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Hans von der Groeben: Lebenserinnerungen



Deutschland und Europa in einem unruhigen Jahrhundert

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von Hans von der Groeben

Von Hans von der Groeben †

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Nach dem Krieg hat der Autor zunächst in Hannover und Bonn am Wiederaufbau mitgewirkt. In der Überzeugung, dass Demokratie, Rechtsstaat und Freiheit nur in engem Zusammenwirken mit den Demokratien Westeuropas und Amerikas gesichert werden können, nahm er den Auftrag dankbar an, am Aufbau der Europäischen Gemeinschaft teilzunehmen. Von 1958 bis 1970 war er Mitglied der Kommission.

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European Communist Parties and Eurocommunism in the Cold War

Wolfgang MUELLER

The revolutions of 1989, the end of communist rule in Eastern Europe, and the overcoming of the Cold-War division of the continent have necessitated a reassessment of post-war European history. In the following years, the partial opening of former communist archives revitalized research on Eastern Europe and opened new perspectives which included the Eastern experience.¹ New attention was given to communist history which was perceived no longer as a solely Russian, but also as a Western European phenomenon.²

This themed issue aims at drawing attention to recent archival-based research on Cold-War communism in Europe and at integrating it into European history. Several European parties are presented in their transnational relations with external actors, communist and non-communist alike. The issue covers the entire period of the Cold War, ranging from post-war issues to the 1980s.

Since the emergence of the Communist International, the issue of “divided loyalty” of communists toward their respective country on one hand and Moscow as the ultimate arbiter in strategic issues on the other has sparked discussion. It shaped Western perceptions for the entire Cold-War history of European communism. In his article on “Togliatti, Tito and the Shadow of Moscow”, Karlo Ruzicic-Kessler turns to the communist factor in post-war territorial disputes between Italy and Yugoslavia in the 1940s. The issue of the Italian-Yugoslav border, in particular Yugoslav claims on the border region around Trieste, created a crucial test for Italian communists under Palmiro Togliatti who struggled to combine Italian national interests with loyalty toward Soviet directives. Ruzicic-Kessler demonstrates how Togliatti and Yugoslav

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1. E.g. G.P. MURASHKO et al. (eds), *Vostochnaia Evropa v dokumentakh Rossiiskikh arkhivov 1944–1953*, Sibirskii khronograf, Moscow, 1997-98; T.V. VOLOKITINA et al. (eds), *Sovetskii faktor v Vostochnoi Evrope*, Rosspen, Moscow, 1999-2002; J. ROTHCHILD, *Return to Diversity. A Political History of East Central Europe Since World War II*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1993; I.T. BEREND, *Central and Eastern Europe 1944-1993. Detour from the Periphery to the Periphery*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996; M. MAZOWER, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century*, Lane, London, 1997; T. JUDD, *A History of Europe Since 1945*, Penguin, New York, 2005; T. SNYDER, *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin*, Basic Books, New York, 2010.
 2. F. FURET, *Le passé d'une illusion*, Laffont, Paris, 1995; J. HOLZER, *Der Kommunismus in Europa*, Fischer, Frankfurt/Main, 1998; S. COURTOIS et al., *Le livre noir du communisme*, Laffont, Paris, 1999; R. PIPES, *Communism: A History*, Random House, New York, 2001; M. DREYFUS et al., *Le siècle des communismes*, Atelier, Paris, 2000; A. BROWN, *The Rise and Fall of Communism*, Vintage, London, 2009; J. PRIESTLAND, *The Red Flag: A History of Communism*, Grove Atlantic, New York, 2009; R. SERVICE, *Comrades! Communism, a World History*, Macmillan, London, 2009; D. SASSOON, *One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century*, Tauris, London, 2010; S. PONS, *La rivoluzione globale: storia del comunismo internazionale, 1917–1991*, Einaudi, Turin, 2012.

leader Tito developed their strategies regarding the disputed region and attempted to persuade the Soviet leadership of their respective arguments.

Three years after Stalin's death, the twentieth congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) declared that communists might have the right to choose their own "national path". This did not mean that the Kremlin abandoned its leading role in world communism. Yet, diversity among and within communist parties grew, and new tendencies emerged in Eastern and Western European parties alike, such as in, e.g., Poland, Hungary, and Italy. Even after the Soviet military intervention in Hungary, some reformist tendencies lived on. Maximilian Graf draws our attention to one of these tendencies in the hitherto often neglected Communist Party of Austria by analysing "The Rise and Fall of 'Austro-Eurocommunism'" in the 1960s. While liberalizing tendencies were welcomed by some communists, they were watched with mistrust by others. East German communists took the lead in fighting reformers within the KPÖ who were perceived as violating the principle of loyalty toward the Soviet model. Graf argues for placing the Austrian reformist tendencies into the context of an early period of Eurocommunism, a movement that surfaced some years later among Western communists and advocated detaching Western communist parties from the Soviet model after the Warsaw-Pact crackdown on the Prague Spring of 1968.

Despite the East German SED's rigid stance in ideological issues, the party later sought lucrative commercial relations with Western European partners, as Francesco di Palma demonstrates. He analyses the "Contradictory Relationship" between East German communists and the most influential Eurocommunist parties, Italy's PCI and the French PCF, and he argues that, as East Germany consolidated national sovereignty during the 1970s, transnational relations gained in importance for the SED, even with Eurocommunists.

Eurocommunism embodied the hope of Western communists that their movement could be more democratic than policy in Eastern Europe implied and that it might even become fit for participation in government. In the West, however, Eurocommunist electoral successes in Italy 1975–76 provoked similarly ambivalent reactions as among their Eastern comrades – although the PCI even attempted to demonstrate independence from Moscow by reducing anti-American declarations and launching a friendlier policy toward the United States. This happened, as Valentine Lomellini argues in "When Hopes Come to Naught", with the aim of improving communist chances for participation in government. While the PCI's overtures toward liberal commentators, scientists and political actors in the United States bore some fruit, the State Department in January 1978 clarified that US policy would not favour communist participation in government.

Not only in Washington, but also in other NATO capitals, Eurocommunism was perceived a threat to Western stability, as Nikolas Dörr reminds us in "NATO and Eurocommunism: The Fear of a Weakening of the Southern Flank". Eurocommunist electoral successes in member countries of the Alliance, such as Italy, France and Spain, which joined the Alliance in 1982, triggered Western fears of a Soviet "Trojan


horse” within NATO. Here again the issue of divided loyalty of Western communists comes up. Dörr analyses threat perceptions in NATO countries as well as strategies for dealing with it by the Western alliance, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States. Once the wave of Eurocommunist successes ended in the late 1970s, it was not seen as an existential threat to NATO anymore and the election of communist delegates, with Giorgio Napolitano among them, to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in 1984 did not cause particular concern. However, it was only after the end of the Cold War that (former) communists played a leading role in Italian government again.

In accordance with the wishes of the journal’s editorial board, this themed issue will be complemented by two non-topical essays. Michael J. Geary analyses the nexus between Ireland’s negotiations on EEC membership in 1970-72 and the Community’s Common Fisheries Policy which had been completed in 1970. The four applicants for membership, Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Norway, reacted negatively to the Policy. While the applicants as well as the Community were interested in successful membership negotiations, Dublin and Brussels “tried to outmanoeuvre each other on the CFP issue”. In the last article of this issue on Western Germany’s preferences regarding the freedom of movement provisions in the EEC’s 1963 association agreement with Turkey, Matthias Mayer demonstrates how a sending country of labour migrants, Turkey, was able to press EEC states to support liberalization of immigration policies. Mayer argues that this was possible, because the domestic salience of immigration was low.

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Togliatti, Tito and the Shadow of Moscow 1944/45-1948: Post-War Territorial Disputes and the Communist World

Karlo RUZICIC-KESSLER

The relations between the Italian (PCI) and Yugoslav (KPJ) communist parties during the period consecutive to the Second World War and preceding the signing of the resolution of the Communist Information Bureau against Yugoslavia in June 1948 can be described as fluctuating, as a result of the international environment, as well as reflecting the breaches, rifts and different currents within the communist camp.

This article will analyse relations between Italian and Yugoslav communists in the border region that was to become the “Free Territory of Trieste” (FTT). Similarities and discrepancies on positions regarding international matters related to this very region will be in the focus. Furthermore, the Soviet influence over decisions taken in Rome and Belgrade during the period of analysis is portrayed. By doing so the article demonstrates that the communists, both in Italy and Yugoslavia, developed specific tactics and concepts in the disputed region, all the while carefully observing Moscow’s attitude and sometimes skilfully attempting to persuade the communist centre in Moscow of the validity of their respective arguments. By comparing Yugoslav and Italian initiatives through primary sources, the article will provide new insights on dynamics inside the European communist camp, thus going beyond the results of hitherto published studies.

The article is subdivided into two distinct phases. The first phase will highlight the relations between both PCI and KPJ during the period ranging from the last stages of the war up to the events of May 1945. This period is characterised by the strong influence of Yugoslav policies on the situation throughout the analysed region and the surfacing of problems between Italian and Yugoslav comrades. The second phase begins with the retreat of Yugoslav troops from Trieste in June 1945 and leads up to the rift between Josip Broz “Tito” and Joseph Stalin in June 1948. Here it will be possible to examine how the tactics and tendencies within the communist movements in both Italy and Yugoslavia evolved over time and how both parties tried to influence Moscow to their advantage. It will be shown that far from being a completely monolithic hierarchical movement, astonishing nuances began to emerge within the communist camp during the first post-war years already. The impact of those subtleties was felt across the Adriatic. For this purpose, archival sources from both Italian and Yugoslav communist archives will be considered, and the spectrum of interpretation of events will also be taken into account.¹

1. This article is a result of the research project “The ‘Alpen-Adria’ region 1945-1955”, funded by *The Austrian Science Fund* (FWF), project number: P25183-G18.

A Long Struggle

To fully understand the question of Italian and Yugoslav antagonism over the question of Trieste and the Julian March region it is necessary to consider that these lands were contested between Italian and Slavonic nationalisms already in the Hapsburg monarchy and before the outbreak of the First World War. Yet, when Italy entered the war on the Entente's side in 1915 it had been granted vast parts of the Hapsburg coastline in a secret treaty. During the Paris peace conference the new Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs (Kingdom SHS) that had emerged through the merger of former Southern-Slavonic Hapsburg lands with the Kingdom of Serbia, claimed parts of the lands granted to Italy in 1915. Italy's non-compromise policy at the peace conference soon isolated the country from the other Entente powers. Thus, Italy was not granted control over all lands it claimed, while the Kingdom SHS also remained dissatisfied by the incorporation into Italy of Slovene lands to the East of the Isonzo/Soča River, Istria and the city of Zara in Dalmatia.²

Subsequently the interwar period saw the rise of a strong antagonism between Italy and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (as the Kingdom SHS was called after 1929). Benito Mussolini's foreign policy towards the Balkans concentrated on the encirclement of Yugoslavia through treaties with neighbouring countries and the annexation of further territories. Thus, Italy could reach the incorporation of the Free City of Fiume in 1924 and establish a virtual protectorate over Albania in the 1920s before annexing the country in 1939. Consequently, Yugoslavia was threatened by Italian expansionism during the whole interwar period, but could save itself from total domination by the Axis-powers after the rise of Nazi-Germany in the 1930s by joining the Axis' Tripartite Treaty in March 1941, albeit with very favourable conditions in questions of military support and independence. Yet, the army coup that followed this decision in Belgrade led to the declaration of war by Germany and Italy in April 1941. The question of Yugoslav-Italian relations after 1945 from a transnational as well as an international perspective has to take the war period into account. Mussolini's fascist regime took part in Germany's conquest of Yugoslavia and incorporated wide parts of the land under the Italian kingdom.³

During the Second World War already, the partisans of Tito pushed for the establishment of a new socialist Yugoslavia after the end of the conflict and for the expansion of the country in almost every direction to the disadvantage of its neighbours, especially Austria and Italy. The idea was to incorporate all "Slavonic" terri-

2. A good overview on the Italian policy towards Yugoslavia after the First World War can be found in: M. BUCARELLI, *Mussolini e la Jugoslavia (1922-1939)*, Ed. B.A. Graphics, Bari, 2006.

3. On the Italian occupation of Yugoslavia see H.J. BURGWYN, *L'impero sull'adriatico: Mussolini e la conquista della Jugoslavia 1941-1943*, LEG, Gorizia, 2006; D. CONTI, *L'occupazione italiana dei Balcani: Crimini di guerra e mito della "Brava gente" (1940-1943)*, Odradek, Roma, 2008; E. GOBETTI, *Alleati del nemico: L'occupazione italiana in Jugoslavia (1941-1943)*, Laterza, Roma, 2013; D. RODOGNO, *Il nuovo ordine mediterraneo: Le politiche di occupazione dell'Italia fascista in Europa (1940-1943)*, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino, 2003; K. Ruzicic-Kessler, *Die italienische Besatzungspolitik in Jugoslawien 1941-1943*, PhD thesis, Vienna, 2011.

ories that had remained outside the country's borders after the First World War. This was also one of the leading drives behind the partisan conquests during the liberation of Yugoslavia from German occupation. In fact, it has to be kept in mind that while Zagreb, the capital of Croatia, was only liberated after the withdrawal of German and Croatian troops on 6 May, the “run for Trieste” enabled Slovenian partisans to reach the Italian city as early as 1 May 1945.

Moreover, it has to be considered that only after the Axis' attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Yugoslav communist partisan movement gained momentum and finally also the upper hand in the civil war that was fought along ideological and national lines in Yugoslavia.⁴ In December 1941, during a visit by British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, to Moscow, Soviet leader Stalin displayed his recognition of the Yugoslav struggle by declaring that Yugoslavia should be given parts of Italy after the end of the war.⁵ Further, the struggle for contested lands in the border region between Italy and Yugoslavia continued with forced population shifts from 1943/45 to 1954, testifying to a brutal “Yugoslavisation” by the regime in Belgrade and the departure of most of the (autochthon) Italian community from Istria, Dalmatia and the Dalmatian islands. The figures known today show that some 250,000 persons left their homes after the establishment of Yugoslav rule.⁶ Finally, when considering the resistance movement in Northern Italy – while the armed resistance itself will not be in the focus of this article – it has to be kept in mind that the Italian resistance was fractioned between its communist, monarchist, and liberal components, which also led to armed struggle among these groups in the analysed regions.⁷

1945: A New Adriatic Order?

While the Second World War was still raging, Yugoslav and Italian communists discussed the post-war order in their region. After the Italian capitulation in September 1943, the institution of a new fascist Republic in the North and a free Italian kingdom in the South of the country, tens of thousands of Italian soldiers, out of the almost 230,000 that had fought in Yugoslavia, sided with the partisans to fight against

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4. On the partisan war in Yugoslavia see K. SCHMIDER, *Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien 1941-1944*, Mittler&Sohn, Hamburg, 2002; J. TOMASEVICH, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia 1941-1945: Occupation and Collaboration*, University Press, Stanford, 2002.
 5. E. MARK, *Revolution by Degrees, Stalin's National-Front Strategy for Europe 1941-1947*, in: *Cold War International History Project*, Working Paper, February 2001, p.8.
 6. For further information on the “exodus” of the Italian community, see: R. PUPO, *Il lungo esodo. Istria: le persecuzioni, le foibe, l'esilio*, BUR, Milano, 2013³; G. SCOTTI, *Dossier foibe*, Manni, San Cesario di Lecce, 2005.
 7. For instance the massacre at Porzûs in Friuli region in February 1945 that saw communist partisans kill members of the ideologically opposing Osoppo brigades, has become part of the collective memory and was much debated due to the role of the PCI.

Germany in Yugoslavia until the end of the war.⁸ Moreover, the anti-fascist, communist Yugoslav and Italian movements in the border regions of Slovenia and Friuli had already cooperated in the summer of 1943 before the Armistice with Italy was signed.⁹

Thus, it can be asserted that the relationship between the Italian and the Yugoslav factions of the (communist) insurgent movement had already successfully matured during the height of the Second World War. Both the PCI and the KPJ's party leaderships were in close contact with Moscow on the one hand – the leader of the Italian communists, Palmiro Togliatti, remained exiled in the Soviet Union until March 1944 – and on the other hand, they also held high-ranking meetings and exchanges with each other in the months leading up to the end of the war. During that same period however, tensions arose on the question of the future border between Italy and Yugoslavia, especially concerning the cities that were predominantly inhabited by Italians, such as Trieste or Gorizia. In fact, in the autumn of 1943, a resolution emanating from the communist directorate of Yugoslavia declared the annexation of the Slovenian and Croatian littoral, Istria and the Dalmatian Islands. This announcement provoked a negative reaction by Togliatti, who reminded the factual head of the International Department of the CPSU's Central Committee, Georgi Dimitrov, in a message that these questions were only to be discussed after the fall of National Socialism and Fascism.¹⁰ In fact, Dimitrov suggested in a message addressed to the Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov in March 1944 that it was “politically wrong, considering the fight against a common enemy”, to debate the borders' question, “which should be discussed after the defeat of the enemy”.¹¹

In April 1944 the PCI and the Communist Party of Slovenia (KPS) reached an important compromise on the question of how the resistance in the Eastern border regions of Italy would be coordinated. Moreover, it was established that the lands with a compact Slovenian population would become part of Yugoslavia; the question of the territories with mixed populations was postponed until the end of the war to

8. On the involvement of Italian soldiers in the rows of Tito's partisans, see E. AGA ROSSI, M.T. GIUSTI, *Una guerra a parte, I militari italiani nei Balcani 1940-1945*, Mulino, Bologna, 2011, especially pp.171-228.

9. AUSSME [Archivio dell'Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito], H1, b. 52, Il prefetto di Udine Mosconi al Capo Gabinetto Ministero Guerra, 27.06.1943; Nuclei comunali per la lotta antiribelli, 24.07.1943.

10. E. AGA-ROSSI, V. ZASLAVSKY, *Togliatti e Stalin, Il PCI e la politica estera staliniana negli archivi di Mosca*, Mulino, Bologna, 2007², p.139; L. GIBIANSKY, *La questione di Trieste tra i comunisti Italiani e Jugoslavi*, in: E. AGA-ROSSI, G. QUAGLIARIELLO, *L'altra faccia della luna, i rapporti tra PCI, PCF e Unione Sovietica*, Mulino, Bologna, 1997, pp.173-208, here p.175; M. CLEMENTI, *L'alleato Stalin, L'ombra sovietica sull'Italia di Togliatti e De Gasperi*, RCS, Milano, 2011, p.196.

11. Dimitrov to Molotov, 17.03.1944, cited in: L. GIBIANSKY, op.cit., p.181; also, see M. CLEMENTI, op.cit., p.197.

facilitate the foremost task of fighting Fascism and National Socialism.¹² A second agreement, stipulated in mid-October 1944 between Togliatti and the Slovene leader Edvard Kardelj largely acknowledged the Yugoslav stance on the territorial question, all the while seeking a “national policy” that would satisfy the Italian population. At that moment Togliatti accepted the occupation of Trieste by Yugoslav forces to prevent the Western Allies of doing so, although this was not to be publicised, for fear of possible negative reactions among the Italian population. Thus, taking this gesture into account, Togliatti’s protest towards Dimitrov in 1943 can be understood as a reaction to possible negative effects on the communist movement in Italy, should the Yugoslav stance of annexation be widely accepted, while not denying the Yugoslav request altogether.¹³ Moreover, the Italian communist leader had to plan his steps carefully. He was not only torn between the Yugoslav cause, the adhesion of parts of the Northern Italian insurgents to Belgrade’s ambitions, the open demands of Slovenian communists for annexation (contrarily to the October agreement between Togliatti and Kardelj) and the participation of the PCI to the Italian government that did not accept to relinquish territory to its Eastern neighbour. In terms of ideology he faced the problem of serving the internationalist cause of the global communist movement led by the Soviet Union, that encouraged a national-front strategy, while Yugoslavia as an exception to this very doctrine was pursuing a clearly national(ist) agenda.¹⁴

The circumstances described so far paint a complex picture of interests that emerged during the months preceding the end of the war. The difficult relationship between Moscow, Rome and Belgrade, but also among the communist movements’ regional factions was – up to a great extent – the main focus of interaction and decision processes in the Italian-Yugoslav region. Regional (Italian and Yugoslav) factions enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy, mainly because of the war still raging. The ambiguity of the PCI’s stance can be emphasised in light of some conflicts in the final stages of the war in 1945. The Italian “Committee for National Liberation” (CLN) in Northern Italy, an all-embracing group of the whole political spectrum fighting

12. APCI [Archivio del Partito Comunista Italiano, Fondazione Gramsci], Fondo M [Mosca], Microfilm [hereafter: mf.]093, fasc.I(c), doc.22, Accordo fra PCI e PCS, 04.04.1944; L. GIBIANSKY, op.cit., pp.184 f.; P. KARLSEN, *Frontiera rossa, Il PCI, il confine orientale e il contesto internazionale 1941-1955*, LEG, Gorizia, 2010, pp.49 f. On the question of what “Slovenian” and “mixed” territories meant and the discordance within the communist movement, see N. TROHA, *Chi avrà Trieste? Sloveni e italiani tra due Stati*, IRSMLFVG, Trieste, 2009, p.20.

13. This point causes major friction in Italian historiography. While authors like Leonid Gibianskii, Elena Aga-Rossi and Victor Zaslavsky or Patrick Karlsen (see publications cited above) confirm the line of argument followed in this article, others, like Roberto Gualtieri or Marco Galeazzi rather prefer an interpretation along the lines that although many among the Italian communists favoured the annexation of Trieste to Yugoslavia, this was not the case for their leader, Togliatti. See R. GUALTIERI, *Togliatti e la politica estera italiana. Dalla Resistenza al trattato di pace 1943-1947*, Riuniti, Roma, 1995, pp.82 f.; M. GALEAZZI, *Togliatti e Tito. Tra identità nazionale e internazionalismo*, Carocci, Roma, 2005, p.59. Another interpretation is also given by considering Togliatti’s movements as preventive to “fix the limits of the occupied territories [...] thus, limiting the influence” of the Yugoslav communists in the Julian March. See P. KARLSEN, op.cit., p.66.

14. On the national-fronts and Stalin's agenda, see E. MARK, op.cit.

Fascism and National Socialism – and at times a close ally to the Yugoslav partisans – was accused by the Slovenian communists of becoming increasingly nationalist and fascist, in any case “reactionary”. The Italian communists, although part of the government, would incorporate such stances into their own arguments.

More ambiguity can be found in different declarations by the Italian communists in February 1945. In an article dated 7 February, the party organ *l'Unità* commented on the relations with Yugoslavia after a successful defeat of Fascism and National Socialism. The article explained the “concern over declarations by media from the capital, dealing with the Eastern border” that portrayed the situation “as if Italy had won the war”. The newspaper stated that all Slovenian regions had to be incorporated into the Yugoslav state, while the fate of those cities with mixed populations or Italian population majorities “that did not want to leave Italy, despite the fascist experience” would be decided upon on the grounds of mutual treaties between Italy and Yugoslavia and keeping the “Yugoslav necessities” in mind. Finally the common struggle against Fascism was emphasised. So far, this was more or less the stance that had been agreed upon between Togliatti and Kardelj in October 1944. While the communist paper explained that Italy obviously had to pay a price for its aggression, the question of the Italian cities in the border region was not explicitly mentioned. Moreover the widespread demonstrations throughout major Italian cities in the liberated South, asking for an Italian Trieste in the first months of 1945, were declared “fascist” by the communist papers, because they were “inspired” by and a “continuation” of Mussolini’s policies.¹⁵ Thus, as Patrick Karlsen affirms, “to demonstrate for an Italian Trieste was described as a *per se* nationalist gesture that was factually fascist in its intentions and outcome”.¹⁶ Yet, this picture becomes even more interesting when considering Togliatti’s plea to Dimitrov in these same days of February 1945. In his message to Moscow, Togliatti explained that the Italian public was increasingly turning to the question of Trieste that was “exploited by our enemies” to further “isolate the communist party”. While referring to the problems the Italian communists were facing due to the possible future settlement of the borders with Yugoslavia, he suggested that although “the city’s population is indeed made up of Italians for the most part [...] it would accept the status of a free city, especially if that status were proposed by our party”.¹⁷

This statement marks an important step in the Italian communist leader’s attitude. For the first time he argued along the lines of a “free city”, thus reinterpreting the outcome of the war to the disadvantage of Yugoslavia and the agreements between the PCI and the KPJ. Knowing this, he also reflected, stating that “I do not know whether Yugoslavia would accept it” and strongly urged Moscow to provide him with advice “in order to orient our future endeavours as regards this issue, which may become one of the most crucial questions of Italian politics”.¹⁸ Thus, Togliatti’s letter

15. *Per la nostra amicizia coi popoli della Jugoslavia*, in: *l'Unità*, 07.02.1945.

16. P.KARLSEN, *op.cit.*, p.80.

17. Ercoli [Togliatti] to Dimitrov (encoded), 09.02.1945, in: I. BANAC (ed.), *The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov 1933-1949*, Yale University Press, New Haven/London, 2003, p.359.

18. *Ibid.*

showed his uncertainty on what to do considering the difficult situation in Italy but it also showed that he had at least partially abandoned the path to total acceptance of Yugoslav domination in the Julian March region, be it for tactical or national reasons. Moreover, he was obviously trying to circumvent Belgrade, of whom he could be sure to expect a negative reaction to any such proposition as to not directly annex Trieste. In short, it has to be stated that Moscow did not, however, send any clear information to Togliatti, who tried to get instructions again on several occasions. Togliatti depended entirely on the Kremlin's stance towards national and international problems while presumably, Moscow was waiting for the end of the war before giving any further instructions. Under these conditions the PCI did take a step forward in its ambitions, by launching the idea of an autonomous region, encompassing wide parts of the Julian March in the periodical *Rinascita* in April 1945.¹⁹

This being the situation during the last days of the war, the Yugoslav army launched its final offensive on Trieste in late April, occupying the city on 1 May. The fact that the Italian resistance inside the city had prepared for a massive upheaval against German troops, in the case of an Allied advance towards the city, is of importance indeed. This upheaval was triggered on 30 April and the anti-fascist groups inside Trieste started to attack German garrisons. Yet, the outcome of a possible liberation from within was not something the Yugoslav partisans would accept. The central committee of the Slovenian Communist Party declared that not only German, but also "all non-German units and the administrative apparatus of Trieste" had to be considered enemies. Moreover any faction had to be hindered from "declaring itself anti-German", because all "Italian elements, could only consider capitulating" to the Yugoslav liberation army. Thus, the Yugoslav (in this case Slovenian) partisans did not accept any rule over the city if it was not directly linked to them. Moreover, since the question of the Julian March had not thoroughly been solved between the Allies either, the VIII British army reached Trieste on 2 May, occupying parts of the port and town. They also invited the Yugoslavs to leave, which was categorically declined by the partisans.²⁰ Finally on 3 May, the occupying Yugoslav forces declared the annexation of Trieste to Yugoslavia. This in turn angered Togliatti, who, sending yet another message to Moscow, declared that the whole Yugoslav procedure was highly inappropriate and further complicated the PCI's position, handing the Anglo-Americans the advantage of popularity among the Italian population.

Togliatti's intervention proves to be validating evidence that the Italian communist leader was indeed seeking a new arrangement beyond the decisions taken in October 1944. Togliatti was trying to adjust the party's position, worrying that the affiliation with the Yugoslav communists would ultimately become a liability for the PCI in national politics. In fact, he quite clearly announced his new tactic in an article in *l'Unità* on 16 May. Starting with a statement on "the newspapers in the capital",

19. *Relazione sul problema della Venezia Giulia*, in: *Rinascita*, 4(1945).

20. For a chronology of events and the British, American and Yugoslav talks about the fate of Trieste during the last stages of the war, see M. CATTARUZZA, *L'Italia e il confine orientale*, Mulino, Bologna, 2007, pp.283-286; Idem., 1945: *alle origini della questione di Trieste*, in: *Ventesimo Secolo*, April(2005), pp.97-111.

Togliatti referred to “reactionary” circles’ attacks, who accused the PCI of “renouncing” to Trieste, barely “defending Italy” and “being traitors” of the national cause. Then, the communist leader explained that “we communists affirm the Italianità of Trieste; we do not want the city’s destiny to be compromised by unilateral actions”. This statement can be interpreted as directed at the Italian conservatives and Belgrade alike. Moreover, according to Togliatti, the PCI’s vision was “national and international”; “international because it wants to eliminate the motives of contrast between the peoples [...] and construct true peace”. More importantly, after clear words of friendship towards Yugoslavia, Togliatti did however point out that “those leaders [of Yugoslavia] are wrong who seem to be mistaking all exponents of the new Italian democracy for old imperialist and fascist Italy”.²¹ Thus, Togliatti’s words marked his attempt to elaborate a strategy for the PCI that would on the one hand satisfy those (especially among the Italian communists) who saw the PCI’s attitude as overly favouring Belgrade. On the other hand, he also seems to have tried to reach out to his Yugoslav counterparts, and, to a certain extent, to reshuffle the situation created on Italy’s Eastern border.

Yet, amidst this insecure situation, where the Italian communist leader was trying to find a path that would satisfy the national and internationalist interests alike, Moscow finally answered his plea for directives at the end of May. Sure enough, it did not go the way Togliatti would have hoped for in that moment. As suggested by Dimitrov, Stalin came to the conclusion that Trieste ought to become a Yugoslav city and that the PCI should openly approve of this solution. Stalin’s argumentation that had to be used was that Trieste and its hinterland had to stay connected territorially with one another; that the port was vital to Yugoslavia and that Italy would benefit from a clean and undisputed border.²² Thus, Togliatti was put into a very delicate situation by Moscow’s answer. Openly accepting the Yugoslav plea for the annexation of Trieste would have made a catastrophic impression on the Italian public. Hence, during meetings between members of the Italian left (Pietro Nenni for the socialists, Togliatti for the communists) with the Yugoslav representative in Rome on 31 May and 1 June respectively, the Italian politicians pleaded for a solution on a bilateral Yugoslav-Italian basis, facilitated by the possible – yet finally not obtained – nomination of Nenni to the presidency of Italy. This meant that Italian communists and socialists tried to foster an agreement with the regime in Belgrade, enabling them to take credit for the solution to a strained international situation. As far as the communists were concerned, after Stalin had rejected Togliatti’s proposition for a “free city” or the internationalisation of the Julian March, direct talks with the Yugoslav communists were the last straw.

While these inter-party problems intensified in May and June 1945, the dispute between the Western Allies and Belgrade was solved after 40 days of Yugoslav occupation of all regions to the East of the Isonzo/Soča river. The United States’ and

21. P. TOGLIATTI, *I comunisti e Trieste*, in: *l’Unità*, 16.05.1945.

22. E. AGA-ROSSI, V. ZASLAVSKY, *op.cit.*, p.146; L. GIBIANSKY, *op.cit.*, p.198; also see Dimitrov’s notes on 23 and 28 May 1945, in: I. BANAC, *op.cit.*, p.371.

Britain's strong opposition, coupled with the fact that the Soviet Union did not want to risk a rupture with the West over the question of Trieste, led to the agreements of Belgrade and Duino between Yugoslavia and the Allies on 9 and 20 June 1945 respectively, effectively dividing the Italian territories of the Julian March into an Anglo-American Zone (A) including Trieste and Duino and a Yugoslav Zone (B) to its South, including Istria with the exception of Pola that remained under Western Allied administration until the signing of the Peace Treaty with Italy in February 1947.²³ This agreement also meant that the situation within the communist camp had dramatically changed. Now the Italian territory had been divided, and while Moscow was still backing the Yugoslavs, Stalin had chosen to adopt a “wait-and-see attitude” and proved that he could “go back on choices already made”.²⁴

Italian, Yugoslav or Free: the Fate of Trieste

After the Yugoslav retreat from Trieste the distribution of forces within the communist camp in the Julian March remained in limbo. Whereas the arrangements between the Allies and Yugoslavia somewhat favoured the PCI whose ambiguous position was partially alleviated – the KPJ pushed forward with its policy towards the disputed region. Some important steps were taken by Belgrade to further tighten its grip on the communist movement in the Julian March region. On behalf of the KPS, on 30 June 1945, the KPJ's central committee accepted the creation of an autonomous communist party for Trieste and the Julian March, under the authority of the central committee of the KPS.²⁵ Obviously, after the first disputes with the PCI, the leaderships in Ljubljana and Belgrade sought to resolve all problems inside the common communist camp by imposing their view and by trying to control the development of communism in the border region.

On 13 August 1945 the founding congress of the Communist Party of the Julian March (PCRГ/KPJK) was held in Trieste. The 496 delegates present elected 16 members to the Party Committee, of which 7 were Italians, 6 Slovenes and 3 Croats. The Slovene Boris Kraigher was elected secretary of the party.²⁶ The unification of

23. On this phase of the conflict between the Allies and Tito see D. DE CASTRO, *La questione di Trieste: L'azione politica e diplomatica italiana dal 1943 al 1954*, vol.I, Lint, Trieste, 1981, pp. 210-220; A.G.M. DE ROBERTIS, *Le grandi potenze e il confine giuliano 1941-1947*, Caravelle, Bari, 1983, pp.217 f; B.C. NOVAK, *Trieste 1941-1954: La lotta politica, etnica e ideologica*, Mursia, Milano, 2013; M. BUCARELLI, *La “questione jugoslava” nella politica estera dell'Italia repubblicana (1945-1991)*, Aracne, Roma, 2008, pp.17-19.

24. S. PONS, *Stalin, Togliatti, and the Origins of the Cold War in Europe*, in: *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 2(2001), pp.3-27, here p.12.

25. Sjednica Politbiroa Centralnog Komiteta Komunističke Partije Jugoslavije, 30.06.1945, in: *Izvori za Istoriju Jugoslavije. Zapisnici sa sednica Politbiroa Centralnog Komiteta KPJ (11. jun 1945–7. jul 1948)*, Arhiv Jugoslavije, Beograd, 1995, p.74.

26. AJ [Arhiv Jugoslavije], Arhiv Centralnog Komiteta Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije [hereafter: ACKSKJ], IX-18/II-1, Komunistička Partija Julijske Krajine.

all communist forces also reflected the retreat of the PCI from the region, as the Yugoslav communists took over the organisation, while the PCI's stance would leave it with the difficult task of rhetorically defending Trieste's "Italianità", all the while collaborating with the Yugoslavs.²⁷ Yet in the fall of 1945 some sections of the PCI in Istria refused to join the new party which they considered "nationalist", causing their forced dissolution.²⁸

The stance taken by a part of the Italian communists in the Julian March definitely displayed validity. The PCRG/KPJK became an instrument of Yugoslav (Slovenian) irredentism. It openly supported the annexation of Trieste by Yugoslavia, doing so against the common agreement that this question would not be raised, awaiting the outcome of the peace conference instead. In a resolution from 24 September 1945, the PCRG/KPJK decided to ask the population of Trieste to openly adhere to the annexation of the city by Yugoslavia. The PCI leadership sent a letter to the comrades of the PCRG/KPJK on 30 September, asking them to recede from their position and to "await the decisions of the conference in London". Moreover Rome declared that if the PCRG/KPJK was to publish its resolution, the PCI would reserve itself the right to openly disapprove of this. Finally, on 7 October the party in Trieste openly adhered to the principle that Trieste should become part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The argumentation of this decision revolved around "ideological and practical" issues, such as the "Marxist-Leninist" development in Yugoslavia; the "prospective of the revolution in Europe and the world" by strengthening the areas "where revolutionary forces" had won the upper hand; the economic connection between Trieste and its Slovenian hinterland; the weakening of the "imperialistic" American and British influence and finally, the "solution to the problems of the [working] masses" of the region.²⁹

Following these events, member of the PCI leadership Luigi Longo, described the party's reaction to the developments in the Julian March region in an article in *l'Unità*: on the one hand Longo attacked the Italian "reaction" that had used inflammatory "anti-Slavonic" words and had thus "forced" the communists in Trieste to ask for a Yugoslav annexation. On the other hand, the article also disapproved of the line followed in Trieste, because the workers of the city "also had to think of all Italian workers" and not just of themselves.³⁰

Taking into account the broader picture drawn by the events of late summer and fall 1945, it can be asserted that the Yugoslav communists had taken steps to enforce their (national) vision of the future settlement of disputes in Trieste and the Julian March. The PCI, on the contrary, was rather arguing along internationalist and "class"

27. Togliatti especially favoured the retreat from the Zone B, knowing that this part of the region would most probably become a part of Yugoslavia. See P. KARLSEN op.cit., pp.96 f.

28. APCI, Fondo M, mf. 094, fasc.III/g/doc.22, Verbale dell'incontro di Pratolongo con Bussano e Mastromarino di Capodistria, 21.11.1945.

29. APCI, Fondo M, mf. 095, fasc.r/doc.9, Direzione del PCI alla direzione del PCRG, 30.09.1945; Direzione del PCI to direzione del PCRG: Appunti per una discussione sul problema di Trieste, 10.01.1946.

30. L. LONGO, *Per una miglior difesa dell'italianità di Trieste*, in: *l'Unità*, 30.10.1945.

lines. This all makes sense when considering that the Yugoslav organisations could count on the backing of a government in Belgrade that was pursuing its national interests with the support of Moscow.³¹ The Italian communists were still in a fragile position whereby they had to back Yugoslav claims, according to the leading figure of Moscow but also had to work in a democratic, parliamentary system, where an overtly internationalist course could mean the loss of large portions of potential voters. Thus, as depicted in Longo's article, the optimum choice – defending Trieste's "Italianità", while simultaneously backing Yugoslavia – was an attempt to satisfy the whole of the currents inside Italy as well as within the international communist movement too.

In continuation of its attempts to reach a useful agreement with its Yugoslav comrades, the PCI continued to seek dialogue with its counterparts in the Julian March and Belgrade throughout 1945 and the beginning of 1946.³² Meanwhile the Yugoslav propaganda accused Togliatti of working for the "Italian reaction" and thus publicised the discordance within the communist movement.³³ As the question of an "internationalisation" of Trieste became more relevant in international meetings, the PCRG/KPJK suggested that the communist forces: refuse an internationalisation; recognise that the inclusion of the Julian March into Yugoslavia was the only acceptable solution for the Slavonic majority of the population; neither accept the current situation nor the Anglo-American intervention, and reach an agreement along the lines discussed above between the PCI, the KPJ and the PCRG/KPJK; until the implementa-

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31. In fact, the representatives from the Julian March complained at Politburo meetings in Belgrade about the behaviour exhibited by the Italian communists and their stance on the "free city". See AJ, CKSKJ, IX-13/10, Kidrič to Kardelj; Izvori za Istoriju, 115 f.
 32. In direct talks with the Yugoslav representative to Rome, Josip Smolaka, in November 1945, Togliatti and Smolaka agreed on the "free city" as suggested by Belgrade, under Yugoslav administration, with a customs union with Yugoslavia, while the solution would be bilateral. This was a wider concession to Yugoslavia, compared to the solution suggested by PCI representatives in Moscow in May, cited above. See AJ, ACKSKJ, IX-48/I-13, Smolaka to Tito, 12.11.1945.
 33. The accusations were formulated by Yugoslav propagandist Stefan Mitrović in the party organ *Borba*. The Italian communists reacted by explaining that Mitrović's article showed that the KPJ did not understand the situation in Italy, which led to difficulties in cooperation between the Italian and Yugoslav communists (see AJ, ACKSKJ, IX-48/I-17). Later the same article appeared in the French party organ *Cahiers du Communisme*, which led to a much cited and debated letter from Togliatti to the PCF's leader Maurice Thorez, in which Togliatti defended the PCI and attacked Mitrović. In this letter, some historians saw a clear statement of Togliatti's defence of an Italian Trieste (e.g. Clementi, Galeazzi and Gualtieri). Rather, the letter should be interpreted in the light of Togliatti's defence of "Italianità" altogether, and also the frustration caused by the multiple breaches of accords by the communist leaders in Trieste (see APCI, Fondo M, mf. 267, Togliatti to Maurice [Thorez], 21.4.1946). Yet, Tito was firmly campaigning for annexation, without concern for the problems faced by the comrades in Rome. He stated on 2 February: "[For the question of the Julian March] not only ethnic, economic and strategic points of view should be taken into account, which would speak in Yugoslavia's favour, but also the correctness towards our country. [...] [Italy] was the aggressor and at war against the United Nations. [...] We have the support of the local population [...] it is in the interest of the future peace [...] and Yugoslavia has suffered tremendous losses [for which it shall be compensated]". See *Borba*, 02.02.1946 and J. TITO, *Govori i članci*, vol.2, 8-VIII-1945-31-XII-1946, Naprijed, Zagreb, 1959, pp.168 f.

tion of such an agreement, the PCRG/KPJK would dwell on the position of annexation of Trieste and the Julian March to Yugoslavia. The trade unions were all to be organised under one common umbrella organisation and not inside Italian unions.³⁴ Thus, the communists in the Julian March were pushing for a clear pro-Yugoslav stance once again, while at the same time criticising the disputes created between the Italian and Julian party.

The PCI responded with a counter proposition. First, the Italian communists explained that the meetings between the two parties had revealed a deep discord on the question of Trieste. Second, the PCI would not “renounce the Italianità of Trieste” and raise the question of Trieste’s state affiliation, as this would cause major problems inside Italy and would be exploited by “reactionary forces”. Moreover the PCI supported the self-determination of all peoples and the “Italian national unity” was seen as a duty of “all democratic forces”. Taking these assertions into account, the PCI proposed a catalogue of measures: the unity of the Italian and Slavonic communists in the PCRG/KPJK should be granted; to achieve the latter, the PCRG/KPJK should refrain from disseminating Yugoslav annexation propaganda; the programme of the Julian party should instead propagate the achievements of Trieste’s population and fight “Italian chauvinism”; the Italian and Slavonic communists in the region should adhere – no matter what the solution to the question of Trieste – to the fight for self-government of the town, letting the people of Trieste decide their fate themselves; the PCRG/KPJK should secure an adequate representation of the two nationalities and shall be organically linked to the PCI, the KPS and the KPJ, to prevent divergence within the party.³⁵

Obviously, the PCI was on the one hand trying to impose the acceptance of the “free city” theory, calling it “self-government”. Moreover, by demanding closer ties to the Italian and the Yugoslav parties, the PCI would ensure that Ljubljana and Belgrade loosen their grip on the Julian March’ organisation. Boris Kraigher, secretary of the PCRG/KPJK, formulated his answer to the Italian plea quite clearly: the party would not officially take any stance on the future of Trieste. The members of the party would only talk about territorial questions through non-party institutions and societies. Moreover, Kraigher declared that

“it is not the duty of a party member to declare his position on the [territorial question]. It is [however] the duty of those who do not embrace the Yugoslav solution, not to declare themselves favourable to any other position”.

34. The internationalisation had already been examined by the Allies in 1945 following the partition of the Julian March between the Western Allies and Yugoslavia. In 1946, it became more and more obvious that this solution would become the one favoured at the peace conference with Italy. See R.H. RAINERO, G. MANZARI (eds), *L'Italia del dopoguerra: Il trattato di pace con l'Italia*, Stabilimento grafico militare, Gaeta, 1998; APCI, Fondo M, mf. 095, fasc.r/doc.10, Documento proposta dai delegati del PCRG, 17.01.1946.

35. APCI, Fondo M, mf. 095, fasc.r/doc.11, Posizione della segreteria del PCI sui rapporti col PCRG, 26.01.1946, also: AJ, ACKSKJ, IX-48/I-15.

