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L'INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE**

**ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DER
EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION**

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‘Solving the Paradoxes of Enlargement: the Next Research Challenge in our Field’

Fernando Guirao

The history of the progressive enlargement of the European Community should soon become, if it has not already done so, the central issue in our field of research. Since its very first day of life, the Community has been either constantly threatened by outsiders, or it has been getting ready to accommodate new members. After 1969, it has been either involved in accession negotiations or adapting itself both internally and externally to the consequences of enlargement. The present situation is in fact one of permanent expansion. Because the history of the expansion is, thus, the history of the European Community/European Union itself, research of the kind the five articles in this volume present must be a major step in providing the EC/EU with its *own* history independent of the individual histories of its member States.

The expansion of the Community at any point in time has always been a phenomenon of extraordinary complexity. Any proper research surrounding this theme requires a search for explanations to several questions of large scale and scope. The questions to be answered address many facets of the process – why a specific country decides to surrender a part of its national sovereignty at a given point in time; why the member States of the original European Community and those Community institutions being brought into enlargement negotiations come to accept the materialization of any enlargement and how they come to agree upon the conditions under which any expansion of the Community is to take place. And, more specifically how the two parties involved – i.e., applicants and member States – get ready for the actual moment of negotiating the process of enlargement; how and why each negotiation process evolves in a certain manner and finally, what the overall consequences internal to former members as well as to newcomers are. Of course, the external consequences that any expansion upon the greater world involves must also be taken into account.

The specific case studies included in the present volume address at least one of the main aspects involved in any enlargement process. Each case takes place at a different point in time. The first piece in this volume, *The Politics of Financing the Community and the Fate of the First British Membership Application*, refers to the aborted attempt to expand the EEC in the early 1960s. This was an episode of Franco-German disputes over fundamental intra-Community issues. The author of this article, Ann-Christina L. Knudsen, suggests that German refusal to approve French designs for financing the Community was THE ultimate cause of general Charles de Gaulle’s rejection to continue negotiations with the British in January of 1963. By the end of the transition period, the introduction of a system of *ressources propres* based on the revenues generated from the common customs tariff and from the external agricultural levies for a Community having to pay for little more than guaranteed agricultural prices at high levels and export subsidies to domestic

surpluses was a highly beneficial situation, above all, for France being such a large agricultural producer and net exporter. The acquiescence of Germany was needed to break the resistance of the rest of the EC partners. It was also essential to turn this specific financial arrangement into Community law with full enforcement for new entrants. Britain more than Germany might have been the ultimate destination of the French design for a permanent financing of the Community so heavily biased against food importers from outside the Community.

In this interpretation, De Gaulle's decision to stop negotiating with the British was a way for France to defend its own interpretation of what the EEC should look like to its five Community partners. At the same time, De Gaulle vetoed British attempts to direct Western European trade relations away from French ambitions (as he had already done in 1958). The kind of basic Franco-German agreements over a permanent financing model for the Community that permitted opening negotiations with the United Kingdom in 1970 could vindicate retrospectively the hypothesis that this issue - first under discussion in 1962 - determined the fate of the first attempt to negotiate the Community's territorial expansion. The contribution by Knudsen is also important because it reminds scholars in the field that the history of the financing model for the Community is perhaps our most urgent pending subject.

The history of the European Commission itself is also a crucial component of the history of the EC/EU. In the article entitled *The Welcome Change: The European Commission and the Challenge of Enlargement, 1958-1973* Piers N. Ludlow shows that the Commission had a policy agenda of its own which was independent of the member States. Given even the slightest opportunity, the Commission would not hesitate to pursue its agenda. In this respect, every episode of enlargement could be considered a window of opportunity for the Commission. The latter acted quite similarly to each member State when dealing with the prospect of enlargement, regardless to the point in time. The type of assessment carried out by the Commission differed in one important aspect with respect to similar exercises conducted at national headquarters: the Commission was almost exclusively concerned with the kind of Community's internal consolidation that rapidly increased its own field of competence. Member States, however, maintained a wider perspective; they could not encapsulate supranational institutions and policies away from other national-based institutions, policies and goals.

The aspect that will certainly merit future attention by this author and others is how and whether the Commission's own agenda influenced the overall Community policy agenda. During the first enlargement negotiations, and at subsequent episodes, the Commission deployed important technical skills in devising compromise solutions to bridge the division between the member States and, in turn, between them taken as a whole and the applicants. This was done, however, with respect to relatively technical issues such as intricate agricultural arrangements and secondary legislation. It must be kept in mind that none of which were of central importance to the future of the Community or a determining factor in explaining the prospects of failure or success of any accession round of

negotiations. The Commission's technical skills served, above all, to avoid complete marginalization within membership negotiations. Ludlow himself suggests that key political decisions did not require any input from the Commission. Furthermore, the Commission soon learnt that when key political decisions were at stake it was wiser to step aside. For instance, Knudsen shows how at the time when disputes over the definition of the revenue sources for the Community got entangled with accession negotiations, one of those crucial junctures for the future of the Community as a whole, the divided Commission completely lost its effectiveness as the obvious broker in disputes among the Six. The role of the Commission in the adoption of pro-integrationist solutions to collective problems remains a topic of great controversy in the field. It could hardly be otherwise. The main theoretical schemes which most European integration historians apply to their research clash precisely on the role of the Commission in determining the path and speed of EC policies (the Court of Justice would soon be added as historical research moves definitely into the 1970s).

The first actual expansion of the Community deserves special attention. Of many possible aspects, the contributions that made their way through the peer-review process refer to the long-term process of policy distillation towards Community membership that took place in Denmark after the mid-1950s and the global implications of British accession as seen from Australia. Morten Rasmussen's *The Hesitant European. The history of Denmark's accession to the European Communities 1970-73* also deals with the essential questions of negotiation skills and political will on the part of the applicants. The Danish administration set itself to secure that membership should not have any particular cost in terms of losing sovereignty with regard to the Danish socio-economic model and Nordic co-operation, nor should it involve any delay in obtaining the expected and much desired economic benefits involved. The key to the first aspect was essentially that the Community would not enforce or that the Danish could easily postpone those initiatives that alarmed Danish public opinion. The author of this article assures us that the key to the second aspect was the Danish capacity to tailor their requests and present satisfactory solutions in a manner compatible with existing Community legislation. Before deriving general rules from the Danish case, however, one should first look at the question of how much of the mostly unproblematic Danish negotiations were due to the type and size of the problems that Denmark posed to the Community as a whole.

A second aspect of general interest in *The Hesitant European* is the explanation of how Danish society remained divided over relations with the Community despite a quite successful outcome in the actual terms of accession. In this respect, Rasmussen suggests that part of the explanation lies on the way the leadership of the two main Danish political parties tackled internal EC-scepticism by means of giving the responsibility for making the final decision to public opinion. While this strategy proved successful in the short-term battle over accession without splitting either party, it had the significant long-term consequence of subjecting the fundamental EC decisions – i.e., Maastricht Treaty and EMU – to the uncertainties

of binding referenda. Rasmussen's description encompasses many important points. He addresses how the anti-EC coalition of forces emerged and were set in motion; their rhetoric about the threats posed to national independence and welfare systems; the lack of a coherent campaign by EC-supporters (given the existence of minority EC-opposition sectors within the main political parties); and electoral campaigns where little effort was made to inform but much effort was made to polarise the electorate over EC matters. All of these points sound strikingly familiar to those having recently gone through the experience of attending a referendum on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe!

The first EC enlargement was not exclusively the story of how three Western European countries had to make amends to the manners of the Six. The contribution by Andrea Benvenuti, *Dealing with an Expanding European Community: Australia's Attitude towards the EC's 1st Enlargement* shows how many others also had to adjust to the economic, political and security implications of Community enlargement. The progressive *Europeanization* of what had previously been considered Imperial Britain had important strategic consequences for the whole of Southeast Asia given Britain's weakened determination to retain close political, economic and security ties with that part of the world. Apart from reiterating their demands, with decreasing intensity, Australian policy-makers (and through extension, other members of the *Commonwealth*) were forced to re-direct their country's main export commodities to alternative markets. They were also forced to re-define Australia's overall political and defence policy towards the highly volatile South-East Asia following the military and political vacuum left by the United Kingdom. This is a good example of how Community expansion is an outcome of previous global change but also the trigger for subsequent changes at a global scale.

The development of a new dynamic relationship with Japan and the surrounding countries was the Australian reaction to the declining commercial trend with Britain. Japan had come to progressively replace the United Kingdom as Australia's main outlet market in the period between the first and the second British membership negotiations with the European Community. By 1971-72 Britain had been downgraded to a market share similar to that of the United States in 1959-60. The harm done by British EC membership to geo-strategic alliances was more difficult to deal with since Australia had traditionally depended on close defence co-operation with Britain. The withdrawal of British forces from East of Suez (except Hong Kong) by the end of 1971, according to Benvenuti, was somewhat linked to the British EC 1967 bid. The combination of the United Kingdom's obsession with EC entry and rapid detachment from South East Asia in political and security terms imposed upon Australia a complete turnabout involving closer political and economic relations with Japan, then Asia's emerging economic power.

The process of Community enlargement deals almost universally with central policy issues of applicant States. In the case of post-1977 Spain, Community membership meant above all the definitive consolidation of the political transition from authoritarianism to the rule of democracy. In fact, the direct link that public

opinions made, in general, between democratic consolidation and EC membership provided the Nine with the perfect occasion to increase the political profile of the European Community after the first difficult expansion had been assured. Notwithstanding, at the time of the Spanish and Portuguese accessions the whole rescue operation was delayed because of relative minor agricultural issues. This took place at a time when the fundamental question at stake, in public terms, was apparently the consolidation of democracy in the Southern flank of the European continent. This was possible because CAP matters were encapsulated from budgetary or trade-liberalisation constraints, consumer pressure or overall political priorities.

Lorena Ruano deals with this in *The Consolidation of Democracy vs. the Price of Oil: The Story of why the CAP delayed Spain's Entry to the EC*. She explains how specific institutional 'biases' worked in favour of agricultural interests over other broader economic and political interests. A close focus on olive oil serves to reveal in great detail the process through which the myriad of interests involved were represented and defended at different levels. At the domestic level, the interests of consumers in many of the then member States were at odds with those of producers. At the international level, any market-intervention device by the largest world olive oil producer would have an impact on other producing countries, from the Mediterranean to the United States, who also had their say. And last but not least, disputes at the Community level were not reduced to having national positions in opposite corners, but to a larger extent, the dispute was specifically between agricultural and finance ministers due to the overall financial implications of the kind of solutions envisaged in the sector. The fact that Ruano takes the case where Knudsen left off shows that the history of CAP deserves attention not because it exhausted the Community's budget, administration and legislative capacity for too many years, but because it generated acrimonious disputes between the Community, taken as a single power, with the wider world. In fact, the Community's goals of trade-liberalisation and democratic promotion worldwide have historically been seriously impaired by the insistence to protect inefficient farmers by means of the most inefficient of existing protectionist devices.

In sum, the five contributions in this volume show that the enlargement of the Community, regardless of which territorial expansion we are dealing with, involved finding solutions to a wide range of questions with multiple derivations in opposite directions. Indeed, enlargement meant parallel processes of widening, deepening and nourishing internal and external contradictions that, in turn, required yet further changes. How properly this complex policy-exercise was carried out provides ample room for research. In my view, solving the many paradoxes involved in each and every Community expansion and finding the ultimate logic for such collective action constitutes the next chapter of importance in the history of European integration.

The Politics of Financing the Community and the Fate of the First British Membership Application

Ann-Christina L. Knudsen

The rejection of British accession to the European Economic Community (EEC) by the French president in January 1963 is to date probably the most well-researched event by historians in the EU's history. Dominant explanations vary in emphasis on what caused Charles de Gaulle to throw the nascent Community into this crisis of trust. Thus, many agree that the British themselves were to some degree at fault because they had set conditions in the accession negotiations in key areas such as agriculture and colonial trade that France was never going to accept. Another group of explanations focus on issues internal to the accession negotiations and the Community, the common agricultural policy (CAP) and the question of how to finance the Community in the future. A third emphasis is found with those studies that stress externalities and the wider international political context, such as the French president's dislike of the close relationship between the United States and Britain. The conclusion of the Nassau agreement shortly before the veto, so it is typically argued, accounts for the timing of the veto. Finally, some take the pragmatic route, suggesting the issues were all so interlinked that it is impossible to separate them.¹

In each their different ways, these are excellent historical studies. It is important to notice, however, that they share the common trait that ultimately the explanations put forward are suggestive, deducting their conclusions from surrounding materials. Indeed they have to do so, as no historian has been able to find that final, trustworthy note where Charles de Gaulle stated what was *really* on his mind. His personal papers are still off limits to most historians. But it is certainly possible that that final piece of evidence never existed. President de Gaulle's press statement on 14 January 1963, for instance, where the *de facto* veto was publicised, stressed a variety of reasons. It also portrayed a view of the negotiations that some of those involved were hesitant to accept. Most scholars of Europe in the sixties would agree that de Gaulle was a (melo)dramatic personality whose statements intended for the public were not always an accurate guide to his thoughts or acts. This has also left scholars divided over how to interpret his intentions and preferences.² On the one hand stand those who believe that de Gaulle acted out of geo-strategic national interests, as state leaders in general may be expected to do, assuming that this would apply above all to a person with a military career. On the other hand are those who see the politician de Gaulle,

1. An early version of the research presented here is from A.-C.L. KNUDSEN, *Defining the policies of the Common Agricultural Policy. A Historical Study*, Florence, 2001. For insightful comments on the topic treated here, I am in particular thankful to John Gillingham, Fernando Guirao, Johnny Laursen, Piers Ludlow, Alan Milward, Morten Rasmussen, Jim Rollo and Jeff Vanke.

2. A good example can be found in the *Journal of Cold War Studies*, vol.2 and 3(2000).

concerned with re-election, with enforcing domestic welfare gains, and as someone who also pursued primarily economic strategies in foreign policy. These interpretations ultimately mirror debates within the realism and liberalism paradigms of international relations theory.

The purpose of this article is to present a new angle to the shipwrecked British accession negotiations that so far has been largely neglected by historical scholarship. The article departs from the internal negotiations among the Six over finding a permanent financing model for the Community. The chronology of events is particularly interesting in the period between the passing of Financial Regulation no.25 in the Council of ministers on 14 January 1962 – the regulation popularly known for having instituted ‘financial solidarity’ in the Community – and the January 1963 veto. During 1962, the financial regulation became entangled in the enlargement negotiations with Britain, at the same time as serious internal tensions over this regulation were building up among the Six.

This article shows, through the presentation of a broad range of new archival materials, that the French, as self-appointed leaders of both sets of negotiations, were close to losing control over the direction of the financing negotiations when the would-be paymasters in both Germany and Britain appeared highly reluctant to embrace the particular financing model promoted by the French in concert with the European Commission. It is primary Alan S. Milward’s 2002 analysis that promotes financing as the decisive point that led de Gaulle to act so resolutely in January 1963.³ This article supports Alan Milward’s analysis, though from completely different primary sources.⁴ In most accounts of these events, there is certainly a high awareness of financing being an issue, but it is nevertheless typically seen as a subordinate issue to the CAP or security-strategic concerns. This article shows that the question of financing took on a life of its own during 1962. The history of financing the Community is one that has not been told at length yet. That is why this article focuses primarily on presenting new empirical evidence, and the narrative of the close connection between the negotiations for financing and enlargement negotiations.

3. A.S. MILWARD, *Rise and Fall of a National Strategy 1945-1963*, Frank Cass, London, 2002.

4. Unpublished materials from the following historical archives have been used throughout this article: Nationaal Archief (NA) (formerly, Algemeen Rijksarchief) in the Hague: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (NA/MBZ), Ministerie van Financiën (NA/MF), and Ministerie van Landbouw, Visserij en Voedselvoorziening (NA/MLV) (depot Rijswijk); Bundesarchiv-Koblenz (BAK): Bundeswirtschaftsministerium (BAK/B102), Bundesministerium für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten (BAK/B116), and Bundesfinanzministerium (BAK/B126); Council of Ministers of the European Economic Community (CM2) in Brussels; Historical Archives of the European Communities (HAEC) in Brussels and Florence.

Basic Issues of Financing the Community

It is necessary for the long-term stability of any political institution to have a permanent source of financing. From 1958, the Community was financed through direct member state contributions following a financial burden-sharing key laid down in article 200.1 of the Treaty establishing the EEC. Accordingly, Germany, France and Italy were to cover 28 per cent of Community expenditure each, the Netherlands and Belgium 7.9 per cent each, and the small member state of Luxembourg a mere 0.2 per cent. This burden-sharing key was roughly based on the relative size of each member state, and correlating to voting weights assigned in the Council of ministers.

Article 201 EEC opened the possibility of switching to another model for financing the Community, namely by creating 'own resources'; a direct albeit poor translation of the French *resources propres*. Own resources is a Community-technical term that refers to a source of revenue that flows automatically to the Community, and hence does not depend on the will of the member state governments. The Treaty stipulated that own resources could be instated from the revenue generated from the common customs tariff, once introduced, as well as from the external agricultural levy created in relation to the CAP. The formal procedure for enacting article 201 EEC was the Community method, that is, on proposal from the Commission, on decision by the Council, acting after advice from the European Parliament. The Treaty article stipulated also that each member state should adopt it "in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements". It meant that the introduction of own resources would have to go through national parliamentary recognition, and could not be enforced solely through a top-down Council regulation or directive. The additional national procedure for the creation of own resources was, no doubt, placed in the Treaty due to the symbolic importance of giving up national taxes, so central to modern state authority; this procedure, however, played hardly any role in these early policy discussions.

Among the landmark decisions adopted by the Council on 14 January 1962 was Financial Regulation no.25 which created the key financial instrument of the Community's budget: the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (better known by its French acronym, FEOGA).⁵ Regulation no.25 has typically been seen as the first step towards the introduction of own resources according to article 201 EEC; at the time of implementation, however, there was some ambiguity about this, as this article will show. FEOGA was to cover Community expenditure regulated by the CAP such as agricultural guarantees, export refunds, and structural improvements. The regulation stipulates that FEOGA was, on a gradually incremental basis, to be fed by the revenue accrued from the common external agricultural levies. At the same time there would be a gradual scaling down of the direct member state contributions. Whereas the regulation did mention

5. *Règlement no.25 relatif au financement de la politique agricole commune*, in: *Journal Officiel de Communauté Economique Européenne*, no.30, 20 April 1962, p.991, Luxembourg.

that at the common market stage the revenue from the common agricultural levies would become a budgetary resource for the Community, it only made specific provisions for the period until the end of the second stage of the common market in 1965. The political interpretation of this ambiguity in the legislative act became central to events that followed.

On 14 January 1962 the Council also adopted the central framework regulations for the CAP that essentially directed the categories of expenditure for the Community. Interestingly, none of the regulations adopted on 14 January 1962 were accompanied by actual financial projections of how much these were expected to cost, as political projects that incur costs typically are. Nonetheless, even in the absence of formal estimates, it was not difficult to project, as most did, that the gradual switch to own resources as the method of financing the CAP would alter the burden-sharing among the member states that their parliaments had initially signed up in article 200.1 EEC. On the one hand, the introduction of an agricultural levy-based own resource would impose a system whereby net importing member states would have to surrender to the Community a traditional source of revenue from their frontier tariffs. An early Commission report stated boldly that with the introduction of own resources these receipts would have “perdu absolument tout caractère national, afin de faire face aux différents besoins nécessités par la politique commune”.⁶ On the other hand, the CAP regulations – above all the Grain Regulation no.19 – meant that funds could flow to a member state primarily from the CAP’s common market organisations in the shape of price guarantees and export refunds.

A rough cost-benefit calculation of a financing model based on own resources coming from the external agricultural levies of the Community would easily place France, as a large agricultural producer and exporter both to other EEC member states and third countries, as the ultimate beneficiary of the system of own resources. Member states with net agricultural imports from within and outside the Community, that is Germany followed by the Netherlands and Italy, would become the main donors of the common project.⁷ In fact, own resources were promising to be such a good financial deal for France that its minister for Agriculture, Henri Rochereau, in November 1960 announced that,

“parmi les mécanismes communautaires, le système des prélèvements apparaît comme une pièce maîtresse des propositions de la Commission”.⁸

In this light, it is not surprising that the politics of financing the Community, and the debate over the introduction of own resources, split the positions of the member states into two main groups: those who ‘*would have to pay*’ – that is, Germany, often supported by the Netherlands and Italy – and those who would

6. HAEC/BAC, 187/1995, 8, IV/COM(62)241, Commission, Direction générale de la Concurrence, Application des dispositions de l'article 201 CEE (ressources propres). Communication de M. von der Groeben, 09.08.1962.

7. NA/MLV, DGV/727, Report: Financieel Reglement EEG, Kennmerk 154966, 25.10.1962; NA/MBZ, 996 EEG/1955-1964, 1259, Nota over het financieel reglement, 23.10.1962.

8. NA/MBZ, 996 EEG/1955-1964, 114, P-V Conseil, 14-15.11.1960, Annexe II.

become net beneficiaries, that is, France. The net financial result for Belgium was projected to be fairly neutral. If Britain ever joined under a system of own resources, she was likely to be “paying much more into the Community budget than she was ever likely to receive in the form of EC funds”, because this country imported more food from outside the Community than all of the Six put together.⁹

Whereas the overall positions of the key actors in the negotiations for financing the Community as described above are fairly predictable and well-known, the unusual procedure through which regulation no.25 was created is not. Nor are the political implications inside the Community that ensued from this procedure. That narrative will unfold in the following sections.

The Peculiar Birth of Regulation no.25

The unusual trait surrounding the birth of the financial regulation is that it defied Community procedure to the extent that it had not originated as a legislative proposal in the Commission prior to the Council meeting where it was adopted. The Commission may actually never have intended to create a separate financing regulation prior to the 60th Council meeting, beginning on 18 December 1961. By comparison, the draft proposal that became Grain Regulation no.19 had already been sent out to the member states at the end of May 1961, providing ample time for consultation within governments.¹⁰ Financial provisions were directly incorporated into the draft regulations for the CAP, and the draft grain regulation was seen as the model for other CAP common market organisations.

The political preparation among the member states for the conclusion of the first stage of the implementation of the common market with respect to the CAP had been delayed during the fall of 1961, not least because Germany was facing elections. Considering the important decisions to be taken by the end of 1961, the Council was ill-prepared at the beginning of the 60th meeting. The result was a meeting that was unusually long-drawn, confusing, and the final decisions were unclear on many points.¹¹

The Council experienced several deadlocks over key issues during its ‘marathon’ meeting from 18 December 1961 to 14 January 1962.¹² This was

9. N.P. LUDLOW, *British Agriculture and the Brussels Negotiations: A Problem of Trust*, in: G. WILKES (ed.), *Britain's Failure to Enter the European Community, 1961-1963. The Enlargement Negotiations and Crisis in European, Atlantic and Commonwealth Relations*, pp.110 ff.

10. HAEC/BAC, VI/COM(61)73final, Proposition de règlement portant institution d'un régime de prélèvements et établissement graduel d'une organisation commune des marchés dans le secteur des céréales (Proposition de la Commission du Conseil), 31.05.1961.

11. As Commission president Walter Hallstein famously recounted: “Forty-five separate meetings, 7 of them at night; a total of 137 hours of discussion, with 214 hours of subcommittees; 582,000 pages of documents; 3 heart attacks ...”, in: W. HALLSTEIN, *United Europe. Challenge and Opportunity*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1962, p.53.

12. CM2/1961, 51, P-V Conseil, 60, 18-22.12.1961, 29-30.12.1961, and 4-14.1.1962.

certainly also the case in relation to the provisions over financing the CAP. In response, an *ad hoc* working group was created during the Council meeting for reviewing the financial issues of the CAP. On 28 December a separate proposal for financing the CAP emerged, presented as a temporary solution, namely as a three-year agreement whose provisions covered the period until 1965.¹³ The details of how the *ad hoc* expert group worked remain obscure, but earlier (and later) sources give reason to believe that German hesitance towards the financial provisions – as well as other provisions – of the draft grain regulation was dominating.

The German hesitance had been twofold. Firstly, the German delegation had submitted a note in late November stating reluctance to accept the institutional positioning of the FEOGA within the realm of the CAP and each of the common market organisations.¹⁴ This reluctance was repeated in a working document that the Commission transferred to the Special Committee on Agriculture the day prior to the 60th Council meeting.¹⁵ At this point, however, the Germans did not try to separate the financial provisions from the draft grain regulation. Rather, the German aim was to broaden the notion of financial solidarity away from just the CAP to the Community in general. Secondly, on 20 December, the German delegation submitted a proposal to the Council in which it showed agreement to the principle of *recettes communautaires* providing that the financial burden-sharing would still follow what was laid down in article 200.1 EEC.¹⁶ Germany wanted to assure that its maximum contribution would never go above the 28 per cent agreed in the EEC Treaty. If these sources give the essence of Germany's position, the fact that a draft Financial Proposal emerged on 28 December is a partial victory to Germany which wanted it removed from the draft grain regulation. It is important to notice that the draft Financial Proposal had not been given any legal shape (regulation, directive or resolution) yet. In it, Germany did not manage to insert a maximum ceiling in the draft Proposal, and it proved impossible to get this concession through later, as it tried to do in the final hours of the Council meeting on 13 January 1962.¹⁷

After three weeks of exhaustive negotiations, the resulting text was one that both France and Germany were able to accept. France hinged its hopes to the fact that own resources were the stated aim of the Community's financing model. Germany seemed contented with two points. Firstly, that Community financing was now not only about the CAP, and, secondly, that the financial regulation was a temporary

13. CM2/1962, 497, VI/COM(61)215, Commission, Financement de la politique agricole commune (Proposition de la Commission au Conseil), 28.12.1961.

14. CM2/1962, 496, T/541/61 (AGRI) Note, Délégation allemande, 23.11.1961.

15. CM2/1962, 496, VI/8983/61, Commission, Direction générale de l'Agriculture [DGVI], Financement communautaire (Document de travail), Annexed to: T/578/61 (AGRI), 17.12.1961. In the same file, see also R/617 (AGRI 143) and VI/COM(61)216final.

16. CM2/1962, 496, T/586/61, Proposition de la délégation allemande au sujet des recettes communautaires, 20.12.1961.

17. CM2/1962, 498, T/75/62, Amendement relatif à la proposition de la Commission au sujet du financement de la politique agricole commune proposé par la délégation allemande, 13.12.1962.

one. There had been very little time for consultation over the draft regulation within the participating governments before it was approved in the Council of ministers. The hastened preparation of the financial document also seems to have meant, at least for the German delegates, that they had not fully understood the legal status and implications of the document until after the Council meeting, as the next section will show. Seen in the long run, of course, an important implication of the removal from the draft grain regulation of the financial provisions was that there was no direct legal connection between the Community expenditure in the CAP regulations, and the way in which these regulations were to be financed.

Conflicting Interpretations of Regulation no.25.

After the January 1962 meeting, Edgar Pisani, the French minister for Agriculture, declared triumphantly on behalf of the French government that:

“Les prélèvements perçus à la frontière commune sur les importations en provenance de pays tiers constituent une ressource propre de la Communauté. De ce fait, cette affectation des prélèvements devra être entérinée par chacun des Etats-membres, conformément à ses règles constitutionnelles propres ce qui implique, dans certains pays, une approbation parlementaire. Les six pays de la CEE ont déjà engagé de mettre en œuvre dès à présent la procédure prévue à l'article 201 du Traité afin que ce corollaire essentiel de la préférence communautaire au sein du marché unique puisse entrer en vigueur dès la fin de la période de transition”.¹⁸

It was clear that the French government wanted to argue that own resources had now entered the *acquis communautaire* through financial regulation no.25. That the road to introducing them was irreversible. The formal wording of regulation no.25, however, did not make this so evident, because it only stipulated the *possibility* of making agricultural levies into own resources at the end phase.

In Bonn, the opinion was somewhat different, and a gradually growing resistance against it was spurred on by only a few people in the federal Finance ministry who had understood for quite a while that own resources would turn out to be a bad deal for Germany. Already in February 1960, the Finance ministry had urged the federal government to come up with a coordinated opinion about the destiny of the revenue from the external agricultural levies of the EEC.¹⁹ This request was not taken seriously by other parts of the German administration, and the influence of the Finance ministry remained marginal in Germany's EEC policy for still some time. Subsequently, the German government voted in favour of the resolution passed by the Council of ministers in December 1960 expressing

18. NA/MBZ, 996 EEG/1955-1964, 1148, Analyse des décisions prises le 14 janvier 1962 par le Conseil des Ministres de la Communauté Economique Européenne.

19. BAK, B102/14037, Ergebnisbericht über die Sitzung auf Abteilungsleiterebene im Bundesministerium für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten am 16. Februar betr. Vorschläge der Europäischen Kommission zu einer gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik, 16.02.1960.

political agreement to establishing common market organisations as the central pillar of the CAP, and the institution of a system of agricultural levies. The resolution made reference to the *possibility that the levies could accrue to the Community to cover the expenditure for the CAP and Community activities after the end of the transition period.*²⁰ *It is important to stress that the resolution did not entail a political decision towards the introduction of own resources, as it only made mention of a future possibility of moving ahead with this.*

Prior to the resolution, there had hardly been any reactions in Germany to the eventual cost of the Community. In fact, at that time only the French seem to have been actively engaged in getting the December 1960 Resolution passed. Olivier Wormser, the director of Economic affairs in the French ministry for Foreign affairs, was so keen on this that he was personally willing to meet his German colleagues to ascertain that the Germans did not have outstanding issues that could block the resolution.²¹ Wormser's concern for the German position was most likely caused by the seeming unpredictability of Werner Schwarz, the German Agriculture minister, who in turn was heavily influenced by the domineering German farm group, the Deutsche Bauernverband.²² Wormser got his meeting with the Germans, and must have been satisfied with the answers that he received, because afterwards he triumphantly wrote in a note that the German government,

“à enfin accepté, conformément au souhait de la France, l'affectation intégralement communautaire du prélèvement au stade définitif et, pendant la période préparatoire, l'affectation progressive du prélèvement à des actions communes dont il pourra être convenu”.²³

In this connection it is important to note that a resolution is not a legally binding instrument according to the Treaty, although, as a soft legal instrument it certainly displayed a political commitment.

Own resources were not mentioned again until they appeared in the Commission's draft grain regulation at the end of May 1961. This document mentioned, as pointed out above, that the expenses from the various support measures at the agricultural market should be covered progressively by the Community. When this Commission document landed on the desk of Mr. Hartig,

20. NA/MLV, DGV, 440, Résolution du Conseil sur les principes à prendre pour base d'un système de prélèvements pour un certain nombre de produits à déterminer. *Verslag*, 2/4, 15.02.1961.

21. AMAE [Archives, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris], DE-CE [Service de Coopération Économique], Bd.653, Note à l'attention du Ministre (Baumgartner), 16.12.1960; and telegram no.6463/7, Wormser (MAE) to Hilger van Scherpenberg (director-general of the Federal ministry of Foreign affairs), 08.12.1960. Sources in: H. MÖLLER and K. HILDEBRAND (eds.), *Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Frankreich: Dokumente 1949-1963*, vol.2, K. G. Saur, München, 1997.

22. See for instance, A.-Ch. KNUDSEN, *Creating the Common Agricultural Policy. Story of Cereals Prices*, in: W. LOTH (ed.), *Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963-1969*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2001, pp.131-154; and E. FREISBERG, *Die Grüne Hürde Europas*, Westdeutscher Verlag, Köln, 1965.

23. AMAE, DE-CE, Bd. 653, Telegram no.6463/7, Wormser (MAE) to van Scherpenberg (AA), Telegram no.6463/7, 08.12.1960. Source reprinted in H. MÖLLER and K. HILDEBRAND (eds.), op.cit.

the director in the federal Finance ministry, he began a tireless crusade to halt Germany's commitment to the introduction of own resources. Unfortunately, apart from scattered archival remains, little is known about Hartig who was such a passionate guardian of German finances.

In the first place, Hartig tried to persuade the Agriculture ministry to submit German counter-proposals for the financing aspect of the Commission's May draft grain regulation.²⁴ When the Agriculture ministry refused to do so, an angered Hartig wrote directly to the German delegation in Brussels to alert them that,

"from the German side, no position has yet been taken towards the financial provisions of the draft regulations [...]. Accordingly there is no agreement between, on the one hand, the Agriculture ministry and on the other, the federal Finance ministry, as well as other relevant departments, about the financial provisions of the draft regulations and about any German counter-proposals".²⁵

The ministry for Agriculture, in turn, defended its rejection of Hartig's attack by referring to the likely reactions of the Deutsche Bauernverband if Germany negotiated over financing before it had even created the CAP:

"If the Federal Republic agrees to a common financing already now, it can expect a severe criticism from German agriculture, if federal funds are being used to finance interventions in other member states and agricultural exports [...]".²⁶

The Agriculture ministry, which was totally uninterested in financing, nonetheless assured the federal Finance ministry that it would prefer to stay with the financing model of member state contributions, and that it was against letting revenue from levies become own resources to finance the CAP. It concluded unilaterally that there was no major discrepancy between the opinions of the two ministries.²⁷ This meant that no coherent position regarding the issue of financing or own resources emerged from the side of the German government prior to the important December 1961 Council meetings where the Commission's draft was scheduled for discussion and final approval.²⁸

Still, trouble broke out when the federal Economics and Finance ministries discovered what the German delegation had agreed to in the Council meeting. Technically, a regulation is the strongest legal instrument of the Community because it is binding upon the member states in its entirety, as well as being directly applicable in member states (articles 189-191 EEC). In Bonn, the expectation had been a financing agreement in the form of a less binding legal instrument; for

24. BAK, B102/98850, Schnellbrief from Hartig (BMF) to the German delegation in the Comité Spécial, 18/21.09.1961.

25. BAK, B102/98850, Schnellbrief, 18/21.09.1961.

26. BAK, B116/7870, Bemerkungen zu dem Vermerk des Herrn Staatssekretärs Lahr vom 6. November an den Herrn Bundesminister, 10.11.1961.

