with the textile and clothing industries paying a particularly important role. Spanish entry into the Community will secure privileged access for its goods, increasing at the same time in significant manner the level of self-sufficiency for Mediterranean-type agricultural products".

The research-study prepared on behalf of the EC Commission highlighted that Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Israel would be severely affected and, more worryingly:

> "There is already a growing disenchantment among the Southern Mediterranean states concerning the real worth of their bilateral agreement with the EEC. They complain about the erosion of the limited advantages enjoyed in the farm sector and the so-called "self-limitation" agreements in textiles and clothing hoisted on them by the Community".[44]

As a matter of fact, the crisis affecting the textile and clothing industries in Europe led the EC Commission to enforce the limitation of export quotas on the Mediterranean partner in 1978, thus derogating to the previous agreements. Such limitations concerned the bulk of Moroccan and Tunisian industrial supplies to the EC, respectively 63 and 85 per cent of their total exports (c.i.f. cost insurance and freight). Despite the EC arguing that such "self-imposed" limitations did not hinder their growth, the textile and agricultural exports from the two Maghreb countries, actually, stagnated. Since the EC market was moving toward "self-sufficiency", the report suggested helping the Arab countries "to develop those sectors of their industries for which there is a major home demand" and converting farming "away from products for which it has to compete with the candidate countries", namely Spain and Portugal.[45]

Moreover, in June 1982, the EC Commission recognized the "frustration" of the previous 1972 "overall approach", whose cause was found in the world recession. It argued that it was in the EC's "vital interests to avoid contributing to economic and social problems in a way which would threaten to destabilize the Mediterranean region", and accusation from the US to damage their commercial interests in the region were rebuffed by the inherent contribution of the Cooperation Agreements to the stability of the "pivotal region".[46] However, only minor adjustments were proposed to a situation that, indeed, was fast deteriorating for the Arab partners. Quite indicative

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44. HAEC, X/225/80-EN, Commission of the European Communities, DG for Information, Robert Taylor, *Implications for the Southern Mediterranean Countries of the Second Enlargement of the European Community*, Brussels, 06.1980, pp.3 and 5.
45. HAEC, X/85/1982, DE36, Commission of the European Communities, DG for Information, *Cooperation Agreements Between the EEC and the Maghreb Countries*, Brussels, 02.1982, pp.4 and 19.
46. HAEC, Information, P-39, Spokesman's Group, Commission of the European Communities, Information, *Overall Mediterranean Policy*, Brussels, 06.1980, p.2. The US accusation concerned the entry of EC societies into the lucrative market of construction of oil refineries in the region, where the US firms were traditionally at the forefront.

was the proposal to set up multiannual food supply programmes for certain Arab partners "to enable them to get better control of their supplies in the longer term". However, it was concealed: "The Treaty of Rome does not provide the possibility of funds for such schemes. This is a big problem".[47]

Far from advancing any pro-active policy, and pressured by both Arabs and the US, the EC seemed locked in what might be labelled as the strategy of "crisis avoidance". The proceedings of the meetings between EC officials and their Arab partners show both the marginal attention paid to the Arab requests and the shift in EC policy. Arab officials asked for a larger increase in the quotas of agricultural exports to the EC market, or the removal of all quotas; they asked for a delay or restriction in European industrial exports or, rather, for more investments and technical assistance to develop their industrial capacities. Quite significantly, they asked the EC for a public campaign against discrimination towards Arab migrants in Europe, whose remittances were more and more essential to their economies. The EC Commission acknowledged legitimacy and understanding for some of the Arab requests: in particular their will to deepen cooperation with the EC. However, it suggested neither overestimating the gravity of the situation in the Arab countries, nor granting more financial aid: "a certain inability on the part of the Mediterranean countries to adjust to changes in demand has sometimes been the basic reason for the loss of some markets". The same applied to the mismanagement of aid and the implementation of financial and technical cooperation. They also minimized Arab concerns over the impact of Spanish and Portuguese access to the EC, arguing for the "pro-active" approach of the two applicant countries to tackle possible negative effects. In a slightly different but significant change of tone and criteria, the EC Commission argued in May 1984 for the European Communities and the Arab partners to make full use of their "comparative advantages" of both sides of the Mediterranean basin.[48] Ultimately, it was now up to the Arab Mediterranean countries to reform according to market dynamics and exploit, rather than change, the differentials in development.

The EC Getting "Tough"

In March 1985, the European Council re-affirmed its commitment to the goals and principles of the EC Mediterranean Policy and, in September, the Commission hammered out the strategic guidelines for the next-five years, from 1986 to 1991.[49] It was

47. HAEC, X/177/1982, DE38/1982, op.cit., pp.1, 18 and 27.
48. HAEC, COM (84) 107 Final, Commission of the European Communities, *Commission Report to the Council on the Exploratory Talks with the Mediterranean Countries and the Applicant Countries. Commission Proposals Concerning the Implementation of a Mediterranean Policy for the Enlarged Community*, Brussels, 11.05.1984, pp. 2-3, 6 and 11-14.
49. HAEU, COM (85) 517 Final, Commission of the European Communities, *The Community and the Mediterranean Countries: Guidelines for Economic Cooperation*, Communication to the Council, Brussels, 26.09.1985.

argued that the EC was the "leading power in the Mediterranean": the non-member countries represented its third most important external outlet and its biggest trade surplus; the EC had an interest in the stabilization of a region "torn by tensions and conflicts", and could play the role of catalyst for the Arabs' anxiety "to retain their independence vis-à-vis the superpowers". It acknowledged the difficulties engendered by adjustment and austerity policies aimed at tackling the main "obstacles": namely, fast population growth, food shortages, trade deficits and external debts and, last but not least, the fragility of the "industrial fabric". In coordination with public and private international institutions, the EC would focus on reducing food dependence through aid destined for local and regional consumption; again, it would encourage Arab countries to diversify its agricultural exports as regards both crops and markets, in order "to reduce or prevent strains in the Community market".

The "long-term" complementarity of the EC and South Mediterranean countries would now involve "the effective participation of entrepreneurs, bankers, industrialists and traders", which "naturally presupposes a welcoming environment and sufficient incentives for investment between European trade and business and undertakings in the Mediterranean countries". The Arab partners had to make "the efforts to create a more welcoming environment" because for the EC "it is no longer possible to imagine in this connection any formal improvement in the trade provision contained in the agreements". The EC agreed with the World Bank on the need for Arab countries to attract risk-capital for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and establish joint-ventures with foreign partners. The EC would provide aid for technical assistance, professional training and facilitate connections between chambers of commerce and trade associations.[50] Last but by no means least, the EC Commission argued that bilateral relations "should eventually be placed in the context of an overall convention between the European countries and the South Mediterranean countries, or at least agreements with each sub-region", namely the Maghreb countries.

The 1985 guidelines marked the eventual adoption by the EC of the neoliberal approach that would shape the frameworks and policies on the Mediterranean for the coming decades. Such a long-term agenda basically rested on two pillars: few resources at their disposal and strong conditionality.

> "The direct Community contribution is bound to be modest. Its effectiveness will depend essentially on the determination of the Mediterranean partners themselves to take this path".[51]

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50. World Bank, Report n. 4580-EGT, Industrial Development and Finance Division, Projects Department, Europe, Middle East and North Africa Regional Office, *Egypt: A Programme for the Development of Manufactured Exports*, 05.12.1983, pp.6 and 11; World Bank, Report n. P-4075-MOR, *Report and Recommendation of the President of the IBRD to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Second Industrial and Trade Policy Adjustment Loan in an Amount Equivalent to US$200.00 Million to the Kingdom of Morocco*, 06.05.1985, pp.16 and 31; Report n. 5328-TUN, Département des Programmes II, *Europe, Moyen-Orient et Afrique du Nord, Tunisie. Rapport économique sur l'exécution du sixième plan du développement (1982-1986)*, vol.I, *Objectif de croissance et de politique économique*, Washington DC, 10.1985, pp.20 and 69.
51. HAEU, Com (85) 517 Final, pp.4 and 11.

With all due adaptations, the EC policy towards the Mediterranean region reflected the global strategy to enhance the member countries' position in the emerging markets. As for the Arab world, the Gulf States were the primary targets of EC efforts: the high-tech capacities, the decline of production costs and the "stability" of EC foreign policies would fit well with the patterns of trade diversification of developing countries. Accordingly, the EC Commission fully supported both trade liberalizations and the construction of regional markets:

> "To be sure the removal of restrictions would also help non-Community firms, but European firms, which have less of a foothold in the key markets than the US and Japanese firms, would stand to benefit even more. […] The creation of regional markets would be a powerful incentive to direct investment and industrial cooperation, since the range of outlets would be increased".[52]

The following years witnessed the fall of the Mediterranean Arab countries into economic crisis. While the external debt and its servicing increased steadily, the Community financed the Mediterranean neighbours in order to contain their current account deficits. The third generation of Financial Protocols (October 1987-October 1991) gave the European Investment Bank a total of 192 million ECU: 60 million for Tunisia, 50 million for Morocco, 34 million for Jordan and 28 million for Egypt. They focused mostly on the improvement of infrastructure (railway and electricity networks) as well as agro-industrial production, tourism and small and medium-sized business.[53] The European Council agreed on the Spanish proposal for the creation of a European Guarantee Fund (EGF) to reduce the foreign debt of countries like Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco or Egypt. However, its implementation was conditional on the indebted countries' agreement with the IMF economic programmes. In parallel, the formation of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) in Marrakesh on 17 February 1989 was welcomed as a positive step towards regional cooperation.[54] Yet, the Mediterranean lay on the margins of EC attention because the acceleration towards the construction of the European Union as well as events in Eastern Europe catalysed most attention and resources. In order to appease the concerns of its South Mediterranean partners, the European Council of Strasbourg in December 1989 stressed the need to

52. HAEC, Com (86) 603 Final, Commission of the European Communities, *Industrial Cooperation with Certain Latin America, Asia, The Gulf and Mediterranean Countries*, Communication to the Council, Brussels, 03.12.1986, pp.6-7. In relation to the Arab Gulf, much attention was given to the establishment of "real" international industrial standards, against those imposed by US dominant supplies "to capture markets", as well as to the formation of a specific European "business culture" that would support EC products and business relations against the US monopoly in developing countries, pp.10 and 16.
53. HAEC, SEC (89) 1625 Final, Commission of the European Communities, *Commission Report to the Council and Parliament on the Borrowing and Lending Activities of the Community*, Brussels, 17.10.1989, p.76.
54. HAEC, SSN 254/2/89, Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Madrid, 26-27.06.1989, Annex II.

intensify "neighbourly relations", especially with AMU, and reiterated its support for a political settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the civil war in Lebanon.[55]

Facing the expiration of the previous Five-year programme, in June 1990 the EC Commission detailed its proposals for the next period (1992-1996). The document followed the basic principles of the previous approach, but with renewed emphasis both on the nexus between free-market capitalism and pluralist democracy, and the suitability of the Plans for Structural Adjustment (PSA) as the "only" way to tackle the problem of public debt.

> "The Commission has already voiced the view that there is little choice but to continue and intensify the process of economic reform and to bring about a considerable improvement in the volume and methods available to finance reform and growth. The member States therefore continue to support the international financial institutions' move to draw up viable economic reform programmes with the countries concerned".

Besides the usual financial protocols attached to the cooperation agreements, the EC Commission now asked the Council for 600 million ECU to support those Arab countries adopting the neoliberal PSA:

> "It [aid] was to be granted to those countries which agree to take certain specific economic and financial policy measures. The aid would therefore not be allocated to implement a given development project. It would primarily be used to encourage fundamental changes – either sectorial or macro-economic".[56]

The EC could now deploy the heavy leverage of its "conditionality" clauses, thus strengthening the power of industrial creditor countries vis-à-vis their Mediterranean indebted partners. The time was ripe for a "qualitative and quantitative leap".

The problem of public debt was addressed as a priority, and more coordination among Member countries was suggested before they convened to the creditors' Paris and London Club. If this could be interpreted as a desire for more autonomy, the Commission did not alter the overall approach along which it was the debtors' primary and ultimate responsibility to enforce the reforms that would set their economies on sounder, more competitive ground. It conceded, however, that these entailed "stringent economic and financial discipline and unpalatable sacrifices at social and political level". The EC would support their efforts by deploying more resources and a wider range of instruments. Among these, the Commission argued "the time has come to include textiles in the free access arrangements" as well as to let agricultural products enter the EC market. However, the "right" time was postponed to the mid-1990s. As for the "fourth" generation of Financial Protocols, priority was given to funding projects aimed at reducing food dependence, enhancing the industrial and manufacturing capacities of small and medium-sized business, protecting the environment

55. HAEC, SSN 441/2/89, Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Strasbourg, 08-09.12.1989, pp. 12 and 16-17.
56. HAEC, SEC (90) 812 Final, Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council, *Redirecting the Community's Mediterranean Policy. Proposals for the Period 1992-1996*, Brussels, 01.06.1990, pp.3 and 15.

and improving economic infrastructure. Efficiency in the allocation of funds, flexibility in the face of "sudden upheavals" or "balance of payment crisis", subsidiarity and quality were the principles according to which EC aid was to be granted.[57]

Far from objecting to the core content of the EC approach, the main critique still lay on the need to integrate trade liberalization and financial discipline with cooperation to development in order to contain the social and political spill-overs from the reforms. In May 1991, the Rapporteur of the Committee on External Economic Relations of the European Parliament, Mr Eusebio Cano Pinto, wrote that the EC Commission's guidelines "constitute a starting point, albeit a somewhat inadequate one" because the new protocols for 1992-1996 "should place greater emphasis on financial, economic and technical cooperation rather than trade relations alone".[58] The Committee called for the construction of new institutions for a

> "genuine partnership, in particular with the Arab Maghreb countries, with a view to creating a custom union and free trade area within a reasonable period of time".

In late 1990, the Directorate-General for Information, Communication and Culture of the EC Commission admitted:

> "wealth is unevenly distributed between the Northern and Southern parts of the Mediterranean Basin, which is economically dominated by the power of the European Community".[59]

Indeed, the economic and political crisis affecting the Arab world and European Communities in the 1980s enlarged the distance between the North and South Mediterranean countries: the Gini index of income polarization in the Mediterranean basin rose from 0.29 in 1961 to 0.32 in 1980 and 0.34 in 1990. The bi-polarization of incomes between North and South Mediterranean doubled from 0.06 in 1961 to 0.9 in 1980 and 0.12 in 1990.[60] The four EC members on the shores of the Mediterranean accounted alone for two-thirds of the region's wealth alone and, in overall terms, the GNP of the EC was ten times that of non-member Mediterranean countries: average per capita GNP in the EC was 10,000 US dollars, in contrast to 1,000 US dollars in the South Mediterranean, with the Maghreb and Mashreq at the bottom of the scale. The "balance-sheet is not conducive to optimism". The Mediterranean policy "had not lived up to expectations".[61] The main causes were found on the erosion of the trade preferences, the EC protectionist attitude in the agricultural and textile sectors. Eventually, the Commission conceded that the EC enlargement to Spain and Portugal had let the EC became self-sufficient in many areas at the detriment of its

57. Ibid., pp.14-16.
58. HAEC, A3-0121/91, DOC_EN/RR/109118, European Parliament, Session Documents, *Report of the Committee on External Economic Relations on a revamped Mediterranean policy. Rapporteur: Mr Eusebio Cano Pinto*, Strasbourg, 03.05.1991, p.6.
59. HAEC, X/20/90-EN, CEE: VIII/53, Commission of the European Communities, DG for Information, *The European Community, the Mediterranean and the Middle East*, Brussels, 1990, p.8.
60. J. ESTABAN, *Economic Polarization in the Mediterranean Basin*, in: *Els Opuscles del CREI*, 10(2010).
61. HAEC, X/20/90-EN, CEE: VIII/53, op.cit., pp.13-14.

non-member Mediterranean partners. The "strong interdependence" led the non-member Mediterranean countries becoming the third largest market for the EC and its biggest trade surplus. Purchases from the EC amounted to 60 per cent of total imports in Algeria, 50 per cent in Tunisia, 44 per cent in Morocco, between 30 and 33 per cent in Mashreq and Israel. These countries accounted for 10 per cent of total EC exports, three times the amount it exported to Japan and half of what it exported to the US, with the difference being that the EC ran deficits with these two latter countries. Given the rate of inflation, the Commission admitted that the aid and capital investments included within the three generations of Financial Protocols did not help much in improving the balance of payments. Nor did the remittances of 1.8 million migrants from North Africa working in the EC, which corresponded to 20 per cent of Tunisian exports, and 50 per cent for Morocco.[62]

Despite such a deteriorating situation and in order to appease the concerns over the geopolitical leaning of the EC towards Central and Eastern Europe after the demise of the Berlin Wall, the Commission stated that it was ready to play a "stabilizing role" to preserve "peace on its doorsteps and markets for its outlet". It conceded that "protectionist responses in the period of recession and the consequences of certain excesses of its agricultural policy" had undermined the relationship with Mediterranean partners. However, it now felt "strong enough" to regain their confidence.[63]

Conclusions

In late 1990, the Commission was blunt in saying that the Mediterranean "[had] always been far more important as a dynamic market than as a rival producer": the division of labour meant that its vehicle exports alone were worth more than total textile imports from those countries. As a matter of fact, far from the state-led developmental approach of the early 1970s, since 1985 the EC worked with the Arab Mediterranean countries "in accordance with a single principle: the maintenance of traditional patterns of trade".[64] The following January, the EC Commission commented that: "Neither geographical proximity nor free access to the market have prevented our investors from clearly preferring other parts of the world (South East Asia especially). […] The unsuitability of economic and administrative policies, poor productivity and narrow national markets" were seen as the causes for the Maghreb inability to become the EC Mediterranean "Tigers".[65] Despite poor results, the Commission still argued in April 1992 that structural adjustment reforms would revert

62. Eurostat estimates 1986 and DGV, reported in HAEC, DE 68, Commission of the European Communities, DG for Information, Communication, Culture, *The Countries of the Greater Arab Maghreb and the European Community*, 01.1991, p.10.
63. HAEC, X/20/90-EN, CEE: VIII/53, op.cit., p.8.
64. Ibid., p.16.
65. HAEC, DE 68, op.cit., p.9.

such marginality, and the EC would give "absolute priority to support for reforms" in three ways:

> "specific technical assistance, financial assistance as a backdrop to economic reforms, and an intensive dialogue to be held jointly or in parallel with the IMF and the World Bank".[66]

In the Mediterranean the European communities always adopted economic policies that ranged from free-trade liberalism to shrewd mercantilism. Basically, it depended on what policy would guarantee the prominence of the EC in the region at any given period. With the Global Mediterranean Policy and the Cooperation Agreements of the 1970s, the European Communities and its Arab partners "embedded" liberalism within multilateral, state-led cooperation to development. This was a partial response to the pressure applied by the Arab countries, which enjoyed the advantage of high oil prices for the time being. On the contrary, as long as the Arab positions weakened because of political fragmentation and decline of the oil leverage since the mid-1980s, the EC promoted "unleashed capitalism" in the Mediterranean basin.[67] The harsh realities of differences in the levels of development were then considered a comparative advantage that would serve the interests of both EC and Arab business and authorities. The "distance" between the North and South of the Mediterranean was an opportunity from which to profit as well as a problem to be managed and contained, rather than solved.[68] Cooperation to development was thus "embedded" within neoliberalism.

It might be worth asking whether the EC economic policies for the Mediterranean in the 1980s actually contributed or not to the peaceful resolution of conflicts, like the Arab-Israeli one, and the stability of the Mediterranean area. Quite differently from the 1970s, direct linkages between economics and peace were mentioned in official documents only in broad, general terms. In line with contemporary literature, economic reforms were supposed to tackle fiscal crisis, contain military spending in the region and, thus, prevent countries from engaging in an arms race and hazardous military adventures. Moreover, the bilateral approach of the EC and the pressure to fully exploit "comparative advantages" fostered existing cleavages and competition among Arab states, rather than cooperation.[69] Despite multilateral events such as the Madrid Conference in 1991, such a division was the basic condition leading to bi-

66. HAEC, SEC (92) 401 Final Commission of the European Communities, Communication to the Council and the European Parliament, *The Future of the Relations Between the Community and the Maghreb*, Brussels, 30.04.1992, pp.11-12 and 15.
67. A. GLYN, *Capitalism Unleashed. Finance, Globalization and Welfare*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, p.24; H-J. CHANG, *Kicking away the Ladder. Development Strategy in Historical Perspective*, Anthem Press, London, 2002, p.110.
68. N.N. AYUBI, *Distant Neighbour. The Political Economy of Relations between Europe and the Middle East/North Africa*, Ithaca Press, Reading, 1995, pp.5-6; S. MEZZADRA, B NIELSON, *Border as Methods, or, the Multiplication of Labor*, Duke University Press, Duke, 2013, p.61.
69. I. DIWAN, N. PAPANDREOU, *The Peace Process and Economic Reforms in the Middle East*, in: S. FISCHER, D. RODRIK, E. TUMA (eds), *The Economics of Middle East Peace. Views from the Region*, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1993, pp.227-258.

lateral negotiations, or even partial normalization with Israel during the 1990s. As stated in 1978, the European Communities, later European Union, deployed their "strength" and provided the economic and financial guarantees for the peace process as well. However, on the one hand, the kind of economic reforms supported by the EC increased those social tensions which would either turn into full scale civil war, like in Algeria in the 1990s, or into renewed repression against any dissidence, like in Egypt, Tunisia or Jordan. On the other hand, economic inducements tested all their limits with regards to unresolved political issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the ambivalent posture of the EC/EU. Ultimately, both economic restructuring and the "peace process" led neither to comprehensive peace nor to social stability. At best, they contained conflict and instability to the Southern and "distant" shores of the "sea-in-between".

Migration and Regional Interdependence in the Mediterranean, from the Early 1980s to the Mid 1990s

Emmanuel COMTE

Since the early 1980s, migration between Mediterranean countries has intensified.[1] The increased flow of people across international borders with the prospect of lasting settlement has linked the countries of the Mediterranean basin. This happened at a time of growing regional integration between Mediterranean states, until the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference of 27 and 28 November 1995, the final declaration of which intended to create a lasting partnership between the European Union (EU) and twelve countries in the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean. Studying the relationship between these growing migration flows and this movement of regional cooperation matters in order to better understand international relations in the Mediterranean region and the factors of regional cooperation, as well as to think about the prospects of this cooperation. For about twenty years, following the development of the Barcelona Process and the Union for the Mediterranean, political scientists have developed some historiography of trans-Mediterranean cooperation. This historiography has already highlighted that Southern European states have been the protagonists in this development. The political scientist Richard Gillespie considered that "the motors of the Barcelona process [were] Spain and France".[2] The historiography has also highlighted the divergence of interests between Northern European states and Southern European states over trans-Mediterranean cooperation, and has explained the limited results achieved in trans-Mediterranean cooperation owing to the reluctance of the former. Yet the main dynamic, namely the motivations of Southern European states, has insufficiently been explained and it is these motives that this article aims to better present. To this end, this article aims to highlight the migration factor in the position of Southern European states. By Southern European states, this article means Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, and Greece.

The explanatory framework of this article resorts to the concepts of interdependence developed by the political scientists Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye.[3] Theoretically, international relations consist of interactions between actors. The most important actors in international relations are states. This assumption does not exclude other types of actors on those states' territories, for instance unions, shaping states' preferences. The interactions between states might be the result of commercial flows,

1. I would like to thank the organisers of the November 2013 Padua Conference on the Origins of the Euro-Med Partnership: Elena Calandri, Simone Paoli and Antonio Varsori. I would like to thank in particular the discussant of my paper at this conference, from which this article is drawn, Lorenzo Mechi. Finally I thank the *JEIH* anonymous reviewers for their comments.

2. R. Gillespie, *Northern European Perceptions of the Barcelona Process*, in: *Afers Internacionals*, 37(1997), p.65.

3. R.O. KEOHANE, J.S. NYE, *Power and Interdependence*, Little, Brown, and Company, Boston/Toronto, 1977, pp.5-21 and, idem. 4th ed., 2012, pp.8-17.

migration flows, capital flows, and information flows between their territories. The more there are such interactions between the states in a given international system, the higher is their degree of *interconnectedness*. When those interactions create costs, when states are all "significantly affected by external forces", Keohane and Nye no longer speak of mere *interconnectedness* but of *interdependence*.[4] When the actors in an international system have the ability to produce costs for each other, they are interdependent. These costs created by interactions among countries may or may not be intentional. The existence of costs is not incompatible with the existence of gains associated for different actors by the same interactions, even for different actors within the same country. In a situation of interdependence then, politics matters, i.e. actors use their capabilities to maximise their gains and minimise their costs. These political relationships may in some circumstances lead to international treaties, and to the creation of international organisations with institutions to make transactions between states and to monitor those agreements. This article will show that increased migration across the Mediterranean has created not only interconnectedness between the countries of the Mediterranean basin, but also interdependence. It will show also the interdependence created by migration flows has determined multiple types of relationships between Mediterranean states, which are at the centre of the dynamics that led to the Euro-Mediterranean framework established by the Barcelona Conference in November 1995.

This study is based on the use of three separate archival holdings: the documents of the EEC and EU Council of Ministers relating to migration flows in the Mediterranean; the documents of the Elysée during the François Mitterrand presidency relating to the negotiation and implementation of the Schengen Agreements; and the documents of the Council of Europe on the migration flows in the Mediterranean. These archives show the actions of the main international organisations to shape the international order in the area, namely the EU and the Council of Europe, gathering the most powerful states in the area. The documents of these organisations also give a statistical picture of the flows in the Mediterranean basin. French documents allow for a better understanding of the French strategy, highly influential in these episodes. The article will first present how increasing migration flows in the 1980s produced interdependence in the Mediterranean, creating costs in Southern European countries. It then shows how Southern European states used their capabilities to reduce the migration flows from Eastern and Southern Mediterranean countries, under the impetus of France. Finally the article will demonstrate how trans-Mediterranean cooperation developed to reduce the migration pressure from Eastern and Southern Mediterranean countries to Northern Mediterranean countries.

4. R.O. KEOHANE, J.S. NYE (1977), op.cit., p.8.

Increasing Migration

The increase in migration in the Mediterranean in the 1980s was a source of interdependence in the region. Emigration pressure was high in the East and South of the Mediterranean. This was first and foremost the result of the borderline that the Mediterranean constituted between rich and poor countries, in an era of rising inequalities between rich and poor countries at the global level. The ratio of incomes of the twenty per cent of people in the world living in the richest countries, compared to the twenty per cent living in the poorest countries, increased from 30 to 1 in 1960 to 74 to 1 in 1997.[5] Alongside the economic imbalance between Mediterranean countries, the demographic imbalance also increased. The labour force in the countries between Turkey and Morocco rose sharply in the 1980s. Each year, the annual increase in the labour force exceeded two million people, while it was only about 450,000 people in the EEC. To cope with the increased workforce, Turkey and Egypt would have had to grow by 880,000 new jobs each year for ten years.[6] Over the period from 1985 to 1990, the fertility rate in North African countries was more than five children per woman, against only 1.6 in Western Europe. The population was to increase by 50 million people in the 1990s.[7] Given this context, Southern Mediterranean governments favoured emigration to avoid rising unemployment and to increase remittances.[8] Finally, the wars in Algeria and Bosnia from 1992 onwards created migration flows, in part towards other Mediterranean countries.[9] To sum up, increased economic and demographic imbalances between the two sides of the Mediterranean, promotion of emigration by Southern Mediterranean governments, and armed conflicts were to cause ever-increasing migration to EEC Mediterranean countries.

These increasing migration flows between Mediterranean countries created greater interconnectedness between those countries. Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal

5. J.S. NYE, *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, Pearson Longman, New York, 2005, p.196.
6. ACCUE [Archives centrales du Conseil de l'Union européenne], Liste Rouge 68830, Rapport d'experts de la Commission au Conseil du 10.10.1990 sur les politiques d'immigration et d'intégration sociale des immigrés dans la Communauté européenne, 16.03.1990-13.04.1992. SEC (90) 1813 final.
7. R. KING, *Migration and the Single Market for Labour: An Issue in Regional Development*, in: M. BLACKSELL, A.M. WILLIAMS (eds) *The European Challenge: Geography and Development in the European Community*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994, p.240.
8. ACE [Archives du Conseil de l'Europe, documents en ligne sur : http://www.coe.int/lportal/web/coe-portal]. Doc.6266, Migrants maghrébins en Europe. Rapport d'Antonio Romero (Espagne) et Jean-Pierre Worms (France), Commission des migrations, des réfugiés et de la population, 12.07.1990.
9. ACCUE, Liste Rouge 18371, Groupe coordonnateurs «Libre circulation des personnes». Réunions et travaux. CIRC 3642/92. Conclusions du Groupe des Coordonnateurs «Libre circulation des personnes», 26-27.05.1992).

became new immigration countries.[10] In the late 1980s, the number of foreigners in those countries was around two millions, half of them in Italy. The immigrants amounted then to around 2 per cent of Italy's population. Spain had about 650,000 foreigners, Greece nearly 200,000 and Portugal 150,000. Not all of these came from the Mediterranean basin, but there were many Tunisians, Egyptians and Yugoslavs in Italy, the latter especially in the Northern regions. Tunisian labourers were employed in Tuscany and Sicily. Tunisians and Egyptians worked as seamen by Greek or Sicilian ship owners. Senegalese street hawkers began to work in major cities. Similarly Eritreans, Ethiopians, Somalis and Sudanese came to Italy from further South. Origin countries of immigrants in Italy included Morocco, Tunisia, Yugoslavia, Albania and Senegal. In Spain, Algerians and Moroccans especially were numerous. Agricultural workers from Morocco multiplied in Catalonia. In Portugal, agricultural labourers from Cape Verde were employed in the Algarve. Cape Verdean women worked as housemaids in Portugal and other Mediterranean countries.