The fact that the party was rather leaning to Belgrade than to Rome was explained by the revolution that had taken place in Yugoslavia and by the fact that the Italian communists were incorporated into a “bourgeois parliamentary system”.³⁶ Thus, it was obvious that the two parties would not easily come to an agreement. Moreover, Tito clearly supported the representatives of the PCRG/KPJK in their meetings with the Politburo in Belgrade. Additionally he refrained from giving in to Italian demands no matter how difficult the situation for the PCI. Again, this dispute demonstrated that the logic behind the two factions’ struggle was completely opposite. Kraigher was indeed quite right when he referred to the incorporation of the PCI into the “bourgeois” system and that this made the difference. Yugoslavia’s supporters were backing national ideas and expansionist aspirations for the regime in Belgrade, while – for lack of an alternative – the PCI argued along internationalist lines, since it had no direct power in the contested territory and thus had to search for a compromise. The situation within the party would in fact not change very much in the months to come. Only in December was it attempted to find common ground between the PCI and the PCRG/KPJK.³⁷

Meanwhile, Tito and Kardelj complained to the Soviet ambassador to Yugoslavia, Anatolij Lavrent’ev, in mid-April 1946 about the PCI and its policy regarding the question of Trieste. The PCI was accused of taking almost the same stance as the other Italian parties and the Italian communists were also denounced as being “social-democrats” in their attitude. Here, the Soviet documents show that Moscow was not satisfied with the Yugoslav policy, since Belgrade had publicised the discord within the communist movement in January and the Kremlin did understand that the PCI could not adhere to the Yugoslav cause without losing face in front of the Italian public. Togliatti, who was holding on to the “free city” proposition for Trieste, asked for a compromise when meeting the Soviet ambassador to Italy, Mikhail Kostylev, in May 1946. The PCI leader argued along the lines of a common Italian-Yugoslav agreement, as he had done several times before, and asked the Soviets – also on the eve of the next round of peace talks in Paris in June – to support his proposition. Kostylev responded negatively, concluding that leaving Trieste out of Yugoslavia was akin to “separating the head from the body”.³⁸ Furthermore, just days after this exchange between Togliatti and Kostylev, a Yugoslav delegation headed by Tito visited Moscow. Stalin asked if in the case of the creation of a “free territory” – according to the Yugoslav stance on a special status within Yugoslavia – this would have to include the surroundings of Trieste. Tito answered that the suburbs were

36. APCI, Fondo M, mf. 095, fasc.r/doc.12, Boris Kraigher to segreteria del PCI, 06.02.1946.

37. The attacks on all who did not adhere to the Yugoslav annexation continued until December, when at last Luigi Longo was sent to Trieste to find an agreement with the PCRG/KPJK that included the necessity for a common policy and the inclusion of PCI members into communist organisations of the region, see a.o. APCI, Fondo M, mf. 271, Verbali Segreteria 1944-1948, pp.21 and 24; Situazione politica a Trieste e Udine, Allegato 2, Situazione a Trieste, 26.07.1946; APCI, Fondo M, mf. 096, fasc.t/doc.8, Riassunto di Pratomlongo su una riunione con Babic e Jaksetic, 19.08.1946; Situazione a Trieste, 02.12.1945. On Longo’s visit, see also the Yugoslav documentation in: AJ, ACKSKJ, IX-48/I-33.

38. E. AGA-ROSSI, V. ZASLAVSKY, op.cit., p.149.

Slovene and that thus, only the city could be granted special status, although he still argued for a complete inclusion of the area into Yugoslavia. Stalin did however notice that the Western Allies did not want to hand over Trieste. Moreover, the Yugoslav proposition foresaw a loss of territorial integrity between Italy and Trieste, a stance only abandoned in 1954.³⁹

In the aftermath the Italian and Yugoslav communists tried to generate a favourable approach in Moscow before the next peace talks in June 1946. Evidently, the key in reaching those goals that the parties had set out for themselves was the leader of the communist world, Stalin. His position on the question of Trieste had up to that point in time been pro-Yugoslav. Yet, Stalin had already informed Tito in May that the Western Allies were not giving in on Trieste.⁴⁰ This was identical to Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov's experience in Paris in June. His interlocutions with the Western Allies proved difficult on the question of Trieste and he was not able to enforce the Soviet line. Thus, on 23 June Stalin telegraphed to Paris that

“we must not derail the [...] conference of ministers because of the issue of Trieste [...] If there is an agreement on other issues, including the one on Bulgaria, then you should introduce the Memel version.⁴¹ If the Memel regime is not acceptable, then we could propose a modus vivendi analogous to Togliatti's proposal, i.e. internationalization of the port of Trieste and a condominium of Yugoslavia and Italy regarding the city of Trieste [...] Under any conditions the border between Yugoslavia and Italy must go to the west of the French line or at least according to the French line”.⁴²

A compromise was reached on 3 July 1946, with the creation of a free territory that basically sanctioned the events of May and June 1945. Finally, the partition was formalised with the signing of the Peace Treaty with Italy on 10 February 1947, when most of the Eastern Adriatic territories were annexed to Yugoslavia, while a small strip of land, including Trieste, Capodistria/Koper and Cittanova/Novigrad formed the so-called Free Territory of Trieste (FTT), placed under the jurisdiction of the United Nations after the installation of a governor appointed by the international

39. Soviet and Yugoslav Records of the Tito-Stalin Conversation of 27-28 May 1946, in: *Cold War International History Project*, March 1998, p.119; P.E. TAVIANI, *I giorni di Trieste: Diario 1953-1954*, Mulino, Bologna, 1998, pp.126-128.

40. In May the members of the Allied Commission for the study of the frontier between Italy and Yugoslavia had made propositions on this matter. The Soviet line granted full control of all the Julian March to Yugoslavia; the American line gave Trieste, Gorizia and large strips of Istria to Italy; the British proposal foresaw similar borders as the American with minor advantages for Yugoslavia; finally, the French proposal gave Trieste and Gorizia to Italy, but most of Istria, with the exception of the North-Western tip would become Yugoslav. See G. VALDEVIT, *Il dilemma Trieste, Guerra e dopoguerra in uno scenario europeo*, LEG, Gorizia, 1999, pp.86 f.

41. The “Memel version” foresaw Yugoslav administration of the city under control of the Allies, similarly to the Memel regime after the First World War.

42. V.O. PECHATNOV, *The Allies are Pressing on you to Break your Will.... Foreign Policy Correspondence Between Stalin and Molotov And Other Politburo Members, September 1945-December 1946*, in: *Cold War International History Project*, September 1999, pp.17 f.

body.⁴³ Since the governor would never be appointed to the FTT, the situation remained a *de facto* partition of the territory in an Anglo-American “Zone A”, consisting of Trieste and the coastal strip leading North to Duino, and a Yugoslav “Zone B” including the North-Western part of Istria and the cities of Capodistria/Koper, Buie/Buje, Umago/Umag and Cittanova/Novigrad.

Yet, before the conclusion of the peace talks with Italy and the signing of the peace treaty, the communist world experienced some movement on the Adriatic in late 1946. The division of the Eastern part of Italy resulted in the affirmation of Anglo-American administration in Trieste. This in turn was a solution that neither the PCI nor the KPJ found appropriate. The Italian communists were fighting for an “independent” Italy ever since the time of the war, and did not tolerate its inclination towards the West. Moreover, direct military rule by the Western Powers over Trieste was an utter debacle for the international communist movement. Thus, after the solution of 3 July, a phase of “maximum convergence of the different components of the international communist movement” concerned by the fate of Trieste was launched. This phase culminated in Togliatti's visit to Belgrade in November 1946, the goal being to find a compromise with Tito that would undermine the politics of the christian-democrat Prime Minister, Alcide De Gasperi, and boost the PCI's reputation in the eyes of the Italian public, as well as find a solution that would force the Western Allies to retreat from Trieste altogether.⁴⁴

At first, the two leaders exchanged their points of view through Soviet ambassador Lavrent'ev in October. Togliatti suggested incorporating Trieste into the Italian state, while the rest of the Julian March including Gorizia – a city that according to the conclusions of the peace conference was in any case going to be Italian – would be transferred to Yugoslavia. Tito's counter proposition foresaw autonomy for Trieste under an Italian-Yugoslav condominium, while Italy would be granted a predominant role.⁴⁵ During the actual meeting between 2 and 6 November, the two communist leaders agreed on a line that foresaw autonomy for Trieste under Italian guidance along with the shift of Gorizia to Yugoslavia. After this agreement Togliatti made sure his apparent success was duly publicised. On 7 November *l'Unità* explained in its editorial how Tito was ready to accept Italian sovereignty over Trieste, thanks to Togliatti's intervention.⁴⁶ In a letter to Molotov the same day, ambassador Kostylev announced the “hard blow” to the Italian political right and the “rehabilitation of the PCI”.⁴⁷ Thus, it is possible to witness how the communist parties concerned by the

43. On the clauses of the Italian Peace Treaty: B. CIALDEA, M. VISMARA (eds), *Documenti della pace italiana: Trattato di pace con l'Italia*, Ed. Politica Estera, Roma, 1947; A. VARSORI, *Il trattato di pace italiano. Le iniziative politiche e diplomatiche dell'Italia*, in: A. VARSORI (ed.), *La politica estera italiana nel secondo dopoguerra (1943-1957)*, LED, Milano, 2006, pp.156-163.

44. After all, the communists had suffered a delicate defeat in the first post-war national elections of June 1946, obtaining just over half the votes of the christian-democrats and staying behind their allies, the socialists.

45. L. GIBIANSKIJ, *Mosca, il Pci e la questione di Trieste (1943-1948)*, in: F. GORI, S. PONS (eds), *Dagli archivi di Mosca. L'Urss, il Cominform e il Pci (1943-1951)*, Carocci, Roma, 1998, pp.122 f.

46. *Il Maresciallo Tito è disposto a lasciare Trieste all'Italia*, in: *l'Unità*, 07.11.1946.

47. Quoted by E. AGA-ROSSI, V. ZASLAVSKY, op.cit., p.153.

question of Trieste had in fact orchestrated an attack on the conservative parties in Italy. In doing so, they seemingly achieved an important goal by showing how co-operation between Italy and Yugoslavia was indeed possible under communist guidance and that the Anglo-Americans ought to leave Trieste.

Although the international communist movement was cheering and from inside the “Marxist-Leninist” world, everything seemed to be working out quite suitably, the reaction to Togliatti, Tito and Stalin’s diplomatic move would prove them wrong. First, the PCI’s ally, the Socialist Party – in charge of the Foreign Ministry since October – disapproved the deal and did not want to give up Gorizia. Foreign minister Nenni would recount in his diary:

“[It was] an agitated day. It is Togliatti’s fault. After returning from Belgrade last night, he rushed to *l’Unità* to give an interview, announcing that Tito would renounce Trieste while asking for Gorizia. To be true, Tito is giving up on something he does not have and is asking for something that is already ours”.⁴⁸

The national newspapers’ reactions were quite similar and demonstrated that Togliatti had completely miscalculated his moves and further discredited the communist party in the Italian public opinion.⁴⁹ Finally, while his party was still part of the Italian government, Togliatti had taken diplomatic action without the government’s consent and without even informing it prior to the publication of its outcome, shedding dubious light on his behaviour. In fact, the Italian Council of Ministers decided that there could be no further deliberation on the grounds of a cession of Gorizia. At least on the internal communist front, Belgrade acclaimed the success of the PCI and rebuffed the Italian government’s stance as unmasking the “fascist” ideology inherent to it. At the same time, the accord between Rome and Belgrade was a hard blow for the PCRG/KPJK that was still fighting for the inclusion of the Julian March into Yugoslavia as “7th Federative Republic”, leading – according to the observer of the PCI, Giordano Pratolongo – to a feeling of powerlessness, disorientation and even of treachery by Belgrade.⁵⁰ All in all the idea of the “free city” without Western control resulted in clamorous failure. Moreover, after years of support for the cause of a Yugoslav Trieste, Soviet diplomacy had given in to the possibility of creating a free territory. This in turn was a simplification of the situation for Togliatti, who was bound to the commitment within the communist movement, while he defended the ambiguous “Italianità” of Trieste and had sensed the possibility of a “free city” for quite some time. Nevertheless, the Italian communist leader was always adherent to a principle commitment to the decisions emanating from the Kremlin, while he did have some peculiar ideas on solving the problems with Italy’s Eastern neighbour. Hence, the PCI’s policies during this period had their specific nuances, far from being

48. P. NENNI, *Tempo di Guerra Fredda. Diari 1943-1956*, SugarCo, Milano, 1981, pp.295 f.

49. For the attacks and responses in the newspapers, see different articles in *l’Unità*, 08.11.1946-17.11.1946.

50. AJ, CKSKJ, IX-18/I-30, KPI i politička situacija u Italiji, [late November 1946];APCI, Fondo M, mf. 096, Appunti di Pratolongo sulla situazione di Trieste, 21.11.1946.

but a mere product of Moscow's dictate.⁵¹ The events and discussions described so far do show that even with restricted room for manoeuvre, a possibility to at least try and enforce a distinct policy on such a question as the territorial dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia, still existed nevertheless.

Trieste, the Cominform and the Split

After this phase of transnational and international negotiations, the Peace Treaty with Italy was signed on 10 February 1947. This also led to a reorganisation and a reshuffling of the situation in the FTT. A new party was to be formed for the region, under the auspices of better cooperation between the Italian and Yugoslav communists. As previously stated above, at the end of the year 1946, representatives of the PCI had met with their Slovenian comrades to resolve the problems within the party of the Julian March and had agreed on an enhancement of the PCI's position. Yet, as early as January 1947, there was again "contrast with the comrades on several issues".⁵² Thus a solution was sought out involving Belgrade, whose positioning on the matter had shifted towards a more pragmatic stance in the meantime also factoring in Tito's acceptance of Italian control over Trieste as a viable option before the signing of the Peace Treaty with Italy.

Once again Luigi Longo was to lead the discussions with the Eastern comrades. In early April 1947 he visited Belgrade to discuss the future order of the FTT. Longo and Milovan Djilas signed an agreement expressing the will to convene for a congress of the PCRG/KPJK as soon as possible; to rename the party and to form a programme in accordance with "the actual questions".⁵³ The information office opened by the PCI a year earlier, headed by Pratolongo, would be dissolved and incorporated into the new party while the organisations inside the territories belonging to Italy according to the peace treaty would be absorbed by the PCI.⁵⁴ Finally, the PCI was to campaign for an autonomous status for the Friuli region.

The man who was assigned to the task of enforcing the decisions taken in Belgrade in April was Vittorio Vidali, an Italian communist who had fought for the communist

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51. Here the author refers to Silvio Pons' argument, stating that seeing the Soviet-PCI relations as a "one-way command structure, in which the Soviet Union made all the decisions and the PCI implemented them", misses out on the "complexity of Soviet strategy" toward Europe. See S. PONS, *L'impossibile egemonia. L'Urss, il Pci e le origini della Guerra fredda (1943-1948)*, Carocci, Roma, 1999.
52. APCI, Fondo M, mf. 271, p.24, Situazione di Trieste, 23.01.1947.
53. On this meeting see AJ, ACKSKJ, IX-46/1-56; The corresponding Italian documentation is in APCI, Fondo M, Verbali Segreteria, mf. 268.
54. This in turn had already been discussed in a meeting of Slovenian representatives of the PCRG/KPJK and Italian communists in Gorizia in February and decided upon in March. See APCI, Fondo M, mf. 247/248, Costituzione Comitato nuovo Circondario Gorizia-Monfalcone, 16.02.1947; Promemoria su Gorizia, 04.03.1947; Direzione PCI al comitato circondariale del PCRG di Gorizia, Monfalcone e Gradisca, Risoluzione, 28.03.1947.

cause in South America during the fascist period and who was “coming back to his native town” after 24 years, to take part in the party's transformation in the Julian March.⁵⁵ After years of problems in Trieste and especially with the pro-Yugoslav leadership of the PCRG/KPJK, the PCI was sending a strongman to the town, whose credentials for the international communist movement were impeccable. It soon became apparent from inside the PCI that Vidali and the PCRG's old leaders would not easily get along. Indeed, the comrades of the PCRG/KPJK were trying to stall and not carry out the congress, waiting instead for the nomination of a governor to the FTT. Furthermore, the Yugoslav communists were trying everything in their power not to go ahead with the execution of the other points in the agreement. Yet the PCI strongly opposed this tactic and went ahead with planning a congress for July 1947. Vidali's point of view on what had to be done in the FTT becomes absolutely clear when analysing a letter sent to the PCI's leadership after the meeting in Belgrade. In his opinion, it was time to “leave aside the insecurities and implement the recent resolution”; to understand “that Italy is not the main enemy” and “bring to an end the lack of respect for promises and pacts”, while the “hostility towards the PCI” had “to end once and for all”.⁵⁶ Moreover his words marked the wish for a new beginning, and he was undeniably arguing for the party's complete reform. No wonder that relief was felt among Slovenian representatives, when Vidali's future in Trieste seemed unclear following the Belgrade meeting. Among the “old guard” of the PCRG/KPJK, a loss of power and control could be assumed once the man from Trieste put his plans into action.

While the Italian movement to reform the PCRG/KPJK was trying to gain momentum, the position of the PCI in Italy changed dramatically. After a governmental crisis in May, the left (communists and socialists led by Nenni) was excluded from government.⁵⁷ The international situation also changed considerably with the launch of the “Marshall Plan” in June and the escalation of the East-West conflict during that same period, which would lead to Moscow having a tighter grip on the communist parties in Western Europe in the medium term. The new situation would also be reflected in Togliatti's fierce speeches in front of the PCI's central committee in July.

Finally, at the end of August 1947, the inaugural congress of the new communist party of the Free Territory of Trieste (PCTLT/KPTO/KPSTT) was held under the auspices of a re-launch for the regional movement by the Italian communists.⁵⁸ The party leadership remained deeply fractioned after the congress however, as the Yugoslav wing continued to argue that it did not want to take orders from Rome, that it was still faithful to Belgrade, while at the same time mocking the Italians who had been “kicked out of government”.⁵⁹

55. *Il Lavoratore*, 19.06.1947.

56. APCI, Fondo M, mf. 096, fasc.t/doc.20, Relazione di Pratolongo sul rientro a Trieste di Vidali, 29.05.1947; Lettera di Vidali.

57. P. CRAVERI, *De Gasperi*, Mulino, Bologna, 2006, pp.267-302.

58. APCI, Fondo M, mf. 098, fasc.56/1, Congresso costitutivo del PCTLT, 31.08-02.09.1947.

59. P. KARLSEN, op.cit., p.193.

Indeed, the repercussions of the new political situation were felt by the PCI in connection with the creation of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) and its founding conference in Szklarska Poreba, Poland, in September 1947. The PCI (along with the French communists) took a severe beating by the Soviets and suffered an even worse defeat by the Yugoslavs, who profoundly criticised the Italian communists' approach towards internal and international matters and even the entire war period. Criticism by the Soviet Union led the PCI to engage in yet harsher words against the Marshall Plan, "American imperialism", to strongly adhere to "peace campaigns" and to demonstrate its ability to mobilise the masses by initiating strikes throughout the whole country.⁶⁰

Meanwhile the situation of a fractioned party leadership in Trieste was not overcome. The Belgrade agreements had created a situation in which the Italian wing of the party had become far stronger than before and the Yugoslav wing had to accept the implementation of the Italian Peace Treaty, which made it far more difficult to openly adhere to a "Yugoslav" solution in territorial issues. Indeed, the answer to this situation was granted by the next conference held by the Cominform in June 1948 and the decision to condemn Yugoslav behaviour and its overly independent approach to the questions of a Balkan Federation, the intervention in Albania and the support of the communist movement in Greece.⁶¹ This time around, it was Togliatti who could triumph over the "failures" of Yugoslav communism and, moreover, get revenge on the comrades who had so fiercely attacked the Italian communists just a few months earlier.

Conclusion: The New Communist Order in the FTT

The repercussions of the split between Tito and Stalin were also deeply felt on the Adriatic. The new situation led to a much desired settlement of scores in the FTT. The PCI, faithful to the line of Moscow, attacked Tito's "adventurism" in foreign policy and naturally declined the invitation to the KPJ's fifth congress to be held in July 1948.⁶² In Trieste and the Julian March region, the clashes between Comin-

60. On Szklarska Poreba: G. PROCACCI (ed.), *The Cominform. Minutes of the Three Conferences 1947/1948/1949*, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1994. For analyses on the attacks on the PCI and their effects: S. PONS, *A Challenge Let Drop: Soviet Foreign Policy, the Cominform and the Italian Communist Party, 1947-8*, in: F. GORI, S. PONS (eds), *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943-1953*, Macmillan, London, 1996, pp.247-263.

61. Also in this case, literature and interpretations available are immense. For further information see the volumes cited above and I. BANAC, *With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1988; P.J. MARKOVIĆ, *Beograd između istoka i zapada 1948-1965*, NIU, Beograd, 1996; M. ZUCCARI, *Il ditto sulla piaga. Togliatti e il Pci nella rottura fra Stalin e Tito 1944-1957*, Mursia, Milano, 2008.

62. APCI, Fondo M, mf. 199, p.12-II, Verbali Direzione, 08.-09.07.1948. See also the articles published in the party organ in the days after the rift, confirming the alignment to Moscow's stance in *l'Unità*, 29.06.1948-02.07.1948.

formist and anti-Cominformist forces were fierce. In Trieste the PCTLT organised a special congress, in which the Cominformist wing prevailed, prompting the party leader, Vidali, to a purge within the ranks of the party and to the “re-education” of its members.⁶³ Meanwhile, in the Zone B of the FTT, the Yugoslav view prevailed. While Vidali was securing the party's support in Trieste and tightening his grip on the comrades in the city, the pro-Cominformist forces on the other side of the Zone border faced denunciation and persecution by anti-Cominformists. Finally, by the end of July, many communist leaders of the Zone B were expelled to Italy.⁶⁴

Thus, the resolution of the Cominform led to a clear divide of the communist inclinations throughout the FTT. While the years after the end of the Second World War had been characterised by the attempt of both the Italian and the Yugoslav leaderships to enforce their point of view in the contested region – albeit under completely different circumstances –, the rift within the communist world led to the clarification of positions. For the Italian communists on the one hand, this was certainly a relief, after years of having to cope with national requirements and internationalist ideals. For the Yugoslav communists, on the other hand, the loss of support from Moscow implied that the strong and unequivocal official inclination of the FTT's communists towards Yugoslavia would end and be split between the Zones A and B of the Free Territory.

What was brought to light in this article is that the difference in the internal positions of the PCI and KPJ played a decisive role in how they were able to manage the issue of territorial disputes between Italy and Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs, initially supported by Moscow and relying on a regime that controlled a country victorious during the war, could easily make demands of a purely national nature, without considering the difficulties of their brother party in Rome. While the historiography has been inclined to see Togliatti as either completely following the line of Moscow, or being an independent actor in the question of Trieste, the truth is more nuanced. The fact that, for the longest time, the communist leader was manoeuvring between Italian nationalism and irredentism and the line set out by Moscow, is proof of his difficult position that was articulated through the vague term of “Italianità” of Trieste. Yet, his tactic that evolved throughout the year 1945, and was apparent in the “free city” proposition, shows that he was not but a mere puppet with Moscow pulling the strings, although his room for manoeuvre was quite limited. This is also demonstrated through the tactic of trying to persuade Moscow of a certain idea first, before in turn trying to implement it in his policies. It can moreover be asserted that the conflict between Italian and Yugoslav communists in the first post-war years was an offspring of the beginning Cold War. Since the Allies could not resolve the question of Trieste and the free territory, national ambitions inside the communist camp surfaced and led to a clash on the question of the Adriatic city. This clash proves that Moscow was not the almighty ruler of the communist world, allowing some prospect of tactical ma-

63. APCI, Fondo M, mf. 098, fasc.II/B, Bozza Relazione Vidali sulla situazione politica ed organizzativa del PCTLT alla luce della Risoluzione dell'UI.

64. A chronology of the events can be found in: APCI, Fondo M, mf. 099, fasc.VI.

noeuving for other communist parties. Yet, the possibility of Moscow enforcing a final “diktat” whenever it felt this was necessary must also be considered as a fact.

Finally, when considering breaches, rifts and different currents within the communist camp during the Cold War period, it has to be kept in mind that only a fraction of these manifestations of discord – such as the “Hungarian Revolution” in 1956 or the “Prague Spring” in 1968 – surfaced in a dramatic way. Rather, as the example of Trieste has shown, a thorough analysis of interparty relations is needed to portray also those occurrences that shaped the communist world without being at the centre of attention.

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The Rise and Fall of “Austro-Eurocommunism”. On the “Crisis” within the KPÖ and the Significance of East German Influence in the 1960s

Maximilian GRAF

Usually, the dramatic events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia are regarded as the starting point for what became known as “Eurocommunism” in the mid-1970s. However, many of the ideas of reform communism had been developing at least since 1956 and had already become part of the official policy of Western European Communist parties throughout the 1960s. This happened long before Warsaw Pact tanks crushed the “Prague Spring” thereby creating a further challenge to Western communists’ solidarity with Moscow. Surprisingly enough, the parties that opted for reform included not only the usually suspect Italian communists but also their Austrian “comrades” who had been one of the most consistently Sovietized parties in Western Europe. How was such a development possible and what were the reactions towards it?

This paper deals with the short period of reform communism in the Austrian Communist Party (KPÖ, *Kommunistische Partei Österreichs*) in the 1960s, a period that has been labelled respectively “Austro-Eurocommunism” by reformist protagonists and the “crisis of the KPÖ” by more orthodox members of the party. Unsurprisingly, the communist parties of the Socialist Bloc took a negative attitude towards Western attempts at reforming communism, even at the national level. In this case, the East German communists took the lead in fighting the reformist forces within the KPÖ. Therefore, the position and actions of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED, *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands*) will be examined in detail. Hence, even though this paper is based on intense multi-archival research in Austria, Germany and Italy, most of the sources cited originate from the SED. Before going into detail, however, some preliminary comparative remarks on post-war developments in Austria and Germany are necessary.

Postwar Context

After World War II, Austria and Germany came under quadripartite Allied control and occupation. In the occupation period from 1945 to 1955, the KPÖ was subservient to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Soviet Occupation Forces in Austria. Still, contrary to Eastern European countries exclusively occupied by the Soviet Union and the Soviet-occupied Eastern part of Germany, Austria was not Sovietised. Moreover, contrary to what occurred in the Soviet Zone of Occupation in Germany in 1946, where the SED was established, no forced merger of the Austrian

Communists and Socialists took place.¹ Compared to their East German counterparts, the Austrian communists had less support from the Soviets. This unsatisfying fact was recognized by the Austrians via their contacts with East German “comrades”.² Whereas the Soviets permitted and fostered the division of Germany and the foundation of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), plans by the Austrian communists aimed at a division of Austria were rejected by the CPSU in February 1948.³

Publicly the KPÖ had welcomed the foundation of the GDR in October 1949 and praised its existence in party media.⁴ Nonetheless, already after the Soviet crackdown on the East German uprising in June 1953 internal criticism about the “white-washing” of all developments in East Germany arose. The KPÖ leadership, despite its recognition that such events further harmed the image of the KPÖ, defied public opinion and reported positively on East Germany. Hence, it felt that it was not allowed to report in a more negative way than the media of the socialist countries.⁵ The postiveness of the communist media coverage on the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence did everything other than contribute to the party’s standing in domestic politics. Lacking the tradition of a workers’ party and burdened by its close relationship to the Soviet occupation power, detested by a vast majority of Austrians, the KPÖ never managed to gain a significant voter base.⁶ After the signing of the Austrian State treaty in 1955, through which Austria regained full sovereignty as well as the

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1. W. MUELLER, *Sowjetische Deutschland- und Österreichpolitik 1941 bis 1955 im Vergleich: Die Frage der staatlichen Einheit und des Friedensvertrages*, in: M. GEHLER, I. BÖHLER (eds), *Verschiedene europäische Wege im Vergleich. Österreich und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945/49 bis zur Gegenwart. Festschrift für Rolf Steininger zum 65. Geburtstag*, Studienverlag, Innsbruck/Wien, 2007, pp.123-154.
 2. ZPA der KPÖ [Zentrales Parteiarhiv der KPÖ, Alfred Klahr Gesellschaft, Wien], *Auslandskorrespondenz 1948*. Kreilisheim und Knepler an das Sekretariat (im Hause), 12.05.1948: Bericht über die Reise der Genossen Kreilisheim und Knepler zum Ersten Kulturtag der SED in Berlin 05.-08. Mai 1948.
 3. W. MUELLER, *Die sowjetische Besetzung in Österreich 1945-1955 und ihre politische Mission*, Böhlau, Wien, 2005, pp.194-198. For the memo on the conversation of Zhdanov with Kopenig and Fürnberg on 1 February 1948, see IDEM, *Die Teilung Österreichs als politische Option für KPÖ und UdSSR 1948*, in: *Zeitgeschichte*, 1(2005), pp.47-54. For a recent summary on the division of Germany, see H.-P. SCHWARZ, *The division of Germany 1945-1949*, in: M.P. LEFFLER, O.A. WESTAD (eds), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, vol. 1, *Origins*, pp.133-153.
 4. F. WEST, *Die Gründung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik*, in: *Weg und Ziel*, 12(1949), pp. 797-805.
 5. ÖGZ [Archiv der Österreichischen Gesellschaft für Zeitgeschichte im Institut für Zeitgeschichte der Universität Wien], Nachlass 40 (Josef Lauscher), DO 173, Mappe 4, fol. 380, *Besprechung im Wahlkreis VI über die Ereignisse in den Volksdemokratien am 21. Juli 1953*; *Ibid.*, DO 141, Mappe 3, fol. IV.204-214, here p. 211. *Die politische Lage und die Aufgaben (Bericht über das letzte Pol.Büro)*, F. Fürnberg.
 6. On the KPÖ in the occupation period, see M. MUGRAUER, *Die Politik der KPÖ 1945 bis 1955/56*, in: IDEM (ed.), *90 Jahre KPÖ. Studien zur Geschichte der Kommunistischen Partei Österreichs*, Alfred Klahr Gesellschaft, Wien, 2009, pp.37-52; F. KELLER, *Die KPÖ 1945-1955*, in: *Jahrbuch für historische Kommunismusforschung 1993*, pp.104-121; IDEM, *Die KPÖ und die Schauprozesse in Osteuropa 1948 bis 1953*, in: W. MADERTHANER, H. SCHAFRANEK, B. UNFRIED (eds), *„Ich habe den Tod verdient“. Schauprozesse und politische Verfolgung in Mittel- und Osteuropa 1945-1956*, Verlag f. Gesellschaftskritik, Wien, 1991, pp.199-218.

disillusioning effects of Nikita Khrushchev's secret speech and his crackdown on the Hungarian uprising in 1956, the KPÖ lost about one third of its membership.⁷ Criticism within the party arose, but these discussions were aborted in favour of the unity of the party. Actually, the developments in the neighbouring "people's democracies" (from then and reinforced after 1956) had made it even harder to promote "socialism" on the domestic scene. Criticism of "real existing socialism" within the party arose.⁸ Understandably, this marked the beginning of slowly growing East German concerns in the second half of the 1950s.⁹ After the construction of the Berlin wall in August 1961, which was defended by the KPÖ chairman Johann Kopenig as an "unavoidable necessity", critiques of developments in the GDR increased within the party, troubling the SED's perception of the Austrian communists even more.¹⁰ Another disturbing factor in party relations was the KPÖ's refusal to establish an Austrian-East German friendship society, much sought after by the GDR in its struggle for diplomatic recognition. Not surprisingly this was the result of repercussions that the development of the Socialist countries had on the domestic standing of the Austrian communists.¹¹ Still, it would be a long time before the crisis in party relations between the KPÖ and the SED escalated.

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7. On the Austrian State Treaty, see G. STOURZH, *Um Einheit und Freiheit. Staatsvertrag, Neutralität und das Ende der Ost-West-Besetzung Österreichs 1945–1955*, 5th rev. ed., Böhlau, Vienna, 2005; A. SUPPAN, G. STOURZH, W. MUELLER (eds), *Der Österreichische Staatsvertrag. Internationale Strategie, rechtliche Relevanz, nationale Identität*, ÖAW, Vienna, 2005; R. STEININGER, *Der Staatsvertrag. Österreich im Schatten von deutscher Frage und Kaltem Krieg 1938–1955*, Studienverlag, Innsbruck/Wien, 2005.
 8. M. MUGRAUER, *Zwischen Erschütterung, neuer Offenheit und „Normalisierung: Die KPÖ, der 20. Parteitag der KPdSU und die Ungarn-Krise 1956*, in: W. MUELLER, M. PORTMANN (eds), *Osteuropa vom Weltkrieg zur Wende*, ÖAW, Vienna, 2007, pp.257-297. See also T. KROLL, *Kommunistische Intellektuelle in Westeuropa. Frankreich, Österreich, Italien und Großbritannien im Vergleich (1945-1956)*, Böhlau, Wien, 2007, pp.293-357.
 9. For two reports that reached the highest party level of the SED, see PAAA [Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Berlin], MfAA [Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der DDR], A 12822, Bl.85-103, Bericht über die Reise der Freundschaftsdelegation des ZK der SED zur KP Österreichs vom 17. bis 23. März 1958. This report was forwarded to the politburo, see SAPMO-BArch [Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisation der ehemaligen DDR im Bundesarchiv, Berlin], DY 30/J IV 2/2J/463. For a message that Walter Ulbricht kept in his private papers on the KPÖ, see SAPMO-BArch, NY 4182/1286 (Nachlass Walter Ulbricht), Bl. 24-31, Alois Pisman an Ulbricht, 13.09.1958.
 10. ÖGZ, Nachlass 40, DO 141, Mappe 9, fol. IV.379-402, here 391, Gen. J. Kopenig, Die Verschärfung der internationalen Lage und die Auswirkungen auf Österreich, 4. ZK-Plenum, 21. u. 22.09.1961. See also J. EHMER, *KPÖ und SED. Ein ambivalentes Verhältnis*, in: W. NEUGEBAUER (ed.), *Von der Utopie zum Terror. Stalinismus-Analysen (Österreichische Texte zur Gesellschaftskritik 59*, Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik, Wien, 1994, pp.171-181, here pp.173-174.
 11. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/20/516, Bl. 6-9, Aktennotiz über ein Gespräch mit Heinrich Fritz am 22.04.1963. On the importance of the friendship societies in the GDR's struggle for international recognition, see H. WENTKER, *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen. Die DDR im internationalen System 1949-1989*, Oldenbourg, München, 2007, pp.55-56; I. MUTH, *Die DDR-Außenpolitik 1949-1972. Inhalte, Strukturen, Mechanismen*, Ch. Links, Berlin, 2001, pp.89-90.

Fighting Ernst Fischer

The most prominent advocate of this flow of criticism was the intellectual Ernst Fischer. Fischer had been a Stalinist in the first post-war decade. He ruthlessly participated in every reversal of Soviet policy, whether it was the split between Tito and Stalin or the brutal Sovietisation of Eastern Europe.¹² On the Tito-Stalin-split, Fischer wrote an exemplary Stalinist propaganda play whose only aim was denouncing the Yugoslav leader as a “traitor”. It was to be performed first in the Deutsches Theater in East Berlin on 18 July 1950 in view of the cheering SED-elite. Ironically, less than twenty years later, the same elite stigmatized Fischer himself in the same way. Fischer did not officially speak out against the Eastern European show trials or the crackdown on the Hungarian uprising even though it is reported that he had become concerned about the deformities of Socialism.¹³ After the KPÖ had lost its last members of parliament in the general elections of 1959, Fischer retired from official political life and focused on his career as a writer. Nevertheless, what did remain for him at least was cultural-political work. Increasingly, he started criticizing the cultural situation in the Socialist countries.

His remarks at the famous Kafka Conference in Liblice (Czechoslovakia) in 1963, which picked the “estrangement in Socialism” as a central theme, resulted in a heated verbal exchange in the Austrian and East German communist party media.¹⁴ At this stage, both sides were not interested in a further escalation, and hence, mutual talks by leading representatives from both parties took place. The SED made clear that it disagreed with Fischer’s positions and ultimately called for an end to his attacks on the cultural policy of the GDR. In the first half of the 1960s, the Austrians assured their East German “comrades” that they would remonstrate with Fischer about the affair internally.¹⁵

However, the general debate on culture and politics had continued meanwhile. This debate was fuelled not only by the Kafka-conference but also by Western communists’ reactions to Soviet cultural policy, which after the “thaw” of the first Khrushchev years had adopted a harsh anti-intellectual stance by the beginning of the

12. On Fischer, see K. KRÖHNKE, *Ernst Fischer oder Die Kunst der Koexistenz*, Büchergilde Gutenberg, Frankfurt-a-M., 1994; S. BARYLI, *Zwischen Stalin und Kafka. Ernst Fischer von 1945 bis 1972*, Studien Verlag/SVK, Bonn, 2008.

13. S. WOLLE, *Der große Plan. Alltag und Herrschaft in der DDR (1949-1961)*, Ch. Links, Berlin, 2013, pp.86-92; F. MUHRI, *Kein Ende der Geschichte*, Globus, Wien, 1995, pp.107–111.

14. For the papers given at the Kafka-conference, see E. GOLDSTÜCKER, F. KAUTMAN, P. REIMANN (eds), *Franz Kafka aus Prager Sicht*, Voltaire, Berlin, 1966. See also M. GRAF, M. ROHRWASSER, *Die schwierige Beziehung zweier „Bruderparteien“*. *SED, KPÖ, Ernst Fischer und Franz Kafka*, in: J. STAADT (ed.), *Schwierige Dreierbeziehung. Österreich und die beiden deutschen Staaten*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt-a-M, 2013, pp.137-178, esp. pp.154-163.

15. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/20/1037, Protokoll über die Aussprache der Genossen Hager, Axen und Florin mit dem Genossen Hexmann, Mitglied des Politbüros der KPÖ, und dem Genossen Scharf, Mitglied des Politbüros der KPÖ und Chefredakteur der *Volksstimme* am 6. und 7. März 1964, 12.04.1964.

1960s.¹⁶ At least since that time it had become clear to the SED that there were some similarities between the Austrian and the Italian Communists. After Italian communist leader Palmiro Togliatti had criticized Soviet cultural policy, Austrian communist Franz Marek contributed to that discussion in the theoretical journal of the KPÖ *Weg und Ziel*. The SED assumed with great concern that the Italian position had found its echo in the Austrian party. This concern was increased by the reactions of both the Austrian and the Italian parties to Khrushchev's ousting from power in 1964. Both parties were taken by surprise and had not been informed about the domestic and foreign policy reasons for the decision. The Italian party criticized the way the decision had been made and, especially, had been communicated.¹⁷ Its position was mainly along the lines of what Togliatti had written in his famous "Yalta Memorandum" only a few hours before he had died earlier that year. In his "political testament", Togliatti had summarized his views on the Communist world movement dissenting from the Soviet position – specifically on the question of the necessity of a world conference dealing with Chinese positions. Above all, the weakest Western European parties would have been burdened with this struggle instead of aiming at improving their domestic political influence. In this matter, Togliatti had argued in favour of accepting the political realities of Western Europe, fighting them by winning over a higher percentage of the electorate with more openness toward other political, social and religious groups.¹⁸ Similar remarks on the ouster of Nikita Khrushchev occurred in the Austrian communist media. The SED assessed it as an attempt to outline a "more autonomous" policy. Obviously, both parties had domestic political reasons for taking such a position. In any event, Khrushchev's removal came at an awkward time for parties facing important regional elections, as it was the case for the Austrian communists.¹⁹ By the mid-1960s the growing influential reformist flow within the KPÖ was about to be formalized as the party's official line.

At its Nineteenth Party Congress in 1965, the KPÖ adopted a reformist program, which was in large parts written by the reformer Franz Marek and heavily influenced by the ideas of Togliatti.²⁰ The "Yalta Memorandum" became the "crucial link" in paving the way to reform. Even though the KPÖ officially rejected Togliatti's doubts about the necessity of an international conference for all communist parties and his

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16. V. ZUBOK, *Zhivago's Children. The Last Russian Intelligentsia*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2009, pp.219-225.
 17. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/20/508, Bl. 149-156, esp. Bl. 155, Information. Auffassungen leitender Genossen der KP Italiens und der KP Österreichs zu Fragen der Kultur, Berlin, 02.07.1963; Bl. 470-472, Kurzinformation über die Stellungnahme der KPI zu den Veränderungen in der Partei- und Regierungsführung der Sowjetunion, 24.10.1964.
 18. For the memorandum, see e.g. <https://www.marxists.org/archive/togliatti/1964/memorandum.htm> (accessed 21 September 2014).
 19. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/20/508, Bl. 473-474, Reaktion der KPÖ auf die Veränderungen in der sowjetischen Partei- und Regierungsführung, 24.10.1964.
 20. On Marek and the influence of Togliatti's ideas, see L. SPIRA, *Ein gescheiterter Versuch. Der Austro-Eurokommunismus*, J&V, München, 1979, pp.22-23; for more recent publications highlighting this assessment, see B. COUDENHOVE-KALERGI, *Zuhause ist Überall. Erinnerungen*, Czernin, Wien, 2013, pp.185-186; M. GRABER, *Franz Marek (1913-1979)*, in: *Mitteilungen der Alfred Klahr Gesellschaft*, 2(2013), pp.21 f.

evaluation of the situation of the small Western European communist parties, what he said showed a possible way for overcoming domestic political isolation. One key element was the party's attitude towards democracy. The changed stance of the KPÖ became a "red rag" for the SED. Talking about the "dictatorship of the proletariat" was no longer sustainable. The reformist and later "Eurocommunist" Western European parties aimed openly at gaining power through fair elections (which in case of the Austrian communists was highly improbable) or gaining domestic political influence by joining forces with other parties. The latter strategy became a highly controversial international topic from the mid-1970s until the mid-1980s, when "Eurocommunism" was talked of not only in Western Europe but also in the United States.²¹ Nonetheless, the roots of this flow originated from the 1960s and not merely at a national level. The Italian origins are doubtless, but in the developing Western European theatre even the small Austrian party aimed at taking the lead.

To what extent the leading reformist circles of the KPÖ had already been thinking in a European dimension became obvious when in May 1966 they hosted a conference of Western European communist parties in Vienna. For Marek, who was the main organizer of this event, it was a logical follow-up to the Brussels Conference of 1965, which had marked a restart for such meetings after initial attempts of the late 1950s. In the Belgian capital, they had dealt with contemporary issues such as the Vietnam War, the question of European security, and solidarity with "persecuted fraternal parties". Marek proposed a continuation of this discussion. Despite being aware of "national characteristics", he aimed at discussing common European challenges in the "capitalist countries". The changes since the interwar period, for example the improved living conditions for the "working class", demanded a new approach to domestic politics. To reform-communists like Marek, it was evident that Socialism had to be attained within the framework of Western European democracy. Therefore, the question of the communists' relationship to "Catholics" and "Socialists" or "Social Democrats" had to be debated anew.²² These basic questions were about to become some of the core problems with which "Eurocommunism" dealt in the 1970s. Nonetheless, it seems that in 1966 the time was not yet ripe for such a discussion. The Italian communists appreciated the recently developed awareness, but according

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21. N. DÖRR, *Der Eurokommunismus als Herausforderung für die europäische Sozialdemokratie. Die Beispiele Frankreich und Italien*, in: *Perspektiven DS – Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsanalyse und Reformpolitik*, 2(2010), pp.83-102; N. DÖRR, *Die Auseinandersetzungen um den Eurokommunismus in der bundesdeutschen Politik 1967-1979*, in: *Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung*, 2012, pp.217-232; M. MAYER, «Macherschleichung auf Filzpantoffeln». *Die Bundesrepublik, die DDR und die mögliche Regierungsbeteiligung der kommunistischen Parteien in Frankreich und Italien in den Siebzigerjahren*, in: *Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung*, 2010, pp.127-141; S. PONS, *La politica internazionale di Berlinguer negli anni dell' „Unità Nazionale”*. *Eurocomunismo, NATO e URSS (1976-1979)*, in: A. GIOVAGNOLI, L. TOSI (eds), *Un ponte sull'Atlantico. L'alleanza occidentale 1949-1999*, Guerini e associati, Milano, 2003, pp. 282-297; A. BROGI, *Confronting America: the Cold War between the United States and the Communists in France and Italy*, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2011.
22. F. MAREK, *Probleme der kommunistischen Parteien Westeuropas*, in: *Weg und Ziel*, 11(1965), pp. 660-672.

to the report by their representative at the Vienna conference, Ugo Pecchioli, the meeting was not sufficiently prepared.²³

Marek himself was quite satisfied with the outcome of the conference, even though it had proved impossible to exclude international and foreign policy issues from the conference discussions.²⁴ The illegal West German communists had attended the conference. In fulfilling their task as Eastern "agents" within the framework of Western European communism they reported about it to the SED. The chairman Max Reimann of the West German communists, who lived in exile in East Berlin, regularly attended the politburo sessions of the SED. After returning from Vienna, he used this forum to complain about the negative attitude of Marek toward the GDR. Thereafter, the East German leadership asked the KPÖ for clarification of his statements. An internal SED assessment of the Western communist parties spoke of "bourgeois influences" within the Italian, Austrian, and to a lesser extent French party, which indeed was not yet fully on its way to "Eurocommunism".²⁵ However, at this stage no public criticism on the overall policy of these parties arose.