27. For these views, see: BAK, B116/7870, Vermerk, to Schwarz from MR Schwerdtfeger: Stellungnahme der Bundesregierung zu den Vorschlägen der Kommission für die Entwicklung einer gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik in der EWG, 13.11.1961.

28. BAK, B102/98850, Erklärung betreffend Beiträge der Mitgliedstaaten zur gemeinschaftlichen Finanzierung, 15.12.1961.

instance a declaration of intent over own resources, or another resolution.²⁹ Günther Harkort, the German permanent representative to the Community, had to account for why the delegation had failed at the 60th Council meeting:

“The question of whether to give the financial regulation the shape of a decision or a regulation was open from the outset. Not until the very last stage of the discussion did the Council decide to choose a regulation. With it, all the delegations agreed to an additional mention in the minutes of a ceiling for the contributions for the first three years of the transition period. [...] The permanent representatives have explicitly declared that their governments legally recognise the ceilings mentioned in the minutes. The ceilings have therefore again been guaranteed beyond doubt”.³⁰

Harkort was wrong about the guaranteed ceiling, but the German delegation had actually made several attempts to get such a financial ceiling for Germany included in the regulation, as several documents in relation to the 60th Council meeting bear witness to.³¹ Economics minister Ludwig Erhard therefore attempted a new procedure: he wanted to try and change the legal status of regulation no.25 before the final linguistic corrections and legal proving had been made, a process that was expected to take three to four months.³² The German permanent representative therefore placed a reservation on regulation no.25 with the view of examining the text in more detail before finally approving it.³³

An internal letter in the Economics ministry explained the unusual birth of the regulation. It said that because the regulation had not been handled from draft and committee meeting hearings and legal services following the usual legislative procedure, mistakes had happened during the heated negotiations in Brussels.³⁴ The biggest mistake was possibly that regulation no.25 did not mention a financial ceiling for Germany's contribution. The note reiterated that the federal Finance ministry had demanded such a ceiling prior to the Council meeting, and had the Economics ministry been present in the Council, it would also have insisted on this. In the Finance ministry, questions were asked about how such a mistake could

29. For instance, BAK, B102/98850, letter from Eberling to Herrn Abteilungsleiter E, 30.01.1962.

30. BAK, B102/98850, letter from Harkort to the Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 26.01.1962.

31. CM2/1962, 498, T/141/62 (AGRI), Extrait provisoire du projet de procès-verbal de la 60^{ème} session du Conseil, 16.02.1962; and, T/75/62, Amendement relatif à la proposition de la Commission au sujet du financement de la politique agricole commune proposée par la délégation allemande, 13.01.1962; CM2/1962, 496, T/586/61, 20.12.1961, op.cit. See also Lahr's account of the exhausting end to the negotiations for the Germans: R. LAHR, *Zeuge von Fall und Aufstieg. Private Briefe, 1934-1974*, Albert Knaus Verlag, Hamburg, 1981. Especially letter, 18.01.1962, pp.353-355.

32. BAK, B102/98850, Telegram from the Economics minister to the Brussels permanent representative: Verordnung über die Finanzierung der gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik, 25.01.1962.

33. CM2/1962, 498, Extrait du Compte rendu sommaire de la 199^{ème} réunion du Comité des représentants permanents, 24-26.01.1962. The German reservation was extended in February: CM2/1962, 498, Extrait du compte rendu sommaire de la réunion restreinte, tenue à l'occasion de la 202^{ème} réunion des représentants permanents, 14-15.1962.

34. BAK, B102/98850, Letter from Eberling to Abteilungsleiter E, 26.01.1962.

possibly have occurred.³⁵ An explanation that circulated within the inner circle of the ministry was that perhaps a linguistic mistake had happened in-between its previous report and the Brussels negotiations. It was noted that the report referred to *Verordnung*, which in German translates to both 'rule' in the general sense and 'regulation' in the Community-legal sense. *Perhaps the German delegation had misunderstood the French documents. Whatever the reason for the blunder, the Economics and Finance ministries in concert decided, firstly, to create an inter-ministerial investigation of the situation, and secondly, to push for the reopening of these negotiations in Brussels. Neither proved successful, as we will see below. Like so many other inter-ministerial meetings in Adenauer's administration, this one ended in disagreement over how to approach the issue, and proved utterly unconstructive.*³⁶

On his side, permanent representative Harkort promised to address the matter in Brussels again, though he personally expressed doubts about this undertaking. Harkort believed – correctly as it turned out – that it was already too late.³⁷ When he did not achieve anything, Heinz Starke, the Finance minister, personally went along to the next Council meeting.³⁸ Aided by Rolf Lahr, state secretary in the German Foreign affairs ministry, Starke demanded the negotiations of regulation no.25 reopened, and a maximum contribution percentage for Germany inserted. Lahr also attempted to show that there had been a linguistic confusion and the German delegation had not initially understood the financial responsibility of the agreement.³⁹ With French Foreign minister Maurice Couve de Murville chairing the meeting it is not surprising that the Germans could have saved themselves the effort at this point in time.⁴⁰

A final unsuccessful protest was delivered by state secretary for Economic Affairs, Alfred Müller-Armack, at the time of approving the final translations of regulation no.25 in early April 1962.⁴¹ As a minimum, he was allowed to insert a unilateral German statement in the minutes of that meeting, stating that the German government considered that “la déclaration insérée au procès-verbal sur le plafond de la contribution comme une proposition de même valeur juridique”. And after this, the French delegation mocked the Germans by inserting another unilateral

35. Ibid., Letter from Eberling to Abteilungsleiter, 30.01.1962.

36. Ibid., Kabinetttvorlage from the Bundesminister für Wirtschaft and Bundesminister des Auswärtigen: Formelle Verabschiedung der Verordnung des Rates der EWG über die Finanzierung der gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik, 26.03.1962; also: BAK, B126/8909, Kabinettsbeschluss, 28.03.1962.

37. Ibid., Letter from Harkort to the Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 26.01.1962.

38. CM2/1962, 6, P-V Conseil, restreinte, 63, 05-07.03.1962.

39. Dutch minutes of the meeting: NA/MF, BBV 781, 1.88 EEG/x/9, doss.4124, Bijeenkomst van de raad van ministers van EEG (63e) en Euratom (48e) op 5, 6 en 7 maart 1962.

40. After discussion over whether to re-examine regulation no.25 according to Germany's wishes in the Committee of permanent representatives, the request was finally declined on 15 March 1962: BAK, B102/98850, Fernschreiben from Harkort, 280, 16.03.1962; see also, CM2/1962, 498, R/131/62, Note, 07.03.1962; and R/133/62, Extrait du compte rendu sommaire de la réunion restreinte tenue à l'occasion de la 205^{ème} session du Comité des représentants permanents, 08.03.1962.

41. CM2/1962/13, P-V Conseil, restreinte, 65, 02-04.04.1962.

statement saying that Community law grants no legal status to unilateral statements inserted in the minutes. On the basis of this ‘agreement to disagree’ the members of the Council gave their unanimous approval to regulation no.25. The ministers parted with different interpretations of what the regulation really meant for the future of the Community, in terms of the future role of levies, the end of the transition period, and the legal status of Germany’s unilateral statement about a financial ceiling for contributions to the financing of the Community. The implications of this mess on Britain’s future as a member state, was equally unclear at this point.

The Financial Regulation and the accession negotiations

Financial regulation no.25 was now part of the *acquis communautaire*, and thus part of the Community’s legal body that prospect member states would also have to accept upon accession. During the spring of 1962, the British government was asked by the Commission and the French presidency to send an official response to this. Off the record, it had been no secret that the British were generally unhappy with the Community agreements concluded on 14 January 1962, and at the bottom line, British expressions in this respect referred to the question of financing.⁴² The official British response avoided commenting directly on article 201 EEC, and instead noted that Britain was prepared to contribute in a similar fashion as other large member states following the burden-sharing in article 200 EEC.⁴³ After delivering this message to the Community, Pierson Dixon, the leader of the British delegation at the official’s level and British ambassador to France, noted that “it was clear from remarks made outside the meeting that our remarks on this point had caused surprise and some alarm”. Such British signals, of course, went contrary to the French wish for an unobstructed implementation of article 201 EEC and own resources. Subsequent French diplomatic manoeuvres aimed at ensuring that the link between the common market and the agricultural levies would be maintained also after the expiry of regulation no.25.⁴⁴

When enlargement negotiations resumed in early August, the financial regulation took centre-stage. Harold Macmillan, the ministerial leader of the British delegation, started out by accepting regulation no.25 as an acceptable basis for further negotiations, and therefore signalled a more reconciling view than the one expressed by Pierson Dixon before the summer. This, however, was not sufficient for some, and the British negotiators faced a rather hostile attempt to try and enforce the French view of what should happen in this area after 1965 led by

42. See for instance, W. KAISER, *Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans: Britain and European Integration, 1945-63*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1996, pp.179-180.

43. HAEC/BAC, 38/1984, 54, Cab. Mansholt, COM(63)70, Rapport au Parlement Européen sur l’état des négociations avec le Royaume Uni, 26.02.1963.

44. A.S. MILWARD, *op.cit.*, pp.431-434.

two Frenchmen, namely Foreign minister Maurice Couve de Murville, and French commissioner Robert Marjolin.

In this connection, a meeting among the six EEC member states in the evening of 4 August developed into the first direct internal confrontation over the way in which the accession and financing negotiations were handled. When the German delegation expressed reluctance towards the French strategy, Marjolin defied procedure for Commission competences. My findings support Milward's, who has noted that Marjolin "redrafted the French motion as a Commission proposal put forward by Robert Marjolin", which was a move that upset the German delegation so much that it chose to "reveal what had happened in the meeting to their British counterparts".⁴⁵ Marjolin's initiative came too fast for anyone else in the Commission to react against it. And in the absence of a clear German counter-initiative, Marjolin's paper proceeded into the enlargement negotiation with Britain in the early morning hours of 5 August. Here, Marjolin's paper was presented as if it was a Community document, as we will see below. This it could not be. Firstly, the Commission was not the chief negotiator in the accession, and even if it had been, there is no indication that Marjolin tried to obtain the acceptance of the other Commission members for the content of the paper. Secondly, had it been a Community document, all member states should have agreed to it, which was clearly not the case. Given that disagreement within the six over the matter was already fairly well-known, the presentation of the Marjolin paper can be understood as an extra-procedural attempt by Marjolin and his French connections to try and push for making the British accept their interpretation of own resources.

Marjolin's intervention at the meeting came when most delegates had gone to bed or simply collapsed, as happened also to the Luxembourg chairman of the meeting, Eugène Schaus. Edward Heath, who was the Lord privy seal and head of the British enlargement delegation, has described the events with a mix of disappointment and anger:

"A little before 4 a.m., the French unexpectedly demanded that we should sign a paper on financing the CAP, committing us to an interpretation of the financial regulation favourable to the French. [...] This action was self-evidently dilatory in intent, and I refused to be bounced into a snap judgment on such a complex matter. I was supported in this by the Germans and the Dutch, who were as irritated as I was. The French redrafted the document twice, but this only hardened my resolve. This was no way of carrying out such important negotiations, and I was having none of it".⁴⁶

At 6.30 a.m., the negotiations had produced no result, and were adjourned until the autumn. The unorthodox French manoeuvre was clearly a traumatic event for the British. Ambassador Dixon noted in his diary that the night between 4 and 5 August marked "the end of the Brussels negotiations".⁴⁷ According to the main biographer of

45. *Ibid.*, p.434.

46. E. HEATH, *The Autobiography of Edward Heath. The Course of My Life*, Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1998, p.222.

Macmillan, Dixon had been forewarned “in confidence” by a French official that “Couve had informed the other Five that the French were going to ‘wreck’ the negotiations by refusing any concessions over the financial negotiations”. The Belgian Foreign minister, Pierre Forthomme, later told the British that they “had done great damage by not allowing the financial regulation to be settled in August”.⁴⁸ Throughout this political process, the Belgians showed a tendency to support the French view.

While the Germans had not stood up to the situation in Brussels at the time, the incidence triggered strong reactions in the federal Finance ministry. The document that had been presented to the British in the early morning hours of 5 August was here referred to as the ‘Marjolin paper’. It was viewed with great scepticism, as another French attempt to draw own resources into the *acquis communautaire*. Obviously, so German Finance experts reasoned, if the French succeeded in forcing the British to accept own resources, the matter would practically be settled, and Germany could not resist their introduction. The French clearly had similar expectations.

Finance minister Starke and his director Hartig, however, still found themselves in a rather isolated position within the federal administration, as if they were the only people to fully appreciate that if implemented in the way that the French government and commissioner Marjolin wanted, regulation no.25 would be a poor financial deal for Germany. Their fears were well-grounded, considering the almost unchecked process whereby own resources moved into Community legislation: from the December 1960 resolution to article 2 of regulation no.25 which directly accepted further elaboration of article 201 EEC. No one else in Bonn seriously reacted against this.⁴⁹ The German government had in January 1962 most likely agreed to transfer the revenue of levies from imports of agricultural products from third countries to the Community to cover common expenditure at the stage of the common market. It had also accepted that agricultural exporters would receive subsidies for certain agricultural products in some of the other agreements regarding the CAP. In addition, the leaders of the Finance ministry were furious over the fact that the German negotiators had not assured, at the very least, the insertion of a financial ceiling for Germany’s future contribution to the EEC.

After the night of the Marjolin paper, Hartig addressed the matter in a long note intended for the German cabinet. He pointed out that,

“the real purpose of this paper is to undermine the use of article 201 of the EEC Treaty for transfers of revenue from levies from the member states to the Community”.⁵⁰

In Hartig’s view, the Marjolin paper was an attempt to sneak in via the back door an agreement to own resources that both the applicant countries and the EEC partners

47. R. LAMB, *The Macmillan Years, 1957-1963. The Emerging Truth*, John Murray, London, 1995, p.174.

48. *Ibid.*, p.198.

49. BAK, B126/8909, Note from Hartig to the Finance minister, 18.08.1962.

subsequently would have to accept. He described Marjolin as the *Vertrauensmann* – the confidant – of the French government in the Commission, and suggested that Marjolin had transgressed the ‘neutrality’ of commissioners and drawn up the paper on the basis of instructions directly from Paris. Moreover, Hartig pointed out that the state secretaries Rolf Lahr and Alfred Müller-Armack, and the German permanent representative to the Community, Günther Harkort, were responsible for not standing up to the French move at the right time. Hartig accused his colleagues of simply not understanding properly the legal and financial implications of own resources for Germany. He directly described the French strategy:

“The presentation at night of the paper and its discussion in the narrowest of circles belongs, of course, also to the arsenal of the well-known French negotiation tricks”.⁵¹

This view was shared by Finance minister Starke who, in a letter to the chancellery, explained that:

“The attempts by the French clearly aim to commit the English to regulation no.25 from 14 January 1962. [...] There is no basis for the French demands of wanting to oblige extensively the other member states and in particular the Federal Republic as it has nonetheless already happened in the agricultural financing regulation. That demand is not legitimate”.⁵²

Clearly, the night of the Marjolin paper was not only traumatic to the British, but to the Germans too. Starke insisted that the chancellery and German government face up to the realities of the state of the Community negotiations. Starke went further, when on 10 October he personally presented the case to the cabinet. He outlined carefully the financial prospects for Germany if article 201 EEC was introduced into Community legislation according to the French plan.⁵³ At the cabinet meeting, chancellor Konrad Adenauer reacted to Starke’s warnings by talking generally about the Community and the importance of a successful outcome of the negotiations with Britain. He obviously showed an outright disinterest in the case, as he so often did when faced with economics and dry technical matters. Starke did however manage to make the chancellor raise the matter with the German members of the European Commission, and president Walter Hallstein was mentioned as a key contact. Starke moreover managed to persuade his colleagues to take a cabinet decision to reject the Marjolin paper as basis for further accession negotiations with Britain. Representing the Economics

50. BAK, BMF, B126/8909, Note from Hartig to the Finance minister: Gerechte finanzielle Lastenverteilung unter sämtlichen EWG-Mitgliedstaaten im Falle der Übertragung der Abschöpfungseinnahmen an die Gemeinschaft, 18.08.1962; also, BAK, BMF, B126/8909, Note, Hartig to the minister: Beitrittsverhandlungen mit Grossbritannien; Hier: Verordnung Nr.25, 03.10.1962.

51. BAK, BMF, B126/8909, Note from Hartig to the Finance minister, 18.08.1962, op.cit.

52. BAK, B102/98851, Letter from the Bundesminister der Finanzen to the Staatssekretär des Bundeskanzleramtes: Gerechte finanzielle Lastenverteilung unter sämtlichen EWG-Mitgliedstaaten im Falle der Übertragung der Abschöpfungseinnahmen an die Gemeinschaft; hier: Verhandlungen über den Beitritt Grossbritanniens. Bezug: Beschluss des Bundeskabinetts vom 28. März 1962, 29.09.1962.

53. BAK, B126/8909, Auszug über die 50. Kabinettsitzung der Bundesregierung am 10. Oktober 1962.

ministry at the meeting, Müller-Armack noted that he now for the first time saw the situation in full:

“Behind the [Marjolin] proposal is the political purpose that Germany will have to pay a price to France for the accession of England”.

Foreign minister Gerhard Schröder later thanked Starke for his warnings.⁵⁴

The French, however, hardened their efforts to proceed with getting own resources accepted through the enlargement with Britain. Just as the Germans had finally realised what the French were up to, the French knew that convincing the Germans to accept the financial regulation was key to progress. Towards the end of October, the two French top officials Bernard Clappier, leader of the French enlargement negotiation delegation, and director-general Olivier Wormser met in Bonn with the German Foreign Affairs secretary of state, Rolf Lahr, with the explicit aim of persuading the Germans to accept the link between the successful ratification of British accession and full implementation of the financial regulation. Lahr refused, and subsequently wrote to some of his colleagues that he had made it clear to the French that neither the Germans nor the British were willing to accept the French interpretation of the document. Lahr's letter mentioned the word *mißtrauen* [mistrust] several times, referring to the procedure that the French had pushed forward. Given the value and prestige the French attached to the matter, he speculated that if the financial regulation was rejected, “the negotiations with Great Britain can enter a state of serious crisis”.⁵⁵

Engineered by Hartig, Finance minister Starke now made a move to try and assure that his department be represented in all foreign affairs meetings where the issues of financing the CAP, own resources, and enlargement, were to be discussed. Starke directly warned his colleagues in the government that he believed that the French “will undoubtedly not hold back from artificially provoking a serious crisis in the negotiations with Great Britain”.⁵⁶ At this time, there was little doubt that Starke had convinced his colleagues about the need to assure that Britain did not commit to own resources via accepting the French interpretation of article 201 EEC and regulation no.25.⁵⁷ A new note from the Federal ministry of Justice supported Starke's interpretation.⁵⁸ But the problem was still how to break it to the French without the Germans or British being seen as the source of an eventual crisis. Moreover, as one top official in the federal Treasury recognised, “the French mostly manage to isolate the German delegation” in the accession negotiations.⁵⁹

54. BAK, B126/8909, Letter from Schröder to Starke, 20.10.1962.

55. BAK, B102/98851, Letter from Lahr to Hettlage, Müller-Armack and Hüttebräuker, 23.10.1962.

56. BAK, B126/8909, Letter from Starke (via Min.Rat Hartig) to the ministers AA, BMJ, BMWi and BML, November 1962. [Day of the month not specified].

57. For instance, BAK, B102/98851, Letter from Eberling to Abteilungsleiter E: Auslegung der Verordnung über die Finanzierung der gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik im Zusammenhang mit dem Beitritt Grossbritanniens zur EWG, 13.11.1962.

58. BAK, B102/98851, Schnellbrief from the Bundesminister der Finanzen to the Bundesminister der Auswärtigen Angelegenheiten (- der Justiz, - der Wirtschaft, - der Landwirtschaft), 09.11.1962.

59. BAK, B126/8909, Letter from Feldmann to Hartig, 09.11.1962.

By mid-November, Starke asked the Brussels delegation to make the French aware that Germany would not accept any new negotiations within the EEC that did not involve a fair burden distribution for Community financing.⁶⁰ Yet a meeting at the federal Finance ministry a few days later showed that there was some insecurity about how to approach the situation.⁶¹ It seemed clear to leading voices in the ministry that the message to the French was likely to provoke problems, possibly termination of the accession negotiations. They questioned whether this outcome was desirable, especially if Germany really was too late to avoid the automatic introduction of own resources by the end of the transition period. In that case, it was noted, British membership would give Germany someone to co-finance the Community with.⁶²

From the point of view of financing, the Dutch government was facing a situation not unlike that of the Germans. The Dutch, however, may have been less inclined to confront the French directly with the financial question at this point for at least two reasons. Firstly, the Dutch were unlikely to try and endanger the full creation of the CAP by upsetting the French on the issue of financing.⁶³ Secondly, British accession to the Community promised the reward of direct access of Dutch farm products to British agricultural markets. Nevertheless, from the fall of 1962, discontent was also brewing within the Dutch administration specifically with relation to French procedure and the Financial regulation ("the French delegation will not yield an inch on this issue").⁶⁴

In a report to the Dutch Council of minister from mid-October 1962, Foreign minister Joseph Luns expressed that he was increasingly reluctant to accept a model in which the Dutch would become permanent net financiers of the Community along with Germany and Britain.⁶⁵ Within the Dutch Foreign affairs ministry there was a growing reluctance to accept that the French unilaterally were forcing such an unfavourable deal through the Community against the explicit wishes of at least three countries.⁶⁶ Moreover, several of the Dutchmen involved were beginning to view the procedure with which the situation had developed as a bad omen for future cooperation in the Community. The Dutch permanent representative tried for a short while to mediate between the French, German and

60. BAK, B102/98851, Fernschreiben from Starke to the Brussels permanent representation, 15.11.1962.

61. BAK, B126/8909, Vermerk über die Hausbesprechung zu finanziellen, rechtlichen und wirtschaftlichen Fragen der EWG-Verordnung Nr.25, 20.11.1962.

62. BAK, B126/8910, Note from Hartig: Beitrittsverhandlungen mit Grossbritannien, 18.01.1963.

63. A.S. MILWARD, op.cit., p.437; also J.H. MOLEGRAAF, *Boeren in Brussel, Nederland en het Gemeenschappelijk Europees Landbouwbeleid 1958-1971*, unpublished Ph.D., Utrecht, 1999.

64. NA/MBZ, 996 EEG/1955-1964, 1259, Ontvangen Codebericht, no.9452, from the Paris embassy to the MBZ, 28.09.1962.

65. NA, MLV/DGV, 727, Report, Kennmerk 154966, from the Foreign minister to the minister-president: Financieel Reglement EEG, 25.10.1962; see also, NA/MBZ, 996 EEG/1955-1964, 1259, Nota over het financieel reglement, 23.10.1962.

66. MBZ, Code 996 EEG/1955-1964, 1259, Memorandum, 990/62, Onderwerp: Brits standpunt t.o.v. EEG.Verordening No.25 inz. financiering van het gemeenschappelijk landbouwbeleid, 06.11.1962.

British views, but it proved unsuccessful.⁶⁷ Towards the end of November, Dutch Foreign ministry officials also tried contacting the Commission directly to make it revise the documents regarding the financing issue used in the negotiations with Britain.⁶⁸ This also proved to be unsuccessful, not least because also the Commission itself was internally split over the procedure to be followed.⁶⁹

In the Commission, Marjolin insisted on upholding his paper initially introduced in the enlargement negotiations – thus siding with the French government – whereas Hallstein and von der Groeben, at least in principle, tended to side with the German government. In fact, in a note to the other commissioners in mid-November, von der Groeben brought up the procedure for the issue of financing in order to try and face the mounting political problems surrounding the British accession negotiations.⁷⁰ He noted that among the member states, the French stood alone with wanting to implement article 201 EEC at the time of the British accession. The main reason for this resistance, so von der Groeben noted, was the unjust financial burden-sharing in the Community that the French interpretation so obviously would lead to. At about the same time, Hallstein made similar observations about the dispute *among the Six over the financial regulation, not only between the Six and Britain*.⁷¹

During December the negotiations appear to have been even more confusing than previously, as it was becoming unclear who needed to negotiate with whom: was this above all an internal affair that needed to be solved between the Six, or could the matter be solved directly in connection with the British accession negotiations?⁷² The German and Dutch Foreign affairs ministries were now in frequent contact over this.⁷³

67. BAK, B102/98851, Fernschreiben from Harkort to BMW, BML, BMF: Beitrittsverhandlungen mit Grossbritannien; Hier: Verordnung Nr.25 über die Finanzierung der Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik, 10.11.1962.

68. NA/MBZ, 996 EEG/1955-1964, 1259, Memorandum, No.1176: Financieel Reglement voor de Landbouw, 23.11.1962.

69. Hans von der Groeben has made it clear in print that he was not always in agreement with the regulations passed in the Commission concerning financing, and that he and for instance Hallstein often disagreed over this issue. See, H. GROEBEN, *Walter Hallstein as President of the Commission*, in: W. LOTH, W. WALLACE and W. WESSELS (eds.), *Walter Hallstein. Der vergessene Europäer*, Europa Union Verlag, Bonn, 1995.

70. HAEC/BAC, 187/1995, 8, 9763/IV/62-D, Mitteilung des Herrn von der Groeben an die Kommission [probable date: 16.11.1962].

71. N.P. Ludlow, *Dealing with Britain. The Six and the First UK Application to the EEC*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p.197.

72. BAK, B102/98851, Letter from the German delegation in Brussels to Müller-Armack: Beitrittsverhandlungen mit Grossbritannien; Hier: Verordnung Nr.25 über die Finanzierung der gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik, 26.11.1962; and Schnellbrief from Lahr to the Staatssekretär des Bundesministeriums der Finanzen, 14.12.1962.

73. NA/MBZ, 996 EEG/1955-1964, 1259, Letter from Lahr to van Houten (Sts., MBZ), St.S1097/62, F/322/63, 29.12.1962. This letter refers to a series of correspondence between the German and the Dutch Foreign ministries about the difficulties surrounding the issue of financing the Community and the accession negotiations with Britain, especially in relation to the French show of force towards both Britain and the other five EEC member states.

In the German government, control of the situation was on the point of disappearing, had there ever been full control over it, in the eternal disputes among the ministries over competences. Foreign affairs state secretary Lahr sent his personal version of a compromise proposal to the other four EEC governments and the British, but not to the French. Lahr suggested that whatever agreement made between the Six and Britain during the accession negotiations should not have general validity for the Community afterwards.⁷⁴ It soon transpired, however, that Lahr had not consulted the rest of the German government on this. The Finance ministry in particular objected to both what they saw as an inappropriate procedure of excluding the French in this kind of communication, and the content of Lahr's message. Notwithstanding this early disagreement on procedure, this seems to have been the time when the German administration was ready to confront the French. During the week leading up to president de Gaulle's press conference, Lahr informed Wormser that the German government would definitely not accept the documents on which France wanted to base the financing agreement with Britain: "state secretary Lahr has explicitly explained to director Wormser that it won't happen this way".⁷⁵

To what extent this was merely a personal message from Lahr to Wormser is difficult to verify, nor do we know whether Wormser ever passed it on to his superiors or to his president. But given the way in which events had unfolded, Lahr's message could also be seen as a very direct warning from German high official circles, possibly in consultation with the Dutch, about ending the aggressive French insistence on continuing financing negotiations at this point in time when most parties involved were left with a feeling of dismay about the whole affair, and opinions continued to be irreconcilable. Under these circumstances, seen from a proud French point of view, ending the enlargement negotiations altogether at this stage, and dealing with financing as an internal Community affair afterwards, constituted a good exit strategy.

Concluding remarks

This article has aimed to provide considerable new circumstantial evidence in support of the argument that the British membership application failed over the controversies over finding a financing model for the Community. It was a dispute not primarily between the Six and Britain, but within the Six. The aggressive

74. BAK, B102/99851, Letter from Eberling to Müller-Armack: Finanzierung der gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik in der EWG, insbesondere im Zusammenhang mit den Verhandlungen über den Beitritt Grossbritanniens zur EWG, 07.01.1963.

75. BAK, B126/8910, Note from Hartig: Beitrittsverhandlungen mit Grossbritannien; Hier: Finanzierungsfragen aus Art.2, Abs.1 der EWG-Verordnung Nr.25, 18.01.1963. This may be the same event referred to by Macmillan's biographer, based on British Foreign Office records, described as when "Lahr [...] proposed to tackle Wormser". See R. LAMB, *op.cit.*, p.198.

French promotion of a particular financing model, through a mix of formal diplomatic negotiations and informal pressure, as well as the engagement of French commissioner Robert Marjolin in this, created an increasing frustration among France's negotiating partners. During 1962, Germany, and later Britain and the Netherlands, signalled serious doubts about accepting the French interpretation of regulation no.25. By the end of the year, the French must have been aware that the situation, as it had developed, was untenable. As a result, financing was an uncomfortable and unsettled issue both in the accession negotiations and among the Six by January 1963, and it began to seem difficult for anyone to devise an exit strategy. It seems unlikely, however, that the leaders of the German, British or Dutch governments would have acted as abruptly as the French did, although none of the three seems to have known how to solve the problems at hand.

The question of the financing model for the Community remained a fundamental issue in the history of the EU. Thus, in 1965, when it was time to renew regulation no.25, de Gaulle was again ready to paralyse the Community's high-level decision-making bodies unless Germany agreed to extend regulation no.25's commitment to own resources. When this resulted in yet another temporary agreement over financing, in 1966, the French continued to pursue the issue until own resources were finally introduced in the 1970 Budget Treaty. Only then were the French ready to accept Britain's membership.

A Welcome Change: The European Commission and the Challenge of Enlargement, 1958-1973

N. Piers Ludlow

The European Commission would no doubt have expected that most of the greatest challenges it would face in the EEC's first decade of existence would come from within the Community. After all, one of the reasons that the Treaty of Rome negotiators had been able to reach agreement, was precisely that a significant number of the most controversial decisions facing the Six had simply been postponed to a later date. Examples of this include the way in which the so-called List G had been employed to delay any decision on the appropriate tariff level for a range of important commodities and products, the manner in which details were deliberately omitted as to the shape and timing of the Common Agricultural Policy, and, perhaps most fundamentally of all, the multiplicity of institutional and political pathways left open by the Treaty of Rome. But to the evident dismay of some of its early members, it very quickly became apparent that the Commission would also have to devote a great deal of time to discussing and then negotiating over the political and economic relationship between the EEC and those multiple Western European countries that had chosen not to sign the Treaty of Rome. Robert Lemaigen, a member of the first college of commissioners, indeed claims that the Commission's first ever substantive discussion, on January 16, 1958, was devoted to this topic.¹ And the pattern, once set, persisted, with the only major alteration coming in 1961 at which point several of the non-member states began requesting actual membership of the EEC rather than simply seeking some type of status as a privileged outsider. If association requests and the debate about British proposal for a free trade area and its aftermath are added to the enlargement negotiations themselves, it is plausible to claim that not a single one of the Commission's first fifteen years of operation passed without the Community's relations with third countries being a major and potentially divisive topic for debate.

An overview of how the Commission handled this challenge is thus overdue. There have in the past been a number of works looking at the way in which the Commission responded to individual association or enlargement requests – especially those of 1961-3.² And a few of the memoirs left by those who worked in Brussels during the period contain some general reflections about the enlargement

1. R. LEMAIGNEN, *L'Europe au Berceau. Souvenirs d'un technocrate*, Plon, Paris, 1964, p.7.

2. See esp. N.P. LUDLOW, *Influence or Vulnerability: the Commission and the first Enlargement Negotiations*, in: R. GRIFFITHS & S. WARD, *Courting the Common Market: The first attempt to enlarge the European Community 1961-3*, Lothian Foundation Press, London, 1996; and N.P. LUDLOW, *A Short-Term Defeat: The Community Institutions and the Second UK Application*, in: O. DADDOW (ed.), *Harold Wilson and European Integration*, Frank Cass, London, 2002.

phenomenon and the way in which the Commission responded.³ But there has so far been no single attempt to analyse and assess the Commission's role in enlargement negotiations throughout 1958 to 1973 period. In attempting to fill this gap in the literature, this article will draw upon the archival records of the Community institutions themselves, as well as the official papers of several of the principal member states and would-be member states.