The interconnectedness between Mediterranean countries created by migration flows was also interdependence because of the costs associated with these migratory movements. Although a factor of growth, these flows imposed costs on certain actors in the immigration countries of Southern Europe, first and foremost among local unskilled workers.[11] In Spain, unemployment had risen dramatically in the previous decade, first because of diminishing emigration opportunities to Western Europe from 1973 onwards and second because of the high employment protection in Spain inherited from the period of the dictatorship. The unemployment rate thus rose from 2.62% of the active population in 1974 to 14.35% in 1981.[12] Immigration could create in Spain increased competition for the access of local workers to the few available jobs.

Moreover, and in part because of high employment protection in Southern European countries, an important part of the new immigration to those countries took place through clandestine channels and fuelled the underground labour market. Local workers were then all the more threatened. Among the million foreigners in Italy in the late 1980s, almost 40 per cent were clandestine according to the Consiglio Nazionale dell'Economia e del Lavoro (National Council of Economy and Labour). This proportion reached more than 33 per cent in Greece and Portugal, and even 45 per cent in Spain. In the mid-1980s, the number of illegal foreign workers in Greece would have reached 70,000 according to a report of the EEC Economic and Social

10. For this paragraph: ACE, Doc.6211, Nouveaux pays d'immigration. Rapport d'Alfons Cucó Giner (Espagne), Commission des migrations, des réfugiés et de la population, 24.04.1990; R. KING, op.cit., pp.234-235; T. PERLMUTTER, *Immigration Politics Italian Style: The Paradoxical Behaviour of Mainstream and Populist Parties*, in: *South European Society and Politics*, 1(1996), p. 233.
11. For this paragraph and the next: ACCUE, Liste Rouge 32095, Avis de la section des affaires sociales du CES. sur les travailleurs migrants, 16.07.1984; CES 694/83, Projet de rapport de M. Dassis; ACE, Doc.6211, op.cit.
12. A. DESDENTADO BONETE, I. CRUZ ROCHE, *Las prestaciones de desempleo ante la crisis*, in: *Papeles de Economia Española*, 12/13(1983), pp. 317-335.

Committee. In the early 1990s, the estimation of the number of irregular migrants in Italy had increased to between 600,000 and 1,000,000. The underground labour market benefitted from the small size of Italian businesses and from the importance of domestic work. The small size, weak organisation and marginality of some firms in Southern European economies made them difficult to control.[13] Irregular employment was particularly widespread in the building, mining, textiles, clothing, footwear and farming sectors. Illegal employment, without contracts and characterized by easy dismissals, wages 35% lower than those in the legal market on average, and often below the legal minimum wage, opened admittedly greater employment opportunities in the countries on the North of the Mediterranean basin to migrants from the poorer South. But its expansion jeopardized the wage levels and the employment protection that local unskilled legal workers in immigration countries wanted to preserve. Indeed, as the labour supply in the clandestine labour market was high, some employers had an incentive to resort to that alternative market, decreasing the labour demand on the legal labour market, unless local workers accepted similar wages or working conditions to those practiced in the clandestine market. As a result, local unions mobilized against illegal employment. By the early 1980s, the Greek General Confederation of Labour asked the Ministry of National Economy to reduce illegal work. Local unions feared including immigrant workers in their strategies, because of the conflicting interests between those workers and the unions' core members. As a result, in France, Maghreb immigrants preferred their own associations to local unions, and immigrant workers were barely represented in local unions.[14] Local workers, represented by local unions, could thus experience costs if poor immigration continued, because of declining wages and deteriorating working conditions.

In addition, Southern European governments more directly experienced costs because of trans-Mediterranean immigration. Undeclared work did indeed constitute a significant lack of revenue for public finances, given the high numbers of illegal foreign workers. The underground economy, fed by the work of illegal immigrants, would have already amounted to 5% of Spanish GDP in the mid-1980s and between 20 and 30% of Italian GDP.[15] Moreover a clandestine existence could lead immigrants into violence and sometimes crime, leading to higher public security expenditure.[16] A 1990 report produced by the Council of Europe about the new immigration countries of Southern Europe underlined the high rate of foreign criminality in those countries.[17] In reaction, the Italian government offered, from 1986 onwards, amnesty programmes for clandestine immigrants who were in work. Nevertheless, these programmes were a failure and, by the deadline of 30 September 1988, very few immi-

13. ACE, MMP (91) 4, Migratory movements from Central and East European countries to Western Europe. Document submitted by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Strasbourg, 1991.
14. ACE, Doc.6266, op.cit.
15. ACE, Doc.6211, op.cit.
16. ACE, MMP (91) 4, op.cit.
17. ACE, Doc.6211, op.cit.

grants had legalised their status. The larger underground economy, which their jobs were part of, prevented them from declaring their status.

Increasing migration flows across the Mediterranean therefore imposed costs on unions and governments in immigration countries. These costs transformed the interconnectedness between Mediterranean countries produced by those increasing migration flows into interdependence.

Policies to Reduce Immigration

The first movement of EEC Mediterranean member states to manage that interdependence was to adopt policies to reduce immigration from other Mediterranean countries, without negotiation with Southern Mediterranean governments. First, Southern European governments supported the West German government, in the early and mid-1980s, in the violation of the agreement between the EEC and Turkey regarding the free movement of workers. In Article 12 of the 1963 Ankara Association Agreement with Turkey and Article 36 of the 1970 Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement, the EEC had committed to achieve the free movement of workers with Turkey by 1 December 1986 at the latest. Already in April 1981, in line with German views, the Ministers of Labour and Social Affairs of EEC member states agreed that this commitment could not be respected. As the West German Minister for Foreign Affairs Hans-Dietrich Genscher wrote to the president of the EEC Commission, in June 1981, the situation of the German labour market explained the German position.[18] At the end of November 1986 the EEC made a final offer to Turkey that was far from the free movement originally planned. In the negotiations between member states on the final offer, in October and November 1986, the Greek delegation supported the German delegation in considering that family reunification should be excluded from the proposal.[19] Greece wanted to limit family migration from Turkey, whereas this type of migration had become more important since the official stop to labour recruitment in the early 1970s. More radically, Greece wanted to include in the text of the proposal that immigration states could suspend the application of the proposal "for reasons of national security".[20] As the text of the proposal did not include this, the Greek delegation raised a general reservation regarding the proposal. Greece should be able to oppose the installation of Turkish migrants within its territory, particularly in areas that might be subject to territorial claims.

18. ACCUE, Liste Rouge 74534, Libre circulation des travailleurs; problèmes d'application de la décision n°1/80 du Conseil d'Association CEE-Turquie, 01.06.1981.
19. ACCUE, Liste Rouge 74145, Turquie. Avant-projet de décision du Conseil d'association relative à la mise en œuvre de l'article 12 de l'Accord CEE-Turquie (libre circulation des travailleurs), 14.10.1986. TR 15/86 REV. 1, Note de la présidence.
20. ACCUE, Liste Rouge 74142, Turquie. Communication de la Commission au Conseil concernant la mise en œuvre de l'article 12 de l'accord d'Ankara, 14.10.1986. TR 14/86 REV. 1, Rapport du Comité "Associations pays tiers/Turquie" au Coreper.

Moreover, according to the Community proposal, Turkish workers were not to benefit from Community priority for access to employment in the member states. The workers of the member states enjoyed priority for jobs within the Community according to Regulation number 1612 of 1968. To implement this priority, member states' employment offices exchanged their job offers before transmitting them to third countries. Nevertheless, Turkish workers were expected, according to the proposal, to benefit from a secondary priority. Once the exchange of job offers between member states had proven that there were no Community workers to fill in the job vacancies, then, according to the proposal, job offers could be transmitted to the Turkish employment office before the employment offices of other third countries. However, the proposal included two limitations. First, this secondary priority was not compulsory: the member state with job offers might or might not ask the Commission for this secondary priority to be implemented. Second, when the Commission transmitted job offers to Turkey, the Commission transmitted them again, simultaneously to the employment offices of other member states. With this second provision, the member states that were, within the Community, emigration countries benefitted from an additional protection to ensure that they actually had no workers to fill in the job vacancies and, eventually, to ensure the priority of their workers within the Community.[21] At that time, Mediterranean EEC member states could be either labour-importing states in general or labour-exporting states within the Community. With these two limitations to the priority for Turkish workers, Mediterranean EEC member states were in a position to limit Turkish immigration on their territories or elsewhere in the Community. Nevertheless, the decision not to respect the commitments taken in 1963 and 1970 was met with bitterness by the Turkish government, which rejected the EEC proposal of November 1986.[22] The situation of Turkish workers and members of their families in the EEC remained governed by the provisions of a 1980 decision of the EEC-Turkey Association Council (Decision 1/80 of 19 September 1980).[23]

EEC Mediterranean member states also agreed, in the course of their accession to Schengen Agreements, to French demands regarding their visa policies, so as to restrict Mediterranean immigration. The migration policy of the French government was determined, under both left-wing and right-wing parliamentary majorities, by the situation of the French labour market, which did not allow for the integration of additional unskilled workers. By the late 1980s, Mediterranean member states other than France had not developed restrictive immigration policies towards Eastern and Southern Mediterranean countries. The will to maintain good relationships with those

21. ACCUE, Liste Rouge 74148, Turquie. Avant-projet de décision du Conseil d'association relative à la mise en œuvre de l'article 12 de l'Accord CEE-Turquie, 06.10.1988-28.01.1992. 10791/86 NT 24. Position de la Communauté approuvée par le Conseil du 24 novembre 1986.
22. ACCUE, Liste Rouge 74534, Libre circulation des travailleurs; problèmes d'application de la décision n°1/80 du Conseil d'Association CEE-Turquie. Ali Bozer (Ministre d'État chargé des relations avec les Communautés européennes) au Président du Conseil des Communautés européennes, 21.11.1986.
23. ACCUE, Liste Rouge 68422, Rapport de la Commission au Conseil du 22.06.1989 sur l'intégration sociale des migrants des pays tiers résidant de façon légale et permanente dans les États membres. SEC (89) 924 final.

countries prevented them from doing so. Italy and Spain, the main immigration countries among Mediterranean member states, did not demand visas for nationals of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Yugoslavia, and Turkey, although those were the main Mediterranean emigration countries towards the EEC. Portugal did not require visas from Turkish and Yugoslav nationals, and Greece did not impose visa requirements on Moroccan and Tunisian nationals.[24] The French strategy in negotiating Schengen Agreements with only Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg was intended to develop common restrictive immigration regulations. Indeed those four states had similar policies to France in this field. Applicant states to Schengen Agreements would have to fully accept previously negotiated provisions. The abolition of controls at internal borders was a key element of the new Single Market and the Mediterranean EEC member countries, which had benefitted from the Common Market, would want to join Schengen Agreements.

When Italy asked to participate in the negotiations, deploring to be excluded from the reduced Schengen Group, the position of the French government was to accept Italian membership once the agreements were signed, provided that Italy accepted all the provisions of these agreements. Already in a December 1988 note, the cabinet director of the French Minister for European Affairs, Georges Chacornac, stated:

> "We have no reservation in principle to the Italian accession to the Schengen Agreement, provided that Italy accepts […] all the provisions of the existing agreement".[25]

The main preoccupation for the French government had to do with the requirement of visas for the nationals of Maghreb countries, Yugoslavia, and Turkey.[26] The French government even seemed to consider that the mechanism of the negotiation to join Schengen Agreements, as Chacornac put it, "would give the Italians the pretext they needed to explain to the Yugoslavs why they were imposing the visa".[27] This idea of a useful "vincolo esterno" for the Italian government, similar to that in the economic and financial area, did not necessarily fit completely with the preferences of the Italian government.[28] The Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Giulio Andreotti, indeed testified before the Italian parliament on 26 January 1989 that Schengen "created not a few difficulties" with North African countries and Turkey.[29]

Nevertheless, the incentive to join Schengen Agreements, the determination of France on visa issues, and finally the incentive of EEC Mediterranean governments to reduce immigration were enough to lead them, by the early 1990s, to define a

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24. AN [Archives nationales, Paris], Archives d'Élisabeth Guigou, 5 AG 4 / EG 68, dossier 1, Accords de Schengen sur la libre circulation des personnes et des biens. 1988-1989. Jean-Marc Sauvé (Directeur des Libertés publiques et des Affaires juridiques au ministère de l'Intérieur) au Premier Ministre, 06 février 1989.
25. Ibid., Note de Georges Chacornac (Directeur de cabinet du ministre des Affaires européennes) pour le Ministre, 09.12.1988.
26. Ibid., Jean-Marc Sauvé au Premier Ministre, 06.02.1989.
27. Ibid., Note de Georges Chacornac, op.cit., 09.12.1988.
28. A. VARSORI, *La Cenerentola d'Europa? l'Italia e l'integrazione europea dal 1947 a oggi*, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2010, p.370.
29. Camera dei Deputati, 1990b, 72, S3. Quoted by: T. PERLMUTTER, op.cit., p.249.

restrictive visa policy towards other Mediterranean countries. As early as May 1989, the Spanish coordinator for the free movement of persons to the EEC Council of Ministers, Rafael Pastor, indicated to Élisabeth Guigou, special assistant to François Mitterrand for European Affairs, that "Spain had decided to request visas for Moroccans, Algerians and Tunisians, and that it would be announced in October".[30] France, Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg finally signed the Convention implementing the first Schengen Agreement in June 1990. The visa policy defined in the Convention was restrictive, an agreement having been reached during the negotiations on a long list of countries that were to be subject to visa requirements, to the delight of the French government, with only the case of Yugoslavia remaining under negotiation between Germany and France.[31] The negotiations for membership could then proceed, requiring other EEC member states to follow the provisions of the Schengen Convention on visa policy. As early as 1991, ten out of twelve EEC member states required visas for the nationals of all Arab countries.[32]

Finally, EEC and then EU Mediterranean countries agreed to strengthen border controls to comply with the requirements of Schengen Agreements. EEC Mediterranean member states other than France had until then been reluctant to implement stricter border controls for fear of harming their important tourism sectors.[33] What mattered for the French government was to stop poor, trans-Mediterranean immigrants as much as possible at the border. It did not want its efforts to restrain immigration from Mediterranean poor countries jeopardized by Mediterranean member states. It was an event to be feared if EEC Mediterranean member states were integrated into the Schengen area. In March 1989, the French Minister of the Interior, Pierre Joxe, wrote to the Prime Minister Michel Rocard and to François Mitterrand:

> "What if tomorrow a serious political and social crisis in any of the Maghreb countries brought here waves of asylum seekers driven by perfectly justified motives, both political and economic"?

In September 1989, Jean-Marc Sauvé, Director of Civil Liberties and Legal Affairs at the French Ministry of the Interior referred in the EEC Council of Ministers to Mediterranean member states and Italy in particular when stressing "border control difficulties in countries rendered […] vulnerable by very long maritime borders". According to him, this favoured "increased penetration of the European area".[34]

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30. AN, Archives d'Élisabeth Guigou, 5 AG 4 / EG 69, dossier 1, Préparation des accords de Schengen […]. Compte rendu de ma rencontre avec MM. Yanes et Pons, conseillers de Felipe Gonzales, à Madrid, le 23 mai 1989.
31. AN, Archives d'Élisabeth Guigou, 5 AG 4 / EG 67, dossier 2. Préparation des négociations dans le cadre des accords de Schengen […]. Note du Directeur adjoint du Cabinet du ministre des Affaires européennes relative à la réunion ministérielle des 12 et 13 novembre à Bonn, 14.11.1989.
32. Article of Serge de Waersegger in: *Le Soir*, 11.06.1991.
33. ACE. Doc.6211, op.cit.
34. ACCUE, Liste Rouge 1575, Travaux du Groupe des coordonnateurs (libre circulation des personnes). 3/2. 26.06.1989-30.10.1989. Réunion du groupe des coordonnateurs «Libre circulation des personnes», 15.09.1989.

The Italian government readily followed French recommendations in this area as well. In February 1990, the Martelli law redefined Italian immigration law in a restrictive way. The Socialist leader Claudio Martelli was at this time the Vice-president of the Council of Ministers, the second highest post in the government. In March 1990, he proposed using the army to patrol the coastline. In the Schengen Central Negotiating Group, on 31 May 1990, with regard to the Italian Schengen candidacy, the French delegation stressed "the need, […] in clear and concrete terms, for common rules on the control of external borders".[35] To facilitate its accession to Schengen Agreements, in November 1990, Italy informed other member states that it was about to adopt a new legislation to "control growing migration flows".[36] Italy also led deterrent action in 1991 when it announced a state of emergency to drive back Albanian boat people and it later expelled about 20,000 Albanians.[37] Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece joined Schengen Agreements between November 1990 and November 1992, readily agreeing to the policy of closing off trans-Mediterranean migration that France requested. This policy did however cause tensions in the Mediterranean area.

Trans-Mediterranean Cooperation

Migration protectionism did not remove the interdependence between the countries of the Mediterranean basin. The migratory pressure in the Mediterranean continued to impose costs in EEC Mediterranean countries, leading EEC Mediterranean states to extend their cooperation with other Mediterranean states. Migration remained a major development lever for non-EEC Mediterranean countries. Migration regulated the imbalances between labour supply and labour demand in these countries, and contributed to the training of the workforce. Migrant workers were the source of significant financial transfers. Remittances in 1988 amounted to 22.5% of export revenue for Tunisia, and 35.6% for Morocco.[38] This migratory lever of development had become important given that the accession to the EEC of Greece (1981) and Portugal and Spain (1986) limited the access of Eastern and Southern Mediterranean agricultural products to European markets.[39] The migratory pressure was, in the late

35. AN, Archives d'Alain Holleville, Adjoint officieux d'Élisabeth Guigou pour les affaires européennes et les sommets (1989-1990). 5 AG 4 / AH 18, dossier 1. Accords de Schengen. 1989-1990. Compte rendu de la réunion du Groupe central de négociation, 31.05.1990.
36. ACCUE, Liste Rouge 43450, Groupe coordonnateurs «Libre circulation des personnes». Conclusions de la réunion du Groupe des coordonnateurs du 16 novembre 1990 à Rome. Communication de l'ambassadeur Calamia.
37. ACE, Doc.6817, Migrations clandestines: passeurs et employeurs de migrants clandestins. Rapport de Christos Pahtas (Grèce). Commission des migrations, des réfugiés et de la population, 26.04.1993.
38. ACCUE, Liste Rouge 74814, Traitement par l'Assemblée sur les répercussions de la création du Marché unique de 1992 sur les travailleurs migrants des P.V.D. Parlement européen. A3-0393/91. Rapport de José Mendes Bota, au nom du Comité sur le développement et la coopération, 20.12.1991.
39. R. EDIS, *Does the Barcelona process matter?*, in: *Mediterranean Politics*, 3(1998), p.94.

1980s, stronger than ever. The presence of immigrant communities from the South in Northern Mediterranean countries created poles of attraction for chain migration. Clandestine immigration networks dispatched migrants to the hubs of undeclared work. Boats with crew and passengers carried away by the sea washed up regularly on Southern European shores, indirectly demonstrating the continuing migratory flow.[40] This pressure, in spite of closure policies, created persistent costs for Southern European governments, leading them to tackle the causes of migration pressure in the Mediterranean more thoroughly.

In the early 1990s, the governments of Mediterranean member states expressed to their European partners the importance of further trans-Mediterranean cooperation, in order to favour the development of Eastern and Southern Mediterranean countries. In September 1990, the Spanish and Italian Foreign Ministers, Fernández Ordóñez and Gianni De Michelis, jointly proposed dedicating 0.25% of the EEC GDP to foster economic growth in the Southern Mediterranean countries, in exchange for a commitment from beneficiary countries to reduce the migration flow to the North.[41] In March 1991, the Italian government organised jointly with the OECD an International Conference on Migration Flows in Rome.[42] In a December 1991 report on behalf of the Committee on Development of the European Parliament, the Portuguese member of the European Parliament José Mendes Bota invited the Parliament to adopt a resolution to regret that

> "no action [had] yet been taken to implement the provisions concerning cooperation in the area of labour included in the cooperation agreements concluded since 1977 between the EEC and Maghreb countries".[43]

Finally, in his opinion on the 1991 activities of the OECD regarding migration and demography, on behalf of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the French deputy François Grussenmeyer also considered that it would be advantageous to "link […] the granting of development assistance to the implementation of family planning programmes in the beneficiary countries".[44] In various frameworks, the representatives of Southern European countries thus tried to draw the attention of other European governments to the situation of Southern Mediterranean countries and to encourage them to accept deeper cooperation with Southern and Eastern Mediterranean states, including development aid, labour and demographic policies.

With this perspective, EEC policies to reduce the pressure to migrate northward in the countries of the Southern Mediterranean came under consideration. As early

40. ACE, Doc.6211, op.cit.
41. *International Herald Tribune*, 25.09.1990. Cited by: ACE, MMP (91) 4, op.cit.
42. ACE, Doc.6491, Activités de l'OCDE en 1990 dans le domaine de migration et de démographie. Avis de M. François Grussenmeyer (France), Commission des migrations, des réfugiés et de la population, 12.09.1991.
43. ACCUE, Liste Rouge 74814, A3-0393/91, op.cit.
44. ACE, Doc. 6658, Activités de l'OCDE en 1991 en matière de migrations et de démographie. Avis de François Grussenmeyer (France), Commission des migrations, des réfugiés et de la population 15.09.1992.

as March 1990, the European Commissioner for Mediterranean and Latin American policy, Abel Matatues of Spain, envisaged a plan to reduce emigration from the fourteen non-EEC countries bordering the Mediterranean by allowing greater access for products from those countries to European markets.[45] A September 1990 report of experts produced at the request of the European Commission considered that "population pressure from poor countries [was] probably one of the major problems of our time". The report called for a

> "quantitative and qualitative strengthening of the forms of cooperation for the economic and social development of these countries and [for a] coordinated support to their possible population management programmes".[46]

In a May 1992 resolution, on the basis of the report prepared by the Portuguese MEP José Mendes Bota, the European Parliament regretted the lack of cooperation with Maghreb countries in the area of labour, as proposed by Bota, and considered that the EEC should use its aid policy to encourage "labour intensive" activities in emigration countries, to promote, throughout the countries of the Southern Mediterranean, "regional cooperation policies that [would take] due account of the potential and the problems […] of intra-regional migration" and to obtain "the establishment and implementation of demographic policies on the part of the developing countries concerned".[47] Within European institutions, such as the European Commission and the European Parliament, Southern European representatives thus managed to convince their European partners to go forward in cooperating with Mediterranean countries. The importance of migratory pressure in the interdependence between the various countries of the region translated in the fact that the main considered themes of cooperation were intended to reduce migratory pressure in origin countries.

More broadly, this resulted in the creation of new institutions to implement the contemplated policies and manage Mediterranean interdependence. This creation of institutions was part and parcel of the dynamics leading to the partnership envisaged at the Barcelona Conference and to the Union for the Mediterranean. A European Centre for Global Interdependence and Solidarity was first established by the Council of Europe in Lisbon in May 1990. In 1992 it was to start a pilot project on trans-Mediterranean interdependence; the project intended to focus on measures to manage the changing relationships in the region.[48] A migratory observation centre was provided for in the EEC budget in 1991: with an allocation of ECU 1,000,000, it was to monitor migration flows in the Mediterranean and assess the extent to which Community development projects had contributed to the creation of local jobs and the containment of emigration.[49] On the model of the Conferences on Security and Cooperation in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s between Western and Eastern Europe, a

45. *Financial Times*, 11.03.1990. Cited by: ACE, MMP (91) 4, op.cit.
46. ACCUE, Liste Rouge 68830, SEC (90) 1813 final, op.cit.
47. ACCUE, Liste Rouge 74814, Procès-verbal de la séance du 14 mai 1992. Résolution A3-0393/91.
48. ACE, CM/Del/Dec(92)469, 469e réunion. Immigration de la rive Sud de la Méditerranée et du monde musulman, 23.01.1992.
49. ACCUE, Liste Rouge 74814, Rapport A3-0393/91, op.cit.

Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) was held in June 1992, in Malaga (Spain), on the initiative of Italy and Spain.[50] Armed conflicts in the Mediterranean basin had then dramatic consequences on migration flows. In that context, the June 1994 Corfu European Council, under Greek Presidency, instructed the Commission to prepare a more comprehensive strategy for the Mediterranean. This led to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership initiative, developed in 1995 under the French and Spanish presidencies of the European Council, leading finally to the agreement adopted by the 15 EU states and their 12 Mediterranean partners, at Barcelona on 28 November 1995.[51] The partnership was intended to establish a free trade area in the Mediterranean by 2010, in order to substitute trade flows to migration flows.[52] Unsurprisingly, Maghreb governments were concerned that the principle of the free circulation of persons was not recognized within that partnership.[53] The interdependence produced by migratory pressure in the Mediterranean thus led to more comprehensive cooperation in a variety of fields, with the creation of new institutions.

However, in spite of these institutional steps, the policies actually implemented remained reduced due to the limited interest on these issues in Northern Europe. This aspect has already been well developed by previous studies. As underlined by the political scientist Richard Gillespie, "crucial decisions affecting EU Mediterranean policy [needed] Northern European support", for economic and financial reasons: those countries would have to pay the largest share of aid.[54] Northern European governments accepted Mediterranean cooperation in the context of the outbreak of violence in Algeria from 1992 onwards. As Gillespie considered, this event triggered "a gradual realisation that the Maghreb, in particular, is of importance to the entire European Union", creating greater security concerns about an Islamist challenge.[55] Moreover, the Spanish Prime Minister Felipe González threatened to block progress towards the Eastern enlargement of the EU without EU commitments in the Mediterranean region.[56] Nevertheless, the Northern European commitment remained limited. Within the European Population Committee of the Council of Europe in January 1992, the representative of the United Kingdom believed that the study of demographic imbalances between the countries of the Mediterranean basin was not a priority and that it was not clear that such a study was actually relevant in that committee's tasks.[57] While the Spanish Commissioner Manuel Marín had sought ECU 5.5 billion for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership funding package, this amount was reduced by Northern European governments to ECU 4,685 million. Rather than direct aid, Northern European governments preferred that Eastern and Southern Mediter-

50. Inter-Parliamentary Union website: http://www.ipu.org/iss-e/cscm.htm.
51. R. EDIS, 1998, op.cit., pp.95-96.
52. M. MONTANARI, *The Barcelona Process and the Political Economy of Euro-Mediterranean Trade Integration*, in: *JCMS*, 5(2007), pp.1011-1012.
53. R. EDIS, op.cit., p.96.
54. M. MONTANARI, op.cit., p.1017.
55. R. GILLESPIE, op.cit., pp.67-68.
56. *El forcejeo con Alemania*, in: *El País*, 20.11.1995; Commission of the European Communities, 1994, cited by: R. GILLESPIE, op.cit., p.68.
57. ACE, CM/Del/Dec(92)469, op.cit.

ranean countries created the conditions to attract foreign direct investment. As computed by the political scientist Marco Montanari, the financial resources allocated by the EU to partner Mediterranean countries amounted to 33 € per capita during the 2000-2006 period, while this amount was 209 € per capita for Central and Eastern European countries over the same period.[58] Richard Gillespie has already summarized it: "German, British and Scandinavian priorities continued to relate to Central and Eastern Europe".[59] Even on capital flows the impact of the Barcelona Process was limited. The main destination of EU foreign direct investment remained Central and Eastern Europe, reaching 21 billion Euros in 2000, against only 4 billion Euros towards Mediterranean countries.[60] The limited involvement of the wealthiest and most powerful European states in the Mediterranean limited the ability of Southern European governments to manage Mediterranean interdependence in a favourable way.

Conclusion

To conclude, the migratory factor was a key factor of interdependence in the Mediterranean region and explains significantly the dynamics that shaped the relationships between Mediterranean states from the 1980s onwards. Increased trans-Mediterranean migration flows from the 1980s onwards interconnected the countries of the Mediterranean basin and made all Southern European countries immigration countries. In destination countries, there were winners and losers in this increased interconnectedness. The employment protection of local unskilled workers was threatened by poor immigration and threw immigrant workers into the underground labour market and sometimes into criminality. The costs then created by immigration for local workers and governments explain why Southern European governments used their capabilities to close their borders to immigration. Even if it was largely one Southern European government that drove this process, namely the French government, it seems that other Southern European governments were ready to implement some immigration closure. All Southern European governments recognized however that mere closure was not a way to eliminate the costs associated with interdependence. It was then necessary for Southern European governments to complement immigration closure with cooperation to reduce emigration pressure in origin countries: this required policies to promote labour-intensive industries in those countries, trade agreements, as well as policies of demographic control. This dynamic, which included in itself a part of institution building, is at the heart of the dynamics leading to the Barcelona Process and to the Union for the Mediterranean. Projects of trade liberalization, international division of labour, population control, constituting the core of that process, were intended to reduce local migratory pressure. Nevertheless, this

58. R. GILLESPIE, op.cit., p.67; R. EDIS, 1998, op.cit., p.98; M. MONTANARI, op.cit., p.1020.
59. R. GILLESPIE, op.cit., p.69.
60. M. MONTANARI, op.cit., p.1028.

strategy has not managed to solve the problem of international inequalities in the Mediterranean basin. Major donors of EU policies in the Mediterranean, namely Northern European countries, had a limited interest in this area, explaining their reluctance to support greater financial aid to the area. This article has highlighted a major dynamic leading to the Barcelona Process. It has demonstrated how the migratory factor created interdependence between Southern European countries and other Mediterranean countries. It has demonstrated as well the channels through which Southern European governments came to try to manage that interdependence. The interdependence created by the migration factor kept increasing in the following years. The migration factor has never been as relevant as in the last years in Mediterranean interdependence. The various barriers to immigration in Southern European countries in the context of the recent recession have contributed to destabilise economically and politically Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries. Inversely, the migration flows created by subsequent Arab uprisings and civil wars have created much pressure on EU countries and led to ever increasing EU involvement in the area.