After the Nineteenth Party Congress of the KPÖ in 1965, the attacks by the SED on Fischer actually swelled over to criticisms of official positions of the Austrian party.²⁶ Another severe dispute about Fischer occurred in late summer of 1966. Ernst Fischer had participated in a West German television production in which the GDR was heavily criticized. Immediately, the SED started a media campaign against Fischer's statements.²⁷ In a further instance, an emergency meeting between the SED's "fire fighter" in inter-party crises, Hermann Axen, and leading politicians of the KPÖ became necessary. Again, the Austrian communists tried to calm the heated situation and promised to deal with Fischer internally. After the Secretary General of the KPÖ Siegfried "Friedl" Fürnberg had proposed to the GDR that they make use of Fischer by letting him perform on East German television, Axen's statement was unambiguous. The diction he took was unusual for a communist of his calibre: "For God's sake, Fischer may corrode capitalism in Austria, but not Socialism in the GDR, which he does not understand anyway".²⁸

What had become clear to the SED after this dispute was that among conservative anti-reformist forces within the KPÖ distance to Fischer had grown too. Josef Ehmer,

23. APCI [Archivio del Partito Comunista Italiano, Ugo Pecchioli, Fondazione Gramsci, Rom], Serie: Estero, MF: 537, pp.1016-1094, here pp.1044-1048, *Informazione sull'incontro dei partiti comunisti dell'Europa occidentale* (Vienna, 9-11 maggio 1966).

24. F. MAREK, *Die Wiener Konferenz*, in: *Weg und Ziel*, 7/8(1966), pp.362-368.

25. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/11774, Notizen zu Wien. Konferenz europ. Bruderparteien, 16.05.1966; DY 30/J IV 2/2/1059, Bl.2, Sitzung des Politbüros des Zentralkomitees am 24. Mai 1966; DY 30/11775, Bl. 1-24, Bürgerliche Einflüsse in der kommunistischen Weltbewegung, 29.06.1966.

26. L. SPIRA, op.cit., pp.62 and 66; J. MEISEL, *Die Mauer im Kopf. Erinnerungen eines ausgeschlossenen Kommunisten 1945-1970*, Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik, Wien 1986, p.181.

27. For a summary, see M. GRAF, M. ROHRWASSER, op.cit., pp.166-172.

28. „Fischer möge doch in Gottes Namen den Kapitalismus in Österreich zersetzen, aber nicht den Sozialismus in der DDR, den er doch ohnehin nicht begreife“. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/3651 (Büro Ulbricht), Bl. 1-13, Information über ein Gespräch des Genossen Hermann Axen mit dem Genossen Franz Muhri, 30.09.1966.

an Austrian historian and former member of the KPÖ, supposed almost two decades ago that from this moment on the SED “in secret” had aimed at an expulsion of Fischer from the KPÖ.²⁹ Even though there is no document proving this judgment, Ehmer’s interpretation is still to the point. The SED sought contact with those KPÖ members, who were against the newly established official reformist stance. Conservative anti-reformist powers within the KPÖ, like Erwin Scharf (who became the advocate of the East German view), Walter Hollitscher, Friedrich Hexmann, and several others began an intense dialogue with their East German allies, who supported their upcoming standoff with the reformers by continually attacking Fischer and by financing their publications. Another means was direct conversations in the course of mutual visits of delegations. Within the KPÖ the new Chairman elected in 1965, Franz Muhri, tried to mediate between conservatives and reformers in favour of the unity of the party.

In December 1966, a delegation of the KPÖ headed by Muhri paid a visit to the GDR. Not least because of the simmering conflict about Fischer, this “fraternal” encounter attracted attention far beyond the usual level. While Western media (and diplomats) frankly reported about the conflict between the Austrian and the East German communists, both parties tried to avoid such an impression. The First Secretary of the SED Walter Ulbricht was prepared in detail for his conversation with the Austrian delegation.³⁰ On the conflict between Fischer and the SED, he took a clear stance. After generally criticizing reformist ideas, he argued that Fischer’s public statements were harming the positions of both the Austrian and the West German communists. As long as Fischer’s comments do not harm the illegal West German communists’ prestige – Ulbricht promised – the SED will stay calm and consider it as an internal affair of the KPÖ. In the same breath, he further stated: “Since Fischer continues his attacks on German soil, the SED has to deliver its opinion in a forthright manner”. Muhri answered that the KPÖ opposed some of Fischer’s theses, but he did not abstain from declaring that there was also disagreement with some theses propagated by the SED newspaper *Neues Deutschland*. Again, he tried to mediate by pointing out Fischer’s merits for the KPÖ and promising continued internal discussions with Fischer.

Some weeks earlier, Fischer had published his work *Art and Coexistence* in which he made reference to the Kafka Conference and again criticized the cultural policy of the socialist states. Additionally, it should be mentioned that after several publications in the GDR, *Art and Coexistence* was his first book to appear in West Germany first. Since Muhri tried to avoid an immediate resurgence of the public clash, he asked the SED not to attack Fischer for this publication. The KPÖ chairman promised a debate on Fischer’s writings within the party. Finally, yet most importantly, he asked several times for an understanding of his personal situation because he had only been

29. J. EHMER, op.cit., p.176.

30. For the detailed preparatory papers, see SAPMO-BArch, NY 4182/1286 (Nachlass Walter Ulbricht), Bl. 120-191.

elected Chairman of the KPÖ in 1965 and, therefore, his prime focus was the unity of the party.³¹

Fighting Reform Communism

It seems that the SED met Muhri's requests. In a politburo session in early January 1967, the SED decided to further intensify contacts with the KPÖ at all levels. No campaign against Fischer's *Art and Coexistence* was launched; however, the SED was far from being satisfied with the way the KPÖ officially dealt with the content of Fischer's publication. For the SED, the reviews in the KPÖ's party media were not nearly critical enough. Even though the party authorities had approved the reviews, it had become obvious that since 1965 party organs were heavily influenced and perhaps even controlled by the reformist wing of the KPÖ.³² This was a fact that gained significance in 1968.

Before turning to the thrilling events resulting from the divergent attitudes toward the "Prague Spring" that finally led to an open outbreak of the crisis within the KPÖ and between the Austrian and East German communists in the late summer of 1968, a closer look will be taken at how the SED tried to influence the struggle between reformers and those opposing reforms within the KPÖ. Despite being far from satisfied with the KPÖ's handling of Fischer, the SED had abstained from officially criticizing *Art and Coexistence*. However, the SED had paid a lot of attention to the further developments within the KPÖ. When the KPÖ called for a public discussion about "Democracy and Socialism" in 1967 that resulted in controversial statements about the fundamental policy paper written by Marek, the SED analysed it with mistrust. Overall, its perception of the KPÖ had continually worsened. The analysis painted a picture of resignation and disunity, which was regarded as the main reason for not consistently fighting Fischer's positions and having diverged from the path of a "true Marxist-Leninist party".³³

Because of influential reformers in the politburo of the KPÖ and a so-called "centrist" leadership, the SED felt that it had to rely on those within the KPÖ who openly

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31. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/20/519, Bl. 83-100, Bericht über den Besuch einer Delegation der Kommunistischen Partei Österreichs in der Zeit vom 1. bis 7. Dezember 1966. See also E. FISCHER, *Kunst und Koexistenz. Beitrag zu einer modernen marxistischen Ästhetik*, Rowohlt, Hamburg, 1966, pp.71-74 and 191-193.
 32. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2/1096, Bl. 8, Anlage Nr. 5: Bl. 42-44, Sitzung des Politbüros des Zentralkomitees am 31. Januar 1967; DY 30/IV A 2/20/520, Bl. 185-188, Information Nr. 16/67 für die Mitglieder und Kandidaten des Politbüros über zwei Besprechungen des Buches von Ernst Fischer, 20.03.1967.
 33. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/20/521, Bl. 287-294, Information der Abteilung für Internationale Verbindungen; Betr.: Öffentliche Debatte der Kommunistischen Partei Österreichs zu Fragen, Demokratie und Sozialismus, 29.11.1967; Bl. 295-300, Information über die Plenartagung des ZK der KPÖ am 26. und 27. Oktober 1967, 14.12.1967.

opposed the reformist course. The KPÖ's chairman, Franz Muhri, was regarded as one of those "centrists", who despite apparent disunity acted in favour of the unity of the party by mediating between the antagonist groups.

The most striking example of East German support for the opponents of reform in the KPÖ occurred in the spring of 1968. Erwin Scharf had written an examination of Fischer's *Art and Coexistence* from an anti-reformist point of view. The KPÖ's politburo had rejected a publication in the party's publishing house "Globus". Only an eventual internal distribution to the members of the central committee was regarded as feasible. Upon hearing this, Scharf asked for support from East Berlin. After the Department for International Affairs of the Central Committee of the SED had studied his writings, it was decided that a publication for the GDR-market was inappropriate because its contents did not meet the requirements of the SED. Instead, they offered to produce a small edition for distribution in Austria only. This procedure was agreed upon in June 1968 when Scharf paid another visit to the GDR. In the course of his visits, he always informed his East German comrades about the internal proceedings of the KPÖ.³⁴ His work *Lob der Ideologie* appeared in the autumn of 1968 – when things had already changed significantly.³⁵

Within the leading circles of the KPÖ in the spring of 1968, conflicts had increased further. While the reformers and to some extent, those who remained in-between the antagonist groups had welcomed the developments in Czechoslovakia, the anti-reformist forces heavily opposed them. Since the reformers held strong positions in the politburo and in the party media, the KPÖ publicly welcomed "Socialism with a human face". Internally conflicts about the appraisal of the reforms of the "Prague Spring" were aggravated.³⁶

The SED, as many scholarly studies have shown, openly opposed the "Prague Spring" and especially Walter Ulbricht supported and fostered the idea of an inter-

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34. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/20/1037, Aussprache der Genossen Honecker und Axen mit dem Leiter der österreichischen Delegation, Gen. Erwin Scharf [...], am 4. März 1968; DY 30/IV A 2/20/517, Bl. 137-138, Axen to Markowski, 29.03.1968; NY 4182/1286 (Nachlass Walter Ulbricht), Bl. 242-247, Bericht über den Besuch des Genossen Erwin Scharf [...] in der DDR (13. bis 16.06.1968), 26.06.1968; Bl. 248-251, Gesprächsvermerk über ein Gespräch des Genossen Hermann Axen, Kandidat des Politbüros und Sekretär des ZK der SED, mit Genossen Erwin Scharf [...], am 14.06.1968, 26.06.1968.
35. E. SCHARF, *Lob der Ideologie. Den Marxismus nicht anpassen sondern weiterentwickeln*, Verlag d. Wissenschaften, Berlin (Ost), 1968. For the personal account by Scharf, see: E. SCHARF, *Ich hab's gewagt mit Sinnen... Entscheidungen im antifaschistischen Widerstand. Erlebnisse in der politischen Konfrontation*, Globus, Wien, 1988, pp.251-261.
36. M. MUGRAUER, *Der „Prager Frühling“ und die Parteikrise der KPÖ*, in: S. KARNER, N. TOMILINA, A. TSCHUBARJAN, et al., *Prager Frühling. Das internationale Krisenjahr 1968*, vol. 1: *Beiträge*, Studienverlag, Wien, 2008, pp.1043–1061, here: p.1046.

vention in Czechoslovakia.³⁷ Due to constant denunciation reports by Erwin Scharf and in spring and summer 1968, especially by Walter Hollitscher, the SED was well informed and – not surprisingly – highly concerned about the situation within the KPÖ.³⁸ Understandably, East Berlin's focus was on the developments in Czechoslovakia and on finding a possibility to end them. What Ulbricht had desired came to pass on 21 August 1968, when Soviet-led Warsaw Pact forces invaded Czechoslovakia.

Already on 21 August 1968, the KPÖ had officially condemned the crackdown on the "Prague Spring" by the Warsaw Pact powers. This led to an open outbreak of the conflict between the KPÖ and the Socialist Bloc. Fischer spoke of "tank communism" and publicly called for a split with the Soviet Union in the case of a lasting occupation of Czechoslovakia. The condemnation of the invasion was a result of the composition of the KPÖ leadership and the wait-and-see attitude adopted by the anti-reformists.³⁹ The SED was enraged and convinced that within the KPÖ the reformers had entirely taken over. Once again, it was Fischer who was attacked. Now, the SED publicly called for an expulsion of Fischer from the KPÖ.⁴⁰ In fact, Fischer was the target not only of East German enagement but his statements also contributed to insurmountable clashes within the KPÖ. To many ordinary party members, his statements had gone too far. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the KPÖ, with the aim of discussing the consequences on a multilateral level, had called for a conference of Western European parties. The idea, however, was finally rejected by the Western "fraternal parties". The main reason was that the CPSU heavily opposed such a conference and was pressing the French and Italian communists not to take part in such

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37. On the SED and "Prague Spring", see L. PRIESS, V. KURAL, M. WILKE, *Die SED und der „Prager Frühling“ 1968. Politik gegen einen „Sozialismus mit menschlichem Antlitz“*, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin, 1996; R. WENZKE, *Die NVA und der Prager Frühling. Die Rolle Ulbrichts und der DDR-Streitkräfte bei der Niederschlagung der tschechoslowakischen Reformbewegung*, Ch. Links, Berlin, 1995. On Ulbrichts position within the context of the Warsaw Pact meetings, see J. PAUER, *Prag 1968. Der Einmarsch des Warschauer Paktes. Hintergründe – Planung – Durchführung*, Ed. Temmen, Bremen, 1995; on the situation in the GDR in 1968 see S. WOLLE, *Der Traum von der Revolte. Die DDR 1968*, Ch. Links, Berlin, 2008; for a short summary on the GDR's perception of Czechoslovakia throughout the 1960s, see M. GRAF, *Die Entwicklungen in der Tschechoslowakei in den 1960er Jahren aus Sicht der DDR*, in: F. KASTNER, B. VESELÁ, J. JAROŠ, C. KNOCHE (eds), *„Prager Frühling“ und „Ära Kreisky“: Zwischen Reformwillen und Reformverwirklichung. Untersuchungen zu den europäischen Nachbarn Tschechoslowakei und Österreich*, Iuvenilia Territorialia, Praha, 2009, pp.19-40.
38. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/20/1037, Vermerk über ein Gespräch der Genossen Kurt Rätz und Hans Jungblut mit dem österreichischen Genossen Prof. Dr. Walter Hollitscher [sic!], 28.05.1968; DY 30/IV A 2/20/518, Bl. 65, Gespräch mit Gen. Prof. Walter Hollitscher, Mitglied des ZK der KPÖ, 05.08.1968.
39. For interpretations on the bringing about of the decision by the KPÖ, see L. SPIRA, op.cit., pp.89-99; M. MUGRAUER, op.cit., pp.1043–1061, here pp.1046-1049. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/20/522, Einschätzung zur Reaktion der KPÖ auf die Intervention, 02.09.1968.
40. For example, see *Neues Deutschland*, 04 and 13.09.1968.

an event.⁴¹ Although both the French and the Italian parties openly opposed the intervention, the time was not yet ripe for a joint action by the Western European communists. Being the most influential communist parties in the West, they avoided siding with extremely small “fraternal parties” from within whose ranks “comrades” were even calling for a split with the Soviet Union.

In early December 1968, a delegation of leading Austrian communists paid a visit to the Soviet Union. The main reason for the invitation by the CPSU was the KPÖ’s condemnation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. No joint statement on the intervention was agreed upon – a fact that went unmentioned in the joint communiqué. This caused heated debates within the political leadership of the KPÖ. For many reformers, the text of the communiqué was not an ideal compromise, despite which – at least officially – the party had not revised its standpoint. Fischer called it a break from the party’s position and a blow to the party’s credibility. Hence, the party media in addition to the communiqué published an interview with Muhri in which he confirmed that the KPÖ’s position had not changed. In retrospect, some reformers spoke of the “turnaround” in Moscow. New archival evidence suggests that this interpretation is correct. Vadim Sagladin, Deputy Head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU informed the GDR Embassy in Moscow that from the Soviet perspective, Muhri’s attitude in Moscow had been far more “positive” than the contents of his interview back home.⁴² In any case, the Moscow visit was a harbinger of the upcoming “normalization” of the KPÖ.

“Normalization”

The SED, actually, was in denial about the true situation within the KPÖ. Soon, it turned out, strong groups within the KPÖ opposed the official stance taken by the party leadership. Despite continuous information from anti-reformist members of the KPÖ about their plans to revise the position of the party, the SED had almost no glimmer of hope for the future development of the KPÖ by the end of 1968.⁴³

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41. RGANI, Fond 3, opis’ 72, delo 210, Protokoll der Sitzung des Politbüros der KPdSU vom 11. Oktober 1968, Beschluss Nr. 23; Beilage 2: Schreiben an den sowjetischen Botschafter in Paris. Kopie im Archiv des Ludwig-Boltzmann-Instituts für Kriegsfolgenforschung, Graz.
 42. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/20/163, Bl. 266-270, Vermerk über ein Gespräch mit Sagladin [signed Bittner], 20.12.1968.
 43. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/20/517, Bl. 175-178, Vermerk [of Waschewski] über ein Gespräch mit dem Genossen Fritz im Zentralkomitee der KPÖ am 17. September 1968, 18.09.1968; DY 30/IV A 2/20/1037, Aktenvermerk über eine Aussprache des Gen. Markowski mit dem Mitglied des ZK der KP Österreichs, Gen. Zucker-Schilling, am 9. Oktober 1968, 11.10.1968; DY 30/IV A 2/20/517, Bl. 190-193; Vermerk über ein Gespräch mit dem Genossen Friedrich Hexmann, Mitglied des ZK der KP Österreichs am 31. Oktober 1968, 08.11.1968; DY 30/IV A 2/20/520, Bl. 193-197, Einschätzung zu KPÖ Dezember 1968.

Immediately after the invasion, the conservatives began preparing for their final battle against the reformers, which they intended to initiate at the Twentieth Party Congress in January 1969. One of their paramount goals was to get rid of Fischer. Despite knowledge of the conservatives' plans, the SED did not expect a breakthrough in 1969.⁴⁴ Even though major disputes on fundamental questions concerning the current state and future of the party persisted, personal matters were the central issue of the Party Congress. The anti-reformist forces had carefully prepared to topple various reformers from the party's central committee. To prevent a split within the KPÖ, Muhri together with Fűrberg, pressed for time, pushed for an en-bloc re-election; and finally most of the reformers maintained their positions. The turbulent Party Congress, due to the efforts of the so-called "centrists", Muhri and Fűrberg, who opted for unity within the party, ostensibly ended with a compromise. Still, this setback for the anti-reformist forces constituted only a short adjournment of the inner-party struggle. The problems and antagonisms were now apparent to all party-members and the course of the Party Congress already foreshadowed future developments.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, the SED report on the Party Congress assumed that the reformers had entirely taken over. A first report by the SED-delegate Hermann Matern was even flown out of Vienna in an otherwise empty plane and directly delivered to Walter Ulbricht. Matern had completely misperceived and misinterpreted the situation within the KPÖ. In his report to the politburo, he claimed that the Party Congress had been a victory for the "revisionist forces around Marek".⁴⁶

The opposite was the case. Despite still being part of the leadership, the reformers began to retire from party life. Marek stopped attending politburo sessions. Even though it took two attempts, within less than a year, Fischer had been expelled from the KPÖ. The final decision resulted in a severe clash between the remaining reformist supporters, who continued to protest the expulsion, and the anti-reformists who continued to gain ground in the inner-party struggle. The last reformers and their most prominent remaining advocate Marek were also expelled or quit the party severely disappointed.⁴⁷

44. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/20/517, Bl. 190-193, Vermerk über ein Gespräch mit dem Genossen Friedrich Hexmann, [...] am 31. Oktober 1968, 08.11.1968; Bl. 208-211, Information über Besprechungen anlässlich der Trauerfeier für Genossen Koplenig in Wien; L. SPIRA, op.cit., pp. 128-132.

45. On the twentieth party congress of the KPÖ, see L. SPIRA, op.cit., pp.137-157; M. MUGRAUER, „*Ofi setzte man sich über vernünftige Argumente hinweg...*“. *Die krisenhafte Entwicklung der KPÖ in den Jahren 1968 bis 1971*, in: IDEM (ed.), *90 Jahre KPÖ. Studien zur Geschichte der Kommunistischen Partei Österreichs*, Verlag der Alfred Klahr Gesellschaft, Wien, 2009, pp.261-318, here pp.276-280.

46. SAPMO-BArch, NY 4182/1286 (Nachlass Walter Ulbricht), Bl. 218-220, Matern to Ulbricht, 06.01.1969; DY 30/J IV 2/2A/1350, Bl. 50-79, Sitzung des Politbüros des Zentralkomitees am 14. Januar 1969; DY 30/IV A 2/20/1040, Bl. 1-21, Bericht von Hermann Matern über die Teilnahme einer Delegation des ZK der SED am XX. Parteitag der KPÖ vom 3. bis 6. Januar 1969 in Wien, 13.01.1969.

47. For details, see L. SPIRA, op.cit., pp.162-212.

With satisfaction, the SED noticed that the conservatives had managed to expel Fischer and crowd most of the reformers out of the party in a little more than a year. However, the (extraordinary) Twenty-First Party Congress of the KPÖ in 1970 was still regarded as “normalization” with a stigma because no resolution on a revision of the party’s position towards the invasion of 1968 had been adopted. The SED spoke of Muhri’s Czechoslovakian “trauma”.⁴⁸ Hence, the KPÖ was regarded with mistrust until it took back its condemnation of the 1968 invasion in 1971 and the central committee decided that the intervention needed to be regarded as “a bitter necessity”.⁴⁹

Thereafter, the KPÖ returned to a completely Muscovite stance. Henceforth, KPÖ and SED re-established close ties.⁵⁰ On “Eurocommunism”, which at that time was on the rise, they took nearly the same stance. Both parties truly opposed the politics of the Italian, French and Spanish communists in the 1970s. Those who had crowded out the KPÖ reformers still feared the possible influence or return of reformist ideas successfully propagated by the bigger Western European parties. The SED under the leadership of Erich Honecker (who superseded the disempowered Ulbricht in 1971), however, developed a more pragmatic approach. Despite rejecting “Eurocommunism”, dialogue with “fraternal parties” in the West was maintained and was aimed at overcoming the reformist era.⁵¹

When Mikhail Gorbachev introduced his reforms in the second half of the 1980s, both sides were actually anxious about further developments in the Soviet Union and possible repercussions for the Socialist Bloc and in the domestic arena. The institutionalized and personalized solidarity with the Soviet Union hindered them from openly criticizing glasnost and perestroika right from the start. It was only at the end of the 1980s that the SED started openly criticizing Gorbachev’s politics, thus avoiding any repercussions for the GDR. The KPÖ hung back with official criticism until the revolutions of 1989 had almost entirely and definitively ended communist rule in

48. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/20/1003, Bl. 85-90, Information Nr. 2/70 für die Mitglieder und Kandidaten des Politbüros, 12.01.1970; DY 30/IV A 2/20/521, Bl. 183-195, Bericht über den XXI. (außerordentlichen) Parteitag der Kommunistischen Partei Österreichs in Wien [1970].

49. M. MUGRAUER, op.cit., pp.261–318, here p.299.

50. N. DÖRR, *Die Beziehungen zwischen der SED und den kommunistischen Parteien West- und Südeuropas. Handlungsfelder, Akteure und Probleme*, in: A. BAUERKÄMPER, F. DI PALMA (eds), *Bruderparteien jenseits des Eisernen Vorhangs. Die Beziehungen der SED zu den kommunistischen Parteien West- und Südeuropas (1968-1989)*, Ch. Links, Berlin, 2011, pp.48-65, here: p.60-61.

51. On the SED and „Eurocommunism“ in general, see A. BAUERKÄMPER, F. DI PALMA (eds), op.cit.; L. FASANARO, *Eurocommunism. An East German perspective*, in: L. NUTI (ed.), *The Crisis of Détente in Europe. From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985*, Routledge, London, 2009, pp.244-255; for a contemporaneous KPÖ-publication on „Eurocommunism“, see F. MUHRI, E. SCHARF, E. WIMMER (eds), *Eurokommunismus? Eine Sammlung von Stellungnahmen*, KPÖ, Wien, 1978.

East-Central Europe.⁵² The fall of the Berlin Wall 1989 and German reunification in 1990, were a "shock" to the KPÖ, not least, because of its financial dependence on the SED.⁵³ The end of communism in Europe, however, not only led to a further decline of the KPÖ but also brought back the internal divergences of the 1960s. The already dwarfish party lost some further members disappointed by the first revelations that came after the revolutions of 1989. Its first post-1989 leadership retired only a little more than a year after its election at the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress in January 1990. The main struggle was about the future orientation of the KPÖ. Until today, there has been no true consensus within the party about whether the KPÖ should be a classical "revolutionary party" or if it should transform itself into a more open party of the left.⁵⁴ At the European level, the KPÖ is a founding member and active participant in the European Left. At home, there is no consensus about the party's European policy.⁵⁵

Conclusions

It is no surprise that the SED during the Ulbricht era opposed any reformist stance taken by a communist party, whether in the East or in the West. Whenever other communists started to criticize the situation in the GDR, a conflict seemed unavoidable. In the case of the Austrian communists, reformist thoughts and politics made the SED openly attack Fischer and the KPÖ. One reason why this was done so fiercely was because of the common German language. Fischer's public statements in West Germany, especially those in which he frequently criticized the GDR, were suitable for further damaging the image of the illegal West German Communists and the GDR in West German society. Moreover, the GDR was not able to entirely shut out Western media. To what extent its leadership feared the influence of reformist ideas propagated by Austrian communists is not easy to prove on the basis of available sources,

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52. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/3085, Bl. 136-160, Niederschrift über das Gespräch des Generalsekretärs des ZK der SED, Genossen Erich Honecker, mit dem Vorsitzenden der Kommunistischen Partei Österreichs, Genossen Franz Muhri, am 30. November 1987. On the published position towards Perestroika in *Weg und Ziel*, see P. WIMMER, *Die Rezeption der Ideologie der Perestroika durch die KPÖ von 1985 bis 1990. Anhand „Weg und Ziel, der „Monatsschrift für Theorie und Praxis des Marxismus-Leninismus“*, Dissertation University of Vienna, 2003.
 53. Archiv des Parteivorstands Die Linke, Zur Reise von Gregor Gysi in die Republik Österreich (5. bis 8. Juni 1990). See also M. GRAF, *Parteifinanzierung oder Devisenerwirtschaftung. Zu den Wirtschaftsbeziehungen von KPÖ und SED, 1946-1989*, in: *Jahrbuch für historische Kommunismusforschung*, 2014, pp.229-247, here: pp.239-246.
 54. P. WIMMER, op.cit., pp.257-266 and 270-271; I. BRICKNER, C.M. SCHMIDT, *Wie die „Kummerln“ überlebten*, in: *Der Standard*, 06-07.09.2014, p.20.
 55. M. GRAF, *Die KPÖ und Europa. Internationale Stellung und Europapolitik einer Kleinpartei (1945-heute)*, in: F. DI PALMA, W. MUELLER (eds), *Kommunismus und Europa: Europavorstellungen und -politik europäischer kommunistischer Parteien im Kalten Krieg*, Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn, forthcoming 2015.

but the SED's reaction to the "Prague Spring" provides us with unambiguous insights into its general attitude towards reform communism in the late Ulbricht era.⁵⁶

From what we now know, it is impossible to prove the extent to which financial matters influenced the crisis in party relations between KPÖ and SED in the 1960s. A closer analysis of economic relations between the two parties leads us to the conclusion that the financial dependence of the Austrian communists resulted from growing bilateral trade between Austria and the GDR in the 1970s and 1980s.⁵⁷ Still, besides propaganda the SED tried to place pressure on the Austrian communists by stopping the import of KPÖ publications.

The SED's open engagement in favour of the KPÖ's anti-reform forces, who became advocates of the SED's position, and the numerous East German attacks on Ernst Fischer created a complicated situation for the Austrian party. The settlement of the party crisis of the KPÖ by returning to an entirely Muscovite stance and the expulsion of the reformers were much more due to the situation within the KPÖ. The "centrist" leadership hoped to avoid a definitive split with Moscow and the majority of the party members (however instrumentalized they were by the anti-reformist activists) did not accept the most extreme positions taken by the reformers. In the end, their struggle for some sort of reformed communism (similar to the "Eurocommunist" developments of the 1970s), simply lacked a basis. Those who might have backed the reformers had left the party a dozen years earlier. New archival evidence suggests without much doubt that the influence of the CPSU in 1968 had shown a stronger effect than preceding efforts by the SED. The same holds true for Moscow's successful prevention of joint (re)action by the Western communist parties after the crackdown on "Prague Spring". The East German party – albeit permanently well informed – was everything but certain about the future development within the KPÖ. On the contrary, even after the conservatives had almost irrevocably won the inner-party struggle, the SED had the impression that the reformers had taken over. The condemnation of the invasion of 1968 remained a point of conflict until it was finally rescinded in 1971. Anti-reformist Austrian communists could rely on East German support, but the die had been cast within the KPÖ.

56. The East German State Security used Fischer's *Art and Coexistence* as training material for its cadres/agents. Cf. A. SCHMOLE, "Operationsgebiet" Österreich, in: J. STAADT (ed.), *Schwierige Dreierbeziehung. Österreich und die beiden deutschen Staaten*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt-a-M, 2013, pp.179-225, esp. pp.222-225.

57. M. GRAF, op.cit., pp.229-247, here pp.239-246.

Eurocommunism and the SED: a contradictory relationship

Francesco DI PALMA

The recent historiography on the SED and its relationships to Western European communist parties has witnessed an unparalleled resurgence over the last couple of years. This holds true for „Eurocommunism”, a third-way interpretation of communism, which spread all over Western Europe from the early 1970s. It drew the attention of an entire generation of politicians, intellectuals and journalists, who were willing to understand and use its democratic, un-hegemonic potential to reform and renew the European left.

The gradual opening of archives and the declassification of masses of significant documents of the leading communist parties in both Western and Eastern Europe has spurred in the last twenty years a real revolution in the interpretation of socialism and its ideological sources during the Cold War until the fall of the Berlin Wall. This shift also testifies a radical intellectual change, accomplished by a new and young generation of historians, who started exploring Socialism from an international, comparative point of view and were more amenable at using modern methods of analysis. Eurocommunism was developed just after the momentous year of 1968, its theoretical grassroots being much older and dating back to such thinkers as Antonio Gramsci or Palmiro Togliatti, to mention only the most eminent. From 1968 on, the world witnessed on the one hand a thorough sharpening of communist rule in Eastern Europe – of which the Warsaw Pact’s military crushing of the „Prague Spring” in August 1968 was only the most blatant expression. On the other hand, a gradual and cautious opening in bilateral relationships across the blocks could be noticed. Even the SED, deemed as one of the most obedient parties behind the Iron Curtain, could very much profit from that and embarked upon a wide range of projects with Western European communists, mostly exchange programs for party members, aimed at deepening the mutual understanding and fostering peace and cooperation. In doing so it had to go to considerable length in being involved often even with partners holding different views or at least very sceptical of the social and political substrate of the “real socialist countries”. Eurocommunists, with their striving for freedom and avowal of a specific national path to communism without intervention and pressure „from above”, were among those. This didn’t eventually prevent the conformable SED – as we shall see out of an opportunistic approach – from coming to terms with them.

These issues will be investigated in the first (chapter 1 and 2) and second part (chapter 3 and 4) of this paper, which aims at outlining the political and ideological development of Eurocommunism in the light of its perception by the Socialist Unity Party of (East) Germany (SED) through the 1970s and 1980s of the past century; then some conclusions will be drawn. To do so this paper will encompass the relationships between the SED itself and the most influential Eurocommunist parties of that time, mostly the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI) and the Parti Communiste Français

(PCF); sporadically it will also relate to the Communist Party of Spain (PCE) and the West German social-democratic Party (SPD). The following article relies on comprehensive research in different archives, foremost in Germany, but also in Italy and France and critically re-examines previously published papers.

1. On „Eurocommunism“

The term Eurocommunism first showed in the Milan-based newspaper *Giornale Nuovo*, in an article by the Yugoslavian journalist Frane Barbieri, back in 1975.¹ With that he intended to coin a word which could exemplarily sum up and pinpoint the main intention by most of the Western European communist parties to break free from the traditional obedience to Moscow, thus questioning its status as the very centre of world communism.² The new concept stirred up a debate about its appropriateness as well as to which extent it actually reflected the willingness of West European communism to challenge Moscow and to build up a counterpart within the parliamentary democracies on the Western side of the continent. Moreover it was criticized because of its main concentration on Europe itself, even though the profile of many non-European parties (for instance the Communist Party of Chile) may have fit into the description and would feature very similar patterns of evolution.³

Also the main focus of the three largest West European communist parties, the PCI, the PCF and the PCE, as the pillars of Eurocommunism, was in this regard problematic. Apart from the PCI, which can be considered as the main source for Eurocommunist beliefs, both ideologically and politically, the reference to the PCF, a thoroughly Stalinist type of party, and to the PCE, which was operating from the exile until 1977, may be misleading. Even their diverging stance to the fateful crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968 by the troops of the Warsaw Pact showed that they could not form a homogeneous block to hold against Moscow. The PCI, nationally and internationally very influential, denounced the military intervention in Prague emphatically and uniformly. So did the PCE executive, though in this way provoking an internal fracture which eventually undermined the exile party. The PCF initially

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1. On this see M. STEINKÜHLER (ed.), *Eurokommunismus im Widerspruch. Analyse und Dokumentation*, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, Cologne, 1977, pp.389-392.
 2. N.R. DÖRR, *Wandel des Kommunismus in Westeuropa. Eine Analyse der innerparteilichen Entwicklungen in den kommunistischen Parteien Frankreichs, Finnlands und Italiens im Zuge des Eurokommunismus*, Arbeitspapiere für Internationale Politik und Regionalstudien, Berlin, 2006, pp.10-19.
 3. K. PRIESTER, *Hat der Eurokommunismus eine Zukunft? Perspektiven und Grenzen des Systemwandels in Europa*, Beck, Munich, 1982; W. LEONHARD, *Eurokommunismus. Herausforderung für Ost und West*, Goldmann, Munich, 1980; F. BONDY, *Eurokommunismus – das Wort und die Sache*, in: *Merkur. Deutsche Zeitschrift für europäisches Denken*, 11(1977), pp.1030-1033.

rebuked the aggression; it then revised its position thoroughly until the end of the year and manoeuvred back to a Soviet-friendly strategy.⁴

Given the manifold differences within the Eurocommunist area it is quite appealing to question whether there has ever been such thing as „a” Eurocommunism. Some of its most influential leaders, Enrico Berlinguer (PCI), Georges Marchais (PCF) and Santiago Carrillo (PCE) were themselves sceptical about that matter, at times questioning its meaning. So it is clear that the Western European communist parties involved in this were far from being compact. How did the SED relate to such a fragmentation and how and why did it build up relations to those parties?

2. The SED and (Western) Europe at the beginning of the 1970s

Until 1968 the SED had kept quite stable relationships to its Western European counterparts. The tenet of „proletarian internationalism” with its particular focus on solidarity was there the inspiring force. Moreover it was the Soviet Union, with its strong leading role, which held most communist parties together, despite political issues and controversies. This changed abruptly in 1968, as the thus ensuing international debate about the Czechoslovak crisis exposed a deep ideological fracture within the European communists, between East and West, as well as among the westerners.⁵

The call for more diversity, for a freer approach to governmental and oppositional work in their own countries was amidst the major claims formulated by the communist parties of the West. In fact all these requests were not new at all. Palmiro Togliatti, the partisan and illustrious leader of the PCI, had already called for „polymorphism” and a higher degree of self-determination back in the 1950s.⁶ His plea remained for

4. F. DI PALMA, *Die SED, die Partito Comunista Italiano und der Eurokommunismus (1968-1989). Akteure, Netzwerke, Deutungen*, in: A. BAUERKÄMPER, F. DI PALMA (eds), *Bruderparteien jenseits des Eisernen Vorhangs. Die Beziehungen der SED zu den kommunistischen Parteien West- und Südeuropas (1968 bis 1989)*, Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin, 2011, pp.136-152.

5. F. DI PALMA, *Die SED, die kommunistische Partei Frankreichs (PCF) und die kommunistische Partei Italiens (PCI) von 1968 bis in die achtziger Jahre – ein kritischer Einblick in das Dreieckverhältnis*, in: *Deutschland Archiv*, 1(2010), pp.80-89; on the PCE see, A. BAUMER, *Kommunismus in Spanien. Die Partido Comunista de España – Widerstand, Krise und Anpassung (1970–2006)*, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, 2008; Idem., *Camaradas?*

Die Beziehungen zur SED im Kontext der Debatte um das Verhältnis zum Staatssozialismus innerhalb der Partido Comunista de España 1968–1989, in: A. BAUERKÄMPER, F. DI PALMA, *Bruderparteien ...*, op.cit., pp.187-209, here pp.189-191; S. CARRILLO, *Eurocommunism and the State*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1977.

6. Togliatti spoke about polycentrism for the first time on an interview for the journal *Nuovi Argomenti*, soon after the XX. Party Congress of the CPSU in 1956. On this C. SPAGNOLO, *Sul memoriale di Yalta: Togliatti e la crisi del movimento comunista internazionale*, Carocci, Rome, 2007; A. AGOSTI, *Togliatti negli anni del Comintern: (1926-1943). Documenti inediti dagli archivi russi*, Carocci, Rome, 2000.

the most part unanswered, as the ongoing Cold War and its propaganda forced the communist parties of the world to stick to the traditional two blocks division.

The crushing of the Prague Spring was going to change the communist world forever.⁷ Differences were to plague all communist parties, the larger ones – as we saw beforehand – as well as the less influential, as for instance the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) or the Greek KKE, which denounced the military campaign in Czechoslovakia, but literally fell apart over the issue, with a considerable amount of criticism coming from the lower cadres as well as from intellectuals.⁸ The blanket refusal by the SED to allow third-way socialist theories proved to be shallow when it came to opportunistic strategies to bolster its own diplomatic and economic position in Europe. A short overview of its stance toward the PCE will yield explanations as to how the East Germans approached the building of relationships to unconformable partners.

Spanish communism had been banned by the Franco regime and had restructured in exile. Many Spanish communists settled in East Germany, where they had eventually been given shelter and the possibility to do politics and to organize resistance to the detested fascist regime at the home country. In the GDR they were able to run their own party schools and training camps for both the ideological and the paramilitary battle. The SED supported and financed all this generously in the firm conviction that this would pay off.⁹ The dooming events in Prague from the summer of 1968 not only polarized the entire European Left, it also fragmented it. With it the SED changed its attitude toward the Spanish companions brusquely. East Berlin let the PCE executive know that it condemned the position the party had expressed about the Warsaw Pact's military intervention in Czechoslovakia. As a matter of fact the PCE had shown great insecurity about the position to take in that respect. Once again, Prague had caused internal fractures, which the SED ostensibly tried to use for its own interests. The reformers around Santiago Carrillo, the Party Secretary of the PCE, and the supporters of a Soviet friendly policy led by Enrique Lister had engaged in a struggle with each other. The conflict was to weaken the exile organization visibly, until at least the beginning of the 1970s.¹⁰ Yet not all West European communist parties were imbibed by Eurocommunist ideas, the fewest of them were indeed. Over all the smallest of them refused generally the search for a more independent path to communism and remained loyal to Moscow or at least to the common bipolar world

7. M. BRACKE, *Which Socialism? Whose Détente? West European Communism and the Czechoslovak Crisis, 1968*, Central European University Press, Budapest, 2007; S. PONS, F. ROMERO (eds), *Reinterpreting the end of the Cold War: issues, interpretations, periodizations*, Frank Cass, London, 2005; M. NAUDY, *PCF. Le suicide*, Michel, Paris, 1986, here pp.9-57; U. PFEIL, *Sozialismus in den Farben Frankreichs. SED, PCF und „Prager Frühling“*, in: *Deutschland Archiv*, 2(2001), pp.235–245.

8. On CPGB see, G. ANDREWS, *Endgames and New Times. The Final Years of British Communism 1964–1991*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 2004; on the Greek KKE, A. STERGIOU, *Im Spagat zwischen Solidarität und Realpolitik: die Beziehungen zwischen der DDR und Griechenland und das Verhältnis der SED zur KKE*, Bibliopolis, Mannheim, 2001.

9. A. BAUMER, *Kommunismus ...*, op.cit., pp.228-253.

10. A. BAUMER, *Comaradas ...*, op.cit., pp.191-193.

view. This was the case of the Finnish (SKP), the Portuguese (PCP) and the West-German (DKP) communists, among others.

Yet the SED was willing to take advantage of any possible exchange with influential partners in order to achieve its own goals. Once the GDR's recognition as a sovereign state had been stipulated through the Basic Treaty (Grundlagenvertrag) with the FRG in late 1972, the GDR set out to improve its international credit by embarking upon multi- and bilateral cooperation projects even with political actors who had been very critical of the communist system in East Germany. These efforts were aimed at consolidating the position of the „new-born“ GDR within Europe as long as its status as an independent country. In order to do so the SED had signalled that it better keep a balance between its alignment towards Moscow and the strategic cooperation with the West.¹¹ The Italian Communist Party seemed to be a perfect addressee of this search for cooperation partners: the PCI was the largest Western European communist party, with the highest electoral figures as well as the highest number of party members (almost as high as the Christian Democrats [DC], who were a leading political force in Italy for over 40 years). Moreover it maintained strong ties to West European leading institutions and political organizations, such as the European Parliament as well as the powerful Socialist Party of France (PS) and of West-Germany (SPD).¹²

On 16 October 1973 a communist representative fraction could be built in the European Parliament. It was the first time ever that a communist organization became member of such an institution, thus overcoming much adversity and the traditional veto by the majority Christian Democratic fraction.¹³ There seemed to be a window of opportunity for the SED, beyond all ideological frictions and political tensions of the past years – the echoes of the Prague Spring and its violent crushing were still much alive – to gear up its diplomatic machinery and make a step towards reconciliation with old foes.

3. SED facing Eurocommunism

The SED rejected Eurocommunism as a heretic form of socialism: According to its analysts it was bereft of the ideological scaffolding of Marxism-Leninism and seemed to show patterns of convergence to common social-democratic policies, such as those adopted by the West German SPD. Through the 1970s Eurocommunism had been thoroughly monitored by East German observers, who kept at the behest of the unified

11. On this see, H. WENTKER, *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen: die DDR im internationalen System 1949-1989*, Oldenbourg, Munich, 2007.

12. F. DI PALMA, *Die SED, die kommunistische Partei Frankreichs ...*, op.cit., pp.85-89.

13. SAPMO-BArch [Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bunderarchiv], DY/30/IV B 2/20/189, Information Nr. 3/74 für das Politbüro, Haltung der FKP und der IKP zur Frage des Weges zur Macht, 10.01.1974.

Party a well detailed dossier on its development.¹⁴ The dismissing tone of the document left very little room for doubts: there would neither be an agreement on ideological matters, nor any kind of mingling on the part of East-Berlin.

Eurocommunists themselves however looked at the third-way doctrine from a slightly different point of view. It wasn't Social Democracy they were tending to, nor were they absolutely objecting Marxism-Leninism: they wanted to assert themselves as a recognizable force in between, a third way indeed, able to draw consensus from larger parts of the society, even from the conservative bourgeoisie. It was a very ambitious project, bearing the risk of watering down the traditional underpinning of West communist Parties, thus weakening their identity. Then the distinguishing aspect of the „Eurocommunist Turn” was its avowal of the Parliament as the main stage of political struggle, and not anymore its dismissal as the very stronghold of revisionist, anticommunist powers. The concentration on international politics, as the prefix „euro” reveals, was considered to be consequence of a strategic overhaul in the policy of West European communist parties, signalling their cohesion and agreement on a supranational orientation, in order to make Communism more appealing to a larger amount of population. Indeed, as Eurocommunist leaders were asked about the main objectives of the new doctrine, there was profound vagueness and imprecision. The „third way” had been eventually called upon by the media and specialized journalists and it was now a highly praised political phenomenon.¹⁵

As a matter of fact only little agreement on substantial questions could be found within the Eurocommunist family. The above mentioned concentration on international politics, for instance, finds no match for the PCF, which was traditionally strongly bound to pro-national, protectionist forms of policies. Even the common belief that Eurocommunists would be seeking to overcome the typical Cold War bipartition of the World, thus vanquishing the two blocks logic, wouldn't apply to the French Party, which continued to be – except for short periods – mostly Stalinist in structure and political disposition.¹⁶ Even the SED was well aware of the intrinsic incongruences affecting Eurocommunism and felt that it was no real threat for “Real Socialism”, nor at all for its own goals.¹⁷ It was indicative of this that even the gathering of the three main protagonists of the „third way”, Enrico Berlinguer, Santiago Carrillo and Georges Marchais, who in 1974 laid the foundations for a strategic co-operation in Brussels, did not preoccupy Soviet Russia and its satellite states.¹⁸ The Western front seemed fragmented and utterly fragile, as we already stressed. The

14. SAPMO-BArch, DY/30/IV B 2/20/170.

15. A. KRIEGEL, *Eurocommunism: a new kind of communism?*, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1978; D. OBERNDÖRFER, *Einführung: Die sozialistischen und kommunistischen Parteien Frankreichs, Italiens, Spaniens und Griechenlands*, in: D. OBERNDÖRFER (ed.), *Sozialistische und kommunistische Parteien in Westeuropa*, Bd.1: Südländer, Leske + Budrich, Opladen, 1978, p.11.