Two preliminary points probably need to be made before an overall analysis can begin. The first is to acknowledge the danger in any set of generalisations about the opinions and beliefs of an institution, and the particular hazardousness of sweeping statements about an issue as potentially divisive as enlargement. Throughout the whole of the 1960s very different views about the membership of Britain and the other applicants persisted within the Brussels institution, up to and including members of the Commission itself. As a result, statements about the Commission's opinion during this period, have to be taken to refer to the majority viewpoint rather than to a genuinely unanimous stance. And second it is important to highlight from the outset the gap which often existed between the Commission's actual majority view about enlargement at any given time, and the official institutional stance as expressed in public statements and/or the *avis* which under article 237 of the EEC treaty the Commission is required to issue about each membership request. As will become clear below, the Commission was highly conscious of the political stakes at play over the enlargement issue, and was therefore extremely cagey about expressing its real views openly. Its various public pronouncements and still more its official opinions were therefore highly political *prises de position* in which the Commission's genuine view of enlargement blended with numerous tactical considerations and assessments of the risks involved in too firm a decision one way or the other. A proper analysis needs to go beyond the highly Delphic public statements and look for evidence of what the Commission really believed.

In arriving at what might perhaps be described as its internal and confidential assessment of each enlargement request, the 1960s Commission tended to be affected primarily by two factors, each of which might pull in very contradictory directions. The first of these was a strong sense that membership requests, far more than simple requests for special economic relationships, constituted a compliment to the EEC, a vindication of its progress to date and a recognition of the vitality and prospects of European integration. This was very apparent in 1961 when someone like Sicco Mansholt, vice-president of the European Commission and one of the most dynamic of the early commissioners, could speak of the membership applications deposited by the British, Danes, Irish and Norwegians as '*une preuve du succès de notre Communauté*'.⁴ And it was perhaps even more of a factor in

3. See R. MARJOLIN, *Le Travail d'une Vie. Mémoires 1911-1986*, Robert Laffont, Paris, 1986; R. LEMAIGNEN, op.cit.; S. MANSHOLT, *La Crise. Conversations avec Janine Delaunay*, Editions Stock, Paris, 1974.

4. *Débats de l'Assemblée Parlementaire Européenne 1961-2*, Vol.II, p.78; much the same view was expressed by Emile Noël, the former secretary-general of the Commission, in an interview with the author, 16.12.1995.

1967, when the renewal of Britain's membership bid, coincided with a period during which other aspects of the European project seemed at a low ebb. At a time when the member states of the Community seemed to be acting as if they undervalued both the achievements and prospects of the EEC, it was profoundly reassuring to know that several countries outside of the EEC were extremely eager to get in.⁵ No institution like the European Commission whose whole *raison d'être* was pushing forward the process of European integration and whose success (and even survival during the early years) was so tied up with the maintenance of forward momentum in Europe could be entirely insensitive to the potential psychological boost which membership applications could provide.

Equally important, however, and also tied up with the Commission's self-perception as the motor of integration and the protector of the Community against any potential hazards, was an assessment of how the enlargement process was likely to affect the overall health and vitality of the European integration process. Such a calculation included both economic and practical estimates of how the arrival of new member states with new interests and problems might potentially influence the workings and prospects of each Community policy, and more political evaluations about the impact which enlargement (and the negotiation about enlargement) might have on the general stability and unity of the EEC.

In 1961-3, as had been the case in the earlier debates about relations with Britain recalled by Lemaignan, this assessment led to the widespread view that enlargement was a potential nuisance which might, if mishandled, seriously disrupt the very satisfactory advance of the integration process. The membership negotiations threatened to eat up valuable time which might be better devoted to internal consolidation, could cause damaging rifts of opinion amongst the member states, and would afford ample scope for canny British negotiators to play upon the many disagreements which persisted amongst the Six and obtain multiple concessions. Once inside the EEC, moreover, the British and their Commonwealth and EFTA retinuees would require substantial changes to be made to the EEC and to its embryonic policies.⁶ That there was 'no joy' expressed at the first Commission debate after Harold Macmillan had announced that the United Kingdom intended to apply was hardly surprising.⁷

By 1967, however, this same set of calculations led to a radically contrasting result. The Community which Harold Wilson approached, was no longer the

5. For Rey's 1967 enthusiasm about enlargement, see *Débats du Parlement Européen. Session 1967-68, Séance du Mercredi 20 septembre, 1967*, p.11

6. See for instance Hallstein's comments to the Americans, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963* (United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1994), vol.13, pp.13-14; for an analysis of the specific policy-related problems British membership would pose, Council of Ministers Archives, Brussels (henceforward CMA), 07.151. Premier document de travail de la Commission CEE contenant une analyse des propositions contenues dans la déclaration de M. Heath faite lors de la session ministérielle à Paris, tenue le 10 octobre 1961. S/05700/61.

7. The phrase was used by Karl-Heinz Narjes, deputy chief of cabinet to Walter Hallstein, the first Commission president. Interview with the author, 18.05.1992.

confident, ambitious and fast-evolving entity of 1961-3. Instead, the Commission was highly conscious of the deep division which existed between France and the other member states, and which had come to the surface most spectacularly during the empty chair crisis of 1965-6.⁸ It was also aware that with the CAP and the customs union nearly complete, the EEC needed to devise new challenges in order to continue to advance. The applications received from Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Norway were therefore perceived more as a source of much-needed fresh impetus, rather than as a brake on already rapid forward movement. Furthermore, with the Community's agricultural and tariff policy that much more solidly established, and with Britain's Commonwealth links having withered in the course of the interval between 1961 and 1967, there was every chance that the EEC could be enlarged without serious harm being done to the Community and its policies.⁹ Jean Rey and his colleagues therefore greeted news of the UK's decision to apply with a spontaneous pleasure entirely different from the scarcely concealed irritation which Walter Hallstein, his predecessor as president of the Commission, had felt in 1961-3.¹⁰

Likewise in 1970-2, the Commission was more conscious of the potential rewards that enlargement might bring than the difficulties which it could cause. The struggle between the French and their partners over British membership had poisoned the atmosphere in Brussels and had led to a situation in which even the most innocuous of Community discussions could quickly degenerate into a bitter row about 'la question anglaise'.¹¹ The only way in which this highly dangerous state of affairs could be solved would be for the much delayed increase in the EEC's membership actually to take place – a step which, Georges Pompidou, the new French president seemed inclined to allow.¹² The Commission of the early 1970s thus had every political incentive to smooth the path of the UK and the other applicants. The last thing which the Community experiment needed was another acrimonious failure of an enlargement negotiation. Furthermore, as had been the case in 1967, Commission estimates of the possible advantages of enlargement highlighted the new policy areas which might be opened up by the entry of new members. One exciting possibility for instance was that the need to address the chronic weakness of Sterling and the ongoing problem of the so-called 'Sterling Balances' might push all of the

8. R. MARJOLIN, *op.cit.*, pp.322-353.

9. The contrasting lengths and complexities of the 1961 and 1967 statements setting out Britain's opening negotiating stance rather underlined the change that had occurred. For the 1961 statement, see 'The United Kingdom and the European Economic Community', HMSO, Command 1565, November 1961; for the 1967 equivalent European Commission Historical Archives (henceforward ECHA), BDT 38/84, file 341, SEC(61) 3108, *Compte rendu de la réunion des ministres de l'UEO*, 04.06.1967.

10. See ECHA, COM(67) PV 401 final, deuxième partie, 3 May 1967.

11. For a weary French acknowledgement of this fact, see Pompidou papers (Archives Nationales, Paris): 5AG2/1010, entretien en tête-à-tête entre le Chancelier Kiesinger et le Président Pompidou.

12. Although there had been multiple previous hints that the French line on enlargement was changing, the final admission of this would have to await The Hague conference of December 1969. The summit communiqué acknowledged that 'widening' would happen. See European Commission, *Troisième Rapport Général sur l'activité des Communautés 1969*, (European Commission: Brussels, 1970), pp.520-524.

Community towards far greater economic coordination and monetary cooperation than was currently the case.¹³ The Commission could only gain from such a development.

Taken together the sense of approbation and praise for the Community which membership applications seemed to imply and calculations about the extent to which the Community would be harmed or helped by the influx of new members explain the Commission's private estimate of the three enlargement attempts of the 1960s and early 1970s. The first was viewed with a great deal of ambivalence, bordering at times on outright hostility. The second British application, by contrast, and the revival of the British bid by the incoming Conservative government in 1970, were both seen as much more positive than negative events. The internal mood of the Commission was correspondingly much more pro-enlargement on the latter two occasions. But in all three cases, a straightforward expression of such views was not possible. Before the Commission could decide what to say in public about the issue of enlargement, let alone what needed to go in its official avis, several more factors had to be taken into account.

The first cluster of additional calculations sprang from an awareness that the ultimate power of decision in membership negotiations lay with the member states and not the Commission. Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome, gave the Commission the task of expressing an opinion, usually assumed to be a preliminary opinion of the applicants. But thereafter the whip hand lay with the national governments who were collectively responsible for the conduct of the membership negotiations.¹⁴ That they also held the power to shape the outcome of these negotiations had been dramatically demonstrated by de Gaulle. Two important consequences followed from this realisation.

For a start it meant that enlargement might still go ahead even if the Commission came out strongly against. Were this to happen the Commission would have to participate in membership negotiations with member states who presumably held an opposite view. And still worse, of course, would be the prospect of eventually finding itself coexisting within the enlarged Community with member states whose path to the EEC the Commission had sought unsuccessfully to block. Given that member states, whether old or new, still retained the capacity to frustrate many of the Commission's ambitions and possessed multiple means to 'punish' the Commission for an unfriendly stance, not least through the degree of financial control they exercised, such a state of affairs was not one which the Commission could easily risk.

Second, it meant that the Commission's best means of influencing the decisions taken in the course of the membership negotiations – decisions which could be of

13. For a discussion of this see ECHA, COM(69)1000, Avis de la Commission au Conseil concernant les demandes d'adhésion du Royaume-Uni, de l'Irlande, du Danemark et de la Norvège, 06.10.1969.

14. The Commission had sought to counter this in 1961-3 by refusing to issue a formal *avis* and instead insisting that its opinion would only emerge, bit by bit, as the negotiations progressed. ECHA 38/84, file 99, S/420/61(RU4), Hallstein to Erhard, 08.09.1961.

significant importance for the shape and workings of the enlarged Community – was to ensure that its assistance was sought during the membership negotiations. This was far from guaranteed. In the run up to the first set of membership negotiations the Commission had been forced to watch from the sidelines as the French and the Dutch sought to persuade their partners that under article 237 the Commission had solely the right to express its view of enlargement prior to the opening of negotiations and should thereafter be excluded from the process.¹⁵ Although this had failed – largely due to the strong contrary opinions expressed by the Germans, Italians and Belgians – it had been an uncomfortable reminder that the Commission's place at the negotiating table was not automatic. As a result, the Commission had every incentive to present itself to the member states as an objective and open-minded body whose presence would be an asset during the talks. This was of course especially true if the Community was deeply divided over the question of enlargement.

As a result caution, caginess and even deliberate vagueness were sometimes more to be aimed at in an *avis* than a straight talking assessment of an application. Technical judgements and detailed analysis did of course need to be carried out thoroughly. If the Commission's opinion was to have an impact it had to be an accurate document which could not too easily be disregarded by the member states. But equally the Commission had to be extremely careful about expressing its more political judgements about enlargement, since these were likely to be ill-received by some of the member states and were potentially counter-productive should they lead to a situation in which the Commission was either excluded from altogether or marginalised within the membership talks.

Furthermore, the Commission was well aware throughout the period under review that the process of negotiating about enlargement could be an opportunity for the self-styled 'executive' to prove its prowess and utility and even to advance various causes it had long been pursuing. Skilfully handled, a set of highly complex negotiations which would inevitably focus on the *acquis communautaire* – the corpus of pre-existing Community legislation – would offer a valuable opportunity for the Commission to demonstrate how well it understood the functioning of the Community and the means by which the EEC could be adapted to cope with additional members, to show its skill in international diplomacy, and to underline its importance in devising compromise solutions to bridge divisions both between the member states and between the EEC and the applicants.¹⁶ All of this would be of great value at a time when the Commission was pressing hard to rebuff a concerted French campaign to strip the Brussels body of most of its overseas representative functions.¹⁷ Instead, competence was likely to be rewarded by further attractive negotiating tasks in the future.

15. ECHA, BDT 38/34, No.99, S/04880/61, Herbst's report on the 18.08.1961 Coreper meeting.

16. For a more detailed discussion of this mediating role of the Commission in 1961-3, see N.P. LUDLOW, *Influence and Vulnerability* ..., op.cit., pp.146-147.

17. See for instance the French attempt to prevent the Commission from attending an OECD ministerial conference in January 1966, ECHA, COM(66)PV 346 final, 2^e partie, 26.01.1966.

Also potentially available in the course of the membership negotiations were a number of opportunities to advance long-cherished policy aims. In 1961-3 there were several occasions when this clearly occurred. The most celebrated of these (and the most blatant) was the way in which Hallstein sought to use the enlargement talks to bounce the Germans especially into agreeing to a settlement on the financing of the CAP which was highly advantageous to the Community budget. In August 1962 this was done by providing assistance to the Italians and French as they sought to devise a form of wording which would bind not only the British but also the Six to a set of rules for CAP finance which would heavily penalise large-scale importers of food.¹⁸ Then in November the Commission went one stage further by tabling a set of proposals of its own, ostensibly intended to resolve the impasse and thereby allow progress to resume in the talks with the British.¹⁹ In reality, however, the Commission proposals were more about securing the earliest possible agreement on a financial regulation which constituted a major step forward towards a fully working CAP and would furthermore bring a sizeable influx of 'own resources' into the Commission's coffers. In similar fashion, the compromise solutions put forward by the Commission to settle some of the tariff problems raised by the British, 'just happened' to eliminate the tariff quotas secured by the Dutch and long-despised by the Commission.²⁰ Likewise in 1967 it is quite clear that had the negotiations got underway (the French successfully made certain that this never happened) the Commission would have used them as a vehicle for its hopes of widening the Community budget and adding a set of redistributive regional mechanisms to its policy armoury. In the event a solution along these lines was followed in the 1970-2 negotiations, allowing the Community to take a first step towards what in the 1980s would become its fastest growing policy area.

Finally, of course, the membership negotiations offered an opportunity for the Commission to forge new, and potentially valuable links with the would-be member states. This does not appear to have been much of a priority in 1961-3, although with hindsight the British did identify the establishment of better relations with the Commission as being one of the few positive outcomes of the early frustrating months of negotiation in Brussels.²¹ But by 1967 the Commission having seemingly decided that enlargement would happen and that the sooner it did the better it would be, went out of its way to assist and encourage the applicants, even to the point of courting criticism from the French. Extensive information was

18. See N.P. LUDLOW, *Dealing With Britain: The Six and the First UK Application to the EEC*, CUP, Cambridge, 1997, pp.144-151; and A.C. KNUDSEN, *Defining the Policies of the Common Agricultural Policy. A Historical Study*, PhD thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2001, pp.401-418; for complaints about this Commission role, see Public Record Office, London (henceforward PRO), FO371/164791, M641/380, Robinson minute, 10.08.1962.

19. ECHA. BDT 145/88, No.245, S/08146/62. Report No.39 on the thirteenth ministerial session (15-17 November 1962).

20. ECHA. BDT 145/88, No.245, S/03194/62. Report No.21 on the 21st deputy meeting (22-24.05.1962).

21. Author's interview with Sir Christopher Audland, 21.02.1994.

given to the British, tactical advice was proffered and detailed dialogue was sought out on those issues which threatened to be most problematical.²² Similarly, Sir Con O'Neill's report on the 1970-2 negotiations pays tribute to the very constructive working relationship which the UK negotiators were able to build up with the Commission. Although the Commission was careful at first not to be too visibly close to the applicants, it soon lost most of its anxieties and played

'an important and indeed an indispensable part, which tended to get more, not less, significant as the negotiations progressed'.²³

This mixture of dangers and opportunities, led the Commission to qualify its initial judgement about the desirability of enlargement, especially in its public statements. Thus the widespread mistrust which characterised the Commission's view of the 1961-3 membership bids was largely concealed, behind neutral language and a cautious public welcome to Britain and its fellow applicants. Hallstein's September 19, 1961 speech to the European Parliament for instance, betrayed few of his personal doubts, and instead stressed the vital importance of the enlargement negotiations being used as a spur to future progress rather than as a pretext for slowing down the Community's advance.²⁴ Conversely, the very different majority views of the Commission in 1967 and 1970 were toned down substantially in official pronouncements. The 1967 *avis*, for instance, while recommending that negotiations begin, hedged its bets somewhat by including a sizeable section which was highly critical of the state of the British economy and which acknowledged the difficulties that this could pose to the Community.²⁵ These observations were not a purely technical and objective judgement (although they were well grounded in reality, as the subsequent devaluation of sterling would show). Instead they reflected the need to provide the dissenting minority within the Commission with an outlet for their views (it was no coincidence that the section on the British economy was largely drafted by Raymond Barre, the senior French commissioner, and the single most sceptical member of the Brussels body about the case for enlargement), to reassure the French in particular that the Commission was not entirely *parti pris*, and to signal to London that the Commission needed yet more evidence of the UK's new, pro-European stance.²⁶ The change in the Community's public discourse between 1961-3 and 1967 was much less marked than its private *volte-face* on the issue might have implied.

In order to provide a full assessment of the Commission's role in the enlargement debate, however, it is necessary to go beyond an analysis of the Commission's

22. For the agreement to start such cooperation see PRO: FCO 30/102, Record of a conversation between the Foreign secretary and the president of the Commission of the European Communities at the British Embassy, The Hague, 4 July 1967.

23. C. O'NEILL, *Britain's Entry into the European Community. Report on the Negotiations of 1970-1972*, Frank Cass, London, 2000, p.305.

24. Reproduced in *Europe (Documents)*, 20.09.1961.

25. ECHA. COM(67)750, 'Opinion on the Applications for Membership received from the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and Norway', 29.09.1967.

26. Records of the key drafting meetings are in ECHA, COM(67) PV 6, 2^e partie, 13.09.1967 & PV8, 2^e partie, 27.09.1967; for British awareness of Barre's role, PRO, FCO30/103, Marjoribanks to FCO, tel. 247, 30.09.1967.

general views, whether public or private, and examine the Commission's actual involvement to the negotiating process itself. The second half of this article must thus include a closer look at how the Commission contributed to the 1961-3 and 1970-2 discussions, as well as a brief reference to its participation in the shadow-boxing about the possible opening of membership talks which characterised the 1967 applications. In the process it will highlight those features of the Commission's approach which remained constant, as well as pointing out those aspects of the Commission's performance and stance which had altered over the decade between 1961 and 1972.

The first major element of continuity in the Commission contribution, was the way in which it proved much more at home on the technical aspects of the negotiation, rather than on the underlying political choices. This may at first seem surprising. After all, as Hallstein was fond of repeating, the early European Commission was 'in politics, not economics'.²⁷ Furthermore, as argued above, the Commission's basic attitudes towards the desirability or otherwise of enlargement were determined by highly political calculations. Yet within the context of the discussions about enlargement, it remained the case that the Commission was best able to exert an influence, and even in certain cases to determine the direction of debate, when discussion centred on technical and economic questions rather than more overtly political issues.

For much of 1961-2 and 1970-2 this was not really a disadvantage. On the contrary, on both occasions Britain and the other applicants' approach posed a large number of highly technical difficulties which needed to be overcome, and the enlargement negotiations were hence dominated by detailed discussions of tariff levels, agricultural subsidies, and possible derogations and exceptions from Community rules.²⁸ In such circumstances the Commission, with its undeniable mastery and knowledge of the *acquis communautaire*, was able to exercise a great degree of influence. Its figures and in-depth studies provided the raw material for much of the debate, its draft proposals often lay at the heart of the Community's *prises de position*, and its compromise formula were central to a number of the agreements reached.²⁹ In the first enlargement negotiations, this technical expertise was given its fullest recognition in December 1962, when Mansholt was asked to chair the special committee with which it was hoped that the impasse in the agricultural negotiations could be broken.³⁰ Whether or not this contribution would have proved decisive is impossible to determine, since de Gaulle's veto intervened before the work of the Mansholt committee was fully completed. But both the praise that the body attracted from the British and the 'friendly five' and the evident

27. For one of the most sophisticated formulations of this view, see his speech to the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 25.3.1965. ECHA, speeches collection.

28. The main issues at stake are discussed in N.P. LUDLOW, *Dealing With Britain ...*, op.cit., pp.79-106.

29. N.P. LUDLOW, *Influence and Vulnerability ...*, op.cit., pp.144-145.

30. ECHA, BDT 145/80, No.245, S/08134/62, Report No.42 on the ministerial meeting between the Six, 03-05.12.1962.

anxiety which its debates engendered amongst the French, testify to the way in which the Dutch commissioner was able to use his unrivalled knowledge of the CAP in order to push the member states and Britain towards reaching an agreement.³¹ Had the general not intervened, and had the negotiations gone on to reach the agreement which many still believed was within reach, it is therefore likely that a great deal of credit would have been due to the Commission in general and Mansholt in particular.³²

The way in which the Mansholt Committee was rendered irrelevant in January 1963, however, also highlights the Commission's vulnerability whenever discussions about enlargement moved from the technical to the political. For in the frantic diplomacy which broke out in the aftermath of de Gaulle's January 14 press conference and its apparent rejection of British membership, the Commission, hitherto at the centre of the enlargement debate, found itself marginalised.³³ In the face of the great political choices about the way in which Europe should be organised, about the links which should exist between the two sides of the Atlantic, and about the ability of one member state to impose its will on its partners, the Commission's views and assessments were held to be of little consequence and were scarcely heeded. Instead it was the senior politicians from the key member states, and even the representatives of external powers like the United States, who came to fore, despite their scant knowledge of the precise economic issues upon which debate in Brussels had previously centred.³⁴ Hallstein, Mansholt and their colleagues became no more than bit players in the political drama of January 1963.

Likewise in 1967 and 1970-2 the Commission was not very effective when the key political decisions needed to be made. Despite his evident desire to see negotiations open between the EEC and the British, Irish, Danes and Norwegians, Rey floundered when trying to devise a mechanism which might pressurise the French into allowing talks to start. Several of his suggestions were rejected as unwise and potentially counterproductive by both the Five and the British.³⁵ Similarly, his attempt in December 1967 to draw to the attention of the French the dangers which they were running by blocking enlargement once more, only served to aggravate an already tense and fractious meeting and reportedly earned him

31. For British pleasure see PRO, CAB 134/1512, CMN(62) 28th meeting, 18.12.1962; for French disquiet Ministère des Affaires étrangères (henceforward MAE), Série DE-CE 1961-6, Carton 519, Note, 18.12.1962.

32. An attempt to draw up a balance sheet of the Commission's contribution in 1961-3 is made in N.P. LUDLOW, *Influence and Vulnerability* ..., op.cit., pp.148-149.

33. For details of the diplomacy of January 1963 see O. BANGE, *The EEC Crisis of January 1963. Kennedy, Macmillan, de Gaulle and Adenauer in conflict*, Macmillan, London, 2000; and N.P. LUDLOW, *Dealing With Britain* ..., op.cit., pp.200-226.

34. See also W. HOLSCHER, *Krisenmanagement in Sachen EWG. Das Scheitern des Beitritts Großbritanniens und die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen*, in: R.A. BLASIUS (ed.), *Von Adenauer zu Erhard. Studien zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1963*, R. Oldenbourg Verlag, München, 1994, pp.9-44.

35. PRO, FCO 30/102, Marjoribanks to FO, Tel. 236, 27.09.1967 and following telegrammes.

criticism from German and Dutch ministers who might have been expected to support his stance.³⁶

The first indications from the successful 1970-2 membership talks meanwhile also suggest that the Commission was best able to make a meaningful contribution to progress when the subjects were highly technical and not too political. The major decisions of principle were made at The Hague Council of December 1969, where the Commission was a peripheral player present for only part of the time, and at the May 1971 encounter between Edward Heath and Georges Pompidou from which the Commission was entirely absent.³⁷ Even in Brussels meanwhile, the way in which it was the relatively light-weight and junior Jean-Francois Deniau who emerged as the main Commission voice on enlargement issues, rather than some of his colleagues whose political views might have carried more weight, suggest that once more it was as a guide to the technical intricacies of the Treaty of Rome and not as a major political arbiter that the European Commission made its essential contribution. O'Neill's report indeed goes even further suggesting that in 1970-2 the member states kept 'jealous' control of most of the key issues, and that it was

'in the extremely complicated work connected for instance with arrangements for agricultural transition, with aspects of the Common Commercial Policy and above all with secondary legislation, that the Commission came into its own and gave us invaluable indispensable help'.³⁸

Once again therefore the Commission's importance sprang not from high-profile politicking over enlargement, a game in which it could not compete with the strong member state opinions at play, but instead from the lower-key and unromantic, but absolutely essential, work it could do establishing the precise manner in which new member states could take their place in the already highly complex Community system. Technical expertise, not political clout, was the Commission's main asset.

A second major element of continuity is the way in which the Commission held the protection of the interests of existing member states to be more important than the needs and requests of the applicants. That this was highly evident in 1961-3 could of course be interpreted as a sign of the way in which the majority of the Commission was biased against enlargement. Certainly there are indications that British complaints about the Commission's rigid adherence to the rules devised by the Six, periodically spilled over into outright suspicions that the Commission was being deliberately obstructive.³⁹ Likewise in 1967 the Commission's rather critical words about the way in which British monetary and economic weakness might

36. The record of the meeting itself is CMA: I/8/68 (GB5), extrait de procès-verbal de la réunion restreinte tenue à l'occasion de la dix-huitième session du conseil, 18-19.12.1967. For Dutch complaints see SGCI archives, Fontainebleau, Versement 900639, article 75, Brunet tel. 314, 23.12.1967.

37. For details of The Hague – and the Commission's minor role – see *Journal of European Integration History*, vol.9, no.2(2003) esp. pp.21-22; for an account of the Heath-Pompidou meeting based largely on the French minutes, E. ROUSSEL, *Georges Pompidou*, Fayard, Paris, 1994, pp.437-447.

38. C. O'NEILL, *op.cit.*, p.310.

39. See e.g. PRO, FO371/164789, M641/281, Roll to FO, 30.06.1962.

pose a threat to some of the ways in which the EEC worked, were seen by some as confirmation that the Brussels institution was essentially opposed to enlargement.⁴⁰ But in fact, the Commission's tendency to defend where possible the existing workings of the Treaty of Rome and the *acquis communautaire*, followed naturally from the manner in which the Commission interpreted its task during the enlargement talks, rather than being a reflection of underlying hostility. In the eyes of the Commission its key roles in the discussions with would-be members, were as guardian of the Treaties of Rome and as protector of unity amongst the existing member states. Both of these goals were most likely to be served by sticking close to the existing corpus of Community legislation, since this already represented something upon which the Six had agreed. Too easily to acknowledge the need for major change, by contrast, would risk undermining the Treaty, dividing the Six, and handing a potentially dangerous degree of initiative to an applicant whose knowledge of the Community's inner workings was necessarily limited. However desirable was the goal of enlargement, it could not be purchased in a manner which risked undermining the very Community which the applicants were seeking to join.

This explains why in 1961-3 the Commission seemed so dogmatic in its defence of the existing CAP, and the tariff levels and structure which had been agreed upon by the Six.⁴¹ Undue movement on either issue towards the requests tabled by Heath and the other British negotiators, would create acrimonious divisions amongst the Six and would threaten the degree of policy consensus which the EEC needed to function. The Commission was therefore adamant throughout the 1961-3 talks that the principal onus of adaptation lay on the side of the applicants and not the Community. By 1970 this was a lesson that the British had thoroughly learnt. And alongside the recognition that it was they and not the Community which would have to show the greater flexibility, went an acceptance that in the first instance the Commission would have to look to its internal Community responsibilities rather than to the needs and desires of the would-be members. O'Neill specifically acknowledges that

'helpful and ingenious though they were, the representatives of the Commission could not be definition be completely impartial. It was their duty to defend the interests of the Community. They thoroughly understood the interests of the Six Member States; and sometimes found ours hard to accept as qualifying for accommodation. In spite of this, and more and more as time passed, they came to play a most helpful part, and to develop a strong commitment to success'.⁴²

The Commission, it had clearly been understood, by some at least of the British negotiators, would naturally lean towards the Six but in doing so was neither exhibiting illegitimate bias, nor precluding success – it was simply doing the job it was required to do under the Treaty of Rome.

40. *Daily Telegraph*, 07.10.1967.

41. See for instance Mansholt's speech to the European Parliament, *Débats de l'Assemblée Parlementaire Européenne 1961-2*, vol.1, pp.78-82.

42. C. O'NEILL, *op.cit.*, pp.308-309.

In most respects, however, the contrast between the different character of the Commission contributions in 1961-3, 1967 and 1970-2 is more striking than the similarity. The biggest evolution was the way in which the Commission appears as the 1960s progressed to have lost much of that anxiety which had been so notable feature of its reaction to the issue of enlargement in 1961-3. This may at first seem unexpected. After all, it is commonly asserted that the early 1960s were a good period for the European Commission, when much went well and spirits in Brussels soared to unprecedented levels, whereas the end of the decade was a time of limping progress and a correspondingly depressed outlook on the part of most of those who worked in the Community capital.⁴³ It would therefore have been logical had the optimistic and idealistic Commission of the early part of the decade been better able to regard enlargement as an opportunity than the more downbeat institution of the later 1960s. But to assert this would be to misunderstand both the nature of the early 1960s optimism and the characteristics of the later gloom.

The EEC's advance during the 1958-1962 period was frenetic and exhilarating, but not self-assured. Like a cyclist, careering down a slope at an unsustainable speed, the Commission was excited by the speed of progress, but acutely conscious of how little it would take to bring the whole descent to a painful and decisive stop. Remarkable achievements were certainly attainable, but so was total disaster. As a result, the Commission of the early 1960s could at one and the same time, genuinely believe that the EEC was on the fast-track to imminent federation, and fear that France or one of the other member states might leave the Community, thereby bringing the whole EEC experiment to a premature and abrupt end.⁴⁴ By the end of the decade, however, the uncomfortable experience of crisis, whether in 1963 in the wake of de Gaulle's first veto, or in 1965-6 during the empty chair crisis, had tempered Commission hopes but had also demonstrated that the early EEC was more resilient than it had initially feared. The Community of 1967 did not look likely rapidly to evolve into an out and out federation; but nor was it probable that complete collapse and dissolution lay just around the corner. The prospect of enlargement could therefore be looked at with much more equanimity towards the end of the decade than at the start. What in 1961 was seen as a potential shock which might cause the precariously balanced bicycle to topple over altogether, was greeted six years later, as a welcome jolt to a routine process which had neither the excitement nor the risk of the earlier advance.⁴⁵

43. Marjolin's memoirs (op.cit., pp.302-353) contrast 'Les années d'avance' until 1963 with 'Les années de crise' thereafter.

44. For an example of Commission optimism see Hallstein's speech to the European Parliament, 17.10.1962; for an equally clear instance of pessimism see Mansholt's speech to Louvain University, 22.01.1963. Both in ECHA, speeches collection.

45. For a more detailed explanation of this phenomenon and how its effects stretched beyond the Commission to the Community as a whole, see N.P. LUDLOW, *The Eclipse of the Extremes: Demythologising the Luxembourg Compromise*, in: W. LOTH, *Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963-9*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2001, pp.260-264.

These differing attitudes fed through into contrasting behaviour during the negotiations themselves. In 1961-3 the defining feature of most of the Commission's activities was extreme circumspection vis-à-vis the applicants and great rigidity in the way in which the Treaty and the acquis were interpreted. This was notable throughout the negotiations with the British, particularly in the way in which the Commission stance on many of the substantive issues was highly defensive and often close to that of France; during the key debates about Commonwealth trade for instance, the Commission was every bit as reluctant to allow major exceptions to the Community's external tariff regime as was France.⁴⁶ To permit too many exceptions so early in the life of the Common External Tariff (CET) and the CAP, was potentially to cast doubt over the viability of both policies. But Commission sensitivity about the possible dangers of enlargement and consequent defensiveness was still more marked when discussions shifted from the possible entry of the UK to that of Britain's fellow applicants. For in the case of the Danish, Norwegian and Irish applications for membership, not to mention the association requests tabled by the Swedes, Swiss and Austrians, there was a clear belief in the Commission that so many new members and partners would harm the Community rather than strengthen it. This led in July 1962 to a Commission decision to explore the possibility of persuading the applicants other than Britain to settle for associate rather than full membership.⁴⁷ Similarly, in October of the same year, Hallstein spoke to the European Parliament about the need for an enlargement 'doctrine' – an innocent enough sounding concept, but one which in the context of early European integration, could only be translated as meaning that the Community should establish the criteria which would allow it to pick and choose amongst those states seeking to enter.⁴⁸ Had it been able to impose its vision, therefore, it seems very likely that the 1962 European Commission would have sought to postpone the approach of all but the British, so as to lessen the shock of enlargement to the still fragile EEC system.