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

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The Schengen Agreements and their Impact on Euro-Mediterranean Relations
The Case of Italy and the Maghreb

Simone PAOLI

What were the main reasons that, between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s, a group of member states of the European Community (EC) agreed to abolish internal border controls while, simultaneously, building up external border controls? Why did they act outside the framework of the EC and initially exclude the Southern members of the Community? What were the reactions of both Northern and Southern Mediterranean countries to these intergovernmental accords, known as the Schengen agreements? What was their impact on both European and Euro-Mediterranean relations? And what were the implications of the accession of Southern members of the EC to said agreements in terms of relations with third Mediterranean countries?

The present article cannot, of course, give a comprehensive answer to all these complex questions. It has nonetheless the ambition of throwing a new light on the origins of the Schengen agreements. In particular, by reconstructing the five-year long process through which Italy entered the Schengen Agreement and the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, it will contribute towards the reinterpretation of: the motives behind the Schengen agreements; migration relations between Northern and Southern members of the EC in the 1980s; and migration relations between the EC, especially its Southern members, and third Mediterranean countries in the same decade.

The article is divided into three parts. The first examines the historical background of the Schengen agreements, by placing them within the context of Euro-Mediterranean migration relations; it, also, presents the main arguments. The second analyses the reasons for Italy's exclusion from the Schengen Agreement in 1985 and, also, for Italy's initial reluctance to accept its underlying philosophy. The third, finally, explores the motives behind Italy's eventual acceptance of both the Schengen Agreement and the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement in 1990. In both, the second and the third part, special attention is paid to relations between Italy and Maghreb countries.

Research for this article was based primarily on unpublished documents in Belgium, France and Italy: the archives of the European Union in Florence and Brussels; French archives, including the French National Archives in Paris and the French Diplomatic Archives in Nantes; Italian archives, including the Central Archive of State, the Historical Archives of the Chamber of Deputies, the Historical Archives of the Senate, the Historical Archives of the Luigi Sturzo Institute and the Historical Archives of the Bettino Craxi Foundation in Rome.

Setting the Scene

As is well known, since the early and especially since the mid-1950s, all the member states of the EC, apart from Italy, experienced mass immigration, due to the pull of high growth economies: these economies needed cheap labour from poorer countries on the periphery, especially labour from the Mediterranean region. Though the phenomenon of illegal immigration was even then widespread, a significant part of the movement of labour from South to North occurred within the framework of bilateral migration agreements.[1] Through them, in particular, France recruited manpower from Italy (1946; 1951), Greece (1954), Morocco (1962), Algeria (1962; 1964; 1968; 1971), Portugal (1963), Tunisia (1963), Yugoslavia (1965) and Turkey (1965). The Federal Republic of Germany recruited workers from Italy (1955), Greece (1960), Spain (1960), Turkey (1961; 1971-1972), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968). Belgium recruited manpower from Italy (1946), Morocco (1963), Turkey (1964), Tunisia (1969) and Algeria (1970). The Netherlands, meanwhile, recruited workers from Italy (1948), Turkey (1964), Morocco (1969) and Tunisia (1971).[2]

At that early stage, the EC was unimportant in migration matters as migration relations were easily conducted at the bilateral/national level. But what started as an apparently efficient transfer of labour from poorer countries in the South to richer countries in the North became a political, social and economic liability in the late 1960s and in the early 1970s. This change in perceptions, in turn, led to a dramatic shift from liberal to restrictive migration policies in all European destination countries.

The debate over the reasons behind this shift is still wide open. Generally speaking, there are two main schools of thought.

One group of scholars emphasize political factors.[3] They point to the transition from European to African and Asian migrants. This was a consequence of improvements in the economic conditions of Southern European countries and, at the same

1. See: S. RINAURO, *Il cammino della speranza. L'emigrazione clandestina degli italiani nel secondo dopoguerra*, Einaudi, Torino, 2009. See also: C. CARUSO, *Inclusion opportunities and exclusion risks: Mediterranean labour migration and European migration policies*, in: C. CARUSO, J. PLEINEN, L. RAPHAEL (eds), *Postwar Mediterranean Migration to Western Europe. Legal and Political Frameworks, Sociability and Memory Cultures/La migration méditerranéenne en Europe occidentale après 1945. Droit et politique, sociabilité et mémoires*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 2008, pp.9-35.
2. S. CASTLES, M.J. MILLER, *The Age of Migration. International Population Movements in the Modern World*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1993, pp.68-78.
3. J.F. HOLLIFIELD, *L'immigration et l'État-Nation à la recherche d'un modèle national*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 1997. See also: J.F. HOLLIFIELD, *Immigration and the politics of rights: the French case in comparative perspective*, in: M. BOMMES, A. GEDDES (eds), *Immigration and Welfare. Challenging the borders of the welfare state*, Routledge, London, 2000, pp.109-113; J.F. HOLLIFIELD, *Immigration and integration in Western Europe: a comparative analysis*, in: E.M. UÇARER, D.J. PUCHALA (eds), *Immigration into Western Societies: problems and policies*, Pinter, London, 1997, pp.28-41.

time, the explosion of birth rates and growing life expectancy in developing countries.[4] This, the same scholars suggest, contributed to opposition to immigration in European receiving countries. As cultural and ethnic diversity increased and, consequently, anti-immigrant sentiments surfaced within European societies, the political classes of the various countries realized that there was the need to contain immigration and, at the same time, to integrate immigrants. The ultimate aim was, of course, to preserve social cohesion and harmony. According to a minority of these scholars, another political event was even more influential in determining the U-turn in European migration policies.[5] The surprisingly active role played by foreign workers in the protests that swept through Northern European industries between the late 1960s and the early 1970s, alarmed employers who had benefited from the docility of immigrant employees. As a result, even before the economic crisis in the mid-1970s, they began to mistrust their immigrant workforce and, accordingly, to reduce requests for foreign workers.

Another group of scholars have, instead, put emphasis on economic factors; this view is prevalent in the literature.[6] According to them, as growth rates slowed, and unemployment rates increased, in consequence of the 1973 Oil Shock, the need for further immigrants simply ceased. As a consequence, employers stopped insisting on liberal immigration policies, trade unions voiced concern about the conditions of the local workforce and political leaders tried to preserve social peace and consensus by preventing fresh immigration.

Regardless of motives, it is certain that, between the early and the mid-1970s, all the receiving member states of the EC unilaterally stopped the recruitment of foreign workers and began to encourage the voluntary repatriation of immigrants. In exchange, efforts were stepped up to incorporate foreign nationals already settled in the host societies, not least by expanding family reunification schemes.[7] In the same

4. In the course of the 1960s extra-European immigration began to replace migration within the Community. The influx of peoples from Asia, Africa and the Caribbean largely reflected past colonial ties. G. GARAVINI, *After Empires: European Integration, Decolonization, and the Challenge from the Global South 1957-1986*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, pp.110-114.
5. U. ASCOLI, *Movimenti migratori in Italia, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1979; A. SERAFINI, L'operaio multinazionale in Europa*, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1974. See also: P. BASSO, F. PEROCCO, *Gli immigrati in Europa*, in: P. BASSO, F. PEROCCO (eds), *Gli immigrati in Europa: diseguaglianze, razzismo, lotte*, FrancoAngeli, Milano, 2003, pp.6-7.
6. M. LIVI BACCI, *In cammino. Breve storia delle migrazioni*, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2010; J. HUYSMANS, *The Politics of Insecurity. Fear, migration and asylum in the EU*, Routledge, Abingdon, 2006. See also: D. BIGO, *Frontier Controls in the European Union: Who is in Control?*, in: D. BIGO, E. GUILD (eds), *Controlling Frontiers. Free Movement Into and Within Europe*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2005, pp.59-85.
7. Unlike European receiving countries, which experienced a convergent evolution in their migration policies, the main sending countries in the Mediterranean region pursued different strategies. Algeria unilaterally suspended emigration to France in 1973 and turned to policies of national economic development to substitute exportation of workers to Western Europe. Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey, on the other hand, adopted different combinations of economic development policies and, in order to diversify migration destinations, new active emigration policies. As a result, significant migrant flows from these states headed towards Southern European countries, including Italy and Spain, and petroleum producing countries in Northern Africa, including Libya and Saudi Arabia. S. COLLINSON, *Europe and international migration*, Pinter Publishers for Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1994, pp.64-80.

period, as its member states were closing their borders to non-Community workers, the EC, under pressure from Arab governments, began to include migration in its nascent foreign policy, especially its Mediterranean policy.[8] Since the governments of the Mediterranean sending countries were no longer allowed to negotiate exportation of surplus manpower to European labour markets, these same governments changed priorities. They now interested themselves in the socio-economic integration of emigrants and brought this issue to the main bilateral and multilateral Euro-Mediterranean fora. Migration was thus pushed into the centre of the Euro-Arab Dialogue, where, between 1975 and 1978, representatives from the EC and the Arab League discussed

> "the problems of migrant workers and particularly Arab workers in countries of the European Economic Community. [They] referred to the importance of considering the topic of Arab workers in Europe, especially its human aspects considering labour as a human value in the first place, and the role that can be played by the Arab workers in the field of cultural contacts and economic development".[9]

In this context, representatives from the EC and the Arab League committed themselves to exchanging views, information and data concerning the employment situation, the working and living conditions and the social security schemes of migrants; though they did not achieve any concrete results, they also made serious efforts to help with the training of Arab workers in Europe and the return of Arab workers to origin countries. More importantly, despite divergences of opinion, which undermined the political and juridical significance of the final document, in late 1978 in Damascus they adopted a "Declaration on the principles concerning the working and living conditions of migrant workers".[10] This document recognized some generic rights for Arab migrants residing in EC countries.[11]

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8. See: F. BICCHI, *European foreign policy making toward the Mediterranean*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2007; J. NIESSEN, F. MOCHEL, *EU external relations and international migration*, Migration Policy Group, Brussels, 1999; J.-F. DREVET, *La Méditerranée, nouvelle frontière pour l'Europe des Douze?*, Karthala, Paris, 1986; E. CALANDRI, *L'eterna incompiuta: la politica mediterranea tra sviluppo e sicurezza*, in: E. CALANDRI (ed.), *Il primato sfuggente. L'Europa e l'intervento per lo sviluppo (1957-2007)*, FrancoAngeli, Milano, 2009, pp.89-117; A. BIN, *L'Europa e la sicurezza nel Mediterraneo*, in: F. ATTINÀ, F. LONGO (eds), *Unione europea e Mediterraneo fra globalizzazione e frammentazione*, Cacucci, Bari, 1996, pp.91-94; S. HENIG, *Mediterranean policy in the context of the external relations of the European Community 1958-1973*, in: A. SCHLAIM, G.N. YANNOPOULOS (eds), *The EEC and the Mediterranean countries*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976, pp.305-324.
9. ADN [Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes], AT [Ambassade à Tunis], 164 711PO A, Ministère français des Affaires étrangères, Dialogue euro-arabe, 30.7.1975. See also: I. SABRI ABDALLAH, *La place du Dialogue euro-arabe dans les relations internationales contemporaines*, in: J. BOURRINET (ed.), *Le Dialogue euro-arabe*, Economica, Paris, 1979, pp.115-129.
10. Unlike Arab representatives, European representatives refused any reference to international conventions that were not ratified by all EC countries. They opposed specific and binding provisions and supported the introduction of safeguard clauses stating that the application of all principles should be subject, on the one hand, to public order, safety and public health and, on the other, to national laws. ADN, AT, 164 711PO A, Ministère français des Affaires étrangères, Réunion à Tunis du groupe de travail spécialisé euro-arabe "Affaires culturelles et sociales", 31.10.1976.
11. ADN, AT, 165 711PO A, Ministère français des Affaires étrangères, Situation du dialogue euro-arabe, 25.05.1979.

Migration issues were, also, widely discussed in the negotiations for the cooperation agreements that were signed in 1976 by the EC and Algeria, the EC and Morocco, the EC and Tunisia and the EC and Turkey within the framework of the Global Mediterranean Policy. In the third chapter of these four agreements, "Cooperation in the sector of labour", the EC member states committed themselves to respect the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality regarding working conditions and the remuneration of Algerian, Moroccan, Tunisian and Turkish workers residing in their respective territories; at the same time, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey committed themselves to respect the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality regarding working conditions and the remuneration of workers from EC countries residing in their respective territories.[12]

However, while EC receiving countries were closing frontiers to non-Community workers and, together with the EC, were making efforts to integrate migrants already settled in their territories, demand-pull-forces were rapidly giving way to supply-push forces in the third Mediterranean countries. As populations began to grow at a rapid pace and economies began to weaken in all non-petroleum-producing countries in Northern Africa and the Middle East, it became increasingly difficult for the member states of the EC to contain migration flows from the South. At the same time, it was impossible for receiving countries simply to militarise their borders or to expel or deport all unwanted migrants. After all, this was the period of the struggle to win civil and social rights for marginal groups, including ethnic minorities and foreign nationals and the consequent institutionalization of those rights in the jurisprudence of liberal-republican states. Inadvertently, the result of trying to shut off legal immigration led to the opening of what might be termed "side doors", including family reunification, illegal immigration and false refugee claims.[13]

The perceived failure and the high costs of national migration policies as well as the unexpected strength of constitutional, social and political obstacles in the adoption of restrictive policies at national level, changed matters. A group of EC member states, namely France, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, began to look for a Europe-wide solution to the problem of migration control. This is the first thesis defended in this article.

Andrew Moravcsik, Professor of Politics and Director of the European Union Program at the Princeton University, has written the mainstream account of Schen-

12. F. MARTINES, *The cooperation agreements with Maghreb countries: a contribution to the study of consistency of EEC development cooperation policy*, European University Institute, Florence, 1994, pp.37-53.
13. See: T. BALE, *Immigration and Integration Policy in Europe. Why Politics – and the Centre-Right – Matter*, Routledge, London, 2009; P. ANDREAS, T. SNYDER, *The Wall around the West. State Borders and Immigration Controls in North America and Europe*, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 2000; R. COHEN, Z. LAYTON-HENRY, *The Politics of Migration*, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham Glos, 1997; M. PACINI, *Italia, Europa e nuove migrazioni*, Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, Torino, 1990.

gen's origins.[14] Schengen emerged, according to him, betraying an "economistic" perspective, because "the French government, concerned that German standards were blocking imports, and the German government, concerned that France would close its borders because of balance of payments difficulties, successfully pressed for a bilateral Franco-German arrangement to simplify and eventually eliminate border formalities", including border controls on persons.[15] The French and German leaders then agreed to include the members of the Benelux Customs Union in this arrangement for commercial reasons. The decision to create an area without border controls, related to the parallel decision to establish a Common Market at the EC level, was in turn, according to Moravcsik, part of a strategic game in which France and Germany used the Schengen initiative as "a threat of a two-tier Europe". This threat was mainly directed toward the United Kingdom, which was unwilling to establish a common travel area with continental members.[16]

This interpretation offers a crucial insight, but the present article's contention is that it is not ultimately able to explain the emergence of Schengen. Political, not economic, considerations were most important in the decision to sign the Schengen Agreement and the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement. Paradoxically, it was the strengthening of external border controls, rather than the relaxation and eventual abolition of internal border controls that best explains these accords. Moreover, the decision to act outside the Community framework was not primarily intended to put pressure on Great Britain. Rather, it was an attempt to exclude the institutions of the European Community from the decision-making process on immigration. And, more than this, it was a way to pressure Italy, Spain and, to a lesser extent, Greece and Portugal into adapting their migration policies to the more restrictive politics, which was pursued among Northern EC members. This argument forms the basis for the second thesis maintained in this article.

After readmission agreements and wider cooperation accords on migration were signed between members of the European Union (EU) and third Mediterranean countries, the concept of the externalization of European borders began to widely circulate

14. An useful analysis of the most relevant interpretations of the Schengen agreements can be found in: R. ZAIOTTI, *Cultures of Border Control. Schengen and the Evolution of European Frontiers*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2011, pp.8-13.
15. A. MORAVCSIK, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, Cornell University Press, New York, 1998, p.359.
16. Although Moravcsik's model emphasizes economic factors, it does not preclude the possibility that more strictly political considerations, such as national security, played a role. A. MORAVCSIK, op.cit. pp.359-360. On the same line of reasoning, Jörg Monar, Rector of the College of Europe, stressed that the Schengen agreements were a direct consequence of the need to complete the European Common Market. See: V. MITSILEGAS, J. MONAR, W. REES, *The European Union and Internal Security. Guardian of the People?*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2003. See also: J. MONAR, *The Project of a European Border Guard: Origins, Models and Prospects in the Context of the EU's Integrated External Border Management*, in: M. CAPARINI, O. MARENIN (eds), *Borders and Security Governance. Managing Borders in a Globalised World*, Lit, Zurich, 2006, pp. 193-194.

in specialized literature.[17] Generally speaking, this notion implies that, since the late 1990s, the European Union and its member states systematically tried to move the place where travel checks occurred. The control point shifted from the border of the destination state to a point within the state of origin or transit. The intention was to reduce the number of persons entering irregularly while, simultaneously, reducing political costs and bypassing the legal constraints implicit in such an attempt.

Drawing on these ideas, the present article contends that the strategy of externalization began much earlier than is generally acknowledged and that the Schengen agreements can be considered as the first stage in this process. In particular, we would suggest that, before being moved to origin and transit countries in Northern Africa, the Middle East and, to a certain extent, Eastern Europe, Northern European border controls were shifted to Southern European transit countries through Schengen. Unlike non-Community countries, which were rewarded for their collaboration in controlling European borders with financial support, Italy and, afterwards, Spain, Portugal and Greece were rewarded for guarding the Southern marches of the EC with Schengen membership. This leads us to the third and last thesis introduced in this article.

With very few exceptions, the multifaceted relationship between the establishment of the Schengen area, the external relations policy of the EC, later the EU, and the complex of Euro-Mediterranean relations has largely been neglected in both European and Mediterranean studies.[18] In this study we agree wholeheartedly that there was a complex combination of interdependent variables behind the Schengen agreements. But we would argue that the agreements ought to be primarily interpreted as a foreign policy initiative aimed at protecting the geopolitical core of the European Community from a security threat: namely, unwanted mass immigration, especially from Southern Mediterranean states. Seen in this light, third Mediterranean countries

17. See: A. BERRAMDANE, J. ROSSETTO, *La politique européenne d'immigration*, Karthala, Paris, 2009; S. LAVENEX, E. UCARER, *Migration and the Externalities of European Integration*, Lexington Books, Lanham, 2002. See also: M. CECCORULLI, *The Mediterranean as a buffer: confining irregular migrants in North Africa*, in: M. CECCORULLI, N. LABANCA (eds), *The EU, Migration and the Politics of Administrative Detention*, Routledge, Abingdon, 2014, pp.187-208; F. SAHLI, *Le partenariat Euro-Maghrebin, droits humains et dialogue*, in: L. BEKEMANS, M. KARASINSKA-FENDLER, M. MASCIA, et.al. (eds), *Intercultural Dialogue and Citizenship. Translating Values into Actions: a Common Project for Europeans and their Partners*, Marsilio, Venice, 2007, pp.333-343; R.A. DEL SARTO, *Borderlands: the Middle East and North Africa as the EU's Southern Buffer Zone*, in: D. BECHEV, K. NICOLAIDIS (eds), *Mediterranean Frontiers. Borders, Conflict and Memory in a Transnational World*, IB Tauris, London, 2010, pp.149-165; D. BIGO, *Sécurité et immigration: vers une gouvernementalité par l'inquiétude?*, in: *Cultures et Conflicts*, 31-32(1998), pp.13-38; C. BOSWELL, *The "External Dimension" of EU Immigration and Asylum Policy*, in: *International Affairs*, 3(2003), pp.619-638; D. LUTTERBECK, *Policing Migration in the Mediterranean*, in: *Mediterranean Politics*, 1(2006), pp.59-82; A. GEDDES, *Europeanisation Goes South: The External Dimension of EU Migration and Asylum Policy*, in: *Journal for Comparative Government and European Policy*, 3(2008), pp.275-293.

18. See: M. CREMONA, J. MONAR, S. POLI, *The External Dimension of the European Union's Area of Freedom, Security and Justice*, Peter Lang, Brussels, 2011; P.J. CARDWELL, *EU External Relations and Systems of Governance. The CFSP, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Migration*, Routledge, Abingdon, 2009; N. RIBAS-MATEOS, *Migration, Welfare & Borders. The Mediterranean in the Age of Globalization*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 2005; S. COLLINSON, *Shore to Shore: the politics of migration in Euro-Maghreb Relations*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1996.

were the main targets of the Schengen Agreement in 1985 and remained the main targets of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement in 1990. This was so even if, after the collapse of Communist regimes, immigration flows from the East were expected to surge past those from the South. This approach is not without implications for our understanding of the external relations of the European Community and for our understanding, too, of relations between third Mediterranean countries and the member states of the EC, especially the Southern ones.

Italy's Exclusion: What was at Stake (1984-1987)

The beginning of the debate over the free movement of persons in Europe coincided, of course, with the beginning of the European integration process.[19] However, a decisive step forward was only taken in the mid-1980s with the Saarbrücken Accord, brought about by meetings between French President François Mitterrand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. The agreement, signed by the French Secretary of State for European Affairs, Roland Dumas, and the Head of the German Chancellery, Waldemar Schreckenberger, on 13 July 1984, envisioned the immediate abolition of controls on persons and the easing of controls on vehicles. It also envisioned the transfer of these controls to external borders; the harmonization of visa policies and legislation on foreign nationals, drugs, arms and passport delivery; and the strengthening of police and customs cooperation. The Italian government, at the initiative of the then Foreign Minister, Giulio Andreotti, immediately expressed the desire to reach a similar agreement with France.[20] However, Laurent Fabius's government turned the request down. In the opinion of French Interior Ministry officials, Italy's immigration policy was lax: this made it the most important transit country for illegal immigration heading for France from Yugoslavia, Turkey, Maghreb countries, especially Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria, and sub-Saharan African countries, especially Senegal.[21] According to French officials in the Ministry for External Relations, 800,000 undocumented immigrants, who then lived in Italy, were potentially ready to cross the Alps into France.[22] In addition, the officers of both the French Ministry for External Relations and the French Interior Ministry were concerned that the abolition of border controls with Italy might encourage an influx of inactive and unemployed Italian persons and, more importantly, favour international terrorism and criminal trafficking into France, including counterfeit money, smuggled

19. See: A. GEDDES, *Immigration and European Integration. Towards fortress Europe?*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2000; F. ROMERO, *Emigrazione e integrazione europea 1945-1973*, Edizioni Lavoro, Roma, 1991.
20. G.-H. SOUTOU, *L'Italie et le "couple" franco-allemand*, in: P. CRAVERI, A. VARSORI (eds), *L'Italia nella costruzione europea. Un bilancio storico (1957-2007)*, Franco Angeli, Milano, 2009, p.60.
21. ADN, CGF [Consulat Général in Florence], 227 PO 1 291, Ministère Français de l'Intérieur, Réflexions sur le contrôle transfrontalier à la frontière franco-italienne, 06.1985.
22. ADN, CGF, PO 1 137, Ministère français des Relations extérieures, Immigration clandestine, 25.10.1984.

artwork, stolen cars and drugs.[23] Without cooperation between border guards, a drastic tightening of its own immigration policy and, more importantly, a readmission agreement with France, Italy could not hope to form a borderless area with its Northern neighbour.[24]

Soon after the signature of the Saarbrücken Accord, the Benelux countries began to show interest in the project and, at the conclusion of brief negotiations, on 14 June 1985, the French Secretary of State for European Affairs, Catherine Lalumière, the Head of German Chancellery, Waldemar Schreckenberger, the Dutch Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Willem Frederik van Eekelen, the Belgian Secretary of State for European Affairs, Paul De Keersmaeker, and the Luxembourgian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Robert Goebbels, signed the Schengen Agreement.[25] Modelled on the Saarbrücken Accord, Schengen provided for the removal of internal border controls, while simultaneously introducing measures to strengthen external border controls and to ramp up the fight against drug-trafficking, international crime and illegal immigration.

London, Dublin and Copenhagen refused to stop border controls because they did not trust the effectiveness of Central and Southern European countries and wanted to maintain sovereignty in this politically sensitive domain. In addition to these motives, the determination to remain part of the Nordic Passport Union, a borderless area composed of all Scandinavian countries, played a role in Denmark's decision. Similarly Ireland's opposition to borderless areas at the European level came down, in part, to the Republic's desire to remain a member of the Common Travel Area with Great Britain. Athens was, meanwhile, potentially interested. Yet Greece was a newcomer to the EC and an emigration country on the geopolitical periphery, to boot: it would not be invited to join Schengen.[26]

Italy was the only important EC member excluded from the accord and the exclusion came as a shattering blow to Italy's pride. Italy, after all, was not only a

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23. ADN, CGF, 227 PO 1 39, Ministère français des Affaires étrangères, Ressortissants italiens soumis à l'obligation du visa, 30.03.1981; PO 1 291, Ministère français des Relations extérieures, Sommet franco-italien. Procédure d'allègement des contrôles aux frontières avec l'Italie, 28.05.1985; ibid., Ministère français de l'Intérieur, Note relative à l'ouverture de la frontière franco-italienne, 05.06.1985.
24. ADN, CGF, 227 PO 1 137, Ministère français des Relations extérieures, Passages à la frontière Franco-Italienne, 18.10.1984; ibid., Cadre général des relations franco-italiennes, 19.10.1984; ibid., Éventuel allègement des contrôles à la frontière, 22.10.1984.
25. *Le Soir*, 14.06.1985; *Le Républicain Lorrain*, 15.06.1985; *Le Figaro*, 16.06.1985.
26. See: A. PUDLAT, *Schengen. Zur Manifestation von Grenze und Grenzschutz in Europa*, Olms, Hildesheim, 2013; Idem., *Der lange Weg zum Schengen-Raum. Ein Prozess im Vier-Phasen-Modell*, in: *Journal of European Integration History*, 2(2011), pp.303-325; P. BOELES, M. DEN HEIJER, G. LODDER, et.al., *European Migration Law*, Intersentia, Antwerp, 2009; S. K. KARANJA, *Transparency and Proportionality in the Schengen Information System and Border Control Cooperation*, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden-Boston, 2008; G. SCIORTINO, *L'ambizione della frontiera. Le politiche di controllo migratorio in Europa*, Franco Angeli, Milano, 2000; V. HREBLAY, *Les accords de Schengen: origine, fonctionemment, avenir*, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1998; J.S. LOUTTE, *Les États du Benelux et la France face aux accords de Schengen*, Centre de recherche et d'information socio-politiques, Bruxelles, 1998; S. BELLUCCI, *L'Europa senza frontiere e le nuove misure di cooperazione tra polizie*, Laurus Robuffo, Roma, 1997; D. BIGO, *Polices en réseaux: l'expérience européenne*, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris, 1996; G. RENAULT, *Schengen. Un modèle pour l'Europe pénale?*, Larcier, Bruxelles, 1995.

founding member but it was also then serving as President of the Council of the European Community. As such Italy was also finalizing the organization of an important European Council in Milan, which was expected to relaunch European integration.[27]

The Italian Prime Minister, Bettino Craxi, was certainly concerned. He put it at the top of the agenda in a summit with French President Mitterrand, which took place in Florence on the same day on which the Schengen Agreement was signed.[28] Mitterrand agreed, under pressure from Craxi, on bilateral negotiations aimed at reaching a quasi-Schengen arrangement between Italy and France. Mitterrand was, however, brutally clear that Rome first needed to strengthen controls on persons trying to illegally enter France through Italy, especially from the Mediterranean region.[29] What emerged was a basic disagreement over the role of the EC and, more importantly, the generalised perception of the Mediterranean region. Craxi was convinced that the EC was the appropriate framework for dealing with the liberalization of the cross-border movement of persons and that the EC should develop a generous immigration policy, consistent with its moral responsibilities and political and economic interests in the Mediterranean. This attitude went hand in hand with Italy's unspoken need for illegal migrants and with the renewed Mediterranean ambitions of the country, which meant a greater role in the Middle East, Malta and the Maghreb region, including Algeria, Libya and Tunisia.[30] Mitterrand was, instead, preoccupied with the political and electoral rise of the anti-immigration *Front National* (FN) and a sharp increase in the risk of terrorist attacks in France.[31] Consequently he believed that any prospect of Communitarisation of the Schengen policy and any enlargement of the Schengen group should be linked to a preliminary tightening of immigration policies, the ultimate aim being to protect Europe and, in particular, France from unwanted migration from the South.