16. See A. AGOSTI, *Storia del Partito Comunista Italiano 1921-1991*, Carocci, Rom, 1999; S. PONS, *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo*, Einaudi, Turin, 2006.

17. SAPMO-BArch, DY/30/IV B 2/20/61, Büro Hermann Axen, Information für das Politbüro. Tagungen des ZK und der Zentralen Kommission der IKP vom 2. bis 5. Juli 1979 und am 10.07.1979, Berlin 13.07.1979.

18. See S. PONS, Berlinguer, pp.21-161.

agreements reached at the summit in the Belgian capital (among others, enhanced cooperation to foster democracy, higher autonomy from Moscow) could not be fulfilled and the core of the Eurocommunist movement started very quickly to fade away.

SED observers repeatedly tied the birth and the „survival” of Eurocommunism to the PCI, which in their analysis dominated Western European Communism. French communists, entangled in internal quarrels such as the maintaining of the political alliance with the Socialist Party they had stipulated in 1972, would just uncritically trail the PCI. The SED concluded that this was to be attributed to the fragility of the PCF, internally as well as internationally, due to the French comrades’ increasing dependence from the Socialist Party and to lacking willingness for ideological renewal. At the same time they conceded that its opening to Eurocommunism was solely tactics and couldn’t be considered as a sign of opposition against the Eastern Block.¹⁹

As a matter of fact the two main pillars of Eurocommunism, PCI and PCF, differed greatly in many aspects of their policies. The first relied thoroughly on its ties to the German Social Democracy (SPD) as a powerful intermediary in both the political and the financial sphere; the latter was very critical of the SPD, overtly accusing it to operate as an “agent” for the allegedly “hegemonic”, “imperialist” US. Moreover the PCF would not agree on manifold ideological beliefs with the PCI.²⁰ Indeed the French companions were never able to cut loose conclusively from the Russian model and continued to depend on guiding principles from Moscow.²¹

By the mid-1970s it seemed like the emphatic boost that had accompanied the emergence of Eurocommunism had already come to an end. In addition, the SED dismissed the avowal of the PCF to the heretic doctrine and claimed that the French would adhere to it only out of opportunism. East German analysts argued that the PCF was still too much influenced by Marxism-Leninism as to be able to break free and steer a course of democratic communism the Italian companions were promoting.²² The main gap between the two major Western European communist Parties remained structural as well as ideological: the PCF was in the eyes of the SED still a class-party, the PCI rapidly transforming into a social-democratic, catch-all kind of

19. SAPMO-BArch, DY/30/IV B 2/20/187, Abteilung Internationale Verbindungen (hereafter, Int. Verb.), Einschätzung der Gemeinsamen Erklärung der FKP und der IKP, 17.11.1975.

20. SAPMO-BArch, DY/30/IV B 2/20/187, Int. Verb., Vermerk über Aussprache zwischen Genossen Erich Honecker und Genossen Georges Marchais am 1. November 1975, 04.11.1975, here p.5.

21. Bericht über die Konsultation des Genossen Paul Markowski, Mitglied der ZK und Leiter der Abteilung Internationale Verbindungen, mit Vertretern des ZK der Italienischen Kommunistischen Partei am 19. und 20. Mai in Rom, in: SAPMO-BArch, Int. Verb., DY/30/IV B 2/20/508, pp.4-6.

22. SAPMO-BArch, DY/30/IV 2/2.035/92, Büro Hermann Axen, Einschätzung des gemeinsamen Programms von FKP und Sozialistischer Partei, (no date), p.9.

organization, with interests and ramifications reaching well beyond the national borders.²³²⁴

Official SED declarations would generally depict Eurocommunism as a highly subversive theory underpinning attempts of US- and FRG-driven “capitalistic imperialism” to erode the heterogeneity and solidity of world communism. Eurocommunists would aim at weakening Soviet Russian predominance and drive a wedge between Moscow and the rest of its allies.²⁵ So what use was for East Berlin rulers to still maintain relationships to the alleged renegades?

The GDR was on the one hand reluctant to support „emancipatory” efforts of fraternal parties in the West; on the other hand it sensed that it could very much benefit from such ties. In this struggle between communist interparty solidarity and GDR regime interests, often the latter prevailed. In 1973 the SED suddenly announced the recognition of the fascist Franco regime in Spain, a decision that caused quite a stir.²⁶ Cooperation with a sovereign state, albeit an authoritarian and that was poised to recognize the GDR in return, carried much weight. The same approach was to characterize the international policies of the SED for the years to come: gaining and asserting power within the given restraints of a small satellite nation at the very border of the two superpower systems.

So while the PCI drew much attention from the SED, for all the reasons we already mentioned, the PCF began to fade inexorably into the background, even though its profile was still very congruent with the general tenet of the East Block. The PCF was going to pull out of the Left Coalition it had started with the French Socialists back in 1972 as late as 1977, thus plunging into a crisis.²⁷ On the contrary the PCI was intensifying its international clout, backed up by very successful electoral campaigns in Italy that had made it by far the largest Communist Party (it boasted over three times as many party members as its French counterpart) of the West and one of the biggest overall. It was indeed Enrico Berlinguer's Party, the charismatic leader who during the 1970s would arise to one of the most popular personalities in Europe and set the PCI out to a more comprehensive interpretation of communism, at odds with traditional, Soviet Marxism-Leninism and very dissuasive of any form of dogmatism. So it is easily comprehensible that the SED would seek and ensure regular contact with the Italians solely out of opportunism.

23. SAPMO-BArch, DY/30/IV B 2/20/189, Int. Verb., Information Nr. 3/74 für das Politbüro, Haltung der FKP und der IKP zur Frage des Weges zur Macht, 10.01.1974.

24. SAPMO-BArch, DY/30/IV B 2/20/60, Int. Verb., Information Nr. 90/1978 für das Politbüro, Rede des Gen. der IKP, Enrico Berlinguer, auf der Kundgebung zum Abschluss des Pressefestes der „L'Unità“ in Genua am 17.09.1978, 27.09.1978, p.20.

25. SAPMO-BArch, DY/30/IV B 2/20/60, Int. Verb., Zum „Eurokommunismus“, 1975 (anonymous), p.2.

26. A. BAUMER, *Camaradas ...*, op.cit., p.202.

27. F. DI PALMA, *Die SED, die kommunistische Partei Frankreichs ...*, op.cit., p.85; see also U. PFEIL, *Die anderen deutsch-französischen Beziehungen. Die DDR und Frankreich 1949-1990*, Böhlau, Cologne, 2004.

Significantly, it did so consistently: it tackled neither Euro- nor Italian communism as such, apart from standard verbal attacks. Along these lines it went on to reconcile with the PCE, still bewildered by the German decision to recognize the Franco regime. In late 1974 the SED summoned a meeting with the Spanish companions in East Berlin to talk about the latest events and make up for past misunderstandings. Confronted by the reality of the situation the SED assuaged its ideological differences with the Spaniards, which dated back to the Prague Spring, and offered to reset the mutual relationships. As a matter of fact it was neither „fraternal solidarity” nor conviction but rather a long-sighted calculation that led to settlement. Signals showed that Francisco Franco was teetering and losing control of the regime, so it was all set for an imminent takeover by democratic forces, among which the PCE would surely play an influential role. Erich Honecker wanted to take the SED into a position where it would directly benefit from good connections with a potential government party.²⁸

Differences among Eurocommunists would deepen over the years, despite all efforts to find a common basis of shared values and concerted policies. Even propaganda events like the gathering of PCI and PCE with their own leaders, Berlinguer and Carrillo, in summer 1975 in Livorno, emphatically making the case for „the Communism of the future” – irrespective of borders, free from dogmatic tenets, thoroughly integrated into democratic parliamentary systems – to be rapidly laid down and implemented everywhere, was to yield no tangible results.²⁹ Quite the contrary occurred. As it became clear that the European Community was going to accept new membership applications, Western European parties reacted very nervously, mostly abiding by their own national traditions. PCI and PCE expressed almost directly their conformity with the plans of the EC, the PCF instead wasn’t willing to accept a formal joining of for instance Spain, because this would undermine French agricultural interests in the South of the country.³⁰

The 9th SED Party Congress in late May 1976 was meant to make the final arrangements for the imminent Conference of the European communist Parties, starting one month later in East Berlin.³¹ Symbolically the Conference had to boast the integrity and cohesion of the communist world and propagandize that no slight differences on ideological matters could ever infringe the unity of the socialist family. Indeed the meeting was a breakthrough as it helped arbitrate pending quarrels and drew the attention of the media from all over the globe. Conflicts of opinion with fellow Western European communist parties could actually not be solved, yet the gathering was of great importance as it took different personalities together. All

28. A. BAUMER, *Kommunismus ...*, op.cit., pp.114-129 and 171-173.

29. Gemeinsame Erklärung der IKP und SpKP/1975, in: M. STEINKÜHLER, *Eurokommunismus ...*, op.cit., pp.272-273.

30. SAPMO-Barch, DY/30/IV B 2/20/50, Int. Verb., Tagung des ZK der Kommunistischen Partei Spaniens vom 28. bis 30. Juli 1976 in Rom, 11.08.1976.

31. S. WOLLE, *Die heile Welt der Diktatur. Alltag und Herrschaft in der DDR 1971-1989*, Ch. Links, Berlin, 1998, pp.46-49.

speeches, without exceptions, were replicated in the SED organ *Neues Deutschland*, even the most critical ones.³²

The willingness of East Berlin to take advantage of bilateral relationships, also with partners that had been very censorious of Moscow, proved stronger than any formal affiliation to the Eastern Block.³³ This doesn't mean that the SED contravened by any chance the international policy set out by the Russian „mother party”, the CPSU, it yet tried to widen its scope of action – it desperately needed in order to keep up its diplomatic and political legitimacy on the one hand, and on the other hand to be involved in lucrative financial and commercial activities to relieve the disastrous economic situation of the country – mostly with Western partners. The Marxist-Leninist tenet of solidarity and loyalty to the members of the Warsaw Pact was still strongly clasped; East Berlin rulers recognized nonetheless the strategic importance of preferably good relationships to NATO countries, all propagandistic hostility notwithstanding.

This certainly was the case as in February 1977 the three main Eurocommunist „ambassadors”, PCI, PCF and PCE, gathered in Madrid on a meeting designed to revive Eurocommunism. Pluralism, freedom of thought, of opinion and the press, respect of voting rights and results etc. were the pivotal requests they expressed. The CPSU made no secret of its concern about the message sent out in the Spanish capital city and called upon its allies to energetically go up against the ideological foes and sap the subversive platform.³⁴ All of this went quite unheard within the SED, which just didn't see the necessity of freezing important contacts to the West. This stance was refined subsequently on a session of the „Central Committee Secretaries of Eastern Countries”, as the SED allegedly thwarted the plan of its fellows to start a major attack against Eurocommunism and its leaders.³⁵

4. The 1980s between rearmament issues and perestroika

As the Cold War winds started to blow stiffer again since the end of the 1970s the action radius of the SED narrowed visibly. The crises in Afghanistan and Poland signalled that military options were still very much on the agenda, the Soviet Union invading the Asian country in 1979, only a few days after NATO had made the Double-Track decision, which countered the Soviet SS-20 deployments by reinforcing missile presence in Western Europe. Here again, Eurocommunism showed all its

32. For example the speeches by Santiago Carrillo, *Rede des Genossen Santiago Carrillo*, and Enrico Berlinguer, *Rede des Genossen Enrico Berlinguer*, both in: *Konferenz der kommunistischen und Arbeiterparteien Europas. Dokumente und Reden*, Dietz, (East) Berlin, 1976, respectively pp. 119-127 and 223-233.

33. H. TIMMERMANN, *Ost-Berlins Beziehungen zu Jugoslawien und „Eurokommunisten“*, in: *Deutschland Archiv*, 9(1977), pp.949-965.

34. F. DI PALMA, *Die SED, die kommunistische Partei Frankreichs ...*, op.cit., pp.1-2 and 85.

35. H. TIMMERMANN, *Ost-Berlins Beziehungen ...*, op.cit., pp.963-964.

intrinsic fragility. The PCF at least condoned the Soviet attack in Afghanistan; the PCI criticized it vehemently and billed the NATO resolution on deployment of further American weaponry at the border to the Iron Curtain. Italian communists, according to Russian observers, would have taken much the same stance as the US-President.³⁶

Propaganda bore its fruits. Transnational relationships over the Curtain suffered strongly from the crisis, delegation visits, political and technical, decreased dramatically while Eurocommunism was actually coming adrift. PCE and PCF were internally fragmented, reformers and pro-soviet traditionalists antagonizing each other, electoral power breaking away, steadily moving to the brink of insignificance.³⁷ Yet characteristically the SED didn't break up with the PCI, still strong and influential enough to guarantee useful links to the ruling parties in France (François Mitterrand and his Socialist Party) and West Germany (Helmut Schmidt and the SPD), two of the most powerful figures in Europe; it did instead reshape its relationships to both French and Spanish communists, putting them on hold.³⁸

At a summit in January 1980 in Moscow PCF leaders reconciled definitively with the CPSU. Both parties put on record that they were willing to overcome all past differences and cooperate again against capitalism and the power of monopolies.³⁹ Also they didn't miss the chance to send a reproach out to the PCI, who was found guilty of having lately endorsed NATO policies. The resurgence of the „axis” Paris-Moscow sealed eventually the end of the Eurocommunist base frame that once reached from Rome over Paris all the way to Madrid. *Le Matin de Paris* would afterwards much representatively headline: „le PCF rentre dans son ghetto”, in other words, „the PCF gets back to its own ghetto” by reaching out again to Soviet rule and breaking with the libertarian attempts of a more comprehensive kind of communism the Italians had in mind.⁴⁰ On the situation in Poland again the two major Western European communist parties differed deeply, the French maintaining that Solidarność would only endanger the Government's efforts to restore order and security, the PCI arguing that the upsurge led by Polish workers would act as a stimulus for democracy.⁴¹

Yet, despite all disagreement on sensible issues, the Eastern Block, especially the SED and the CPSU, would not stop contemplating the possibility to cooperate with

36. APCI [Archivio del Partito Comunista Italiano], Sez. Estero, Mikrofilm 8012, Lettera del KPdSU al PCI, 05.12.1980.

37. A. BAUMER, *Camaradas ...*, op.cit., pp.205-206; F. DI PALMA, *Die SED, die kommunistische Partei Frankreichs ...*, op.cit., p.89.

38. APCI, Sez. Estero, Mikrofilm 8110, Relazione della delegazione del PCI (Cervetti, Cacciapuoti, Mechini) al X. Congresso della SED, Berlin 10.-16.04.1981, pp.6-7; Mikrofilm 8112, Verbale dei colloqui tra delegazioni della SED e del PCI, 11.11.1981, p.5.

39. APCI, Sez. Estero, Mikrofilm 440, Conclusi a Mosca i colloqui tra il PCUS e il PCF („Unità”), 12.01.1980.

40. APCI, Sez. Estero, Mikrofilm 440, Les communistes explorent la voie (*Le Matin de Paris*), 26.01.1980.

41. APCI, Sez. Estero, Mikrofilm 487, Critiche di Marchais al PCI sulla Polonia („Unità“), 14.11.1980.

the PCI, or at least to take advantage of its intermediary role.⁴² East Berliner rulers had ever since the end of the 1960s regularly resorted to it to keep their contacts to the SPD alive, with which they were going to embark upon (among others) projects on a chemical-weapons-free corridor at the inner German border.⁴³

By the mid-1980s the general framework changed drastically. Hovering above the increasingly difficult domestic political situation in East Germany – where the Friedensbewegung (peace movement) was rapidly gaining weight, thus endangering the legitimacy of the communist regime – and the ailing financial conditions of the country was perestroika, launched by Mikhail Gorbachev a year after his inauguration as General Secretary of the CPSU in 1985. Perestroika called for détente and a more transparent approach to the exercise of power, proclamations which couldn't encounter much enthusiasm in East Berlin, taken in desperately trying to save both SED and GDR from ruin.

On the other hand, the only remaining advocate of Eurocommunism, PCI, was going through a stage of harsh discomfort, after its leader Enrico Berlinguer had passed in 1984. His death had widened the schism within the Party, with Soviet supporters beginning to speak up and majority reformers behind the new Secretary Alessandro Natta showing all kind of difficulty in handling the dire situation. Against this background the SED put its relations to the Italians on ice, particularly since Natta and his companions had begun to enhance their affiliation to the CPSU under the new rule of Gorbachev. Ironically, as contacts between Italian and Russian communists grew both in quantity and in quality, East Berlin opted out of the „privileged connection” to the PCI. Overall conditions were hostile: Eurocommunism had ceased to exist, the Italians were themselves in an awkward position and the SED was facing the last crisis of its history, which would pave the way to the fall of the Berlin wall.

5. Final remarks

East German rulers, ever since the founding of the GDR in 1949, were strongly committed to the Soviet Union. They owed the CPSU almost everything, power, legitimacy and not least economic security. Yet, as the Superpowers began to ratchet up the Cold War and financial hardship to be felt, the SED found itself in a position where it had to act from necessity.⁴⁴ This meant it should spare no effort but try and

42. APCI, Sez. Estero, Microfilm 8112, Verbale dei colloqui tra delegazioni della SED (Heinz Lehmann, Helmut Schiffner – Abteilung Außenbeziehungen; Hans Voss, DDR-Botschafter in Italien) e del PCI (Antonio Rubbi, Rodolfo Mechini, Michele Ingenito), Roma 09.-11.11.1981; Microfilm 8112, Incontri politici in URSS, Luciano Barca e Franchi, 23.12.1981.

43. F. DI PALMA, *Die SED, die kommunistische Partei Frankreichs ...*, op.cit.

44. F. DI PALMA, *Europa als transnationales „Konstrukt“? Europapolitik und Europavorstellungen bei der SED (1945-1989)*, in: F. DI PALMA, W. MUELLER (eds), *Kommunismus und Europa. Vorstellungen und Politik europäischer kommunistischer Parteien im Kalten Krieg*, Schöningh, Paderborn, forthcoming.

come to terms with any potential counterpart, even those holding different views, to maintain and consolidate its status. Once the national sovereignty was reached, at the beginning of the 1970s, it turned to lucrative commercial and political operations with Western European partners. These happened to be often Eurocommunists, who were then quite influential, both nationally and internationally, as we saw.

Ever since Soviet Russia had set the main frame of action for the Eastern Block, the SED could take advantage of bilateral contacts with selected organizations, such as the PCI and the PCF, often bypassing negotiations with the mother party. Quite characteristically East Berliners would prefer to go back – despite all criticism and profound ideological disagreement – to the Italians, who had become behind the leading role of Enrico Berlinguer one of the most influential political forces in Western Europe. Much less appealing to them was the PCF, although mostly Soviet friendly, but at the same time strongly nationally bound and by far not as powerful as the PCI.

Eurocommunism, the third-way communist doctrine that was meant to offer an alternative to both Social Democracy and Marxism-Leninism, was never at stake, nor did it ever constitute a real threat for the SED. No ideological mingling, nor at all adhesion was allowed. On the contrary, East Germans criticized the “heretic” Eurocommunist ideas with great energy and unequivocally. The SED sought in general dialogue with useful partners solely out of opportunism and showed no reluctance to do so until the very end in the late 1980s.

European Civil Society

Edited by Taco Brandsen, Gemma Donnelly-Cox, Matthias Freise, Michael Meyer, Filip Wijkström and Annette Zimmer



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
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Valentine LOMELLINI

In 1975, the significant success of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) at the administrative elections raised concern about the political stability of one of the main border-countries of the Cold War in Europe. The PCI seemed to achieve the so-called “sorpasso” of the Christian Democrats: the difference in the electoral outcome of the two Parties was only 1.8%.

The outcome of the administrative elections adumbrated a further victory for the PCI in the political elections in 1976. Washington was concerned about their results: Rome was central for the Western alliance because of its geographical position (it was one of the Mediterranean nations which hosted relevant NATO forces); its economic partnership and its political position as a mediator between East and West. A triumph of the PCI could have led to a wide imbalance in the Mediterranean area, with heavy consequences on countries that had just began their democratic transition, such as Spain, Portugal and Greece. Thus, Washington expressed its worry about the “complicated Italian electoral geography”:¹ the wide discontent for the economic crisis could have increased communist consensus among moderate public opinion, tired of the incapability of the Italian leading class to get out of the economic and financial problems.²

The Italian public opinion, disappointed with the ineffective outcomes of its ruling class, became upset by rumours about the US involvement in covert operations in Italy. In December 1974, Seymour Hersh wrote a front-page article in the *New York Times* headlined “Huge CIA. Operation reported in US against anti-war forces”. Hersh’s article alleged that the Agency had been engaged in massive domestic spying activities. The US Congress soon launched an investigation of the entire Intelligence Community and its possible abuses. The congressional investigations eventually delved into all aspects of the CIA and the IC, highlighting CIA involvement in key events of the Western Europe policy such as the political elections in Italy in 1948.

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1. U. GENTILONI SILVERI, *L'Italia sospesa. La crisi degli anni Settanta vista da Washington*, Einaudi, Turin, 2009, p.149.
 2. GFL [Gerard Ford Library], Arthur Burns papers, Folder: Italy, box B75, Division of International Finance to Chairman Burns, Possible arrangements for further federal reserve assistance to Italy, 26.01.1976; John E. Reynolds to Board of Governors, Memo on the Italian economic and financial situation, 23.01.1976; Frederick R. Dahl to Chairman Burns, Examiner classification of country risk: status of Italy, 29.01.1976; Chairman Burns to Charles J. Siegman, EC Monetary Committee conditions for \$1 billion EC loan to Italy, 03.03.1976.

This kind of interference soon became a paradigm in the matter of covert operations outside American boundaries.³

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's approach to the Italian communist forces seemed to remember such kinds of interference: public statements against the PCI participation in the government, possible economic covert operations as well as the support to Christian Democrats, appeared to part of the public opinion as open interferences in the Italian context.⁴ "Botteghe oscure" was supposed to lead such widespread discontent.⁵

In contrast to this belief, this paper aims at showing that the PCI substantially reduced its public anti-Americanism and launched a new policy toward the US.

Our main objectives will be thus analysing first, the Italian communists' perception of the US interference and their policy in connection to this. Second, to investigate what image the PCI had of the United States, dealing especially with its ruling class and new political actors. Third, and last, to understand if other Italian social and political actors – apart from the PCI – bear on the definition of the US image in the Italian progressive public opinion and on the development of the relationship between Americans and Italian communists.

This paper is part of a broader research, which deals with the political and cultural relations between the PCI and the US during the 1970s. It is based on primary sources from the Central Archive of the Italian Communist Party (Fondazione Istituto Antonio Gramsci of Rome), from the Gerald R. Ford Library, the National Security Archives, as well as on interviews and the analysis of secondary sources such as the daily and weekly newspapers L'Unità, L'Espresso and La Repubblica.

A New Policy Towards the US?

In the mid-1970s, the events in the Mediterranean area – the collapse of the Portuguese regime, in April 1974, the end of the Greek government of the colonels some months later, and the conclusion of the dictatorship of Francisco Franco, in Spain, in 1975 – substantially changed the equilibrium of the South-European region.⁶ Three authoritarian regimes fell, strengthening the group of the European democratic countries. The Italian Communist Party – led by Enrico Berlinguer since 1972 – looked very attentively at such a kind of change: that evolution could forecast new possibilities

3. M. DEL PERO, *CIA e covert operation nella politica estera americana del secondo dopoguerra*, in: *Italia contemporanea*, 12(1996), p.699.

4. U. GENTILONI SILVERI, *op.cit*; M. MARGIOCCO, *Stati Uniti e PCI, 1943-1980*, Laterza, Bari-Rome, 1981.

5. Botteghe oscure was the name of the street of the PCI's main headquarters in Rome. In the Italian historiography is used as synonymous of the PCI.

6. F. ROMERO, *Storia della guerra fredda. L'ultimo conflitto per l'Europa*, Einaudi, Turin, 2010, pp. 241-243.

for Leftist forces in Italy, and especially for the PCI and its strategy of “historic compromise”.⁷ As consequence of the Chilean coup in 1973, Berlinguer in fact made known its proposal, which was to develop a special dialogue between the two main political actors of the country, the PCI and the Christian Democrats. It was a great change and a big challenge for a Party that aimed at gaining democratic credibility after being formally excluded from the Government since 1947.⁸

The Italian Communist Party was not considered as the most loyal to Moscow and orthodox communist party of the Western world (belonging this role to the French Communist Party). In the early 1970s, at international level, the PCI made its European choice and began to look at European integration as a process which could open up new opportunities.⁹ Furthermore, its condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and its critical position in the world conference of communist parties – held in Moscow, in 1969 – put the PCI on the edge between criticism and heresy. However, its undeniable tie with the Soviet Union and its communist legacy and ideology restricted the PCI to the opposition ranks. Since the 1960s, the gradual openings toward Leftist forces (first the Italian Socialist Party which took part in the Centre-Left government since 1963) made the PCI think that the international developments – e.g. détente and the democratic changes in the Mediterranean area – could forecast a new political placement for communist forces.¹⁰

From the very first moment, nevertheless, the leaders of the PCI were very aware that such a good development could become a trap. In September 1974, during a meeting among leaders, Berlinguer pointed out that the new “positive events” in Southern Europe could raise doubts and worries in the US leadership, “especially dealing with military and strategic issues”.¹¹

This understanding of the situation influenced the PCI’s perception in two ways in the key months before elections, in 1974 and 1975. First, the belief that – in the US policy – Italy was considered merely one actor among others in the wide context of the Mediterranean area: the central role that Italy could have had in the aftermath of the second WW was definitely over. Thus, the US policy towards Rome was determined by several factors: in front of the leftist shift of Southern Europe, the pos-

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7. Berlinguer had been Deputy Secretary since 1969; his influence had been growing during the long illness of Luigi Longo, officially the leader of the Party from 1964 to 1972. F. BARBAGALLO, *Enrico Berlinguer*, Carocci, Rome, 2006, pp.105 f.; see also: A. HÖBEL, *Il Pci di Luigi Longo, 1964-1968*, ESI, Napoli, 2010, pp.583-601.
 8. A. SANTONI, *Il PCI e i giorni del Cile. Alle origini di un mito politico*, Carocci, Rome, 2008; R. GUALTIERI, *L’Italia dal 1943 al 1992. DC e PCI nella storia della Repubblica*, Carocci, Rome, 2006, pp.52 f. and pp.165 f.
 9. M. LAZAR, *Maisons rouges. Les Partis communistes français et italien de la Libération à nos jours*, Aubier, Paris, 1992; A. VARSORI, *La cenerentola d’Europa? L’Italia e l’integrazione europea dal 1947 ad oggi*, Rubettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2010, pp.302-314.
 10. S. PONS, *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo*, Einaudi, Torino, 2006; L. NUTI, *Gli Stati Uniti e l’apertura a sinistra: importanza e limiti della presenza americana in Italia*, Laterza, Rome-Bari, 1999.
 11. IFG [Istituto Fondazione Gramsci], APCI [Archivio del Partito Comunista Italiano], Direzione, MF 079, Berlinguer’s speech, meeting, 12.09.1974, p.27.

sibility of interferences of any kind could increase, as the on-going anti-communist campaign was showing.¹²

Second, Italian communists believed that loyalty to NATO was definitely central in reassuring the Ford Administration about their democratic credibility. Since the end of 1974, on several occasions during private talks, Berlinguer stressed the need to calm Americans down about the Italian communists' wish to adopt a "non-unfriendly" policy towards the US. In doing this, Berlinguer did not mean to passively accept the American interference in the Italian domestic policy: the defence of the autonomy of the peninsula remained central in the strategy of the PCI. Nonetheless, Italian communists' public attempts to reassure the US about their position on foreign policy clearly showed that Berlinguer decided to follow a different strategy, based on the belief that the international process of détente could open new perspectives. This new approach – supported by the President of the Party Luigi Longo – did not arouse enthusiasm among Berlinguer's comrades. In particular, the long-term leaders Giorgio Amendola and Gian Carlo Pajetta marked their belief that the PCI undervalued dangers coming from the use of secret services and NATO bases for domestic and "not legitimated" actions. According to them, the Party had to focus on the persistence of the anti-imperialist struggle.¹³ On the contrary, other representatives of the Party – such as the former Head of the Foreign Department of the PCI, Carlo Galluzzi – pushed for a more realistic and concrete international policy of the PCI, based on the assumption that the Party had to take a new position on foreign policy issues, a position as a ruling party.¹⁴ As usually, Berlinguer was able to "make the synthesis" of the two different positions: a policy that was not prejudicially negative towards the United States and the renouncing to getting out of NATO were the official choices in the XIV Party Congress.¹⁵

Envisaging a "Western Europe" that was "neither anti-Soviet nor anti-American", Berlinguer announced that the PCI would not ask for the Italian withdrawal from the NATO. It was a significant change in the Party's strategy: as Silvio Pons has well underlined, in this doing Berlinguer benefited of the identification between Europeanism and Atlantism, taking the chance to "embrace the first in a credible way, while avoiding to adhere to the second unconditionally". So, the change in the Party's strategy did not mean that Italian communists became US fans: as Alessandro Brogi pointed out, Berlinguer was not less anti-American than the most part of his comrades.

12. In particular, Dario Valori: IFG, APCI, MF 208, Meeting among leaders, 23.10.1975, pp.377-401. About the importance of the Mediterranean context in understanding the Italian foreign policy: E. CALANDRI, *Il Mediterraneo nella politica estera italiana*, in: A. GIOVAGNOLI, S. PONS (eds), *L'Italia repubblicana nella crisi degli anni '70. Tra guerra fredda e distensione*, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2003, pp.351-382.

13. IFG, APCI, MF 81, Berlinguer's speech, meeting, 07.10.1974, pp.48-49; Longo's statement, meeting, 16.10.1974, p.85; Statements by Giorgio Amendola and Gian Carlo Pajetta, meeting, 07.10.1974, pp.48 f.

14. IFG, APCI, MF 205, Carlo Galluzzi's discourse, meeting, 19.06.1975, pp.82-102.

15. *XIV Congresso del Partito Comunista Italiano*, Editori Riuniti, Rome, 1975.

It was the PCI's realpolitik, based on the idea that the PCI had to develop a fruitful dialogue with all democratic forces of the Western bloc, realizing a Westpolitik.¹⁶

The US Interference in Italy: A Never-Ending Story?

Such a new attitude had to cope with the negative positions held by the US Administration towards the PCI, during the electoral campaign for the Italian administrative elections of June 1975. One month before the elections, *L'Espresso* revealed the US denied the entry permit to Giorgio Napolitano, one of the most prominent representatives of the moderate wing of the PCI.¹⁷ Napolitano had been invited to hold some seminars and conferences in the US by the University of Yale, Harvard, and Cornell and by the MIT. A few months later, the Pike Committee – in charge of investigating the use of covert actions abroad by the CIA – finished its work. Although Gerald Ford and his entourage tried to impede the publications of the outcome,¹⁸ it became known substantially confirming the US covert actions in Italy.¹⁹ The official press of the Party strongly denounced the illicit interventionism and interference in Italy by the United States, deprecating the anti-communist purpose of the US policy in Western Europe.²⁰

Even in the academic field – where the first analysis of the US interventionism in the late 1940s was promoted under the supervision of Ennio Di Nolfo – some pro-Leftist scholars and eminent representatives of the Party (such as Umberto Terracini)

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16. E. BERLINGUER, *La proposta comunista. Relazione del Comitato centrale e alla Commissione centrale di controllo del Partito Comunista Italiano in preparazione del XIV Congresso*, Einaudi, Torino, 1975; S. PONS, op.cit., pp.49 f.; A. BROGI, *Confronting America. The Cold War between the United States and the Communists in France and Italy*, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2011, p.312; about the Westernpolitik toward the SPD: A. GUERRA, *La solitudine di Berlinguer*, Ediesse, Rome, 2006, pp.157-160.
 17. *L'Espresso*, 18.05.1975.
 18. GFL, Folder: Italy, President Leone, box 56, Ford to Othys Pike, 15.01.1976; Memorandum for the President, 01.1976; GFL, Collection: John Marsh Files, Folder: Italy – Investigation of Alleged American payments to influence Italian politics, box 19, Thomas Morgan to Ford, 06.1976 and Brent Scowcroft to Thomas Morgan, 16.06.1976.
 19. About the support to neo-fascist and extremist forces in Italy, see: M. DEL PERO, *L'Italia e gli Stati Uniti: un legame rinnovato?*, in: F. ROMERO, A. VARSORI (eds), *Nazione, interdipendenza, integrazione. Le relazioni internazionali dell'Italia (1917-1989)*, vol.I, Carocci, Rome, 2005, pp. 310-311 and note 12, p.314. Among the popular literature, P. MASTROLILLI, M. MOLINARI, *L'Italia vista dalla CIA, 1948-2004*, Laterza, Bari/Rome, 2004.
 20. *L'Unità*, 18.01.1976. See also: V. BOSCO, *L'amministrazione Nixon e l'Italia*, Eurilink, Rome, 2009, p.219.

drew a parallel between 1975 and 1948 elections, denouncing the “subjugation” of Rome to Washington.²¹

Although official statements stressed the parallel to the US covert operations of 1948, minutes of private meetings among leaders revealed a little and limited concern about that. Analysing confidential encounters of the “Direzione”²² during the electoral campaign of 1976, we can surprisingly find a significant but not astonishing worry about political implications of the CIA at the beginning of the year, while a decreasing attention during and after elections. Just to make an example: in February 1976, Longo said that “there are all the makings for the creation of a situation beyond control”. Berlinguer – a few days after the elections, on 24 June 1976 – commented the influence of the US in very few lines, combining it with that of the Catholic Church and reducing its importance in the definition of the electoral weight of the Christian Democrats.²³

With regards to this, the PCI revealed a double-image of the United States: if the US political leadership in office was considered the worst representative of imperialism, the situation was bound to get better because of the general improvement of international relations. The faith in détente brought Italian leaders to think that the replacement of the American leadership in office would have probably modified the US foreign policy towards Western countries in a priori non-negative way concerning a possible participation of Leftist forces in the governments. According to the main leaders of the PCI, the last elections and the fall of three authoritarian regimes in Europe were clear signals that the situation was going to change: more democracy was needed, and such a necessity was closely linked to a demand for more autonomy from the US by the European national domestic contexts.²⁴ In fact, the US interventionism was seen as not affecting the Italian situation only: the PCI warned European social democrats about possible American interference, whose alleged aim was maintaining Europe in a condition of limited sovereignty. Since the mid-1970s – the PCI argued – there was a substantial correspondence between foreign and domestic policy

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21. S. GALANTE, *La politica del PCI e il Patto atlantico: Rinascita 1946-1949*, Marsilio, Padua, 1973; S. GALANTE, *La fine di un compromesso storico: PCI e DC nella crisi del 1947*, Franco Angeli, Milan, 1979; D. ARDIA, *Il Partito socialista e il Patto Atlantico*, Franco Angeli, Milan, 1976. See in particular the statements by Aurelio Macchioro and Umberto Terracini, E. AGA ROSSI, *Italia e Stati Uniti durante l'amministrazione Truman*, Franco Angeli, Milan, 1976, pp.51-53 and 188-198.
 22. The so-called “Direzione” was the party executive, the leading organization which set policy for the entire party at the national level.
 23. IFG, APCI, MF 0211, Meeting among leaders, 07.02.1976, pp.120 f; MF 239, Meeting among leaders, 24.06.1976, p.615. This opinion – that could seem as an exaggeration – was conditioned on one side, by rumours from the US Pike Commission about covert actions in Italy and, on the other, by the tragic Italian situation, upset by terrorist attacks. See: A. VENTURA (preface: C. FUMIAN), *Per una storia del terrorismo italiano*, Rome, Donzelli, 2010; P. CALOGERO, C. FUMIAN, M. SARTORI, *Terrone rosso: dall'autonomia al partito armato*, Rome-Bari, Laterza, 2010.
 24. *Rinascita*, 23.01.1976 and 12.03.1976. See: F. HEURTEBIZE, *Le peril rouge. Washington face à l'eurocommunisme*, Puf, Paris, 2014; F. HEURTEBIZE, *Washington face à la participation des communistes au gouvernement en Italie (1973-1979)*, in: *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire*, 1(2014), pp.95-111.

trends: in that moment, the situation could be modified thanks to the international context of détente.²⁵

Hopes related to a possible and significant change in the US policy (and ruling class) brought the PCI to follow a double path strategy, based on two main pillars. The first was the consistent confirmation that a communist participation in the government will not lead to a withdrawal from the Atlantic Alliance. Such affirmation was repeated several times by relevant representatives of the Party and confirmed by the well-known interview to Berlinguer by Giampaolo Pansa, at the eve of the Italian political elections of 1976.²⁶

The other relevant element of the Italian communists' policy in the mid-1970s became the increasing attention to the development of a dialogue with the United States. After the statement about the "historical compromise" by Enrico Berlinguer, Botteghe oscure began to attract the attention of some representative of the US institutions. In August 1974, the first Secretary of the US Embassy, Robert Boies, asked to establish a "successful dialogue" with the PCI, mentioning the possible change in the US attitude towards Italian communists due to the new Ford Administration.²⁷ In reality, the institutional dialogue was obviously a rocky road: thus, the PCI began to develop relationships with the academic and – more generally – the cultural arena of the United States.

Curiously, the idea that the US intellectuals could be interested in having contacts with Botteghe oscure emerged during a dialogue between the Italians and the Vietnamese Communists. The latter suggested to the PCI's leader the development of dialogue with parts of the American society that were not prejudicially negative to the communists, e.g. intellectuals, parliamentarians, students.²⁸

Some relevant communist intellectuals believed that such a suggestion could be useful. As Adriano Guerra reconstructed, the first contacts were established between the communist journalist Giuseppe Boffa and the American diplomat Peter Bridges.²⁹ Moreover, after his first trip to the States, Boffa pointed out that the PCI could find available interlocutors in parts of the academic field, the State Department, some progressive press, and the Democratic Party – especially the area close to Senator Edward Kennedy.³⁰ Boffa argued that those environments did not wish to be on friendly terms with the PCI; nevertheless, their attitude was characterized by a genuine interest towards the Italian communists' evolution. The journalist of *L'Unità*

25. *Rinascita*, 16.04.1976, 23.07.1976 and 11.06.1976.

26. As precedent, we can quote: *Rinascita*, 30.05.1975. The interview by Gianpaolo Pansa was published on the newspaper *Corriere della Sera*, 13.06.1976, IFG, APCI, MF 239, pp.1158-1171.

27. IFG, APCI, MF 080, Note about meeting between Segre and Boies, 13.08.1974, p.401. This argument has been developed in-depth in: V. LOMELLINI, *Bisbigliando al 'nemico'? Il PCI alla svolta del 1973, tra nuove strategie verso Washington e tradizionale antiamericanismo*, in: *Ricerche di Storia Politica*, 1(2013), pp.25-44.

28. IFG, APCI, MF 032, Meeting of the "Direzione", 26.04.1972, pp.610-624.

29. A. GUERRA, op.cit., p.125; see also: G. BOFFA, *Memorie del comunismo. Storia confidenziale di quarant'anni che hanno cambiato l'Europa*, Ponte alle Grazie, Firenze, 1998, pp.165 f.

30. IFG, APCI, MF 206, Notes by Giuseppe Boffa, 21.05.1975, pp.332-337.

warmly suggested favouring such relationships in the belief that developing relationships with the academic world could improve the dialogue with the US political arena.

Since the mid-1970s onwards, Italian communists believed that cultural dialogue was not simply a way to deepen dialogue with the US, but the main tactic to do so. The cultural aspect and, in particular, the dialogue between the PCI and the “professors’ club” – as they were called – is absolutely central in understanding the Italian communists’ attitude towards, and hopes in prospect of improvement with Carter’s entourage, first, and administration, later.

The role played by some scholars seemed – at a first glance – very relevant indeed. In particular, some italianists such as Joseph La Palombara, Sidney Tarrow and Peter Lange – who were also occasional consultants for the Department of State – were perceived by the Italian communists as key characters in the re-definition of the PCI image in the US and also abroad. To the Italian communists, US intellectuals’ statements on the Italian press promised the new dynamism of Washington. In doing this, a key role was played by Stanley Hoffman, chairman of Harvard’s Centre for European Studies from its creation in 1969 to the mid-1990s. In Italian communists’ mind, he gave his contribution in condemning the logic of the Cold War and its consequences in terms of domestic policy in the Western bloc, conditioning the view of the State Department about the politics toward the PCI.³¹

A relevant centre of interest for what was happening in the PCI and – more generally – in the Italian political context was the review *Foreign Affairs*, published under the Council for Foreign Relations. Sergio Segre, the Head of the Foreign Department of the PCI, made regular contacts with William Bundy, editor of *Foreign Affairs* from 1972 to 1984, who repeatedly asked Segre to write articles about the strategy of the PCI.³² Zygmunt Nagorski, the Secretary of the Council of Foreign Relations, in several occasions publicly expressed his belief that the Italian Communist Party was a democratic political actor, whose line was based on the legacy of the well-known leader Palmiro Togliatti. Nagorski openly supported the idea that the US had to open dialogue with the PCI: ignoring signals coming from Botteghe oscure could have been an “errore madornale”.³³ Furthermore, after the formation of the so called “governo delle astensioni”, the Director of *Foreign Affairs*, Robert Chase, had come to say that his group was disappointed by the PCI because of its caution in directly taking

31. Interview of the author with Joseph La Palombara, 30.01.2010; IFG, APCI, MF 204, Note by Starubin, 17.04.1975, pp.541-542.

32. IFG, APCI, MF 212, William Bundy to Sergio Segre, 18.12.1975, pp.296-297. Bundy wrote also a key book on the foreign policy of the Presidency Nixon: W. BUNDY, *A tangled web*, Tauris, London/New York, 1998.

33. *Daily American*, 18.07.1975.

part in the Italian Government, an option his group would have been glad to support.³⁴

Generally, such a positive attitude was welcomed among the leaders of the PCI, who publicly took a favourable position regarding such forces. Commenting the US decision to deny an entry permit to Napolitano, in spring 1975, the official newspaper of the PCI – *L'Unità* – stressed

“the value and the meaning of the fighting positions of reliable cultural and democratic people committed to defending the principles of freedom and tolerance”.

The positions of Lange or Kogan became the undeniable point of reference for criticizing the attitude of the Ford Administration, emphasising the existence of “another America”, which was more sensitive and open to the “need of socialism”.³⁵

Some members of the PCI – especially the journalists who attended as observers of the Party in Washington – warned Italian communist leaders to be cautious in considering the attention of such US groups: Carlo Maria Santoro openly talked about a “mistrustful kindness” by these American political actors, due to doubts about a possible fallback by the PCI to pro-Soviet positions, in a situation of crisis of international relations.³⁶ Steve Hellman, one of the US intellectuals who worked on the PCI, in our recent interview commented:

“The PCI leadership badly overestimated the influence of US intellectuals, and also misunderstood, due to projecting what it would have liked to see onto reality, the way the US political system operates”.³⁷

The Italian communist leaders probably were not so naive as to believe that American intellectuals could change the way of the US foreign policy. They probably assumed that the development of international relations and détente, jointly with the influence of the professors' group, could condition the domestic Italian situation. During the US Presidential campaign, contacts with some key members of Carter's entourage made Italian communists understand that they would pave the way for a more positive attitude toward the PCI.

34. The strange formula meant that the PCI – being the second party of the country in the elections in 1976 – allowed the government to survive thanks to its votes although it did not take part directly in the government. See S. COLARIZI et al. (eds), *Gli anni Ottanta come storia*, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2004, pp.119-184 and 190-191. See also IFG, APCI, MF 280, Notes by Corsini, 08.11.1976, p.375.

35. *L'Unità*, 18.01, 23.03 and 16.05.1974.