By 1967, however, all had changed. The Commission *avis* of that year specifically rejected the French claim that the Community institutions would not be able to cope with ten or more member states.⁴⁹ On the contrary, the Commission appeared to have believed that institutions and policies which had weathered the internal Community storms of the previous four years were resilient enough to survive in even a substantially enlarged EEC. There was therefore no repetition of the attempt to differentiate between applicants, either in the abortive talks about talks of that year, or in the actual negotiations from 1970 onwards. And while the

46. See for instance the Commission's contribution to the drafting of the Six's opening statement in November 1961. CMA 07.151 Préparation par le Conseil de la réunion ministérielle entre les Etats membres et le Royaume Uni, ainsi que la déclaration commune des six. S/05701/61, Commission draft, 04.11.1961.

47. See ECHA, COM(62) PV 194, 2^e partie, 18-19.07.1962.

48. *Le Monde*, 19.10.1962.

49. ECHA. COM(67)750, 'Opinion on the Applications for Membership received from the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and Norway', 29.09.1967.

Commission was, as noted above, keen to protect the status quo on certain issues, notably that of CAP finance, its whole attitude denoted a greater willingness to embrace change and evolution than had been the case a decade earlier.

Ironically, however, the need for Commission leadership (and defensiveness) during the technical negotiations had also declined because the applicants were now much better at formulating their requests in a manner compatible with the Treaty of Rome. In 1961-3 the British case especially, while firmly argued, displayed a great deal of ignorance about how the Community and its policies actually worked.⁵⁰ This had at least two important results. First, it meant that all of the Six were immediately forced onto the defensive, a position where the Commission, as guardian of the EEC status quo, was bound to thrive. Secondly, it tended to mean that when substantive talks between the British and the Six did take place, they did so more often than not, on the basis of a Community rather than British text. This last was normally elaborated by the European Commission. A case in point would be the vital 'comparable outlets' debates of the summer of 1962 where the British were crucially forced to concede in July that their own proposals were fundamentally unacceptable and that the way ahead lay on the basis of the modified Commission text which lay at the heart of the Six's stance.⁵¹ By 1970, however, the EEC found itself negotiating with British and other EFTA negotiators who had spend almost a decade seeking to enter the EEC, and had in the process learnt a great deal about the manner in which it functioned. Their starting proposals were therefore that much better targeted, and their subsequent concessions, well calculated to win agreement from the Six without forcing them to table an alternative text. This meant that the Commission – still the most likely source of Community counter-proposals should these have proved necessary – was less often able to define the basic wordings around which agreement was sought. Instead, the majority of agreements reached were done so on the basis of the applicants' texts.⁵² The Commission role was correspondingly reduced.

The final change was also perhaps a slightly negative one from a Commission point of view, in that it centred on the declining prominence of individual commissioners in the context of the 1970-2 negotiations. Nine years earlier, Hallstein, Marjolin and Mansholt had been key figures in the negotiations, well able to play a crucial role both in the discussions with the British and still more during the vital internal deliberations of the Six. So great indeed was the task of maintaining the fragile unity amongst the existing members states, that the Commission's contributions during the closed-door debates of the Six was absolutely essential in allowing the negotiations to progress as far as they did. Paul-Henri Spaak for instance chose the aftermath of the most intensive of all the ministerial meetings, to praise the Commission for its 'souple autorité' which he believed had done much to preserve the Community intact.⁵³ In 1970-2 by contrast

50. This point was made by the British negotiators themselves in their postmortem to the negotiations, PRO, FO371/171442, M1091/542G, 26.02.1963.

51. CMA, RU/M/45/62 (part 1), Annex II, Statement by the Lord Privy Seal.

52. See C. O'NEILL, *op.cit.*, pp.309-310.

it would appear that few of the commissioners were able to play a comparable role. Jean-Francois Deniau, the commissioner entrusted with the direct responsibility for the enlargement process did make a valuable contribution. But even he would appear from the British assessment of the talks to have had a lower profile than his predecessors in 1961-3, and none of his colleagues made much of an impact at all.⁵⁴ This may of course have simply been a reflection of the fact that the Six were more united and less in need of Commission mediation than had been the case during the first enlargement talks. And it may also have been accentuated by the diminished need for Commission textual suggestions noted above. But also responsible was the way in which the early 1970s Commission lacked individuals of the calibre of the earlier Hallstein body: with Mansholt now seriously ill, Franco Malfatti, the new president, lacking either the authority or the knowledge of his predecessors, and Barre too isolated in his scepticism about enlargement to match the impact which Marjolin, his direct predecessor had had. It was perhaps fortunate that Commission leadership and mediation was less necessary than it had been in 1961-3, since it is possible that had the need arisen, the Commission's ability to provide what was asked of it would have been less impressive than before.

Enlargement while a near constant issue for the Commission to deal with during its first fifteen years of existence, can therefore be seen as measure of how much the Commission had changed over that period, rather than how similar its position remained. Most marked of all was the evolution of its basic attitude, from mainly hostile with only its tactical awareness of how counterproductive overt opposition could be tempering its negativism, to almost wholly favourable. This in turn marked the evolution from an ambitious but apprehensive institution, hopeful of attaining success very rapidly, but haunted by the constant fear of failure, to a more mature and balanced body, conscious of both the inherent strengths of, and the short to medium term constraints upon, the Community within which it functioned. Also important were the changes in the calibre of the Commission's leading figures and a lessening need for the Commission to play the central role in the enlargement talks, largely because of the way in which the applicants had become accustomed to the workings of the Community and were better able to tailor their membership bids to fit with the methods and habits of the EEC. Even in 1970-2, however, despite its somewhat lower profile role, the Commission did more than enough to confirm that lesson which the first set of enlargement talks had demonstrated, namely that any discussion which revolved around the *acquis communautaire* and the precise rules and regulations of the European Community, would be one in the process of which, a great deal of importance would be attached to the opinions, tactics and performance of the European Commission. If debate about enlargement had become a fixture in the life of the Commission, a salient role for the Commission had become an inescapable part of every discussion or negotiation about the widening of the EEC

53. *Le Monde*, 07.08.1962.

54. C. O'NEILL, *op.cit.*, pp.306-307.

The Hesitant European

History of Denmark's Accession to the European Communities 1970-73

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Denmark's accession to the European Communities (EC) on 1 January 1973 is one of the central events in 20th century Danish history.¹ The decision to join the EC represented a second and decisive step, NATO-membership constituting the first, away from the long established tradition of neutrality and relative isolation that had dominated Danish foreign policy from 1864 to 1945. At the same time, EC-membership divided Danish society between those who considered it as a necessary adaptation to commercial and political realities of post-war Europe and those who opposed it as an unwanted infringement on national sovereignty. As this ambivalence has been characteristic of Danish EC-membership, this article will not only analyse the historical dynamics that brought Denmark into the EC, but also delineate the roots of EC-opposition. The hope is to provide a better understanding of the European policy of a country that has often been described – along with Britain – as the odd man out of European integration.

The Danish Model, Nordic Sentiment and Danish Identity

In order to understand the complexity of Danish attitudes towards Europe by the early 1970s, a historical perspective is required. While the Kingdom of Denmark has a recorded history of more than a thousand years, the modern Danish nation-State evolved in a series of dramatic foreign political events during the 19th century. With the loss first of Norway in 1814 and later of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein in 1864, Denmark was reduced to a small State with an ethnically homogenous population, if the remote and sparsely populated North Atlantic areas of Greenland, the Faeroe Islands and Iceland were excluded. In particular, the defeat to Prussia in 1864 and the emergence of the German Empire shortly after left a deep mark on Danish foreign policy and Danish identity. Acutely aware of the great power south of the border, the period from 1864 to 1945 became one of national survival. The strategy adopted by the Danish State, which became a

1. This article is based on research done in the course of writing a doctoral thesis on Denmark's accession to the European Community which was defended at the European University Institute in June 2004. The author has, at some points, to omit detailed references to avoid going beyond the argument of this article. These details can be found in the thesis, titled *Joining the European Communities – Denmark's Road to EC-membership, 1961-1973*. It is slated for publication in autumn 2005 by Aarhus University Press. I would like to thank Fernando Guirao and Thorsten Borring Olesen for commenting on earlier drafts of this article.

democracy in 1848, had implications for foreign policy as well as for domestic politics.

In foreign policy terms, Denmark chose neutrality, combined with a symbolic defence of sovereignty to avoid provoking Germany. This policy option reflected both the fact that Germany constituted the main threat to Danish independence, and the need to assure Germany of friendly official Danish intentions, in contrast to Danish public opinion which was rampantly anti-German. To Peter Munch, the social liberal Foreign minister of the social democratic-social liberal governments governing from 1929-40, any participation in a war either against Germany or on the German side would lead to the destruction of the Danish State and nation. It was consequently paramount that Denmark did not become part of a general European war, even if the cost was partial or complete occupation by Germany. This policy made Danish governments extremely cautious in dealings with Germany, in particular in 1920, when the Danish-German border was revised to incorporate the Danish speaking part of Schleswig as part of the wide European peace treaty and after 1933 when the Nazi regime made Germany a much more unpredictable player. To balance this extremely pragmatic adaptation to Germany, the social democratic-social liberal governments supported, in co-operation with Sweden and Norway, the League of Nations in an effort to develop, in the long run, peaceful arbitration based on international law to regulate international politics.

While the defence of Denmark could not be of a military nature, a line of defence was developed after 1864. By giving Danish democracy and civil society an inner cohesion, it was hoped that the Danish State and nation could survive even occupation by Germany. The inter-war years, and in particular the critical 1930s, showed the strength of this approach. In contrast to most European societies, Denmark managed to weather the economic crisis, while preserving a strong democracy. A green-red compromise between the social democratic-social liberal government and the agrarian liberals in 1934 carried through socially responsible crisis legislation and laid the early foundation of what would become the welfare state. A well-functioning parliamentary system, combined with an early corporatist model of co-operation between the State and the representatives of the labour movement, industry and agriculture, made Danish society practically immune to fascism and communism. This did not imply that the Danish polity or society were devoid of political and socio-economic conflict; it only implied that social conflicts were channelled, to a very large extent, within commonly agreed institutions. The result was what often is termed the Danish model, that is, a democratic system with a tradition for broad compromises in parliament, a comprehensive democratic dialogue between societal interests and a distinct flavour of social solidarity.²

2. J. LAURSEN, *A Kingdom Divided: Denmark*, in: W. KAISER (ed.), *European Union Enlargement – A Comparative History*, Routledge, London and New York, 2004, pp.32 f. and B. LIDEGAARD, *Overleveren, Dansk udenrigspolitisk historie*, Bind 4, Danmarks Nationalleksikon, Copenhagen, 2003, pp.633 ff.

It was also during the 1930s, and in particular, under the German occupation of 1940-45, that pan-Nordism became a potent political force in Denmark. With similar political developments of the Nordic countries during the 1930s, intellectuals and the population alike began to share a notion of a particular and socially responsible Nordic democracy as separate from what was perceived as the democratic and social failures of continental nation-States. Nordism was only strengthened by the experience of the German occupation, and the horrors of the German war crimes, that rendered any notion of neutrality adapted to German interests politically untenable after 1945. Nordic co-operation, with countries perceived to share the same social and democratic values, was instead considered the natural alignment of a more active Danish foreign policy in the post-war period. This was combined with a strong Danish international commitment to the United Nations founded in 1945.³

The post-war period would display a clear continuity with central societal values and foreign policy notions established during the battle for national survival from 1864 to 1945. The continued development of the Danish model of democracy and social solidarity and the strong support to Nordic co-operation became central features of Denmark's post war experience. The welfare state would become the central element of the Danish model. The particular shape of the welfare state, universalistic benefits and tax-financed, would greatly strengthen the perception that the Danish model differed from Continental Europe.⁴ The wish to further Nordic co-operation would also lead to concrete results in the post war period. The Nordic Council was founded in 1952 and close co-operation was established in numerous low policy fields such as transportation, social, environmental, and cultural policies. Regardless of the striking lack of success for Nordic co-operation in security policy and commercial liberalisation, the Nordic alternative, as it was termed, continued to play an important role in Danish European policy until 1973.⁵

However, perhaps the most important heritage of the pre-1945 period was the way it had shaped Danish identity and perceptions of Denmark's place in Europe. The Danish model was considered unique; co-operation with the Nordic countries

3. J. LAURSEN and T.-B. OLESEN, *A Nordic Alternative to Europe? The Interdependence of Denmark's Nordic and European Policies*, in: H. BRANNER and M. KELSTRUP (eds.), *Denmark's Policy Towards Europe After 1945 – History, Theory and Options*, Syddansk Universitetsforlag, Odense, 2000, pp.224ff.

4. K. PETERSEN, *Legitimität und Krise. Die Politische Geschichte des dänischen Wohlfahrtsstaates 1945-1973*, Berlin Verlag, Baden-Baden, 2000 and V. SØRENSEN, *Den skandinaviske model og Europa - dilemmaer i dansk arbejderbevægelses holdning til europæisk integration 1950-1980*, *Årbog for Arbejderbevægelsens Historie*, 1991, pp.13-48. Sørensen's article reflects the perception that the establishment of the Danish welfare state pushed Denmark even further away from continental Europe.

5. F. WENDT, *Co-operation in the Nordic Countries, Achievements and Obstacles*, Almquist & Wiksell, Stockholm, 1981 and J. LAURSEN and T.-B. OLESEN, *A Nordic Alternative to Europe* ..., op.cit., are the best analyses of respectively the development of Nordic cooperation during this period and of the role of Norden in Danish politics. For a succinct discussion of Nordic co-operation as alternative to participation in European integration see B. STRÅTH, *The Illusory Alternative to Europe*, in: *Co-operation and Conflict*, 15(1980), pp.103-114.

was regarded as the only way to strengthen the model, while continental Europe was considered to be undemocratic, conservative and posing a real danger to Danish values. The fear of Germany lay just beneath the surface. Unsurprisingly, these perceptions left little room for popular support of the European idea and consequently the European movement had no impact in Denmark after 1945. These views dominated the centre-left, because the Social Democratic and Social Liberal parties had held governmental responsibility during the central years from 1929 to 1939. The two large rightwing parties, the Agrarian Liberal and the Conservative, felt themselves less attached to both Nordic co-operation and the Danish model.

At the same time, the new challenges posed by international politics after 1945 would also necessitate several breaches with the pre-1945 heritage. The first serious step towards redefining Danish foreign policy was the decision in 1949 to join NATO. The inability of the United Nations and later the failure of Nordic co-operation to offer a safe haven for Danish security concerns, offered no other alternative to Danish decision-makers than to join the Western alliance.⁶ For the social liberals and many left wing social democrats to enter into alliance with the great powers of the Western world, in particular the continental powers, was considered a breach with Nordic solidarity and Denmark's international commitment to the United Nations. The agrarian liberals, conservatives along with the large majority of social democrats considered NATO the only viable solution to Danish security problem, and appreciated the participation of the United States and Britain that would help balance the mistrusted continental powers. Despite the split over Danish NATO-membership between the four main parties, the abandonment of neutrality was an important step towards a more internationally engaged Danish foreign policy. The rapprochement of Denmark to the process of European integration would serve to consolidate this.

The Political Economy of Danish European Policy

Denmark's 1961 application for EC-membership should be surprising given the strong support to Nordic co-operation in Denmark after World War II and the existing political mistrust against continental European countries. What provoked this rapid reorientation of Danish European policy was the dynamic development of Western European trade and payments from the late 1940s onwards. After the war, Denmark faced the fundamental challenge to create the economic foundations for full employment, increased wealth and the establishment of a comprehensive welfare state. Danish wealth had since the late 19th century been built on an extensive foreign trade in agricultural products, in particular to Britain and Germany, while the industrial sector produced mainly for a protected home market.

6. T.-B. OLESEN, *Brødrefolk, men ikke våbenbrødre – diskussionerne om er skandinavisk forsvarsforbund 1948-49*, in: *Den Jyske Historiker*, 69-70(1994), pp.151-178.

In the post-war world, agricultural exports by themselves were unable to secure high economic growth; for that industrial modernisation was necessary. Denmark's active participation in the expansion of European trade and payments proved an invaluable tool to reach this objective. By the early 1970s, the necessary industrial revolution had been completed and industrial exports now constituted more than 70 per cent of total Danish exports.

The strong expansion of Danish industrial production and export was connected to the dynamic expansion of Western European industrial trade after 1950. Germany played a pivotal role in this development, because it was the high demand of the German market that drove expansion of industrial trade forward.⁷ Denmark was a case in point. The Danish industrial sector gradually adapted and industrial exports to Germany grew rapidly during the 1950s. Despite this relative success, the liberalisation programme of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), by removing quantitative quotas only, discriminated against countries with low tariffs and this imposed serious costs for example on the Danish textile industry. In the 1960s, the pattern of exports changed as a result of the Western European market split and Denmark's participation in the European Free Trade Area (EFTA). Industrial exports to Germany now grew by a significantly lower rate, but instead rapidly expanding exports to the increasingly liberalised, and traditionally strong, markets of Sweden and Norway ensured that the high growth rate of industrial exports of the 1950s continued. Despite the advantages of participating in EFTA, the Western European market split imposed important opportunity costs on industrial export to the EC.⁸

The development of Danish agriculture differed dramatically from the history of success of the industrial sector. After 1945, Western European agricultural trade suffered from the increasingly protectionist policies of the traditional food importing countries as they gradually moved towards self-sufficiency by the means of comprehensive schemes of state subsidy. The OEEC did little to alleviate this problem.⁹ To Danish agriculture, the decline in prices received and of quantities sold at Western European markets, combined with the rise of domestic production costs, cast the entire sector into a grave economic crisis. The market split was another serious blow because it placed Denmark's two largest markets for agricultural products, Britain and Germany, in opposite organisations. Due to EFTA-membership, Danish farmers felt the full impact of the Common

7. A.-S. MILWARD, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, Routledge, London, 1992, pp.119 ff. This argument was first launched in Milward's brilliant study of the development of Western European trade in the 1950s.

8. H.-C. JOHANSEN, *The Danish Economy in the Twentieth Century*, St. Martins Press, New York, 1987, pp.104-109, 114-120, 124-132 and 138-145 and *Udvalget vedrørende Danmarks forhold til De europæiske Fællesskaber*, in: *Danmark og De europæiske Fællesskaber*, Bind 1, Copenhagen, 1968, pp.79 ff.

9. R.-T. GRIFFITHS and B. GIRVIN, *The Origins of the Common Agricultural Policy*, in R.-T. GRIFFITHS and B. GIRVIN (eds.), *The Green Pool and the Origins of the Common Agricultural Policy*, Lothian Press, Bloomsbury, 1995, pp. xxvi ff. and A.S. MILWARD, *The European Rescue* ..., op.cit., pp.224 ff.

Agricultural Policy (CAP) when it was established during the 1960s, to a large extent at the expense of external agricultural exporters. Traditional Danish exports of eggs and poultry were extinguished by the mid 1960s, while other important export staples like cheese or live cattle were seriously hurt in the latter half of the 1960s. What saved Danish agriculture through this period of trepidation was the establishment of a comprehensive scheme of state subsidies from 1961 onwards, that by 1970 constituted as much as a third of total farm income. Even so, many farmers had built up very large encumbrances by the early 1970s and were extremely vulnerable if no improvement in their situation would take place.¹⁰

The overall result was very high annual economic growth, in particular in the period from 1958 to 1972. This enabled Denmark not only to secure rising standards of living but also constituted a precondition for the establishment of a comprehensive and generous welfare state. While the Danish experience can thus be characterised as a success, it was perhaps less so than in the case of most Western European countries. The pre-1973 commercial organisation of Western Europe was deeply problematic to Denmark. The absent liberalisation of agricultural trade in the OEEC and EFTA seriously hurt the Danish economy by limiting agricultural exports and imposing the need to finance state subsidies. The result was continuous balance-of-payment problems during the 1950s and 1960s. Adding to this the fact that the Danish economy during the golden sixties tilted out of balance due to an uncontrolled expansion of public expenditure (the welfare state) and of private consumption, the need to solve Denmark's commercial predicament by the early 1970s was greater than ever.¹¹ Only a broad Western European commercial solution that liberalised both industrial and agricultural trade offered a solution to Denmark's economic problems of the early 1970s.

Towards Danish EC-Membership

The development of Denmark's political economy analysed above had a clear reflection on Danish post-1945 European policy. Although Denmark, as a result of deep political reluctance towards continental Europe, was oriented towards the Nordic countries and Britain, the increased commercial importance of Germany, in particular, gradually pulled Denmark towards the continent. Denmark supported the British free-trade area proposal from 1956, but along with many countries

10. H.-C. JOHANSEN, *The Danish Economy ...*, op.cit., pp.109-114 and 132-138 and *Danmark og De europæiske Fællesskaber*, op.cit., pp.185 ff.

11. H. CHRISTOFFERSEN, *Dansk Velfærdspolitik efter 1945*, Ny Nordisk Forlag – Arnold Busck, Copenhagen, 1984 and R. MIKKELSEN, *Dansk pengehistorie 4 - 1960-1990*, Danmarks Nationalbank, Copenhagen, 1993. The two titles mentioned offer the most in-depth analysis of these complex processes of economic and societal change. The report by the Economic Council published in 1971 discussed the structural problems of the Danish economy with admirably clarity. Det Økonomiske Råd, Formandskabet, *Markedsperspektiver og strukturproblemer*, Copenhagen, 1971.

demanding for the inclusion of agricultural trade. With the failure of the British proposal and the foundation of EFTA in 1959, Denmark reluctantly chose EFTA-membership as the lesser of two evils.¹² However, considering the strong Danish commercial interest in a broad commercial framework encompassing as many Western European countries as possible, it was not surprising that Denmark became a restless member of EFTA.

Given the chance, provided by the 1961 British application for EC-membership, to join an enlarged Community, which should liberalise both industrial and agricultural trade and receive more than 60% of total Danish exports, the social democratic led government decided that Denmark should also apply for membership. The strong commercial and economic case for joining meant that the 5/6-majority in parliament necessary to surrender sovereignty according to § 20 of the Danish 1953 Constitution was within reach.¹³ The four old parties were in favour of Danish EC-membership, while the Socialist People's Party that had been formed by a group of ex-communists a few years before was opposed. However, important minorities in the trade union movement, i.e., the Social Democratic Party and the Social Liberal Party opposed Danish accession based on views rooted in the traditional centre-left perception of Denmark and Europe according to which EC-membership threatened the Danish model of democracy and welfare and Denmark's independence from Germany. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that Denmark would have joined the EC in the beginning of the 1960s, if Britain had been allowed in. Although, the Danish membership negotiations had not been concluded, none of the outstanding problems were serious enough to cause a breakdown.¹⁴ Likewise, the government had managed to silence opposition in the trade union movement and the Social Democratic Party by the summer of 1962. The French veto on British accession in January 1963 completely changed the situation.

Without British EC-membership, the economic case for Danish accession was less clear-cut. As a consequence, the economically motivated support of Danish EC-membership in the trade union movement, among social democrats and social liberals disappeared, as the instinctive political reluctance towards an EC without Britain got the upper hand. Confronted with this domestic development even Prime

12. J. LAURSEN, *Mellem fællesmarkedet og frihandelszonen. Dansk markedspolitik 1956-1958*, in: B.-N. THOMSEN (ed.), *The Odd Man Out? Danmark og den europæiske integration 1948-1992*, Syddansk Universitetsforlag, Odense, 1993, and J. LAURSEN and M. MALMBORG, *The Creation of EFTA*, in: T.-B. OLESEN (ed.), *Interdependence Versus Integration – Denmark, Scandinavia and Western Europe*, Syddansk Universitetsforlag, Odense, 1995.
13. Paragraph 2 of § 20 stipulates that statutory law delegating sovereign authority to supranational bodies requires a 5/6-majority in parliament for passage. Failing that, but obtaining an ordinary majority and having government maintain the law, it must be admitted to the electorate for approval by referendum according to the requirements of § 42 of the Constitution.
14. G.-P. NIELSON, *Denmark and European Integration: A Small Country at the Crossroads*, Ph.D., University of California, Los Angeles, 1966, pp.561 ff. and J. LAURSEN, *Next in Line. Denmark and the EEC Challenge*, in: S. WARD and GRIFFITHS (eds.), *Courting the Common Market: The First Attempt to Enlarge the European Community, 1961-63*, Lothian Foundation Press, London, 1996.

minister, Jens Otto Krag, who probably would have preferred Danish EC-membership, had to accept the political reality.¹⁵

In the period from 1963 to 1970, Denmark now had to wait for the Community to accept British EC-membership. The configuration of domestic politics excluded that any government could find the necessary parliamentary support for an application of EC-membership without Britain. And the second effort by Britain to join the EC in 1967 was quickly rebuffed by France.¹⁶ On the European scene, Danish governments had to fight hard to protect Danish commercial interests, in particular with regard to agriculture that was threatened by the European market split. Bilateral contacts with the Commission, France or Germany proved futile, and only the common Nordic position in the Kennedy round managed to extract a number of very limited concessions in agriculture from the EC in 1967 – improvements that to some extent were actively undermined in the following years.¹⁷

EFTA did little to alleviate the problems of Danish agriculture despite Danish efforts in this direction. That Denmark's market shares of agricultural trade in EFTA declined during the latter half of the 1960s as a result of the dumping of cheap surplus production both from EC-member states and EFTA countries show the degree to which Danish vital interests were ignored.¹⁸ The lack of progress resulted in yet another Nordic initiative in January 1968 by the Danish centre-right government – constituted by the social liberals, the agrarian liberals and the conservatives – to establish a Nordic Union. Negotiations progressed slowly, but eventually the so-called NORDEK-treaty was signed in February 1970. By that time, however, Charles de Gaulle's resignation changed the prospects for enlargement of the EC. Eventually, as a result of the high priority Denmark and Norway granted to EC-membership, Finland chose not to ratify the treaty.¹⁹ Now, the road to Danish membership negotiations with the EC was cleared.

Danish European policy from 1945-1970 was shaped partly by the political reluctance towards cooperating too closely with continental Europe that particularly dominated the centre-left and partly by Denmark's interest in finding a broad Western European commercial organisation that included and liberalised both industrial and agricultural trade. With the decision by Britain to join the EC in 1961, the ideal commercial solution was finally within reach. The strong commercial and economic incentive for Danish EC-membership as part of a broad enlargement, created the necessary 5/6-majority backing in the Danish parliament

15. B. LIDEGAARD, *Jens Otto Krag II*, Gyldendal, Copenhagen, 2002, p.82.

16. For an analysis of Denmark's role in the 1967 discussions on enlargement see J. LAURSEN, *Denmark, Scandinavia and the Second Attempt to Enlarge the EEC 1966-67*, in: W. LOTH (ed.), *Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963-1969*, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, 2001.

17. B.F. JACOBSEN, *Danmark og GATT 1963-1967 – En analyse af Danmarks politiske strategier i forbindelse med Kennedy Rundens landbrugsforhandlinger*, unpublished master thesis, Department of History, University of Aarhus, 2003.

18. V. CURZON, *The Essentials of Economic Integration – Lessons of the EFTA Experience*, Macmillan, London, 1974, pp.180 ff.

19. T.-B. OLESEN and P. VILLAUME, *I blokopdelingens tegn, Dansk udenrigspolitisk historie*, Bind 5, Danmarks Nationalleksikon, Copenhagen, 2005.

despite the strong scepticism by the centre-left with regard to the consequences of Danish EC-membership to the future of the Danish model and Nordic co-operation. With the failure of the first enlargement negotiations, Denmark had to wait seven long years before enlargement was again a realistic possibility. This was a period of commercial difficulties, during which the decision-makers learned how hard it was to defend Danish commercial interest outside the EC. This was an important lesson that to Danish decision-makers made anything but full Danish EC-membership as part of a broad enlargement unimaginable.

Possible success in the new membership negotiations with the EC would depend on two factors. On the one hand, it was important to secure the economic benefits expected from Danish EC-membership as early as possible after enlargement. On the other hand, the costs in terms of sovereignty should be limited in particular with regard to the Danish model and Nordic co-operation. Only if both these dimensions of the negotiations had been negotiated successfully, should the support of the majority of the centre-left, essential if Denmark should join the EC, be expected.

Denmark's Membership Negotiations, 1970-1972

With the summit of The Hague in December 1969, the EC finally swung the door open for possible applicants to begin membership negotiations.²⁰ To join the EC, the applicants were obliged to accept the entire *acquis communautaire*, including the new policies planned at the summit, i.e. Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the European Political Co-operation (EPC). The enlargement negotiations would consequently focus on how the applicants should adapt to the *acquis*, possibly by means of transitional arrangements.²¹

The new political commitment to enlargement demonstrated by the EC was received with enthusiasm in Copenhagen. A coalition of the four old parties supported the initiation of Danish membership negotiations. Negotiations were to focus on three main problems. The first one concerned the transitional arrangements expected to be the result of the negotiations. It was important to accrue the economic benefits expected to derive from full EC-membership already in the transition period. This had been thoroughly documented by the foreign ministry reports published on Denmark and the EC since 1967. In total EC-membership was expected to improve the Danish balance-of-payments by 1,250 million kroner. Considering that Denmark ran a balance-of-payments deficit of 4,077 million kroner in 1970, 3,169 million kroner in 1971 and 465 million

20. N.P. Ludlow, *Chronicle of an Enlargement Foretold? – Pompidou, the Hague Summit and the lifting of the French veto*, unpublished paper presented at the Breakthrough workshop, November 2002. On the summit of Hague, see also the *Journal of European Integration History*, 2(2003).

21. C. O'NEILL, *Britain's Entry into the European Community – Report by Sir Con O'Neill on the Negotiations of 1970-1972*, Frank Cass, London, 2000.

kroner in 1972, this was a substantial improvement. The second problem was how to adapt the Danish model and Nordic co-operation to the requirements of EC-membership. If Danish accession undermined the Danish model or Nordic co-operation, the necessary 5/6-majority in parliament to secure Danish EC-membership would be in danger. The establishment of the EPC in early autumn 1970 constituted the third problem. Danish NATO-membership continued to split the four old parties, with a minority of left wing social democrats and the social liberals, in principle at least, opposed. With the social liberals obliged, as a result of the participation in the centre-right government, to accept the security policy of the pro-NATO majority in parliament, Denmark had prolonged membership in 1969. The consensus on Danish NATO-membership rested, however, on the Atlantic orientation of Danish security policy. If the EPC developed into an ambitious forum for defence and security policy dominated by the continental great powers and undermining NATO, this might seriously split the consensus on Danish EC-membership.²²

Securing the economic benefits of EC-membership

In Danish accession negotiations, securing the economic benefits deriving from Danish EC-membership during a possible transitional period, the shape and length of the transitional arrangements for agriculture and the contribution to the Community budget were of central importance. Danish industry and fishery were both expected to benefit from EC-membership; however, advantages were more diffuse and in the longer run than was the case with regard to agriculture.

In the field of agriculture, the four candidates differed greatly in their wishes with regard to the length and nature of the transitional arrangement. Denmark and Ireland wanted a swift transition to the Community's common agricultural policy (CAP), while Britain preferred a gradual introduction of CAP mechanisms. Norway with its uncompetitive agricultural sector due to the climatic conditions played no role in the negotiations and instead requested for (and received) a special deal with the EC. Among the Six, France and the Netherlands were the main opponents of the British demands, while the remaining countries were ready to make concessions to ensure British accession. This disagreement made it difficult to define a common Community negotiating position. The Danish centre-right government chose to work closely with the French government to influence the Community position. In coordination with the French government, the Danish government presented in October 1970 a complete proposal with regard to the transitional period and submitted in mid February 1971 its view concerning the timing of the introduction of the Community preference.²³ The British government

22. Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFAA) 108.DAN.A.1: The Market Secretariat, "Memorandum. Denmark's Negotiations with the European Communities." and "Statement by Mr. P. Poul Nyboe Andersen".

also made an effort to influence the internal deliberation of the Community and presented its own proposal in December 1970 – one that would seriously reduce Danish economic benefits from the CAP during the transitional period.²⁴

Only in late February 1971, after several Commission interventions and very difficult negotiations, was a common Community position defined on two key questions, i.e., the shape and length of the transitional period and the timing of the introduction of Community preference. The French-led coalition that included Ireland, and at times, the Netherlands was successful and the Community position was very similar to the original Danish position. On this basis, a compromise with the British government was found in May 1971: Britain accepted the introduction of the CAP and Community preference from the very first day of enlargement, although, a gradual price alignment from the producer prices of the new member states to CAP prices would take place in six steps during the following five years.²⁵

Now only one important question remained to be solved. It concerned whether Danish farmers exporting to the British market would be able to receive FEOGA-financed export restitutions to pay the difference between the low British market prices and the higher Danish prices. The Danish Mission in Brussels had since the spring of 1970 repeatedly made this case and claimed that it rested firmly on Community principles.²⁶ Finally, in June 1971, the Council pushed by France decided to accept the Danish request. It probably helped that the French government had a keen interest in upholding all principles in order to avoid possible British obstructionism during the transitional period. This secured important financial benefits to Danish farmers during the transition.²⁷

While the Danish government had tried actively to influence, successfully at times, the agricultural negotiations, the negotiations on Community finance placed Denmark on the sideline. Instead, the transitional arrangement in this field was negotiated solely between the EC and Britain. After great difficulties, a solution

23. MFAA.108.L.1.a.38: Telegram from the Danish embassy in Paris to the ministry of Foreign affairs, amtel 285a+b, 1 September 1970, "Franske overvejelser vedrørende landbrugsproblemerne under EEC's udvidelsesforhandlinger", and MFAA.108.L.1.a.38.: Telegram from the Danish embassy in Paris to the ministry of Foreign affairs, amtel no.47 a+b, 12 February 1971.