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27. A. VARSORI, *La Cenerentola d'Europa? L'Italia e l'integrazione europea dal 1947 ad oggi*, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2010; M. NERI GUALDESI, *Il cuore a Bruxelles, la mente a Roma. Storia della partecipazione italiana alla costruzione dell'unità europea*, ETS, Pisa, 2004. See also: S. PAOLI, *Tra solidarietà e fermezza, tra Europa e Mediterraneo. Craxi, il Partito socialista e l'adesione italiana all'accordo di Schengen*, in: D. CAVIGLIA, S. LABBATE (eds), *Al governo del cambiamento. L'Italia di Craxi tra rinnovamento e obiettivi mancati*, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2014, pp.103-134; S. ROMANO, *Eurosocialismo e politica estera del governo Craxi*, in: A. SPIRI (ed.), *Bettino Craxi, il socialismo europeo e il sistema internazionale*, Marsilio, Venezia, 2006, pp.83-84; G. MAMMARELLA, *Il Consiglio europeo di Milano del giugno 1985*, in: E. DI NOLFO (ed.), *La politica estera italiana negli anni Ottanta*, P. Lacaita, Manduria, 2003, pp. 199-223.
28. ADN, CGF, 227 PO 1 291, Ministère français des Relations extérieures, Sommet franco-italien, 24.05.1985.
29. *Financial Times*, 15.06.1985.
30. In the mid-1980s, France was quite preoccupied with the apparent success of Italy's Mediterranean policy and it had the clear intention of limiting the influence of Rome in crucial countries, especially in the Maghreb. ADN, CGF, 227 PO 1 291, Ministère français des Relations extérieures, L'Italie et le Maghreb, 23.05.1985; ibid., Politique étrangère de l'Italie, 05.06.1985.
31. ADN, CGF, 227 PO 1 291, Ministère français des Relations extérieures, Circulation des personnes: Immigration clandestine, 05.1985.

Shortly after the summit in Florence, representatives of the Italian Foreign Ministry and the French Ministry for External Relations met. Negotiations lasted for months before coming to an abrupt halt in early 1986: nothing was achieved. Both Italian and French primary sources show that the main cause of the breakdown in negotiations was the Italian government's refusal to meet the requests made by French representatives on behalf of the Schengen states. First, the Italian authorities were reluctant to pay the political and financial cost of removing the geographical limitation contained in the 1951 Geneva Convention from their legislation, in which the status of political asylum was only recognized for "persons fleeing events occurring before 1 January 1951 and within Europe".[32] This request was due to the willingness of the Schengen countries, especially Germany, to share the increasing burden of refugee flows from Africa and Asia.[33] Second, they opposed signing a readmission agreement with France whereby Italy had to readmit irregular migrants transiting from Italy to France.[34] Finally, and more importantly, they were reluctant to make their own immigration legislation conform to the stricter laws adopted by all Schengen states between the early 1970s and the mid-1980s.[35] Rome questioned the convenience and feasibility of stricter border controls and new penalties on carriers transporting undocumented foreigners.[36] Also, Rome staunchly rejected the French call for the introduction of visa requirements for nationals of all emigration or potential emigration countries. While both the French government and presidency regarded visas as effective antidotes to illegal immigration and international terrorism, the Italian government argued for exempting a number of developing countries, es-

32. Introductory note to OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (ed.), *Convention and Protocol relating to the status of refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees*, Geneva, 2010, p.2.
With the adoption of the 1967 Protocol relating to the status of refugees, the geographical limitation lost much of its significance and it was maintained by a very limited number of states, including Italy.
33. ASFBC [Archivi Storici della Fondazione Bettino Craxi], FBC [Fondo Bettino Craxi], 4A, Ministero Italiano degli Affari Esteri, Libera circolazione delle persone nella Comunità, 11.1986.
34. According to the officials of the Italian Foreign Ministry, the Schengen Agreement "was conceived of, especially by France, as a means of pressuring Italy in order to solve, possibly with profit, the problem of repatriation of illegal immigrants to their countries of origin" [translated by the author]. ASFBC, FBC, 4A, Libera circolazione delle persone …, op.cit.
35. According to the officials of the Italian Foreign Ministry, the real reason why the Schengen countries signed an intergovernmental agreement rather than adopting an EC directive was their conviction that "the other members of the Community (above all Italy) were not sufficiently able to ensure serious control over common external borders" [translated by the author]. ASFBC, FBC, 12B, Ministero Italiano degli Affari Esteri, Europa dei cittadini. Cooperazione in materia di libera circolazione delle persone, 11.1986.
36. ASFBC, FBC, ALL12, Ministero Italiano degli Affari Esteri, Seguiti riunione interministeriale sul soggiorno dei cittadini CEE, snellimento controlli frontiere intracomunitarie e proposta tedesca sull'ingresso illegale di extra-comunitari provenienti con navi e aerei, 14.11.1986.

pecially in the Mediterranean basin, from visa regimes.[37] According to the Italian authorities, the expansion of visa requirements, in addition to being ineffective in dealing with illegal immigration and international terrorism, contradicted the internationalist values of the main national political and social forces. Moreover, it was a hindrance to both tourism to Italy and pilgrimages to the Vatican City and, what was worse, it was an obstacle to the government's Mediterranean strategy.[38]

Not surprisingly, the exemption of visas for Turkish and, above all, Maghreb citizens stood out as the most divisive issue.[39] Openness towards immigration from Tunisia, in particular, had been a constant in Italo-Tunisian relations since the early 1970s, when Tunisian Foreign Minister Mohamed Masmoudi explicitly asked Italian Foreign Minister Aldo Moro to improve the working and living conditions of Tunisian residents in Sicily.[40] He also asked for an alternative destination for Tunisian migrants

37. The French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson was the first to draw up a plan to extend visa requirements; however, the plan was abandoned because of the protests from sending countries, especially in the Maghreb and Francophone sub-Saharan Africa. After the French legislative election in 1986, which saw the rise of the National Front and the victory of the *Rassemblement pour la République* / *Union pour la Démocratie Française* (RPR/UDF) coalition, the new French government carried the idea of visa requirements to extremes, by deciding to impose visas on all countries of the world apart from Switzerland and Community countries. The aim was to contribute to the fight against international terrorism and illegal immigration from Maghreb and Francophone sub-Saharan African countries without undermining bilateral relations: "il est tout à fait clair que c'est le caractère universel de la mesure qui a permis de faire admettre le visa aux pays du Maghreb et de l'Afrique francophone, sans que ceux-ci le ressentent comme une discrimination intolérable". ADN, CGF, 227 PO 1 39, Ministère français des Affaires étrangères, Extension du régime du visa de court séjour, 07.11.1986; PO 1 205, Ministère français des Affaires étrangères, Les visas, 13.01.1988. See also: R. LEVEAU, *Migrations et imaginaires sociaux: l'épreuve de la guerre du Golfe*, in: B. BADIE, C. WIHTOL DE WENDEN (eds), *Le défi migratoire. Questions de relations internationales*, Presses de la Fondation Nationale, Paris, 1994, pp.127-139.
38. A. MELONI, *Visa Policy within the European Union Structure*, Springer, Berlin, 2006, pp.38-39.
39. Before the extension of visa requirements to all the countries in the world except for Switzerland and Community countries, the French authorities were particularly concerned with the exemption of visas for Turkish citizens to visit Italy. On the eve of the summit between President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Craxi, (Rome, 14 November 1985), the General Secretariat of the Élysée reminded the French President that: "une divergence importante subsiste: L'Italie refuse de soumettre les Turcs à un visa d'entrée dans son pays. Si ce refus était maintenu, nous devrions différer la conclusion de l'accord sur l'allègement aux frontières". ANF [Archives Nationales de France], APR [Archives de la Présidence de la République], ACD [Archives de la Cellule diplomatique], 5 AG 4 / CD 300 Dossier 4, Élisabeth Guigou, Hubert Védrine, Note pour le Président de la République. Votre entretien avec M. Craxi, 13.11.1985.
40. Tunisians constituted the earliest, significant, immigrant community in Italy. The first wave of migration took place between the late 1960s and the early 1970s; first-wave migrants were mainly single males who came to work in the fishing and agricultural sectors in the South. See: M. GIACOMARRA, *Dai siciliani in Tunisia ai Maghrebini in Sicilia*, in: E. GIANOTTI, G. MICCICHÉ (eds), *Migrazioni nel Mediterraneo: scambi, convivenze e contaminazioni tra Italia e Nordafrica*, L'Harmattan Italia, Torino, 2002, pp.81-89; R. RIBERO, F. DALY, *The double passage: Tunisian migration to the South and North of Italy*, in: R. KING (ed.), *The Mediterranean Passage. Migration and New Cultural Encounters in Southern Europe*, Liverpool University Press, Liverpool, 2001, pp. 186-205.

after the anti-immigration policies adopted in France, the traditional destination of Tunisian migrants in Europe.[41]

In the mid-1980s this request became even more pressing. Tunisia was then experiencing a period of economic, social and political crisis, combined with sustained demographic growth.[42] In the same period Libya expelled 30,000 Tunisian migrants for economic and political motives.[43]

Craxi was well aware of the risks involved with an uncontrolled influx of migrants from Southern Mediterranean countries. However, he became convinced that the message sent by border closure to Maghreb states, especially Tunisia, ran counter to national interests and he took the lead in suggesting an alternative approach to European immigration policy. According to Craxi, the containment and reduction of immigration flows should not be pursued at the cost of deterioration in relations with Maghreb countries, not least a privileged partner such as Tunisia. On the contrary, he argued that the restrictive immigration policies, which France, Germany and Benelux countries adopted between the early 1970s and the mid-1980s and tried to export to all member states of the EC through the Schengen Agreement, were objectionable. These policies needed to be replaced with an EC strategy of acceptance and integration of a significant proportion of the Maghreb labour surplus and an EC plan of economic assistance for redressing socio-economic imbalances between the two shores of the Mediterranean. This was functional to both the requirements of the

41. ACS [Archivio Centrale dello Stato], FAM [Fondo Aldo Moro], 156, Ministero Italiano degli Affari Esteri, Visita in Italia del ministro degli Affari Esteri della Repubblica tunisina. Relazioni economiche fra l'Italia e la Tunisia, 12.1973. Italy became a coveted destination for Tunisian migrants due to historical ties, geographical proximity and cultural links between the two countries, plus the liberal immigration policy pursued by Italy and the existence of a large underground sector in the Italian economy. See: M. A. PIRRONE, *Approdi e scogli. Le migrazioni internazionali nel Mediterraneo*, Eterotopia, Milano, 2002; F. BOSELLO, *Tunisia: un impegno rivolto al futuro*, Mondadori, Milano, 1987. See also: F. DALY, R. BAROT, *Economic Migration and Social Exclusion: the Case of Tunisians in Italy in the 1980s and 1990s*, in: F. ANTHIAS, G. LAZARIDIS (eds), *Into the Margins: Migration and Exclusion in Southern Europe*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 1999, pp. 35-53; M. MOZZATI, *La compresenza delle culture*, in: M. MALCHIODI (ed.), *La Rai in Tunisia. L'immagine dell'Italia e degli Italiani negli spettatori tunisini di Raiuno, Rai*, Nuova Eri, Roma, 1995, pp. 14-18; F. CARCHEDI, I Tunisini, in: G. MOTTURA (ed.), *L'arcipelago immigrazione. Caratteristiche e modelli migratori dei lavoratori stranieri in Italia*, Ediesse, Roma, 1992, pp.127-134.

42. During the 1980s, 53,000 workers joined the labour force each year in Tunisia, but there were only 40,000 new jobs. The gap was largely met by exporting workers to Europe, Libya and the Persian Gulf. R. COHEN, *Migration and its Enemies. Global Capital, Migrant Labour and the Nation-State*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2006, pp.126-127.

43. See: E. PAOLETTI, *The Migration of Power and North-South Inequalities. The Case of Italy and Libya*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke; New York, 2011; O. PLIEZ, *La nouvelle Libye. Géopolitique, espaces et sociétés au lendemain de l'embargo*, Karthala-Iremam, Paris, 2004; N. VAN HEAR, *Consequences of the Forced Mass Repatriation of Migrant Communities: Recent Cases from West Africa and the Middle East*, UN Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva, 1992.

Italian economic system and the Mediterranean ambitions of the Italian government, especially its Socialist wing.[44]

This political offensive culminated in the Mediterranean Conference on Labour Market Policies, which was held in Tunis in early 1987 at the suggestion of the Italian Labour and Social Affairs Minister, Gianni De Michelis.[45] De Michelis found himself speaking in front of Ministers from France, Greece, Spain, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey and Yugoslavia, plus representatives from the Arab League, the Arab Labour Organization (ALO), the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the European Community. He made a sustained effort to reply to the Fortress Europe logic that, according to him, was implicit in Schengen.[46]

In his view, restrictive policies had proved to be both ineffective in tackling unwanted immigration and detrimental to positive Euro-Mediterranean relations; in addition, he was also convinced that immigration, including illegal immigration, was vital in easing Italy's demographic decline and in circumventing the rigidities of the Italian labour market. As a consequence, according to De Michelis, the solution to the challenge of migration from the South was not to be sought in Schengen-like agreements. These only extended unsuccessful national policies to the whole continent and heralded a police approach to complex, multifaceted questions. The European Community was the suitable institutional space within which European countries should try to discuss and agree a common strategy. In this context, in particular, the EC should contribute to the establishment of a sort of integrated Euro-Mediterranean labour market, in which Southern surpluses of manpower alleviate shortages of manpower and ageing populations in the North. In addition, the EC should work at implementing economic and social cohesion at the Euro-Mediterranean level, the ultimate aim being to close disparities in socio-economic conditions between the two shores of the Mediterranean. In De Michelis's opinion, this was the only way for the European Community and its member states to govern immigration pressure on

44. ANF, APR, ACD, 5 AG 4 / CD 135 Dossier 1, Edgard Pisani, Note pour le Président de la République: Entrevue avec le Président Bettino Craxi, 03.12.1986. See also: I. AMRI, *Le relazioni della Tunisia con l'Europa occidentale in materia di manodopera*, in: M. DELLE DONNE, U. MELOTTI (eds), *Mediterraneo. Di qua di là dal mare Tunisia Italia*, Ediesse, Roma, 2002, pp. 99-110.

45. Though Gianni De Michelis served as Labour and Social Affairs Minister between 1983 and 1987, from the mid-1980s he was generally considered by European authorities, especially the French, as "l'homme clé des relations internationales au sein du Parti socialiste italien"; between 1989 and 1992, he served as Foreign Minister. ANF, APR, ACD, 5 AG 4 / CD 135 Dossier 1, Hubert Vedrine, Note pour le Président de la République, 27.06.1986.

46. R. COSTA, *L'immigrazione verso l'Italia e l'Europa nelle previsioni per i prossimi venticinque anni, in*: C. MACCHERONI, A. MAURI (eds), *Le migrazioni dall'Africa mediterranea verso l'Italia*, Giuffrè, Milano, 1989, p.20.

Western European countries, thereby simultaneously contributing to the development and stabilization of the Mediterranean region as a whole.[47]

Italy's Entry: Caught Between Europe and the Maghreb (1987-1990)

At the fall of the Craxi government on 17 April 1987, all proposals were put aside, not least because of the cold reaction from the French government. Paris stood against the prospect of relaxing Schengen immigration rules, especially on the Mediterranean front. They refused, too, the idea of associating the strengthening of external border controls with the adoption of assistance plans for third Mediterranean countries.[48] They were convinced, finally, that the migration issue was not to be dealt with in the complex and sometimes chaotic Euro-Mediterranean fora:

> "il faut travailler dans une aire plus homogène, par exemple les relations entre la CEE et le Maghreb, ou les relations entre pays complémentaires d'émigration et d'immigration, ou les riverains de la Méditerranée occidentale".[49]

At the same time, the government in Rome realized that it was too costly, in both political and economic terms, to stay on the margins of the Schengen club. Not least, there was the danger that Italy might cease to be a transit country, as it was perceived by a large part of its ruling class and public opinion, and become, instead, a receiving country. In addition, the predominance of the "pro-French faction" led by Foreign Minister Andreotti over the "pro-Mediterranean faction" led by Craxi, the ex-Prime Minister and Secretary of the *Partito Socialista Italiano* (PSI), also played a role in the more favourable attitude towards Schengen in the new Fanfani government.[50] Moreover, after a rebuffed attempt at alliance with Spain, Italy faced the serious risk of being diplomatically isolated in Europe; unlike the Italian Parliament, in fact, the Spanish Parliament was prompt in bringing national immigration legislation in line

47. ANF, APR, ACD, 5 AG 4 / CD 135 Dossier 1, Hubert Vedrine, Initiative italienne sur la Méditerranée, 07.04.1987. See also: G. DE MICHELIS, *La lezione della storia: sul futuro dell'Italia e le prospettive dell'Europa*, Marsilio, Venezia, 2013; idem., *La lunga ombra di Yalta: la specificità della politica italiana*, Marsilio, Venezia, 2003. In accordance with this strategy, the government in Rome gave 500 million dollars of assistance to Tunisia in the context of a wider change of priorities and beneficiaries in Italy's policy of cooperation. E. CALANDRI, *Prima della globalizzazione. L'Italia, la cooperazione allo sviluppo e la Guerra Fredda*, Cedam, Padova, 2013, pp.251-306.
48. J.S. LOUETTE, *Les États du Benelux et la France face aux accords de Schengen*, Centre de recherche et d'information socio-politiques, Bruxelles, 1998, pp.11-16.
49. ANF, APR, ACD, 5 AG 4 / CD 135 Dossier 1, Hubert Vedrine, Méditerranée, 06.04.1987.
50. The French Ambassador to Italy in the late 1980s and early 1990s considered Andreotti "sans doute un des hommes politiques italiens les plus proches de la France, maniant parfaitement notre langue et fin gourmet de notre culture". ADN, CGF, 227 PO 1 291, Gilbert Pérol, Rencontre du Président de la République avec Andreotti, 27.09.1989.

with the more restrictive legislation of Schengen countries, while remaining reluctant to impose visa requirements on Maghreb and South American citizens.[51]

After a short internal debate the Italian government, inspired by Andreotti, agreed on asking for admittance to the groups charged with drafting the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement. The Italian government was, though, well aware that the five original Schengen signatories had no intention of toning down their requests.[52]

Unsurprisingly, the Schengen governments accepted the Italian request for admittance. The aim was to reassure the European Commission and the European Parliament that the Schengen Agreement would eventually include all members of the EC and contribute to a politically and financially convenient externalization of border control activities.[53] The Schengen governments, however, continued to insist that Italy should meet all the conditions and remove the obstacles for acceptance into the Schengen club, starting with the introduction of visa requirements for countries deemed to be problematic, including the Maghreb states. There was awareness that Italy would set the precedent for all Southern European states, so there was little room for compromise.[54] In addition, Italian ministers were excluded from biannual ministerial meetings, which took place in the framework of the negotiations for the Con-

51. A. CORTÉS MAISONAVE, *Los antecedentes políticos del codesarrollo: la reinvención del nexo entre la migración y el desarrollo en el sur de Europa*, in: F. CHECA Y OLMOS, J.C. CHECA, A. ARJONA (eds), *Las Migraciones en el Mundo: desafíos y esperanzas*, Icaria, Barcelona, 2009, p. 75; F.J. MORENO FUENTES, *Dissonance between Discourse and Practice in EU Border Control Enforcement. The Spanish Case*, in: A. CHEBEL D'APPOLLONIA, S. REICH (eds), *Immigration, Integration, and Security. America and Europe in Comparative Perspective*, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, 2008, pp.262-267. As a matter of fact, the Italian Parliament adopted a law on immigration as early as 1986. At that time, however, Italian decision makers were not concerned with the problem of reducing inflows; the aim of the act was to legalize and regulate the situation of immigrants in Italy and to gently prevent further illegal immigration rather than to restrict access and cut down inflows. See: C. BONIFAZI, *L'immigrazione straniera in Italia*, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2007; E. PUGLIESE, *L'Italia tra migrazioni internazionali e migrazioni interne*, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2006; K. CALAVITA, *Italy: Economic Realities, Political Fictions, and Policy Failures*, in: W.A. CORNELIUS, T. TSUDA, P.L. MARTIN, et.al. (eds), *Controlling Immigration. A Global Perspective*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2004, pp.366-369; P. BONETTI, *Italy*, in: B. NASCIMBENE (ed.), *Expulsion and Detention of Aliens in the European Union Countries*, Giuffré, Milano, 2001, pp.314-315; G. SCIORTINO, *Planning in the Dark: the Evolution of Italian Immigration Control*, in: G. BROCHMANN, T. HAMMAR (eds), *Mechanisms of Immigration Control. A Comparative Analysis of European Regulation Policies*, Berg, Oxford, 1999, pp.237-239; M. CONTEL, R. DE BIASE, *Italy*, in: S. ANGENENDT (ed.), *Asylum and Migration Policies in the European Union*, Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Affairs, Berlin, 1999, pp. 236-237; G. ZINCONE, *Immigration to Italy: Data and Policies*, in: F. HECKMANN, W. BOSSWICK (eds), *Migration Policies: a Comparative Perspective*, Enke, Stuttgard, 1995, p.138.

52. HACEU [Historical Archives of the Council of the European Union], SEC [Schengen Executive Committee], 230487, Ambassade d'Italie à Bruxelles, Lettre au Secrétariat Général du Benelux, 13.04.1987; ibid., Union Économique Benelux, Demande d'adhésion de l'Italie, 23.04.1987.

53. C. BOSWELL, *European Migration Policies in Flux. Changing Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion*, Blackwell, Oxford, 2003, pp.100-112.

54. N. GUIMEZANES, *La Convention de Schengen: une présentation française*, in: A. PAULY (ed.), *Schengen en panne*, European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, 1994, pp.5-10.

vention implementing the Schengen Agreement. Italian representatives, meanwhile, were admitted as mere observers to technical committees, without any decision-making powers.[55]

After one and a half years of Italian representatives' participation in negotiations, the Italian Parliament discussed the opportunity of entering the Schengen system. Between late 1988 and late 1989, the Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies conducted an enquiry into immigration and the conditions of foreign nationals in Italy. This highlighted the existence of important political forces opposing any Italian participation in the upcoming Schengen area.[56] There was, it is fair to say, a general failure to understand immigration and its potential implications; in addition, most criticisms depended on a common internationalist ideology and the shared memory of a long migratory past. Also, foreign policy considerations were crucial in shaping the views of Italian Socialists; put simply participation in the Schengen system seemed at odds with the Socialists' Mediterranean strategy, which included privileged economic and political relations with Maghreb countries. Third-Worldism played a decisive part in the critical positions taken by the representatives of the *Partito Comunista Italiano* (PC), meanwhile. The pro-immigration stance of the Catholic Church, finally, was influential in determining the *Democrazia Cristiana*'s (DC) position.[57]

All the members of the government, who spoke during hearings, criticized the Schengen Agreement and opposed Italian accession as well: with the sole exceptions of the Foreign Minister and, from mid-1989 to mid-1992, the Prime Minister, Andreotti, and the Interior Minister, Antonio Gava. The Labour and Social Affairs Minister, Rino Formica, questioned, for example, Schengen's emphasis on police border controls in the fight against illegal immigration. The Minister of European Affairs, Antonio La Pergola, argued against the decision to act outside the EC framework and to disregard, as he saw it, the interests and opinions of third Mediterranean countries. The Vice-Prime Minister, Claudio Martelli, a Socialist, bluntly attacked the Schengen Agreement head on. He denounced Schengen as an inhuman and ineffective attempt to establish a *cordon sanitaire* against the South whose poverty was, according to him, in great part attributable to the North. Martelli proposed as an alternative the strategic planning of migration flows at the EC level and in close coordination with the countries of origin: according to this proposal, the European Community ought to set a flexible and articulated framework within which all its member states, on the

55. M. FRIDEGOTTO, *L'accordo di Schengen: riflessi internazionali ed interni per l'Italia*, Franco Angeli, Milano, 1992, pp.17-20.
56. In addition, all the members of associations and trade unions, including the *Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro* (CGIL), the *Confederazione Italiana Sindacato Lavoratori* (CISL) and the *Unione Italiana del Lavoro* (UIL), who participated in the meetings of the Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies, expressed scepticism and criticism against the Schengen system. M. BASSETTI, *Immigrazione e razzismo in Italia*, in: *Testimonianze*, 3-4(1990).
57. ASILS [Archivio Storico dell'Istituto Luigi Sturzo], FDC [Fondo Democrazia Cristiana], SCONGRN [Serie Congresso Nazionale], 29, Delegazione italiana nel Gruppo del Partito Popolare Europeo, Mozione dei Deputati Europei DC per il Congresso, 18.02.1989.

basis of their respective socio-economic needs and in a spirit of international solidarity, would plan immigrant quotas and sign bilateral agreements with sending countries.[58] This proposal was clearly intended to satisfy the request for flexible and low-wage workers coming from Italian employers. But it also gave space to the Italian government's ambition to play a leading role in the Mediterranean region while, simultaneously, defending the primacy of the EC in international cooperation on migration and asylum.[59]

In this context, the request to impose visas on people coming from Maghreb countries became the most significant obstacle to Italy signing the Schengen Agreement and the upcoming Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement. In an attempt to strengthen diplomatic relations with Maghreb countries, especially the Morocco of King Hassan II and Tunisia with its new President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the Vice-Prime Minister openly challenged the Schengen countries, by confirming the Italian government's unwillingness to impose visas on persons coming from these states. Martelli, with the support of his party, and hoping to help with the unification of the Maghreb countries, was also actively committed in promoting free movement agreements between the European Community and the plan for an Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), which involved Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.[60]

With this in mind, after the well-publicized murder of a South-African refugee, Jerry Essan Masslo, and a consequent, unprecedented, mass rally against racism in late 1989, Martelli introduced a bill to reform Italian immigration policy. He was determined that it would not conform to Schengen norms; according to him, Italy should be particularly careful not to follow the model of France, which he regarded as a country: "shaken by waves of racism and with a foreign population that is five times larger than ours".[61]

After the approval of Martelli's decree law by the Council of Ministers, however, a heated debate began in which the distance between Italian and Northern European

58. CAMERA DEI DEPUTATI, *Immigrazione e condizione dello straniero. Indagine conoscitiva della I Commissione Affari Costituzionali e Testi normativi conseguenti (novembre 1988-dicembre 1989)*, Ufficio Pubblicazioni del Servizio Informazione Parlamentare e Relazioni Esterne della Camera dei Deputati, Roma, 1990.
59. C. MARTELLI, *Il merito e il bisogno*, SugarCo, Milano, 1987, p.194.
60. In a series of meetings with the Moroccan, Algerian and Tunisian authorities, which took place, respectively, in Rabat, Algiers and Tunis (October 1988), the Secretary of the PSI, Craxi, explicitly linked his support for the Great Maghreb project to the need for closer Euro-Maghreb cooperation on migration. See: A. MAHIOU, *Problématique de la construction maghrebine*, in: R. BISTOLFI (ed.), *Euro-Méditerranée. Une région à construire*, Publisud, Paris, 1995, pp.199-211; C. DAUDEL, *Quelles perspectives entre la CEE et l'UMA?*, in: *Afrique et Asie Modernes*, 166(1990), p.34; R. ALIBONI, *Le Maghreb et la Communauté européenne: vers une nouvelle approche solidaire*, in: *Orient*, 3 (1990), p.87.
61. See: *La Stampa*, 19.12.1989; *Il Giornale*, 20.12.1989. See also: C. MARTELLI, *Ricordati di vivere*, Bompiani, Milano, 2013.

immigration regimes became a fundamental argument against Martelli's approach.[62] This was the time when long-standing fears of immigrant invasion from the South combined with more recent fears of a looming immigrant invasion from the East. Significant political forces, including the neo-fascist *Movimento Sociale Italiano* (MSI) and the regionalist *Lega Lombarda* (LL)/*Lega Nord* (LN), began to openly criticize the liberal approach taken by the Vice-Prime Minister. They caricatured Italy as the soft underbelly of Europe and the open door to the Continent, borrowing from the French and German media and from the political debate in those two countries. Also, governing parties such as the *Partito Liberale Italiano* (PLI) and, above all, the *Partito Repubblicano Italiano* (PRI) protested Martelli's decree law in an attempt to take advantage of middle-class voters' fears and to reach out to the Schengen governments.[63]

The Schengen governments, in fact, made every effort to persuade both the Italian government and Parliament to accept their views on immigration. The French government and presidency were the most resolute in pressing the Italian authorities. In the words of the then Ambassador of France in Rome, on the eve of the Venice summit between French President Mitterrand and Italian Prime Minister Andreotti (4-5 October 1989):

> "notre intérêt […] n'est pas d'avoir, sur notre flanc méditerranéen oriental, le plus exposé précisément à la pression démographique, un "pays-passoire", […], ni un pays marginalisé avec lequel il faudrait maintenir, faute d'avoir pu maîtriser le problème, une sorte de "cordon sanitaire" sur les Alpes. L'occasion nous en est fournie précisément par la négociation sur les accords de Schengen – quel que soit, en définitive, le sort de ces accords. Puisque l'Italie frappe à la porte, il faut […] contraindre le Gouvernement italien, en l'enserrant dans un compte à rebours précis, à procéder à la nécessaire mise à jour de sa réglementation".[64]

Similarly, the Italian politicians who were most exposed to European influence, such as European Commissioner Carlo Ripa di Meana, publicly agreed with the Schengen countries, who refused to open their borders with Italy unless Italy adopted stricter rules on immigration. This included, naturally, visas on migrants or travellers from Southern Mediterranean countries.[65]

Pressure from Schengen governments, which was added to growing protests from both opposition and government parties and increasingly vociferous complaints from city mayors and social groups, especially shopkeepers, led to an abrupt change of