36. IFG, APCI, MF 0281, Notes by Carlo Maria Santoro, 09.12.1976, pp.476-478.

37. Interview with Stephen Hellman, 20.09.2010.

Foreign Affairs, Brzezinski and the Role of the L'Espresso Group

In 1975-1976, we could mention at least two occasions when the US-PCI cultural connection became a more political one. Drawing closer to the Presidential elections in the US, the Democratic Party began to show its concern about foreign political actors. Zbigniew Brzezinski – who would become in a few months the National Security Advisor during the Carter presidency – was the key character in the development of such a relationship for two reasons: first, he was one of the most prominent analysts of *Foreign Affairs*, the review which shaped – as we have argued – the PCI as a democratic and trustable force in the US and abroad the idea. Second, because Brzezinski established a close link with the *L'Espresso* group, led by the eminent publisher Arrigo Benedetti, owner of the homonym magazine and of the new-born newspaper *La Repubblica*, the journal that was destined to become a main point of reference in the opinion making of the progressive Italian electorate.

In January 1976, Mauro Calamandrei – the official correspondent of *L'Espresso* in Washington – reported to Segre a message from Brzezinski: the Polish-born politician believed that it was the best time to open a public debate, in Calamandrei's magazine, about the policy of the democratic candidate Carter dealing with Italy and, particularly, the PCI. The main idea – already arose during 1975 – was to open a debate with two or three Italian communist leaders.

Brzezinski – Calamandrei continued – would make known that American democrats had a different position, compared to the republicans, towards the PCI and its participation in the Italian political life. In this doing, Brzezinski would have been able to bring together positive positions emerged on the press, in the academic field as well as within the Congress and the Department of State.³⁸

Such a kind of proposal did not come out of the blue: during 1975, Brzezinski was interviewed and published articles a couple of times in *L'Espresso*.³⁹ The magazine actively contributed to shape the image of a substantial change in the US political arena towards the PCI, sometimes even announcing meetings between Italian communists and American politicians that had never happened.⁴⁰ The magazine stressed also very much the development of pro-PCI positions in the US ruling class, particularly among members of the Democratic Party. In another interview, Brzezinski had the chance to denounce the foreign policy of Kissinger, a “nineteen-century” strategy based on the obsession to maintain unchanged political equilibria. A democratic government – said implicitly Brzezinski – would have changed key elements of the US foreign policy: the attitude towards the PCI was one of them.

Openly criticizing the US Ambassador John Volpe, Brzezinski declared:

“Let's take the case of the PCI. A smart foreign policy could not ignore the reality of a Party that reached the consensus of a third of the electorate. I do not believe that the US

38. IFG, APCI, MF 0212, Confidential note by Sergio Segre, 09.01.1976, pp.306-307.

39. *L'Espresso*, 23.02 and 27.04.1975.

40. This is the case of a meeting on August 1975 between Segre and Ford: *L'Espresso*, 17.08.1975.

government has to encourage this or that party [...]. The most essential thing is to have a long-term strategy and one of the principles of such a strategy must be strengthening democratic institutions. With regards this, the democratization of the PCI should be encouraged".⁴¹

Benedetti was not the only matchmaker between the PCI and the American Democratic Party: as Segre has pointed out during our interview, the well-known Fiat entrepreneur Gianni Agnelli played a similar role, informing the PCI of his talks in Washington and introducing Italian communist leaders to those of the Democratic Party.⁴² This aspect clearly emerged during an official dinner with Senator Edward Kennedy, where Segre took part. On the eve of the US elections, Kennedy repeated the official position of the Democrats about the PCI. The United States would evaluate its developments on the basis of four elements: attitude towards the EEC, behaviour towards NATO, approach regarding the United States and the democratic institutions. Agnelli put forward the idea of a meeting between Kennedy and Napolitano but the first refused, arguing that he did not want to put Carter in trouble. But the way seemed paved: as Kennedy mentioned during a meeting in autumn 1976, his visit in Italy meant "the actualization of the availability [of the US Democrats] to communicate and open a dialogue" with the PCI.

Such a talk seemed to corroborate Italian communists' feeling that something was changing in Washington. Segre – the main contact both for the US and the SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) – believed such an attention was not merely due to tactics played during the electoral campaign. On September 1976, just two months before American elections, Brzezinski made a strong impression on Segre. Once more, they met during a dinner organized by Agnelli and, remembering their previous encounter, they openly talked about relations between the PCI and Carter group. Segre commented:

"Today he [Brzezinski] could not push himself too far, but he is a man open to dialogue and to news; in any case, his staff follows carefully Italian political developments and the position of the PCI".⁴³

Conclusions

Did Italian communist leaders truly believe that the US policy could change towards them? Did they really believe the US intellectuals were able to modify the American foreign policy regarding communists' participation in the government? Were these hopes the outcome of a naïve understanding of the reality?

41. *L'Espresso*, 19.10.1975.

42. Interview of the author with Sergio Segre, Rome, October 2009.

43. IFG, APCI, MF 280, Confidential notes by Segre, 13.11.1976, pp.397-398 and 24.09.1976, pp. 427-428.

As far as we can see from archive documents, Italian communist leaders did not become US fans: in public statements, the PCI clearly claimed the end of the US interferences in the political affairs of the peninsula, refusing the idea that it had to give evidences of its democratic credibility.⁴⁴

However, interviews and documents show that they assumed that their chances to get into government were strongly related to their ability to show their independence from Moscow in particular on foreign policy.

Therefore, in Italian communists' analysis, the dialogue with the professors' club was part of a wider strategy, a kind of "Westpolitik" that the PCI developed to re-set its position in the international arena (and, consequently, in the domestic).

Jointly to the dialogue with the "other America", détente and a replacement of the US administration in office could change their political fate, giving the chance to get into government, following the way of the opening up to the PSI in the late 1960s. Such hopes were strengthened by the first declarations of the new elected President Jimmy Carter and by enthusiastic comments of the Italian communist observers in Washington.⁴⁵

In the end, all these hopes came to naught: the well-known US State Department's declaration of January 1978 clarified that the newly elected President would not change American policy regarding a possible participation of Italian communists in the government. The sunset of détente and the growing opposition to this openness in the US domestic context (namely by the conservatives and the US-Italian community) led Carter administration to a more cautious fall-back.⁴⁶ Domestic events then contributed to isolate the PCI: the kidnapping and murder of the main Christian Democrat interlocutor, Aldo Moro, the end of the government of "solidarietà nazionale" with the negative votes about the Italian adhesion to the Economic Monetary System and the euro missiles crisis, among the most important factors, re-shaped the Italian political situation.⁴⁷

The PCI's chance was already over and Italy had to wait for the 1990s to have its first Leftist Prime Minister.⁴⁸

44. *L'Unità*, 23.03.1976, p.1.

45. L. COMINELLI, *L'Italia sotto tutela. Stati Uniti, Europa e crisi italiana negli anni Settanta*, Le Monnier, Firenze, forthcoming.

46. F. HEURTEBIZE, op.cit., pp.110-111; U. GENTILONI SILVERI, op.cit., p.206; A. BROGI, op.cit., p.344.

47. About the consequences of the Euromissiles issue in the Italian Left situation: M. GERVASONI, *La guerra delle sinistre. Socialisti e comunisti dal 68 a Tangentopoli*, Marsilio, Venice, 2013, pp. 86-93.

48. S. COLARIZI, M. GERVASONI, *La tela di Penelope. Storia della Seconda Repubblica*, Laterza, Rome-Bari, 2012, pp.109-110.

NATO and Eurocommunism. The Fear of a Weakening of the Southern Flank from the mid-1970s to mid-1980s

Nikolas DÖRR

In December 1967, the NATO strategy, colloquially referred to as “massive retaliation”, was replaced by the new strategy of “flexible response” with the document MC 14/3. The report “Future Tasks of the Alliance”, prepared by the former Belgian Prime Minister and then Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel and adopted by the NATO Council in December 1967 had had a central influence on the development of this new strategy.¹

In contrast to the previous massive retaliation doctrine Harmel did not see the need for military deterrence by NATO being at variance with the establishment of a form of détente with communist states. Following Harmel, security was only possible if military defence and détente went hand in hand. The report called on the Member States to bring about improvement in their relations with the Soviet Union and other communist states. Ideally, these efforts should be coordinated between the NATO countries to prevent a disparate alliance.

While détente was propagated outwardly, massive conflicts emerged within the Alliance in the 1970s that contributed to a significant weakening of NATO. This crisis peaked with the Eurocommunist electoral successes from the mid to the late 1970s.² Conflicts such as the withdrawal of France from the military integration of NATO in 1966; the “Cod Wars” between the United Kingdom and Iceland (partially also between the Federal Republic of Germany and the mentioned countries); the Turkish invasion and occupation of Northern Cyprus and the following tensions between Greece and Turkey, with the exit of Greece from the military integration of NATO in 1974; the withdrawal of the British forces from Malta; the emergence of Soviet-sponsored regimes of Arab socialism in the Southern Mediterranean; the Middle East conflict and the ongoing crisis between the United Kingdom and Spain over Gibraltar weakened NATO.³ With the exception of Iceland these crises invariably concerned the Mediterranean and thus the Southern flank of the Western defence

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1. The Future Tasks of the Alliance. Report of the Council – “The Harmel Report”, in: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_26700.htm (02.04.2014).
 2. For a definition of Eurocommunism, cf. M. AZCARATE, *What is Eurocommunism?*, in: G.R. URBAN (ed.), *Eurocommunism. Its Roots and Future in Italy and Elsewhere*, Temple Smith, London, 1978, pp.13-31. See also H. KISSINGER, *Communist Parties in Western Europe. Challenge*, in: A. RANNEY, G. SARTORI (eds), *Eurocommunism. The Italian Case*, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington DC, 1978, pp.189-193.
 3. Cf. D. LEEBAERT (ed.), *European security. Prospects for the 1980s*, Lexington Books, Lexington (Mass.), 1979, pp.107-134.

alliance, which had been defined in an internal NATO report from 1974 as “one of the world’s most politically unstable areas”.⁴

In the following, the image of Eurocommunism as a threat to NATO will be closely examined. It will be shown that it represented the background for a great uncertainty in the security policy of NATO as well as parts of the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America. Eurocommunism was less of a real threat to NATO. The term was rather used as a projection screen of fears during the Cold War. In this way the concept was highly politicized. This led to misperceptions in the analysis of Eurocommunist parties by NATO and conservative politicians in the member states of the Alliance.

This article is based on research in the NATO Archives in Brussels, the Archive of Social Democracy in Bonn, the Archive for Christian Social Policy in Munich, the Archive for Christian Democratic Policy in St. Augustin, the Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office in Berlin, the British National Archives in Kew, the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library in Ann Arbor and the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library in Atlanta.

The threat to NATO from within

The success of the Eurocommunist parties in the West led not only to political but also military uncertainties.⁵ In the most important NATO Member States in Europe, apart from the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, the communist parties of Italy and France experienced electoral successes. These parties were successful at the municipal, regional and state level and could also boast an increase of membership. In Spain, a country that was particularly important for Western European security and a potential NATO Member State, the Communist Party with its charismatic leader Santiago Carrillo was also a factor to consider. At the same time, there was uncertainty about the strength of the Communists in the post-dictatorial NATO countries Portugal and Greece. Therefore, the NATO leaders acknowledged, at the height of the Eurocommunist movement, that the observation and analysis of the political situation in these countries was a top priority.⁶

4. NATO Archives/Archives de l’OTAN in Brussels, Defence Planning 1971-1975, Flanks, DPC/D(74)9, Alliance Defence Problems for the Planning Committee, Report of the Defence Planning Committee, 07.06.1974.

5. Cf. R. GODSON, S. HASELER, “Eurocommunism”. *Implications for East and West*, Macmillan, London, 1978, pp.104-112.

6. GFPL [Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor], White House Central File, Subject File, International Organizations, IT 50 North Atlantic Treaty Organization 7/1/75 (executive) to IT 52 Organization of American States, IT 50 NATO 7/1/75-12/31/75, Box 5, Press release “President’s Meeting with NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns”, 10.02.1976.

Electoral strength of communist parties in NATO Member States⁷			
Country	Year of election	Percentage of CPs	Seats in Parliament
Belgium ⁸	1977	1,1	0
Canada	1979	0,2	0
Denmark	1977	10,3	19
France	1978	20,6	86
West Germany	1976	0,5	0
Greece	1977	12,1	13
Iceland	1978	23,0	9
Italy	1976	36,0	234
Luxembourg	1979	6,9	3
Netherlands	1977	2,6	3
Norway	1977	5,2	2
Portugal	1976	16,1	41
Spain ⁹	1977	15,0	27
Turkey	1977	0,1	0
United Kingdom	1979	0,2	0
USA	1976	0,2	0

Since French President Charles de Gaulle had decided to withdraw from the military integration of NATO in 1966, the military strength of Italy – the country had

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7. These are the results of the parliamentary elections in the heyday of Eurocommunism from the mid to the late 1970s. In plurality voting systems only the result of the first election round is shown. The result of the United States is based on the presidential election in 1976.
8. Belgium: Communist Party of Belgium, Canada: Communist Party of Canada and Communist Party of Canada (Marxist-Leninist), Denmark: Communist Party of Denmark, Socialist People's Party and Left Socialists, France: French Communist Party, West Germany: German Communist Party, Communist Party of Germany (AO) and Communist League of West Germany, Greece: Communist Party of Greece and Progress and Left Forces Alliance, Iceland: People's Alliance and Communist Party of Iceland (Marxist-Leninist), Italy: Italian Communist Party, Proletarian Democracy and Proletarian Unity Party, Luxembourg: Communist Party of Luxembourg and Independent Socialist Party, Netherlands: Communist Party of the Netherlands and Pacifist Socialist Party, Norway: Socialist Left Party, Red Electoral Alliance and Communist Party of Norway, Portugal: Portuguese Communist Party and People's Democratic Union, Spain: Communist Party of Spain, People's Socialist Party, Catalan Left-Democratic Electoral Front and Euskadiko Ezkerra, Turkey: Workers Party of Turkey, United Kingdom: Communist Party of Great Britain and Workers Revolutionary Party, USA: Communist Party USA and Socialist Workers Party.
9. Spain became a Member State of NATO on 30 May 1982.

an army of 362,000 soldiers in 1978/79¹⁰ – gained in importance. However, the country's membership in NATO would have been in danger, if Italy got a communist government. Hans-Christian Pilster, former head of the Amt für Militärkunde of the Bundeswehr, mentioned the good relations between the administration of communist-ruled cities and regions in Italy and the military departments, thus stressing communist influence within the army. In addition, the Communist Party of Italy had become increasingly attractive for the lower ranks of the army since the early 1970s.¹¹

Although the Italian government, due to the precarious financial situation in the late 1970s, spent only 2.4 percent of its gross domestic product on its military budget, and the Italian army used mostly outdated machinery and weapons, Italy was vital for NATO. Not only had Italy a large number of soldiers at its disposal, the Italian army was also a leading force in some special areas within the Western military alliance that were considered central to the security of the Mediterranean and the Alps in the event of an attack by the armies of the Warsaw Pact. These included mainly the speedboats of the Italian Navy, the special unit of the combatant divers as well as the parachute and mountain troops.¹²

In addition to the Italian army, the logistical and operational function of Italian territory was seen as essential for NATO. The VI US Fleet, for example, was stationed in Gaeta and the fifth tactical air fleet (ATAF) of NATO had its base in Vicenza. The island of La Maddalena, which belongs to Sardinia, served as a base for nuclear-powered submarines. The NATO headquarters for Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) was located in Naples and the NATO Defence College, the central training institution of the Alliance, was stationed in Rome. In several bases, most of which were located in the Northeast of Italy, nuclear weapons of NATO were stored as part of the nuclear sharing concept. These nuclear weapons would have been provided in the case of an attack.

Italian Eurocommunism as an internal threat to NATO

The supposed threat to Western security by the Communist Party of Italy was one of the central themes within the NATO's bodies before the Italian parliamentary elections of 20 June 1976. A possible government involvement would have given the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI) the right to name high ranking members of the government. Ministers and Secretaries of State from the Italian Communist Party could have there-

10. Cf. D.S. LUTZ, A. POTT, *Südeuropa. Eurokommunistisches Problemfeld der NATO?*, in: D.S. LUTZ (ed.), *Eurokommunismus und NATO. Zukunftsprobleme europäischer Sicherheit*, Osang, Bonn, 1979, p.17.

11. Cf. H.C. PILSTER, *Eurokommunismus. Eine Gefahr für die Sicherheit der NATO?*, in: *Politische Studien*, 247(1979), p.462.

12. Cf. G. SCHREIBER, *Italiens Marine 1978. Bestandsaufnahme und Ausblick*, in: *Marine-Rundschau*, 1(1979), pp.42-44; R. MENNEL, *Die wehrgeographische Bedeutung Italiens für die Südflanke der NATO*, in: *Wehrkunde*, 3(1974), p.143.

fore attended meetings of NATO committees. NATO Officials were especially anxious that communist office holders would take part in the meetings of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). The NPG was created in 1966 for the coordination of the nuclear weapons strategy of the Alliance.¹³ Thus the NPG automatically belonged to the most secret and most important NATO bodies and was obviously no place for the participation of communists, in the opinion of NATO officials.

Although the PCI leadership had announced before the election that the party was not interested in the Ministry of Defence in case the Communists would be included in the government, the fears within NATO were thereby hardly dismissed. As dramatically described in the words of Hans-Christian Pilster, NATO seemed for the majority of security policymakers impossible with a communist participation:

“Whether to proceed to an amputation or an aseptic treatment of the infected member of the Alliance will be a pragmatic decision”.¹⁴

“Eurocommunism” was extensively discussed in the North Atlantic Assembly, which today is the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. The topic of “Take-over of governmental power by the Communist Parties” was set on the agenda of the 22nd Annual Meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly from 14 to 19 November 1976 in Williamsburg, Virginia. In a resolution, which had been drafted by the Political Committee, the majority of the General Assembly spoke out against the government participation of communist parties in any NATO member states:

“The General Assembly [...] is of the opinion that with regard to the public opinion the necessary continuation of defence policy would be affected negatively in the West, if one were to believe the declarations of some of the mentioned communist parties”.¹⁵

The Resolution of the annual General Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA), NATO’s most important lobby group, stressed in August 1977 in Reykjavik that Eurocommunist parties had to be analysed with caution because they were “masters of deception”.¹⁶ General Alexander Haig, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander for Europe and later US Secretary of State under President Ronald Reagan, stated in an article a few months after the Italian parliamentary election that Western

13. “The NPG is the essential instrument by which the NATO governments can develop policies and guidelines for military planning and procedures for effective consultation and decision-making regarding the possible defensive use of nuclear weapons by NATO”. Communiqué of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, adopted at the 15th Ministerial Meeting on 11-12. June 1974 in Bergen, Norway in: ASD [Archive of Social Democracy in the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, Bonn], Bruno Friedrich papers, NATO materials, 1/BFAA001151, Bulletin of the Federal Government, 22.06.1974, p.743.

14. H.C. PILSTER, *op.cit.*, p.468.

15. Information of the German Delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly in: ASD, Bruno Friedrich papers, NATO materials, 1/BFAA001151, Bulletin of the German Bundestag 8/27, 30.12.1976, p.6.

16. JCPL [Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta], White House Central File, Subject File, International Organizations, Executive IT 45/A 1/20/77-1/20/81 through Executive IT 67 6/1/78-1/20/81, IT 67 6/1/77-12/31/77, Box IT-5, Final Resolution of the XXIIIrd Annual Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association, 26.-29.08.1977, p.2.

Europe did no longer feel “the impulse of fear” towards communism.¹⁷ Nearly a year later, he warned in a speech at the Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU) in Paris that in the case of a communist government participation in NATO Member States severe problems would arise regarding the submission of secret security information to these countries.¹⁸ In addition, these communist infiltrated governments would play a reduced role in Western security policy and would also encourage for cuts in the defence budget.¹⁹

Besides the potential participation of Eurocommunist parties in the government, the possible inclusion of (Euro)communist delegates in the North Atlantic Assembly was perceived as a threat to the security of NATO. The North Atlantic Assembly discussed the issue which had become acute by the addition of two communist delegates from Italy and one from France to the Committee on Defence and Armaments of the WEU Parliamentary Assembly. In the wake of the meeting in Reykjavik in early April 1977 the International Secretariat prepared a paper which indicated that in the case of a proportional composition of the NATO Parliamentary delegations, communists from Italy, France, Portugal, Greece and Iceland would be allowed to participate in the meetings. The conservative politician and former German Minister of Justice Richard Jaeger, who also gave a detailed presentation on the “dangers” of Eurocommunism, voiced the opinion that the work of the North Atlantic Assembly would be meaningless if communists participated in it.²⁰ Communists in the Parliamentary Assembly of NATO would be a “*Contradictio in adjecto*”. Jaeger, who was also President of the Atlantic Treaty Association, preferred the abolition of the Assembly rather than allowing communist delegates to participate, as, in his view, this was still better than to “assist the enemy.” Especially German Social Democrats had previously argued for a proportional representation of delegates in the Assembly including communists. The accusation of the former General Secretary of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and then Chairman of the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation Bruno Heck that some Social Democrats dreamed of a new security policy including Eurocommunists against the United States was, however, clearly exaggerated.²¹

17. Alexander Haig quoted in: Amerika-Dienst der US-Botschaft Bonn, in: ASD, Eugen Selbmann papers, NATO, 91/1, Oktober 1976, p.1.

18. Previously there had been two NATO Member States with communist participation in government. The participation of the People's Alliance in the Icelandic government deemed irrelevant because Iceland did not provide troops for NATO. In post-revolutionary Portugal no secret information had been forwarded to the government for a certain period.

19. Haig warnt vor dem Eurokommunismus, in: *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 01.12.1977.

20. Jaeger saw the danger of deception by Eurocommunist delegates. They would receive sensitive information in the meetings which they might transmit to Moscow afterwards. Eurocommunist delegates would also try to influence decisions of the North Atlantic Assembly for the purposes of the Soviet Union. In this way they would act like a Trojan horse. ACSP [Archive for Christian Social Policy in the Hanns-Seidel-Foundation, Munich], Richard Jaeger papers, A:291, speech manuscript for the meeting of the for the meeting of the Standing Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly on 1/2 April 1977 in Reykjavik, Iceland.

21. ACDP [Archive for Christian Democratic Policy, St. Augustin], Bruno Heck papers, 01-022, 015/2, Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, SWR II, Bruno Heck on issues of Eurocommunism, July 31, 1976, 02.08.1976.

A long discussion about the acceptance of communists in the Assembly followed, in which, as expected, the representatives of the conservative, christian democratic and liberal parties were in opposition to a communist involvement in NATO bodies. Finally, the decision was taken by the Assembly to maintain the status quo of exclusion of communists as long as possible.²² But since the national parliaments were responsible for the nomination of the delegates, this could only be interpreted as a recommendation. Eventually, it took until 1984 before the first communist delegates could take their seats in the North Atlantic Assembly.

The United States, NATO and Eurocommunism

Against the background of NATO's crisis mentioned above, the increasing popularity of Eurocommunist parties in Western Europe was regarded with particular concern in the United States. As a result of the success of the Italian Communists in the regional elections of 1975 the House of Representatives prepared a report on the situation of NATO's Southern flank. For this purpose, a group of members of the House Committee on International Relations was sent to Europe from 5 to 27 August 1975. They were supposed to gain information about the strength of Eurocommunist parties in the European NATO countries and to discuss the topic in the NATO head-quarter SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) in Belgium.²³ Chairman of the delegation was the Democratic Congressman Leo J. Ryan.

The report of the delegation stressed that the strength of the communists was a problem for NATO especially in Italy and Portugal. In addition, the Western Alliance was significantly weakened by the withdrawal of Greece from the military integration of NATO and the anti-American stance of the Turkish government after the establishment of the arms embargo by the United States Congress in the wake of the Cyprus conflict. Similarly, the US delegation described the foreseeable end of the Franco dictatorship in Spain as a factor of uncertainty for Southern Europe.²⁴

In addition to these political threats to the alliance, an economic one existed. Due to the worldwide recession after the first oil price crisis, the military budgets of all NATO member countries were under great pressure.

Finally, a psychological component was added. Ryan claimed in his report that the détente policy had led to a dilution of the original mission of NATO in the eyes

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22. ACSP, Richard Jaeger papers, A:291, U 40 SC (77) 25 – Minutes of the meeting of the Standing Committee held in Reykjavik, Iceland, 01./02. April 1977, International Secretariat, p.13.
 23. JCPL, White House Central File, Subject File, International Organizations, Executive IT 45/A 1/20/77-1/20/81 through Executive IT 67 6/1/78-1/20/81, IT 67 1/20/77-5/31/77, Box IT-5, NATO: Pressures from the Southern Tier. Report of a Study Mission to Europe, October 1975.
 24. The Spanish dictator Francisco Franco Bahamonde died just three months after the European tour of the Congressmen on 20 November 1975 in Madrid.

of many Western Europeans but also in North America.²⁵ Congressman Ryan recommended that the United States should increase its pressure on the European NATO partners so that they would contribute more to the costs of the alliance in the future.

In the case of Portugal the report recommended a defensive position of US diplomacy until the post-revolutionary conflicts calmed down. In contrast to Portugal the US government should be very active in Spain and should push for a NATO membership as soon as possible after the expected death of Franco. Concerning Italy the political and military strategists in Washington DC were advised to develop a scenario in which the Italian Communists achieved the majority in parliament and the government. Ryan considered this probable and therefore recommended a suitable preparation.

The report referred to particularly worrisome rumours that the Italian Communists would receive up to 54 million US dollars annually from the Soviet Union. The report therefore demanded a more precise observation and analysis of the Communist Party of Italy:

“We can no longer pretend that the PCI does not exist, officially. The attitude of the PCI toward the United States just might be influenced to some extent by our attitude toward the PCI”.

The delegation of congressmen therefore argued for direct talks with high-ranking officials of the Italian Communists to gain better information about the PCI. This idea was finally rejected on the advice of the US Embassy in Rome.

The US delegation found the most explicit rejection of a communist participation in government in Italy at the NATO headquarter SHAPE:

“There is a considerable resistance at NATO headquarter to the idea that NATO should change to allow for future changes in the governments of the southern tier countries, including possible participation of indigenous Communist parties. The view was expressed that NATO should not be like a salad bar where each country can take and give only what it wants or finds convenient”.²⁶

NATO leaders in Brussels considered the military situation to be good on the Northern flank, improving in the centre and significantly weakened on the Southern flank.

Following the success of the PCI in the parliamentary election of 20 June 1976 the intelligence service of the US State Department, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) headed by the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Harold H. Saunders, expected in a memorandum to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that Italy would reduce its contribution to NATO because of the communist influence on the government of Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti.²⁷ He was convinced that, even without taking part in Andreotti's government, the PCI would play a greater

25. JCPL, Report of a Study Mission to Europe, October 1975, op.cit., p.1.

26. Ibid., pp.2-12.

27. The PCI came in second, gaining 227 seats in the Chamber of Deputies (34,4%) and 116 seats in the Senate of the Republic (33,8%).

role in the foreign and security policy of Italy.²⁸ Despite the assumed increased influence of the PCI on foreign and security policy the INR did not expect an Italian withdrawal from NATO. That was also in accordance with the party program of the Communists which stated that any unilateral withdrawal from one of the two military blocs would endanger the balance of power and détente.²⁹ However, it was assumed that the PCI would advocate further cuts in the defence budget and a restructuring of NATO in order to minimize the dominance of the United States. Only increased Soviet pressure on Tito's Yugoslavia would move the PCI into a more US and NATO-friendly position. Due to the veto power of the PCI in Parliament the conservative Prime Minister Andreotti could no longer appoint outspoken anti-communists to high ranking positions of the military and intelligence services. In addition, Saunders believed that the communists might use their power in Parliament and the relevant committees in order to influence the necessary restructuring of the Italian military intelligence service Servizio Informazioni Difesa (SID).³⁰

The Memorandum of the State Department intelligence service acknowledged that the US administration had regular contacts with the Italian Christian Democrats and the Vatican, while there was only an irregular relationship with the Socialist Party. Concerning the Italian Communists there were only rare contacts on the lowest level. The INR saw this as disadvantageous.³¹

In the most populous NATO country in Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany, a significant percentage of the population expected a reduced defence capability of NATO, when communists would move into the governments of NATO Member States. The US Information Agency collected data on this topic in late 1977 using a questionnaire, which looked at the attitudes to Eurocommunism and its relationship with NATO.³² US President Jimmy Carter's National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and the expert for Western Europe in the National Security Council Robert E. Hunter took part in the development of the questionnaire.³³

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28. GFPL, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Country File: Italy (1), Italy (9), Box 8, Briefing Memorandum from Harold H. Saunders to Henry Kissinger, 02.12.1976, pp.2-8.
 29. Cf. N. KOGAN, *The Italian Communist Party. The Modern Prince at the Crossroads*, in: R.L. TÖKÉS (ed.): *Eurocommunism and Détente*, New York University Press, New York, 1978, p.124.
 30. GFPL, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Country File: Italy (1), Italy (9), Box 8, Briefing Memorandum from Harold H. Saunders to Henry Kissinger, 02.12.1976, pp.8 f.
 31. Cf. R.N. GARDNER, *Mission Italy. On the Front Lines of the Cold War*, Rowan & Littlefield, Lanham, 2005, pp.10 and 113-121.
 32. JCPL, White House Central File, Subject File, International Organizations, Executive IT 45/A 1/20/77-1/20/81 through Executive IT 67 6/1/78-1/20/81, IT 67 6/1/77-12/31/77, Box IT-5, USIA Survey Questionnaire on Eurocommunism Issues, 01.11.1977.
 33. JCPL, White House Central File, Subject File, International Organizations, Executive IT 45/A 1/20/77-1/20/81 through Executive IT 67 6/1/78-1/20/81, IT 67 6/1/77-12/31/77, Box IT-5, Memorandum from Gregory F. Treverton to Zbigniew Brzezinski, November 1977; Executive IT 45/A 1/20/77-1/20/81 through Executive IT 67 6/1/78-1/20/81, IT 67 6/1/77-12/31/77, Box IT-5, Harold E. Engle to Robert E. Hunter, 04.11.1977.

The survey was conducted in November 1977 in West Germany. Following a few initial questions on the attitude towards the United States and NATO, the communist parties in France, Italy, Portugal and Spain had to be evaluated in their relation to the Soviet Union by the survey participants. It was also asked for which side the French Communist Party would decide in the event of a crisis between the West and the Soviet Union. Three questions were related to the effects of a communist government participation in France vis-à-vis the Federal Republic of Germany, the European Community and NATO. It was also asked whether the United States would use its influence to prevent communist parties in Western Europe from participation in government.³⁴

Although the result of the survey showed that West Germans still had a high level of confidence in NATO and the role of the United States in general. Only 37 percent of respondents would have confidence in the US commitment to the defence of Western Europe if the French Communists participated in the Government. 36 percent of the respondents stated that they would no longer trust the guaranteed security by NATO and the United States in such a case. In addition, 40 percent of the respondents were convinced that NATO would be weakened by a communist government involvement.³⁵

How to deal with the Italian Communists? The Western powers and the G7 Summit in Puerto Rico 1976

The main NATO Member States USA, Great Britain, Federal Republic of Germany and France responded initially reluctant on the political level after the high gains of the PCI in the parliamentary elections of 20 June 1976. The G7 states agreed that the unclear situation after the elections should not be made more difficult by public intervention. The governments decided to discuss the subject behind closed doors at the G7 summit in Puerto Rico that took place a week after the Italian elections.³⁶ The summit participants were Gerald Ford (USA), James Callaghan (UK), Helmut Schmidt (West Germany), Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (France), Takeo Miki (Japan), Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau (Canada), Aldo Moro (Italy) and their staffs. The representatives of the United States, Britain, West Germany and France had agreed to

34. JCPL, White House Central File, Subject File, International Organizations, Executive IT 45/A 1/20/77-1/20/81 through Executive IT 67 6/1/78-1/20/81, IT 67 6/1/77-12/31/77, Box IT-5, USIA Survey Questionnaire on Eurocommunism Issues, 01.11.1977, pp.3 f.

35. JCPL, White House Central File, Subject File, International Organizations, Executive IT 45/A 1/20/77-1/20/81 through Executive IT 67 6/1/78-1/20/81, IT 67 1/1/78-5/31/78, Box IT-5, Memorandum from Gregory F. Treverton to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 04.01.1978.

36. Cf. D. BASOSI, G. BERNARDINI, *The Puerto Rico Summit of 1976 and the end of Eurocommunism*, in: L. NUTI (ed.): *The Crisis of Détente in Europe. From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985*, Routledge, New York, 2009, pp.256-267; A. VARSORI, *Puerto Rico (1976). Le potenze occidentali e il problema comunista in Italia*, in: *Ventesimo Secolo*, 16(2008), pp.89-121.

arrive a few hours before the delegations from Italy, Canada and Japan in order to discuss the sensitive matter in a private circle.³⁷ Officially, the topic “Italy” was not placed on the agenda.³⁸ However, it was discussed extensively in private.³⁹ It was widely agreed within the group of Ford, Callaghan, Schmidt and Giscard d'Estaing that a Communist involvement in the Italian government would cause problems for the coherence of NATO.⁴⁰ Chancellor Schmidt stressed particularly the dangers for the Italian economy. Finally, the parties agreed that they would not award international loans to Italy if the PCI was to become officially a part of the government. It was further arranged that the discussions on Italy were not supposed to reach the public.

Nevertheless, the content of the conversation became publicly known shortly after the end of the summit. Chancellor Schmidt had a non-public background discussion with seven American business journalists immediately after the Puerto Rico meeting. Although it had been accepted before the interview that the journalists were not supposed to publish the information directly, one of the participants ignored the agreement.⁴¹ The following publication of the secret talks in the *Washington Post* provoked reactions in all affected countries. On the political level, Ford, Callaghan and Giscard d'Estaing tried to distance themselves from the German Chancellor. The French President, a close friend of Schmidt, published a clear statement via the Elysée Palace.⁴² Giscard d'Estaing stressed that the government of the French Republic rejected external interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. However, considering the continuous involvement of the French government in the affairs of sovereign African states and the politics of “*Françafrique*” Giscard d'Estaing's statement appeared implausible. In addition, the French president reaffirmed the arrangements concerning Italy after the summit of Puerto Rico. However, this confirmation was done in a non-public conversation with Schmidt in Hamburg. In addition to Giscard d'Estaing US President Ford, his National Security Adviser General Brent Scowcroft and Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld also expressed satisfaction with

37. PAFFO [Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office], B 150, Vol. 348, Note about the conversation of Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs with Secretary of State Kissinger on May 23, 1976 by Dr. Jürgen Ruhfus, 24.05.1976.

38. The official agenda included the following: economy and balance of payments problems (27.06), international Trade and East-West economic relations (28.06.), North-South dialogue and energy (28.06.). PAFFO, B 150, Vol. 350, Notes on Summit talks in Dorado Beach Hotel, San Juan, Puerto Rico from 27 to 28 June 1976 by Dr. Dieter Hiss, 07.05.1976.

39. The National Archives (Kew), Prime Minister's Office: Correspondence and Papers, 1974-1979, PREM 16/978, Italy, Italian political situation: UK/US/French/German contact on aid to Italy and reaction to electoral gains by the Communist Party of Italy, Minutes of the British government delegation on the occasion of a dinner of Heads of State and/or Government and Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany by E.A.J. Ferguson, 28.06.1976, p. 1.

40. *Der Spiegel*, 26.07.1976, p.19.

41. Cf. H. SOELL, *Helmut Schmidt*, vol.2, 1969 bis heute. *Macht und Verantwortung*, DVA, Munich, 2008, pp.453 f.

42. Cf. F. HEURTEBIZE, *Le péril rouge. Washington face à l'eurocommunisme*, PUF, Paris, 2014, pp. 152 f.

the agreements of Puerto Rico behind closed doors.⁴³ Nevertheless, the West German Chancellor received public support only by the deputy press secretary of the White House John G. Carlson.⁴⁴

Schmidt's remarks immediately led to criticism by the Italian communists and the French left.⁴⁵ Pierre Mauroy, the second man of the Parti Socialiste behind François Mitterrand and later Prime Minister, accused Schmidt of "American opinions" – a grave insult in the French left of the 1970s.⁴⁶

Domestically, however, the statement of the Chancellor was well chosen. With his criticism of a government participation of the PCI in Italy Schmidt presented himself as tough and anti-communist in his foreign policy only a few months before the West German parliamentary elections in October 1976. Before that the conservative opposition had repeatedly attacked him and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) for being too lax against the Italian Communists.⁴⁷ Prominent politicians of the CDU and CSU like Helmut Kohl, Franz Josef Strauss and Karl Carstens pointed out the dangers of Italian Eurocommunism to NATO and the European Community.⁴⁸ The Chancellor had now clearly taken a stand and refuted the criticism of the conservative opposition.⁴⁹ Internationally, however, the arrangements of Puerto Rico showed only minor effects. Western governments were aware that Italy needed financial support and that the PCI would have benefited from a further deterioration of the economic situation. Nevertheless, behind the scenes continues pressure was put on the Democrazia Cristiana to prevent an official government coalition with the Communists and thus the realization of the communist strategy of the *compromesso storico*.

Ten days after the end of the Puerto Rico summit the four senior diplomats Helmut Sonnenfeldt (USA), Reginald A. Hibbert (United Kingdom), Günther van Well (West Germany) und Yves Carnac (France) met in Paris. They discussed options to operationalize the decisions regarding Italy. It was agreed that the Italian Christian Democrats should be convinced of comprehensive reforms in the field of economic and financial policy. It was also agreed that the four governments should contact Italian decision-makers on private channels to dissuade them from a possible coalition

43. PAFFO, B 150, Vol. 351, Telex from the German Embassy in Washington to the Foreign Office about the conversation of the Federal Minister of Defence with President Ford, Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld and General Scowcroft on July 2, 1976, 13.07.1976.

44. ASD, Bruno Friedrich papers, Italy – Italian Communist Party, 1/BFAA001561, Bulletin of the Federal Press Office, 19.07.1976.

45. Cf. *I segreti della politica internazionale, intervista a Sergio Segre*, in: M. MAGGIORANI, P. FERRARI (eds), *L'Europa da Togliatti a Berlinguer. Testimonianze e documenti, 1945-1984*, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2005, pp.1681 f.

46. ADS, Bruno Friedrich papers, International relations – Italy, 1/BFAA001530, Federal Press Office: Pierre Mauroy's remarks about Chancellor Schmidt's statements regarding the economic aid to Italy, 21.07.1976.

47. In fact, West German Social Democrats and Italian communists established close ties in 1967 which were continued until the dissolution of the PCI in 1991.

48. Cf. N. DÖRR, *Die Auseinandersetzungen um den Eurokommunismus in der bundesdeutschen Politik 1967–1979*, in: *Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung*, 2012, pp.224–228.

49. *Der Spiegel*, op.cit., pp.19 f.

between Communists and Christian Democrats.⁵⁰ In the next days and weeks US Ambassador to the United Nations William W. Scranton and Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., Special Envoy of the United States government to the Vatican, were commissioned, amongst others, for this purpose by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Schmidt informed the US government that he used his contacts to inform the Italian Socialists and Social Democrats about the opinion of the four governments.⁵¹

With the formation of the Christian Democratic government of Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti at the end of July 1976 the primary objective of Western states was achieved. The government was indeed dependent on abstinence, later also on the active support of the communists in Parliament, officially, however, the PCI was not part of the government coalition. In the following months, the four governments publicly supported Andreotti to strengthen him against the dependence on the Communist Party.

After General Secretary Enrico Berlinguer had demanded that the PCI become an official part of the government the Italian situation again became a problem for international politics in January 1978.⁵² But the entry of the PCI into the Italian government was finally denied, also due to massive pressure by the government of US President Jimmy Carter.⁵³

Conclusion

After the Italian parliamentary election in June 1979 the topic “Eurocommunism” became less important in the debate about Western security.⁵⁴ Eurocommunist parties suffered electoral defeats and losses of members. With the decay of Eurocommunist solidarity between the parties the concept lost its attraction. The ideology of the “Third Way” could not be realized in practice. In the early 1980s the Eurocommunist parties had to make a decision between orthodox communism and social democratization. The French and Japanese Communist parties went back to an old-fashioned Marxism-Leninism while the Italian Communists gradually transformed into a social democratic party. That process ended in late January 1991 with the conversion to the Partito Democratico della Sinistra (PDS). Large parties such as the Communist Party of Spain split and thereby lost influence. One of the former leaders of the Eurocommunist movement and former Secretary-General of the Spanish Communists Santiago

50. PAFFO, B 150, Vol.351, Note on the proposals for consultation with Italian personalities associated with the formation of a government and the drafting of a government program, 09.07.1976.

51. Ibid., Notes on the conversation of Federal Chancellor and Federal Minister with President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger on July 15, 1976, 15.07.1976, pp.4-5.

52. Cf. S. PONS, *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo*, Einaudi, Turin, 2006, pp. 122 f.

53. JCPL, National Security Affairs-Brzezinski Material, Country File, Italy 5/78-Ivory Coast 1/77-1/81, Box 39, Italy 6-8/80, Declaration of the State Department from January 12, 1978.

54. The Communist Party of Italy lost 26 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 7 seats in the Senate of the Republic.

Carrillo was even expelled from the party in 1985.⁵⁵ Therefore Eurocommunism as a threat for NATO became slowly but surely obsolete.⁵⁶

Finally, the acceptance of communist delegates to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in 1984 passed without major resistance.⁵⁷ The current Italian President Giorgio Napolitano, a protagonist of the Eurocommunist wing of the PCI, was one of them. Napolitano stressed in the first speech of a Communist delegate in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly on November 16, 1984 that there was a consensus between the Italian Communists and all other members of the parliament in condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the expansionist foreign policy of the Soviet Union.⁵⁸ One of the leading experts of the Social Democratic Party of Germany on security policy Karsten D. Voigt summarised the position of the Italian Communists after the speech as followed:

“The PCI was more interested in a normalization of its relations with the United States than in initiatives to build contacts to the East”.⁵⁹

The quote by Voigt reveals that at least the Italian Communists represented in the early 1980s rather a problem for the Soviet Union than for NATO. Nevertheless, as shown in the article, the participation of Eurocommunist delegates in the North Atlantic Assembly was perceived as a massive threat to the Western Alliance. Furthermore, the cohesion of NATO seemed jeopardized if Communists would be involved in governments of member states of the Alliance. In practice, however, there was no Eurocommunist strategy in the long-term. The much-cited danger of a Trojan horse called Eurocommunism which would subsequently destroy NATO from within never existed in reality. The term "Eurocommunism" was highly politicized by conservative politicians. In this way the term was used to strengthen the cohesion of the Alliance in the period of crisis in the 1970s. The warnings of Kissinger, Haig, and others are examples of this strategy.

55. Cf. N. DÖRR, *Emanzipation und Transformation. Rückblick auf den Eurokommunismus*, in: *Ost-europa*, 5-6(2013), pp.266 f.

56. Cf. A. BROGI, *Confronting America. The Cold War between the United States and the Communists in France and Italy*, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2011, pp.367-381.

57. Cf. E.D. SHERWOOD, *American Foreign Policy towards West European Communism. The Italian and French Cases*, California Seminar on International Security and Foreign Policy, Santa Monica, 1983, pp.68-72.

58. ASD, Horst Ehmke papers, Italy, 1/HEAA000461, Intervento dell'on. Giorgio Napolitano alla seduta plenaria dell'Assemblea dell'Atlantico del Nord, 16.11.1984, p.1.

59. ASD, Horst Ehmke papers, Italy, 1/HEAA000461, Summary report by Karsten D. Voigt, [1984], p.2.

Ireland's EEC Enlargement Negotiations and the Common Fisheries Policy, 1970-1972: Challenging the *Acquis*

Michael J. GEARY

Charles de Gaulle's unexpected departure as President of France in April 1969 ultimately paved the way for the European Economic Community (EEC) to begin its historic first round of enlargement negotiations. Britain, Denmark, Ireland, and Norway had queued for membership since the early 1960s, and that goal was now within reach. The last hurdle was the accession talks. Although the volume of scholarly literature on the first enlargement has grown in the last number of years, many aspects to that round, especially those linked to the three less important applicants, remain unexamined. This article analyses the most important issue that dominated the negotiations between Dublin and Brussels during the eighteen months of enlargement talks between mid-1970 and early 1972, namely the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP).¹ It offers a fresh perspective on those talks by exploiting Irish and Community archival material. It traces the origins and development of the CFP, the unscrupulous attempts by the Community to integrate the policy into the *acquis communautaire* during the negotiations and Dublin's efforts to have the policy shelved until after the Community enlarged. Central to the article is an exploration of the way Dublin and Brussels tried to outmanoeuvre each other on the CFP issue while at the same time ensuring that the negotiations would succeed.