24. MFAA.108.Dan.C.1: The Market Secretariat, "Notits. Stigning i slagsværdien for dansk landbrug ved alternative udformninger af overgangsperioden".

25. U. KITZINGER, *Diplomacy and Persuasion – How Britain Joined the Common Market*, Thames and Hudson, London, 1973, pp.77 ff.; S.-Z. YOUNG, *Terms of Entry – Britain's Negotiations with the European Community, 1970-1972*, Heineman, London, 1973, pp.58-103; M. RASMUSSEN, *How Denmark made Britain Pay the Bills*, in: J. SEVALDSEN, C. BJØRN and B. BJØRKE (eds.), *Britain and Denmark: Political, Economic and Cultural Relations in the 19th and 20th centuries*, Museum Tusculanum, Copenhagen, 2003, pp.628 ff. and C. O'NEILL, *Britain's Entry into the European Community* ..., op.cit., pp.91 ff.

26. For example, MFAA.108.DAN.A.1: Telegram from the mission to the ministry of Foreign affairs, mistel 157, "CE's udvidelse og landbrugsproblemerne", 20 May, 1970.

27. MFAA.108.DAN.A.4: Telegrams from the Danish embassy in Paris to the ministry of Foreign affairs, amtel 151, 14 May 1971, "Fransk vurdering af EC-udvidelsesforhandlingerne. Samtale med Brunets stedfortræder, de Nanteuil om EC-udvidelsesforhandlingerne", and amtel 179, "Frankrigs syn på EC-forhandlingssituationen inden ministermøderne den 7. juni", 3 June 1971.

was found in May-June 1971 that secured an eight-year transitional period with a substantial rebate to all the four applicants.²⁸ The Danish government had accepted that Britain would run the negotiations on finance in consideration of the central importance this issue had to British membership negotiations, but Denmark claimed equal treatment to Britain. At the most critical moment of the British negotiations on the so-called “system of own resources”, in December 1970, the Commission began secretly to consider giving the three smaller applicants less generous transitional arrangements. Picking up rumours about these talks from the secretary-general of the Commission, Emile Noël, the head of the Danish mission in Brussels, Finn Gundelach, protested in the strongest terms.²⁹ This was followed by the minister of Economic and European market affairs, Poul Nyboe Andersen, explaining that it would be most unfair if Denmark had to accept an unnecessary transitional arrangement on agriculture but be discriminated against with regard to the transitional arrangement of the “system of own resources”.³⁰ Eventually, the EC abandoned the idea of differential treatment, and the Danish government could finally, in mid July 1971, accept the compromise achieved between Britain and the EC.³¹ This secured a substantial rebate on the Danish contribution to the Community budget during the transitional period.

The Danish negotiations on the transitional arrangement for industrial products were unproblematic. After having made good use of EFTA as training ground, Danish industry was ready to compete in the Common Market. The negotiations concluded in a five-year liberalisation of tariffs and the adoption of the Common External Tariff, the acceptance of the Common Commercial Policy and after lengthy negotiations of a limited number of import quotas. Denmark also had great interests at stake in the successful free trade negotiations between Sweden and the EC. Sweden constituted a major export market for Danish industry, and as a consequence, a possible rolling back of the liberalisation achieved in EFTA would seriously damage Danish commercial interests. The impact on public opinion would be even more damaging with possible repercussions on the fragile 5/

28. S.-Z.YOUNG, *Terms of Entry ...*, op.cit., pp. 48-57 and U. KITZINGER, *Diplomacy and Persuasion ...*, op.cit., pp.136-138.

29. MFAA.108.DAN.A.8: Letter from the mission in Brussels to the ministry of Foreign affairs, no.68, “Udvidelsesforhandlingerne. Indsendelse af mødereferaterne for Irland, Norge og UK”, 10 January 1972 and MFAA.108.DAN.N: Telegram from the mission in Brussels to the ministry of Foreign affairs, mistel 381, “Overgangsbestemmelser for ikraftsættelsen af CE’s finansreglement - danske problem”, 1 December 1970.

30. MFAA.108.DAN.A.3: “Negotiations with Denmark, Statement by the Danish delegation, Brussels, DK/18/70 (confidential), Statement concerning Transitional measures made by M. P. Poul Nyboe Andersen, at the 2nd ministerial meeting between the European Community and Denmark”.

31. MFAA.108.DAN.A.10: “Conference between the European Communities and the States which have applied for membership of these communities, Negotiations with Denmark, Brussels, DK/34/71, 5^{ème} session ministérielle (Bruxelles - 12 juillet 1971). Projet de relèvement des conclusions”, 18 October 1971.

6-majority in parliament.³² However, eventually the Swedish government concluded a satisfactory free-trade agreement with the EC in July 1972.³³

The Danish negotiations on fishery were seriously influenced by the great difficulties Norway, Britain and Ireland had in accepting the abandonment of the 12-mile-zone of exclusive national fishery implied in the Common Fishery Policy (CFP). The Danish negotiating position was complex as it tried to bridge the very different importance of fishery in the North Atlantic area of Greenland and the Faeroe islands with respect to the Southern part of the country. Denmark supported the CFP but with an exceptional treatment of the North Atlantic area with regard to the 12-mile-zone.³⁴ Furthermore, the Danish governments had a genuine interest in the success of the Norwegian membership negotiations, and thus supported the idea of including the Northern part of Norway in the exceptional scheme. When the EC decided to break up the CFP and introduce a ten-year transitional period for the enlarged Community before renegotiating a common policy, Denmark accepted this result although it meant lesser opportunities for Denmark's Southern fishermen. Securing both the interests of the Faeroe islands and Greenland, and Norwegian EC-membership were considered of paramount importance to the Danish national interest.³⁵ Unsurprisingly the Danish fishery association was kept at arm's length by the two governments involved in negotiating EC-membership.³⁶

All in all, Danish membership negotiations were successful in securing the economic benefits of EC-membership almost from the first day of EC-membership. The transitional arrangement of agriculture would reduce benefits during the first years of membership, but the large rebate on Danish contributions to the Community budget during the transitional period would almost make up for the loss. The negotiations on transitional arrangements of the Common Market and the CFP were satisfactory, although Denmark with regard to the latter found it difficult to influence the enlargement negotiations.

32. Hilmar Baunsgaard's Archive (HBA), 42.Ministtermødereferater 1970-1971: "Ministtermøde tirsdag den 2. juni 1970 kl. 10.00 i statsministeriet".

33. L. MILES, *Sweden and European Integration*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 1997, pp.90 ff.; U. BERNITZ, *The EEC-EFTA Free Trade Agreements with Special Reference to the Position of Sweden and the Other Scandinavian EFTA Countries*, in: *Common Market Law Review*, 23(1986), p.567; C.E. STÅLVANT, *The Swedish Negotiations with the EEC*, in: *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 2(1973), pp.236-245 and V. CURZON, *The Essentials of Economic Integration* ..., op.cit., pp.226 ff.

34. MFAA.108.DAN.A.3: Notes from the Danish delegation: "EC's fælles fiskeripolitik"; "Grønlands forhold til EC" and "Færøernes forhold til EC".

35. Social Democratic Party Archive (SDPA), Ministtermødeprotokoller 1971-1972.1066: "Notat. Statsministeriet. Vedrørende det 16. ministtermøde den 17. januar 1972".

36. MFAA.108.DAN.N: Letter from the association of Danish fishery to minister Nyboe Andersen, "Vedr. syddansk og færøsk fiskeri ved Grønlands indtræden i fællesmarkedet", 8 March 1971. See also MFAA.5.D.103.b.2: "Notits. Erhvervsformandsmødet torsdag den 11. november 1971 kl. 9.00". Author's interview with the Danish chief negotiator at the officials' level, Jens Christensen, August 2003.

Negotiating the adaptation of the Danish model and Nordic co-operation

There is no doubt that the negotiations that secured Denmark the economic benefits from EC-membership during the transitional period were of central importance. However, negotiations on how to adapt the Danish model and Nordic co-operation to the consequences of Community membership were politically of equal importance to the overall success of enlargement negotiations.

The main component of the Danish model was the universalistic, tax-financed welfare state. Given the fact that the EC had done little to flesh out the relatively modest articles on social policy in the treaty of Rome into concrete legislation, Danish welfare legislation would largely be left untouched by Denmark's accession. EC-membership only posed two serious problems. Firstly, the Community legislation on equal pay to both sexes (article 119 of the EEC treaty) could in theory undermine the free Danish labour market negotiations. However, when the ministry of Justice assured that this would only be the case if the parties of the labour market did not voluntarily agree on equal pay, neither the representatives of industry nor of labour found it necessary to raise the problem in the negotiations. Given the later importance of Community law in the field of equal pay, this is somewhat ironical. Despite Danish legislation from 1973 and 1976 aimed at fulfilling the requirements of EC-membership, while maintaining the right of the two sides of industry to negotiate without interference, the European Court of Justice concluded in a seminal judgement from 1985 that Denmark had not adequately adopted Community law in this field. Eventually, the question of equal pay was thus Europeanised and the principle of free labour market negotiations broken.³⁷

Secondly, Danish social pensions, among these old age pensions, had to be adapted to the *acquis communautaire*. The solution found in the late spring of 1971 was to introduce a fundamental reform of Danish legislation that solved the problems of adaptation, albeit at the cost of diminishing the social rights of Danish citizens living abroad part of their life.³⁸ This went against the declared policy of the centre-right government, but given the very limited number of persons affected, it was accepted without any public outcry.³⁹ What was well hidden from the public

37. MFAA.108.DAN.P/1.2: Letter from the Danish association of employers to the ministry of Justice, "Rapport om betydningen for ligestilling i Danmark mellem mænd og kvinder af en dansk indtræden i De europæiske Fællesskaber", 8 September 1971; and ministry of Justice: "Journal nr. L.A. 1970-0131-33. I skrivelse af 8. september 1971 har Dansk arbejdsgiverforening anmodet arbejdsgruppen om en redegørelse for de overvejelser, der har ført arbejdsgruppen frem til den konklusion, at der er mulighed for, at dansk opfyldelse af Rom-traktatens art. 119 til sin tid må ske ved lovgivning". I thank L.-H. Rasmussen, who carries out a doctoral thesis, provisionally entitled "*Statsmagten i forandring. Dansk suverænitet og europæisk integration*", at University of Aarhus, Denmark, for this information.

38. MFAA.108.DAN.P: Note by the ministry of Social affairs: "Fredag den 12. marts 1971 afholdtes møde i EC-kommissionen i Bruxelles med henblik på afklaring af kommissionens stilling til forskellige muligheder for udformning af de ændringer i lovgivningen om sociale pensioner der bliver en følge af en dansk tilslutning til EC".

39. Folketingstidende, Forhandlinger i folketingsåret 1970-1971, p.1048.

was the degree of internal conflict the adaptation of social pensions spurred in the Danish administration and the centre-right government in late 1970 and early 1971.⁴⁰ There was a good reason for that, as any serious public doubt about the future of the social pension system would have jeopardized Danish accession.

If the adaptation of Danish welfare legislation to the *acquis communautaire* happened without serious problems, the Community plans to establish an EMU struck right at the very heart of the Danish model. With the publishing of the Werner report in October 1971, ambitious plans for the shape and nature of the EMU became the centre of public debate. While the centre-right government supported it as a first step towards concrete and, what was expected to be modest, decisions, a large section of the Social Democratic Party and the trade union movement found the report extremely disturbing, in particular in the recommendations to end national sovereignty over fiscal and financial policy.⁴¹ This was unacceptable because it would limit the ability of any future social democratic government to conduct a policy of economic redistribution and undermine the fiscal foundations of the Danish welfare state. The Social Democratic Party persuaded the centre-right government to present the social democratic reservations directly to the EC Council of ministers. However, minister Nyboe Andersen did so in a diplomatic and non-confrontational tone in order to avoid a negative reaction from the Council. It was only when assuming governmental power that the social democrats finally, in November 1971, could present the EC Council with a clear Danish reservation to the surrendering of sovereignty in the field of fiscal, economic and social policy. By then the EMU plans lay in ruins, but that did not matter to a social democratic government that needed a well publicised reservation for public consumption.

Another problem that touched a sensitive chord in Danish identity was the possibility offered to EC citizens by Community law to purchase Danish land. During the first enlargement negotiations in 1961-63, opponents to Community membership had claimed that it would lead to a German take over of the North of Schleswig and of Danish recreational areas along the coast. It was the right to establishment to do business that implied a liberalisation of the purchase of land for commercial use. While a national solution could be found to some of the problems posed by this, in particular foreign purchasing of summer cottages, the right to establishment in agriculture had to be solved in direct negotiations with the Community. Denmark requested a five-year transitional period before implementing the (then partly liberalised) right to establishment in agriculture, and this was eventually granted by the EC in late 1971.⁴² However, in early June 1971, the EC Council was about to accept a complete liberalisation of the right to establishment in agriculture. To the centre-right government, the timing could not be worse, as the

40. HBA.41.Ministtermødereferater 1969-1971: "Ministtermøde tirsdag den 12. januar 1971, kl. 10.00 i statsministeriet", see the handwritten summary.

41. Economic Council of the Labour Movement Archive (ECA), 110: "Forretningsudvalgsmøde den 10. november 1970", where several of the most important trade union leaders discussed and criticised the Werner Report.

Danish parliament had just decided to hold a decisive referendum on Danish EC-membership. To block the directive, Denmark threatened the Six with a potential demand for a Danish escape clause to this part of Community law.⁴³ It was only after the Danish government had reached an understanding with the German chancellor, Willy Brandt, that the EC decided to postpone the adoption of the directive. It stayed on the agenda, however, to avoid publicity. The result was thus satisfactory to the two Danish governments.⁴⁴

How to adapt Nordic co-operation to the requirements of Danish EC-membership was another important question. In general Nordic conventions and treaties did not run into conflict with the obligations of EC-membership. The only serious problem was the adaptation of the Nordic labour market, established by convention in 1954, to the Community's labour regulation. On the one hand, it was clear that the Italian government would veto a general escape clause in favour of Norway and Denmark. On the other hand, Sweden and Finland did not welcome the proposed technical solution that - although of little practical consequence - could be interpreted as being in breach with the convention of 1954.⁴⁵ Eventually, the Swedish government was forced to accept that a general escape clause would not be granted to Denmark and Norway, and as a consequence, the technical adaptation was the only possible option.⁴⁶ Although the Nordic disagreement over the Nordic labour market did spark serious public debate and recriminations, in particular between the Swedish and Danish governments, the fact that the Nordic labour market was retained limited the possible damage to public opinion.

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42. MFAA.108.DAN.A.8: "Conférence entre les communautés européennes et les états ayant demandé leur adhésion à ces communautés. Bruxelles, le 4 janvier 1972. DK/58/71. Confidentiel. Négociations avec le Danemark, 11ème session de la conférence des suppléants, 24 novembre 1971. Projet de relèvement des conclusions".
 43. MFAA.108.DAN.A.5: Telegram from the mission in Brussels to the ministry of Foreign affairs, mistel 323, "Bedes givet udelukkende til kontorchef Niels Ersbøll. Til ambassaden i Haag, Rom, Paris, Bruxelles og Bonn", 16 June 1971, and MFAA.108.Dan.C.1: Telegram from the mission in Brussels to the ministry of Foreign affairs, mistel 325, "Etableringsret i landbruget", 16 June 1971.
 44. MFAA.108.DAN.C.2: Telegram from the embassy in Bonn to the ministry of Foreign affairs, amtet no.168, "Etableringsret i landbruget", 1 July 1971 and Telegram from the mission in Brussels to the ministry of Foreign affairs, mistel 381, "Etableringsret i landbruget", 8 July 1971; MFAA.108.DAN.A.8: "Referat. Møde i det tyske finansministerium vedrørende de danske ønsker med hensyn til etableringsret på landbrugsområdet, Færøerne og Grønland, 3-dagesreglen, stålsektoren, den 15. november 1971".
 45. MFAA.108.DAN/E.1-2: Note by the Market Secretariat, "Forholdet mellem det nordiske arbejdsmarked og arbejdskraftens frie bevægelighed i EEC"; "Nordisk Koordinering av EEC-forhandlingerne. Protokoll fra møte i Oslo torsdag den 14. januar 1971 i arbeidsgruppen for arbejdsmarkedspolitik. Fortrolig"; and "Internt. Unntatt offentlighet. Nordisk Koordinering av EF-forhandlingerne. Tillegg referat fra møte i Oslo fredag 3. september 1971 i arbeidsgruppen for arbejdsmarkedspolitik"; MFAA.108.DAN.a/1-2, Norwegian ministry of Labour, "Nordisk koordinering av EF-forhandlingerne. Referat fra møte i Oslo fredag 3. september 1971 i arbeidsgruppen for arbejdsmarkedspolitik".
 46. SDPA, Ministeriet Jens Otto Krag, Ministeriet Anker Jørgensen. 1066: "Referat af 4. ministermøde i statsministeriet mandag den 18. oktober 1971 kl. 9.00".

All in all, the Danish negotiations were successful in finding pragmatic solutions to the legal adaptation problems lying ahead. That the concrete consequences of Danish EC-membership to the welfare state, Nordic co-operation, and land legislation were relatively limited in the early 1970s was, no doubt, an important result of the Danish membership negotiations.

The EPC

The Community decision to establish the EPC was followed closely in Copenhagen. However, the actual organisation proved to be of little ambition, placed outside the Community framework, without a permanent secretariat and with no solution to the internal disagreement between the Six whether defence and security policy were to be included. The actual shape and content of the EPC raised little concern in Denmark. However, the ambiguity with regard to discussions on defence and security policy complicated the Danish acceptance somewhat. To avoid any doubt about the Atlantic orientation of Danish security policy, the centre-right government wanted the EPC to avoid discussion of defence and security policy.⁴⁷ When the German presidency of the Council rejected this condition in November 1970, the centre-right government with the support of the social democratic leadership reformulated Danish policy. Now discussion of defence and security policy in the EPC was acceptable as long as no concrete, binding decisions were taken. This formula successfully sidestepped further conflict with the EC that could spark domestic fears of the EPC.

Perhaps the most troublesome aspect of the EPC, in particular to the social democratic government, was the lofty Community rhetoric that accompanied the project. The ultimate aim of the EPC was for Europe to talk with one voice in foreign policy. The centre-left government did not oppose the objective of the EPC, rather Foreign minister Poul Hartling had repeatedly stated that the government supported the *finalité politique* of the Community as long as Denmark would have her say. This was a pragmatic policy that managed to balance between the different views of the various governments in the EC. However, the social democratic government would not, when assuming office in October 1971, support any future development towards supranationalism in the field of foreign policy. In fact, the social democrats opposed the entire vision of a supranational Europe and stated this clearly to the EC Council in November 1971. This was, as we shall see below, mainly for domestic consumption. For both Danish governments the bottom-line was that the EPC did not threaten the Atlantic orientation of Denmark's foreign policy.⁴⁸

47. MFAA.5.B.43.A.20, Telegram from the ministry of Foreign affairs to the embassy in The Hague, "Europæisk politisk samarbejde", 30 September 1970.

48. MFAA.108.DAN.A.8, Letter from the mission in Brussels to the ministry of Foreign affairs, no.968, "EF/Danmark-udvidelsesforhandlingerne", 22 December 1971. Enclosed is "DK/48/71 af den 17ds. indeholdende konklusionerne fra det 6. ministermøde den 9. november 1971".

Successful Negotiations?

Estimates by the Danish ministry of Foreign affairs had shown that Denmark would earn considerably from EC-membership. One important aspect of the negotiations had been to preserve the economic benefits during the transitional period. The result of negotiations in agriculture and the Community budget were successful in this respect. During the transitional period from 1973 to 1977, Denmark would pay a small price, but the net result from participating in the EC was already in the second year of the transitional period comparable to the situation under full membership.⁴⁹ At the same time, the Danish model was adapted to EC-membership without major problems. In all cases, technical solutions were found that did not fundamentally compromise Danish legislation at least not at the time of entrance and the Danish governments managed to avoid serious public doubts about the results achieved. With regard to the Community's EMU plans that were hotly contested in the Danish public, the widely publicised reservations made by the social democratic government did defuse the issue. It probably helped that the Community plans crumbled during the spring of 1971 under the weight of the international monetary crisis. Finally, Denmark did not have to break fundamentally with its traditional foreign policy orientation to participate in an EPC held on an intergovernmental basis and without being given real decision-making authority.

The Danish negotiating tactic was characterised by a search for practical solutions on a Communitarian basis. Because Danish interests fitted so well inside the Community, this was a strategy that in most instances produced satisfactory results. The strategy was not always sufficient. Thus, it was not enough to secure the wanted result in fishery, when the EC decided to redefine the CFP. It was only with regard to the right to establishment in agriculture that the Danish governments found it necessary to act anti-communitarian and given the strong Community interest in successful enlargement negotiations, Danish demands were accepted. All in all, the membership negotiations were successful. The result would never become a matter of dispute in the domestic decision-making process over Danish accession. What were discussed in the public debate were the wider consequences of Danish EC-membership. Let us therefore briefly outline what would be the general impact of EC-membership on Denmark.

With regard to commercial policy, the consequences of EC-membership could only be considered positive. Denmark would gain access to a wide Western European market for industrial and agricultural products guarded by a strong body of legislation enforced by the European Court of Justice. This would provide an almost ideal framework for the Danish economy in particular compared with the situation before 1973. The Common Commercial Policy would Europeanise a hitherto national policy, the costs of giving up independence would, however, for a small state like Denmark, be compensated by its capacity to influence the policies of one of the largest economic entities internationally. In

49. J.Ø. MØLLER, *Member States and the Community Budget*, Samfundsvideenskabeligt forlag, Copenhagen, 1982, p.372.

the field of traditional foreign policy, the consequences of Danish EC-membership were not dramatic in the short term since the EPC would not threaten the Atlantic orientation of Danish security policy. However, in the long term participation in the EC might entail a fundamental revolution of Danish foreign policy. The future development of a supranational European polity might fundamentally change Denmark's relations with other member states and eventually the very nature of Western European nation-states. For a small State, the advantages of belonging to a well-protected environment would be the option to conduct a much more independent and active foreign policy.

The main cost of EC-membership was the surrendering of sovereignty over a number of hitherto domestic policies. The acceptance of the *acquis* and the principles on which European legislation was built implied an Europeanization of domestic policy areas that earlier had been under the sole authority of the Danish parliament, but would now fall partly or entirely under the jurisdiction of European institutions. With the widening of the competences of the EC implied in the process of integration, it was obvious that Denmark had given up full control over the future development of the Danish model. In this sense, Denmark's accession to the EC was a revolutionary step. However, the concrete effects of this revolution were limited in the short term. Although the Danish system of social pensions had to be changed to fulfil the requirements of EC-membership, the Danish welfare state model did not have to change. As a matter of fact, Denmark after 30 years of Community membership continues to hold a universalistic and tax-financed welfare state. The same accounted for Nordic co-operation that was maintained after accession to the EC. With the short-term effects of EC-membership on the Danish model relatively limited, the dilemma of Denmark's community membership was watered down by the evidence that in order to preserve the Danish welfare state and economic growth, full control over the Danish model had to be sacrificed. Out in this way, Danish EC-membership was easier to swallow for the EC-sceptical circles in the centre-left.

The Battle of the Centre-left over Danish EC-membership

With membership negotiations concluded, the final decision to join remained to be taken. Despite the deep and widespread scepticism towards Danish EC-membership felt by the centre-left, the party leaderships not only of the Conservative and the Agrarian Liberal Parties, but also of the Social Democratic and the Social Liberal Parties, supported Danish accession. For the members of this political elite, which shared previous governmental experience, there existed no alternative to Danish EC-membership. Denmark had to join for economic reasons to improve the balance-of-payments, save the agricultural sector and secure the financial foundation of the welfare state. The leadership of all four parties also appreciated the political dimension of Danish EC-membership. Although only few supported the idea of a future United States of Europe, none were particularly scared

by the perspective. However, despite the strong priority given to secure Danish EC-membership, the social democratic and social liberal leaderships had what they probably considered an even more important task, namely, to avoid a permanent split of the two parties in two fractions with opposed views on Europe. Given the fact that the Social Democratic Party was by far the largest party in parliament, and that it had direct links with the trade union movement that was also deeply divided over Danish membership, the way the social democratic leadership tackled internal EC-scepticism was decisive in the political battle over Danish accession.

There were several reasons why the social democratic leadership had to handle the European question with utmost care. There existed a widespread EC-scepticism in all circles of the party even among supporters of Danish EC-membership. To promote Danish EC-membership too strongly would not only provoke a deeper split, but could also increase the number of opponents. Furthermore, a split over the European question before the next general election, convened for the autumn of 1971, could be disastrous. Not only would the Socialist People's Party that opposed Danish EC-membership gain in votes, but a third electoral defeat in a row would also hinder a much needed generational change of the parliamentary group at a time when the 1968-movement had created increased competition on the political left.⁵⁰ In this perspective the need to secure a 5/6 majority in parliament in favour of Danish EC-membership was a luxury the social democratic leadership could not afford to take into account. Anyhow, a strategy that avoided a serious split in the party would probably offer the best chances to eventually secure the necessary majority.

The numerous sceptics about Danish EC-membership in the Social Democratic Party shared - with the other EC-opponents - a number of views that were rooted in the traditional understanding of Denmark's troubled relationship with continental Europe. They feared that EC-membership would endanger the Danish model of democracy and social solidarity, terminate Nordic co-operation and put an end to an independent Danish foreign policy and consolidate Danish NATO-membership which a minority in the party already opposed. To find as broad a consensus as possible, the party leadership decided to adopt a conditional support to Danish EC-membership that met most of the reservations expressed above. Firstly, Britain had to become member of the EC. Secondly, a satisfactory solution should be found to the commercial relationships between the Nordic countries and the EC. Thirdly, the EPC should not obtain a decision-making capacity in the field of defence and security policy. Finally, the founding of EMU should not lead to a further surrendering of Danish sovereignty in the fields of economic, fiscal or social policy. The task to outline the European policy of the party was given to one of the leading EC-sceptics, Ivar Nørgaard, who believed that Denmark should join the EC for the economic benefits but, once membership had been secured, it should block any future move towards political integration. Nørgaard represented an intermediate position between the EC-opposition and ardent EC-supporters such as Jens Otto Krag.⁵¹

50. N. PETERSEN, *Folket og udenrigspolitikken - med særlig henblik på Danmarks forhold til EF*, Gyldendal, Copenhagen, 1975, p.83 and B. LIDEGAARD, *Krag II*, op.cit., pp.428 and 514 ff.

The Social Liberal Party also accommodated its own internal EC-opposition. Although a significant majority backed the party leadership's support to Danish EC-membership, it was decided to abandon any pretension of party discipline to avoid a split in the party.⁵² However, at the same time, the party's chairman, Prime minister Hilmar Baunsgaard, and the party leadership had other obligations. The centre-right government conducted the Danish negotiations from June 1970 onwards and it was essential that the government agreed on a common policy that would ensure the successful conclusion of these negotiations. During the spring of 1970, the centre-right government outlined two central requirements for Danish EC-membership. Britain had to become a member of the EC and the Nordic countries should receive satisfactory commercial arrangements with the enlarged Community. With regard to the EPC, the Danish government decided on the background of social liberal scepticism, to recommend that defence and security policy were not discussed in that forum. Finally, the government supported the Community plans for EMU, although the Prime minister – to silence the dissenting voices in his own party – pointed out that any future surrendering of sovereignty in this field would require a new 5/6-majority decision in parliament.⁵³

It was not an easy task for the centre-right government to conduct membership negotiations with the EC, while being confronted with the conditional approach of the Social Democratic Party. In general, the government chose not to compromise the Danish membership negotiations in order to appease the social democrats. The most prominent example was the diplomatic presentation by Nyboe Andersen of the social democratic reservation on EMU to the Council. Only at one very important occasion could the government not agree to reject social democratic demands. This happened in early May 1971 when the social democrats decided to recommend a binding referendum and thus circumvent the 5/6-majority requirement of § 20 of the constitution. The constitutional basis of such a referendum was somewhat innovative; Krag had received informal assistance from the Foreign ministry and its judicial expert, Professor in law Max Sørensen. The latter claimed that § 20 could be replaced by a binding referendum by the means of an unorthodox combination of § 19, §20 and § 42.⁵⁴ The social democratic leadership feared that the European question,

51. M. RASMUSSEN, *Ivar Nørgaards mareridt – Socialdemokratiet og den Økonomiske og Monetære Union 1970-1972*, in: *Den Jyske Historiker*, 93(2001), pp.73-95, for a detailed analysis.

52. Naming a leading EC-opponent, such as Poul Overgaard Nielsen, as chairman of the internal Market Committee was one example of this strategy; Social Liberal Party Archive (SLPA), Det Markedspolitiske Udvalg.323: "Det Radikale Venstre. Markedspolitisk udvalg. 2. november 1970. Referat af møde".

53. HBA.40.1. Ministermødereferater 1969-1971, "Ministermøde tirsdag den 2. juni 1970 kl. 10 i statsministeriet". Handwritten and *Avisårbogen 1970 – årets begivenheder hjemme og ude i få ord*, G.E.C. Gads Forlag, Copenhagen, 1971, p.179.

54. Professor in law Henning Koch has recently argued that Max Sørensen's interpretation and thus the referendum of 1972 was indeed unconstitutional. However, as a result of later referenda held on the same legal basis, the judicial practise (retssædvane) has achieved constitutional status. H KOCH, *Grundlovsstridige EU-folkeafstemninger*, in: H. KOCH (ed.), *Politik og jura – Festskrift til Ole Espersen*, Forlaget Thomson A/S, Copenhagen, 2004, pp.497-524.

despite the conditional support of Danish EC-membership, would lead to a defeat at the next election. However, if the electorate did not have to worry about the European views of the candidates running for parliament, it was hoped that the EC-scepticism of the social democratic electorate would not necessarily lead to an electoral defeat. Baunsgaard supported the initiative, despite criticism from his coalition partners, and as a consequence, parliament passed a motion on 18 May, stating that a binding referendum would now decide Danish EC-membership.⁵⁵

The election held on 21 September 1971 resulted in a narrow defeat of the centre-right government, and on 11 October, Jens Otto Krag presented his new social democratic minority government. The internal compromise in the party over Danish European policy was maintained, the naming of Ivar Nørgaard as new minister for the European market and Nordic affairs consolidated it. The same did the election result that greatly increased the number of EC-opponents in the social democratic parliamentary group. However, the end of the enlargement negotiations was close and to be able to sign the accession treaty, the new government had to actively promote Danish membership. The result was a double strategy launched by the government in the following months.

On the one hand, the conditional approach to Danish EC-membership was re-emphasised in mid November 1971, when Nørgaard, in unambiguous language, explained to the EC Council that Denmark would not surrender sovereignty in the field of social, fiscal and economic policy in the context of a future EMU nor support the introduction of supranational institutions in the EPC. On the other hand, prominent ministers like Krag and Nørgaard began openly to speak in favour of Danish EC-membership. It was emphasised how important EC-membership was to the Danish economy: if Denmark stayed outside, the economic consequences would be catastrophic.⁵⁶ The strategy proved immediately successful when in mid December 1971 the leading organs in the party supported the decision of the government to sign the accession treaty.⁵⁷ When parliament also backed the decision on 16 December, Prime minister Krag could finally sign the accession treaty in Brussels on 22 January 1972. Shortly thereafter Krag announced that the Danish referendum would take place on 2 October 1972.⁵⁸

The government's next action to secure Danish accession was addressed to convince the labour movement to back Danish membership. If this happened it would

55. SDPA, Forhandlingsprotokollerne for hovedbestyrelsen og forretningsudvalget.941.1: "Referat af forretningsudvalgsmødet den 3 maj 1971, kl. 13.00 på Chr.Borg"; HBA.38.Ministtermødereferater 1969-1971: "Ministtermøde tirsdag den 4. maj 1971 kl. 10.00 i statsministeriet." and HBA.41.2.Ministtermødereferater 1969-1971, "Ministtermøde tirsdag 4. maj 1971 10.00" and Folketingstidende, Forhandlinger i folketingsåret 1970-1971, pp.6628 ff.

56. L.-R. JENSEN, *Socialdemokratiets markedspolitik 1970-1972 med særligt henblik på de indre brydninger i partiet*, unpublished masterthesis, Department of History, University of Aarhus, 1982, pp.49 ff.

57. *Avisårbogen 1971 – årets begivenheder hjemme og ude i få ord*, G.E.C. Gads Forlag, Copenhagen, 1972, pp.193 f. and J.-O. KRAG, *Dagbog 1971-1972*, Gyldendal, Copenhagen, 1973, pp.97 f.