62. L. EINAUDI, *Le politiche dell'immigrazione in Italia dall'Unità a oggi*, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2007, pp.144-148.
63. SENATO DELLA REPUBBLICA ITALIANA, *Atti parlamentari. X Legislatura*, Resoconto stenografico, Roma, 27.02.1990. See also: *Il Manifesto*, 23.12.1989; *Avanti!*, 24.12.1989; *Il Giornale*, 06.01.1990; *Panorama*, 14.01.1990.
64. ADN, CGF, 227 PO 1 291, Gilbert Pérol, Rencontre du Président de la République avec Andreotti, 27.09.1989.
65. *Il Messaggero*, 24.02.1990.

heart in the two main government parties, the DC and the PSI.[66] This, in turn, led to a dramatic shift from a liberal to a restrictive approach to immigration. Though a majority in both parties remained secretly sceptical about the Schengen system and its underlying philosophy, they decided that the electoral and political costs of self-exclusion were too high.[67]

At the conclusion of the parliamentary debate, the original law decree was radically modified and all the most significant reforms requested as conditions for the country's accession to Schengen were adopted.[68] First, the Italian Parliament abolished the special clauses of the Geneva Convention in which the status of political asylum was only recognized for those from European countries.[69] Second, it strengthened rejection and detention procedures for irregular immigrants, tightened up sanctions for migrant smugglers and traffickers and introduced penalties on carriers transporting the undocumented. Finally, it agreed on visas for those coming from Turkey, the Maghreb and sub-Saharan African countries.[70] This was at the same time, it must be remembered, that all Schengen countries, immediately after the collapse of Communist regimes and under pressure from Germany, decided to remove Hungary and Czechoslovakia from the Schengen Black List. They also agreed to treat the German Democratic Republic, prior to reunification, as a non-foreign part of Germany, so *de facto* admitting East Germany into Schengen.[71]

Significantly, shortly after the adoption of the new restrictive law on immigration, which paved the way for the country's signature of the Schengen agreements, the

66. See: *Il Giornale*, 15.02.1990; *Secolo*, 15, 17, 20 and 21.02.1990; *L'Unità*, 17 and 23.02.1990; *Il Mattino*, 18.02.1990; *Corriere della Sera*, 18.02.1990; *L'Espresso*, 18.02.1990; *Avanti!*, 20.02.1990; *La Repubblica*, 23.02.1990; *Avvenire*, 24.02.1990; *Il Giorno*, 24.02.1990. See also: S. PAOLI, *La legge Martelli su asilo politico e immigrazione: una scelta europea*, in: *Storia e Politica – Annali della Fondazione Ugo La Malfa*, XXIX(2015).
67. ASILS, FDC, SCONSN [Serie Consiglio Nazionale], 71, Arnaldo Forlani, Relazione del segretario politico al Consiglio Nazionale della Democrazia Cristiana, 19-20.02.1990.
68. The so-called Martelli Law did not eliminate all differences between immigration legislation in Italy and in most European countries. As far as quotas for new immigration were concerned, it left the option to allow immigration flows if domestic labour market conditions were suitable, a point which differed from the legislation of many European neighbours. See: C. BONIFAZI, *European Migration Policy: Questions from Italy*, in: R. KING, G. LAZARIDIS, C. TSARDANIDIS (eds), *Eldorado or Fortress? Migration in Southern Europe*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2000, pp.233-252; C. MARTELLI, *Introduzione*, in: A. SAIJA (ed.), *La normativa sugli extracomunitari. Testo e commento della Legge 28/2/1990 N. 39*, Edizioni delle Autonomie, Roma, 1990, pp.5-6.
69. It is fair to say that the removal of the geographical limitation was also due to the pressure made by left-wing parties, religious and secular associations, intergovernmental organizations and international non-governmental organizations. C. HEIN, *Storia del diritto d'asilo in Italia*, in: C. HEIN (ed.), *Rifugiati: vent'anni di storia del diritto d'asilo in Italia*, Donzelli, Roma, 2010, pp.33-84.
70. K. BADE, *Migration in European History*, Blackwell, Malden, 2003, pp.234-240.
71. HACEU, CGFMP [Coordinators' Group on Free Movement of Persons], 3607/1/90, Groupe des Coordonnateurs "Libre Circulation des Personnes", Conclusions, 16.02.1990; HACEU, ADGI [Ad Hoc Group on Immigration], SN 2480/90 (WGI 541), Groupe Ad Hoc Immigration, Réunion, 29.01.1990; WGI 567, Groupe Ad Hoc Immigration, Conclusions, 05.03.1990; WGI 598, Groupe Ad Hoc Immigration, Conclusions, 05.04.1990; WGI 612, Groupe Ad Hoc Immigration, Conclusions, 15.05.1990.

Tunisian President Ben Alì made his first official visit to Italy. He emphasised the need for more open borders between Tunisia and Italy, and between the newly established Arab Maghreb Union and the European Community.[72] But despite protests from Ben Alì, Vice-Prime Minister Martelli signed the Schengen Agreement and the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement on 27 November 1990.

The governments of the Schengen countries were satisfied with the reassurances given by the Italian government and Parliament through the approval of the so-called Martelli Law and the promise, quickly fulfilled, to sign a readmission agreement with France. The Italian government, meanwhile, was content with its entry into Schengen after a debate which had risked the country's relations with its Community partners and the government's coalition and natural constituency.

Conclusion

In conclusion, an important reason why the Schengen countries resolved to act outside the EC framework and, in this context, to exclude Italy was their political determination to press Italy and, ultimately, all the Southern members of the EC into adopting the Northern European approach to the problem of immigration control. These Southern EC countries would, by this logic, have been transformed into a convenient and efficient first line in the externalization of border controls and a buffer zone against Southern Mediterranean countries.

Conversely, an important reason why Italy resisted, for a long time, to comply with the requirements to join Schengen was its willingness to facilitate the political and economic penetration of the Mediterranean region, especially the Maghreb. Seen in this light, even if it did not definitely prejudice relations with Maghreb countries, Italy's accession to the Schengen agreements marked a significant turning point in Italian foreign policy and, to a certain extent, in external EC relations. On the one hand, this episode represented a victory for the "pro-European faction" in its long-running conflict with the "pro-Mediterranean" one in Italy. On the other, it represented a failure to reverse both the Schengen approach to common immigration policy and the emergence of a security paradigm that, since the late 1980s and the early 1990s, has largely characterized Euro-Mediterranean relations.

72. Both in the summit with the Vice-President of the Italian Council of Ministers, Martelli, (Tunis, February 1990), and in the meetings with the President of the Italian Republic, Francesco Cossiga, the President of the Council of Ministers, Andreotti, and the Foreign Minister, De Michelis, (Rome, June 1990), the Tunisian President Ben Alì stated that the solution to the immigration problem should not be sought in imposition of visas and the deployment of the army at the borders but in a political agreement between the EC and the UMA, aimed at promoting socio-economic development in the Maghreb region. P. WULZER, *Le relazioni fra Italia e Tunisia*, in: M. PIZZIGALLO (ed.), *Il ponte sul Mediterraneo. Le relazioni fra l'Italia e i paesi arabi rivieraschi (1989-2009)*, Apes, Roma, 2011, p.237.

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



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Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen

Giovanni FARESE, Paolo SAVONA, *Il Banchiere del mondo. Eugene Robert Black e l'ascesa della cultura dello sviluppo in Italia. Prefazione di Giuseppe Di Taranto*, Rubettino Edittore, Soveria Mannelli, 2014, 165 p. – ISBN 978-8-8498-4161-9 – 12,75 €.

The Bretton Woods institutions, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, have played a fundamental role in the post-Second World War period. This book takes a special perspective: it offers a biography of Eugene Black, who was president of the World Bank from 1949 to 1962, focusing on his relationship with Italy.

The volume is composed of three main parts: "Sowing. Da Atlanta a New York", the youth, education and early career of Black; "Blossoming. Da New York a Washington", his World Bank years; and "Reaping. Da Washington a Roma", the relationship of Black and the World Bank with Italy. Furthermore, there are several interesting appendices with documents offering short overviews of Bretton Woods, Black and the World Bank, written by some of the main protagonists like Black, Guido Carli, John Maynard Keynes or Nicholas Kaldor. As such, this short book covers several worlds, both geographically (from Black's youth in Atlanta to New York and Washington and Italy), but also intellectually, as it covers different communities: bankers, academic economists, and policy-makers, both national ones (in the United States and Italy) as international ones.

As is well known, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund had very different tasks. As emphasised by George Theunis, a former Belgian Finance minister and delegate at Bretton Woods, the IMF

> "is not regarded, and should not be regarded, as an institution for the provision of long-term capital requirements. The Fund has been created to provide members with an "opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments" […]. On the contrary, when the Bank promotes or supplements investments […], the aim is to provide capital on a long-term or medium-term basis" (pp.90-91).

Eugene Black, the third president of the World Bank, was fundamentally a banker, a deal man, and as he himself observed, "I am a Wall Street Banker". The book offers several short portraits of Black. For instance one by Alec Cairncross, the first director (in 1957) of the World Bank Institute: "He treated banking as most people would treat running a small store. You could understand what it was about when he talked, whereas most bankers talk in a way that makes you think you'll never understand it" (p.IX), or by Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, the head of the Economic Advisory Staff of the Bank:

> "His philosophy is not very deep. He has a great deal of charm on which he relies, and part of his charm also is that he can listen, and one can persuade him… He is certainly elastic

> […] and with good instinct […] he takes certain views, which he may well refuse to apply generally" (p.IX).

The book brings quite well to the fore the dual nature of the World Bank as a "development bank". After the experience of the great Depression and the two world wars, economic growth and full employment became key economic policy objectives. As expressed by Henry Morgenthau, the US Finance minister at the time of the Bretton Woods negotiations, "I take it as an axiom that after this war ended no people, and therefore no government of the people, will again tolerate prolonged and widespread unemployment" (p.83). However, the World Bank was also a bank, and, as Black always remarked, "We like to get paid back".

Black himself was well aware of this dual nature of the Bank and the ensuing need for cooperation between governments and private investors,

> "to activate and attain economic development, international investment in productive facilities is required on an unprecedented scale. It is this factor, in the light of current world conditions, which presents us with a most difficult problem. Investors, governmental or private, but particularly the latter, are naturally hesitant about accepting the risks inherent in the present situation… The International Bank, or the World Bank, as it is often called, is the product of an idea which holds that successful investment in reconstruction and development requires cooperation not only between governments but between governments and private investors as well" (p.118).

Consequently, during the years of Black, and in line with this dual nature of the Bank, the World Bank focused on project loans, especially for infrastructure. This latter comes clearly to fore in Carli's observation:

> "We might, for instance, in this ancient city of ours, be tempted to compare Mr. Black with one of those Roman consuls who, in the course of history, distinguished themselves as builders of roads and bridges and aqueducts throughout the world" (p.104).

The World Bank extended its first loan to Italy in October 1951. While Italy recovered quite well from the war, there remained, as observed by Carli "the painful and age-old problem to the economic backwardness of some parts of our country, especially in the South" (p.104). It became a key economic policy issue in post-war Italy. The government, in collaboration with the World Bank, set up a new Southern Development Fund, the *Cassa per il Mezzogiorno*, which was very much inspired by the New Deal's "Tennessee Valley Authority". As further observed by Carli, "the support of the International Bank, in the form of seven successive loans for a total of some 300 million dollars, became an element of key importance in putting our programme into effect". The influence of the World Bank was not only financial, but also intellectual, through the many contacts of Black and World Bank officials with Italian policy-makers, leading the authors to speak of "the rise of the culture of development in Italy".

However, while the North-South gap in Italy diminished in the 1950s and 1960s, it increased again thereafter, as also admitted by the authors (p.8), implying that the

duality of the Italian economy was underestimated. Naturally this also raises questions about how well anchored the "culture of development" was in Italy.

On the whole, this is a thoroughly researched book (ten archives are listed, among them Chatham House, the World Bank, Brookings, the London School of Economics, Harvard University, the United Nations in Geneva). It is somewhat surprising that, notwithstanding all the archival research, the core of the book covers only eighty pages. Consequently, the book is sometimes rather short on certain issues, like the role of the World Bank in the rise of Keynesian economics in Italy. It might also have been useful to have a table with a chronology, to have a better overview of the life of Black and the main events during his lifetime. Moreover, while the book evokes very well the atmosphere of the times, it is a pity that there are no photographs (however there is a small cartoon of Black on the cover).

To conclude, this book not only offers a beautiful portrait of Eugene Black and his vision of the World Bank, but also of the relationship of the World Bank with Italy during his presidency of the Bank. It would merit to be also available in other languages as it not only concerns Italy but offers an interesting example of the role of an international institution as well as its influence in Italy, a crucial country in the Cold War period.

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INSTITUT FÜR ZEITGESCHICHTE, im Auftrag des AUSWÄRTIGEN AMTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND (Hrsg.), ***Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundsrepublik Deutschland – 1980***, Band I: ***1. Januar bis 30. Juni 1980***; Band II: ***1. Juli bis 31. Dezember 1980***, Wissenschaftliche Leiterin: Ilse Dortothee Pautsch, Bearbeiter: Tim Geiger, Amit Das Gupta und Tim Szatkowski, Oldenbourg, München, 2011, 2115 S. – ISBN 978-3-486-70219-4 – 148,00 €.

Wer aufschlussreiche, einschlägige und sehr gut belegte Informationen zur deutschen Außen-, Europa- und Weltpolitik des Jahres 1980 sucht, so zum Beispiel über das Gespräch von Deutschlands Bundeskanzler Helmut Schmidt mit dem Generalsekretär der Sozialistischen Partei Spaniens, Felipe González am 8. Januar in Madrid; eine Analyse des deutschen Botschafters Rolf Friedemann Pauls in Brüssel bei der NATO über den Doppelbeschluss des atlantischen Bündnisses und des sowjetischen Einmarsches in Afghanistan u. a. gedacht zur Wahrung des europäisch-amerikanischen Zusammenwirkens; Aufzeichnungen von Telefongesprächen Schmidts mit US-Präsident Jimmy Carter vom 29. Januar; Inhalte des Treffens von Außenminister Hans-Dietrich Genscher mit seinem sowjetischen Amtskollegen Andrej Gromyko in Wien am 16. Mai mit Blick auf die Frage des westlichen Boykotts der Olympischen Sommerspiele in Moskau aufgrund des sowjetischen Einmarsches in Afghanistan; Berichte von Günter Gaus, dem Ständigen Vertreter der Bundesrepublik in Ost-Berlin,

über die Verschlechterungen der innerdeutschen Beziehungen, die Rede des Vorsitzenden des Staatsrats der DDR und Generalsekretärs des Zentralkomitees der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei (SED) Erich Honeckers in Gera, die Erhöhung der Mindestumtauschsätze für Besuche in der DDR und Ost-Berlin sowie Fragen der Abrüstung und Rüstungskontrolle; Unterredungen zwischen Schmidt und der britischen Premierministerin Margret Thatcher über Agrar- und Haushaltsfragen der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (EG) und das Erfordernis vermehrter politischen Konsultationen; Berichte über die KSZE-Nachfolge-Konferenz in Madrid; Unterredungen von Genscher mit seinen Amtskollegen Peter Alexander Rupert Lord Carrington (UK), Jean François-Poncet (Frankreich) und Edmund Sixtus Muskie (USA) in Brüssel über die Preispolitik der OPEC-Staaten; Bilanzierungen der Verhandlungen über die Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Wien usw. usw., der greife zu diesen beiden voluminösen Teilbänden einer einmal mehr einzigartigen deutschen Außenpolitik-Editionsleistung!

Auf 2115 Seiten sind 376 sehr gut ausgewählte Aktenstücke im Rahmen einer umfassenden Dokumentation vornehmlich aus dem Politischen Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes praktisch unmittelbar nach Ablauf der 30-jährigen Sperrfrist publiziert worden. Aber nicht nur aus dem deutschen Außenministerium, sondern auch aus dem Bundeskanzleramt sowie aus dem Archiv der sozialen Demokratie (AdsD) der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Bonn Bad Godesberg (Materialien aus dem Privatpapier-Bestand von Helmut Schmidt) wurde dieser enorme Schatz von einer konzertiert agierenden und konzentriert arbeitenden Akteneditions-Arbeitsgruppe vorgelegt. Es ist eine wahre Fundgrube für Historiker, die sich mit der deutsch-deutschen Zeitgeschichte bzw. mit der Geschichte des Kalten Krieges und den Entspannungsbemühungen im Zeichen des Ost-West-Konflikts befassen wollen.

Das Hauptverdienst der gründlichen Erhebungen und Recherchen sowie der sorgfältigen Dokumentenauswahl, der Erarbeitung der Dokumentenabfolge und die Benennung der Dokumentenköpfe nebst der treffenden Kommentierungen und eingehenden Erläuterungen in den mitunter ausführlichen Anmerkungen wie der aufwändigen Erstellung der Verzeichnisse, Register und des Organisationsplans haben die lediglich unter „Bearbeiter“ firmierenden Tim Geiger, Amit Das Gupta und Tim Szatkowski sowie ihre Leiterin Ilse Dorothee Pautsch geleistet.

Diese Art von Editionsarbeit in kontinuierlicher Abfolge und in Serienbänden vorgelegt kann angesichts des Ausbleibens, ja Versagens von Grundlagenforschungsleistung vergleichbarer Art an universitären Geschichtsinstituten gar nicht genug anerkannt und gelobt werden. Die vorliegende Dokumentensammlung ist absolut mustergültig erarbeitet worden und vorbildhaft für ähnlich gedachte oder erwünschte Editionswerke zu bezeichnen, die allerdings in dieser Bonität, Gediegenheit und Fundierung in Europa ihres Gleichen suchen dürften. Wie wünschenswert wären vergleichbare Editionsvorhaben für andere europäische Staaten und deren Außenpolitik wie z. B. für Österreich.

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Dominik GEPPERT, *Ein Europa, das es nicht gibt. Die fatale Sprengkraft des Euro*, (mit einem Vorwort von Udo Di Fabio), Europa Verlag, Wien-Berlin-München, 2013, 189 S., – ISBN 978-3-944305-18-9 – 16.99 €.

Die Medaille „Euro" hat zwei Seiten, wobei hier die Kehrseite besonders scharf beleuchtet wird. Kritische Betrachtungen zur „Herausforderung Euro" (2005) wie vom ehemaligen Präsidenten der Deutschen Bundesbank Hans Tietmeyer, Untergangsszenarien wie die „Die letzten Jahre des Euro" vom Journalisten Bruno Bandulet (2010) oder Kritik am „Weg zum Euro. Stationen einer verpassten Chance" vom früheren sächsischen Ministerpräsidenten Kurt Biedenkopf (2012), um nur drei Akteure zu nennen, sind allerdings nicht neu. Wurde bisher an der Methodik der Einführung, der Verfrühtheit und den Mängeln des Entwicklungssystems der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion (WWU) Kritik geübt, so stellt der Bonner Ordinarius für Neuere und Neueste Geschichte als erster deutscher Historiker den Euro als politisches Projekt gleich fundamental in seinem Bestehen und Fortbestand in Frage. Die europäische Einheitswährung wird in Dominik Gepperts kritischem Beitrag entgegen der gängigen Lesart nicht als einigender Faktor für die Integrationsgeschichte begriffen, sondern als Spaltpilz verstanden, der das Einigungsprojekt nicht nur politisch bedroht, sondern auch existentiell gefährdet.

Die von Geppert vermittelte und von ihm in der öffentlichen Debatte vermisste Sichtweise von Parallelen der Entwicklung von vor 1914 mit der vor 2014 erscheint verführerisch (S. 15 ff.), aber letztlich doch nicht haltbar. Schon in den 1990er Jahren war keine europäische Nation mehr bereit, wegen Sarajewo Krieg zu führen, gleichwohl sich die Sympathien in London, Paris und Wien und Bonn (Berlin) ähnlich wie 1914 für bzw. gegen Serbien verteilten. Das Gegeneinander des Europa der Nationalstaaten des Kolonialismus und Imperialismus von 1914 steht doch dem Europa des Miteinander der „entkolonisierten" EU-Mitglieder im Zeichen der Dekolonialisierung des Postkolonialismus gegenüber. Der nationale Autismus Europas vor dem Ersten Weltenbrand ist nicht annähernd gleichzusetzen mit der vielzitierten Eurokrise und der von Geppert auf ihre Sinnhaftigkeit in Frage gestellten währungspolitischen Solidarität, die ein hohes Maß an politischer Entschlossenheit und Übereinkunft unter den EU-Staaten gegenüber den Defizit- und Schuldnerländern aufgewiesen hat, abgesehen von den durch die zahlreichen Verträge immer stärker verflochtenen, ja eng miteinander verschweißten internationalen Staatengemeinschaft – zumindest am Kontinent.

Zuzustimmen ist Geppert in seiner Kritik an der angeblichen Alternativlosigkeit historischer Vorgänge (S. 22), ein spätes Erbe Adenauerscher Westintegrationsdoktrin, was allerdings auch erst recht für diese gilt. Geppert sieht das Euro-Projekt bedroht und zwar an seinen inneren Widersprüchen zu zerbrechen (S. 25) – dabei war die europäische Integration nie widerspruchsfrei und unumstritten. Der europäische Integrationsprozess und seine Fundamente (S. 28) waren stetem Wandel gerade durch Brüche, Krisen und Zäsuren unterworfen – das gilt für das Europa von Konrad Adenauer und Robert Schuman, Adenauer und Charles de Gaulle, Willy Brandt und

Georges Pompidou, Helmut Schmidt und Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Helmut Kohl und François Mitterrand, etc.

Erhebliches Gewicht haben Gepperts Hinweise auf die Aushebelung von Rechtsstaat und Demokratie (S. 89-106) durch eine intransparente und inkonsistente Politik, die Entmachtung der nationalen Parlamente und nicht zuletzt durch die bewusste Umgehung und fatale Verletzung der EU-Verträge und -Pakte im Zuge des Eurokrisen-Managements. Hier wird der zentrale Nerv der Euro-Politik durch Gepperts Kritik getroffen, die auch Erfolge von Rechtspopulisten und der „Alternative für Deutschland" erklären dürfte. Dem Plädoyer des Autors – als „zentrale Lehre" – zur Einhaltung der Verträge zurückzukehren (S. 183), ist nur zu folgen. Auch ist dem Verfasser mit seiner These von der „Rückkehr der deutschen Frage" zuzustimmen, die der Rezensent allerdings weniger bedrohlich, düster und gefährdend für den Zusammenhalt der EU sieht. Die Stimmengewichtung im Rat der EU, die Verteilung der Kommissarsposten sowie die Mehrheitsverhältnisse im EU-Parlament, d.h. die Koalitionsmöglichkeiten gegen Deutschland (eben auch durch das von Geppert empfohlene „System variabler Koalitionen", S. 179) sprechen gegen eine übermäßige und das EU-System sprengende Dominanz der Berliner Republik, ganz abgesehen von der grundgesetzlich verankerten kontinuierlich proeuropäischen Haltung als Leitprinzip der Politik der Bundesrepublik, welche von ihren Anfängen bis heute gilt. Das ist das Europa eines europäisierten Deutschlands, das es gibt und das die wesentliche Basis der europäischen Integration von der Montanunion bis zur Fiskalunion ausmacht. Dieses existierende Europa war stets ein Europa der ständigen Krisen. Dabei hat die Eurokrise eine Reihe von schrittweisen Maßnahmen und gezielten politischen Reaktionen hervorgerufen, die auch institutionellen Niederschlag und vertragliche Vereinbarungen nach sich zogen, die nicht unbeachtet bleiben sollten (EFSF, ESM, Fiskalpakt, Schuldenbremsen, europäisches Semester, Bankenunion). Wie sich der angebliche Zerfall des Euroraums im Lichte dessen anhaltender Attraktivität erklären lässt, bleibt ebenso ein Geheimnis von Euro-System-Kritikern und all ihren negativen Prophezeiungen. 2014 übernahmen Lettland und im Jahr darauf Litauen den Euro als offizielle Währung. Das Euro-Währungsgebiet umfasst nunmehr 19 EU-Staaten. Inzwischen fühlt man sich im Euroraum offensichtlich so sicher, dass man sich ein Verlassen Griechenlands sogar vorstellen kann, ohne die Gefährdungen mit Blick auf das gesamte Währungsgebiet wie die 2011/12 befürchteten Dominoeffekte (Italien, Spanien, Portugal) mehr zu sehen.

Die von Geppert in Frage gestellte Politik der Bundesrepublik (S. 169 f.) wurde durch den Ausgang des Bundestagswahlsiegs von Angela Merkel 2013 nicht bestätigt. Ihr Kurs der Beruhigung der deutschen Öffentlichkeit, des Festhaltens am Status quo der Eurozone und der Stützung strukturschwacher und verschuldeter Euro-Länder war trotz aller akademisch-intellektueller und parteipolitischer Fundamentalopposition und Kritik 2013/14 mehrheitsfähig – innerhalb Deutschlands und mehrheitlich auch innerhalb der EU. Nur knapp verfehlte Merkels CDU/CSU-Bündnis eine absolute Mandatsmehrheit.

Es ist einerseits ein Vorzug des Werks von Geppert, weil es flott geschrieben ist, sich sehr gut liest, aber andererseits nicht immer die konkrete historische Tiefenschärfe der europäischen Finanz- und Währungsgeschichte der 1970er, 1980er und 1990er Jahre besitzt, die notwendig ist, um sowohl den aktuellen Gesamtkomplex als auch die historisch-politischen Hintergründe des Euro auszuleuchten und zu verstehen. Geppert ist Historiker. Sein Text gleicht aber mehr einem großem politischen Essay, geschrieben wie aus der Feder eines gewandten, sachkundigen und profilierten Journalisten eines Qualitätsblattes. Das verwundert nicht angesichts der vielen Bezugnahmen auf Beiträge aus der Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung, welche allerdings nicht immer durch eine ausgezeichnete EU-Expertise, u.a. durch ihren Brüssel-Korrespondenten, ausgewiesen war und ist.

„Primärquellen" wären hingegen Dokumente von der Deutschen Bundesbank, der Europäischen Zentralbank oder dem Bundesfinanzministerium gewesen, die zwar derzeit nicht so ohne weiteres zugänglich sind, zumindest hätten sich aber gezielte Befragungen durch systematisch angelegte Zeitzeugen-Interviews angeboten. Die Akteure sind im Wesentlichen alle noch greifbar wie eben Jacques Delors, Hans Tietmeyer, Theo Waigel, Hans Eichel, Otmar Issing, Jürgen W. Stark, Jean-Claude Juncker, Jean-Claude Trichet, Klaus Regling, Werner Hoyer oder Thomas Wieser.

An sich ist es nur sehr zu begrüßen, ja unbedingt notwendig, wenn sich Historiker auch zu aktuellen Fragen öffentlichkeitswirksam äußern, aber es sollte sich dann auch mehr als z.T. nur um eine Aneinanderreihung von Meinungsäußerungen handeln. Gepperts Buch basiert zudem auf spezifisch britischen Einschätzungen wie die von Margaret Thatcher, Timothy Garton Ash oder David Marsh (der die Eurokrise für nicht mehr lösbar hielt), die erfrischende und neue „Außenperspektiven" vermitteln können, aber nicht frei von euro-skeptischen bis euro-hostilen Tendenzen sind. So sehr die Empfehlungen Gepperts fußend auf David Camerons Europarede vom Januar 2013 prüfenswert erscheinen, die britischen Fehlbeurteilungen, Übertreibungen und Unterschätzungen der Europa- und Integrationspolitik sind als historisch zu bezeichnen – von Winston Churchill bis heute. Sie griffen wiederholt entweder auf Empfehlungen für Dritte, ohne sich selbst einzubeziehen, Superstaat-Horror-Visionen oder auf ein EFTA-de luxe-Modell zurück.

Ein Hauptkritikpunkt der Studie ist darin zu erblicken, dass Gepperts Buch mehr eine Perzeptions- als eine Realgeschichte des Euro ist. Das Hauptproblem der Euro-Debatte besteht auch in einer emotionalisierten, teils reduzierten, teils selektiven Wahrnehmung aus einer europäischen Binnensicht bzw. maximal einer kritisch-britischen Außensicht. Die reale über Europa hinausgehende internationale und globale Bedeutung des Euro (Devisen-, Emissions-, Reserve- und Transaktionswährung) bleibt dabei oftmals unbeachtet und wird daher unterschätzt, was auch hier zutrifft. Dennoch vermittelt das Buch eine Reihe von klugen Gedanken und erhellenden Einsichten, die über das eigentliche Thema weit hinausweisen. Daraus kann eine eigenständige umfassendere wissenschaftliche Monografie erwachsen, die wünschenswert wäre.

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Matthias PETER, Hermann WENTKER (Hrsg.), ***Die KSZE im Ost-West-Konflikt. Internationale Politik und gesellschaftliche Transformation 1975-1990*** (Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte Sondernummer), Oldenbourg, München, 2012, 344 S. – ISBN 978-3-486-71693-1 – 65,55 €.

Die Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (KSZE) bezeichnete internationale Begegnungen, die mit einer Vorkonferenz am 28. November 1972 und sodann formell in Helsinki am 3. Juli 1973 mit einem Außenministertreffen eröffnet, vom 18. September 1973 bis 21. Juli 1975 in Genf fortgesetzt und am 1. August 1975 durch die Staats- und Regierungschefs mit der Schlussakte von Helsinki beendet wurden. Teilnehmer waren 33 europäische Staaten sowie Kanada und die USA. In den 1950er Jahren hatte die UdSSR bereits vergeblich ein gesamteuropäisches kollektives Sicherheitssystem vorgeschlagen, u.a. um die Westintegration der Bundesrepublik und somit deren westliche Blockbildung zu verhindern. Auf die seit Mitte der 1960er Jahre erneuten sowjetischen Initiativen reagierten die NATO und der Westen zunächst reserviert und erwiderten diese mit der Forderung nach gleichzeitiger Behandlung von Menschen- und Bürgerrechtsfragen. Drei Themenkomplexe standen bei der KSZE als Kompromissunternehmen sodann im Mittelpunkt: „Korb I" umfasste vor allem Sicherheitsfragen in Europa, „Korb II" Kooperationen auf den Sektoren Wirtschaft, Wissenschaft, Technik und Umwelt, während „Korb III" besonders Menschen- und Bürgerrechte, Kultur- und Informationsaustausch betraf.