Due to Ireland's relative size, and pro-EEC outlook, negotiating membership should have been a straightforward affair. Ireland was not a member of the Commonwealth or the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), although it had a close economic relationship with Britain that needed attention. Domestically, there was no serious political opposition to membership. Fianna Fáil, the governing party, had originally applied for membership in 1961 and the party had remained in power since then, continually advocating for accession. Indeed, of the four applicants, Ireland was perhaps the staunchest advocate for membership, a policy position largely driven by a desire to gain access to the Common Market and to the Community's generous Common Agriculture Policy (CAP). Patrick Hillery, Ireland's Minister for Foreign Affairs, was appointed to lead the Irish delegation in Brussels, and was assisted by many of those who had worked on Dublin's first application for membership a decade earlier.² Between The Hague Summit of December 1969 and the opening of negotiations seven months later, the government sought to convey the message that Ireland was willing to accept the *acquis* as well as the political implications vaguely associated with membership.

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1. I would like to thank the Institute for European Global Studies, University of Basel, for providing financial support to complete this article as well as an anonymous referee for valuable suggestions.
 2. For more on the first Irish application for EEC membership, see M.J. GEARY, *An Inconvenient Wait: Ireland's Quest for Membership of the EEC, 1957-73*, Institute of Public Administration, Dublin, 2009, pp.9-52.

In meetings with the EEC six and the Commission, Hillery highlighted the need for the simultaneous opening and closing of negotiations and accession for Ireland and Britain; Denmark had been pushing for something similar.³ He also stressed the importance of consultations on matters of common interest to all the applicants as they arose during the negotiations.⁴ Between January and June 1970, not only did Irish government Ministers visit the capitals of the six, the Commission, and the applicant counties, the government also published a White Paper on membership that was generally well received in the Community, and completed its negotiating positions on a wide range of issues. Irish diplomats in Brussels played a key role in this process with clear direction from Hillery. In the aftermath of The Hague Summit, Seán Kennan, Ireland's ambassador to the EEC, offered Dublin the following advice on how to proceed with a renewed application:

“(i) Avoiding disclosure of information which would prejudice our negotiation position (ii) avoiding disclosure of confidential information, such as conversations with Commissioners (iii) avoiding publication of evaluations or judgements of a sensitive nature, ‘our attitude as regards New Zealand butter and lamb’ (iv) bearing in mind that whatever was published would in all probability be studied in Brussels, projecting the image of a country ready and able to accept all the obligations (political as well as economic) of full membership, to play a constructive part in the further development of the Communities and not ‘concerned exclusively or mainly with the economic payoff particularly in agriculture’, and (v) to a very limited extent ‘factual accuracy’”.

Kennan stressed: “We also have to bear in mind the sensitive issue of agricultural surpluses within the EEC”.⁵ The Irish government did not want to attract too much unwelcome attention towards its principal exports, such as butter. After all, by the end of the 1960s, the Community had surpluses in many of the dairy commodities that Dublin wished to export. Ireland's membership would only add to the Community's butter mountain and by extension, additional costs to the CAP. While the economic benefits were the principal motivation behind the Irish application, it was important to show Brussels that Ireland was also interested in other, more political aspects of the integration process. At a meeting with Irish ambassadors to the capitals of the EEC six, Hillery stressed that his government had indicated publicly that it was prepared to participate in a European defence community and warned his diplomats to discourage any comparisons between Ireland's version of neutrality and that of the established neutrals, Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland. The evidence suggests that the pre-Second World War policy was not set in stone and if it became an obstacle to accession, Dublin seemed ready to abandon it.

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3. M. RASMUSSEN, *Joining the European Communities: Denmark's Road to EC-Membership, 1961-1973*, Ph.D. Thesis, European University Institute [Florence], 2004, p.179.
 4. NAI [National Archives of Ireland], Department of Foreign Affairs (hereafter: D/FA) 2003/1/183, note of meeting between Irish officials in Brussels, and Dirk Spierenburg, Dutch permanent representative to the EEC, 14.05.1970.
 5. NAI, D/FA 2003/1/248, Observations from Kennan in document entitled ‘Membership of the European Communities’, 10.12.1969.

Apart from these policy considerations, Dublin had a significant interest in Britain's negotiations with the EEC. After all, the Danish and Irish applications were largely tied to the apron strings of the British application. Keeping an eye on London was a prime concern for both Dublin and Copenhagen and there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the latter never fully trusted London to keep them informed on matters of mutual interest. George Thomson, a British Foreign Office Minister before the talks opened, appeared willing to keep the channels of communication open during the accession discussions but Dublin remained suspicious. Hillery urged his diplomats to be "very much on the alert for possible moves by the British to seek accommodations with individual EEC governments" – this was in response to early indications that some attempt at a Franco-British dialogue was likely.⁶ Throughout the spring and summer of 1970, Irish and Danish officials complained privately that London might not be a helpful negotiating partner. Erling Kristiansen, Denmark's ambassador to London told Donal O'Sullivan, his Irish counterpart, that his government had learned lessons from the 1961-1963 negotiations. Denmark had, he said, "first hand experience of how loosely the British can interpret an undertaking" to brief their partners in the EFTA.⁷ Kevin Rush, chargé d'affaires at the Irish embassy in London, wrote a highly negative report based on a meeting he had with Geoffrey Rippon, head of the British negotiating team in Edward Heath's Conservative government. He concluded that Rippon was

"a small town politician trying too hard to say the right thing with transparent insincerity ... genial, hearty, typically British and obviously quite insincere".⁸

Managing relations with the other applicants would prove an important but challenging process once the talks commenced in the autumn of 1970.

Having accepted the *acquis* at the opening meeting between the Community and the four applicants on 30 June 1970, the real negotiations for Ireland began the following September. Prior to the first ministerial meeting with Dublin, there was very little discussion within the Community about the Irish application. It was clear to Brussels that Ireland's candidacy posed none of the more challenging problems associated with Britain's accession. At first glance, most, if not all, the problems, related to finding technical solutions. At the first ministerial session between the Community and Ireland on 21 September 1970 under the chairmanship of Walter Scheel, West German Foreign Minister, Hillery outlined eight key areas that Dublin prioritised for discussion including the transition period, customs union, CAP, fisheries, trade relations with Britain, Ireland's contribution to the EEC's budget, economic and monetary union, and a number of relatively minor issues. Hillery supported the Commission's position on the transition period, especially the parallelism between the achievement of the free movement of industrial goods, and the common market for agricultural products. He also supported the Commission's view that the transition

6. NAI, D/FA 2003/1/434, Meeting of the ambassadors of the six and applicants at the embassy in Paris on 14 December 1969, 17.12.1969.

7. NAI, D/FA 2003/1/407, Donal O'Sullivan, Irish ambassador, to Secretary D/FA, 01.06.1970.

8. NAI, D/FA 2003/1/407, Rush to Secretary D/FA, 13.08.1970.

period would be the same for the four applicants.⁹ While Dublin had been a supporter of the CAP since the policy was first developed in the late 1950s, it paid special attention to the British negotiations on this issue for fear that London would negotiate special arrangements for third countries, such as New Zealand, that could affect Ireland's export trade to its nearest neighbour. Unlike Britain, Ireland had accepted the Community's finance system from the outset. This was a minor issue since Ireland's contribution to the Community's budget would be small in comparison to the gains it was likely to make from the CAP and other funds. Yet, it was the introduction of the EEC's new Common Fisheries Policy in June 1970 that caused the greatest strain in relations between Dublin and Brussels during the course of the negotiations. The origins of the policy and its impact on the accession talks are examined in the remainder of the article.

The Fisheries Policy

Most of the main agricultural products in the Community were subject to a common policy by mid-1968 under the CAP. Fish and fish products had not been included despite coming within the Treaty of Rome definition of agricultural products. The Treaty was silent on the type of policy that should regulate the Community's fishing industry; there was large scope for interpretation. In many ways, the origins of the CFP could be linked to the problems that had confronted the French fishing industry during the early part of the 1960s. By 1962, that industry found itself increasingly threatened by competition from cheaper foreign fish imports from member and non-member states. Fish trade was also being liberalised within the framework of the GATT. As a result, imports into France rose significantly, from 95,000 tons in 1957 to 242,000 tons in 1962.¹⁰ It was at this point that the French government lobbied the Community for a common fisheries policy to help its fishing industry cope with the extra competition.

The Hallstein Commission proved rather receptive to the French position despite lukewarm responses from France's EEC partners who were worried about the costs associated with another new policy. It was perhaps no surprise that the Commission became a supporter of a common policy covering the fishing industry. As the CAP had shown, common policies had the effect of bringing the six closer together but, crucially for the Commission, common policies deepened the integration process, and gave the Commission a greater role in influencing the policy-making process. With a green light from Paris, the Commission set about drawing up a common policy to regulate Community fishing. By 1968, the Commission had sent a package of

9. D. MAHER, *The Tortuous Path: The Course of Ireland's Entry into the EEC, 1948-1973*, Institute of Public Administration, Dublin, 1986, pp.274-275.

10. M. WISE, *The Common Fisheries Policy of the European Community*, Methuen, London, 1984, p. 87.

proposals to the Council of Ministers. The 1968 fisheries proposals covered three main areas: (i) the common organisation of the fishery market; (ii) a common structural policy that included using EEC funds, and establishing common rules governing the granting of state aids; and (iii) equal conditions of access to fishing grounds. It was the third aspect of the Commission's proposals that caused the greatest problem at the enlargement negotiations. The Community's fishermen, the Commission argued, had to have

“equal access to and use of fishing grounds in maritime waters coming under the sovereignty or within the jurisdiction of member states”.¹¹

These access proposals were an integral part of the Commission's structural policy designed to eliminate national discriminations, and equalise conditions of competition. Moreover, the blueprint for a fisheries policy also showed how conscious the Commission was of the various national interests of the member states. The Germans and the Dutch, for example, insisted on the equal access provision, while France wanted the policy to include provisions where its fishermen could use Community funds to upgrade fishing fleets. Though the Commission's proposals made reference to overfishing and conservation, a serious concern for, or analysis of, conserving fishing stocks did not feature prominently.

Between 1968 and June 1970, agreement on the CFP was difficult to achieve in the Council because of the divergent interests of the six and is touched upon elsewhere.¹² However, the Commission had made a number of compromises in order to bridge the divide, especially between France, Germany and the Netherlands over the issue of using Community funds to pay for the new policy. On 30 June 1970, the EEC had reached a less than perfect agreement on the fisheries policy. A deal was only possible after Sicco Mansholt, Agriculture Commissioner, had presented the six with a new set of proposals aimed solely at bringing closure to the CFP before the enlargement negotiations started that same day. By linking the issue of equal access to fishing waters, and the CFP structural fund, the Commission was at once able to reconcile French and German objections to the original Commission plan for the fishing industry.¹³ It was also decided that the CFP's final market, trade, and structural regulations would be formally adopted by the Council before 1 November 1970.¹⁴ Added to this, the Commission and the French insisted that the CFP be implemented in time to become part of the *acquis* which had to be accepted by the four aspiring members as a condition of membership.

While some officials might have seen the introduction of the CFP immediately prior to the opening of the enlargement talks as a “manifest error” on the part of the Commission, it was clear that the policy had broad backing from Commissioners and

11. *Ibid.*, p.90.

12. See J. FARNELL, J. ELLES, *In Search of a Common Fisheries Policy*, Gower, London, 1984, chapter 1.

13. *Agence Europe*, 01.07.1970.

14. See M. WISE, *op.cit.*, p.102.

the political support of the six.¹⁵ Perhaps not without coincidence, the fisheries negotiations with the four applicants were not scheduled to start until early 1971. The Council meeting at the end of October 1970 put the final CFP agreement together. The policy would enter into force on 1 February 1971, and become part of the *acquis*. In addition, the Council decided that any future revisions of the policy could only be made by the Foreign Ministers of the six who were also responsible for the enlargement negotiations, and not by the Community's Agriculture Ministers. This was another example of how the Community attempted to link the CFP to the *acquis* before the applicants had an opportunity to object to the policy while it was in the process of development and therefore more easily modified. Moreover, it showed how important politically the CFP was to the member states. Wrestling control of the policy from the Community's Agriculture Ministers revealed how vital it was that the main provisions of the CFP remained in place. Arguably, the Foreign Ministers of the Community did not trust either Mansholt or the EEC Agriculture Ministers who might be more prone to compromise and negotiate away hard won ground by default. Indeed, it is also questionable whether this struggle was part of a general attempt by the Foreign Ministers to reign in specialist Councils in the later 1960s to prevent them from gaining too much decision-making power.

Defending the *acquis*

Prior to the first ministerial meeting in Brussels, Dublin had concluded that if the six adopted the CFP proposals before Ireland became a member or if the issue was raised during the negotiations "we should endeavour to maintain our existing exclusive fishery rights".¹⁶ Central to Irish concerns was the policy's equal access provision as well as fears of over-fishing. At the first ministerial meeting in September 1970, Hillery made clear that the equal access provision was a major issue because the Irish fishing industry was based on inshore fishing; Ireland had no deep-sea fishing fleet unlike the other applicants and some of the six. Dublin feared that better equipped fishing vessels would deplete Ireland's rich fishing stocks. The Community adopted a legalistic position to Ireland's concerns. The Council made clear that:

"it assumes, as a general principle, that the Applicant States accept the Treaties and all decisions of every kind taken from the entry into force of the Treaties until the end of the negotiations, and that the rule which must govern the negotiations is that the solution of

15. See J. VAN DER HARST, *Enlargement: the Commission seeks a role for itself*, in: M. DUMOULIN (dir.), *The European Commission, 1958-72: History and Memories*, OPOCE, Luxembourg, 2007, p.550; Historical Archives of the European Union, *Voices on Europe Collection*: R.P. Dingemans, J. Schram, Interview with Edmund Wellenstein, 10.07.1998.

16. NAI, D/FA 2003/1/230, Briefing notes for ministerial meeting with European Communities on 21 September 1970 – EEC Fisheries Policy. Ireland's exclusive fishery limits extended twelve miles seaward of the baseline of its territorial waters. This was in accordance with the Fisheries Convention signed in London on 9 March 1964.

any problems of adjustment which may arise must be sought in the establishment of transitional measures and not by amendments of the existing rules".¹⁷

Furthermore, Dublin was reminded that CFP would be implemented before 1 November 1970; thereafter, any difficulties faced by the applicants could only be solved with transitional measures. Given the difficulty surrounding the adoption of the policy within the Council, it was logical that the Community wanted to protect the existing provisions of the hard fought policy. While there would be advantages for Ireland in the measures proposed by the Commission for market organisation, and in the provisions for Community financial aid for improving fishing fleets and facilities for research, common access to fishing waters would create "grave difficulties for Irish fishermen".¹⁸ For Ireland, the fisheries question was about competition, over-fishing and the potential death of an economically (and politically) important industry. Domestic calculations concluded that over 5,000 Irish jobs were endangered as a result of the Commission's policy. In stark contrast, Denmark accepted the CFP from the outset; its middle and distant fishing industry would benefit most of the policy's main provisions.¹⁹ Even though Ireland had opened an embassy in Copenhagen before the negotiations opened, in an effort to strengthen relations during the accession talks, it was clear that Dublin could not rely on Denmark for support against the policy.

While the Council had made clear its position on the CFP, which was in line with the Commission's internal thinking on the policy, the latter adopted a more defensive attitude in response to statements by the applicants and articles that appeared in the newspapers. One of the roles of the Commission was, after all, to defend the *acquis*. Speaking in Dublin in October 1970, Mansholt denied that the policy was as inflexible as suggested by its critics and believed that the likely outcome to the negotiations on fisheries would be a five-year transitional period during which access to waters within the three-mile limit would be restored to local populations depending essentially on coastal fishing, and one or more of the member states of the enlarged Community could propose an extension of this period.²⁰ He dismissed outright fears that the policy would lead to over-fishing and argued that small industries had nothing to fear from competition. The onus was on the applicants to modify their policy positions in order to meet the necessary requirements for membership. In Ireland's case, as Mansholt pointed out, its fishing industry had to adapt to survive, and while the Commission would help in this adaptation process, the CFP would not be changed.

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17. HAEC [Historical Archives of the European Commission, Brussels], BAC 134/1987, no.98/3, European Community, Summary of conclusions from first ministerial meeting between Ireland and the Community, 21.09.1970.
 18. NAI, D/FA 2003/1/441, D/FA memorandum, Negotiations with the European Communities – The Common Fisheries Policy, c. May 1971. Another significant development from the September meetings with the applicants was the Community's decision to grant 'special status' to the Norwegian fishing industry.
 19. NAI, D/FA 2003/1/230, Irish Department of Agriculture and Fisheries memorandum in advance of first ministerial meeting with European Communities on 21 September 1970 regarding the CFP, c. September 1970. See also M. RASMUSSEN, *op.cit.*, p.256.
 20. NAI, D/FA 2003/1/550, Notes of comments made by Mansholt at Irish Council of the European Movement seminar, 29.10.1970.

A prominent feature of the preliminary CFP discussions between Dublin and Brussels during the first six months of the negotiations was the continuity in the Community's position; the Irish delegation met with stiff opposition from the Commission and the Council. At the deputies' meetings on 20 October and 27 November, and at the ministerial meeting on 15 December 1970, Dublin continued its protests. In an attempt to placate the Irish negotiating team, the Council suggested in November that the Commission could liaise with Dublin to "obtain all the clarifications" regarding the scope and content of the fishing regulations.²¹ The Community clearly believed that contacts with the Commission would be enough to "allay Irish concern". If, however, talks with the Commission failed to adequately address Irish concerns, the Community stated:

"the latter [Ireland] could inform the Community delegation about them as soon as the common fisheries policy entered into force, whereupon the Community delegation would be willing to discuss them".²²

The Community delegation attempted to play a rather clever game. The Council had instructed the Commission to talk with the Irish side but not to entertain Ireland's problems. Arguably, these technical talks were merely delaying tactics in order to keep the real negotiations away from the enlargement negotiations until the CFP became part of the *acquis*. The fact that the Community mentioned the possibility that talks with the Commission would not suffice was evidence that the EEC fully understood the level of potential difficulties ahead for the policy. Ireland was conscious of the need to act before the February deadline. However, the Community refused to entertain any calls from Dublin for the renegotiation of the CFP. From the September 1970 ministerial meeting until the end of the year, the Community delegation repeated the same line, namely, that the applicant countries

"acceptent les Traités et les dispositions de toute nature intervenues depuis l'entrée en vigueur des Traités jusqu'à la fin des négociations."²³

Any change to a particular aspect of the *acquis* would have had wider implications not just for the applicants negotiating membership but also for the six. Any modification in the policy would have to be agreed by the six and given the Community's history of disagreement, especially over the common policies, it was unlikely that the Commission would entertain making Ireland a special case even though special status had been conceded to Norway in its enlargement negotiations. The Commission's public silence on the CFP, with the exception of Mansholt's comments, was not wholly surprising because at the ministerial meetings it did not have the right to speak.

21. NAI, D/FA 2003/1/497, Comments on second deputies meeting, 27.11.1970 in 'Second Ministerial meeting – summary of conclusions', 15.12.1970. The summaries of the enlargement negotiation meetings used in this paper are the original copies distributed to the applicants after each meeting by the Community secretariat, and produced after ministerial and deputies meetings during the enlargement conference.

22. Ibid.

23. HAEC, BAC 134/1987, no.47, Minutes of Council of Ministers' meeting, Négociations avec l'Irlande, 2^e session ministérielle, 15.12.1970.

However, there was little need for the Commission to get directly involved in the enlargement discussions of the CFP at such an early stage of the talks. The Community, under the German presidency for the second half of 1970, had done an adequate job of defending the CFP. Moreover, the German government was a supporter of the very provision that Ireland had objected to, namely, equal access to the fishing waters of member states.

Challenging the *acquis*

At a number of informal meetings between the Commission and Dublin throughout early 1971, Brussels continued to adopt a defensive position towards the CFP. While accepting that Ireland would have initial problems with adapting to the policy, Jean-François Deniau, the French Commissioner and key Community negotiator, stressed that it could be possible to grant a concession covering the whole of Ireland or more probably covering certain areas.²⁴ However, he cautioned that such concessions, even if they could be granted, were limited to a period of five years, and to fishing areas within a three-mile limit from the coastline. Given French scepticism towards the equal access provision, this was a good example of a Commissioner not acting as a proxy for national interests. Hillery pointed out the awkward reality that the four applicant countries would account for 60 per cent of the fisheries in the area that would constitute the enlarged Community. This created a new situation, one that the Commission must have been conscious of when drafting the policy, but Deniau was adamant that the principle of non-discrimination applied in relation to common access, a typical response from the Community. A far greater concern for Brussels was protecting the *acquis*, rather than bending the rules to accommodate the multitude of national interests of the four candidate countries and these interests were growing. Despite Denmark's broad support for the policy, it wanted special treatment for its two overseas territories, Greenland and the Faroe Islands.²⁵

The CFP made a formal appearance at the negotiations during the third ministerial meeting with Ireland on 3 March 1971. Accepting that most aspects of the policy were fully acceptable to Dublin, Hillery stressed that the equal access provision was still a major issue; no amount of discussion would alter this fact. He reiterated with added force that Ireland could not accept the Community's CFP proposals as they stood. Even the Community's derogation mechanism built into the policy was

“limited both in scope and in duration, and recourse to it alone would not meet the special problems of the Irish fishing industry”.²⁶

24. NAI, D/FA 2002/19/304, Notes of meeting between Deniau and Hillery, 05.03.1971.

25. M. RASMUSSEN, *op.cit.*, p.257.

26. NAI, D/FA 2003/1/474, Third Ministerial meeting – summary of conclusion, Statement by the Irish delegation on Common Fisheries Policy (Annex 1), 02.03.1971.

Dublin adopted a new tactic a month later designed to put further pressure on the Community. At a meeting with the Commission, Dublin asked: If Norway received special treatment from the Community would Ireland get the same? Policy-makers in Dublin had known since the previous September that Norway was seeking special status for its fishing industry, something akin to a complete opt-out from the policy. A demand by Ireland for similar treatment was in many ways a questionable negotiating ploy that quickly became part of its formal negotiating strategy in Brussels and added further pressure on the Community to find a solution. Norway, of course, had much more to lose and, unlike the other applicants, it was unlikely to gain significantly from the CFP.

Ireland's position had evolved from concerns over the equal access provision to include the question of equal treatment amongst the applicants even though the applicants were far from united on the subject. Irish negotiators decided to raise its demands even higher by adopting the main strand of Oslo's negotiating strategy. As a result, the Commission now had to face demands from another applicant for equal treatment; offering it to one and denying it to another would prove difficult for Brussels to justify. In the months that followed, Dublin lobbied the Commission to grant the same terms to all the applicants. Manfred Caspari, a senior member of the Commission's negotiating team, believed that this was highly improbable. Norway, he argued, had "much bigger" problems than had Ireland, and he pointed out that the Community had already agreed to give special recognition to Norway's interests in the fisheries question. When Irish negotiators reiterated that the fisheries issue was a "big public opinion issue in Ireland" and that open access "would result in the complete spoliation of the fishing stocks in a very short time", Caspari repeated that Ireland would get a five-year period for the three-mile zone, and could "enforce conservation measures which would have to be non-discriminatory".²⁷ The Commission hoped that suitable transition measures and a review of the conservation clauses in the CFP would be enough to end the discussions on the policy, at least with Britain, Denmark and Ireland. However, the Commission underestimated the growing level of opposition from the applicants to the policy.

Between May and June, Britain and Norway had each submitted very different proposals that would significantly restructure the original CFP; yet neither suited Dublin and on 7 June, Hillery presented counter proposals.²⁸ London and Oslo approached the subject from the position that, if the CFP had to exist, then it had to be modified, yet Dublin sought to effectively scrap the policy in favour of the status quo. The London Fisheries Convention of 1964, which had been concluded after protracted discussions between the EEC six and three of the four applicants (except Norway), allowed the signatories to establish a 12-mile fishing limits from their coastlines.²⁹ That Convention, Dublin suggested, should be maintained during the transitional

27. NAI, D/FA 2003/1/922, Minutes of meeting between Caspari and E.J. Brennan (Irish Embassy official, Brussels), 26.04.1970.

28. *Agence Europe*, 07.06.1971.

29. For more on the 1964 Convention, see J. FARNELL, *op.cit.*, chapter 1; M. RASMUSSEN, *op.cit.*, p.252.

period and, before the end of this period, the entire situation would be reviewed by the enlarged Community. Effectively, the proposal aimed at maintaining the status quo in Europe's fishing industry. The plan alone carried little weight until the British delegation abandoned its own proposals and showed a real interest in the possibility of maintaining the status quo; this was not a solution favoured by Denmark who feared that a new post-enlargement fisheries policy would differ too drastically from the original plan. Added to this, the following day, the British delegation asked the Community to put forward its own proposals indicating how the fisheries problem could be resolved. London was anxious to find agreement on CFP related issues before the summer recess. Maurice Schumann, the French Foreign Minister, agreed and the Commission in cooperation with COREPER went to work with a mandate to find equitable solutions to the problems affecting the four applicants. The Commission had to ensure that the fine balance achieved on the CFP negotiations in the Council the previous October would be maintained. However, it also had to deal with the concerns of the applicants.

Although the Commission defended the main provisions of the policy in its compromise proposal that it sent to the Council, some flexibility was evident when these were revealed by mid-June.³⁰ A transition period of ten years was proposed before the equal access provision would be introduced; this was an extension of five years under the original proposals. At the end of this transition period, the Commission would report to the Council on the social and economic situation in the Community's fishing regions and on the state of fish stocks. The transition period would be divided into two stages: the first five years would see the member states maintain an exclusive six-mile national fishing zone and during the second five-year period, the member states could continue to enforce the six-mile zone for local fishermen provided they depended essentially on inshore fishing. This six-mile zone was double the original proposal that had been bitterly rejected by the four applicants. The Commission also introduced a special exception regime for certain limited geographical zones that lacked alternative resources and employment. Britain, Norway and Denmark benefited from this but the Commission did not include any regions of Ireland in this exception regime. In these special regions, a twelve-mile exclusive fishing limit would apply for five years. During the second five-year transition period, Council would decide if these exceptions would be extended. The Commission was unwilling to budge on the equal access provision apart from extending the transition period. It would have made very little difference to the overall compromise plan had Deniau and Mansholt included some regions of the Irish coastline to placate Dublin; it seemed like a clumsy omission. Unsurprisingly, Ireland rejected the compromise solutions and continued to promote its status quo plan.³¹

30. HAEC, BAC 134/1987, no.57/4, European Commission. Communication de la Commission au Conseil au sujet du problème de la pêche – document de travail, 17.06.1971.

31. HAEC, BAC 134/1987, no.57, Secretariat of the Council of Ministers, Négociation d'adhésion – Rapport du Comité des Représentants permanents au Conseil – problème de la pêche, 09.07.1971.

The new proposals had in some ways strengthened the hand of the Irish negotiators. London's failure to achieve an increase in the six-mile limit pushed Britain closer to the Irish corner. Norwegian intransigence further helped Dublin and weakened the Commission's position, although Norway refused a British offer to hold bilateral meetings with the other applicants, and rejected the idea of attending a multilateral meeting in July between the Community delegation and the applicants. By the end of June, London had concluded that "we ought to move to adopt the status quo proposal put forward by the Irish".³² The Commission accepted that there were difficulties in reaching "une position commune" but made it clear that it was not prepared to either accept the objections of the applicants or rethink the CFP any further. The Commission continued to hold this line, and Mansholt defended it, in the Council in July before the enlargement conference adjourned for its summer recess.³³

The period from October 1971 to January 1972 saw the most "intense, intricate and continuous" discussions taking place on the fisheries question.³⁴ Dublin and Brussels tried to outmanoeuvre each other in their attempts to find an agreed solution to the CFP. By October, Dublin had built a strategy around convincing the Community to accept the status quo, and shelving the policy until after the four had joined the EEC. Unsurprisingly, the proposal did not find any supporters in the Commission.

In late October, Edmund Wellenstein, a senior Commission official, gave it a curt rejection during an intense meeting with Kennan. The status quo proposal was absolutely dead, "a non-starter", the Irish ambassador wrote to his colleagues in Dublin after Wellenstein repeated the Commission's objections. In a good example of Commission directness vis-à-vis the applicants, the Commission argued that there was no certainty that a new fisheries policy would be successfully negotiated after enlargement within any reasonable time; it had taken the Community over a decade to develop the original CFP.³⁵

The Commission wanted the focus to remain firmly fixed on its compromise solutions rather than allow the applicants to set the agenda, although Wellenstein acknowledged that the Commission was preparing a new set of compromise solutions closely linked to their June proposals. Despite this, Dublin decided to maintain its opposition to the CFP and continued to push the status quo plan at the ministerial meeting in Brussels on 9 November "despite the pressure from the Commission". Dublin believed that there was still a chance that the status quo "will de facto turn out to be the eventual solution". Much of this hope rested on British support but if London accepted the Commission's compromise solutions

32. C. O'NEILL, *Britain's Entry into the European Community: Report by Sir Con O'Neill on the Negotiations of 1970-1972*, Frank Cass, London, 2000, p.267.

33. HAEC, BAC 259/80, no.168-174, PV 172, 2^e partie, Minutes of European Commission meeting, 07.07.1971 and 14-15.07.1971.

34. C. O'NEILL, *op.cit.*, p.270.

35. NAI, D/FA 2003/1/151, Kennan to Assistant Secretary D/FA, 26.10.1971.

“it would of course weaken our position in favour of the status quo and would be very difficult for us to avoid getting into a negotiation on regions to get a quasi-permanent derogation up to 12 miles”.³⁶

The strength of the Commission's and Ireland's policy positions rested largely on the support of others. The Commission relied heavily on the support of the six, and especially France, if its compromise solutions were to have any chance of success and the policy saved. The alternative presented by Dublin was a threat to the Commission only when this gained Britain's support and therefore became a serious option for consideration.

The British delegation had avoided any discussion on the CFP negotiations when the enlargement talks resumed after the summer recess. London wanted to keep the remaining CFP meetings off the agenda until after the House of Commons had voted on Community membership. However, without recalling the British position on the CFP, towards the end of the summer its stance on the Irish plan began to change. This was partly due to some gentle prodding from the Commission that indicated “the way out might be notional 6-mile limits for all, with extensions to 12 miles for special areas”. This was more than the Commission had been willing to concede the previous June. Nevertheless, by early November the British cabinet recommended that the

“right course was to press ahead with our proposal for maintaining the status quo pending the negotiation of a new policy by the enlarged Community”.³⁷

While London broadly supported the Irish plan, they continued, as did Ireland, to consider the Commission's revised proposals submitted through the Council. These were presented in early November. The morning session of the ministerial meeting on 9 November saw further gains for the British on the special exceptional regime of 12-mile limits but the Commission did not apply this to any part of the Irish coastline. British lobbying of the Commission had paid dividends when the two-stage transition period was scrapped and replaced instead with a single ten-year period, while a new review clause was also introduced. The more concessions that London received from the Community, the less inclined it was to support the Irish plan. Throughout November, and early December, Britain had won most of what it sought from the Community, and were ready to sign the Accession Treaty. The loss of British support was a major setback for Irish negotiators who were now forced to accept the CFP and negotiate exemptions for large sections of the Irish coastline. This was Dublin's “fall-back position” when “the status quo proposal has no longer any chance of success”.³⁸

The meeting on 9 November between Ireland and the Community proved acrimonious. Hillery, stressing that Ireland accepted the *acquis*, reminded the Community: “I think when the fisheries regulation came in, the day after or so, I did say that

36. NAI, D/FA 2003/1/151, Kennan to Seán Morrissey (Assistant Secretary D/FA), Suggested strategy, Ministerial negotiating meeting, 9 November 1971, 27.10.1971.

37. C. O'NEILL, *op.cit.*, p.270.

38. Kennan to Seán Morrissey, *op.cit.*, 27.10.1971.

this was not suitable to a Community of Ten".³⁹ With no agreement in sight, Italy suggested that a special, unscheduled ministerial meeting would take place on 29 November, the aim of which was to bring an end to the fisheries saga. In the interim period, the Commission would liaise with the four applicants in order to iron out any remaining problems.

At the ministerial meeting on 29 November, the Community again presented new proposals that included designating only one part of the Irish coastline for the special twelve-mile regime. Dublin rejected this, and argued instead that other areas of the Irish coast had to be designated as qualifying for the special twelve-mile limit; Hillery argued that any criteria that could be used for the selection of the Northwest coast could apply "with equal justification to other areas of the Irish coast".⁴⁰ Ideally, of course, Dublin wanted this limit extended around the entire coastline. A powerful display from Geoffrey Rippon before the Community negotiators on 29 November certainly put the CFP negotiations into perspective, perhaps for the first time since the enlargement talks had begun. Echoing comments made frequently by Hillery though never of the same ferocity or passion, Rippon argued that the fisheries policy could not be regarded as part of the real *acquis* because everyone was aware that it had been rushed to partial conclusion just before enlargement negotiations had begun.⁴¹ This intervention had the desired effect because the Commission was asked to prepare new proposals "en vue de favoriser une solution du problème".⁴²

There was evident pressure on the Commission to take the debate out of the realms of legal intricacies into what the Community politicians oddly called the "political" and "economic" spheres.⁴³ The original CFP had set no real provisions for conservation of fishing stocks, which was a major concern in Dublin (and Oslo). Ireland therefore submitted a provision designed to resolve this anomaly. Before 31 December 1982, Dublin wanted the Commission to present a report to the Council on the economic and social conditions of the coastal areas of the member states with particular reference to the development of the inshore fishing industry, and the state of fish stocks. This proposal was adopted by the Commission and presented to the Council on 11 December. The Commission had also cast aside its reservations about granting Ireland further concessions on the twelve-mile limits and the latter made additional gains.⁴⁴ The Community also announced that from the sixth year after the entry into force of the Accession Treaty, the Commission would present the Council

39. NAI, D/FA 2003/1/472, Annex I, EEC Council secretariat conclusions of seventh ministerial meeting between Community and Ireland, 09.11.1971.

40. NAI, D/FA 2003/1/432, Notes of ministerial meeting between Community and Ireland, 29-30.11.1971.

41. M. WISE, *op. cit.*, p.128.

42. HAEC, BAC 259/80, no.185-187, PV 187, 2^e partie, Minutes of European Commission meetings, 29.11.1971, 01-02.12.1971.

43. M. WISE, *op. cit.*, p.128.

44. See HAEC, BAC 134/1987, no.65/4, Secrétariat général du Conseil, Régime des droits de pêche (Déclaration faite par la délégation de la Communauté le 12 décembre 1971). The areas included the coast North and West of Lough Foyle as far as Cork in the Southeast, and the East coast from Carlingford Lough to Carnsore Point, for fishing of crustaceans and shellfish.

with a review of the fishing conditions ensuring protection of the seabed, and preservation of biological resources of the sea.⁴⁵ It was an important victory for Dublin. By the first week of January 1972, final agreement was reached on the fisheries question.⁴⁶

Conclusions

The fisheries question was by far the most complex issue that dominated Dublin's relations with Brussels during the eighteen months of enlargement negotiations. The original CFP was one of the few Community policies that represented a tangible loss for Ireland's post-accession and one that would have political consequences for the governing Fianna Fáil Party. Many of the party's members, including the Taoiseach, Jack Lynch, all hailed from coastal constituencies. Hillery, for example, had been a member of parliament for Clare since 1951; water defines much of that county's boundaries. Ireland's chief negotiator would have been acutely aware of how the CFP's equal access provision would have impacted on fishing communities. Although no archival evidence has been found that shows pressure from the Irish fishing lobby, there was enough political awareness of the issue within government to force negotiators to adopt a hard bargaining position in Brussels. There was a political, as well as an economic, imperative to find a solution to the CFP. Complicating Dublin's efforts was the disunity among the four applicants, coupled with the Commission's determination not to disturb the delicate balance that it had achieved within the Council before the enlargement talks began. On its own, Ireland lacked the political support base to successfully challenge the *acquis* and the institutional actors that defended it.

Yet, the evidence does suggest that given the rather devious way that the CFP had been introduced, a united approach by the four might have resulted in the policy being shelved until after the negotiations had concluded. Dublin believed that once inside the Community, it would be able to wield enough influence (through membership of the Council, COREPER and with an "Irish" Commissioner) to revise the CFP. That policy position rested on securing the support of the other applicants, something it was unable to fully achieve. Norwegian negotiators believed it was better to strike a deal before rather than after accession and thereby securing an opt-out from much of the policy. Denmark, too, had little interest in siding with Dublin's status quo proposal. Copenhagen was broadly in favour of the original CFP so long as it was able to negotiate a solution for Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Although Britain had for a time during the talks supported Dublin, once London had received sufficient con-

45. NAI, D/FA 2003/17/256, Note from the secretariat of the Council of Ministers to applicants regarding arrangements for fishing rights, 12.12.1971.

46. See NAI, D/FA 2003/1/910, Official minutes of Fiftieth meeting of the Conference at Deputy Level, 05.01.1972.

cessions from the Commission on extending fishing limits around the British coastline, its support ebbed away. Despite vague attempts to coordinate negotiating positions, there was no effort made between Copenhagen, Dublin and London; national interests differed too much to achieve cohesion.

The CFP negotiations highlighted the limited influence of an applicant state in influencing internal Community policy after agreement had been reached. Yet, the fisheries talks also exposed other issues such as the very real concerns for overfishing and conservation raised by Dublin, and the potential destruction of coastal communities that had heavily relied on fishing for centuries. These issues would resurface later in that decade with Spain's accession negotiations and when the EEC began to adopt a greater concern for protecting the Community's natural and declining resources.

Liberalising Labour Migration Policies at the European Level: Germany's Preferences on the Freedom of Movement Provisions of the Ankara Agreement

Matthias MAYER

On 12 September 1963, the European Economic Community concluded an association agreement with Turkey (Agreement Creating an Association Between the Republic of Turkey and the European Economic Community, also called Ankara Agreement). The Agreement entered into force on 1 December 1964. It was supposed to establish a customs union between the two parties in three steps and possibly prepare Turkey for EEC membership. The Agreement contained provisions on the establishment of the freedom of movement for workers between Turkey and the EEC and thus constituted the first instance of liberalising economic migration policies at the EU level.

This is puzzling for a number of reasons. EEC Member States could agree on common European action for provisions on freedom of movement between the EEC and Turkey, which constituted a liberalisation. However, around 40 years later, efforts to create common EU measures on legal economic migration from outside the Union into the Union failed because of pronounced opposition and disagreement about the nature of such measures.¹ In addition, the Federal Republic of Germany² had become one of the fiercest opponents of common EU measures on economic migration. Moreover, the federal government of Germany concluded a bilateral labour recruitment agreement with Turkey on 30 October 1961 (Vereinbarung zur "Regelung der Vermittlung türkischer Arbeitnehmer nach der Bundesrepublik Deutschland"), before the Association Agreement with Turkey was brought to a successful conclusion. These developments pose an array of important questions. First, why did the federal government of Germany see the need for EEC involvement in this domain when everything was already regulated on the bilateral level? Second, why did the EEC only put in place provisions on freedom of movement with Turkey (and Greece) and not with other countries, such as Spain, Portugal, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, which have been used as a source of labour migrants by EEC Member States? Third, why do the freedom of movement provisions feature at all in an agreement which had the establishment of a custom union as its main objective? Finally, did the commitment to implement the freedom of movement provisions lack from the very beginning, thus leaving ultimate power to implement the freedom of movement provision with the Association Council, where every Member State has the right to veto? While

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1. Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third country nationals for the purpose of paid employment and self-employed economic activities, COM(2001) 386 final, which was proposed by the European Commission in July 2001, had to be formally withdrawn in 2006, as Member States could not reach an agreement on the Directive.
 2. The analysis of the paper considers the Federal Republic of Germany, not the German Democratic Republic.

all these questions need to be – and will be – answered, the main and overarching question that concerns this paper is: why did Germany support the freedom of movement provisions of the Ankara Agreement?

The paper focuses on the period between the points in time when Turkey applied for European Economic Community (EEC) associate membership in 1959 and the Ankara Agreement entered into force in 1964.³

The empirical analysis consists of three causal factors – misfit, political salience and foreign policy considerations. In 1961, Germany concluded a bilateral labour recruitment agreement with Turkey. Its existence then minimised the misfit and the cost of including provisions on freedom of movement and right of establishment in the Ankara Agreement, which happened on Turkish demands. But only the constellation of the high foreign policy value of Turkey together with the relatively low domestic political salience of immigration matters and the bureaucratic nature of the decision-making process led to the German government's support of the provisions.

The paper uses archival primary data from three different archives which has been looked through for the first time with a particular focus on the freedom of movement provisions.⁴ The paper is structured as follows. It begins with presenting the theoretical framework. It then gives an overview of the freedom of movement provisions of the Ankara Agreement. This is followed by the empirical analysis. The paper ends with a concluding section.

I. Theoretical Framework

The theoretical model of bureaucratic politics is used as a macrostructure for analysing how the causal factors – misfit, political salience and foreign policy considerations – affect the relevant actors in terms of the distribution of costs and benefits, and how the final governmental preferences emerge from the preferences of the different actors involved.

3. The focus of this paper is on the Ankara Agreement itself and not the decisions of the Association Council, because the articles of the Agreement contain the most far-reaching provisions with regard to the freedom of movement for Turkish workers. Although its implementation is not tied to a particular deadline, article 12 contains a binding obligation for Member States to establish the freedom of movement.

4. The Bundesarchiv (German Federal Archive) in Koblenz, the Historical Archives of the European Union in Florence and the Political Archives of the Auswärtiges Amt (German Federal Foreign Office) in Berlin.

Misfit

The concept of the fit between national and EU-level legislation helps to analyse the role of national legislation.⁵ This approach is borrowed from the Europeanization literature that perceives EU policy-making as a two-level game, in which national decision-makers attempt to reconcile national with international obligations.⁶

The concept of a misfit or mismatch between the national legislation and the proposed EU policies has been used for both gauging the degree of change induced by the EU policies, and the different compliance or implementation trajectories of Member States.⁷ If the adaptation pressure to adjust national and EU-level legislation or regulation is low, only little changes to the status quo are required. As adaptation costs are low, domestic actors easily implement the changes induced at the EU level. However, if the adaptation pressure is substantial, European institutions induce a collision with national regulatory principles, practices and laws. In this scenario, adaptation costs can be very high; consequently they might lead to national resistance to the proposed changes and a poor implementation record. The Europeanization literature on misfit focuses heavily on the final result of the governmental preferences and does only pay scant attention to the process of how these preferences are formed, the actors involved in the process and the continuously evolving external context. The paper unpacks the black box of governmental preferences in tracing the causal processes that lead to certain outcomes in preferences.

By applying the above stipulations to the research question, the paper hypothesizes the following: A member state government supports the EU-level facilitation of economic migration policies if the misfit between the proposed measure and the national regulations is low.

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5. Cf. T.A. BÖRZEL, T. RISSE, *When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change*, in: *European Integration online Papers*, 4(2000); K. FEATHERSTONE, *Introduction: In the Name of 'Europe'*, in: K. FEATHERSTONE, C.M. RADAELLI (eds), *The Politics of Europeanization*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003; C.M. RADAELLI, *Whither Europeanization? Concept stretching and substantive change*, in: *European Integration online Papers*, 4(2000); C.M. RADAELLI, *The Europeanization of Public Policy*, in: K. FEATHERSTONE, C.M. RADAELLI (eds), *The Politics of Europeanization*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003.
 6. R. PUTNAM, *Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games*, in: *International Organization*, 3(1988), pp.427-460.
 7. T.A. BÖRZEL, *Towards Convergence in Europe? Institutional Adaptation to Europeanization in Germany and Spain*, in: *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 4(1999), pp.573-596.; T.A. BÖRZEL, T. RISSE, op.cit.; M.G. COWLES, J. CAPORASO, T. RISSE, *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2001; A. HERITIER, C. KNILL, S. MINGERS, *Ringling the Changes in Europe: Regulatory Competition and the Transformation of the State. Britain, France, Germany*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1996; C. KNILL, D. LEHMKUHL, *How Europe Matters. Different Mechanisms of Europeanization*, in: *European Integration online Papers*, 3/7 (1999).

Political salience

This paper uses the definition of political salience put forward by Marc Rosenblum: ‘the level of popular attention to immigration issues’.⁸ The level of politicization changes how an issue is discussed at the political level and how the process of preference formation takes place.