58. J. CHRISTENSEN, *Danmark, Norden og EF 1963-1972*, in: B.-N. THOMSEN (ed.), *The Odd Man ...*, op.cit., pp.146 f. and J.-O. KRAG, *Dagbog ...*, op.cit., pp.128 f.

be significantly easier to convince the EC-sceptical social democratic electorate to vote in favour of Danish EC-membership. The leadership of the National Organisation of the Federated Trade Unions had continuously been in favour of EC-membership. However, with two of the largest trade unions (i.e., the Danish Labourers Union and the National Union of Smiths and Machinists) opposed to Danish accession, it was not an easy task to secure an ultimate endorsement by the annual conference, to take place in May 1972. With the outspoken support of Danish EC-membership by the leader of the National Organisation, Thomas Nielsen, a narrow majority was secured; 524 delegates voted in favour while 406 rejected Danish accession.⁵⁹ In the meantime, a campaign was launched within the Social Democratic Party from February onwards. Members of the party leadership and of the parliamentary group visited local party branches to convince them of the virtues of EC-membership. Also, EC-opponents in the party, by now organised in their own committee, requested permission to use the party secretariat to distribute their information material, but Krag would not offer this service. It was an unequal fight and at the extraordinary party conference in August 1972, 272 of the delegates voted in favour of Danish EC-membership while only 95 rejected it. There is little doubt that with the labour movement endorsing Danish EC-membership, an important step had been taken towards securing a successful referendum.⁶⁰

With the social democratic government fighting an internal battle to secure the backing of the labour movement, the centre-right parties were careful not to intervene and create unnecessary difficulties for the government. Neither the agrarian liberals nor the conservatives experienced any serious internal opposition to Danish EC-membership, while the Social Liberal Party decided at the annual conference in May 1972 that it would not recommend any particular solution, but that its members of parliament and other party members would vote according to their own belief. On the left, the Socialist People's Party tried to make good use of the European question to make inroads into the social democratic electorate and into the trade union movement, but with limited success. The decisive parliamentary debate on Danish EC-membership took place on 4-8 September 1972. Eventually, a large majority in parliament, although less than a 5/6-majority, supported Danish EC-membership - 141 voted in favour, while 34 voted against – despite the fact that numerous social democrats and social liberals voted against. With this clear recommendation by parliament, only the last month of referendum campaigning remained.⁶¹

59. J. ENGBERG, *I minefeltet. Træk af Arbejderbevægelsens historie siden 1936*, Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd, Viborg, 1986, pp.110 ff. and L.-R. JENSEN, *Socialdemokratiets markedspolitik ...*, op.cit., p.80.

60. L.-R. JENSEN, *Socialdemokratiets markedspolitik ...*, op.cit., pp.64 ff.; K. HJORTNÆS, *20 år efter - et spil om magt*, Fremad A/S, Copenhagen, 1992, pp.27 ff. and B. LIDEGAARD, *Krag II*, op.cit., pp.605 ff.

61. Two members of parliament did not vote and two members were absent. Folketingstidende, Forhandlinger i folketingsåret 1971-1972, pp.7699 f.

The Referendum

The campaigning in favour or against Danish EC-membership had already begun during the spring of 1972 in what would become the most polarised political campaign in Denmark in the twentieth century. Confronting each other were, on the one hand, the four old political parties and almost all important societal interest organisations, and on the other hand, a national grass roots and non-partisan organisation, the People's Movement Against the EC, in which almost all of the small left wing parties opposed to Danish EC-membership participated, including the communists and the people's socialists.

Facing up to the political forces in support of Danish accession to the EC was not an easy task for the EC-opposition. The first EC-opposition had emerged in the shape of a large number of committees during the first enlargement negotiations from 1961-63, but no national umbrella organisation had been formed. It was only after the parliament decided to hold a referendum in May 1971 that the efforts to unite the EC-opposition into a national grass roots organisation were crowned with success. The People's Movement Against the EC – as the organisation was named – began to work in earnest from early 1972. A national campaign against the EC was launched in several waves during the spring and summer of 1972, but was somewhat hampered both by lack of financial support and inefficient organisation. The arguments used to convince the electorate to vote against Danish accession to the Community focused on the perceived negative political consequences of membership and were rooted in the traditional perceptions of Denmark and Europe analysed in this article. The Community - it was claimed - would develop into a centralised European super state. As a direct result, Danish EC-membership would threaten Denmark's independence, the welfare state and Nordic co-operation. In the last month, the rhetoric became increasingly intimidating and leading politicians were accused of lying about the true consequences of EC-membership. Despite the defeat at the referendum, the EC-opposition had with the People's Movement managed to organise a viable and strong national organisation that was to play a central role in Danish European policy in the coming decades.⁶²

The EC-supporters would also, despite a more generous financial support, find it difficult to organise a coherent campaign. The main reason for this was the lack of unity in the labour movement. The National Organisation did not want to participate actively in the campaign in favour of Danish EC-membership, and as a consequence of this, the Social Democratic Party lacked financial resources.⁶³ Furthermore, the labour movement refused to join a broader campaign with the other EC-supporting parties and societal interests. Only in the very last phase of the campaign, organised and financed by Danish industry, did the social democratic leadership accept to offer concrete advice with regard to what type of propaganda

62. MARTENS, *Danmarks ja, Norges nej*, Munksgaard, Copenhagen, 1979 and S.-H. RASMUSSEN, *Sære alliancer. Politiske bevægelser i efterkrigstidens Danmark*, Syddansk Universitetsforlag, Odense, 1997 provide the fullest account of the People's Movement and campaign against Danish EC-membership.

could be used to convince the sceptical electorate on the centre-left. While in particular the centre-right parties had never hidden, what they considered to be the positive political aspects of Danish EC-membership, the arguments used in the campaign were mainly of an economic nature. This was in particular the case during the last month of campaigning, when influenced by the advice of the social democratic leadership, the economic advantages of Danish EC-membership, as well as the economic consequences of not joining, were repeatedly emphasised. In the last two weeks, the campaign deteriorated into simplistic threats. The highpoint came with posters announcing prices on groceries before and after the devaluation that had been announced by the government in case Denmark did not join the EC. These figures were of course purely fictional.⁶⁴

On 2 October 1972, a record 90.1% of the electorate turned out and voted Denmark into the EC: 63.3% of the voters were in favour and 36.7% against. The relatively clear victory in favour of Danish EC-membership was not easy to predict on the basis of opinion polls issued in the autumn of 1971 and in the spring/summer of 1972 that predicted a much closer race than was ultimately the case. What impact did the two campaigns have on public opinion? According to a contemporary examination of public opinion in April 1972 and October 1972, the campaign in favour of Danish EC-membership managed to move public views about Danish EC-membership on all key issues. Thus, 66% "completely/partly agreed" in October that Denmark would derive great economic advantages from accession to the EC, while only 50% had done so in April. Likewise, 55% "disagreed completely/partly" in October that Denmark would surrender her national independence, while 40% thought so in April. The campaign in favour of Danish EC-membership must have done something right.

This impression is confirmed by another opinion poll that show the degree of Danish scepticism about the political dimension of the EC. More than half of the Danish electorate was opposed to the development of the EC into a United States of Europe with a common European government. This was apparently a decisive concern to part of the electorate rejecting Danish EC-membership since a third considered the surrendering of sovereignty as the most important reason for voting 'no'. The argument that convinced enough of the electorate to vote in favour of the EC-membership referred clearly to the deriving economic benefits.⁶⁵ In this light, the electoral strategy of the social democratic leadership appears to have been correct. To highlight the economic benefits Denmark would gain from membership and de-emphasise its political dimension, apparently managed to convince the electorate to support Danish EC-membership despite their misgivings about the political nature of the EC.

63. Archive of the National Organisation of the Federated Trade Unions (NOA), *forretningsudvalget*, protocols of 21 January and 2 June 1972 and SDPA, *Forhandlingsprotokollerne for hovedbestyrelsen og forretningsudvalget*.941: "Referat af forretningsudvalgsmødet tirsdag den 16. maj 1972, kl. 13.30 på Chr.Borg" and "Referat af forretningsudvalgsmødet den 11. august 1972, kl. 9.30 på Chr.Borg".

64. N. FOSS, *Hvor der handles – Kapitler af mit erhvervsliv*, Gyldendal, Copenhagen, 1990, pp.174 ff.

65. N. PETERSEN, *Folket og udenrigspolitikken ...*, op.cit., pp.74 ff.

What decided Danish accession?

Despite the degree of political strategy that went into the decision-making process that brought Denmark into the EC, it must be concluded that the political elite in favour of Danish EC-membership, including the social democratic leadership, did not flinch in their pursuit of Danish accession. Danish EC-membership was considered so important to the Danish economy and the financing of the welfare state that Danish policy makers found little alternative to accession. However, in the two parties that were split over the issue, tactical considerations decisively shaped the way Danish EC-membership was promoted. The social liberal leadership chose the easy solution by accepting both a majority and a minority view in the party. The social democratic leadership on the contrary went one important step further, and while it accepted a vocal minority of EC-opponents, a final recommendation of Danish EC-membership from both the party and the trade union movement was carried through.

What the two parties of the centre-left had to confront within their own ranks was a heritage of the period from 1864 to 1945, namely the perception that continental Europe would threaten the Danish way of life, the Danish model and Nordic co-operation. The strength of these perceptions, or aspects of Danish identity, meant that the European idea fell on stone ground in Denmark. The large majority of the centre-left was deeply sceptical of the EC, but most found that the economic reasons for joining were of such a magnitude that they nevertheless supported Danish membership. It was around this common denominator the social democratic leadership chose to base the European policy of the party. A conditional approach to Danish EC-membership was the result. Selling Danish EC-membership on economic grounds and de-emphasising the political dimension of the EC convinced both the party and the trade union movement to back Danish EC-membership. The same strategy was used with success in the referendum campaign and it apparently convinced the EC-sceptical Danes that they only accepted membership of an economic organisation. Out of the social democratic strategy also grew the decision to hold a referendum. A decision that had important consequences to the way Denmark entered the EC. The decision to hold a referendum united the EC-opposition into a strong national grass roots organisation. Furthermore, the referendum debate developed into a campaign of intimidation from both sides and this polarised the Danish electorate over EC-membership. The way Denmark entered the EC would cast long shadows on Danish European policy after 1973.

Conclusion

Danish accession to the EC on 1 January 1973 was shaped by two large historical trends. On the one hand, the fight for national survival from 1864-1945 produced a

particular Danish model of democracy and social stability, created an affinity for Nordic co-operation and continued, particularly in the centre-left, to dominate perceptions of Denmark's place in Europe after World War II. On the other hand, the increase in economic interdependence between the Western European countries after 1945 included and benefited the Danish economy. As a result, Denmark achieved in little more than two decades a thorough industrialisation that secured high economic growth and full employment. The establishment of a generous welfare state depended on Denmark's participation in this ongoing process. Despite this success, the commercial organisation of Western European markets, in particular in the field of agriculture, was highly problematic to Denmark and caused serious balance-of-payments problems. Only a broad Western European solution that included a scheme for the liberalisation of agricultural trade would solve Denmark's problems. With the British intention to join the EC from 1961 onwards, this solution was finally on offer in the shape of Danish membership of an enlarged EC.

Although, the economic incentive to join the EC motivated a large majority in the Danish parliament to support Danish EC-membership from 1961 onwards, the traditional perceptions among the centre-left of Denmark's place in Europe meant that the embracement of EC-membership was reluctant. It was feared that the EC would develop into a European super state and that the Danish model of democracy and social stability would vanish in the process. Both the Danish membership negotiations with the EC from 1970-72 and the final decision-making process on membership were dominated by this ambivalence. Danish governments managed in the membership negotiations with the EC to secure the economic benefits from almost the first day of membership and limit the costs of adapting the Danish model and Nordic co-operation to an absolute minimum. Furthermore, the EPC proved of little consequence in the short term and Denmark's Atlantic orientation in security policy was maintained. Nevertheless, there was no way of avoiding that Danish EC-membership, considering the surrender of sovereignty involved, in the long term ended Denmark's full control over the future development of the Danish model and Nordic co-operation. The domestic decision-making process was deeply influenced by the need of the Social Democratic and Social Liberal Parties to accommodate the EC-sceptics within their own ranks to avoid a serious split of the two parties. In particular, the strategic decisions made by the social democratic leadership would shape the way Denmark entered the EC. Danish EC-membership was sold to the labour movement and to the public as an essential economic decision without serious political ramifications. To avoid electoral defeat, the social democratic leadership, supported by the social liberals, also decided that a referendum should decide the issue. While the strategy proved successful in bringing Denmark into the EC without splitting either of the two parties, it had significant long-term consequences.

The decision to hold a referendum was for example the decisive factor that induced the EC-opposition to come together in a viable and strong national grass roots organisation. The People's Movement Against the EC would in the decades to come promote opposition to Danish EC-membership and from 1979 to 1992

occupy at least a fourth of the Danish seats in the European Parliament. The decision to hold a referendum constituted furthermore the first step towards establishing a referendum institution that would cripple Danish European policy in the future. Thus, the Danish electorate rejected both the Maastricht treaty in 1992 and membership of the EMU in 2000, despite the fact that a large majority in parliament favoured both. Finally, Danish EC-membership was sold on economic grounds while the political consequences were claimed to be limited. This centre-left consensus on Danish EC-membership proved impossible to change in the following decades. As a consequence, Danish governments found it difficult to conduct an active European policy and Denmark obtained a reputation for being the foot dragging member state. It was only with the end of the Cold War that Danish politicians on the centre-left began to reconsider their political scepticism towards the EC. While it should not be forgotten that the particular way Danish politicians chose to tackle the deep-rooted EC-scepticism in the Danish society did secure EC-membership, the price paid was high. There was no real discussion about what EC-membership would imply for the Danish state and nation.

At the most fundamental level, it could be argued that Danish accession to the EC was a defining moment in Danish history, because Denmark finally broke with the historical remnants of the battle of national survival from 1864-1945. With Danish EC-membership, full control over the future of the Danish model and Nordic Co-operation were sacrificed. Dogmatic defenders of national sovereignty would interpret this as a betrayal of the Danish nation and regret that the Danish model of democracy and social stability is now influenced by European co-operation. However, such a simplistic interpretation is not tenable. The establishment of the Danish welfare state – the jewel in the crown of the Danish model – had depended on Denmark's participation in Western European commercial co-operation after 1945. Danish EC-membership was in this sense a natural and necessary underpinning of the welfare state. The dilemma that Danish decision-makers had faced was that to secure the main element of the Danish model, ultimate control over the future of that model had to be surrendered. The unfortunate effect of the way Denmark entered the EC was that the Danish public never understood this and therefore never embraced membership of a European Union as a new project of economic and social stability. A project that in terms of security and peace represented an enormous step forward compared to the difficult international conditions under which the Danish state had had to fight for its survival from 1864 to 1945.

Dealing With an Expanding European Community: Australia's Attitude Towards the EC'S 1st Enlargement

Andrea Benvenuti

With the entry of ten new countries from Central, Eastern and Southern Europe on 1 May 2004, the European Union (EU) accomplished the biggest and most ambitious enlargement in its history. Yet the widening of EU membership, while unprecedented on such a large scale, was hardly an unusual challenge for the European Union. Prior to 2004, in fact, the latter had carried out four enlargements, with each of them posing demanding challenges to the EU. This was particularly true of the first enlargement in 1973. Albeit more limited in scope than the one in 2004, the 1973 enlargement was regarded at the time as an ambitious venture given the inclusion of a major power such as Britain. Throughout the 1960s the prospect of British entry into the European Community (EC) had been a source of concern within certain European circles – among which de Gaulle's France figured prominently – because of Britain's potential to disrupt, if not totally undermine, the Community's carefully balanced and painstakingly crafted power arrangements. With its vast, if shrinking, network of close political, military and economic ties with non-European countries, including the Commonwealth nations and the United States, Britain was perceived as a potentially destabilising factor – or a “Trojan horse” in Charles de Gaulle's words – for the recently established European Community.

However, if the inclusion of a major power threatened to upset the Community's internal balance of power, it is also true that EC membership posed a number of problems to Britain itself, as well as to its non-European partners – especially those Commonwealth countries that had retained strong links with London. In the early 1960s, Australia was undoubtedly one of the most influential members of the Commonwealth and Britain's closest ally in the Asian region. Australia was still linked to Britain by a vast array of formal and informal links. These links were not confined to foreign policy, defence or trade, but encompassed a wide range of issues – from constitutional arrangements to social connections.

This article argues that Australian policy-makers regarded Britain's EC membership with deep disquiet as they believed British entry would undermine Britain's close political and economic ties with Australia. Furthermore, they were concerned that British efforts to join the EC would weaken London's willingness to play a politico-military role in Southeast Asia, where Australia's main strategic interests lay, and hasten British departure from the region. Given Australia's reliance on the presence of sizeable British forces in Southeast Asia to maintain regional stability, it was not unnatural that an possible British disengagement was regarded with concern in Canberra. Australian policy – makers feared that this would undermine Australia's “forward defence” policy – whereby defence of Australia was best achieved “in depth”, through forward deployments on the rim of the Asian continent – and leave a military and political vacuum in a highly volatile region.

Thus, in assessing the political, economic and strategic implications of the EU's first enlargement for Australia, this article examines how Canberra perceived the challenge posed by British entry into the EC and how it responded to it. In doing so, the article aims to throw light on a hitherto under-researched aspect of the EU's first enlargement by drawing extensively on newly released archival material from the National Archives of Australia (NAA) in Canberra and the National Archives (TNA) in London. While a number of scholars have looked at the impact of EC enlargement upon Australia and the Commonwealth, they have almost exclusively focused on Britain's first application to the EC in 1961-63.¹ Britain's renewed bid for EC membership in 1967 and the resumption of EC-UK negotiations in 1970-72 have drawn very little interest. So has their impact on Australia and the Commonwealth.² Similarly, scant attention has been devoted to the impact of British entry on Australia's strategic interests in Cold War Asia.³ This is a rather conspicuous oversight since British forces in the Far East, in addition to their role in defending Britain's remaining colonial possessions and supporting Western military objectives in the region, provided Australia with an important security guarantee.

Australia's Policy in Response to Britain's Application to the EC, 1961-63

In 1961 Britain's conservative government, led by Harold Macmillan, took the historical step to apply for EC membership.⁴ The British decision came as a shock to the Liberal-Country Party coalition government of Robert Menzies which had hitherto put faith in repeated British assurances that Commonwealth interests

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1. S. WARD, *Australia and the British Embrace: The Demise of the Imperial Ideal*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 2001; H.G. GELBER, *Australia, Britain and the EEC, 1961 to 1963*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1966. D. GOLDSWORTHY, *Menzies, Macmillan and Europe*, in: *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 2(1997), pp.157-169; J. O'BRIEN, *The British Commonwealth and the European Economic Community, 1960-63: The Australian and Canadian Experiences*, in: *Round Table*, 340(1996), pp.479-491; P. ROBERTSON and J. SINGLETON, *Britain, the Dominions and the EEC, 1961-1963*: in: A. DEIGHTON and A. MILWARD (eds.), *Widening, Deepening and Acceleration: The European Economic Community 1957-1963*, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 1999, pp.107-122.
 2. A. BENVENUTI, *The End of the Affair: Britain's Turn to Europe as a Problem in Anglo-Australian Relations, 1961-72*, DPhil Thesis, University of Oxford, 2003, chap.6; P. ALEXANDER, *From Imperial Power to Regional Powers - Commonwealth Crises and the Second Application*: in: O. DADDOW (ed.), *Harold Wilson and European Integration. Britain's Second Application to Join the EEC*, Frank Cass, London, 2003.
 3. The only work on this topic is A. BENVENUTI, op.cit.
 4. For Macmillan's decision to apply to the EC see W. KAISER, *Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans: Britain and European Integration, 1945-63*, Macmillan, London 1996, chap.5; J. TRATT, *The Macmillan Government and Europe: A Study in the Process of Development*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1996, chaps.4-12; A. MILWARD, *The Rise and Fall of a National Strategy*, Frank Cass, London, 2002, chap.11.

would never be sacrificed in a deal with the Six.⁵ Ardent anglophile Menzies was a prime example of the pro-imperial tradition in Australian political history.⁶ Through the 1950s he had sought to maintain very close relations with the “Mother Country”. Therefore, it was hardly surprising that the Australian response to Britain’s growing interest in EC membership was one of deep concern. In May 1961, Australian minister for Trade John McEwen warned cabinet that, should Britain join the EC without adequate safeguards for Commonwealth exports, the economic consequences for Australian trade could be disastrous. Some £140–150 million, or 55–60% of Australia’s exports to the British market, could be affected according to the nature of the agreement. Australia’s agricultural exports, in particular, stood to suffer considerable damage as a result of the concomitant dismantling of imperial preferences and Britain’s adoption of the Common External Tariff (CET), which would establish a ‘reverse preference’ in favour of European farmers. A further problem was represented by the attempts made by the Six in the early 1960s to set up a common agricultural regime which, depending on the level of protection accorded to European farmers, could lead to the exclusion of Australian farm exports from British and European markets.⁷

While it is undeniable that British entry would force painful readjustments on Australia’s farming sector, it is also true that McEwen tended to over-emphasise the potential damage of entry on the Australian economy as a whole. Australia was less dependent on the British market than New Zealand, which sent Britain 53% of its total exports in 1960.⁸ But with its power-base in the countryside, McEwen’s Country Party had traditionally championed the interests of rural Australia. McEwen and his party were therefore resolved to do whatever it took to ensure that Australian rural concerns be heard both in Canberra and London. As deputy Prime minister and head of the influential department of Trade (DT), McEwen would successfully claim a central role in Australian policy-making on the EC issue. This, in turn, ensured that Canberra would adopt a tough stance on the question of Britain’s entry into the EC.

The political consequences of entry were examined by the department of External affairs (DEA) in a submission to cabinet in late June.⁹ In the view of External affairs, British entry was, on the whole, likely to have a negative impact on Australia. DEA was concerned that, as a result of entry, Britain

5. S. WARD, *Australia and the British Embrace* ..., op.cit., p.69. The term, “the Six”, commonly refers to the six European countries (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany) which established the EEC and Euratom by signing the Treaty of Rome on 25 March 1957.

6. Ibid., p.21; D. GOLDSWORTHY, *Australian External Policy and the End of Britain’s Empire*, in: *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 1(2005), pp.17–18.

7. NAA [National Archives of Australia, Canberra], A1838/283, 727/4/2 part 1, Cabinet Submission 1108, 05.05.1961. On the possible implications of a common agricultural policy for Australian primary produce see P. LUDLOW, *Too Far Away, Too Rich and Too Stable: The EEC and Trade with Australia during the 1960s*, in: *Australian Economic History Review*, 3(2001), pp.283–284.

8. Australia sent Britain only 22% of its total exports. See J. SINGLETON and P. ROBERTSON, *Economic Relations between Britain and Australasia, 1945–1970*, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2002, p.166.

9. NAA, A1838/269, TS899/1/4 part 2, Cabinet Submission 1183, 26.06.1961.

“might lose both the interest in maintaining and the ability to maintain, an effective strategic role in the world beyond Suez, where Australia’s defence interests lie”.¹⁰

Lacking the necessary military capabilities to undertake an independent defence role in Southeast Asia, Australia depended on close defence co-operation with Britain and the United States. Throughout the 1950s, however, Washington had regarded Southeast Asia, and more specifically the Malayan region, as very much a Commonwealth responsibility, and carefully avoided any involvement in the area. As a consequence, Australia’s forward defence policy relied heavily upon retaining a close military partnership with Britain, which maintained a significant military presence in the region centred on well-established bases in Singapore and Malaya.¹¹

While strategic questions were uppermost in their minds, DEA officials also saw that British entry would have wider political ramifications. In their view, these threatened to disturb “the whole complex of relationships, including the Commonwealth, on which Australia’s traditional outlook and politics rest[ed]”. It was evident that

“to the extent that the Commonwealth [drew] its vitality from some common political and economic interests [with Britain] it would be weakened by the United Kingdom’s entry into Europe”.

Furthermore, the DEA was much concerned about the impact that entry would have on the strong ties of “kith and kin” which had traditionally bound the old dominions to Britain. The DEA believed that “the countries which [were] likely to be hardest hit economically if the United Kingdom joins the E.E.C. [were] those which ha[d] traditionally placed most importance on their attachment of sentiment to the United Kingdom”. “How would”, External affairs speculated, “these attachments be affected by a decision which resulted in serious hardship?”¹²

Negotiations between Britain and the Six opened in October 1961. Feeling that “Australia could not regard any of her trade items as expendable”, the Menzies government decided to convey to the British “Australia’s firm attitude” on this point. The Australian view was that Canberra should not accept transitional arrangements as a means of safeguarding its trade interests in the British market. Nor should it accept a final settlement based on vague understandings that the Commonwealth trade problem would be subject to further negotiations, which would leave Australia at “the mercy of the Six”.¹³ Trade officials in Canberra favoured the concept of “comparable outlets”, whereby trade losses deriving from the phasing out of Commonwealth preferences in the British market should be made up by “comparable” gains in an enlarged EC market.¹⁴

10. Ibid.

11. Singapore was Britain’s largest military establishment in the Far East and underpinned the British military presence. In 1957 British forces in the Southeast Asian theatre included 21,000 Army troops, ten Royal Air Force squadrons, together with two cruisers, four destroyers and five frigates that formed the Royal Navy Far East station. See NAA, A1838/269, TS692/2 part 1, Joint Planning Committee Report 34/1957, July 1957.

12. NAA, A1838/269, TS899/1/4 part 2, Cabinet Submission 1183, 26.06.1961.

13. NAA, A3917/1, vol.9, Cabinet Submission 1327, 28.08.1961.

14. Ibid.

It must not be forgotten that Australia's close economic relationship with Britain was based on a system of mutual trade concessions, known as the Ottawa Agreement, which Britain and its dominions negotiated at the Ottawa Imperial Economic Conference in 1932. Under the Ottawa Agreement, Britain and Australia were committed to protect their reciprocal trade interests in their respective economies and to accord each other's exports preferential treatment in their own markets. In 1956 London and Canberra negotiated a new preferential agreement. Its main features were the continuation of preferential trade between the two countries, an across-the-board cut in the margin of preference on British exports to Australia, a reiteration of the 1952 meat agreement committing Britain to purchase all Australian beef, and a non-binding clause whereby Britain endeavoured to buy 750,000 tonnes of Australian wheat each year.¹⁵

Preliminary talks between Australian and British officials in September 1961 however had revealed that, despite London's efforts not to upset the Commonwealth, Australian and British interests could hardly be reconciled. While both British and Australian officials agreed on "comparable outlets" as a guiding principle for the forthcoming Brussels negotiations, differences remained on the extent to which Australian interests could be realistically safeguarded.¹⁶

Britain's negotiations with the Six proceeded slowly. This was not surprising given that Britain's opening bid was burdened with a lengthy list of requests to protect Commonwealth interests.¹⁷ In practice, the British started the negotiations demanding that virtually all Australia's trade with Britain be shielded from the likely impact of the CET and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).¹⁸ However, it soon became clear that the Six were not particularly receptive to these proposals. They were concerned that, by accepting the concept of comparable outlets, they would end up allowing for too many exceptions to the treaty of Rome.¹⁹ Instead, the Six showed a clear preference for transitional rather than permanent arrangements to safeguard Commonwealth interests. In April 1962 the British government began to scale down its demands and to abandon its opening bid.²⁰

Worried that Australian problems were not being sufficiently taken into consideration by the British, McEwen flew to Britain in the spring of 1962, where he strongly criticised the British for not doing enough to protect Australian interests.²¹ A few weeks later, it was Menzies' turn to fly to Britain for talks with

15. S. WARD, *Australia and the British Embrace ...*, op.cit., pp.36-37.

16. NAA, A3917/1, vol.9, Common Market—London Consultations: Note for Ministers, 04.10.1961.

17. A. DEIGHTON and P. LUDLOW, "A Conditional Application": *British Management of the First Attempt to Seek Membership of the EEC, 1961–63*: in: A. DEIGHTON (ed.), *Building Postwar Europe: National Decision-Makers and European Institutions, 1948–63*, Macmillan, London, 1995, p.110. A further reason for the British application's slow progress was the Six's determination to thrash out the fundamentals of the CAP before negotiations with the British could start in earnest. See J. SINGLETON and P. ROBERTSON, *Economic Relations ...*, op.cit., p.175.

18. P. LUDLOW, *Too Far Away ...*, op.cit., p.275.

19. *Ibid.*, pp.94–96.

20. A. DEIGHTON and P. LUDLOW, *A Conditional Application ...*, op.cit., p.110.

21. McEwen quoted in S. WARD, *Australia and the British Embrace ...*, op.cit., p.127.

Macmillan and his ministers. Despite adopting a more conciliatory tone, Menzies reiterated his government's stance that "'solutions' under which Commonwealth preferences and other special trading arrangements [would be] phased out by 1970" were unacceptable to Australia.²²

The two Australian leaders' visits to London were part of a wider diplomatic offensive which also targeted the United States and the capitals of the Six. In March McEwen had gone to Washington to plead the Australian case. His hopes of enlisting American support were quashed as he came to appreciate not only the extent to which the Kennedy administration supported British entry, but also the strength of American opposition to the continuance of the imperial preference system in an enlarged EC.²³ In his talks with the Six, McEwen was again disappointed. Although he found the Europeans sympathetic to the Australian plight, he obtained no assurances from them.²⁴ In this context, it is interesting that no significant attempt was made by Canberra to concert a joint Commonwealth strategy with Canada and New Zealand, the other two most influential Commonwealth countries. Canberra certainly kept in close touch with Ottawa and Wellington, but avoided forming a common front with its two Commonwealth partners. Like them, the Australian government was not only careful not to be seen to be ganging up on the British, but was also determined to keep its hands free in its dealings with the Macmillan government and the Six.²⁵

Despite Australian pressure, it became evident by mid-1962 that Britain would enter the EC on terms that would end the imperial preference system, and establish new reverse preferences in favour of the EC member states.²⁶ In early August 1962, British and European negotiators reached a tentative agreement on a temperate zone foodstuffs package. Britain accepted that Commonwealth preferences would have to be phased out over a transitional period. The Six were willing to

22. NAA, A3917/1, vol.9, Cabinet Decision 275, 25.06.1962.

23. S. WARD, *Australia and the British Embrace* ..., op.cit., pp.123–125; NAA, A1838/275, 727/4/1/4 part 1, McEwen to Menzies, cablegram 83, 15.03.1962.

24. NAA, A3917/1, vol.7, McEwen to Menzies, cablegram 386, 28.03.1962; McEwen to Menzies, cablegram 211, 02.04.1962; McEwen to Menzies, cablegram 1535, 07.04.1962; McEwen to Menzies, cablegram 1536, 07.04.1962. For the EC attitude towards the Australian case see P. LUDLOW, *Too Far Away* ..., op.cit., pp.276–279.

25. For Australia's consultations with Canada and New Zealand on the question of British entry see file NAA, A3917/1, vol.8, United Kingdom negotiations with the European Economic Community, 1961–1963: Country attitudes – Canada, New Zealand and United States. In mid-1962, however, the Australians did try to get Canadian support for a joint diplomatic initiative aimed at urging the United States to support the idea of safeguards for the "Old Dominions" farm exports to the British market. See for instance NAA, A3917/1, vol.8, Westerman to McEwen, cable 389, 07.08.1962; Australian High Commission (henceforth AHC) Ottawa to DEA, cable 265, 20.08.1962; British/EEC negotiations: discussion by Hudspeth with Stoner, 24.08.1962.

26. S. WARD, *Sentiment and Self-interest: The Imperial Ideal in Anglo-Australian Commercial Culture*, in: *Australian Historical Studies*, 116(2001), p.103; see also See J. SINGLETON and P. ROBERTSON, *Economic Relations* ..., op.cit., p.182.

contemplate special arrangements for New Zealand given its high dependence on the British market, but no special arrangements were envisaged for Australia and Canada.²⁷

These disappointing developments notwithstanding, the Australian attitude at the Commonwealth Prime ministers' conference – which had been convened by Macmillan to discuss the progress of the UK-EC negotiations with its Commonwealth partners – was restrained. While critical towards the British, Menzies shied away from voicing his criticism too loudly.²⁸ In the summer of 1962, policy-makers in Canberra had in fact become increasingly concerned about the risks of pushing the Australian case too far. With Canada and New Zealand toning down their criticism towards Britain and with the United States encouraging Australia to facilitate Macmillan's task at the forthcoming conference, Australian ministers did not want Australia to be singled out as the British bid's chief opponent.²⁹ At a time of increasing political turmoil in Southeast Asia, any serious damage to Australia's traditional strategic alliances could be far more serious than the economic harm deriving from British entry into the EC.³⁰

The Commonwealth Prime ministers' conference left the Menzies government in no doubt about Britain's determination to join the EC. It was clear that Britain was prepared to do so on terms which would be highly unsatisfactory for countries like Australia and Canada. Predictably, a sense of resignation set in in Australia. Policy-makers in Canberra believed that the government had done all in its power to press the Australian case and to seek satisfactory safeguards for Australia's threatened exports. Even DT, which, under the leadership of McEwen, had emerged as the fiercest defender of Australian economic interests, seemed to be giving up the game.³¹ After all the sound and fury, Australians were finally resigned to the fact that Britain would join the EC and the Commonwealth interests would be the inevitable casualty.