Die vorliegende Studie widmet sich einer Fülle neuer Fragestellungen mit Blick auf den KSZE-Nachfolgeprozess. Dem Gipfel von Helsinki folgten drei Überprüfungstreffen in Belgrad (1977/78), Madrid (1980-83) und Wien (1986-90) mit der Einigung über „Vertrauens- und Sicherheitsbildende Maßnahmen" (VSBM) am 17. November und der „Charta von Paris" vom 21. November 1990.

Lange Zeit haftete der KSZE und ihren Folgen eher ein negatives Image an. Dem wirken nun die Herausgeber wie auch die einzelnen Beiträger dieses innovativen Sammelwerks deutlich entgegen. In der Einführung wird die Frage nach dem „Helsinki-Mythos" oder dem „Helsinki-Effekt" fein abgewogen diskutiert und doch deutlich in Richtung dessen positiver Wirksamkeit beantwortet. Für den Mythos sprachen zunächst die scheinbare Besiegelung des hegemonialen Anspruchs der UdSSR über Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa, die von den Zeitgenossen so wahrgenommene Festschreibung der Teilung des Kontinents, der „Verrat" am Freiheitsstreben der Menschen jenseits des „Eisernen Vorhangs", die Gegensätze bei den Folgetreffen, die sowjetische Aufrüstung, der NATO-Doppelbeschluss, der neue Rüstungswettlauf, die Modernisierung der Atomwaffen, die Entwicklung neuer Raketenabwehrsysteme und die Ausrufung des Kriegsrechts in Polen, während für den „Helsinki-Effekt" die „Binnendynamik des Konferenzsystems", der gewonnene Handlungsspielraum der mittleren und kleineren Staaten sowohl im Europa des Ostens als auch des Westens, die KSZE als Katalysator für die Europäische Politische Zusammenarbeit (EPZ) der EG-Staaten, die Einbeziehung der humanitären Dimension in das Nachfolgekonferenz-Geschehen, die Förderung der politischen Integration der EG-Staaten und ihr

selbstbewussteres Auftreten gegenüber den USA, die Lockerung der Fesseln der „Breschnew-Doktrin“ seitens der ostmitteleuropäischen Staaten, die Neutralen als Geburtshelfer der KSZE und ihre Vermittlerrolle zwischen Ost und West im Sinne der Transformation Europas in den 1980er Jahren, der Abschluss der deutschen Ostpolitik, die Absicherung des Vier-Mächte-Status von Berlin sowie die neue und wachsende Rolle nicht-staatlicher Akteure, wie z.B. der Netzwerke von Menschenrechtsgruppen für den gesellschaftlichen Wandel, die durch die KSZE nicht nur eine Berufungs- und Legitimationsgrundlage erhielten, sondern durch den multilateralen Konferenzprozess auch eine Katalysatorwirkung erfuhren.

Der Band von Matthias Peter und Hermann Wentker gibt aufschlussreiche und überzeugende Antworten auf die Fragen, warum der KSZE-Prozess trotz Krisen und Spannungen fortgesetzt wurde, wer mit welchen Motiven an seiner Fortsetzung interessiert war, welche Rolle die Supermächte dabei spielten und wie die westlichen, östlichen und neutralen Staaten dabei agierten.

Im ersten Abschnitt geht es um die Supermächte. Douglas Selvage zeigt hierbei, dass die USA in Menschenrechtsfragen nicht eindeutig positioniert waren. Für Henry Kissinger bildeten diese keine Priorität, mit der Amtszeit Jimmy Carters dann aber sehr wohl – auch unter Inkaufnahme des Zusammenbruchs des Konferenzmechanismus.

Der zweite Abschnitt widmet sich westeuropäischen Strategien gegenüber Osteuropa (1972-1983). Die französische KSZE-Politik unter Valéry Giscard d’Estaing machte sich für Abrüstung und Rüstungskontrolle, vor allem für Kulturaustausch stark, wie Veronika Heyde herausarbeitet. Matthias Peter verdeutlicht, dass für Helmut Schmidt Fortschritte in Menschenrechtsfragen v. a. wegen der Deutschen in der DDR elementar waren. Kai Hebel schildert den britischen Spagat zwischen der erwünschten Förderung der Veränderung der sozialen Verhältnisse in Osteuropa bei gleichzeitigem Wunsch nach Wahrung des transatlantischen Zusammenwirkens.

Der dritte Abschnitt befasst sich mit Handlungsspielräumen osteuropäischer Staaten in Belgrad und Madrid (1977-83). Wanda Jarząbek behandelt dabei die polnischen Strategien zwischen Belgrad und Madrid und Mihael E. Ionescu die spezifische Rolle Rumäniens im „Ostblock“ während der beiden genannten Nachfolgekonferenzen.

Der vierte Abschnitt des Bandes stellt sich die Frage wie neutral die Neutralen tatsächlich waren. Benjamin Gilde zeigt hierbei die Unterschiede ihrer Haltungen in Menschenrechtsfragen auf. Einen mittleren Kurs praktizierte Österreich unter Bruno Kreisky durch Flexibilität und Pragmatik, womit es vom Osten als Vermittler ernst genommen werden wollte. Die Schweiz ging noch weiter, verließ die Linie der neutralen und nicht-gebundenen „N+N-Staaten“ und forderte die Menschenrechtsfragen so massiv ein wie die USA unter Carter, wie Philip Rosin zeigt. Ary Makko macht hingegen deutlich, dass sich Schweden viel weniger für die Menschenrechte als für vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen engagierte.

Im fünften Abschnitt geht es um die DDR und Polen und die Wirkungen der KSZE-Nachfolge-Treffen auf ihre Gesellschaften. Anja Hanisch macht auf das Span-

nungsverhältnis zwischen Zugeständnissen und Ausreisebewegung aufmerksam. In Madrid waren die sowjetischen Vertreter in der Frage der Familienzusammenführung konzessionsbereit, um westliche Zustimmung zu einer Abrüstungskonferenz zu erlangen. Damit desavouierte Moskau Interessen Pankows, denn die DDR kam in Folge durch eine Welle von Ausreiseanträgen stark unter Druck. Walter Süß behandelt die Rolle der Ostdeutschen auf der Wiener Nachfolgekonferenz, dessen Beitrag nahe legt, dass die Öffnungsbereitschaft der UdSSR zu einer Einschränkung der Handlungsspielräume des SED-Regimes beitrug und letztlich auch zur friedlichen Revolution in der DDR führte. Anja Mihr beleuchtet die Funktion von Amnesty International am Fallbeispiel des ostdeutschen Teilstaats und Gunter Dehnert die Rolle der polnischen Gewerkschaftsbewegung Solidarność nach Verhängung des Kriegsrechts und der Nachfolgekonferenz in Madrid. Ernst Wawra macht in seinem Artikel auf die unterschiedlichen Helsinki-Gruppen aufmerksam, wobei der Moskauer eine Vorbildfunktion zukam. Yuliya von Saal zeigt auf, welchen Einfluss die Wiener Folgetreffen für den Reformprozess in der UdSSR unter Gorbatschow hatten. Silke Berndsen unterstreicht die Bedeutung der KSZE für das Streben nach Freiheit seitens der baltischen Helsinki-Gruppen. Menschenrechte hatten dabei große Bedeutung. Wilfried Loth, Altmeister der Kalten-Kriegs-Analyse und Entspannungs-Historiographie, resümiert die fortbestehende Ambivalenz der Thematik.

Wichtigstes Ergebnis für Peter und Wentker ist die Erkenntnis, dass von einem Ende der Entspannung und einem „zweiten kalten Krieg“ (so Fred Halliday) nicht mehr gesprochen werden könne. Die KSZE habe die Struktur des Ost-West-Konflikts permanent durchsetzt, selbst in den krisen- und spannungsreichsten Phasen der Ost-West-Beziehungen. Zweitens müsse auf die Prozesshaftigkeit der KSZE mehr Gewicht gelegt werden und drittens habe sie „einen gewichtigen Beitrag zum friedlichen Wandel in Osteuropa“ geleistet, „der so jedoch bei ihrem Beginn keineswegs zu erkennen war“. Die Teilnehmer verfolgten sehr divergierende Interessen. Die KSZE hatte einen multilateralen Charakter, der die bipolaren Strukturen abschwächte und den Einfluss der Europäer erhöhte. Die Herausgeber ermuntern die zukünftige Forschung, ihr Augenmerk noch stärker auf den „Helsinki-Effekt“ in Bezug auf Rüstungskontrolle, Sicherheitsfragen und die Weiterentwicklung des Völkerrechts zu richten. Der Band von Peter und Wentker ist ein gelungener Beweis dafür, dass ein Sammelwerk durch Zusammenführung verschiedener Zugänge ein notwendiges und wichtiges Mittel bleibt, gebündelt neue Erkenntnisse zu vermitteln, die ein Einzelforscher gar nicht im Alleingang leisten kann.

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Ludger KÜHNHARDT, ***Africa Consensus. New Interests, Initiatives, and Partners***, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington D.C./John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2014, 380 p., – ISBN-13-978-1-4214-1415-7, 44.95 $.

"Most of our weaknesses" declared Zambia's first president Kenneth Kaunda, in his March 1966 speech, "derive from lack of finance, [and] trained personal […]. We are left with no choice but to fall on either the East or West, or indeed, on both of them". What Kaunda does not state is that the weaknesses that he speaks of were, first and foremost, products of European colonial strategies and, second, the failure of all but a few of his colleagues in other independent African nations to fully serve the interests of their people through innovative development programs. Although Africa's economy has grown rapidly over the past decade, questions are raised about the sustainability of this growth. While some observers believe that the continent will play an increasingly important role in the global economy, others are apprehensive about whether Africa's current development is sustainable and inclusive. More than anything, the concern is that economic growth will fail to create sufficient jobs and improve living standards for Africans. This highlights the need to implement transformation policies that expand the private sector, to increase productivity and, most of all, to create quality jobs. In this book, the political scientist Ludger Kühnhardt (University of Bonn) seeks to connect various perspectives and interests on those issues that are relevant for Africa's future and fundamental economic development.

The 21st century, like the previous one does not seem capable of breaking with the paradigm of the complex and uncertain. Instead, it is confirming that hastily and carelessly proclaiming "the end of history", as Francis Fukuyama did, was not enough to legitimately dispose of issues and challenges such as those of how to understand the presence of Africa in a world where emerging powers (Brazil, Russia, India and China) are increasingly upsetting traditional global geopolitics. The financial crisis and its social implications in some countries of the North and the increasingly global nature of many problems have raised awareness about the vital and imperious need for Africans to tackle the issue of Africa's future in this new century. This underscores the legitimacy of an approach that is founded on a rupture: a clear break with Afropessimism from outside and from within to show that the new global political and economic order is not a fatality but one that calls for a breaking off with a theoretical construction of Africa which led to the posing of questions like those asked by the World Bank in 2000: "Can Africa claim its place in the 21st century"? It is about understanding why and how Africa is still at the heart of new global political and economic strategies, and what opportunities there are for the black continent to reposition itself in the world, and reposition the world with regard to its own objectives, perhaps the most important of which still remains that of bringing development (also to be understood as freedom) to its people. It is also a question of deconstructing what some have called "the confinement of Africa in a rent economy" in order to more critically understand the opportunities available to the continent but also the constraints facing it, because the basic question is how, in the course of this century, to oppose to the "invention of Africa" an "invention of the world by Africa".

Chapter I of this book simply shows how the paramount importance of Africa in global age is vital and his involvement in the changing world economy. Chapter II casts a glance on the past and retraces the invasion and annexation of African territory by European powers during the period of new imperialism. Africa has suffered genocide at the hands of architects of slavery and colonialism. "What is called European Renaissance" was the worst darkness for Africa's people. Europe became a menace for Africa against her spears. So-called "civilized" Europe also having claimed to be "Christian" came up with the trans-Atlantic slave trade. There produces massive losses of African population and skills. As if slavery hat not already done enough damage to Africa's people, European leaders met in Germany from December 1884 to February 1885 at the Berlin Conference. At this occasion the Belgian King Leopold stated its purpose "How we should divide among ourselves this magnificent African cake"? Africa was therefore plunged into another tragedy. Through the Berlin Treaty of 26 February 1885, the European powers sliced the continent and there was no Africa left for Africans except Ethiopia, encircled by paupers of land dispossessed people who were now the reservoir of cheap native labour for their dispossessors. In fact, in this chapter, Kühnhardt seeks to distil as he said "the lesson learned from colonial and post-colonial history down to one fundamental insight: Africa's future will depend on African ownership and responsibility". Indeed, external partners aid programs remain important, but, the challenge of Africa is for the new generation to reflect on their commitment to the vision of Pan-African pioneers that worked hard in order to bring Africans to where they are today. But, they are now reminding this generation that there is much to be done, development cannot come through if Africa is still facing the problem of mismanagement, misappropriation of public funds and lack of democracy.

A new Africa with a central idea, agenda and project is theme of chapter III. It shows the extent to which African countries have been transformed by the dynamics of internal initiatives. The creation of the African Union (AU) in Sirte (Libya) in 1999 and the adoption of the constitutive Act of the AU in Lomé in July 2000 were milestones in the process of creation a formal political continental unity. The author emphasizes "the expression of a new sense among African elites that the fate of their continent and its people makes a difference to them". Thus, since its inception in 2003, the AU has made remarkable strides towards the development of the continent. To date, AU member states have maintained strong and unwavering unity and solidarity in addressing the common challenges experienced by the continent since the days of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which seeks primarily to improve the quality of life of the continent's citizens through integration, cooperation and development. It strives to promote cohesion, unity and solidarity among the peoples and states of Africa, while developing new and stronger strategic partnerships worldwide for Africa's sustainable development. Reducing conflicts to achieve continental security and stability was identified as the first mainstay of the AU which leads to the fourth chapter.

The challenges associated to governance and in particular to violent conflicts and the attendant economic gains of dominant groups have been part of a metamorphosis

of the development by African states. Empires and kingdoms rose and fell through violence, wars and establishments of various governance institutions. However, contemporary African societies have shown the emergence of new forms of violent conflicts undermining the security, peace and stability of the continent. There is thinking that a new phase of globalization and bad governance has contributed to the new forms of violent conflicts in which the economic agendas dominate the civil wars being fought on the continent. The blessing of security and stability is reflected on economic development, which is a lifeline for any society. Hence, security and stability have direct, long-term effects on the creation of a sound, competitive economic environment that have positive impacts on citizenship and society on the whole. Therefore, Africa must strengthen security and stability in order to improve living standards of their citizens on the one hand, and to push the continent forward towards economic development in order to build up a new generation on the other hand capable of steering the affairs of their home countries and catching up with the development countries. Fact is that no country can develop itself and grow economically without peaceful coexistence among its population. Though all political spheres in a country should reconsider opening up avenue of serious dialogue with other parties to enable, to co-exist with partners in their homeland and to come up with judicious decisions for improving the country's conditions. Kühnhardt concludes chapter IV by saying that "without law-based governance that recognizes pluralism, freedom of expression and political inclusion, no stability worth the name will come about".

Chapter V explores the second strategic pillar: integration, development and cooperation. Africa, a continent endowed with immense natural and human resources as well as big cultural, ecological and economic diversity remained underdeveloped. Most African nations suffer from military dictatorships, civil unrest, war and deep poverty. Although some believe that the continent is doomed to perpetual poverty and economic slavery, Africa has immense potential. Increasing continental trade and improving regional infrastructure has facilitated its development. Due to interaction of international markets there is a high global demand for African resources such oil and metals. However, sustainable and equitable development requires Africa to re-examine its "bias towards external trade". It should focus locally and increase inter-African exchanges. Despite the multiplicity of groupings, regional buildings have not been very effective so far. Intra-regional trade as a share of total foreign trade has traditionally been low compared to other regions. Though most African States have suffered from serve macro-economic disequilibria, foreign debts service burdens, over-valued currencies, lack of trade finance and a narrow tax base, with customs duties a substantial source of revenue. However, drawing on regional model such as the mobile telecommunication revolution, which empowered local industries and created a more equitable work force is a good place to start. By the same token, the establishment of modern Sino-African and BRIC-States relations tend to be more forthcoming in recognizing the continent's market potential. Though the USA and the EU tend to focus on bilateral relationships which include mainly diplomacy and public goods.

Chapter VI inspects the third strategic mainstay which is shared values initiatives. The AU-Commission (AUC), especially the Departments of Political and Social Affairs play a vital role with regard to the achievement of the governance objectives in Africa. The AUC strategic plan (2009-2012) activities aiming at fostering governance in the AU-member states are listed in one out of pillars headline "shared values". The main objective of the programme is that the Departments of Political and Social Affairs have increased capacity to contribute to higher standards on the fields of democracy, elections and human rights. This programme is carried out by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMWZ). This is why Kühnhardt sustains that "the AU and its member states need to develop proactive, multidimensional policy strategies that define how best to cooperate with their external partners". Focusing on shared values can help countries and citizens moving forward and prosper.

Chapter VII scrutinizes the fourth and last mainstay: institutions- and capacity-building. As a matter of fact, the influence of capacity-building on economic growth has been the subject of an increasing body of research recently. The quality of institutions matters, they provide the framework within people and firms participate in the economy. The institutions responsible for economic management in Africa have been developing in terms of their capacity both to formulate policies and to implement them. This process gained momentum over the last decade. Even so there have been frequent lapses. A number of countries that had made progress in policy making have suffered setbacks. Newly established institutions in Africa are not yet strong enough to permit countries to continue pursuing appropriate policies.

Chapter VIII propounds an Africa consensus as a new compact for a common age. But that continent is in precarious danger of imminent destruction, juxtaposed against economic models driven by globalized industrialization and consumption driven growth leading to reckless resource extrapolation. It also faces some of the world's most acute problems of cyclical poverty. However, all across Africa, these challenges are being met head-on by a diverse group of regional leaders, within both government and NGOs together with reaching individual solutions to sustainable economies. These efforts include micro-finance and micro-business, social entrepreneurship, localized health care and education, heritage and environmental protection. Kühnhardt underscores that in the context of reorganizing relationship between Africa and its external partners, some lessons have to be learned: the EU may inspire Africa to look at the complex meaning of the renaissance of a continent destroyed by itself and rebuilt on the ground of a new beginning; the USA may inspire Africa with a spirit of the liberating promise of freedom; China with her impressive success in lifting millions of people out of poverty; India with its experience of combining religious diversity and cultural differences; Brazil with its experience of democratic inclusivity in the process of economic modernization under the conditions of tropical climate; and the Arab World with its experience of turning natural resources into wealth.

Notwithstanding tremendous strides forward, the past 20 years of so-called global prosperity have still left more than 40 percent of the world's population living in poverty and one sixth in extreme poverty. This pattern of development has created greater gaps between North and South, rich and poor. This economic imbalance is caused by distortions in the global trading and financial system, re-enforced by international financial institutions, which often represent entrenched interests. Positive change will occur in Africa by lifting more people out from poverty and narrowing gaps between those who have and those who don't. However, this change will not come from grand theoretical models from development but rather from indigenous economic solutions based on local conditions. Fresh approaches are constructively lobbied into government policy which will in turn influence the behaviour of economic players. Among these new approaches: reconsiderations of economic rationality and behavioural analysis of players; secondly the spontaneous response of those people facing economic and social challenges is to be considered and finally economic sustainability depends very strongly on the ability to create new wealth. Therefore this will be crucial for a new African beginning to think about ways to make players including individuals, capable of having a more useful role in society.

To conclude, Kühnhardt revisits and goes beyond major historical narratives. Therefore the question remains: will this be Africa's century, as it is sometimes claimed? A better way to put more or less the same question is to ask: How can Africa take charge of its future and make this century the one of its renaissance? How can social sciences and humanities address the challenges that Africans already know, and what types of improvements are required in the African higher education and research systems in order for them to better prepare their continent to face the challenges of the coming decades of the 21st century? Though, the strong political will to support Africa's economic and social system will be healthier, if African states can end the cyclical social and economic marginalization. Experience shows that when marginalized have no outlets, continually frustrated, their potential for turning to extremism in various forms increases. However Kühnhardt concludes his book by saying that "the time has come for a new global compact with a transforming Africa".

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Éric BUSSIÈRE, Vincent DUJARDIN, Michel DUMOULIN, Piers LUDLOW, Jan Willem BROUWER, Pierre TILLY (dir.), ***La Commission européenne 1973-1986, Histoire et mémoires d'une institution***, Office des publications de l'Union européenne, Luxembourg, 2014, 667. p. – ISBN 978-92-79-35313-0 – 39,00 €.

Nous poursuivons l'histoire de la Commission européenne s'appuyant sur le témoignage de ses acteurs avec ce deuxième volume qui porte sur les années 1973 à 1986. Le travail est mené par une équipe légèrement remaniée constituée de 22 chercheurs et professeurs qui ont compulsé des archives souvent inédites et interrogé

des anciens de la Commission afin de rendre une histoire de cette institution «de l'intérieur» (244 entretiens ont ainsi été menés, qui sont désormais déposés aux Archives historiques de l'Union européenne). Les 13 années qui sont étudiées sont souvent présentées comme celles d'une stagnation de l'idéal européen qui succède aussitôt après les espoirs soulevés lors du sommet de La Haye de 1969. Pourtant, l'ouvrage nous invite à découvrir que cette stagnation est toute relative, et même que ces années ont été à l'origine d'un « nouvel élan » pour les quatre collèges et les 45 commissaires qui se sont succédés entre 1973 et 1986.

La première partie porte sur les structures et les hommes. Ces derniers sont de cultures différentes, souvent jeunes, et ils ont conscience que la Commission à laquelle ils appartiennent est «tantôt un laboratoire, tantôt un incubateur» de l'intégration européenne. La structure dans laquelle ils évoluent est complexe, ce qui ne rebute pas les auteurs de l'ouvrage, qui nous invitent à découvrir tous les protagonistes, que ce soit les membres très en vue du collège, le secrétaire général (incontournable Émile Noël, encore pour cette période!), les directeurs généraux, mais aussi les membres des offices, des bureaux et des agences qui gravitent autour de la Commission. On se rend d'ailleurs compte que tous ces services ne sont pas aussi bien coordonnés qu'on le pense, mais que la collégialité propre aux commissaires au sein du collège fonctionne à tous les niveaux, même chez les fonctionnaires intermédiaires.

Les années 70 correspondent aux efforts de regroupement des services de la Commission à Bruxelles, qui font que le Berlaymont devient vraiment le symbole de la Commission au cours de la période. Celle-ci est un organisme vivant, qui évolue en fonction des nécessités avec des fusions, des disparitions ou des créations, notamment en ce qui concerne les directions générales. Au sein de celles-ci, on peut voir une pénétration de la pensée managériale qui n'était pas encore prédominante, dont le premier objectif est la recherche d'efficacité, «bureaucratisation» qui rompt avec les principes de l'administration de missions telles que les mettaient en avant Jean Monnet.

Le siège de l'Europe n'est alors pas encore bien défini, ce qui donne une lutte à fleurets mouchetés entre les trois capitales (Bruxelles, Luxembourg et Strasbourg), et qui empêche une politique immobilière digne de ce nom, dont les services de la Commission auraient pourtant besoin. La pénurie s'aggrave avec le temps, à cause de l'augmentation des compétences et des services (le nombre de fonctionnaires de la Commission passe de 6.000 à 10.000 unités dans la période), accentuant la pression immobilière à Bruxelles, ce qui contribue encore plus à éloigner les bureaux de la Commission du reste de la ville: des cadres de sociabilité se créent cependant, en ville ou en banlieue de Bruxelles (écoles, crèches, sport), qui contribuent à la «construction expérimentale» d'une société européenne inédite.

La période est complexe: elle commence plutôt bien pour la Commission avec les dispositions prises à La Haye, qui lui accordent trois ressources propres. Les problèmes vont cependant s'accumuler, dont certains étaient déjà en gestation dans la période précédente, comme la réforme de la PAC, la question de la contribution britannique, le rôle accru du Parlement européen ou les crises pétrolières. Les pres-

sions qui en résultent pour la Commission sont nombreuses, avec une menace de renationalisation qui va à l'encontre des progrès effectués dans l'intégration européenne jusqu'ici. La Commission tire à peu près son épingle du jeu, mais c'est tout de même une initiative intergouvernementale qui va relancer le chantier européen, au Conseil de Fontainebleau (1984), et ouvrir vers une nouvelle phase qui mène aux années Delors.

Les habitudes de travail de tous ces fonctionnaires sont étudiées dans l'ouvrage: cette administration de conception (et pas vraiment d'exécution) est un «patchwork» (Jacques Ziller) qui doit accepter une forte collégialité pour éviter toute influence nationale trop forte sur un dossier; le système des réunions de travail, chaque semaine, permet un bon fonctionnement entre les différents acteurs des dossiers étudiés (le lundi pour les chefs de cabinet, le mercredi pour les commissaires); autour d'eux, les lobbyings se multiplient, signe que la Commission se voit reconnaître *de facto* une autorité qu'elle gagne peu à peu dans des secteurs de plus en plus variés.

Cette administration doit cependant rompre avec ses habitudes, et la première cause en est due à l'élargissement. L'incidence est administrative (arrivée de nouveaux fonctionnaires formés au sein d'autres cultures), mais aussi politique et économique, en fonction des cas rencontrés (problème budgétaire pour la Grande-Bretagne, de cohésion économique et sociale pour les pays méditerranéens).

Les rapports entre la Commission et d'autres institutions occupent une seconde partie dans l'ouvrage. Les relations avec le Conseil européen sont bien évidemment abordées, sachant que ce dernier est créé juste au début de la période étudiée. La première réaction est plutôt positive de la part de la Commission, même si elle prendra du temps pour trouver ses marques avec cette institution purement intergouvernementale, ce qui sera le cas (dans ce domaine comme dans d'autres) avec Jacques Delors, grâce au contexte et à sa maîtrise de l'exercice, ainsi que par ses bonnes relations avec les membres du Conseil.

Les relations de la Commission avec le Conseil des ministres se partagent entre le Conseil lui-même et le Coreper qui en est le prolongement diplomatique. On relève ici des tensions avec la présidence du Conseil, et des rapports musclés également avec son secrétariat général, qui pourrait être une institution concurrente à Bruxelles. Les relations avec le Coreper se densifient, aboutissant à un mélange entre politique (Commission) et diplomatie (représentants permanents). Les liens avec le Parlement européen sont recherchés par la Commission, à une époque où apparaît le thème du «déficit démocratique». Un rapprochement s'effectue, et qui s'accélère pour parer à l'emprise croissante du Conseil. De son côté, le Parlement européen, dès qu'il est élu, cherche à s'émanciper à travers la question du budget, qui vise surtout les États, mais qui au fond se retourne d'abord contre la Commission. L'Acte unique européen va apaiser les choses, et aboutir à une coopération accrue entre les deux institutions, qui multiplient les contacts entre elles.

Les différentes politiques de la Commission sont étudiées en autant de chapitres dans la troisième partie, qui constituent la dernière de l'ouvrage. La politique industrielle connaît des débuts très hésitants, mais se renforce, car elle est soutenue par

l'idée d'achèvement du marché intérieur, qui gagne en intensité au fur et à mesure que la crise sévit en Europe; la politique de la recherche aboutit au programme Esprit, mais dans lequel la Communauté reste plus un cadre qu'autre chose; la politique de la concurrence prend de plus en plus d'importance au cours de la période, car elle doit assurer que les échanges resteront libres, ce que la Commission va constamment tenter de faire respecter; en matière économique et monétaire, l'accord se fait assez vite autour du marché unique et de la dimension sociale de celui-ci, préconisée par Delors, alors que du point de vue monétaire, l'initiative revient aux États, même si on peut dire que la Commission joue un rôle dans l'action qui mène au SME; la PAC et la pêche représentent une politique centrale pour la Commission, confrontée à une crise de plus en plus inquiétante. Les perturbations sont de fait nombreuses et accompagnent un débat houleux sur la réforme qui n'aboutit qu'à l'extrême fin de la période; la politique régionale prend véritablement son envol avec les élargissements: du Feder à la mise en place des fonds structurels, tout annonce le thème de la cohésion économique et sociale qu'impose Delors avec l'AUE, montée en puissance qui se traduit par l'affirmation d'une véritable politique régionale communautaire; l'adoption initiale d'un programme d'action sociale n'empêche pas que la crise joue contre ses ambitions, qui finalement ne consisteront qu'à atténuer le plus possible ses impacts sociaux, sans grand succès; pour les transports, rien n'est encore communautaire à l'aube des années 1970, mais on assiste à une accélération qui doit beaucoup à la coopération Commission/Parlement européen et à la perspective du marché intérieur; concernant l'énergie, il y a encore des incohérences juridiques après la fusion des exécutifs, mais c'est la crise et l'absence de réactions qu'elle suscite qui donne à la Commission l'occasion de prendre l'initiative, et de démontrer pendant ces années difficiles la nécessité de promouvoir un grand marché, qui devient possible à la fin des années 1980; l'environnement n'est européanisé qu'au début de notre période, et il s'adjoint peu à peu la protection des consommateurs; l'aide au développement prend encore plus d'importance avec l'arrivée de la Grande-Bretagne, la Commission jouant tout son rôle, jusqu'à la fin de la période où elle commence à évoquer la question des droits de l'homme dans les négociations; pour la politique extérieure, les négociations au GATT donnent la mesure du rôle accru de la Commission, seule représentante des pays dans cette instance. Tout n'est pas aussi simple (G7, CPE), mais la représentation extérieure de la CEE s'étoffe au fur et à mesure de la période; concernant l'élargissement aux pays méditerranéens, l'adhésion de la Grèce est très politisée et accélérée, celles de l'Espagne et du Portugal plus polémiques, en cette période de difficulté budgétaire et de réforme de la PAC. L'attractivité de la CEE est en tout cas démontrée, alors que l'activisme de la Commission a été important dans tous les cas; enfin, la DG X, qui s'occupe d'informations et de communication, se tourne de plus en plus vers l'information «grand public», via l'audiovisuel: on cherche à promouvoir «l'Europe des citoyens» dans la lignée du rapport Tindemans, de l'adoption du passeport et du permis de conduire européens, puis de l'adoption de l'hymne et du drapeau communautaires.