If preference formation is sheltered from the attention of the masses, the debate is more bureaucratic than political. If this is the case, the debate is more likely to give more prominence to the potential benefits of immigration, e.g., filling labour shortages or establishing a strategic partnership with a third country. Alexander Caviedes notes: ‘Only labor migration policy that manages to pass under the radar of the general debate over immigration is immune from the caprices of public opinion’.⁹ Then it is easier to disconnect the debate from distributive questions, and the discussions are likely to develop into a conversation of national experts in the respective regulatory policy field. If the issues at stake are technically and legally complex, if they are not straightforwardly accessible to the public, and if the political salience and the possibility of political mobilization are low, a bureaucratic rather than a political debate is probable. Conversely, if the issues raised entail the redistribution of costs in an obvious and easily noticeable way, the discourse is likely to be more politically loaded.¹⁰

Accordingly, it is hypothesized, that if political salience is low, the debate is technical and bureaucratic and a member state will support delegating competencies on economic migration to the EU level to realize the economic benefits they promise to offer.

Foreign Policy Considerations

This section analyses how national immigration policies can be deployed as a tool of foreign policy. In order to examine how immigration policy might be used for foreign policy ends, a number of questions need to be answered: What is the link between foreign policy and immigration policy? How does the impact manifest itself and what kind of immigration policy does foreign policy influence? When does a country or a group of countries become relevant? Why would a sending country be interested in the open immigration policies of a host country (or a group of host countries)? How

8. M.R. ROSENBLUM, *The Transnational Politics of U.S. Immigration Policy*, Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, UCSD, La Jolla, 2004, pp.40-41.

9. A. CAVIEDES, *Prying Open Fortress Europe: The Turn to Sectoral Labor Migration*, Lexington, Plymouth, 2010, p.3.

10. A. HERITIER, *The accommodation of diversity in European policy-making and its outcomes: regulatory policy as a patchwork*, in: *Journal of European Public Policy*, 3(1996), pp.155 and 159.

can a third country or a group of third countries impact the preferences of a Member State?

Christopher Mitchell defines foreign policy aptly as ‘a set of concerns and actions in relation to foreign governments and societies, focused on the goals of security, prestige, and economic well-being’.¹¹ Rosenblum proposes a framework that predicts under what domestic conditions foreign policy factors are most likely to shape migration policies. By using two variables, foreign policy value and domestic political salience, Rosenblum’s framework distinguishes four possible modes of immigration policy making. The approach is informed by international considerations but also captures how they are filtered by domestic politics. Foreign policy value is defined here as ‘the importance of migration to U.S. bilateral relations with particular states and the importance of those states for the overall U.S. foreign policy agenda’.¹² The more important the sending state, the higher the foreign policy value. Foreign policy considerations are likely to play out most drastically when the foreign policy value of a country is high and the political salience of migration in the host country is low. Put differently, under these conditions we would expect foreign policy consideration to shape governmental preferences on immigration policy to a sizeable extent.

As for the causal link between foreign policy and immigration policy, we can distinguish two dimensions of influence. First, direct influence, and second, issue linkage. Direct influence of migration policies refers to the direct impact of a receiving country’s migration policies on a certain sending country (or certain sending countries), and how these policies relate to foreign policy goals. For instance, a government might decide to embarrass or weaken a hostile regime, to stabilise less radical but unstable regimes and to support regimes in line with its foreign policy objectives. Accordingly, migration policies towards adverse countries can under certain conditions be more generous and open than towards friendly regimes, as argued by Mitchell.¹³ With regard to the second dimension, concessions on migration policies are used in a bargaining scenario to attain particular benefits in a foreign policy domain, for instance, the pledging of allegiance of a sending country (or a group of sending countries) against an opponent regime.¹⁴

If a sending country (or countries) has (or have) a vested concern for more open immigration policies in a particular receiving country (or a group of receiving countries), the sending country might lobby to push for its objectives. Emigration countries generally advocate open policies because of the prospects to secure remittances, decrease domestic unemployment, raise wages, obtain new workers’ skills and draw

11. C. MITCHELL, *Introduction: Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy toward the Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico*, in: C. MITCHELL (ed.), *Western Hemisphere Immigration and United States Foreign Policy*, The Pennsylvania State University Press; Pennsylvania, 1992.

12. M.R. ROSENBLUM, *The Transnational Politics ...*, op.cit., passim.

13. C. MITCHELL, *Introduction: Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy ...*, op.cit., pp.23-24.

14. M.R. ROSENBLUM, *The Transnational Politics ...*, op.cit., p.29.

level with neighbouring countries with which a historical rivalry exists.¹⁵ The more a sending country cares about a receiving country's (or a group of receiving countries') immigration policy, the more likely it is to make an active effort at influencing and in turn to be successful with its attempts.

Thus, if the foreign policy value of a country (or of a certain group of countries) is perceived as high, domestic political salience of immigration is low and if the sending country (countries) exert(s) relevant pressure on the host government(s), a Member State will support relatively open immigration policies with regard to this country (those countries) both at the national and EU-level.

Bureaucratic Politics

The theoretical model of bureaucratic politics provides an analytical lens to examine how costs and benefits are distributed across actors, and how the final governmental preferences emerge from those of the different actors involved.¹⁶ In order to use it in a systematic way, the paper reduces the model to three main propositions:

First, the political contestation is structured by the rules of the game; they determine the action-channels. Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow define action channels as 'a regularized means of taking governmental action on a specific kind of issue'. They preselect the major players, determine their usual points of entrance into the game and distribute particular advantages and disadvantages. Accordingly, political decisions are the result of a process of contestation.

Second, the actors' position in a bureaucracy influences their preferences, as the mission of the bureaucratic players is generally to improve the position of their respective organization. Thus, different departments or units are likely to perceive costs and benefits varyingly, and consequently differ in their conclusions about certain policy issues.

Third, actors differ in terms of power, i.e., their ability to effectively influence government decisions and actions. Power can be structural, stemming from the particular organization of the bureaucracy, or based on certain skilled individuals.¹⁷

15. M.J. MILLER, *International Migration in Post-Cold War International Relations*, in: B. GOSH (ed.), *Managing Migration: Time for a New International Regime?*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, p.36; M.R. ROSENBLUM, *Moving Beyond the Policy of No Policy: Emigration from Mexico and Central America*, *Latin American Politics and Society*, 4(2004), pp.91-125.

16. G.T. ALLISON, *Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, in: *The American Political Science Review*, 3(1969), pp.689-718; G.T. ALLISON, M.H. HALPERIN, *A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications*, in: *World Politics*, 24/Supplement: *Theory and Policy in International Relations* (1972), pp.40-79; G.T. ALLISON, P. ZELIKOW, *Essence of decision: explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers, New York, 1999².

17. G.T. ALLISON, P. ZELIKOW, *Essence of decision ...*, op.cit., pp.300 and 307.

These three predications are used to analyse how the causal factors lead to the final preference of a government.

II. Genesis of the Ankara Agreement and its provisions on economic migration

Turkey applied to become an associate member of the European Economic Community (EEC) on 31 July 1959 – two months after Greece had put forward its application. Negotiations on an association agreement between the Republic of Turkey and the EEC started on 28 September 1959, and took ten at times slow and difficult rounds lasting several days each, before they could be concluded on 25 June 1963; the agreement was signed on 12 September 1963 and entered into force on 1 December 1964. The association agreement between Greece and the EEC was concluded two years earlier, on 9 July 1961, after negotiations that were less lengthy.¹⁸

The Ankara agreement was concluded to make Turkey an associate member of the EEC, to establish a customs union, and to possibly pave the way for Turkish membership of the EEC.¹⁹ The careful wording of potential Turkish membership to the EEC indicates that the EEC was aware of at least some of the difficulties involved, for instance, the massive developmental gap as well as the prominent question of whether Turkey is a European country.

On the one hand, the EEC wanted to root Turkey firmly in the West, but was, on the other hand, not so sure if Turkish membership to the EEC might be a step too far. The Agreement's provisions on economic migration commit the contracting parties to securing progressively the freedom of movement of workers (article 12), the right of establishment (article 13) as well as the freedom to provide services (article 14). The Agreement also contains a number of further economic provisions for economic union regarding, for instance, transport, competition, taxation, balance of payment and movement of capital. The articles, including the ones on the freedom of movement, are only brief and rather vague in their wording. They are supposed to be supplemented with additional protocols at a later stage. Article 36 of the Additional Protocol from 1977 provides for the gradual establishment of free movement by 1986,

18. J.N. BRIDGE, *The EEC and Turkey: an Analysis of the Association Agreement and its Impact on Turkish Economic Development*, in: A. SHLAIM, G.N. YANNOPOULOS (eds), *The EEC and the Mediterranean Countries*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976; H.-D. WÜLKER, *EWG und wirtschaftliche Assoziierungen: Eine Analyse wirtschaftspolitischer Probleme aktueller und potentieller Assoziierungsformen*, Deutsch-Schwedische Handelskammer, Deutsche Handelskammer in Österreich, Handelskammer Deutschland-Schweiz, Wien, 1971.

19. DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, *Sitzungsprotokoll des Deutschen Bundestages, 84-120 IV, 118. Sitzung, 4. März 1964*, Deutscher Bundestag, Berlin, 1964; J.F. JOSEPH, *The Introduction: Turkey at the Threshold of the European Union*, in: J.F. JOSEPH (ed.), *Turkey and the European Union: Internal Dynamics and External Challenges*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006, p.3.

with the process managed by the Association Council.²⁰ Member States hold veto powers in the Council and freedom of movement was never established.

Sena Ceylanoglu suggests that provisions on economic migration were taken from the Treaty of Rome which together with its four freedoms served as a model for the association agreement, and that there was no disagreement about the freedom of movement provisions in the negotiations.²¹ The paper shows that this is only partially true, as there was disagreement and the wording and content of the freedom of movement provisions in the Ankara Agreement differ from both the Treaty of Rome and the Association Agreement with Greece.

III. Explaining Germany's preferences

This empirical section explains the German government's preferences on the freedom of movement provisions of the Ankara Agreement by discussing the causal factors devised in the theoretical section (misfit, political salience and foreign policy considerations) in light of the empirical evidence. The bureaucratic politics framework provides the macrostructure to analyse how the causal factors lead to the final governmental preference by considering all relevant actors.

Misfit

The point of reference to determine the misfit between the Ankara Agreement and Germany's national regulations was the bilateral labour recruitment agreement the German government had concluded with its Turkish counterpart on 30 October 1961. It entered into force retroactively on 1 September 1961 (Vereinbarung zur "Regelung der Vermittlung türkischer Arbeitnehmer nach der Bundesrepublik Deutschland").²² Labour migration of foreign nationals to Germany commenced in 1955, when the booming German economy had depleted domestic resources and was calling for the import of further workers from abroad.²³ The legal framework was generated by

20. *Official Journal of the European Communities*, 31.12.1977; M. UGUR, *The European Union and Turkey: An Anchor/Credibility Dilemma*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 1999, p.143.

21. S. CEYLANOGLU, *Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Griechenland und die Türkei: Die Assoziationsabkommen im Vergleich (1959-1963)*, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 2004, p.18.

22. BUNDESMINISTER FÜR ARBEIT UND SOZIALORDNUNG, *Regelung der Vermittlung türkischer Arbeitnehmer nach der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, in: *Bundesarbeitsblatt*, 3(1962), pp. 69-71; K. HUNN, "Nächstes Jahr kehren wir zurück...". *Die Geschichte der türkischen "Gastarbeiter" in der Bundesrepublik*, Wallstein Verlag, Düsseldorf, 2005, p.46.

23. S. GREEN, *Divergent Traditions, Converging Responses: Immigration and Integration Policy in the UK and Germany*, in: *German Politics*, 1(2007), pp.95-115.

bilateral labour recruitment agreements, starting with Italy in 1955, Spain and Greece in 1960, and with Turkey in 1961. The wave of conclusion of such agreements continued with Morocco in 1963, Portugal in 1964, Tunisia in 1965 and Yugoslavia in 1968.

The implementation of the agreement on the German side was put into the hands of the Federal Agency for Employment Service and Unemployment Benefits. It was supposed to act together with its Turkish equivalent as an agent to place Turkish workers with German employers. The agreement stipulated that each accepted worker was issued a standard work contract and a so-called legitimization card. The card replaced the work permit, which would usually be required, for a maximum period of one year. If the worker desired to stay longer than this period, the agreement foresaw that the worker would need to request a work permit at the local employment office and a residence permit at the local foreigners authority. The residence permit could only be issued for a maximum period of two years. The agreement was less generous than the ones with the other European countries, such as Italy, Spain, and Greece;²⁴ for instance, it contained no provisions on transferring earnings, family reunification, the right to receive child allowances, or the possibility for German firms to request specific Turkish workers by name, who would then enjoy a simplified admission procedure.²⁵ This suggests that the German government was less keen to conclude such an agreement with Turkey compared to countries such as Italy, Spain and Greece. Labour shortages affected the conclusion of the bilateral agreement with Turkey. However, foreign political dynamics also played an important role in convincing the German government to conclude the agreement.

The bilateral agreement is certainly more concrete than the provisions in the Ankara Agreement. This shows that the Ankara Agreement was an EC-wide compromise, albeit shaped by the countries with bilateral agreements in place. The Ankara Agreement contains a binding commitment to establish freedom of movement and establishment for workers from Turkey. In contrast, the bilateral agreement consists of specific measures that had an immediate effect on regulating labour migration from Turkey to Germany. Hence, the national regulations were more open than the EEC-level measures and the fights had taken place in the preference formation on the bilateral agreement. Consequently, the German stance on the provisions on freedom of movement and establishment was rather relaxed.

The Ankara Agreement did not thwart any national regulations or preclude the inauguration of future bilateral agreements. As the bilateral agreement was more detailed than the relevant provisions of the Ankara Agreement, and allowed Turkish nationals to enter the German labour market with immediate effect, there was no

24. A revised version of the agreement came into force on 30 October 1964, which made its provisions very similar to the other bilateral labour recruitment agreements.

25. BUNDESMINISTER FÜR ARBEIT UND SOZIALORDNUNG, *Regelung der Vermittlung türkischer Arbeitnehmer nach der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 1962; K. HUNN, "Nächstes Jahr kehren wir zurück" ..., *op.cit.*, pp.55-56; J.D. Steinert, *Migration und Politik: Westdeutschland – Europa – Übersee 1945-1961*, Secolo Verlag, Osnabrück, 1995, p.308.

misfit that could trouble the German decision makers. Consequently, consent to the provisions on freedom of movement of the Ankara Agreement was easily given as no political or economic costs were looming as a result of a misfit between national and EU-level regulations.

Political Salience

Immigration was not politically salient at the time the Ankara Agreement was being negotiated. Immigration was largely seen as a temporal phenomenon that would help the German economy to push ahead with full force. The potential difficulties associated with integrating migrants were unknown. In addition, the Ankara Agreement hardly appeared in general public debate which made any politicisation of the decision-making process even more unlikely. Hence, the decision-making process on the freedom of movement provisions of the Ankara Agreement followed the route laid out by the rules of the game – an exception is the role of the Turkish government; this will be discussed below.

Foreign Policy Considerations

Turkey was of high foreign policy value for Germany for a number of reasons. Most notably, its role in fighting the threat emanating from the Soviet Union, interlinked with strong support for the Association Agreement by the US and Germany's desire to promote European integration as a means to regain a foreign policy profile. Finally, there was a historically established special relationship between Germany and Turkey.

The German Federal Minister of Economics Ludwig Erhard mentioned the importance of finding a quick solution for the Greek and Turkish bids, in order not to upset the governments and people of these two countries that constituted a cornerstone of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).²⁶ A German aide-mémoire indicates the importance of Turkey's geographic location and military considerations for the conclusion of the Agreement.²⁷ In a meeting held in the Council of the EEC

26. HAEU [Historical Archives of the European Union, Brussels], Commission of the EEC, 2. Communication de la Commission sur les conversations avec: a) une délégation du Gouvernement grec, suite à la décision du Conseil en date du 25 juillet 1959 b) une délégation du Gouvernement turc, suite à la décision du Conseil en date du 11 septembre 1959.

27. BAArch [Bundesarchiv, Koblenz], Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, Denkschrift zum Abkommen zur Gründung einer Assoziation zwischen der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der Türkei, 1963.

on 3 April 1962, the German delegation reminded the other Member States that it was important not to offend Turkey for geopolitical security reasons.²⁸

It was crucial for Germany to have very close ties with the Western powers and to intertwine as deeply and quickly as possible with the member countries of organisations, such as the EEC and NATO. Being integrated into the EEC gave Germany a voice at the European level and was one of the main priorities of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.²⁹ Integrating with its Western European neighbours was then seen as the prime route to re-establish some of Germany's geopolitical power.

Germany was no nuclear power and needed support of the Western powers, in particular the US, to deter the Soviet Union whose influence began immediately after Germany's Eastern borders.³⁰ This fundamental dependence made Germany subordinate to the US, and meant that German politicians had to take into account US interests when making foreign policy.³¹ The negotiations of the Ankara Agreement show that US pressure was an important factor in the EEC's efforts to integrate Turkey into Europe. This is particularly the case for Germany.³²

The containment policy of the US inaugurated by the Truman Doctrine in 1947 made it an important US foreign policy goal to support states endangered by Communism and Soviet rule, such as Turkey, and to anchor them in the West. Turkey was particularly important, as on 30 October 1959, it had agreed to station US missiles on its ground that could reach the Soviet Union. Consequently, the US supported the Ankara Agreement, largely on political grounds. Nonetheless, budgetary considerations played a role, too. Increasing financial aid from the EEC to Turkey meant a relief for US finances. In particular, with regard to Germany and its increasing economic prosperity and capacity, the US expected a return service for the Marshall Plan. The German government did not have much latitude in that respect and met the demands. Thus, Germany supported Turkey's fast integration in the West by means of the Ankara Agreement.³³

28. BArch, Ständige Vertretung der BRD bei der EWG, 65. Tagung des Rates der EWG am 03.04.1962.

29. A. MORAVCSIK, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1998, p.27.

30. W. RUDZIO, *Das politische System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Leske + Budrich, Opladen, 2003, p.17; 65. Tagung des Rates, op.cit.

31. W. BESSON, *Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik: Erfahrungen und Maßstäbe*, Piper, München, 1970, p.185.

32. HAEU [Florence], Commission of the EEC, Note à l'attention de MM. Rey et Marjolin. Objet: Négociations avec la Turquie, Réunion du Coreper, 10.01.1963; E. KRIEGER, *Die Europakandidatur der Türkei: Der Entscheidungsprozess der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft während den Assoziierungsverhandlungen mit der Türkei 1959-1963*, Chronos Verlag, Zürich, 2006, p.189; C. ÖZREN, *Die Beziehungen der beiden deutschen Staaten zur Türkei (1945/9-1963): Politische und ökonomische Interessen im Zeichen der deutschen Teilung*, LIT, Münster, 1999, p.243.

33. M. JAMIN, *Die deutsch-türkischen Anwerbevereinbarungen von 1961 und 1964*, in: A. ERYILMAZ, M. JAMIN (eds), *Fremde Heimat: Eine Geschichte der Einwanderung aus der Türkei*, Klartext Verlag, Essen, 1998, pp.70-71; S. CEYLANOGLU, op.cit., pp.213-218; G. GÜRBAY, *Die Türkei-Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland unter Konrad Adenauer (1949-1963)*, Centaurus-Verlagsgesellschaft, Pfaffenweiler, 1990, p.175; C. ÖZREN, op.cit., p.293; E. KRIEGER, op.cit., p.178.

The foreign policy value of Turkey to Germany was further increased by the fact that, historically, the relationship between the two countries had been a special and cordial one. Germany was an important trade partner and ally for Turkey and, in addition, the two countries were united by the long-established 'German-Turkish friendship' and the alliance in the First World War. Unlike a few years later, in the 1950s and early 1960s, this 'friendship' was still an appropriate characterisation of German-Turkish relations. The German Federal Foreign Office praised this alliance and friendship strongly in 1963 and attributed great significance to it – at least officially. An internal document of the Federal Foreign Office indicates that the traditional bond with Turkey and its history as a reliable ally were still important considerations for Germany when the Ankara Agreement was discussed.³⁴ In July 1962, the Turkish government thanked the German government in an aide-mémoire for its continued support of the Turkish bid.³⁵ This special relationship further increased Turkey's foreign policy value and gave Turkey the opportunity to voice its interest to the German government with a good chance of being taken seriously. As discussed above, political salience of migration was low, which increased the importance of the foreign policy value of Turkey in the preference formation.

Concerns about political security provide a convincing explanation for why Germany supported the Ankara Agreement as a whole. However, they do not give an indication of why the freedom of movement provisions feature in the Agreement. Including Turkey's diplomatic efforts in the conclusion of the Agreement in the analysis provides a more nuanced view. The provisions of the freedom of movement for workers were important for Turkey. In the late 1950s, Turkey was in an economic and political crisis. The Turkish government anticipated that the freedom of movement provisions promised several immediate benefits to Turkey.³⁶ First, Turkey's economy was suffering sustained underemployment. The possibility of exporting workers to the EEC promised relief for the domestic labour market. A further benefit was that Turkish workers could obtain professional qualifications in the EEC that would benefit Turkey's economic development after the return of the workers. Remittances from workers abroad could improve Turkey's balance of payments.³⁷

In order to advance its goals, Turkey used two framing devices, first the Soviet threat, and second being disadvantaged vis-à-vis Greece. For instance, in April 1962, the Turkish Prime Minister, İsmet İnönü, stressed the fragility of the country despite

34. PAAA [Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Berlin], AUSWÄRTIGES AMT, Antrag der Türkei auf Aussoziierung mit der EWG, 1959. See also G. GÜRBEY, op.cit., pp.9-10 and K. HUNN, "Nächstes Jahr kehren wir zurück ...", pp.34-35.

35. PAAA, 81.12/5, Assoziierungsabkommen mit der Türkei, Turkish Embassy to the Federal Republic of Germany. Aide-mémoire, 1962.

36. A.S. GITMEZ, *Turkish Experience of Work Emigration: Economic Development or Individual Well-Being?*, in: *Yapı Kredi Economic Review*, 4(1989), p.4; A. ESCOBAR, K. HAILBRONNER, P. MARTIN, L. MEZA, *Migration and Development: Mexico and Turkey*, in: *International Migration Review*, 3(2006), p.716.

37. BAArch, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft (1959c), Neue türkische Note, 05.10.1959; Commission of the EEC, *Compte rendu des conversations exploratoires entre les délégations de la Turquie et de la Commission (28-30 Septembre 1959)*; H.-D. WÜLKER, op.cit., p.69.

it being an important pillar of NATO and expressed his concern about the prolongation of the conclusion of the Agreement by the Community. In August 1961, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Selim Rauf Sarper, conveyed an aide-mémoire to the German Embassy in Ankara expressing explicit Turkish expectations for German support of the Turkish bid for associate membership.³⁸

The most important point is that Turkish motivations to join the EEC have to be seen in the light of developments that took place in the wake of Greece's bid for EEC membership. Turkey did not want to fall behind its main rival Greece.³⁹ The Turkish government used the necessity of equal treatment with Greece as a second framing device to make its case vis-à-vis the EEC. A letter about the German position sent around within the Federal Ministry of Economics states that the Commission also saw the Turkish desire for equal treatment with Greece as the main reason for its attempts to conclude the Association Agreement with the EEC. The letter further argues that the sensitivity of the Greeks and the Turks as well as their mutual jealousy blocked the way to an Association Agreement with Turkey that differed fundamentally from the one with Greece. The letter further put forward that although an Agreement with Turkey that was completely identical to the one with Greece was not desirable due to Turkey's lack of economic development, there was not much latitude to take this into account. In addition, a note of the federal government's position with regard to the Association Agreement with Turkey shows that it was considered as politically impossible to refuse Turkey from becoming an associate member of the EEC, as Greece now was.⁴⁰

This argument is further corroborated by the fact that the Turkish delegation was at times badly prepared for the negotiations and predominantly tried to achieve the same provisions that had been agreed in the Athens Agreement. Turkey actively exerted pressure on Germany and the other EEC Member States, for instance, vocally by the Turkish Foreign Minister, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, including reference to the importance of equal treatment with Greece.⁴¹

This Turkish behaviour, induced by its relative position to Greece, is also the key to the freedom of movement provisions in the Ankara Agreement. Before the Athens Agreement was concluded, Turkey did not have any particular demands with regard to freedom of movement, apart from technical assistance from the EEC. At a later stage of the negotiations and after the Athens Agreement was successfully signed,

38. Ständige Vertretung der BRD bei der EWG, 65. Tagung des Rates, 1962; BArch, Wi 412-88.01 – 775/61, Embassy of the FRG in Ankara to the Auswärtiges Amt, 25.08.1961.

39. PAAA, Wesentliche Ergebnisse der EWG-Ratssitzung am 24/25.07.1961; HAEU, Commission of the EEC, Assoziierung der Türkei mit der Gemeinschaft, (Besprechungen vom 14.-21. Oktober 1960).

40. BArch, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, Rahmen für die Assoziierung der Türkei mit der EWG, 1961; S/361/61 (NT4), Council of the EEC, 19.07.1961, Einleitende Aufzeichnung.

41. Communication de la Commission sur les conversations ..., du 25 juillet 1959 [and] du 11 septembre 1959, op.cit.; HAEU, Commission of the EEC, Assoziierung der Türkei mit der Gemeinschaft, (Besprechungen vom 14.-21. Oktober 1960); BArch, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, Fernschreiben aus Ankara, 17.03.1960.

the Turkish delegation's proposal for the content of the freedom of movement provisions consisted of a copy of the text of the Athens Agreement's relevant provisions.⁴² It is important to note that Turkey demanded explicitly that the freedom of movement provisions were similar to the ones in the Athens Agreement. However, after Turkey articulated these demands, the Community did object to having the same provision in the Ankara Agreement, and pushed for formulations that were less encompassing.⁴³ Title III of the Ankara Agreement does not include articles on the exchange of young workers and the provision of technical assistance by the Community, like the ones in the Athens Agreement. In addition, the wording of the freedom of movement provisions in the Athens Agreement is more concrete than in the Ankara Agreement. Thus, Title III of the Ankara Agreement was neither completely uncontested, nor is it just a copy of Title III of the Athens Agreement.

Bureaucratic politics

The rules of the game were set by the joint rules of internal procedure of the German Federal Ministries (*Gemeinsame Geschäftsordnung der Bundesministerien – Besonderer Teil*, as in force in 1959-1963). Sections 22, 75 and 76 determine that the Ministries in charge of concluding agreements are the Federal Ministry of Economics and the Federal Foreign Office. Neither the Länder nor interest groups needed not to be included according to the rules.

The Federal Foreign Office was responsible for questions regarding association agreements. The economic appraisal of the agreement rested with the Federal Ministry of Economics. This constellation gave rise to a turf war in the establishment of ministerial competencies in a new policy-making domain where boundaries of responsibility and influence were still rather fluid.⁴⁴

To distil the individual actors' positions, the second provision of the bureaucratic politics framework proves useful, i.e. an actor's position is a result on where it is situated in the bureaucracy: The Federal Foreign Office's principal objective is the fostering of relations with other states and international organisations. Accordingly, it was the first Ministry to support the Agreement and the freedom of movement provisions. Other Ministries were more sceptical. For instance, the Federal Ministry of Finance was worried about money flowing from Germany to Turkey, which was still relatively poor. Being the guardian of the German federal budget, this position is not surprising. The Federal Foreign Office did not regard these concerns as worthy

42. BArch, Council of the EEC, Einleitende Aufzeichnung. Betr. Mitteilung der Kommission über die Besprechung mit einer Delegation der griechischen Regierung aufgrund des Ratsbeschlusses vom 25.07.59 einer Delegation der türkischen Regierung aufgrund Des Ratsbeschlusses vom 11.09.59; Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, Vermerk, betr. Verhandlungen über die Assoziierung der Türkei vom 14.-18. Januar 1963, 23.01.1963.

43. PAAA, Türkischer Entwurf eines Assoziierungsabkommens mit der EWG, 1963.

44. BArch, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, Assoziierung dritter Länder mit der EWG, 1959.

of blocking the agreement, and remained committed to its stance that the Agreement was urgently necessary for geopolitical reasons.

The Federal Minister of Economic Affairs, Ludwig Erhard, initially rejected a customs union with Turkey in favour of a large free-trade area, which would not have included provisions on the movement of persons.⁴⁵ But also, similarly to the Federal Ministry of Finance, it was worried about the potential economic costs that the conclusion of an association agreement with Turkey might entail. Providing economic assistance to a country of Turkey's size was seen as surpassing the capacities of Germany.⁴⁶ In addition, the Federal Ministry of Agriculture voiced some reservations regarding the inclusion of tariff-quotas for Turkish tobacco to enter the Community. The Ministry was concerned that this might disadvantage domestic tobacco producers.⁴⁷

In the end, the view of the Federal Foreign Office prevailed. This was certainly not due to any superior structural power of the Ministry. Rather, the foreign political argument was the most powerful and found resonance in the highest echelon of the German government. It allowed Turkey to include provisions on freedom of movement and establishment in the Agreement, which resembled the provisions outlined in the Athens Agreement. This implies that the Turkish government belonged to the relevant actors that were involved in the decision-making process. Allison and Zelikow acknowledge that foreign officials can be part of the process; however, the framework does not further elaborate on how exactly foreign governments can take part.⁴⁸ We would expect the rules of the game to include them somehow. Consequently the definition of the rules of the game should allow a point of entry for other actors, such as for instance foreign governments, by external pressure.

IV. Conclusion

Three causal factors have been used to explain why the German government supported the provisions on freedom of movement and right of establishment in the Ankara Agreement: misfit, political salience and foreign policy considerations. As a broader theoretical lens, the paper uses a bureaucratic politics stance that analyses actors' positions and their influence according to their position in the organisation, their power structures and the institutional design that organises the relations between the actors.

45. S. CEYLANOGLU, *op.cit.*, pp.195-196; C. ÖZREN, *op.cit.*, pp.242-243.

46. BArch, EA3 – 5053/59, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, Vermerk über das Problem einer Assoziation Griechenlands und der Türkei mit der EWG, 27.08.1959; B102/12172, Wirtschaftliche Grundsatzfragen der Assoziierung oder des Beitritts der Türkei zur EWG, Bd.1, 30.11.1959-1960.

47. BArch, B126/2554, Bundeskanzleramt – Referat 6, Assoziierung der Türkei mit der EWG 3949/59, 5505/61, 5493/63, 5629/63.

48. G.T. ALLISON, P. ZELIKOW, *Essence of decision ...*, *op.cit.*, p.258.

The bilateral recruitment agreement had feedback effects and reduced the costs of yielding to Turkish bids to include provisions with relevance for migration in the Ankara Agreement. This is because, according to the misfit hypothesis, the Ankara Agreement did not entail any significant costs for actors as the national regulations, i.e., the bilateral labour recruitment agreement between Germany and Turkey would continue to apply. Hence, the Association Agreement did not infringe upon Germany's national regulations. Considering foreign policy considerations elucidates why Turkey was in the position to, and in fact did, propose the insertion of provisions on freedom of movement in the Agreement. It did so principally because it did not want to conclude an agreement that would be significantly less profound than the agreement concluded between the EEC and Greece. Doing otherwise would have produced national embarrassment for Turkey vis-à-vis its long-term rival Greece. That the German government was receptive to Turkey's bids can be explained by foreign policy considerations. Given the geopolitical insecurity of the early Cold War years, Turkey was a key ally for the West that the US did not want to be susceptible to Soviet courtings. Hence, its foreign policy value for Germany was high. This together with the low domestic political salience of migration and the uncontroversial as well as prevalent dictum of the need to continue fuelling the post-war economic boom with foreign labour maximised the influence Turkey could have on the German government. The government in Ankara gladly used this opportunity.

The case nicely demonstrates the interplay of the different causal factors underpinning full German support for a liberalisation measure at the EU level. Each causal factor played a role in the process of preference formation; the most important ones are the misfit and foreign policy considerations.

The paper fills a gap in the literature on the Ankara Agreement and on EU immigration policy. The existing literature on the Ankara Agreement fails to provide a satisfactory explanation of why the freedom of movement provisions are included in the Agreement, and focuses too much on political security factors.⁴⁹ As a result, it misses the complex interplay of political and economic factors that led to Germany's support of the freedom of movement provisions. The paper has shown that the freedom of movement provisions were not just taken from the Treaty of Rome, as put forward by the literature, but are modified versions of the provisions in the Athens Agreement. With regards to the literature on EU immigration policy, it has been shown that Member States have supported liberalisation of immigration measures at the EU level – given that the three causal factors are in place. This challenges the assumption that has been implicitly present in the work on EU immigration policy, i.e., that co-operation at the EU level is only possible if it contributes to making immigration controls into the Union stricter; the immigration of highly skilled workers is the exception.

The findings of this paper outline the foreign policy considerations that were crucial for this process. They show the importance that foreign policy considerations can

49. See, for instance S. CEYLANOGLU, *op.cit.*; G. GÜRBEY, *op.cit.*; E. KRIEGER, *op.cit.*; C. ÖZREN, *op.cit.*

have for the EU-level liberalisation of immigration policies, as well as the significance of the Federal Foreign Office in this regard. The Federal Foreign Office is generally concerned with relations with other countries and less so with domestic political matters that are the chief concerns of the Interior, Employment, Economics and Finance Ministries, such as domestic security, and potential fiscal, political or social costs of immigration.

Theoretically, the paper has assembled different theoretical concepts that are usually not associated with EU policies on immigration. In particular, the bureaucratic politics framework, together with actors' perceived costs and benefits, provide a sound base to approach the black box of governmental sovereignty concerns with regards to delegating immigration competencies to the European level. Furthermore, the bureaucratic politics framework constitutes an analytical lens that might also be applied to other countries and policy initiatives to better understand the causal processes that form certain government preferences on immigration matters. With particular regard to the bureaucratic politics framework, the rules of the game definition should be modified to enable a clear point of entry for a foreign government to influence governments' preference formation without being formally invited to take part in the process. The paper shows that the Turkish government made an important contribution to the decision-making process by lobbying the German government out of its own initiative.

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Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen

Daniele PASQUINUCCI, Daniela PREDA, Luciano TOSI (eds), *Communicationg Europe. Journals and European Integration 1939-1979*, Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2013, 610 p. – ISBN 978-3-0343-1472-5 – 105,60 €.

Ce livre part du constat que la construction européenne n'est aujourd'hui plus seulement une affaire de diplomates, constat devenu évident depuis la fin du monde bipolaire et l'avènement d'une Europe qui se veut acteur des relations internationales. Il est donc d'autant plus évident qu'on ne peut plus passer outre les réactions de la société civile face à un processus dont elle prend de plus en plus conscience. L'analyse de cette relation entre les Européens et l'UE en est ici à son second volet, après les actes publiés chez Peter Lang sous le titre *Consensus and European Integration: an Historical Perspective*, issus d'un colloque organisé par l'*Associazione universitaria di studi europei*. Le volume dont il est ici question s'inscrit donc dans la continuité, et est le résultat d'un second colloque qui s'est tenu du 2 au 4 mai 2013 aux universités de Pérouse et d'Assise, toujours sous l'égide de l'*Associazione*.

Le choix a ici consisté à s'attarder sur un des moyens de la socialisation de l'opinion publique aux problèmes européens: la presse. Il s'agissait d'analyser les moyens d'information officiels, chargés de mieux faire connaître le processus européen, et non-officiels, qui n'ont pas cette fonction comme objectif premier, mais qui peuvent participer à la réflexion sur l'Europe qu'il faut faire. Ces journaux sont politiques, culturels, économiques ou centrés sur le droit. Ils participent du débat démocratique qui accompagne la construction européenne depuis la veille de la Seconde Guerre mondiale jusqu'à 1979 – année des premières élections du Parlement européen au suffrage universel – le plus souvent militants, sans oublier les journaux créés par les institutions européennes elles-mêmes, et notamment la Commission. Tous ont ainsi pu contribuer à alimenter un débat qu'il s'agira d'analyser.

Cette étude comble un trou, celui de la communication autour de l'Europe, et des informations qu'elle apporte aux citoyens: ces journaux représentent un intéressant laboratoire pour connaître le lien qui existe entre les institutions et les hommes, et dans la formation d'un sens critique, qui aujourd'hui occupe tout l'espace de réflexion sur la construction européenne, jusqu'à l'excès. D'où vient ce sens critique, et comment s'est-il formé? Cette question intéresse au plus haut point les acteurs de l'Europe eux-mêmes, qui ont pris conscience de la nécessité de mieux informer les citoyens, notamment sous l'ère Barroso (Plan D d'octobre 2005, Livre blanc pour une politique européenne de la communication de février 2006).

Un retour aux origines s'impose, qui rappelle les liens qui unissent le projet européen et les décombres de l'Europe laissés par la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Ces liens sont effectivement forts avec la Résistance, et son message généreux concernant la mise en place d'un système plus juste et plus solidaire. Le procès a été fait d'un certain nationalisme, auquel il fallait tourner le dos. Dès lors, une floraison de mou-

vements et de journaux ont commencé à réfléchir à la question, mélange d'idéalisme et de réalisme. C'est à cette époque que l'Europe fait débat, notamment dans les journaux militants mais aussi dans les plus grands titres nationaux, où l'on débat de l'urgence à mettre en place une Europe concrète. On écrit déjà cela dans la clandestinité, avec un journal comme *L'Unità europea*, autour d'Altiero Spinelli. D'autres titres paraissent au même moment en Europe, liés par la lutte contre le nazisme. Plus tard, le Plan Marshall donne un coup de fouet à ce débat, alimentant une floraison de titres, parfois de courte durée, souvent animés par quelques militants décidés, loin de toute pression officielle.

Dans les années cinquante, les débuts de la construction européenne ne voient pas le rythme baisser, les journaux jouant le seul relais d'information sur un processus qui n'est pas très lisible par tous, marqué désormais politiquement par la guerre froide, et masqué économiquement par le début de la prospérité générale suite aux Trente Glorieuses. Le débat s'élargit, notamment en direction de la jeunesse, avec toute une série de publications qui lui sont dédiées. Le débat s'institutionnalise, avec la création de la première agence européenne, *Agence Europe*, en 1953 (Emanuele Gazzo), et avec l'Association des journalistes européens, née en 1961.

Cependant, l'échec de la CED a d'ores et déjà signifié à tous les observateurs que l'unité européenne ne sera pas possible en quelques années, comme certains avaient pu l'imaginer au départ, et qu'il vaut mieux mettre en place un effort de pression et de réflexion continu, qui passe par une exposition des différentes théories autour du processus d'intégration européenne. De fait, on assiste à la mise en place de titres plus axés sur la culture et la réflexion, du type *Il Federalista* (1959): il s'agit de donner de la substance à un processus de plus en plus mystérieux et technocratique aux yeux du commun.

Tout au long des articles qui constituent cet ouvrage, on distingue la difficulté méthodologique et surtout archivistique à étudier un support pourtant aussi banal que la presse quand il s'agit d'Europe, et surtout en ce qui concerne les titres qui lui ont effectivement été consacrés au fil des quarante années sur lesquelles se focalise ce volume: l'analyse est compliquée car les études sont, par la force des choses, centrées sur les États où paraissent les titres concernés, sans compter qu'il n'y a pas de projets archivistiques pour ces journaux dispersés, qui sont souvent conservés, dans des conditions difficiles, par des militants ou descendants de militants, avec les risques de déperdition que l'on peut imaginer.

Les points de vue sont très nombreux, et s'attaquent à des revues qui sont très connues (*Il Federalista*, *L'Europe en formation* par exemple), mais aussi beaucoup d'autres qui trouvent là leurs premières analyses sérieuses. Le panel est donc très important, même si, par la force des choses et l'origine des contributeurs, il est très concentré sur la France et l'Italie (il est vrai qu'il s'agit là des deux pays les plus actifs en la matière), et l'idée est très heureuse d'avoir consacré une partie aux débuts de la communication «européenne», mise en place avec de plus en plus de sérieux par Bruxelles. On peut regretter cependant que les auteurs aillent un peu vite en besogne lorsqu'il s'agit de définir l'opinion, qui après tout est l'objet indirect de l'analyse,

puisqu'il s'agit de savoir si la communication qui lui est adressée atteint ses buts. De quelle opinion parle-t-on? Quel impact peut-on déduire? Il manque peut-être une analyse systématique de l'opinion et de ses relations avec la presse, qui aurait pu figurer dans quelques chapitres plus méthodologiques au départ. Il manque peut-être aussi quelques cas d'études centrés sur les organes de presse plus généralistes, susceptibles d'avoir plus de poids auprès des opinions: pourquoi ne pas avoir consacré une analyse sur la façon dont les grands titres de presse communiquent sur l'Europe, tels *Le Monde*, *La Stampa* ou le *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*? Mis à part ce léger bémol, l'ouvrage est très novateur, et remplit un vide concernant la presse militante européenne, qui est ici, en fonction des cas retenus, bien mise en valeur, ainsi que ce sur quoi l'Europe en construction oublie trop souvent de se pencher: l'image qu'elle dégage auprès de l'opinion.

Bertrand VAYSSIÈRE,

Maître de conférences à l'Université Toulouse 2 – Jean Jaurès

Christophe LAMFALUSSY, Ivo MAES, Sabine PÉTERS, Alexandre Lamfalussy: le sage de l'euro, Racine Campus, Bruxelles, 2014, 206 p. – ISBN 978-94-014-1719-8 – 29,99 €.

This book is not a classic memoir, written by the author in the first person, but is instead a long interview with Alexandre Lamfalussy conducted by Christophe Lamfalussy (his son), Ivo Maes and Sabine Péters. The interview format makes for a rather vivid read. The book covers all aspects of Lamfalussy's life; the complementarity of the three interviewers (respectively journalist, central banker and historian), as they themselves note in their preface, indeed contributes to the drawing of a very comprehensive overview. The book is organised in a chronological fashion. It first covers Lamfalussy's childhood and wartime years in Hungary and the flight to Belgium. It then deals with his studies, first in Louvain and then his doctorate in Oxford. Lamfalussy's professional career makes up for the rest of the book, from the beginning of his career at the *Banque de Bruxelles*, then his time at the *Bank for International Settlements* (BIS), and finally his role in European monetary integration.

Delving into the details of Lamfalussy's career is fascinating, and allows the reader to tackle some of the major issues of post-war international economic relations, including banking crises, the evolution of the regulatory/supervisory framework, and the road to the creation of the euro. Lamfalussy's time at the *Banque de Bruxelles* (and his eventual resignation) provides an interesting testimony of the period following the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, and of the international banking crises of the mid-1970s. The development of international financial regulation and supervision, the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s and the subprime crisis of the 2000s is another aspect that was central to Lamfalussy's life and career. Finally, his role in the Delors committee and later his presidency of the *European monetary institute* (and hence his role in the setting-up of the *European Central Bank*) offer valuable insights into the making of the Eurozone. The breadth of topics covered

makes it therefore an important read for anyone interested in postwar international economic history.

Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol,
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Luuk van MIDDELAAR, *The Passage to Europe. How a Continent Became a Union*, Yale University Press, New Haven/London, 2013, p.372, – ISBN 978-0-300-18112-8 – 33,00 €.

When in the spring of 2010 the *Passage naar Europa. Geschiedenis van een begin* appeared in the Netherlands, it became immediately clear that something special had happened in Dutch academic literature on European integration. Ten years after the publication of his MA thesis *Politicide*, the Groningen educated historian Luuk van Middelaar once again produced a brilliant monograph that was enthusiastically received among fellow historians, politicians, civil servants, journalists and many others interested in European affairs.¹

In the autumn of 2013 its English translation – *The Passage to Europe. How a Continent Became a Union* – was published. Since the first print his argument only proved its topicality. Between 2010 and now, the struggle of European institutions and the member states to find a way out of Europe's financial and debt crises, while keeping the Union together, once again showed what van Middelaar argues in his book: that the multi-layered, hybrid character of the EU, produces its strength in difficult times. It produces the intangible, yet substantive structure and space for an ongoing, never ending political debate, thus creating chances for progress and public support.

In the Prologue van Middelaar is clear about his goal. Breaking down the barriers of the classic theoretical Euro lingo, in which European integration has been debated over and over again, he searches for a new perspective and language that do justice to the beautiful complexity of shaping Europe's unity in political practice. In his book, therefore, no stereotypical elaborations on 'intergovernmentalism', 'supranationalism', 'functionalism' and 'spillover effects', but a rich analysis of the (factual) course of European integration instead, combined with sharp observations and insights from political and legal theory and philosophy. The result is a (hi)story – a narrative – that brings the reader surprisingly close to the intriguing complexity of political processes, that eventually produce progress and results. Sometimes against all odds.

The book consists of three parts. Parts that can each be considered to redefine the character and essence of the history of European unification and at the same time give a kaleidoscopic overall impression of this process. In the first part, 'The Secret of the Table', the image of the negotiating table as a convincing force in itself is central.