Events in Europe, however, were to take an unexpected turn. In January 1963 French president de Gaulle shattered Macmillan's hopes of joining the EC by vetoing the British bid. The French veto ensured that no immediate material change arose in the Anglo-Australian relationship and gave Australian producers time to diversify their export markets. Yet Macmillan's unsuccessful bid created a widespread feeling in Australia that relations with Britain had changed for ever and that in order to achieve EC membership, London would allow no Commonwealth

27. NAA, A3917/1, vol.9, British paper, Meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers—September 1962, August 1962. See also P. LUDLOW, *Dealing with Britain: The Six and the First UK Application to the EEC*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p.94.

28. NAA, A3917/1, vol.9, Cabinet Decision 476, 02.10.1962.

29. For American pressure see Kennedy to Menzies, 02.08.1962 quoted in S. WARD, *Australia and the British Embrace ...*, op.cit., p.203. See also P. WINAND, *Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1993, p.293.

30. S. WARD, *A Matter of Preference: the EEC and the Erosion of the Old Commonwealth Relationship*: in: A. MAY (ed.), *Britain, the Commonwealth and Europe: The Commonwealth and Britain's Application to Join the European Communities*, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2001, pp.169–170.

31. See P. ROBERTSON and J. SINGLETON, *Britain, the Dominions ...*, op.cit., p.120.

interest to stand in its way.³² John Crawford, former secretary of the department of Trade, encapsulated the prevailing mood in Australia when he pointed out that

“our psychology has been changed. We will never be the same as we were before we were given a shake-up by Britain’s application”.³³

Britain’s Second Application to the EC and its Withdrawal From East of Suez

British plans for closer engagement with Europe were eventually revived by Harold Wilson’s Labour government in the closing months of 1966. By then, Wilson had concluded that integration with Europe offered better long-term opportunities for British trade despite the new government’s early attempts to revive and strengthen Britain’s economic links with the Commonwealth.³⁴ On 10 November 1966, Wilson informed parliament of his intention to conduct high-level consultations with the EC member states to see whether conditions existed for fruitful negotiations.³⁵ Having completed his tour of the EC capitals in early March 1967, he decided to launch a new bid for membership despite the mixed outcome of his European talks and existing divisions within cabinet.³⁶ On 2 May 1967, he announced his government’s decision to seek EC membership.

Unlike in 1961, the Australian reaction in the run-up to the British decision to apply was muted. The Liberal-Country Party coalition government, now led by Harold Holt who had taken over from Menzies in January 1966, doubted that Britain would be able to join in the light of the persistent French hostility. The overall government view, therefore, was that the best course of action for Australia was to wait and see. Yet there was a general agreement among Australian policy-makers that “the British Government [was] committed to entering the [EC] if at all possible and that it ha[d] made up its mind to try every possible approach”. Canberra knew that, in these circumstances,

“Commonwealth interests and more specifically Australian interests [were] unlikely to be allowed to stand in the way of British entry. Australia [could] expect sympathetic consideration but no more”.³⁷

32. For British-Australian economic relations in the aftermath of the French veto see J. SINGLETON, *After the Veto: Australasian Commercial Policy in the Mid Sixties*, in: *Australian Economic History Review*, 3(2001), pp.287-307.

33. John Crawford quoted in P. ROBERTSON and J. SINGLETON, *Britain, the Dominions ...*, op.cit., p.106.

34. Interestingly, neither the developing members of the Commonwealth nor Australia were keen to see tighter intra-Commonwealth arrangements. See J. SINGLETON and P. ROBERTSON, *Economic Relations ...*, op.cit., pp.196-197.

35. Britain, *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 1966–67, vol.735, cols.1539–1540.

36. See H. PARR, *Harold Wilson, Whitehall and British Policy Towards the European Community, 1964–1967*, PhD Thesis, University of London, 2002, chap.5.

37. NAA, A1838/275, 727/4/2 part 6, Critchley to DEA, savingram 1, 22.12.1966.

Discussions within the British cabinet in the days immediately preceding the decision to apply had in fact given a clear indication of British thinking. For Australia, they were far from reassuring. On 27 April, Commonwealth secretary Herbert Bowden told his colleagues that “we [are] not prepared to sustain the Commonwealth whatever the cost to us might be”.³⁸ As regards Australia, he made it clear that “we should probably be unable to secure any permanent derogations [...] and the outcome would probably be transitional periods for the gradual application of the levy and/or the common external tariff”.³⁹ In 1961–63, as a Commonwealth Office official observed, the British government had been “handicapped by having to negotiate on two fronts, that is, with the Commonwealth as well as the [EC]”. If Britain wished to join the EC, the British government should then

“avoid getting into the same position again. [T]he consultations with the Commonwealth should be conducted on the basis of asking them what they want to tell us, but making no commitments to them about what we shall do about their representations, and keeping our hands free to decide what we say to the Six and at what stage of our negotiations. We should, moreover, not disclose to the Commonwealth in advance what our negotiating position is to be”.⁴⁰

Given Britain’s little concern for Australian trade interests in the forthcoming UK-EC negotiations on enlargement, the Holt government was concerned that British entry would force painful readjustments on certain sectors of the economy. Agriculture was singled out as the most likely sector to suffer, as Britain would have to accept the CET and CAP. However, as Ken Campbell, the EC policy desk officer in the Department of Trade and Industry, conceded privately in January 1966, “British entry into the Common Market would not seriously affect Australian trading interests as before [...]. The situation was not the same as 1963”.⁴¹ The undergoing trade diversification towards non-European markets (see table) and the incipient mineral boom were in fact expected to soften the blow of entry overall.⁴²

38. TNA [National Archives, London], Cabinet Office (henceforth CAB) 128/42, CC(67)23rd meeting, 27.04.1967.

39. TNA, CAB 129/129, C(67)63, 25.04.1967.

40. TNA, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (henceforth FCO) 62/10, Shannon to Snelling, 15.05.1967.

41. NAA, A1838/275, 727/4 part 36, White to Thomson, 28.01.1966.

42. For Australia’s trade diversification see A. BENVENUTI, *The End of the Affair* ..., op.cit., chap.6. For the so-called mineral boom see B. DYSTER and D. MEREDITH, *Australia in the International Economy in the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, p.244.

Australia's main export markets, 1959–72 Source: Australian Bureau of Census and Statistics, Oversea Trade Bulettings, various years						
	1959 – 60	1965 – 66		1971 – 72		
	A\$ (million)	% of total exports	A\$ (million)	% of total exports	A\$ (million)	% of total expor ts
N.Zeala nd	109	5.8	171	6.3	277	5.7
Japan	269	14.3	470	17.3	1,360	27.8
EC	360	19.2	439	16.1	547	11.1
UK	495	26.5	473	17.4	449	9.2
USA	152	8.1	338	12.4	615	12.6

While the likely damage to Australian exports markets in Britain was a concern, there were other important – and certainly more pressing – political and strategic considerations that worried the Australian government with regard to the British attempt to seek EC membership. In February 1966, the head of the Australian Joint Service Staff in London, Air vice-marshal Hartnell, had alerted Canberra to the fact that “there [was] a considerable support” for the policy of “withdrawal from the Far East into Europe” in London.⁴³ In December 1966 Tom Critchley, the Australian senior External affairs officer at the London High Commission, had reported to the DEA that Britain’s entry into the EC was expected

“to reinforce current pressures for Britain to abandon its defence role East of Suez. This could be expected to follow from the growing British sentiment for Europe, from European pressures and by no means least the short-term balance of payments problems that entry into Europe [would] involve”.⁴⁴

On this last point, Critchley warned External affairs that “the prospects for cuts in overseas defence costs will grow as the prospects of Britain joining the [EC] improve[d]”.⁴⁵ Under intense political pressure to rein in defence spending in the light

43. NAA, A1945/37, 287/3/22, Hartnell to Hicks, 25.02.1966. For British force levels in Southeast Asia in 1965 see A. BENVENUTI, *The End of the Affair* ..., op.cit., chap.4.

44. NAA, A1838/275/4/2 part 6, Critchley to DEA, savingram 1, 22.12.1966.

of a precarious economic situation, the Wilson government in fact appeared increasingly inclined to reduce Britain's military presence in Malaysia and Singapore.⁴⁶

Critchley's words accurately summed up the growing sense of unease prevailing in Australian official circles with regard to the strategic implications of Wilson's application to the EC. Australia's worst fears finally came true in mid-April 1967 when the British cabinet decided in principle to withdraw all British forces from East of Suez (with the exception of those stationed in Hong Kong) by the mid-1970s.⁴⁷ In fact, in January 1968 the Wilson government would bring forward the final date of withdrawal to the end of 1971. From the British records it is not possible to establish a clear correlation between Wilson's application to the EC and his East of Suez policy. The documents pertaining to the defence review that took place between December 1966 and April 1967, and that led to the decision to withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore, make virtually no reference to the EC issue. Yet connections between the two issues did exist. In early May 1967, following the decision both to join the EC and to withdraw from East of Suez, chancellor of the Exchequer James Callaghan reminded Australian High commissioner Alexander Downer that the British

"must cut their coat according to their cloth. The price of entry to the E.E.C. for the first few years would be great. It could amount to as much as pounds 300 million or even pounds 400 million [...]. This meant [...] that [the British] must prune severely the defence bill. It was just impossible for Britain to remain in Malaysia [...] The Government, in order to pay the price of entering the Common Market, must economise on defence".⁴⁸

A few days later, British Defence secretary Denis Healey told US secretary of Defense Robert McNamara that "the decision [to withdraw] was being made partly for budgetary reasons, but he [Healey] also acknowledged that it was related to the British desire for association with Europe". Healey also

"indicated that, in the British view, it would be psychologically incompatible with their proposed role in Europe for them to maintain commitments on the mainland of Asia".⁴⁹

Although there was nothing in the Treaty of Rome to suggest that Britain's eventual membership of the EC might be inconsistent with its continuing military role in Southeast Asia, Healey seemed to subscribe to the not so uncommon view in Whitehall that de Gaulle would perhaps look more favourably at the British

45. Ibid.

46. P. PHAM, *The End to "East of Suez": The British Decision to Withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore, 1964 to 1968*, D.Phil Thesis, University of Oxford, 2001, chap.1; M. JONES, *A Decision Delayed: Britain's Withdrawal from South East Asia Reconsidered, 1961-68*, in: *English Historical Review*, 472(2002), pp.569-595; J. SUBRITZKY, *Confronting Sukarno: British, American, Australian and New Zealand Diplomacy in the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation 1961-5*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2000, pp.146-149.

47. P. PHAM, *The End ...*, op.cit., chap.1.

48. NAA, A1209/80, 1966/7335 part 3, Downer to Holt, cablegram 5326, 03.05.1967.

49. NAA, A1209/80, 1966/7335 part 3, Australian Embassy Washington to DEA, cablegram 1995, 11.05.1967.

application if London were willing to abandon its world role.⁵⁰ Clearly, Australian concerns were not misplaced.

While restrained in its response, the Holt government wasted no time in drawing London's attention to the blow that the combined effect of both the withdrawal and the EC application would represent for Anglo-Australian relations. Despite further reorienting Australia's external relations towards the United States, Holt's Liberal-Country Party administration continued to view close relations with Britain as a top priority in Australian foreign policy.⁵¹ In mid-May ambassador Downer warned Healey that if the British persisted in their plans to withdraw and simultaneously entered the EC, then the effects on the Australian public would be calamitous. The Australian High commissioner added that

"this would extend, in our lifetime, even to the Queen's position in Australia, and that in the not-so-long-run the British connection with Australia and New Zealand would be lost".⁵²

A few days before, Australian governor-general Richard Casey made the same point. He told Healey that "these two things [the withdrawal and the EC question] combined would be interpreted in Australia as definite and inescapable evidence of British indifference and isolationism so far as Australia is concerned". In his view, "it would be almost a fatal knock to the most loyal Commonwealth countries".⁵³

Yet Wilson's task of taking Britain into Europe was not "all plain sailing" as the *Sydney Morning Herald* noted with foresight on 9 May 1967. At a press conference on 16 May, in fact, de Gaulle questioned whether Britain was really ready to join.⁵⁴ While not yet exerting a formal veto, he made it publicly known that he was not at all eager to see Britain join the Community. Following de Gaulle's remarks, Wilson flew to Paris in June, hoping to encourage the French president to take a less negative approach. Regrettably, Wilson's personal diplomacy produced no breakthrough. As a result, negotiations between Britain and the EC never got underway. The *coup de grace to Wilson's European aspirations came on 27 November 1967. On that day, de Gaulle declared at a press conference that "for the British Isles to be really able to tie up with the continent, a very vast and very deep transformation is still needed", thus dealing a fatal blow to Wilson's hopes of joining the EC. Despite the British cabinet's decision to "urge the Five to insist on fixing a date in January for the opening of the negotiations, and so force the issue with the French either on 18–19 December or at the beginning of January", French*

50. See for instance Circular Telegram from the Department of State to NATO Capitals, 30.07.1966, doc.266, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–68, vol.12, Western Europe*, Washington, Department of State, 2001.

51. For Australia's reorientation towards the US during the premiership of Harold Holt see A. BENVENUTI, *The End of the Affair ...*, op.cit., chap.5.

52. NAA, A2908/2, D25 part 1, Downer to Holt, cablegram 6177, 18.05.1967.

53. NLA [National Library of Australia, Canberra], Richard Casey Papers, MS6150, series 4, box 31, diary entries 09.05.1967 and 15.05.1967.

54. See H. PARR, *Harold Wilson ...*, op.cit., chap.6.

*opposition could not be overcome. On 19 December, the EC Council of ministers concluded that the conditions did not exist for the application to proceed further.*⁵⁵

In Australia, Britain's failure to open negotiations with the Six allayed local concerns about the economic aspects of the British application. Although no Australian now doubted Britain's resolve to join the EC, this temporary set-back allowed the Australian farm sector more time to reduce its reliance on the British market and to find new outlets elsewhere. This seemed to remove an irritant in Anglo-Australian relations, but did not rejuvenate the relationship. Britain's failed application did not end what Downer described as "the story of disassociation, which has become so marked in the last eighteen months".⁵⁶ Rather, it was one more step in that direction.

The Resumption of the UK-EC Negotiations for Entry, 1970-72

The Wilson government did not take de Gaulle's "non" for an answer. On 20 December, Foreign secretary George Brown told parliament that the British application remained on the agenda of the EC Council of ministers and that his government did "not intend to withdraw it", in spite of the widespread feeling in Britain that prospects for entry looked gloomy as long as de Gaulle remained in power.⁵⁷ Events, however, took a sudden turn when de Gaulle resigned in April 1969. In December 1969, the Six agreed at a summit in The Hague to open negotiations on enlargement with Britain and the other candidate countries, i.e. Ireland, Denmark and Norway. Wilson seized the opportunity and pushed for the earliest possible date for the opening of negotiations, which was eventually fixed for 30 June 1970. In mid-June 1970, Britain went to the polls and, unexpectedly, the Conservative party, led by Edward Heath, won the election. The new administration agreed to attend the formal opening meeting of the negotiations in Luxembourg on 30 June. Britain was again knocking at the EC's door.

Developments in Britain did not catch by surprise the Australian Liberal-Country Party coalition government, now led by John Gorton. Despatches from the London High Commission during the 1968-70 period had noted Wilson's determination to reopen the European chapter as soon as the circumstances permitted.⁵⁸ Following the EC summit in The Hague, there was no doubt in Australian minds that negotiations between Britain and the Six would take place

55. For de Gaulle's public declaration and the text of the communiqué issued by the Council of Ministers on 19 December 1967, see *ibid.*, pp.331-319.

56. TNA, FCO 20/50, Speech of Alexander Downer at the Royal Commonwealth Society (Bath), 11.10.1967.

57. Brown quoted in TNA, FCO 75/1, Britain's Entry into the European Community: Report on the Negotiations for Entry into the European Community, June 1970-January 1972 by Sir Con O'Neill.

58. See NAA, A1838/2, 727/4/1/3 part 3, AHC London to DEA, cablegram 12218, 19.07.1968; NAA, A1838/2, 727/4 part 38, AHC London to DEA, cablegram 967, 15.01.1970.

relatively soon. The Australian approach was set out in a submission put forward by McEwen to cabinet on 28 May 1970. According to the Australian Trade minister, the British government was unlikely to seek any special safeguards for Australian trade interests. Hence, “no amount of representations, personal or otherwise, [was] going to achieve a special position for Australia”. Yet the Australian government could not afford to “be seen to be doing nothing to try to safeguard” Australia’s interests. McEwen, therefore, argued that it was

“imperative that our public position, particularly as seen by the producers of those commodities likely to be most affected, be that [...] we are doing everything possible to influence the enlargement of the Community in such a way as to cause the least damage to Australia”.

He acknowledged that British entry would mainly affect Australia’s farm exports. Wool and some minerals would in fact continue to enter the EEC market freely, as no quota or tariff restrictions were levied on these commodities. Manufactured goods, while subject to the CET, would in general benefit from the Community’s liberal regime in manufacturing trade. As far as the farm sector was concerned, McEwen conceded that British entry would be less disruptive to Australian trade now than it would have been in 1961-62 as dependence on agricultural commodities on the British market had somewhat lessened during the 1960s.⁵⁹ However, the effect on particular industries such as dairy products, sugar, fruit and meat would create very serious problems in the light of their current economic position.⁶⁰ Diversification had in fact been far from satisfactory. For some of them (dairy products, dried and canned fruit, meat and sugar) there was a limited scope for alternative markets. A further problem was represented by the fact that certain regions around Australia had, over the years, specialised in producing specific commodities for the British market. These regions would be hit severely as a result of British entry into the Community.⁶¹ Overall, however, estimated trade losses were this time smaller than in 1967. According to the department of Trade and Industry (DTI), total losses would be in the region of A\$ 86 million a year –

59. NAA, A5619/1, C743 part 2, Cabinet Submission 258, 08.05.1970.

60. The economic future of Papua New Guinea (PNG) represented a further problem for the Australian government in the context of Britain’s negotiations with the EC. In the early 1970s PNG was still a non self-governing trust territory under Australian administration. Because of its constitutional position, it could not become associated with the enlarged EC. This meant that, like Australia itself, PNG would face the imposition of the CET on some of its tropical exports over whatever transitional period was negotiated. Under the UK-Australia trade agreement (1956) PNG had in fact enjoyed tariff preferences in the British market. In 1969, the United Kingdom absorbed almost 29% of PNG total exports. Coconut oil, copra, coffee, cocoa and tea which constituted the backbone of the Territory’s economy all depended on the British market. See TNA, FCO 30/611, Pakenham to Robinson, 01.10.1970. Hence, Britain’s entry into the Community was expected to inflict serious economic damage to PNG. The Australian government was concerned that, unless provisions were made to accommodate PNG trade, British entry could hamstring the territory’s development effort, the purpose of which was to bring PNG to independence as an economically viable country.

61. For instance, the loss of the British market for dairy products would particularly hit Tasmania and Victoria. The disappearance of British outlets for dried fruit would have serious repercussions on the Murray region.

that is, 2.7% of Australia's total exports in 1968–69.⁶² In 1967 initial losses had been put at around A\$ 125 million a year.⁶³ Hence, despite McEwen's claim to the contrary, the British market was no longer of crucial importance to Australia.

Cabinet endorsed McEwen's recommendations. In particular, the ministers agreed to "confirm Australia's former attitude that it is for Britain to decide whether or not it joins the [EC]". They endorsed the DTI's rather overstated stance that "important Australian trade interests stand to be seriously damaged". Cabinet also stressed the need "to explain Australia's position clearly in Brussels and London" and to impress on Australia's European partners that "the enlargement of the Community should be done on the basis consistent with G.A.T.T."⁶⁴

With this brief, McEwen visited Europe in July 1970. His expectations were not high. Yet, on his arrival in London on 6 July, he stated that although Britain was "very, very keen to get into the Common Market", he expected the British to "press quite hard for our interests, recognising that the relationship between Britain and Australia hasn't been by any means one-sided. I can remember a couple of wars".⁶⁵ Skilful a politician as he was, McEwen was clearly speaking to his domestic audience and, in particular, to farming communities scattered around Australia. Privately, however, McEwen "was resigned rather than demanding", as the British noted.⁶⁶ In his talks with the chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, McEwen reminded Barber of the damage that Australian farm interests would suffer if Britain entered the EC, and complained about the EC's protectionist farm policies.⁶⁷ In relation to safeguards for Australian farm exports, McEwen urged the British "to put up a hard fight on the question of length of [the] transitional period". More specifically, McEwen asked Barber to seek as long a transitional period as possible for Australia.⁶⁸ In reply, Barber recognised that entry would have a considerable effect on Australia's traditional exports to Britain. He stressed that "obviously the length of the transitional stage was important", and pledged that "the United Kingdom team would be seeking to achieve the longest transitional stage possible".⁶⁹ However, he reminded McEwen

62. NAA, A5619, C743 part 2, Cabinet Submission 258, May 1970.

63. NAA, A10206, EHEC03, 'Britain and the E.E.C.', 15.11.1967. Initial losses were expected to rise to nearly A\$ 200 million after 1974, when the CSA expired and when the Community was likely to reach self-sufficiency over a large spectrum of farm commodities.

64. NAA, A5619/1, C743 part 2, Cabinet Submission 258, 08.05.1970.

65. NAA, A10206/1, EHEC06, Press conference given by John McEwen at London airport, 07.07.1970.

66. TNA, FCO 75/1, Report on the Negotiations by O'Neill.

67. TNA, FCO 30/609, Memcon, Barber and McEwen (London), 08.07.1970.

68. NAA, A10206/1, EHEC06, Memcon, McEwen and Barber (London), 08.07.1970. See also TNA, FCO 30/609, British High Commission (henceforth BHC) Canberra to FCO, telno. 696, 10.07.1970.


69. NAA, A10206/1, EHEC06, Memcon, McEwen and Barber (London), 08.07.1970. See also TNA, FCO 30/609, Memcon, Barber and McEwen (London), 08.07.1970. Britain's brief as circulated to ministers on 30 June 1970 stated that 'the previous administration decided in 1967 that we should not aim at securing more for New Zealand (apart from the field of dairy products), Canada and Australia than the gradual application of tariffs and levies over whatever transitional periods are negotiated'. TNA, FCO 75/1, Report on the Negotiations by O'Neill.

of the fact that the British government “had to bear in mind the possible views of the E.E.C. Member States”.⁷⁰

In May 1970, as he set out Australia’s position on the forthcoming UK-EC negotiations, McEwen had also sought cabinet approval for “the development of a new dynamic relationship with Japan particularly [but by no means exclusively] in the trade and economic field”. This initiative, far from being accidental, was intimately linked to the imminent opening of negotiations between Britain and the Six. Although Japan had by 1970 established itself as Australia’s largest exporting market and Northeast Asia had already replaced Western Europe as Australia’s major export destination (see table and figure), this was hardly enough and further trade expansion towards the Asia-Pacific region was necessary to offset the loss of the British market. According to McEwen,

“Japan and the surrounding countries offer[ed] the best prospects for increasing Australian exports in the world, and [were] the only area where, by developing closer relations, [Australia could] hope that the doors [were] opening to [its markets]”.⁷¹

Despite some reservations, cabinet accepted McEwen’s proposal.⁷²



70. NAA, A10206/1, EHEC06, Memcon, McEwen and Barber (London), 08.07.1970.

71. NAA, A5619/1, C742, Cabinet Submission 257, May 1970.

72. NAA, A5619/1, C742, Cabinet Decision 387, 18.05.1970.

Australia of Britain's final attempt to join the EC was already in play, even before London began to negotiate in earnest with the EC. The Gorton government was in fact considering deepening Australia's political and economic ties with Japan, accepting McEwen's view that a closer relationship with Tokyo would be the first step towards a much closer political and economic engagement with other countries in the region. This would clearly represent a further step away from the traditional links with Britain, whose plans for entry into the EC, in reality, left Australia with no other alternative. It is noteworthy that, in commending his policy initiative to the cabinet, McEwen drew attention to the fact that British entry "would mean the dismantling of the British Preferential System". He advised the cabinet to act without delay and revoke British preferences. This would allow the government to accord Japan greater trade advantages in the Australian market, in exchange for preferential treatment for Australian goods in Japan. McEwen argued that an early move "would in itself make Australia a much more attractive market partner to Japan but our ability to capitalise on that will [see figure] decrease progressively as the U.K. moves closer to taking its final decision on movement into Europe".⁷³ It was indeed the end of an era.

Yet rarely does the end of an era occur without recriminations. Anglo-Australian relations were no exception. In the summer of 1971 Australia strongly criticised Britain's handling of the negotiations with the Six, and accused the British of completely disregarding Australian interests. The Australian government, in particular, complained that the British had reneged on their pledge to seek long transitional arrangements for Australian agricultural exports.⁷⁴ In the late spring of 1971 the British had in fact come to the conclusion that, for the sake of a breakthrough in the negotiations, they would have to scale down their demands for a five-year transitional period for agriculture and accept the Community's offer for "safeguard clause", whereby

"if circumstances arose during the transitional period in which significant volumes of trade risked serious disruption, then the enlarged Community would deal with the position".⁷⁵

Britain's back-down on the question of a lengthy transitional period was received with bitterness in Canberra. The new Australian government, led by McMahon, accused the British of failing to keep their word and protect Australian interests. It drew particular attention to the deal struck by the UK and EC negotiators on 11–13 May, and protested that this was in stark contrast with the assurances given by Barber in 1970.⁷⁶ Tensions between London and Canberra rose when McEwen's successor, Douglas Anthony, flew to London in mid-June 1971.⁷⁷

73. NAA, A5619/1, C742, Cabinet Submission 257, May 1970.

74. NAA, A1838/2, 727/4/2 part 14, Bunting to Downer, cablegram 7856, 15.06.1971.

75. NAA, A1838/2, 727/4/2 part 17, Anthony to Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), cablegram 327, 04.06.1971.

76. NAA, A1838/2, 727/4/2 part 14, Bunting to Downer, cablegram 7856, 15.06.1971.

77. NAA, A1838/2, 727/4/2 part 17, AHC London to DFA, cablegram 12150, 25.06.1971.

As the new head of the department of Trade and the new leader of the Country Party, Anthony was determined to make sure that Australia's farm interests would not be overlooked. On his arrival, Anthony complained to the new chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Geoffrey Rippon, that in their desire to enter the EC the British had "jettisoned the safeguards and transitional arrangements that they had earlier promised to Australia".⁷⁸ In reply, Rippon

"took the line that even if the British Government had, during April and May of this year, changed its policy on agricultural transitional arrangements, Australian officials had been informed of this change".

He suggested that "if [the Australian government] had any complaint [it] should have raised it at that time". Rippon ruled out the possibility of taking any further action with the EC on Australia's behalf. He claimed that what Australia was seeking was not negotiable. In any case, Rippon argued, a generalised safeguard clause represented a better result for Australia.⁷⁹ In recalling his visit to London more than thirty years later, Anthony described his meeting with Rippon as

"one of the most disorderly, rude and vulgar meetings I have ever attended. And that's saying a lot having dealt with discontented farmers and trade unionists during my political career. After an introduction by Geoffrey Rippon and a few indiscreet comments the whole meeting exploded and each officer virtually took on his counterpart across the table. It was bedlam and the language was pretty raw. I finished up leaving the meeting in disgust".⁸⁰

Rippon's claims were only partially true. He was certainly right to point out that, in the light of EC intransigence on lengthy transitional periods, Australian requests were not negotiable. But, as far as the safeguard clause was concerned, it was doubtful that Britain really believed that it represented a better result. Until the 11–13 May ministerial meeting, the British had in fact insisted on "firmer" and "more specific" guarantees than a safeguard clause.⁸¹ To the Australians this was irrelevant in any case: they did not believe it was a better result. More importantly, Rippon's claim that Canberra had been informed in advance of Britain's change of mind on transitional arrangements was simply not true.⁸² Despatches from the Australian High Commission in London or the Australian embassy in Brussels relayed no such news. This is not surprising. In the spring of 1971 the British were slowly coming to the conclusion that, for the sake of a breakthrough in the negotiations, they would have to scale down their requests on transitional arrangements. Fearing complications with their Commonwealth partners, they kept

78. A. DOWNER, *Six Prime Ministers*, Hill of Content, Melbourne, 1982, p.273. See also TNA, FCO 30/897, Record of Conversation between the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and the Deputy Prime Minister of Australia, 25.06.1971.

79. NAA, A1838/2, 727/4/2 part 17, AHC London to DFA, cablegram 12150, 25.06.1971.

80. Letter to the author 21.08.2003.

81. NAA, A1838/2, 727/4/1 part 13, Australian Embassy Brussels to DFA, cablegram 215, 22.04.1971.

82. See for example NAA, A1838/2, 727/4/2 part 15, Davies to Waller, 08.07.1971; NAA, A1838/2, 727/4/1 part 13, Australian Embassy Brussels to DFA, cablegram 141, 10.03.1971; Australian Embassy Brussels to DFA, cablegram 215, 22.04.1971.

their cards very close to their chests and played the deception game. On 22 April, at a briefing meeting with Commonwealth representatives in Brussels, British officials still maintained that “there would be serious political problems if the British market for products for which there were no other outlets were ‘brutally and abruptly’ ended for the traditional suppliers”.⁸³ But, as noted, the British cabinet agreed to accept the EC’s demands on transitional periods on 6 May. In strict confidentiality, the British informed the Six of their decision in advance to ensure that “an approach on these lines would be acceptable to the [EC] member countries and the Commission, and could lead to an agreement”.⁸⁴ Australians were of course left in the dark. Rippon’s claims that the McMahon government had been kept informed were groundless. As O’Neill pointed out in an internal minute:

“On the whole, it is difficult to refute the Australian case – such as it is. We had hoped to get clearer and more precise arrangements for running down third country supplies over the transitional period. We told Commonwealth representatives this, e.g. 22 April. We did not give them much if any notice of the switch we felt obliged to make at the Ministerial meeting on 11 to 13 when we had to accept the principle of Community preference from the start”.⁸⁵

Unappeased and dissatisfied, Anthony left London resentful at the British sleight of hand. Before leaving the British capital, “he made a bitter statement”, which, according to Downer, “angered British Ministers and upset many people sympathetic to the Australian cause”.⁸⁶

Unsurprisingly, the Heath government found the Australian reaction unpleasant.⁸⁷ At a press conference Heath said that he “regretted” Anthony’s comments.⁸⁸ According to O’Neill, “from May to July 1971 [Australia’s] complaints and accusations rose to an embarrassing public crescendo”.⁸⁹ Even before Anthony’s arrival in London, the British had already voiced their annoyance with Australia. In early June, at a meeting with the foreign diplomatic corps, Rippon lashed out at Downer about Australia’s accusations. According to the Australian High commissioner, Rippon

“embarked on a bitter tirade against Australia. We were a selfish country ... We cared nothing for Britain. ‘It would matter nothing to you if this country sank under the North Sea’, he shouted. We thought of our own interests and nothing else. Australia was a rich country—richer than Britain ... ‘You cannot’, he proceeded, ‘continue to live on England’s back’”.⁹⁰

The rift, however, did not last long.⁹¹ Despite its disappointment, the Australian government had to live with the fact that, as Con O’Neill put it,

83. Ibid.

84. TNA, FCO 75/1, Report on the Negotiations by O’Neill.

85. TNA, FCO 24/1055, O’Neill to Ticknell and Statham, 16.07.1971.

86. A. DOWNER, *Six Prime Ministers*, op.cit., p.273.

87. See Heath to McMahon in TNA, FCO 30/898, Douglas-Home to BHC Canberra, telno 700, 02.07.1971.

88. NAA, A1838/2, 727/4/2 part 15, AHC London to DFA, cablegram 13643, 20.07.1971.

89. TNA, FCO 75/1, Report on the Negotiations by O’Neill.

90. A. DOWNER, *Six Prime Ministers*, op.cit., pp.271–272.

91. TNA, FCO 75/1, Report on the Negotiations by O’Neill.

“what mattered [to Britain] was to get into the Community, and thereby restore [its] position at the centre of European affairs. [...] The negotiations were concerned only with the means of achieving this objective at an acceptable price”.⁹²

Thus, in the final months of 1971 the Australian government sought to put a positive gloss on the Anglo-Australian row. Anthony told the House of representatives that the controversy “must all be accepted as history” and that Australia “must now look to the future”. In this context, he stressed the need to place increasing reliance on ties with Japan and to ensure that “this relationship is developed as much as possible”.⁹³

Following Heath’s successful summit with French president Georges Pompidou in June 1971, the road was paved for a positive conclusion of the EC-UK negotiations. This duly happened on 22 January 1972 when Heath signed the treaty of accession in Brussels. Britain entered the EC in January 1973. In September 1972 the Australian government announced the abolition of preferences granted to British imports and the termination of the UK-Australia Trade Agreement as from 1 February 1973.⁹⁴ The EC question, which had marred Anglo-Australian relations for a decade, had finally come to an end, and, with it, an era of close Anglo-Australian relations. Although cultural ties between Australia and Britain were to remain strong, and relations between the two governments cordial, Britain’s relevance in Australia’s political life as well as in its economic and strategic policy-making had greatly diminished.