Chaque collège est ainsi étudié dans ses rapports avec les États et les autres institutions européennes, les présidents bénéficiant d'un portrait qui donne la mesure

des ambitions et des handicaps rencontrés par chacun d'entre eux: François-Xavier Ortoli, premier président de la période, est confronté à la crise et la création du Conseil européen, avec lequel il faut bien faire; Roy Jenkins est un pro-européen convaincu, mais son expérience est négligeable. C'est cependant lui qui arrache la présence de la Commission au G7, et qui obtient la relance du SME; Gaston Thorn a une parfaite connaissance du système lorsqu'il est amené à le présider, mais il doit lui aussi affronter des conditions difficiles, avec en premier lieu la question du budget, qui sera finalement réglée sans lui; Jacques Delors est le dernier président de la Commission européenne étudié, sur sa première année seulement. Cela suffit pour rappeler que l'homme, qui a indéniablement plus d'impact que les autres, est d'abord arrivé au bon moment, à une époque où les États, pour différentes raisons, appuient plus franchement le processus d'intégration européenne, alors qu'un certain soutien de l'opinion se fait également sentir.

Au final, ce livre est aussi riche que son prédécesseur, et permet d'explorer un peu plus la voie d'une histoire orale des institutions européennes, à même d'offrir une vision plus fine du phénomène communautaire. La troisième partie sur les politiques est un peu austère, mais intéressera plus particulièrement les spécialistes en fonction des matières abordées, donnant une vision longitudinale des activités de la Commission européenne, institution qui mérite décidément un intérêt accru des sciences humaines et sociales.

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François SAINT-OUEN (éd.), ***L'Europe de Denis de Rougemont***, Academia/ L'Harmattan, Louvain-la-Neuve, 2014 – ISBN 978-2-8061-0132-7 – 20,00 €.

Cet ouvrage est issu d'un colloque qui s'est tenu le 23 mai 2013 à Budapest, à l'instigation du Centre européen de la culture à Genève. Il contient des articles originaux de sept chercheurs, essentiellement suisses et hongrois, ainsi que trois textes de Denis de Rougemont, dont deux inédits. Plusieurs facettes de ce personnage complexe sont ici étudiées: l'écrivain, le militant fédéraliste et celui qui pousse au dialogue des cultures, ainsi, tout simplement, que l'homme, vu par l'un de ses anciens collaborateurs, le Professeur Dusan Sidjanski.

Le premier inédit s'intitule «De la liberté» (1945), et nous éclaire sur la philosophie politique de de Rougemont: pour lui, la vraie liberté n'est pas le fruit d'un don, c'est d'abord une responsabilité qui engage l'individu. L'État n'est en effet qu'un moyen, tout reposant sur la personne: «Là où l'homme veut être total […], l'État ne sera jamais totalitaire». Dans ce sens, l'éducation est primordiale et doit être un effort permanent, mais qui doit cependant donner à l'homme les moyens, le cas échéant, de sortir des sentiers battus. Le deuxième inédit est une «sixième lettre aux députés européens» (1950), que de Rougemont adressa aux délégués du Conseil de l'Europe, spécialement à ceux qui s'autoproclamaient «fonctionnalistes». Dans ce document,

l'auteur nous éclaire sur sa vision du fédéralisme et de l'Europe, à une époque où cette doctrine paraît être le seul avenir de la construction européenne, alors encore à peine engagée. On connaît cependant la suite, et ce document reste un témoignage sur l'audace des premiers fédéralistes, sans lendemain une fois la guerre froide véritablement lancée et le processus européen encadré par des États «plus obstinés qu'obsolètes».

Krisztina Horváth ouvre les communications sur de Rougemont en s'intéressant à l'essayiste, peu abordé jusqu'ici. Elle étudie ainsi la poétique du paysage dans *Le paysan du Danube*, écrit en 1932 dans une phase initiatique de l'auteur en Europe centrale, où il découvre, à travers la quête du romantisme allemand, l'âme des peuples, tout en prescrivant la déchéance des États-nations.

Bruno Ackermann, grand spécialiste de de Rougemont, s'intéresse ici aux débats que ce dernier a menés avec les intellectuels de son temps. N'ayant pas été membre d'une école de pensée, de Rougemont a certainement du souffrir d'un certain ostracisme. Normal: son intransigeance lui a fait penser à haute voix, en plein cœur des années trente, que l'intelligence de son époque était «irresponsable». Sa réponse est de fait celle de tous les non-conformistes, et passe par le personnalisme. Son pessimisme ne faiblit cependant pas en 1945, bien que ses idées aient été confortées par la crise qu'il dénonçait, car c'est finalement la force, même du bon côté, qui a gagné. Bon gré mal gré, il conforte son éloignement des autres intellectuels «dominants»: il s'éloigne ainsi d'*Esprit*, se fâche avec Claude Morgan ou Louis Aragon. Son exil pendant la guerre y est pour beaucoup. Peu importe, il trace son sillon en s'intéressant à des enjeux d'avenir, tous à l'échelle planétaire, tels que l'atome ou l'environnement.

Eva Szénási compare les idées politiques de de Rougemont avec celles de György Lukács lors des premières *Rencontres internationales* à Genève (3-14 septembre 1946), qui ont vu certains intellectuels s'exprimer sur l'Europe nouvelle qu'il fallait construire sur les ruines de l'ancienne. Tous deux sont d'accord sur la crise de l'esprit européen, mais de Rougemont en tire des idées qui ne sont pas les mêmes que celles de Lukács. Ce dernier reste un marxiste pur et dur, ce qui pour de Rougemont correspond à «une démission de la pensée, un alibi». Pour parer à cette dernière faiblesse, celui-ci envisage toujours la libération de la personne face aux risques accrus de massification, le fédéralisme lui apparaissant comme l'antithèse du totalitarisme, puisque le premier permet d'être libre et engagé à la fois.

Nicolas Stenger aborde le dialogue des cultures, thème qui apparaît chez de Rougemont en 1961. À cette époque, le dialogue interculturel est indéniablement altéré par la réalité de la guerre froide et par les péripéties de la question coloniale. C'est pourquoi de Rougemont essaie d'abord de comprendre l'Europe, espace complexe de tensions qui a produit la machine, mais aussi l'aliénation de l'homme qui l'utilise et, fort de cet avantage comparatif, a découvert le monde et l'a peint à son image, trompeuse alors mais qui ne trompe plus personne à l'heure où l'Europe est tant affaiblie. Pour de Rougemont, cette dernière a une responsabilité dans le fait d'aider les pays qui se libèrent alors à ne pas reproduire les mêmes erreurs que celles commises sur le Vieux continent, notamment avec le nationalisme: il s'agit donc de

trouver un nouveau modèle de coopération et de développement qui s'épanouisse dans le dialogue de cultures qui ne sont plus antagonistes mais complémentaires. Hélas, ces idées, peut-être du fait de l'isolement de de Rougemont dans un débat qui reste très manichéen, n'auront pas vraiment de suite pratique.

Simon Charbonneau s'interroge sur l'actualité de la pensée de de Rougemont. Dans les éléments positifs, la pensée écologique et la critique de l'idéologie du progrès, de la modernité pour la modernité, de l'arme atomique, de la toute-puissance de l'État-nation et du clivage gauche/droite lui paraissent parfaitement adaptables aux débats du jour. En revanche, de Rougemont ne semble pas pouvoir donner les instruments d'une pensée critique sur la construction européenne actuelle, car il ne s'est jamais vraiment intéressé aux conditions pratiques de l'Europe à faire, mais seulement sur la nécessité de la faire.

Plus précisément, François Saint-Ouen étudie le fédéralisme de de Rougemont. Dans sa pensée, les régions lui apparaissent essentielles, réalités fonctionnelles et espaces de participation civique de «communautés vivantes» à même de reconquérir la citoyenneté, alors déjà en crise, à l'échelle la plus proche de la personne humaine. L'État est un mécanisme foncièrement utile, mais qui doit être intégralement au service des citoyens. L'approche de de Rougemont est donc culturelle et civique: le Centre européen de la culture, qu'il a contribué à créer, lui apparaît d'ailleurs comme un moyen de faire l'éducation des Européens. En fait, sa fédération européenne n'a pas de contours juridiques précis: le compromis est le maître mot de son œuvre («il nous faut apprendre à penser par problèmes, et non par nations»), ce qui montre la souplesse de sa pensée, mais peut-être aussi le défaut signalé juste avant, celui d'une confiance trop grande accordée à un phénomène sublimé par la théorie.

Dusan Sidjanski raconte enfin l'homme de Rougemont, son activité au Centre européen de la culture et à l'Institut d'Études Européennes de Genève. Il revient sur ses idées, notamment le Sénat des régions qu'il avait imaginé au cours des années 1970. Partant de ses prémisses, l'auteur s'intéresse aux modalités de mise en œuvre d'une Fédération européenne, prônant l'élargissement de la méthode communautaire à la zone euro, qui deviendrait un noyau politique fédérateur, avec une politique commune en matière d'affaires extérieures. Ce texte est ainsi la meilleure façon d'illustrer le fait que les idées de de Rougemont vivent toujours, et qu'elles permettent de régénérer un débat qui tombe aujourd'hui dans le conformisme et/ou le manichéisme.

Le dernier texte de de Rougemont présenté dans cet ouvrage s'intitule «Pourquoi des régions?» (1975). Ce court article reprend les idées de l'auteur sur le fédéralisme et le rôle que les régions sont amenées à y jouer. Celles-ci lui apparaissent en effet relever d'un phénomène naturel, le seul à même de favoriser le déploiement d'activités humaines en lien avec la réalité de la personne, tout en constituant le pilier d'une véritable construction européenne, plus grande, mais n'oubliant jamais de s'épanouir d'abord à l'échelle de l'homme. De Rougemont soutient ainsi les premières régions transfrontalières, dont les réalités politiques et économiques ne sont pas prises en

compte par les États, lointains et ignorants de la vie de leurs populations périphériques.

Ce dernier article nous renvoie ainsi aux fondements de la pensée de de Rougemont: tout tient aux dimensions de la communauté dans laquelle vit l'homme, qui doit s'y réaliser et s'y sentir responsable. L'Europe n'est donc pas un préalable, mais l'aboutissement d'une société réconciliée avec elle-même.

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Éric BUSSIÈRE, Guia MIGANI, *Les années Barroso 2004-2014 – Europe: Crises et relances* (foreword by José Manuel Barroso), Tallandier, Paris, 2014, 304 p. – ISBN 9791021008717 – 18,90 €.

The European Commission has recently got a fresh start, with a new configuration, amid a thorny internal political context and unpredictable events in its immediate vicinity. Hence, there is indeed no better time than at present to exhibit a comprehensive analysis of a sinuous double five-year mandate of Commission President José Manuel Barroso, through the lens of two scholars with such prominent academic backgrounds as Éric Bussière and Guia Migani. *Les années Barroso 2004-2014 – Europe: crises et relances* has been made available for academic debate and research at what appears to be a perfect timing and is bound to become a *livre de chevet* assisting any scientific approach dedicated to the decision maker whose terms, next to those of Jacques Delors, account for the longest-serving head of the European Commission. This, combined with the support provided by a genuine collection of first-hand documents and the participation of the protagonist himself, are the premises that lie at the core of the scientific release this review is dedicated to.

Nevertheless, to attempt a portrayal of this book under the auspices of subjectivity or idealism, or to deem it as one more token of Europhilia, would be erroneous. Instead, it reveals itself as a balanced assessment, with tips and criticism, interspersed with pertinent observations of an interval which, albeit shaken by economic and geopolitical challenges, is worthy of being referred to as a time for "more Europe".

The *leitmotiv* of the research understandably revolves around the idea of crises within and beyond the European Union, a word for which the choice of the plural form becomes perfectly justified if one is to follow the argumentative thread, finely wrapped in such tools as introspective rhetorical questions and multi-angle approaches encompassing the economic, political, institutional or international outlooks. At each step of the way, the emphasis lies on context, both internally and externally, say from the failure of the Constitutional Treaty to the outbreak of the financial downturn, to give just two milestones that have not been taken lightly.

A thorough methodological investigation reveals skilful document and discourse analyses, first-hand testimonies and interviews, along with meticulous observations of exceptional intellectual depth.

The institutional file fosters the comprehension of the Community Method, irrespective of the reader's previous documentation endeavour in this regard. This is partly achieved through a welcome biographical touch, rendering it possible to comprehend the person behind the decisions, one that was all too often placed in the hot seat. Once more, complex files circle the sinuous topic of the crisis, with matters of legitimacy and civil society action surprisingly finding their way into the core of the debate.

Historical flashbacks "betray" the background of the two authors, as they structure arguments and prolonged observations either by referring to other prominent figures at the head of the Commission (such as Delors), or to the very ideas that lay at the basis of the European project, combined with references to notable crises throughout the 20th century. In fact, the chronology of the crisis is marked by the dichotomy between "economic" and "political" and oscillates from supranational actions to international reactions, not surprisingly with a welcome across-the-Atlantic focus.

The Community project and method are righteously questioned, especially in the light of the evident shortcomings of the latest reform treaty, ratified in 2009. This approach is furthered by a complex analysis revolving around the European model, shaken by the somewhat ill-timed Lisbon Strategy, in which case José Manuel Barroso was placed before a major learning-from-mistakes endeavour, in the conception of the new and improved Europe 2020 Agenda, functioning within the framework of the so-called European Semester. The impact of this challenge was such that it prompted the authors to dedicate a comprehensive chapter to President Barroso's views on two key priorities of the latest EU multiannual strategy, namely climate and energy (Chapter IV). In the light of a more elaborate energy policy, after Lisbon, but faced with a complicated international dossier and unpredictable attitudes in this respect on the part of the Member States, Barroso negotiated on and laid the foundations for a set of indicators which have become, to a large extent, the driving force of the growth strategy that is Europe 2020. The authors' manner of depicting the birth of such a complex agenda, through the lens of its key artisans, is a remarkable feat of research accuracy.

The analysis of Barroso's legacy would certainly have been incomplete in the absence of such thorny matters as the EU Neighbourhood Policy and the Commission's stance on the principal crises in the Union's vicinity and somewhat beyond, from the Arab Spring to the intricate Russian file. The breadth of the picture is remarkable, as it facilitates the comprehension of the Barroso Commission's approach to international challenges without neglecting, for instance, the EU-Africa partnership. Such diverse diplomatic angles are rendered intelligible from an institutional standpoint due to the presentation of the newly-created External Action Service, whose tools and mechanisms emerge from the pages of the final chapters. This enables the authors to end their research on a high note, encompassing two aspects of unde-

niable importance. The former assesses the prominence of the European Union in the global context, through means of action, soft vs. hard power challenges and an essential focus directed across the Atlantic, whilst the latter is a statement in support of the Community method, which has proved its resilience and reliability in the decade presented.

From a finely-tuned academic research tool, to an enriching informative source, Éric Bussière and Guia Migani's *Les années Barroso 2004-2014* is indeed a necessary presence on the bookshelf of a teacher, researcher and not only, in the areas of European Studies, International Relations, Political Science, to name just a few – a commendable endeavour of synthesis and analysis of a period of time which has set the course of EU reform and integration for the years to come.

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Mauve CARBONELL, *De la guerre à l'union de l'Europe. Itinéraires luxembourgeois*, Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2014, 164 p. – ISBN 978-2-87574-139-4 – 42,80 €.

Avec ce livre sur les itinéraires de Luxembourgeois de la guerre à l'union de l'Europe, Mauve Carbonell apporte une nouvelle contribution à l'étude des premières élites communautaires dont les parcours professionnels et personnels sont peu connus.[1] En s'appuyant sur une large panoplie de sources publiques et privées, ainsi que de nombreux entretiens oraux, elle s'intéresse aux trajectoires de huit «responsables communautaires» luxembourgeois nés entre 1895 et 1920: Albert Wehrer (membre de la Haute Autorité, 1952-1967) et Jean Fohrmann (id., 1965-1967); Michel Rasquin (membre de la Commission CEE, 1958), Lambert Schaus (id., 1958-1967), Victor Bodson (membre de la Commission unique, 1967-1970) et Albert Borschette (id., 1970-1976); Charles-Léon Hammes (juge à la Cour de Justice, 1952-1967) et Pierre Pescatore (id., 1967-1985).

L'ouvrage propose d'analyser comment ces hommes arrivent de la Seconde Guerre mondiale à la construction européenne, de comprendre leur perception de la guerre, le rôle qu'elle joue dans leurs idées, leur évolution professionnelle et personnelle ainsi que leur implication dans le projet de construction européenne. Il suit une trame chronologique qui rend la lecture et l'usage de l'ouvrage faciles. Un premier chapitre est consacré aux parcours d'avant-guerre des hommes étudiés. Il s'intéresse à leur éducation, leur passage sur les bancs de multiples universités des pays environnants, leurs premières activités professionnelles, leurs engagements politiques et associatifs. L'auteure entre ensuite de plain-pied dans les trajectoires de guerre. La reconstruction des parcours, en particulier ceux de Victor Bodson et Charles-Léon

1. En 2008, Mauve Carbonell a publié *Des hommes à l'origine de l'Europe, Biographies des membres de la Haute Autorité de la CECA* (PUP).

Hammes, est détaillée. Les hommes en question connaissent l'occupation, la destitution, l'exil, la déportation et/ou l'enrôlement de force.

Les quatre chapitres suivants sont dédiés à la période de l'après-guerre. Mauve Carbonell cherche tout d'abord (chapitre 3) – de nombreuses citations poignantes à l'appui – à comprendre comment ces futurs responsables communautaires «exorcisent» (p.53) la guerre. Elle montre comment ils parlent de leur vécu et de leurs blessures: Lambert Schaus rédige des poèmes et contribue au *Livre d'or de la Résistance luxembourgeoise*, Jean Fohrmann co-publie en 1945 un texte sur les camps de concentration, Albert Borschette rédige un roman mettant en scène des personnages collaborateurs.

Le quatrième chapitre est consacré au temps de l'épuration et de la répression, pendant lequel les dénonciations vont bon train et que tous, ceux qui ont vécu l'occupation tout comme ceux qui ont connu l'exil, doivent se justifier. Les «élites juridiques» auxquelles appartiennent plusieurs hommes du corpus s'intéressent aux conséquences de la guerre et à la question de savoir quel cadre juridique il faut définir pour juger les crimes du passé.

L'ouvrage analyse ensuite (chapitre 5) la vision du monde transformée et l'engagement politique au lendemain de la guerre. Mauve Carbonell observe une condamnation unanime du passé et des totalitarismes, ainsi qu'un ressentiment anticommuniste qui unit les élites luxembourgeoises de droite comme de gauche. Un large consensus règne également sur la nécessité d'abandon de la politique de neutralité du Grand-Duché. Envisager une collaboration avec l'Allemagne est cependant difficile dans l'immédiat après-guerre. Impossible de faire abstraction des souffrances engendrées par la guerre. Le regard envers les Allemands ne change que quelques années après la guerre, dans le contexte de la guerre froide, lorsque la RFA apparaît comme le rempart face au péril rouge, lorsque «la menace communiste l'emporte face aux traumatismes du passé» (p.117).

Ce livre montre ainsi de manière convaincante que, s'il règne au Luxembourg un large consensus sur la construction européenne, l'engagement européen des hommes étudiés et des élites luxembourgeoises de manière générale (chapitre 6) revêt au départ un caractère essentiellement pragmatique. Le Luxembourg ne peut pas rester en dehors d'un projet comme le plan Schuman. La plupart des responsables communautaires sur lesquels se penche l'ouvrage ne sont d'ailleurs pas de fervents pro-Européens de la première heure. Grand nombre d'entre eux arrivent dans les institutions communautaires à travers leurs activités dans la diplomatie ou dans la vie politique luxembourgeoises. Le lecteur n'obtient par conséquent, mis à part l'argument de la nécessité pour le Luxembourg d'abandonner sa politique de neutralité après deux invasions, que peu de réponses à la question de savoir quel rôle la guerre joue dans l'implication de ces hommes dans la construction européenne. Mais c'est précisément parce qu'il ne livre pas un récit d'hommes arrivant à l'Europe suite à un engagement, dès le lendemain de la guerre et en réaction à la guerre, pour des projets de coopération européenne, que Mauve Carbonell apporte avec cet ouvrage une pièce importante à l'histoire du Grand-Duché et à celle de la construction européenne dans

son ensemble. L'approche biographique lui permet de montrer à quel point les blessures de guerre sont profondes et de mettre en relief le fait que le ressentiment anti-allemand est bien là dans l'immédiat après-guerre. Tout comme avec son ouvrage précédent, elle contribue ainsi à la déconstruction du mythe des pionniers de l'Europe tous enthousiastes à l'égard de la construction européenne dès le lendemain de la guerre.

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Johnny LAURSEN (ed.), ***The Institutions and Dynamics of the European Community, 1973-1983***, Publications of the European Union Liaison Committee of Historians, vol.14, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 2014, 312 S. – ISBN 978-3-8329-6963-9 – 82,00 €.

Verglichen mit den teilweise dramatischen 1960er und den epochalen 1980er Jahren erscheint die Zwischendekade auf den ersten Blick als eine Phase des integrationspolitischen Stillstands. Diese Sichtweise wurde nicht nur dadurch begünstigt, dass mit dem Ende der 1960er Jahre erste wichtige Vorhaben wie die Zollunion und die Gemeinsame Agrarpolitik zu einem vorläufigen Abschluss gekommen und eine – wenngleich fragile – Balance zwischen den einzelnen Institutionen der Gemeinschaft erreicht worden war; auch der langanhaltende Nachkriegsboom fand sein Ende, die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung stagnierte, die Arbeitslosigkeit stieg ebenso wie die Inflationsrate. Intergouvernementale Tendenzen insbesondere in Gestalt des Rats der Staats- und Regierungschefs brachen sich Bahn, die Entscheidungsprozesse wurden komplizierter und langwieriger, die erste Erweiterungsrunde zeitigte nicht die erhofften Impulse. Doch wie bereits der Titel des Buches verrät, gehen die Autoren mit dieser Deutung nicht oder jedenfalls nicht völlig konform. In Übereinstimmung mit neueren Darstellungen weisen sie auf den einigungspolitischen Übergangscharakter der „langen" 1970 Jahre hin: die strukturellen Veränderungen während dieser unspektakulären Dekade hätten der folgenden „belle époque" unter Kommissionspräsident Jacques Delors den Weg bereitet.

Der Band geht zurück auf die dreizehnte Forschungstagung der Historiker-Verbindungsgruppe bei der Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften und schließt inhaltlich an die Bände über die Anfangsjahre der EWG, die Krisenphase Mitte der 1960er sowie die Suche nach einem Kompromiss zwischen Vertiefung und Erweiterung in den frühen 1970er Jahren an. Im Anschluss an die instruktive Einleitung des Herausgebers skizziert Anne Deighton eine Forschungsagenda für eine Integrationsgeschichtsschreibung, die sich als Teil der *New International History* im Sinne Akira Iriyes und entsprechender politikwissenschaftlicher Ansätze versteht, und plädiert deswegen unbefangen für methodologischen Eklektizismus (S. 50). Die folgenden vier Beiträge erproben unterschiedliche Zugriffe auf das einigungspolitische Geschehen in den „langen" 1970er Jahren. Wolfram Kaiser votiert für eine „actor-centred analysis of the internal political dynamics of European integration and EC poli-

tics“ (S. 53) im Kontext der damaligen strukturellen Transformationsprozesse, für die sich Begriffe wie „Globalisierung“ und „Europäisierung“ eingebürgert haben. Ann-Christina L. Knudsen untersucht soziale Profile und politische Karrierewege britischer MEPs zwischen 1973 und 1979 und kommt zu dem für manche EG/EU-Skeptiker möglicherweise überraschenden Ergebnis, dass auf Seiten der heimischen Parteien durchaus die Bereitschaft vorhanden war, Personen mit Regierungs- und Parlamentserfahrung ins Europäische Parlament zu delegieren, das damals offensichtlich eine gute Reputation besaß. Bill Davies und Morten Rasmussen rekapitulieren die Herausbildung einer europäischen Rechtsgemeinschaft seit den frühen 1950er Jahren, während Piers Ludlow nach den Zusammenhängen zwischen dem „Zweiten Kalten Krieg“ und der Neubelebung des Einigungsprozesses in der ersten Hälfte der 1980er Jahre fragt.

Die letzten fünf Beiträge thematisieren integrationspolitische Schlüsselprobleme und -ereignisse der Dekade. Gleich zwei Autoren beschäftigen sich mit der Entstehung des Europäischen Währungssystems: Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol kritisiert die herkömmliche Version der EWS-Gründung, die vor allem auf die Rolle der Gründerväter Roy Jenkins, Helmut Schmidt und Valéry Giscard d’Estaing abhebt, und unterstreicht stattdessen, „that the slow and imperfect formation of a transnational monetary policy consensus among a transnationally connected monetary elite […] arguably mattered much more over the long run“ (S. 171). In einem stärker biographisch, auf die Rolle des deutschen Bundeskanzlers fokussierten Analyse identifiziert Guido Thiemeyer die treibenden Kräfte hinter der währungspolitischen Integration. Mit dem EWG-Beitrittsantrag Griechenlands, des gegenwärtigen Sorgenkinds der EU, setzt sich Antonio Varsori auseinander. Die Anfänge der Europäischen Umweltpolitik sind Gegenstand des Beitrags von Jan-Henrik Meyer, während Michael Gehler mit seiner Fallstudie zur Rolle Bruno Kreiskys die Bedeutung eines europapolitischen Außenseiters untersucht.

Die Beiträge zeichnen sich durch originelle Zugriffe, ein Interesse an methodischen und theoretischen Fragen, die Berücksichtigung der einschlägigen Forschung sowie, zumindest teilweise, den Rückgriff auf neue archivalische Quellen aus. Wer sich ein Bild vom *state of the art* in der Integrationsgeschichtsschreibung verschaffen möchte, wird von den Autorinnen und Autoren dieses Bandes bestens bedient.

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German and European Studies of the Willy Brandt Center at the Wroclaw University



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Lorenzo FERRARI, ***Speaking with a Single Voice. The Assertion of the EC as a Distinctive International Actor, 1969-79*** – IMT Institute of Advanced Studies, Lucca
Supervisors: Mark Gilbert, Johns Hopkins University; Giovanni Orsina, LUISS Rome
Jury: Maria Elena Guasconi, University of Genova; Arlo Poletti, LUISS Rome; Monica Claes, Maastricht University
Field: Contemporary history
Date of the exam: 09.12.2014
Contact: lorenzo.effe@gmail.com

During the 1970s, the EC's activity on the international stage considerably increased both in terms of intensity and scope: the European Political Cooperation and the European Council were established, recognition of the EC by almost all the world's countries was secured, its engagement with global issues was deepened, and so on. Overall, the EC asserted itself as a distinct international actor, endowed with a distinctive political character. This process of assertion constitutes the central object of the thesis.

In the thesis, an extensive historical account of the EC's international activity during the 1970s is provided. It is considered how and why the EC sought to assert itself as an international actor, who influenced its traits as such, and how this process was connected to other contemporary developments. In particular, the thesis focuses on the different conceptions held by main actors involved in this process, such as for instance the EC commissioners for external relations and the most influential national governments. To this end, the thesis mostly relies on primary sources drawn from the EU institutional archives and from the archives of the French and British foreign ministries.

The thesis moves past the traditional divide between the Community's external policies and the EPC, considering both dimensions as well as the European Council's international activity. Attention is paid to institutional developments (e.g. establishment of EPC, admission to the UN) as well as to policy ones (e.g. development cooperation, promotion of human rights abroad). By adopting this broad perspective, the 1973-74 crises do not appear as an endpoint to the EC's international assertion, as it is often depicted. However, the success of such an assertion was hindered by the persistence of a serious mismatch between the discourse of the EC and its actual policies: deeds often fell well short of words.