1. L. van MIDDELAAR, *Politicide. De moord op de politiek in de Franse filosofie*, Historische Uitgeverij, 2009.

This part of the book comes closest to classic diplomatic historiography on European integration, with its focus on the ‘great moments’ (the defining treaties and agreements of the process) and ‘great men’ (the statesmen and diplomats involved in producing and signing these treaties). Notwithstanding this, at first sight rather traditional stance, it is here already where van Middelaar surprises by adding originality to a seemingly worn out genre. What catches the eye most, is his explicit distinction between the three European integration spheres of action 1) the innermost sphere of the Community and its institutions; 2) the outermost sphere of Europe’s sovereign states and their diverse interests and 3) the intangible intermediate sphere where Europe’s member states meet and discover that, in the interest of all, their shared interests sometimes should prevail over self-interest. Van Middelaar’s lively and graphic analysis of political activity in the latter sphere – an area that does not have any formal or legal status and therefore has hardly ever been in the academic centre of attention – shows how its existence is crucial in bringing Europe further in hard times. There the dialogue on Europe and its direction is kept going, even when in the inner or outer sphere a deadlock seems to have blocked all options for future progress. Here political creativity shows to be able to supersede the formal treaty agreements.

In the second part, which is aptly titled ‘The vicissitudes of fortune’ van Middelaar once again reconstructs the history of European integration. But this time, instead of choosing a diplomatic perspective in which the negotiating table is central, the author investigates the role of good fortune and the ability of the actors in the process to seize its fruits when it comes along. This part in particular reads as an ode to politics. In meticulously written, historical descriptions of numerous moments and events in the history of European integration, van Middelaar draws attention to the ‘art of politics’, or – more in line with his idiom – the virtue of politicians to cope with and make most of the whims of fate. In these descriptions, van Middelaar is at his best. A splendid philosopher and historical theorist by education, with subsequent experience in the heart of national and European politics (van Middelaar once was an intern for the Dutch Eurocommissioner Frits Bolkestein, for instance) he beautifully combines compassionate and empathic descriptions with sharp analytical remarks. The result: a highly original perspective on European integration, which both ‘full’ academics and politicians have not been able to produce before.

‘The Quest for Public’, or part three of the book then eventually enters into the million dollar question that has haunted Europe for decades now: how to win the hearts and minds of the peoples of the EU nation states, so that European integration can live up to its commitment of being a democratically instead of a technocratically driven process? Here, again, the political actor-perspective is chosen. And it is here that one of the (few) weak spots of the book comes to the fore most clearly. Whereas van Middelaar’s strong identification with those at the ‘front line’ guarantees a fresh and original stance in explaining how European leaders succeeded in moving European integration ahead, it falls short in explaining why in many European countries so many people did not buy it and euro sceptic movements grew stronger.

His ode to politics, in other words, sheds new light on the skilful way diplomats and politicians negotiated each new European step and also on their attempts and struggles to find popular support. But a deep investigation and understanding of why and how these attempts failed – an important, if not the main question of Europe nowadays – is not found in the *Passage to Europe*. Thus, notwithstanding the originality and depth of the analyses, this ode to politics at some points comes across as a bit overfriendly, not to say naive, with regard to important matters and questions which the political and diplomatic ‘front liners’ have not been able to deal with adequately. This, however, remains a minor point of criticism when regarded in the broader perspective of the fine work van Middelaar has delivered. The *Passage to Europe* is a beautiful and original book. For those interested in the subject, a wonderful read and present that will not be out of place under the Christmas tree.

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Hanns Jürgen KÜSTERS (Hg.), *Deutsche Europapolitik Christlicher Demokraten. Von Konrad Adenauer bis Angela Merkel*, Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf, 2014, 431 S. – ISBN 978-3-7700-1918-2 – 39,00 €.

Die Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU) versteht sich seit ihrer Gründung als die deutsche „Europapartei“ par excellence. Ihre Triebkraft, so der Herausgeber Hanns Jürgen Küsters, sei das Bestreben gewesen, „den Nationalismus und gravierende wirtschaftliche und soziale Unterschiede unter den europäischen Staaten zu überwinden“ und durch den „Abbau von Handelsschranken“ einen gemeinsamen europäischen Markt zu schaffen, der allen Mitgliedsstaaten Prosperität sichern sollte (S.10). Um den Anteil einzelner deutscher Christdemokraten an dieser Entwicklung bestimmen zu können, konzentrieren sich die Beiträge zum einen auf die „persönlichen Netzwerke und Beziehungsgeflechte“ (S.9), die insbesondere die CDU-Kanzler und die -Kanzlerin zu Politikern aus den anderen Mitgliedsländern unterhielten, zum anderen auf die Aktivitäten von CDU-Politikern in den europäischen Organisationen und schließlich auf die innenpolitischen und innerparteilichen Auseinandersetzungen um den europapolitischen Kurs der Bundesregierung.

Dementsprechend gliedert sich der Band in drei Teile. Zunächst steht die Rolle deutscher Christdemokraten in transnationalen und europäischen Zusammenschlüssen und Institutionen im Focus. Wolfram Kaiser nimmt die transnationale Parteienkooperation in den Blick, Thomas Jansen das Europäische Parlament und Burkard Steppacher die Europäische Kommission. Die seit einiger Zeit zu beobachtende Erosion des „föderalistischen programmatischen Konsenses“ in der CDU erklärt Kaiser übrigens damit, dass die Partei neue Mitglieder und Funktionäre gewonnen habe, die „ohne kulturelle oder politische Bezüge zur früheren Westintegration sozialisiert worden“ seien, und dass in der nachwachsenden Politikergeneration „die ursprünglichen Motive für die europäische Integration“ an Bedeutung verloren hätten, sodass „akute EU-Krisen“ Renationalisierungstendenzen Vorschub leisten könnten (S.37).

Im zweiten, umfangreichsten Teil geht es um die Europapolitik der Bundeskanzler von Konrad Adenauer (Michael Gehler und Hinnerk Meyer), über Kurt Georg Kiesinger und den nur knapp gescheiterten Rainer Barzel (Philipp Gassert) bis zu Helmut Kohl, dem sich gleich drei Autoren widmen (Küsters, Ulrich Lappenküper, Klaus Larres) und Angela Merkel (Gerd Langguth, der vor der Veröffentlichung verstarb). Ludwig Erhard fehlt in dieser Reihe überraschenderweise – zumindest erhielt er keinen eigenen Beitrag; er wird allerdings im dritten Teil gewürdigt, in dem die europapolitischen Auseinandersetzungen in den 1950er (Mathieu Segers), 1960er (Tim Geiger) und 1980/90er Jahren (Stefan Fröhlich) sowie die Kontroversen zwischen Bund und Ländern (Rudolf Hrbek) beschrieben und analysiert werden.

Ein solches Unterfangen setzt sich zwangsläufig dem Risiko aus, die Rolle der jeweiligen Akteure zu überzeichnen. Dass einzelne CDU-Politiker „wichtige Impulse“ gegeben, eine „bedeutende Rolle“ gespielt oder einen „wesentlichen Beitrag“ geleistet hätten – Formulierungen dieser Art tauchen denn auch recht häufig auf, doch vermisst man mitunter einen wirklich überzeugenden Beleg für eine entsprechende Rolle. Besonders problematisch wird es, wenn es an der nötigen zeitlichen – und politischen – Distanz mangelt, um einigermaßen objektiv urteilen zu können. Ob man sich beispielsweise auf Magazine wie Focus oder Capital und deren Lobeshymnen auf Angela Merkel stützen sollte, um die Europapolitik der Kanzlerin zu bewerten, erscheint doch sehr zweifelhaft. Alles in allem gelingt es jedoch fast allen Autoren, solchen hagiographischen Versuchungen zu widerstehen und eine kritisch-ausgewogene Bilanz der christdemokratischen Europapolitik auf der Grundlage der einschlägigen Literatur und ausgiebiger Quellenrecherchen zu präsentieren. Dabei wird auch deutlich, dass der europapolitische Kurs in der Partei gelegentlich heftig umstritten war und manche – auch hochrangige – Parteipolitiker und -mitglieder angesichts drückender Probleme auf europäischer Ebene mehr oder weniger offen mit nationalstaatlichen Lösungswegen zu liebäugeln begannen. Fazit: Wer sich verlässlich und quasi handbuchartig über die integrationspolitischen Diskussionen in der CDU und die bleibenden europapolitischen Verdienste der Partei informieren möchte, sollte unbedingt zu diesem Band greifen.

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Economic and Social History of Modern Europe



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Maria X. CHEN, *Wine in Their Veins: France and the European Community's Common Wine Policy, 1967-1980* – London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)

Supervisor/jury: N. Piers LUDLOW, LSE (supervisor); Andy SMITH, Sciences Po Bordeaux; James ELLISON, Queen Mary University

Field: Contemporary history

Date of the exam: 26.03.2014

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This thesis analyses the impact that the European Community had on table wine growers in the Midi region of France in the 1970s. It is divided into the following parts: the negotiations leading to the creation of the Common Wine Policy (CWP) in 1970, its operation in the early 1970s until its first major crisis in 1975-1976, its drastic transformation from a liberal policy to a regime of restrictive control in the late 1970s, the reaction of table wine producers in Languedoc-Roussillon to these changes over the decade, and the change in political relationships and governance at three levels – Brussels, Paris, and Languedoc-Roussillon – as a result of this process.

It argues that the first decade of the CWP changed relationships between different groups at the European, national, and local level in two major ways: first, national French government institutions voluntarily decreased their power over a key national industry – this was the most marked feature in the French wine industry of this time period. Second, the CWP helped facilitate the rise of sub-national and non-state actors in policy circles from which they were previously excluded. Empowered by the new responsibilities given to them by the French government, particularly via a newly-created national office of wine, French wine growers began attempting to bypass the national French bottleneck to the Community and directly lobby European-level in-

stitutions, either via their own organisations or as part of transnational endeavours. Given the French government's particularly adamant control of who represented the country at the Brussels levels in the 1960s, this change in only a decade was a significant shift. In analysing this process, this thesis also makes broader comments on the integration process as a whole, adding particularly to the literature on the Community's agricultural integration, and is the first comprehensive review of the history of the Common Wine Policy, and the first to make an extensive assessment of the impact on local farmers in the Midi during this time in relation to the European Community's policies.

The thesis drew from documents at over a dozen archives and institutions in Belgium, France and Italy, including the Historical Archives of the European Commission as well as the European Council, the Historical Archives of the European Union, Archives Nationales de France (Centre des archives contemporaines), the Archives diplomatiques de France (Centre de La Courneuve), Archives départementales de l'Hérault, Archives départementales de la Gironde, and the National Archives of the United Kingdom.

Emmanuel COMTE, *The Formation of the European Migration Regime, from 1947 to 1992* – Université Paris-Sorbonne, Paris

Supervisor/jury: Éric BUSSIÈRE, Université Paris-Sorbonne (supervisor); Barbara CURLI, Università degli Studi di Torino; Rainer HUDEMANN, Université Paris-Sorbonne; N. Piers LUDLOW, London School of Economics; Kiran Klaus PATEL, Maastricht University; Catherine WIHTOL DE WENDEN, Sciences Po

Field: Contemporary history

Date of the exam: 30.05.2014

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Bearing in mind the political sensitivity of migration flows in general, and the debates brought about by migration relations among European states in particular, this research is designed to fill a gap in the existing knowledge of European regionalism. Historians have indeed not yet fully explained the formation of the European migration regime. A variety of rules, written or not, relating to residence, the crossing of borders, and the provision of social security for migrants define this regime, which covers both intra-European migration flows and flows between Europe and the rest of the world.

In order to produce a better understanding of the nature of the regime and the underlying political strategies that are related to it, this research is mainly based on the archives of the most powerful immigration states, West Germany and France, and on those of the EU Council of Ministers, the central institution in the definition of the European order, where states display their preferences and bargaining power. The thesis shows that the regime corresponds to the preferences of the Federal Republic of Germany, which was eager to stabilize Western Europe in the context of the Cold War, and which worked to diplomatically unify West Europeans in order to prepare the demise of the Soviet order. Its large labour demand enabled the West German

economy to support this regime. However, the regime finally evolved to favour the movements of skilled labour. An open migration regime in Europe also favoured the penetration of foreign markets by German firms. The study allows developing a new theory of an open migration regime that specifies the most favourable economic and demographic conditions, and outlines the factors that encourage a state to support such a regime.

Francisco ROA BASTOS, *La codification des «partis politiques au niveau européen» dans le traité de Maastricht. Histoire(s) d'un évènement discursif* – Université de Versailles-Saint-Quentin

Supervisor/Jury: Patrick HASSENTEUFEL, Université de Versailles-Saint-Quentin (directeur); Renaud DEHOUSSE, Sciences Po Paris; Michel DOBRY, Université de Paris 1; Yves POIRMEUR, Université de Versailles-Saint-Quentin; Andy SMITH, Sciences Po de Bordeaux; Antoine VAUCHEZ, CNRS.

Domaine: Science politique

Date de la soutenance : 12.12.2012

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Cette thèse propose une étude sociologique et historique de l'inscription dans le droit communautaire des «partis politiques au niveau européen». Elle se fonde sur l'analyse des acteurs mobilisés en 1989-1992 dans le cadre des deux conférences intergouvernementales (CIG) ayant préparé le traité de Maastricht. Mais elle étudie aussi comment les «partis européens» ont émergé et ont été pensés dans les discours des chercheurs depuis les années 1950.

Différentes données empiriques ont été utilisées. Les mobilisations politiques de 1989-1992 ont été abordées à partir des archives des CIG, des débats parlementaires, et des documents de travail de la commission institutionnelle du Parlement européen. Des fonds individuels privés ainsi que les archives du PPE et du PSE ont été dépouillés. Un corpus de sources journalistiques tirées de 14 journaux nationaux et des archives de l'Agence Europe a aussi été constitué, et 26 entretiens réalisés avec les acteurs principaux.

Les conceptualisations savantes ayant rendu peu à peu pensable la notion de «partis européens» ont été étudiées à partir d'un corpus de 285 références, rassemblant les études à vocation scientifique (principalement en science politique, en histoire et en droit) traitant des «partis européens» de 1954 à 1992. Ce corpus a permis à la fois de faire l'histoire intellectuelle de l'idée de «parti européen» et la sociologie des producteurs de cette notion (et de leurs réseaux).

Cette double approche a montré comment la codification juridique de l'idée de «partis européens» découle concrètement du positionnement de certains acteurs individuels, situés à la fois dans le champ académique et le champ politique, qui leur permet d'articuler l'espace des discours savants et l'espace politique des mobilisations. Elle montre l'influence particulière des savants allemands dans ces processus, du fait d'une structuration spécifique de ce champ académique national et de finan-

cements importants (publics et privés, allemands et étrangers), tout au long de la guerre froide.

Ludwig ROGER, *De l'Europe du Sud-est à la région Mer Noire : Une Süd-Ost politik communautaire? De l'endiguement de l'Union soviétique à l'élargissement de l'Union européenne* – Université de Cergy-Pontoise

Supervisor/Jury: Gérard BOSSUAT, Université de Cergy-Pontoise (supervisor); Christian LEQUESNE, Science Po, Paris; Georges PREVELAKIS, Université de Paris I; Nicolae PAUN, Université de Cluj-Napoca

Domaine: Histoire contemporaine

Date of the exam: 19.06.2014

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Cette thèse vise à analyser l'action de la Commission dans une région critique pour la géopolitique de la Guerre froide et post-Guerre froide, tout en conceptualisant la notion de «périphérie de l'intégration européenne». En effet, il est rare de voir ensemble les termes «géopolitique» et «Commission européenne». Pour mener à bien cette recherche, nous nous sommes basés sur les archives de la Commission européenne, du Conseil, du Département d'État américain, des Ministères des Affaires étrangères français et britannique, des archives entreposées à la bibliothèque de Cluj-Napoca en Roumanie, des Parlements nationaux et européens, de l'Alliance atlantique, du Gouvernement russe et d'entretiens.

Ainsi, en suivant la méthodologie historique nous avons soulevé un pan méconnu de l'histoire de la Commission européenne. Entre Épire et Mer Caspienne, Bruxelles met en place une Süd-Ostpolitik profondément anti-soviétique et anti-russe. Pour cela, l'action de la Commission repose sur une ligne politique cohérente, mise au point dès 1960: c'est la «doctrine de l'Association». Cette doctrine consiste à «inoculer» les valeurs de la «démocratie libérale à économie de marché» via des accords avec les États tiers. Le résultat majeur de ce travail consiste dans la démonstration que la Commission européenne fait aussi de la «high politics» en parallèle avec le Conseil et parfois en opposition. Par exemple, afin de renforcer la présence de la Communauté en Méditerranée orientale, la Commission n'hésite pas à définir Chypre, dès 1963, comme pays à «vocation européenne», alors que le Conseil souhaite un accord d'association sans promesses. Sur les questions des Juntas grecques et turques, la Commission se montre ferme sur la question de la démocratie, là où les États membres, notamment vis-à-vis de la Turquie, se contentent des militaires. Enfin, pendant les Conférences d'Helsinki et celle de Belgrade, elle multiplie les contacts avec les pays de l'Est dont la Roumanie, malgré les hésitations des capitales des États membres. Ces contacts aboutissent en 1979 à l'accord CEE-Roumanie. À la veille de la chute du Rideau de fer, la Commission se trouve donc au centre d'un réseau d'accords avec l'Europe du Sud-Est qui vont lui permettre de jouer un rôle majeur après les événements de 1989-1991.

En effet, les actions de la Commission dans la région sont menées dans le but de préserver l'équilibre des forces autour des Détroits tout en permettant à la CEE/UE

d'aménager sa propre «sphère d'influence». La chute de l'Union soviétique ne change pas la donne. Construisant sur l'expérience accumulée pendant la Guerre froide, la Commission utilise sa «doctrine de l'association» qui se retrouve aujourd'hui dans le Partenariat oriental. Les événements d'Ukraine sont l'exemple de cette lutte entre «sphère d'influence européenne» et «étranger proche russe».

Brian SHAEV, *Estrangement and Reconciliation: French Socialists, German Social Democrats and the Origins of European Integration, 1948-1957* – University of Pittsburgh

Supervisor/jury: William CHASE, University of Pittsburgh (adviser); Seymour DRESCHER, University of Pittsburgh; Alberta SBAGIA, University of Pittsburgh; Gregor THUM, University of Pittsburgh; Wolfram KAISER, University of Portsmouth

Field: Contemporary history

Date of Exam: 03.04.2014

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The dissertation is based on archival research in four countries. Its source base includes public documents, internal government memoranda, internal party documents, and the correspondence and notes of important party officials. The methodological approach is to surpass comparative history in favour of an “entangled history” approach. The dissertation argues that French Socialist (SFIO) and German Social Democratic (SPD) responses to early European integration initiatives indicate that there was a post-war generation of SFIO and SPD leaders who were informed by experiences rooted in memories, policy proposals, and outcomes from the interwar period. SFIO and SPD policies towards the integration of heavy industry were quite close in 1946-1948. They came into conflict when each party was unable to realize its maximum vision and fell back onto defensive policies, macroeconomic in nature for the SFIO, and regional for the SPD. Hence an intra-party dispute developed around the SFIO's support for and the SPD's opposition to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community.

Despite such conflicts, the minority view in one party often shared the view of the majority of the other party, as the raucous debate over the European Defence Community demonstrates. By 1954, SFIO and SPD deputies in the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community had achieved a working relationship increasingly marked by mutual respect. Inter-party cooperation at the supranational level created a form of Socialist consensus politics. This facilitated a SFIO-SPD entente on European economic integration as embodied in the Treaties of Rome. Decisive for their support was a shared view that trade liberalization within an organized market was a precondition for peace, economic expansion, and international competitiveness. Hence the SFIO and SPD developed a common approach to European economic integration in 1955-56 that created opportunities and conditions necessary for the ratification of the Treaties.

Benedetto ZACCARIA, *For the Sake of Yugoslavia. The EEC's Yugoslav Policy in Cold War Europe, 1968-1980* – IMT Institute for Advanced Studies Lucca

Supervisor/jury: Antonio VARSORI, Università di Padova (supervisor); Vladislav M. ZUBOK, London School of Economics; Silvio PONS, Università degli Studi di Roma “Tor Vergata”; Giovanni ORSINA, LUISS Guido Carli. **External referees:** Dr Svetozar RAJAK, London School of Economics; Silvio PONS, Università degli Studi di Roma “Tor Vergata”.

Field: Contemporary history

Date of the exam: 10.07.2014

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This thesis treats the relationship between the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia between 1968 and 1980. It highlights the political importance of EEC/Yugoslav relations within the Community's broader strategies towards the Socialist bloc and the Mediterranean arena given the wider context of the Cold War and European integration. Based on a Community-centred approach, it focuses on the complex interaction between EEC and Yugoslav representatives in Brussels and Belgrade.

The Community's Yugoslav policy during the 1970s has commonly been described as a policy of neglect and ignorance of the country's fragile internal situation, based on the idea of Yugoslavia as a simple trading partner and exporter of labour. It seems that the story of this relationship does not even deserve to be told. Indeed, the number of studies devoted to EEC/EU policy towards Yugoslavia after the outbreak of the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s contrasts with the almost total lack of historical analysis regarding the preceding years.

This thesis offers a new interpretation of EEC/Yugoslav relations during the 1970s. It argues that, from 1968 to 1980, the EEC established firmly based political relations with Yugoslavia, which were primarily determined, and constrained, by the need to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence in the Balkans and to foster détente in Europe. This is the first historical study of EEC/Yugoslav relations based on primary sources from the archives of the EEC institutions, the French, British, German, Italian and former Yugoslav archives, as well as on several collections of personal papers stored in public and private institutions. It represents an important case study examining the evolution of the EEC's role in the international arena during the 1970s. This work also offers an essential basis for the study of EEC/Yugoslav relations during the 1980s, i.e., the decade which led to the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Yugoslavia.

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Solidarity in the European Union



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Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen

Karlo RUZICIC-KESSLER

Togliatti, Tito and the Shadow of Moscow

1944/45-1948: Post-War Territorial Disputes and the Communist World

Considering the breaches, rifts and different currents within the communist camp during the Cold War period, this article takes on a chapter of communist interparty relations during the early Cold War period. It analyses relations between Italian and Yugoslav communists in the border region that was to become the “Free Territory of Trieste” (FTT). Similarities and discrepancies on positions regarding international questions related to this very region are at the centre of analysis. Furthermore, the Soviet influence over decisions taken in Rome and Belgrade is portrayed. By doing so the article demonstrates that the communists, both in Italy and Yugoslavia, developed specific tactics and concepts in the disputed region, all the while carefully observing Moscow’s attitude and sometimes skilfully attempting to persuade the communist centre of the validity of their respective arguments.

Togliatti, Tito et l’ombre de Moscou

1944/45-1948: Disputes territoriales de l’après-guerre et le monde communiste

En se référant aux différents courants au sein des mouvements communistes européens de l’après-guerre, cet article est consacré aux relations entre partis communistes à l’époque des débuts de la Guerre froide. Au centre de l’analyse se situent les PC italien et yougoslave et leur dispute autour des régions situées le long de la frontière italo-yougoslave. Des similitudes et des différences dans les positions respectives au sujet des conflits territoriaux sont autant prises en considération que le rôle de Moscou dans ce contexte. L’article prouve que les communistes italiens et yougoslaves ont développé des tactiques spécifiques en vue d’imposer leurs conceptions. À cette fin, ils observaient attentivement la position de Moscou afin de l’instrumentaliser habilement dans le but de faire entériner la poursuite de leurs intérêts particuliers par la centrale du grand frère.

Togliatti, Tito und der Schatten Moskaus

1944/45-1948: Territoriale Nachkriegsdispute und die kommunistische Welt

Bezugnehmend auf die verschiedenen Strömungen innerhalb der europäischen kommunistischen Bewegung während des Kalten Krieges, analysiert dieser Artikel ein Kapitel der kommunistischen Parteibeziehungen im frühen Kalten Krieg. Hierbei werden die italienische und jugoslawische KP und ihre Dispute um die italienisch-jugoslawischen Grenzgebiete in den Mittelpunkt der Analyse gestellt. Ähnlichkeiten und Diskrepanzen in den Positionen zu Territorialkonflikten werden ebenso betrachtet, wie die Rolle der Sowjetunion in diesem Zusammenhang. Dabei beweist dieser Artikel, dass die italienischen und jugoslawischen Kommunisten spezifische Taktiken entwickelten um ihre Vorstellungen durchzusetzen. Hierzu beobachteten sie die

Position Moskaus genau und trachteten danach, diese geschickt zu instrumentalisieren, um ihre Interessen durch die kommunistische Zentrale absegnen zu lassen.

Maximilian GRAF

The Rise and Fall of “Austro-Eurocommunism”.

On the “Crisis” within the KPÖ and the Significance of East German Influence in the 1960s

This article deals with the short period of reform communism in the KPÖ in the 1960s, a period that has been labelled respectively “Austro-Eurocommunism” by reformist protagonists and the “crisis of the KPÖ” by more orthodox members of the party. The Austrian reformers were inspired by the positions of the Italian communists’ and aimed at discussing their ideas on a European level. Therefore, this article argues in favour of a longer timeframe, when discussing “Eurocommunism” and its roots. Unsurprisingly, the communist parties of the Socialist Bloc had a negative attitude toward the KPÖ and the SED took the leading role in fighting the reformers. Its position is examined in detail: First, they fought the recalcitrant leading intellectual of the KPÖ Ernst Fischer, then the party program. The conflict escalated when the KPÖ condemned the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia. In the end, however, the reformers lost the inner-party struggle and the KPÖ returned to an entirely Muscovite stance.

Montée et déclin de l’«Austro-Eurocommunisme».

Au sujet de la «crise» au sein du KPÖ et de la portée de l’influence est-allemande pendant les années 1960

L’article traite du court épisode du réformisme communiste au sein du KPÖ que les réformateurs se plaisaient à appeler «Austro-Eurocommunisme», tandis que les adversaires du renouveau préféraient parler de «crise du parti». Les adeptes de la réforme en Autriche s’étaient inspirés des positions prises par les communistes italiens et aspiraient à discuter leurs idées à l’échelle européenne. C’est la raison pour laquelle l’article préfère étendre le cadre chronologique du débat scientifique sur l’«Eurocommunisme». Il ne faut d’ailleurs pas s’étonner du refus opposé par les partis communistes des pays de l’Est à la politique du KPÖ. Sous ce rapport, le SED joua un rôle central: d’abord il attaqua le leader intellectuel, Ernst Fischer, qui les dérangeait le plus, ensuite il visait le programme du parti. Le conflit culmina en 1968, quand le KPÖ condamnait l’intervention des États du Pacte de Varsovie en Tchécoslovaquie. À la fin, les réformateurs eurent le dessous et la lutte intestine s’acheva par le retour du KPÖ à une position fidèle au cours officiel dicté par Moscou.

Aufstieg und Fall des „Austro-Eurokommunismus“.

Über die „Krise“ in der KPÖ und die Tragweite des Ostdeutschen Einflusses in den 1960er Jahren.

Der vorliegende Aufsatz behandelt die kurze Periode des Reformkommunismus in der KPÖ, die von den Reformern als “Austro-Eurokommunismus” und von den Re-

formgegnern als „Parteikrise“ bezeichnet wurde. Die Reformkräfte in der KPÖ waren von den Positionen der italienischen Kommunisten inspiriert und strebten danach ihre Ideen auf einer europäischen Ebene zu diskutieren. Daher plädiert der Artikel dafür die wissenschaftliche Diskussion über den „Eurokommunismus“ zeitlich auszuweiten. Wenig überraschend lehnten die östlichen kommunistischen Parteien die Politik der KPÖ ab. Die SED übernahm hier eine Führungsrolle die eingehend untersucht wird. Zuerst griff sie den unbequemen führenden Intellektuellen der KPÖ Ernst Fischer an, dann das Programm der Partei. Der Konflikt eskalierte als die KPÖ die Intervention der Warschauer-Pakt-Staaten in der Tschechoslowakei 1968 verurteilte. Im Endeffekt verloren die Reformer den innerparteilichen Kampf und die KPÖ kehrte zu einem moskautreuen Standpunkt zurück.

Francesco DI PALMA

Eurocommunism and the SED: a contradictory relationship

The article provides a distinct interpretation of the relationships the SED maintained to the most influential Eurocommunist parties, the PCI and the PCF, through the 1970s and the 1980s, and outlines its stance to the “heretic” Eurocommunist ideology. The account covers the period of the late Cold War, from the revolutionary year 1968 until the collapse of Real Socialism in 1989. It argues that as the GDR consolidated national sovereignty during the 1970s the SED started to seek for lucrative commercial and political operations with Western European partners, even with Eurocommunists. Quite characteristically and out of sheer opportunism East Berliners would prefer to embark on the Italians, who, although being very critical of Real Socialism, had become behind the leading role of Enrico Berlinguer one of the most influential political forces in Western Europe. Much less appealing to them was the PCF, although mostly Soviet friendly, yet strongly nationally bound and by far not as powerful as the PCI.

L’Eurocommunisme et le SED: une relation contradictoire

L’article fournit une interprétation des relations entre le SED et les plus importants partis Eurocommunistes, le PCI et le PCF, pendant les années 1970 et 1980 en retraçant la position Est-allemande par rapport à l’idéologie “hérétique” de l’Eurocommunisme. L’analyse traite du laps de temps entre 1968 et la chute des régimes communistes en 1989. On allègue que, suivant la consolidation de la souveraineté nationale de la RDA pendant les années 1970, le SED avait commencé à établir des contacts avec des partenaires en Europe occidentale, même des Eurocommunistes. Pour des raisons d’opportunité visibles, les Berlinoises de l’Est préféraient paradoxalement s’embarquer dans des relations avec les camarades italiens, qui, malgré leur virulent refus du Socialisme réel, étaient devenus très influents à l’échelle européenne. Par contre le PCF, en dépit de sa loyauté à l’égard de l’Union Soviétique, avait été successivement marginalisé et relégué à l’arrière-plan par les Allemands.

Der Eurokommunismus und die SED: eine widersprüchliche Beziehung

Der vorliegende Aufsatz zeichnet die Interpretation der “ketzerischen” Lehre des Eurokommunismus durch die SED nach und rekonstruiert deren Umgang mit den einflussreichsten eurokommunistischen Parteien, dem PCI und dem PCF, zwischen 1968 und bis zum Zusammenbruch des realen Sozialismus 1989. Gezeigt wird, dass die SED nach dem Grundlagenvertrag 1972/73 verstärkt nach internationalem Spielraum suchte. Dies implizierte die Aufnahme von politischen und kommerziellen Beziehungen zu westeuropäischen Partnern, auch zu eurokommunistischen. Paradoerweise, und wohl aus schierem Opportunismus, präferierten die Ostberliner Machthaber den Umgang mit dem extrem sowjetkritischen PCI, der während der 1970er Jahre zu einer der einflussreichsten Parteien Westeuropas geworden war. Hingegen rückte der elektoral schwächelnde und international unwichtige PCF, trotz seiner unerschütterlichen Loyalität zur KPdSU, auf der außenpolitischen Agenda der SED in den Hintergrund.

Valentine LOMELLINI

When Hopes Come to Naught.

The Question of Italian Communists’ Participation in Government and the Failure of a Particular Strategy, 1974-1978

In 1975-1976, the electoral successes of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) raised concern about the political stability of Italy: it could potentially lead to a wide imbalance in the Mediterranean area.

In this delicate phase, the article argues, the PCI reduced its public anti-Americanism and launched a new policy toward the US in order to get democratic credibility, showing its independence from Moscow. The PCI thus developed a special dialogue with US prominent political scientists and some liberals: this relationship was part of a kind of “Westpolitik”, which aimed at re-setting its position in the international arena (and, consequently, in the domestic). At the same time, during the first phases of Carter’s Presidency, the PCI became victim of this special relation, overestimating its potentiality. In the end, PCI’s hopes came to naught: the well-known US State Department’s declaration of January 1978 clarified that President Carter would not change American policy toward Italian communists.

Quand les espoirs s’évanouissent.

La question de la participation des communistes italiens au gouvernement et la défaillance d’une stratégie particulière. 1974-1978

Le succès électoral du Parti Communiste italien (PCI) en 1975-1976 ne manquait pas de soulever des inquiétudes à propos de la stabilité politique de l’Italie, à tel point que d’aucuns redoutaient de voir perturbé l’équilibre des forces en Méditerranée.

L’article dévoile que durant cette phase critique le PCI a estompé son anti-Américanisme apparent et lança une nouvelle politique vis-à-vis de Washington dans le but d’améliorer sa crédibilité démocratique tout en affirmant son indépendance face

à Moscou. Le PCI développa ainsi aux États-Unis un dialogue particulier avec des politologues renommés et un certain nombre de Libéraux: ces relations devenaient partie intégrante d'une espèce de «Westpolitik» qui visait à redéfinir la position des communistes sur l'échiquier international (et partant, sur le plan national). Pendant la phase initiale de la présidence de Carter, le PCI devint cependant la victime de cette «special relation» dont il avait surestimé le potentiel. À la fin les rêves du PCI s'effondrèrent: par la déclaration bien connue du mois de janvier 1978, le State Department affirma que le président Carter n'allait pas modifier sa politique à l'égard des communistes italiens.

Wenn die Hoffnung zerschellt

Die Frage der Regierungsbeteiligung der italienischen Kommunisten und das Versagen einer eigenen Strategie, 1974-1978

Die Wahlerfolge der Kommunistischen Partei Italiens (KPI) in den Jahren 1975-1976 sorgten für Verunsicherung über die politische Stabilität Italiens: sie könnten sich möglicherweise zu einer Störung des Gleichgewichts im Mittelmeerraum ausweiten.

Der Aufsatz enthüllt wie die KPI während dieser kritischen Phase ihren offenen Anti-amerikanismus abschwächte und eine neue Amerikapolitik einläutete dessen erklärtes Ziel es war, ihre demokratische Glaubwürdigkeit aufzupolieren und ihre Unabhängigkeit gegenüber Moskau unter Beweis zu stellen. Zu diesem Zweck entwickelte man in den USA den Dialog mit namhaften Politikwissenschaftlern und einer Reihe von Vertretern aus dem liberalen Lager. Auf diese Weise entstand eine Art „Westpolitik“ die darauf abzielte, die Position der Kommunisten auf der internationalen Szene (und somit auch auf der nationalen Ebene) neu zu definieren. Während der Anfangszeit der Präsidentschaft von Jimmy Carter wurde die KPI allerdings Opfer dieser „special Relation“ deren Potential sie überschätzt hatte: durch die bestbekannte Erklärung vom Januar 1978, ließ das State Department verlauten, dass Präsident Carter seine Politik gegenüber den italienischen Kommunisten nicht revidieren würde.

Nikolas DÖRR

NATO and Eurocommunism. The Fear of a Weakening of the Southern Flank from the mid-1970s to mid-1980s

The 1970s represent a decade of crisis for NATO. Numerous internal and external conflicts at this time strained the Western alliance. The Southern flank in particular was perceived as being at risk and the Mediterranean region was classified as a threatened area. Since the mid-1970s this feeling of threat to NATO was strengthened by the so-called Eurocommunism. In member countries of the Alliance, such as Italy, France, Iceland and Spain, which joined the Alliance in 1982, Eurocommunist parties achieved electoral success, which triggered fears in Western countries of a Soviet “Trojan horse” within NATO. The article describes and analyses the feeling of a threat to Western security caused by the Eurocommunist phenomenon. In addition, strate-

gies for dealing with it by NATO, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States are presented.

L'OTAN et l'eurocommunisme. La peur devant un affaiblissement du flanc sud du milieu des années 1970 au milieu des années 1980

Les années 1970 étaient une décennie de crise pour l'OTAN. De nombreuses confrontations internes et des conflits externes pesèrent lourd sur l'alliance. Le flanc sud était considéré particulièrement menacé. L'espace méditerranéen fût classé zone menacée. Ce sentiment de menace fût accentué par ce qu'on appelle l'eurocommunisme à partir du milieu des années 1970. Dans certains pays membres de l'OTAN, comme l'Italie, la France, l'Islande et l'Espagne – qui adhéra en 1982 – des partis eurocommunistes remportèrent des succès électoraux. Ces succès déclenchèrent dans les pays occidentaux la peur d'un «cheval de Troie» de l'Union Soviétique à l'intérieur de l'OTAN. L'article décrit et analyse le sentiment de menace qui en découlait. En outre, les stratégies de l'OTAN, de la République Fédérale d'Allemagne et des États Unis pour maîtriser l'eurocommunisme sont exposées.

NATO und Eurokommunismus. Die Angst vor einer Schwächung der Südflanke von der Mitte der 1970er bis zur Mitte der 1980er Jahre

Die 1970er Jahre stellten ein Krisenjahrzehnt für die NATO dar. Zahlreiche interne Auseinandersetzungen und externe Konfliktherde belasteten in dieser Zeit das westliche Bündnis. Als besonders gefährdet galt die Südflanke der NATO. Der Mittelmeerraum wurde als bedrohtes Gebiet eingestuft. Dieses Gefühl einer Bedrohung der NATO wurde seit Mitte der 1970er Jahre durch den sogenannten Eurokommunismus verstärkt. In Mitgliedsstaaten des Bündnisses wie Italien, Frankreich, Island und Spanien, das 1982 beitrat, konnten eurokommunistische Parteien Wahlerfolge erzielen, die in westlichen Staaten Ängste vor einem „Trojanischen Pferd“ der Sowjetunion im Innern der NATO auslösten. Der Artikel beschreibt und analysiert das dadurch ausgelöste Bedrohungsgefühl. Darüber hinaus werden Strategien im Umgang mit ihm durch die NATO, die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten dargestellt.

Michael J. GEARY

Ireland's EEC Enlargement Negotiations and the Common Fisheries Policy, 1970-1972: Challenging the *Acquis*

The completion of the EEC's Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in 1970 coincided with the opening of enlargement negotiations between the Community and four applicants for membership, Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Norway. The new policy received a mixed and largely negative reaction from the four who adopted negotiating positions that challenged the Community and by extension, the *acquis communautaire*. Based on research conducted in Irish and Community archives, this article presents a fresh analysis of Ireland's accession talks and the role played by the CFP.

Its central focus is an examination of the way Dublin and Brussels tried to outmanoeuvre each other on the CFP issue, while at the same time ensuring that the negotiations would succeed.

**Les négociations d'adhésion de l'Irlande à la CEE et la politique commune de la pêche:
Contester l'acquis communautaire**

L'achèvement de la politique commune de la pêche de la CEE (PCP) en 1970 coïncide avec l'ouverture des négociations d'adhésion entre la Communauté et les quatre pays candidats, la Grande-Bretagne, le Danemark, l'Irlande et la Norvège. La nouvelle politique est peu appréciée, voire rejetée par les quatre candidats dont les positions de négociation sont contraires à celles de la Communauté et présentent par extension un risque pour l'acquis communautaire. En s'appuyant sur des sources archivistiques irlandaises et communautaires, cet article présente une nouvelle analyse des négociations d'adhésion de l'Irlande et du rôle joué par la PCP dans ces négociations. Il examine plus particulièrement la façon dont Dublin et Bruxelles cherchent à se circonvvenir l'un l'autre tout en assurant une conclusion fructueuse des négociations.

**Irlands EWG Beitrittsverhandlungen und die Gemeinsame Fischereipolitik, 1970-1972:
die Beanstandung des *Acquis communautaire***

Der Abschluss der Gemeinsamen Fischereipolitik (GFP) im Jahr 1970 traf zusammen mit der Eröffnung der Beitrittsverhandlungen zwischen der EWG, Großbritannien, Dänemark, Irland und Norwegen. Die neue EWG-Fischereipolitik wurde mit gemischten und weitgehend negativen Reaktionen von den vier Beitrittskandidaten aufgenommen. Großbritannien, Dänemark, Irland und Norwegen nahmen alle vier Verhandlungspositionen ein, die nicht nur die Gemeinschaft sondern auch im weiteren Sinne den *acquis communautaire* in Frage stellten. Anhand der Nachforschungen im irischen Staatsarchiv, sowie auch den Archiven der Europäischen Union, stellt dieser Artikel eine neue Analyse der irischen Beitrittsverhandlungen und der dabei gespielten Rolle der GFP vor. Im Mittelpunkt steht die Untersuchung der Art und Weise wie Dublin und Brüssel versucht haben, sich gegenseitig auszumanövrieren, ohne jedoch den erfolgreichen Abschluss der Verhandlungen zu gefährden.

Matthias MAYER

**Liberalising Labour Migration Policies at the European Level: Germany's Preferences
on the Freedom of Movement Provisions of the Ankara Agreement**

The objective of this paper is to explain the preference formation of the German federal government on liberalizing economic migration policies at the EU level, using the first instance of such policy action: the freedom of movement provisions of the Ankara Agreement; that constitutes a contrast to later efforts to do so. The paper argues that if a European policy measure applies to a particular group of sending countries and the domestic salience of immigration is low, sending countries can lobby Member State governments to support EU-level liberalisation of immigration

policies. The *misfit* between the existing national regulations for economic migration and European-level policies has to be zero – otherwise the economic and political adaptation costs for the actors involved are too high. A heated national debate on immigration is negatively related to governmental support for such measures, as the political costs of support skyrocket. Conversely, if the decision-making process happens bureaucratically, this helps to attain governmental support, as the political costs of doing so are kept minimal.

La libéralisation des politiques migratoires à l'échelle européenne:

Les préférences allemandes en matière de liberté de mouvement du traité d'Ankara

En partant d'une analyse approfondie du premier cas de l'espèce, à savoir les dispositions relatives à la liberté de mouvement consignées dans le traité d'Ankara, cet article vise à expliquer comment le gouvernement fédéral d'Allemagne s'est formé une opinion sur la libéralisation des politiques migratoires à l'échelle communautaire; ceci est en contraste avec les efforts ultérieurs. La contribution expose que, si une initiative politique au niveau européen se réfère à un certain groupe de pays d'émigration et que le débat sur les migrations revêt peu d'importance sur le plan de la politique intérieure des pays d'accueil, alors les gouvernements des pays d'émigration peuvent amener les pays membres de l'Union à soutenir une libéralisation de la politique d'accueil européenne. Le degré d'adaptation entre les règlements nationaux relatifs à l'immigration économique et la politique de l'UE doit être nul, sinon les frais d'adaptation économiques et politiques sont trop élevés pour les acteurs concernés. Un débat public national animé des questions migratoires amène forcément les gouvernements des pays d'accueil à se montrer réticents parce que le prix politique payé pour le soutien de pareilles initiatives est trop élevé. En revanche, si le processus de décision demeure une affaire purement administrative, le soutien des gouvernements s'obtient plus facilement parce que le coût politique de l'opération est minime.

Die Liberalisierung der Erwerbszuwanderung auf europäischer Ebene:

Deutschlands Meinungsfindung bezüglich der Freizügigkeitsbestimmungen des Ankara Abkommens

Dieser Artikel hat zum Ziel, die Meinungsfindung der deutschen Bundesregierung zur Liberalisierung von Erwerbszuwanderung auf Ebene der Europäischen Union zu erklären, indem der erste Fall untersucht wird, bei dem eine derartige Politik zum Tragen kam: die Bestimmungen zur Freizügigkeit des Ankara Abkommens; dies stellt einen Kontrast zu späteren Anstrengungen dar. Der Artikel legt dar, dass wenn eine politische Initiative auf europäischer Ebene sich auf eine bestimmte Gruppe von Sendeländern bezieht und die innenpolitische Bedeutung von Migration niedrig ist, können Sendeländer die Regierungen von Mitgliedstaaten so beeinflussen, dass diese die Liberalisierung von Immigrationspolitik auf der Ebene der Europäischen Union unterstützen. Der Anpassungsgrad zwischen existierenden nationalen Bestimmungen zur Erwerbszuwanderung und der EU-Politik muss Null sein – ansonsten sind die ökonomischen und politischen Anpassungskosten für die beteiligten Akteure zu

hoch. Eine aufgeheizte nationale Debatte zu Immigration steht in einem negativen Zusammenhang zur Unterstützung der Regierung von entsprechenden Politikinitiativen, da die politischen Kosten zu hoch sind. Wenn im Gegenzug jedoch der Prozess der Entscheidungsfindung innerhalb der Verwaltung abläuft, hilft dies dabei, die Unterstützung der Regierung zu erhalten, da deren politische Kosten minimal gehalten werden.

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Von Alice Engl

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Besonders berücksichtigt wird dabei die ethnische und sprachliche Vielfalt in Europas Grenzregionen, die neben wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Belangen ebenso die Entstehung von transnationalem Zusammenhalt und Solidarität entscheidend beeinflusst.

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
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Damir Arsenijević is a Leverhulme Trust Fellow at De Montfort University, Leicester, leading a project 'Love after Genocide'.

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