Claudia LESKIEN, ***Operation Welcome. The Municipal Politics of Consolidating Strasbourg's Position as European Institution Host from 1949 to 1979*** – Aarhus University
Supervisor: Ann-Christina Lauring Knudsen, Aarhus University
Jury: Christina Fiig, Aarhus University; Niilo Kauppi, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), University of Strasbourg/University of Jyväskylä; Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, University of Glasgow
Field: Contemporary history
Date of the exam: 27.11.2014
Contact: Claudia.Leskien@gmx.de

The doctoral thesis is an original study investigating which local agents were active in Strasbourg to consolidate its position as European institution host and with which strategies they attempted to achieve this aim. It is based on archival research analysing municipal and institutional administration documents in five archives in three countries with the mainstay of sources from the local archives of Strasbourg. Informed by the original combination of these sources and using selected concepts of Bourdieu's theories, field and capital, as a heuristic toolbox, the thesis offers new information on the institutional history of European integration. By analysing the involvement of agents within a city with regard to the placement of European institutions, the thesis sheds light on this understudied aspect by concentrating on the local level's consolidation efforts in the intergovernmental matter of siting institutions. It also includes the Council of Europe (CoE) in the analysis and therefore offers insight in European integration outside the European Communities. Therefore, it makes an important contribution to European integration history by focusing on these aspects.

The CoE has been located in Strasbourg since 1949 and the assembly of the European Communities provisionally since 1952. A select group of city administration agents, supported by various private associations, utilised various measures of hosting parliamentarians and providing them with desirable transport and building infrastructure to prove that Strasbourg was the best host possible in view of the ongoing competition with other prospective and provisional European Community host cities, such as Brussels. An overarching element to all three themes was to demonstrate that Strasbourg had a European mission that would make it eminently suitable to house a European institution. Thus, local agency in this matter and related issues of accele-

rated infrastructural development were important aspects of institution and city history in the light of European integration.

Eric O'Connor, ***Democracy in the Dark: The Origins of Popular Participation in European Unity, 1949-1975*** – University of Wisconsin-Madison
Supervisor/Jury: Laird Boswell, Mary Louise Roberts, Suzanne Desan, Nils Ringe, and Daniel Ussishkin, University of Wisconsin-Madison
Field: Contemporary history
Date of the Exam: 18.08.2014
Contact: eric.oconnor@eui.eu

This dissertation constructs an original history of democracy in European unity. Applying historical methods to a field dominated by social scientists, it provides an intellectual and empirical foundation to one of the most critical topics in today's European Union (EU). Centring on European federalists and their foils, this transnational study analyses European officials and voters as they considered if, or how, to incorporate voting or other aspects of democracy into the process of European unity before the inaugural 1979 European Parliament elections. It is an exploration of the fluctuating idea of democracy in European unity, a discursive study of supranational democracy's changing meaning, and an archival-based history of rarely-studied democratic experiences during the EU's earliest years. As such, it interprets how officials and voters in key EU member states envisioned democracy outside the bounds of the nation state, as well as investigates numerous unofficial local referendums and elections on European unity from Breisach, West Germany in 1950 to Beckenham, Great Britain in 1971.

This study relied upon archival research in many state and political party archives in Germany, France, and Great Britain, including personal and organizational records from Europa-Union Deutschland, the Council of European Municipalities and Regions, Altiero Spinelli, Jean Monnet, Fernand Dehousse, Michael Foot, Walter Hallstein, Guy Mollet, and others across Europe. The chapters examine competing interpretations of post-war liberal democracy at both the national and supranational levels, the movements for and against direct elections to a European parliament starting in 1949, and local, national, and transnational voting on the topic of European unity until the 1975 United Kingdom national referendum. Bridging for the first time the scholarship of post-WWII transnational political reconstruction and EU democracy studies, this work reveals that the strange, often criticized type of democracy that many associate with today's European Union is a legacy of the contested attempts to stabilize politics in the original EU member states after fascism. This dissertation therefore argues that the EU was a central component to the reimagining and reimplementation of liberal parliamentary democracy in Western Europe after WWII.

Oana Maria ALBESCU, *Ethics in contemporary international business* – Babeş-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca
Supervisor/jury: Vasile Puşcaş, Babeş – Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca (supervisor); Nicolae Păun, Babeş – Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca; Radu Danciu, Dimitrie Cantemir University of Cluj-Napoca; Ludovic I. Bathory, George Bariţ Institute of History, Romanian Academy of Cluj – Napoca; Mircea Maniu, Babeş – Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca.
Field: International Relations and European Studies
Date of Exam: 18.12.2014
Contact: oanaalbescu@yahoo.com

In the globalized, post-westphalian world, we are witnessing the acceleration of global interdependencies and the multiplication of transnational actors, as major players in the International System. The PhD research had the objective to analyze the level of implementation and development of corporate social responsibility in Romania. The present research aims to contribute, through the theoretical and methodological panoply of the proposed tools, to a better understanding of ethical business strategies and also to contribute to the encouragement of debates related to the importance of a sustainable business behavior – critical for the profit of the company and also for the communities' benefits. The research brings an innovative aspect in the study of International Relations, through the presentation and analysis of the new tendencies of corporate social responsibility and the business solutions for the sustainable development of the societies. One of the major conclusions is that the new business tendencies define the "social contract" between multinational corporations and the societies they operate, the long term strategies for the sustainable development of business and communities. We also found that corporate social responsibility is a long-term partnership between society and companies, which, in order to develop business operations, need social legitimacy in communities. The research is qualitative, using interviews, case studies and the documentations and analysis of a taxonomy of reports: European and international reports, multinational companies' reports related to corporate social responsibility, business ethics and corporate governance.

Ramona Alexandra ROŞU, *The asymmetric interdependence and the international mediation in the European Union* – Babeş – Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca
Supervisor/jury: Vasile Puşcaş, Babeş – Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca (supervisor); Nicolae Păun, Babeş – Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca; Mihaela Fodor, Dimitrie Cantemir University of Cluj-Napoca; Silviu Totelecan, George Bariţ Institute of History, Romanian Academy of Cluj – Napoca; Ovidiu Pecican, Babeş – Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca
Field: International Relations and European Studies
Date of exam: 18.12.2014
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The increase of asymmetric interdependence within the EU – which manifests itself not only in the economic area – is intrinsically explosive and this situation may heighten the prospect of economic and political conflicts within integrated systems. The focus of the present study is the core of the politics on interdependence, namely, the management of asymmetric interdependence, in the context of the EU. As interdependence intensifies, the Member States of the Union are subjected to a severe test due to the asymmetric distribution of power. The thesis aimed to demonstrate that a synthetic theoretical approach, based on the conjunction between institutionalist and constructivist approaches, on different levels of the international structure would offer a more inclusive and more comprehensive perspective on political outcomes in the framework of systemic approaches to international relations. We argued that this synthetic vision is in fact compatible with two fundamental positions in the field of ICR (International Conflict Resolution) which were frequently considered to be in a relation of opposition: conflict settlement and conflict transformation. Thus, one of the arguments of this study is the fact that in the conflict resolution processes, two types of approaches are needed: the causal neoliberal approach and the constitutive socio-constructivist approach. Therefore, among the policy instruments that serve to resolve conflicts and preventive diplomacy, smart mediation is the most operative version because it incorporates both types of approaches. We also examined the management of the fundamental disagreements between Member States of the EU, which occurred in the seemingly benign environment of interdependence, in decision-making processes under conditions of the Community Method and the Intergovernmental Method. We found that the two procedures co-exist at different levels in the decision-making processes and that, in both contexts, the inefficiency of disputes management produced problems which remained unresolved, with ominous consequences for the European integration process.

Föderalismus in historisch vergleichender Perspektive



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Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen

Evanthis HATZIVASSILIOU
The Cold War as a Frontier:
The Mediterranean Cleavages and the View from NATO, 1967-1982

A division of the Mediterranean between an "advanced" Northern and a "less developed" Southern littoral was already evident since the 19th century, but the Cold War came to deepen and formalize it. The countries of the Northern coast (except Yugoslavia) became members of the West, in a process which was completed with the Southern enlargement of the Community; the states of the Southern coast joined the Third World. This article discusses the conceptualizations of NATO regarding the Mediterranean, from the arrival of a Soviet naval squadron in the region until the Lebanon war. The experts focused mostly on the impact of the Cold War and on the Soviet presence, while important regional developments falling outside the Cold War context were not always fully appreciated. Still, the NATO analysis papers offer an interesting picture of Western perceptions of developments south of the "area", including the impact of nationalism, the Arab-Israeli dispute, and Islamic revivalism.

La barrière de la Guerre froide:
Les clivages méditerranéens et la perspective de l'OTAN, 1967-1982

La ligne de fracture de la Méditerranée entre une rive septentrionale «avancée» et une rive méridionale «sous-développée» s'est déjà profilée au cours du 19e siècle. La Guerre froide l'a confirmée et formalisée. À l'exception de la Yougoslavie, les pays de la rive du Nord ont fait partie du monde occidental, un processus qui s'est achevé avec l'élargissement de la communauté européenne à la Grèce et la presqu'île ibérique. Ceux de la rive du Sud ont fait partie du Tiers monde. Cet article porte sur la conceptualisation de la Méditerranée dans le cadre de l'OTAN depuis l'arrivée d'un escadron naval soviétique dans la région jusqu'à la guerre du Liban. Puisque les experts de l'OTAN s'intéressaient principalement à l'impact de la Guerre froide et de la présence soviétique, ils ont manqué d'apprécier pleinement et tenir compte d'importantes évolutions au niveau régional, en dehors du contexte de la Guerre froide. Les notes d'analyse de l'OTAN brossent néanmoins un panorama intéressant de la perception des évolutions survenues au Sud de l'espace sous rubrique, y compris l'impact tant du nationalisme que du conflit israélo-arabe et de la montée de l'islamisme.

Die Grenzen des Kalten Krieges:
Die Spaltung des Mittelmeerraumes und die Sichtweise der Nato, 1967-1982

Die sich bereits im 19. Jahrhundert offenbarende Spaltung des Mittelmeerraumes in eine „progressive" Nordhälfte und eine „weniger entwickelte" Südhälfte, wurde in den Zeiten des Kalten Krieg vertieft und formalisiert. Mit Ausnahme von Jugoslawien schlossen sich die Länder des nördlichen Mittelmeerufers dem westlichen Bündnissystem an (der Prozess wurde mit dem Beitritt Griechenlands, Spaniens und Portugals

zur Europäischen Gemeinschaft abgeschlossen), während die Länder des südlichen Randes zur Dritten Welt gezählt wurden. Der vorliegende Aufsatz bespricht die NATO-Konzeptualisierung des Mittelmeeres in der Zeitspanne zwischen der Ankunft eines sowjetischen Marinegeschwaders in der Region und dem Libanonkrieg. Die Experten lenkten ihr Augenmerk hauptsächlich auf den Einfluss des Kalten Krieges und die sowjetische Präsenz, während wichtige regionale Entwicklungen außerhalb des Kontexts des Kalten Krieges nicht immer in vollem Umfang berücksichtigt wurden. Trotzdem liefern die NATO-Analysen ein interessantes Bild westlicher Wahrnehmung der Entwicklungen südlich des NATO-Gebietes, einschließlich der Auswirkungen des Nationalismus, des arabisch-israelischen Konflikts und des erstarkenden Islamismus.

Karin LIEBHART
Images of the Mediterranean in Late 20th Century German Quality Press

The article focuses on the analysis of the media coverage of the Mediterranean region in the late 20th century. German print media have been chosen as examples due to Germany's role as a founding member of the European Economic Community, and core state of the successor organizations European Community and European Union. Discursive and visual representations of the Mediterranean in the quality weekly *Die Zeit* and the quality magazine *Der Spiegel* are analyzed, while main emphasis is put on supra-national and geo-political references. Discursive patterns, textual and visual metaphors as well as selected images are examined using a range of qualitative methods as analytical tools. This contribution attempts to throw somewhat light on the symbolic level of politics, which provides a frame for the perception of political issues and decision making processes.

Représentations de la Méditerranée dans la presse de qualité allemande du dernier tiers du XXe siècle

La contribution est consacrée aux représentations de la Méditerranée dans une sélection de journaux de qualité allemands du dernier tiers du XXe siècle. Les médias imprimés allemands furent choisis à titre d'exemple parce que l'Allemagne est un pays membre fondateur de la Communauté économique européenne et qu'elle a joué un rôle central dans les organisations successeurs de la Communauté européenne et de l'Union européenne. Les représentations discursives et visuelles de la Méditerranée dans l'hebdomadaire *Die Zeit* et le magazine *Der Spiegel* sont spécialement analysées par rapport aux références supranationales et géopolitiques. Des schémas discursifs, des métaphores textuelles et visuelles ainsi qu'une sélection d'images sont examinés grâce à des méthodes qualitatives. L'étude est focalisée sur le plan de la politique qui forme le cadre de la perception du questionnement politique et des processus de décision.

Repräsentationen der Mittelmeerregion in der deutschen Qualitätspresse des späten 20. Jahrhunderts

Der Beitrag befasst sich mit der Repräsentation der Mittelmeerregion in ausgewählten deutschsprachigen Qualitätsmedien im letzten Drittel des 20. Jahrhunderts. Deutsche Printmedien wurden als Beispiel gewählt, da Deutschland ein Gründungsmitglied der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft ist und eine zentrale Rolle in deren Nachfolgeorganisationen Europäische Gemeinschaft und Europäische Union spielt. Diskursive und visuelle Repräsentationen der Mittelmeerregion in der wöchentlich erscheinenden Zeitung *Die Zeit* sowie dem Wochenmagazin *Der Spiegel* werden insbesondere in Hinblick auf supranationale und geopolitische Bezugnahmen analysiert. Diskursive Muster, Text- und Bildmetaphern sowie ausgewählte Bilder und Illustrationen werden mittels qualitativer Methoden untersucht. Der Beitrag fokussiert auf die symbolische Ebene der Politik, die den Rahmen für die Wahrnehmung politischer Fragestellungen und Entscheidungsprozesse bildet.

Sofia PAPASTAMKOU
Greece between Europe and the Mediterranean, 1981-1986.
The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the Greek-Libyan Relations as Case Studies

This article examines aspects of the foreign policy of Greece's socialist Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou regarding the Mediterranean from 1981 to 1986. The Mediterranean was one of the three circles of Papandreou's "multidimensional" approach in foreign policy, a conceptualized one that encompassed Greece's Arab policy, mainly from a third road point of view. Two case studies are considered, the Greek-Palestinian and the Greek-Libyan connections, principally from a European perspective. Opting for a global rather than a bilateral perspective allows to fully appreciate the evolution of Greek foreign attitudes at the time mainly from the perspective of their Europeanisation.

La Grèce entre l'Europe et la Méditerranée, 1981-1986.
Une étude de cas du conflit Israélo-Palestinien et des relations Gréco-Libyennes

Cet article porte sur la politique méditerranéenne du Premier ministre socialiste de Grèce Andréas Papandréou de 1981 à 1986. La Méditerranée était l'un des trois cercles dans lesquels Papandréou plaçait la Grèce dans le cadre d'une politique étrangère qui se voulait «multidimensionnelle». Il s'agissait d'une conceptualisation qui englobait la politique arabe de la Grèce en proposant une approche neutraliste. Deux cas sont abordés ici, l'attitude de la Grèce face au conflit israélo-palestinien dans le cadre de la CEE et les relations entre la Grèce et la Libye. La contribution propose une approche globale qui sort du cadre des relations bilatérales et se place dans une perspective européenne, ce qui permet de mieux suivre l'évolution de la politique étrangère grecque sur ces aspects et son européanisation.

**Griechenland zwischen Europa und dem Mittelmeer, 1981-1986.
Eine Fallstudie des Israelisch-Palästinensischen Konflikts und der Griechisch-Libyschen Beziehungen**

Dieser Aufsatz behandelt die Mittelmeer-Politik des griechischen Premier Ministers Andreas Papandreou zwischen 1981 und 1986. In seiner Außenpolitik, die sich als „multidimensional" begriff, war das Mittelmeer einer jener drei Kreise in denen Papandreous Griechenland sich bewegte. Es handelte sich um ein Konzept, das die arabische Politik Griechenlands miteinbezog und eine neutralistische Sichtweise vorschlug. Zwei Beispiele werden hier behandelt: zum einen, Griechenlands Haltung gegenüber dem israelisch-arabischen Konflikt innerhalb der EWG und zum anderen, die Beziehungen zwischen Griechenland und Libyen. Beide Fragen werden hier global und außerhalb der rein bilateralen Beziehungen behandelt. Der Aufsatz nimmt eine europäische Perspektive ein, was es ermöglicht, sowohl die griechische Außenpolitik zu diesem Themenkreis als auch ihre Europäisierung besser zu verstehen.

**Claudia CASTIGLIONI
The EEC and Iran:
From the Revolution of 1979 to the Launch of the Critical Dialogue in 1992**

The article explores the policy pursued by the European Economic Community and its members towards Iran, from the 1979 revolution to the launch of the first concrete attempt at normalization, the so-called Critical Dialogue of 1992. Drawing on British and French archives, the Archive of European Integration, memoirs, and monographs, the study looks at the impact the revolution had on the economic and political collaboration between Iran and the members of the EC. Secondly, it analyses the initiatives undertaken by the Community in response to the Iranian events, assessing the level of internal cohesiveness displayed by the EC when faced with the regime change and with the Iran–Iraq war. Thirdly, it analyses the impact of Cold War constraints and transatlantic ties on the formulation of EC policy. It argues that the EC members managed to give proof of (relative) cohesion and assertiveness when confronted with the pressure coming from Washington, with the uncertainty of the Iranian situation, and with the resulting difficulties in the protection of their economic interests, but failed to display the same cohesion when the priority shifted from preserving to enhancing such interests and framing them within a multilateral action.

**La CEE et l'Iran:
Depuis la Révolution de 1979 jusqu'au Dialogue Critique de 1992**

Cet article étudie la politique menée par la Communauté économique européenne et par ses membres à l'égard de l'Iran, à partir de la révolution de 1979 jusqu'à la première tentative concrète de normalisation de leurs relations, dite "Dialogue critique" de 1992. En premier lieu, à partir d'archives britanniques et françaises, de l'Archive of European Intégration, de mémoires et de monographies, il examine l'impact de la révolution sur la coopération économique et politique entre l'Iran et les membres de la CEE. En deuxième lieu, il analyse les initiatives entreprises par la communauté en

réaction aux événements iraniens, évaluant le niveau de cohésion affiché par la CEE face au changement de régime et à la guerre entre l'Iran et l'Irak. En troisième lieu, il s'intéresse à l'impact des contraintes résultant de la guerre froide et aux relations transatlantiques sur l'élaboration d'une politique communautaire. Il fait valoir que les États-membres ont fait preuve d'une (relative) cohésion et fermeté face aux pressions de Washington, aux inconnues de la situation iranienne et aux difficultés qui s'ensuivaient en matière de protection de leurs intérêts économiques. Ils ont en revanche échoué à faire preuve de cette même cohésion lorsqu'il s'agissait non plus de préserver, mais de développer leurs intérêts et de les formuler dans un cadre d'action multilatérale.

Die EWG und der Iran:
Von der Revolution von 1979 bis zum „Kritischen Dialog" von 1992

Der Beitrag untersucht die Politik der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und ihrer Mitgliedstaaten gegenüber dem Iran von der Revolution 1979 bis zum ersten konkreten Versuch der Normalisierung, dem sogenannten „kritischen Dialog" von 1992. Mit Hilfe der Auswertung von britischen und französischen Archiven, dem Archive of European Integration, bzw. von Memoiren und Monographien werden zunächst die Auswirkungen der Revolution auf die wirtschaftliche und politische Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem Iran und den Mitgliedstaaten der EWG erforscht und dargestellt. Sodann werden die Initiativen der EWG als Antwort auf die Ereignisse im Iran und damit einhergehend der interne Zusammenhalt der EWG angesichts des Regimewechsel und des Iran-Irak Krieges analysiert. Zuletzt untersucht der Beitrag den Einfluss der Zwänge des Kalten Krieges und der transatlantischen Verbindungen auf die Formulierung der Politik der EWG. Der Beitrag kommt zu dem Schluss, dass die EWG-Mitgliedstaaten zwar bis zu einem gewissen Grad Zusammenhalt und Bestimmtheit bewiesen haben, als sie mit dem Druck aus Washington, der Unsicherheit der iranischen Situation und den daraus sich ergebenden Schwierigkeiten für den Schutz ihrer wirtschaftlichen Interessen konfrontiert waren; sie ließen jedoch einen ähnlichen Zusammenhalt vermissen als sich die bloße Verteidigung ihrer Interessen zur Stärkung eben jener Interessen durch ein multilaterales Vorgehen verschob.

Massimiliano TRENTIN
Divergence in the Mediterranean.
The Economic Relations between the EC and the Arab Countries in the Long 1980s

The article focuses on the changes in the economic relations between the European Communities and the Arab world from the 1970s to the 1980s. The decline of oil prices in 1986 impacted heavily on the development of the Arab world and its partnership with the EC. On the one hand, the Communities could restore their pre-1970s, traditional economic predominance vis-à-vis their Arab partners, now framed along the new neoliberal doctrine promoted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. On the other hand, the Mediterranean basin lost the political and economic

relevance it had enjoyed previously, and was thus relegated to the marginality of "security" concerns.

Divergences en Méditerranée.
Les relations économiques entre la CE et les Pays arabes pendant les longues années 1980

L'article analyse les transformations des relations économiques entre les Communautés Européennes et le monde arabe entre les années 1970 et 1980. La chute du prix du pétrole en 1986 eut de sérieuses répercussions sur le développement des relations entre les Pays arabes et la CE. D'un côté, la Communauté parvint à restaurer sa primauté économique sur ses partenaires arabes, cette fois en adoptant la doctrine néolibérale également soutenue dans la région par la Banque Mondiale et le Fond Monétaire International. De l'autre côté, le bassin méditerranéen perdait l'importance politique et économique qu'il avait gagnée auparavant aux yeux de la CE tout en étant reclassé, et marginalisé, comme affaire de type «sécurité».

Divergenzen im Mittelmeerraum.
Die wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen der EG und den arabischen Staaten in den 1980er Jahren

Der Artikel fokussiert die sich verändernden Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen den Europäischen Gemeinschaften und der arabischen Welt von den 1970er bis zu den 1980er Jahren. Der Rückgang des Ölpreises übte 1986 einen starken Einfluss auf die Entwicklung der Partnerschaft zwischen den arabischen Ländern und der EG aus. Einerseits vermochten die Gemeinschaften ihre traditionelle wirtschaftliche Vorherrschaft über ihre arabischen Partnern wiederherzustellen, indem sie sich, genau wie die Weltbank und der Internationale Währungsfonds in Nahost und Nordafrika auf die neue neoliberale Lehre berief. Andererseits verlor das Mittelmeerbecken in den Augen der EG jene politische und wirtschaftliche Bedeutung die ihm zuvor beigemessen wurde; es fand eine Marginalisierung zu einem Problem der Kategorie „Sicherheit" statt.

Emmanuel COMTE
Migration and Regional Interdependence in the Mediterranean, from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s

This article discusses the way in which migration in the Mediterranean area has affected relations between European states and other Mediterranean states. It is based on the archives of the Council of Ministers of the European Union, the Council of Europe, as well as on documents of the Presidency of the French Republic at the time of François Mitterrand. The main argument developed is that migration in the Mediterranean, from the South and the East to the North, intensified from the early 1980s onwards, creating interdependence in the region. Northern states initially tried to stop these migration flows. However, they quickly also had to consider a more comprehensive approach to address the causes of migration. In this way, the article

explains a fundamental dynamic at the origin of the Barcelona Process in the mid-1990s.

Migrations et interdépendance régionale en Méditerranée, du début des années 1980 au milieu des années 1990

Cet article traite de la manière dont les mouvements migratoires dans l'espace méditerranéen ont affecté les relations entre les États européens et les autres États méditerranéens. Il s'appuie sur les sources du Conseil des ministres de l'Union européenne, du Conseil de l'Europe, ainsi que sur les documents de la Présidence de la République française à l'époque de François Mitterrand. La thèse développée est que les mouvements migratoires en Méditerranée, du Sud et de l'Est vers le Nord, se sont intensifiés à partir du début des années 1980, créant une interdépendance dans la région. Les États du Nord se sont d'abord efforcés d'arrêter les flux migratoires en provenance du Sud et de l'Est. Ils durent néanmoins rapidement envisager également une approche plus globale, afin de s'attaquer aux causes de l'émigration. De cette manière, l'article explique une dynamique fondamentale à l'origine du Processus de Barcelone au milieu des années 1990.

Migration und regionale Interdependenz im Mittelmeer, von den frühen 1980er Jahren bis zur Mitte der 1990er Jahre

Dieser Artikel beschreibt die Art und Weise, wie die Migration im Mittelmeerraum die Beziehungen zwischen den europäischen Staaten und anderen Mittelmeerstaaten betroffen hat. Er basiert auf Archivquellen des Ministerrats der Europäischen Union, des Europarats sowie auf Dokumenten der Präsidentschaft der Französischen Republik zur Zeit von François Mitterrand. Es wird die These vertreten, dass die seit den frühen 1980er Jahren intensivierte Migration im Mittelmeerraum, aus dem Süden und dem Osten in den Norden, die gegenseitige Abhängigkeit in der Region verstärkte. Die Nordstaaten versuchten zunächst, diese Migrationsströme zu stoppen. Sie mussten jedoch schnell auch einen umfassenderen Ansatz entwickeln, um die Ursachen der Migration zu bereinigen. Auf diese Weise erklärt der Artikel die Grunddynamik, die am Ursprung des Barcelona-Prozesses Mitte der 1990er Jahre stand.

Simone PAOLI
The Schengen Agreements and their Impact on Euro-Mediterranean Relations: The Case of Italy and the Maghreb

This article analyses the implications of the Schengen agreements for the migration policies of the Southern members of the EC; in turn, it examines the implications of migration policy reforms consequent upon Schengen for the relations between the Southern members of the EC and third Mediterranean countries, with special attention to Italy and the Maghreb. On the basis of extensive research in archives, it demonstrates that the Schengen agreements were employed to pressure Italy into making its own migration policies more "Northern" and hence more restrictive. It also shows

that the inclusion of Italy in Schengen was due in part to the desire to externalize border controls to transit countries; the intention of the Northern EC members was to reduce the number of persons entering irregularly while, simultaneously, reducing political costs and bypassing legal constraints implicit in such an attempt. Finally, it concludes that the Schengen agreements ought to be interpreted, at least in part, as a foreign policy initiative aimed at protecting the geopolitical core of the EC from a security threat: namely, unwanted mass immigration, especially from Southern Mediterranean countries. The entry of Italy into Schengen, therefore, was not without significance for its relations with privileged partners such as the Maghreb countries.

Les accords de Schengen et leur impact sur les relations Euro-Méditerranéennes: le cas de l'Italie et des pays du Maghreb

Cet article analyse l'impact des Accords de Schengen sur les politiques migratoires des pays membres méridionaux de l'UE; il examine en particulier les implications des réformes consécutives à Schengen sur les relations entre les pays membres du Sud de l'UE et les pays tiers du bassin méditerranéen en prêtant une attention particulière à l'Italie et au Maghreb. Fondé sur une recherche approfondie dans les archives, l'article démontre que les accords de Schengen furent utilisés pour exercer des pressions sur l'Italie afin qu'elle adapte sa politique migratoire à celle, plus restrictive, des États septentrionaux. L'insertion de l'Italie dans Schengen répondait en partie aussi au désir d'externaliser les contrôles frontaliers vers les pays de transit, l'intention des pays membres du Nord étant de comprimer le nombre des immigrants irréguliers tout en réduisant le coût politique et en contournant les contraintes légales inhérentes à une telle opération. Finalement les accords de Schengen doivent être interprétés, du moins en partie, comme une initiative diplomatique visant à protéger le noyau géopolitique de l'UE d'une menace sécuritaire, à savoir, l'immigration massive, mais non-désirée, en provenance des pays de la côte australe de la Méditerranée. Partant, l'entrée de l'Italie dans l'espace Schengen ne manquait pas d'avoir des répercussions sur les relations de l'Italie avec ses partenaires privilégies, en première ligne les pays du Maghreb.

Die Auswirkungen der Schengen Abkommen auf die Beziehungen zwischen der EU und den Mittelmeerländern unter besonderer Berücksichtigung Italiens und der Länder des Maghreb

Der Artikel beleuchtet den Impact der Schengener Abkommen auf die Migrationspolitiken der südlichen EU-Mitgliedsstaaten, insbesondere die Implikationen der durch Schengen verursachten Umwälzungen im Bereich der Beziehungen zwischen den südlichen EU-Staaten und Drittländern des Mittelmeerbeckens. Besonderes Augenmerk gilt dabei Italien und dem Maghreb. Umfassende Archivrecherchen haben ergeben, dass die Schengener Abkommen benutz wurden, um Druck auf Italien auszuüben damit es seine Einwanderungspolitik an jene, restriktivere, der nördlichen EU-Länder anpassen möge. Letztere benutzten die Aufnahme Italiens auch ein Stück weit um die Grenzkontrollen an die Peripherie, in die Transitländer, zu verlegen mit

dem Hintergedanken die Zahl der irregulären Einwanderer zu verringern und die legalen Zwänge die sich daraus ergaben zu umschiffen, ohne dafür den ansonsten hohen politischen Preis zu zahlen. Schließlich muss Schengen auch als diplomatische Initiative gesehen werden, die wenigstens teilweise darauf abzielte das geopolitische Kerneuropa von einer äußeren Bedrohung abzusichern, nämlich der illegalen Masseneinwanderung aus Ländern der südlichen Mittelmeerküste. Die Aufnahme in den Schengen-Club blieb deswegen auch nicht ohne Auswirkungen auf die Beziehungen Italiens zu seinen bevorzugten Partnern, allen voran den Maghreb-Ländern.

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

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



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

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

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

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

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