Conclusion

“Australia is still [...] Britain’s best friend in the world. The bond of attachment runs deep”. So British High commission officials in Canberra wrote in a steering brief dated March 1962. Yet, as they were ready to admit, Anglo-Australian relations had begun to change fundamentally during the previous two years and were bound to change further. The bonds of Empire, they noted, were becoming “increasingly a matter for the historian”. In their view, change had been accelerated by developments of great Commonwealth significance, which included the Commonwealth’s transformation into a multi-racial body with an increasing Afro-Asian membership and new restrictions to Britain’s immigration law. Yet the factor most likely to undermine Anglo-Australian relations was Britain’s bid to join the EC which had been launched in July 1961. As British officials observed, there was a widespread fear in Australia of the consequences of Britain’s entry. Apart from economic damage, Australians were concerned that Britain’s role as a European power would increasingly affect its policies outside Europe and that

92. Ibid.

93. Australia, House of Representatives, *Parliamentary Debates*, vol.73, 1971, pp.354–356.

94. G.C. BOLTON, *The United Kingdom*, in: W.J. HUDSON (ed.), *Australia in World Affairs 1971–75*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1980, p.215.

these would not necessarily accord with Australian interests. Unsettling as it was, the British bid was not the only disturbing aspect of Britain's closer engagement with Europe. There were also politico-strategic factors which fuelled Australian apprehension. "As we withdraw into Europe", British officials remarked, "British power, interests and influence in South-East Asia are seen as waning rapidly". Predictably, the contraction of Britain's politico-military presence in the region was viewed in Canberra with anxiety at a time of growing instability in Southeast Asia.⁹⁵

These observations provide an interesting insight into the changing nature of the Anglo-Australian relationship in the early 1960s. They also foreshadow the emergence of a major conflict of interest between Australia and Britain as policy-makers in London reoriented their country's external policies towards Europe. Macmillan's decision to seek EC membership in 1961 came as a shock to Australian policy-makers given the fact that, during the 1950s, they had accepted in good faith British reassurances that Australian and Commonwealth interests would not be sacrificed on the altar of British entry into the EC. Understandably, Macmillan's change of heart was a source of great anxiety to the Menzies government. From an Australian viewpoint, British entry would irreparably undermine Britain's political ties with Australia and the Commonwealth. It would also have negative economic implications for the Australian economy as British entry would put at risk Australian exports to the British market. In addition, entry would have important strategic consequences for Australia's security since Britain's consequent European focus would weaken its determination to maintain a politico-military role in Southeast Asia where Australia's main strategic interests lay. The Australian response to Britain 1961-63 bid was initially vociferous and rigid. The Menzies government demanded that all Australian trade interests should be protected, and in urging the British to safeguard Australian interests, it sought to play the "sentiment card". In addition, as Menzies himself reminded the British repeatedly, Britain should carefully consider the potential damage that entry would inflict on the unity of the Commonwealth. The Australians also sought to enlist the diplomatic support of the United States in their efforts to have Britain rethink its proposed move. However, as the negotiations in Brussels wore on between the British and the Six, it became evident that Australian and British interests were too far apart to be reconciled. Resigned to the fact that London would allow no Commonwealth interest to stand in the way of British entry, the Menzies government adopted a much softer approach. In the end, the Macmillan bid failed in January 1963 when France vetoed the British application. Despite the French veto, Britain's 1961-63 application left an indelible mark on Anglo-Australian relations. It wrecked Australia's strongly-held belief that differences between Canberra and London could be reconciled in the name of a strong Commonwealth loyalty.

Britain's second application to the EC added further strain to Anglo-Australian relations. Apart from the inevitable economic damage for Australia which would

95. TNA, Dominions Office 169/2, Visit of the High Commissioner to London, 1962. Steering Brief: Anglo-Australian Relations, March 1962.

still result from entry, the application was now also regarded as being likely to weaken Britain's resolve to maintain its politico-military role in Southeast Asia. In particular, Australian policy-makers became persuaded in mid-1967 that Wilson's "approach to Europe" had paved the way for the almost concomitant decision to withdraw from East of Suez. The withdrawal, combined with the decision to seek EC entry, was perceived in Australian official circles as irrefutable evidence that London was reorienting its external policies towards Europe. In this context, the article also reveals the extent to which the Wilson government was prepared to ignore Australian interests in order to secure Britain's foreign policy objectives. The 1967 application sent a clear and powerful message that, in pursuing Britain's European objectives, London regarded Australian interests as expendable. While Macmillan had to some extent tried to reconcile the divergent interests of Britain and Australia at the time of the 1961–63 bid, such consideration was of little interest to Wilson. The lessons of the 1967 bid left Canberra in no doubt about Britain's commitment to joining the EC and under no illusion that the British would jeopardise their chances of success in order to protect Australian interests.

In the event, while the Wilson bid collapsed, its impact was lasting. The application remained on the table and was resumed by the Heath Conservative government in 1970. Since the Australian government had little hope of seeing its trade interests properly safeguarded by Britain, its policy centred on demands for transitional arrangements in order to protect Australian interests. To this end, while urging the British to protect its interests, Canberra also considered steps to deepen its political and economic ties with Japan. A closer relationship with Asia's emerging economic power was seen in Canberra as the first step towards a much closer political and economic engagement with other countries in the region. Thus, as Britain was about to enter the EC, Australia sought to reorient its own external and economic policies towards the Asian region.

The Consolidation of Democracy vs. the Price of Olive Oil: The Story of why the CAP Delayed Spain's Entry to the EC

Lorena Ruano

Thirty years ago, Spain was part of the wave of southern European countries which, in the process of transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, wished to join the European Community (EC).¹ Membership of that organization was perceived as fostering economic modernisation and, more important, as a contribution to consolidate their new and fragile political regimes.² In the context of the Cold War, it was imperative for Western European countries and the United States that all three remained both stable and outside the Soviet Union's influence. So their inclusion in the EC began to be discussed very soon after the first elected democratic governments got into power; applications for membership were presented by Greece in June 1975, by Portugal in March 1977, and by Spain in July 1977. However, although it was in everyone's strategic interest to incorporate these countries into the EC, the negotiations for accession of Spain and Portugal dragged on for a long time (they joined in 1986, while Greece was admitted in 1981). Accession was delayed by interminable 'technical' discussions about Spain's adoption of the agricultural *acquis communautaire*. *Why did agriculture, a supposedly 'low politics' issue, become so salient in the accession negotiations between Spain and the EC? Why did it manage to obscure the 'high politics' motives of regional stability and democratic consolidation?*

This article provides an institutionalist explanation of this 'anomaly' by pointing out three clusters of institutional 'biases' that operated during the negotiations and thus made agriculture predominate over other interests that were more favourable to a steadfast enlargement.³

First, the 'bilateral' structure of the negotiation procedure between Spain and the EC favoured its members, protected the acquis communautaire, and didn't consider sufficiently the applicant's interest in a quick accession. Second, at EC

1. The term 'European Communities' is used to denote the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC, 1951), the European Economic Community (EEC, 1957), and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom, 1957). Since the 1965 Merger Treaty the three Communities have shared the same institutions while remaining legally distinct. In the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the EEC was officially renamed the 'European Community' (EC) and remains a separate entity within the European Union. Throughout this article I use this latest form to refer to the EEC, although it must be noted that Spain joined all three 'Communities' in 1986.

2. The belief that EC membership was an important way of supporting democratization in Spain was one of the main reasons for the members states' commitment to enlargement. See M. LEIGH, *Nine EEC attitudes to enlargement*, in: *Sussex European Papers*, n°2, The Mediterranean Challenge Series vol.I(1978).

3. This article derives from a larger research project where the reader can find additional information: L. RUANO, *Institutions, the CAP and the EC's enlargement to Spain, 1977-1986*, D. Phil. Thesis in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2001.

level, the Common Agricultural Community (CAP) exhibited great capacity to withstand the changes required by this enlargement. This was due to EC decision-making structures which insulated the 'agricultural policy community' from pressure in favour of enlargement that came from other issue areas. Third, at national level, the member states' national positions with regard to enlargement were mixed, with no clear priority and conflicting sectoral views.

How these biases actually worked is illustrated by a historical review of the process of reforming and negotiating with Spain its adoption of a key regime: olive oil. Thus, it will be shown that, in this context, Spain's accession was only made possible after 1983, when fresh budgetary resources were made available for new redistributive policies in the Mediterranean that would compensate those Community farmers who were to lose out on the Iberian enlargement. By then, Spain was already a consolidated democracy.

1. The Paradox of Iberian Enlargement

The nature of the Francoist dictatorship left by the Spanish civil war (1936-1939) led to Spain's international isolation after the Second World War. As a result, the democratization process which started in 1975 was intrinsically linked to Spain's reinsertion in the international community and to the EC in particular. Membership of the EC constituted a point around which all the political forces of the transition converged, and a quick accession was seen as a crucial way to consolidate the process.

However, the Spanish pro-European enthusiasm of the late 1970s was slowly tamed by the painful realization that the EC was an organization in which the translation of political will into concrete action was far from easy or quick. In contrast to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which Spain joined in 1981, the negotiations with the Community lasted eight years and tested the patience of the Spanish, who were increasingly dismayed by the EC's slow, bureaucratic, and 'technical' approach, apparently unaware of the sense of urgency prevailing in Spain. Spanish diplomats in Brussels expressed frustration with the member states and the bureaucrats in Brussels for acting as if they were dealing with a country in which there was a consolidated democracy and time to lose.⁴ The attempted *coup d'état* on 23 February 1981 was a reminder of the weakness of the new Spanish regime and its need for external support.⁵ So it was indeed striking

4. Raimundo Bassols refers to Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, the first Spanish chief negotiator with the EC (February 1978-September 1980), in his address to Lorenzo Natali, the European Commissioner in charge of enlargement, during the joint parliamentary meeting of 2-3 June 1980. See R. BASSOLS, *España en Europa: historia de la adhesión a la CE, 1957-85*, Política Exterior, Madrid, 1995, p.242.

5. It is generally agreed that the failure of the attempted coup of 23 February 1981 marked the end of the transition and the beginning of the consolidation of democracy in Spain. See G. PRIDHAM (ed.), *Encouraging democracy: the international context of regime transition in southern Europe*, Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1991.

how, once the political decision to start enlargement negotiations had been taken, 'the rhetoric on Western democratic ideals gradually gave way to heated discussions about the price of peaches and olive oil' which delayed the enlargement process and even threatened its failure.⁶

Discussions progressed at a timid pace, as the general aim of 'enlargement' was deconstructed into a large number of concrete consequences for specific and diverse interests, all of which followed their own 'logic'. In the areas of olive oil, fruit and vegetables, and wine, Spain's accession required the modification of the existing EC regimes, a task which quickly became enmeshed in the ongoing struggle to reform the CAP more generally. In this context, the talks between the Community and Spain only constituted the last of a long and protracted three-stage process which had required, first, changing the *acquis communautaire* and, second, formulating the Community's position towards Spain. Therefore, negotiations on agriculture formally started when the Community presented its position at the 19th ministerial meeting of 21 February 1984, six years into the enlargement talks. They went on until the final 'marathon' meetings of March 1985, defied several deadlines, and then threatened to water down the Community's enlargement at the very last minute of the last marathon session, when an argument about wine broke out, wrecking the nerves of Fernando Morán, the Spanish Foreign minister and chief negotiator (1982-1985).⁷

Overview of Negotiations in Agriculture

The accession negotiations consisted in devising the rhythm at which Spain would adapt the *acquis communautaire*, that is, defining the so-called 'transition periods'. The main point of reference for their design was the British accession process which had by now provided a model of 'classic transition', and which consisted on a progressive and lineal dismantling of customs between the applicants and the EC.⁸ Most of the accession treaty followed this classical model, but the framework of the agricultural transition periods was of greater complexity because the nature of the CAP meant that they also included the approximation of institutional prices and of other aids, like consumer subsidies, and compensatory amounts.

The Community's strategy was to fragment the agricultural chapter so as to make Spain accept specific transition periods for those products that were 'sensitive' for the EC (fruit and vegetables, oils and wine) and a 'classical' transition for the rest of the sector. Thus, the Community's position on fats and oils did not materialize until October 1984, and that on wine not until December of that

6. L. TSOUKALIS, *The European Community and its Mediterranean enlargement*, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1981, p.136.

7. See F. MORÁN, *España en su sitio*, Plaza y Janés, Barcelona, 1990, pp.446-447.

8. The Commission pointed out that this procedure had by now become 'traditional'. CEC, 'The problems of enlargement', *EC Bulletin Supplement*, 8/1982, p.9 (From now on, quoted as '1982 Inventory').

year. This was partly due to tactics, but also to the incapacity of the Community to agree internally on how to reform these two regimes and their funding.

On their side, the Spanish insisted on working on the agricultural chapter as a whole, so as to compensate for sacrifices made in these products with concessions from the EC on those that were 'sensitive' for Spain (quotas for milk, beef, and other northern products).⁹ At the beginning, this Spanish request for quotas was not acceptable to the Community because it challenged the Community principle of free movement of goods, but in the end, it was accepted as a trade-off for the measures on fruit and vegetables, which were also a-typical.

Both sides agreed that, for 'sensitive' sectors, a 'classical transition' would be insufficient, and special arrangements which departed from this rule had to be devised: a five year 'stand-still' for oils and fats, consisting in the manipulation of prices and quantities to maintain the *status quo*; a transition in two stages for fruit and vegetables; and quotas with 'supplementary mechanisms' for Spanish 'sensitive' sectors.¹⁰ The need to depart from the 'classical' transition period model stemmed from several facts.

First, agriculture was one of the few sectors in which there had been, since the founding of the EC, an important transfer of competences from member states to Community institutions, so the legal body of Spain's adoption of the CAP, was large and complex. Second, the French had openly stated their intention to regulate as much as possible the transition period for Spain's agriculture, to make sure that none of the foreseeable problems was left unresolved before accession.¹¹ Thirdly, extending the application of existing Community rules to Spain was impossible without important consequences for a policy that was already in crisis. Discussion on reform, especially with regard to finances and to the North-South imbalance, ran in parallel with Spain's negotiations, so special arrangements were needed to synchronize these two processes. In the case of olive oil, the reform of the regime was still incomplete at the time of Spain's accession.

A lineal transition was therefore not enough for the agricultural sector and the *acquis* had to be modified. Yet, the process provoked endless bureaucratic haggling while the results were minimal. Why did the Community prove so 'inflexible'? It is here that institutions come into the story.

9. At a Franco-Spanish ministerial meeting Spanish Agriculture minister, Carlos Romero, asked his counterpart for protection in the meat and milk sectors; Michel Rocard responded with reserves; see *Nouvelle rencontre ministérielle franco-espagnole*, in: *Le Monde*, 20.01.1984.

10. C. TIÓ SARALEGUI, *Lecturas sobre la agricultura española ante la CEE*, Ministerio de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación and Universidad Internacional Menéndez Pelayo, Segovia, 1985, p.24.

11. President François Mitterrand stated: 'We have to ensure that as many agreements and as many mutual obligations as possible are contracted before the enlargement decision', *Ambassade de France à Londres, Excerpts from the speech of Mr. F. Mitterrand at a luncheon with representatives of regional farming organizations*, in: *Service de Presse et d'Information*, 11.10.1984.

2. The Role of Institutions

Institutions create 'distortions' or 'biases' by over- or under-representing interests, views of the world, ideas and forms of knowledge.¹² Enlargement negotiations are an extremely complex political process in which the representation of interests - whether sectoral, regional, national, transnational or supranational - is largely shaped by sets of rules and procedures which distribute power and competences among actors. The article focuses on three general sets of institutions which, arguably, shaped the awkward way in which enlargement negotiations between the EC and Spain unfolded: the negotiation procedure, the decision-making process inside the CAP and national coordination mechanisms.

The Negotiation Procedure

The first set of institutions that mattered were those that structured the interactions between the EC and Spain: the negotiation procedure. This followed a 'bilateral' format which had been set up in 1961 during the first EC enlargement negotiations with Britain, Denmark, Ireland, and Norway. As a result, the negotiating procedures were overtly defensive of the still emerging and fragile EC rules and of the cohesion among the member states. It ensured that 'member states came first', controlled the agenda, and shaped the negotiations themselves, by indicating that the Community would negotiate *as a block*, and would therefore be required to agree on 'common positions' first, which were then presented to the applicant.

Although this format was a reaction to the peculiar British approach to EC membership, this decision was to remain in place for all subsequent enlargement negotiations, despite the fact that, later on, other applicants approached the Community without so many reservations.¹³ This was especially true for Spain, where the domestic consensus in favour of joining the EC was virtually total.¹⁴ This had important consequences for the way in which all enlargement negotiations were to be conducted: most discussions took place *among the member states*, while the applicants waited on the sidelines.¹⁵

12. I use the theoretical framework of 'Historical New Institutionalism', based on the work by P.A. HALL and R.C.R. TAYLOR, *Political Science and the three New Institutionalisms*, in: *Political Studies*, vol.44(1996), pp.937-942. I follow the definition of 'institutions' and other related concepts developed by D.C. NORTH, *Institutions, institutional change and economic performance*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990. See also P. PIERSON, *Path-Dependence, Increasing Returns and the Study of Politics*, in: *American Journal of Science Review*, June 2000.

13. L. RUANO, *Origin and Implications of the European Union's Enlargement Negotiations Procedure*, EUI Working Papers, RSC 2002/62.

14. Despite stringent terms of entry, the Spanish Cortes ratified the accession treaty by a unanimous vote in July 1985, EC Bulletin, 7/8-1985, § 2.2.2.

15. Commenting the enlargement negotiations of 1995 to Austria, Finland and Sweden, Graham Avery noted that 'the most lengthy and arduous part of the negotiations is not between the EC and the applicants but the internal discussions of the Community itself'. G. AVERY, *The European Union's enlargement negotiations*, in: *The Oxford International Review*, vol.5(1994), n.3, p.29.

Also, the decision in 1961 that enlargement negotiations should not preclude the development of the Community turned the *acquis communautaire* into a moving target. It allowed the member states to reform the *acquis* in the way of minimizing the costs of enlargement for themselves and passing them on to the new members. It also meant that most delays came from inside the Community, where the formulation of the common position got tangled with other issues being discussed. The asymmetry created by the negotiation procedure was also visible in the fact that, although the EC reserved itself the right to extend and revise the *acquis* while negotiations for enlargement were going on, the applicants were not allowed to unpick it or question its principles.

The procedure also had the effect of allowing the decision-making processes inside the Community, in particular its sectoral segmentation, to get in the way of the formulation of the common positions, thus creating the major problems in Spain's accession negotiations.

Decision-Making and the European Agricultural 'Policy Community'

Given that a common position was formulated following Community procedures, the second set of institutions that need to be analysed are those at the EC level of decision-making. This introduced a high degree of complexity into the negotiations, because the EC arena was itself subdivided into a large number of national and sectoral partitions which were poorly coordinated.

In this respect, CAP institutions have been unusual when compared to the rest of the Community's policies because of its high degree of interventionism, centralization, and re-distributive nature (it absorbed two thirds of the Community's budget in 1980). More important, this policy has also been unusually stable when compared to the rest of the EC, because of the intricacies of its decision-making structures, the way in which interests are represented, and the mechanisms of insulation from external pressures.

As a result of all this, there is a 'policy community' in the sector at European level, the membership of which has been reduced and stable over time, and the relationships between its actors are unusually close.¹⁶ It is composed of the Commission's Directorate General VI (DG VI) in charge of agriculture, farmers associations represented by the *Comité des Organisations Professionnelles Agricoles des Pays de la Communauté Economique Européenne (COPA)* and the *Council of Agriculture ministers (CAM)*. The fact that the CAP requires an annual review of prices has, over time, made relations between these actors highly routinized and institutionalized.

16. I use the term 'policy community' as defined by D. MARSCH and R. A.W. RHODES (eds.), *Policy networks in British government*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992.

Two institutional peculiarities are worth mentioning. First, to ensure the contact between DG VI and organisations in the agricultural sector, which the Commission needed for political support and information, a special division in charge of 'relations with non-governmental organisations' was created, and had no equivalent in other DGs. This made DG VI more amenable to lobbying by private organisations than other directorates of the Commission.

Second, to prepare the work of the CAM, a Special Committee for Agriculture (SCA), composed of civil servants from the member states, was created as separate from its equivalent for Foreign ministers, i.e., the Comité des Représentants Permanents (COREPER). This took agricultural issues away from the main arena where inter-sectoral coordination takes place in the Council, reinforcing the 'closed shop' that has characterized policy making in this sector, dominated by 'experts' and producers.¹⁷ Actually, because of the large amount of legislative work involved in the management of the CAP, many decisions, if passed by the management committees that exist for each commodity, do not even go to the CAM, which restricts its discussions to matters of principle.¹⁸

All these actors seemed to share a set of basic beliefs about the goals of the CAP and the legitimacy of its outcomes. Ministers of agriculture, farmers' association representatives and Commission staff from DG VI shared the idea that the EC should intervene in agriculture to 'ensure a fair standard of living' for farmers and ensure 'self-sufficiency'. The sharp differences of opinion between the actors (for example the Commission insisting on using more structural measures and reducing guaranteed prices, while COPA has always criticized the Commission's price proposals as insufficient) seemed relatively minor when compared with the views of outside actors, like Finance ministers who wanted to cut expenditure altogether. In fact, given the high degree of technical specialization and shared ideas, there seems to be considerable job rotation for individuals among the three sets of organizations inside this policy community, which is an additional source of personal contacts and influence for producers.¹⁹

Thus agricultural interests and issues were not only over-represented in the organizational structure of the EC, but they were also insulated from the pressures of other sectors which, like finance, trade or foreign affairs, might have constrained them. The institutions that governed EC decision-making in the agricultural sector

17. E. NEVILLE-ROLFE, *The politics of agriculture in the European Community*, European Centre for Political Studies, London, 1984, p.208.

18. O.W. GRAY, *Pressure groups and their influence on agricultural policy and its reform in the European Community*, D. Phil., University of Bath, 1989, pp.450-490; S. HARRIS, A. SWINBANK and G. WILKINSON, *The food and farm policies of the European Community*, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1983, p.26.

19. Several members of the CAM have later become commissioners for Agriculture (Sicco Mansholt, Paul Dalsager, Ray MacSharry). Several ministers of Agriculture have been farmers themselves (Michael Jopling) or leaders of associations (François Guillaume, Ignaz Kiechle). Job mobility is also considerable between the SCA, expert groups and DG VI; see P.CULLEY, *The Agriculture Council*, in: M. WESTLAKE (ed.), *The Council of the European Union*, Catermill, London, 1995, pp.199-202; see also O.W. GRAY, *Pressure groups ...*, op.cit., pp.50-51.

had strong 'boundaries' which excluded those which could pose a threat, especially the SCA as separate from COREPER. As will be shown below, technical knowledge and expertise worked as important cognitive barriers which insulated agricultural decision-makers at all levels from the pressure of the political and strategic imperatives of enlargement. For these reasons, when agriculture ministers met in the Council to discuss the reform of the olive oil regime, they did not have at heart the strategic and political implications of enlargement as much as Foreign ministers meeting in the General Affairs Council.

The existence of this policy community is behind the path-dependent way in which the CAP changes: gradually, by adjusting at the margins. This inflexibility turned agriculture into the main point of friction during enlargement negotiations with Spain.

Defining the 'National Interest': Between 'Global' and 'Sectoral' Logics

The third set of institutions which intervened is located at the 'national' level, where member states' interests towards Spain's EC membership were formulated. The strong segmentation of EC policy with regard to agriculture restricted the ability of national governments to be effective 'gate-keepers' in this extremely technical area. Here, the mechanisms which deserve analysis are those dealing with inter-sectoral coordination in national public administrations for the formulation of EC policies.

Sectoral partitions at EC level had altered the way in which the member states' so-called 'national interests' were formulated, because EC policy making exhibited a high degree of sectoral segmentation, as the co-ordination of a 'global view' slipped away from the monopoly of Foreign ministries.²⁰ This was because each ministry of agriculture had developed its own EC policy independently of a more general 'national interest', as it had direct representation in the SCA.

In all member states' organizational structures, agricultural interests have traditionally been over-represented and they have remained relatively insulated from

20. By 'normal foreign policy-making' I refer to theories of international negotiations which conceptualize the state as 'gate-keeper', developed by R.D. PUTMAN, *Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games*, in: *International Organization*, 42(1988), n.3, pp.427-460, and 'Liberal Intergovernmentalism' by A. MORAVCSIK, *The choice for Europe: social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht*, University College London Press, London, 1998. Looking at co-ordination mechanisms, I follow the work of V. WRIGHT, *The national co-ordination of European policy-making: negotiating the quagmire*, in: J. RICHARDSON (ed.), *European Union: power and policy-making*, Routledge, London, 1996; and the conceptual distinction between 'global' and 'sectoral' logics in EC policy-making, as explained by Chr. LEQUESNE, *Paris-Bruxelles: Comment se fait la politique européenne de la France*, Presses de La Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris, 1993; H. KASSIM, B.G. PETERS and V. WRIGHT (eds.), *The National Co-ordination of EU Policy: The Domestic Level*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000.

the pressure of consumers, finance, trade and foreign policy. That is why, although all the member states publicly supported enlargement for political, strategic and economic reasons, all voiced strong misgivings about how it would impact on their own agricultural sectors. The fact that these domestic dilemmas were not always solved at national level before reaching the EC arena of decision-making (where they in fact got amplified), made this problem all the more intractable.

The large northern member states, Germany and Britain, looked forward to Spain's membership in general, as this would bring a new market for their industrial exports and would greatly contribute to the political and strategic stability of Europe's southern flank. However, as the main contributors to the EC budget, these two member states were well aware of the budgetary costs of Spanish accession, and were reluctant to pay for them, either by increasing their contributions or making economies in their own agricultural sectors. This contradiction was particularly acute in Germany, where Commission proposals to curb CAP spending (sponsored by the German Finance ministry) encountered fierce opposition by the ministry of Agriculture and the powerful *Deutscher Bauernverband* (DBV), the organization which aggregates and represents agricultural interests in Germany. Similarly, the smaller northern member states were supportive of the democratization arguments in favour of enlargement, but were concerned with the cost to their own agricultural sectors if budgetary discipline was introduced.

The main opposition to Spain's accession came from Mediterranean farmers in Italy and France, who feared competition from successful Spanish exports. This opposition was mainly expressed in France, where the issue was politicized by farmers organizations and political parties outbidding each other to redress the grievances of the formerly under-represented southern farmers. Both in France and in the EC, poorer southern farmers were under-represented in the associations compared to northern ones. Therefore, the EC regimes for Mediterranean products were more recent and less generous, thus creating what was known as the 'North-South imbalance' of the CAP. The first market organizations, for cereals, pork, eggs and poultry meat, were created in 1962, corresponded to northern products, and offered a high level of support that included high guaranteed prices and protection from external competition through the principle of community preference. The common market organization for the dairy sector, a northern sector *par excellence*, was created in 1968 and has ever since absorbed the largest proportion of resources. In contrast, the regimes for Mediterranean products, created in 1967 under pressure from the Italian government, offered support only for some products and at a relatively low level (see table below). Moreover, The Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) established in 1970 had eroded the principle of community preference for these products by allowing imports from North Africa and the Middle East to access the Community with relative ease.

Structure of EC agricultural market support expenditure and production (average 1974-1976)^a		
Products	Proportion of EAGGF Guarantee Expenditure (%)	Proportion of EC agricultural production (%)
Wheat	11.7	6.2
Rice	0.3	0.3
Sugar	5.6	2.5
Fruits and vegetables	3.3	10.7
Olive oil	5.0	1.0
Oilseeds	1.0	0.4
Wine	2.9	4.9
Tobacco	5.9	0.4
Milk	39.8	18.6
Beef	17.0	15.4
Other products	7.5	39.6
Total	100.0	100.0

a. Source: *Agra Europe*, 07.07.1978, E/1.

Therefore, France and Italy refused to agree negotiating mandates for the Commission in the entry negotiations with Greece, Spain and Portugal until they had secured the changes to Mediterranean agricultural regimes that they wanted. This led to the introduction of a 'pause' by the French government in the negotiations with Spain until the presidential election of 1981. After the 'pause' was officially over, negotiations stalled in the agricultural sector due to the difficulties associated with the end of the exclusive *représentativité* of the *Fédération Nationale des Syndicats des Exploitants Agricoles* (FNSEA) and the *Confédération Nationale des Jeunes Agriculteurs* (CNJA), on the one hand, and temporary changes in the coordination of French EC policy mechanisms on the other.

By contrast, Italy, whose farmers were to be the most affected by Spain's accession, ironically presented a more benevolent attitude, due to the primacy of the Foreign affairs ministry on EC policy, the weakness of the administrative

system, the consensus of political parties in favour of enlargement and the division of its farmers into a diversity of organizations.

The differences between France and Italy prevented the formation of a solid Mediterranean front and delayed the reform of the agricultural *acquis* that was needed for Spain's inclusion into the CAP. More interesting, these differences also highlighted the crucial role played by institutions in the articulation of 'national' positions in Brussels.

In all the member states there was a close interweaving of agricultural producers' associations and public authorities, which varied from the corporatist style of the Netherlands and Denmark to the weaker links of the Italian system. In most cases, it was difficult for Agriculture ministers to agree in Brussels with decisions which could affect their domestic constituencies, on whose cooperation they depended heavily to obtain information, implement policies and for electoral support, even when this was at odds with the 'national interest', as defined from a 'global' perspective in the Finance or Foreign affairs ministries. The degree of coordination of EC policy-making between the different government ministries of each state had a decisive influence on the way in which farmers' interests were translated into the European arena. The French 'unitary' style of EC policy amplified their southern farmers' voices and made them echo outside the CAM, while the German 'fragmented style' often put its own national ministries of Finance and Agriculture at odds with each other. Also, with the exception of Britain, all the member states had a strong interest in maintaining a high level of public support for agriculture, in spite of the generalized outrage about the exhaustion of budgetary resources. Unsurprisingly, this division of 'national interests' along sectoral lines militated against the formulation of a coherent Community position in Brussels to negotiate with Spain.

In sum, poor inter-sectoral coordination mechanisms, both at EC and national levels, explain why the member states expressed support for the democratic transition in Spain and its accession to the EC, while proving so obstructionist at the negotiating table. The negotiating procedure, in turn, meant that Spain had no leverage to intervene in these internal discussions. How these institutional biases worked in practice will be illustrated in the following section with a review of the process in the concrete area of olive oil.

3. Olive Oil: an Expensive New Surplus

The most controversial sector in the agricultural negotiations was fats and oils, for three main reasons. The first problem was that, as the EC olive oil regime stood, incorporating Spain, the world's largest producer, would more than double the support costs of the sector (from 800 to 1645 million ECU).²¹ The regime had just

21. CEC, 'Opinion on Spain's application for membership', *EC Bulletin Supplement*, 9/1978, § 81 (From now on, quoted as 'Opinion on Spain').

been consolidated in 1978, under long time pressure from Italy to redress the previously mentioned North-South imbalance of the CAP, and provided a far more generous level of market support than existed in Spain, which included production aids, a consumer subsidy, threshold prices and a variable levy. It had increasingly absorbed substantial sums of money from the Guarantee Section of the European Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee Fund (best known in its French acronym FEOGA): in 1976, olive oil represented only 1% of EC agricultural production, but absorbed a disproportionate 5% of FEOGA's Guarantee Fund expenditures. An extension of this support system to Spain would clearly be very expensive, and put olive oil at a par with cereals and dairy products, thus making it one of the most expensive sectors of the CAP.

Second, with the accession of Greece in 1981, the Community had reached self-sufficiency in the sector. So the addition of Spain would create a surplus by bringing that level to 123%. Moreover, Spain's adoption of the EC liberal trading regime for non-olive oils and oilseeds would aggravate the surplus as time passed, because it would reduce Spanish olive oil consumption, while at the same time, the introduction of a higher support level would stimulate production.²² The third problem was that non-member countries from the Mediterranean (Tunisia, Morocco and Turkey) would lose access to the EC market, vital for them, as soon as Community preference was extended to Spain.²³

Complex Problems and Multiple Coalitions

The high costs and magnitude of the change implied by enlargement in this area provided the ingredients for an inter-sectoral dispute (agriculture vs. finance and trade) that was first visible in early March 1980, when a row erupted inside the Commission as it was drafting its first proposals for the 'common position', and Commission president, Roy Jenkins, had to decree a 'cooling off period'.²⁴ Agriculture commissioner Finn Gundelach, supported by French and Italian commissioners, revived the old proposal of imposing a tax on vegetable oils other than olive oil, so as to provide revenues to support the olive oil sector. The proposal encountered opposition from commissioners from the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands, who saw it as yet another harmful measure for the consumers

22. CEC, 'Opinion on Spain', §§ 77-81.

23. CEC, '1982 Inventory', Annex § 10. See the report elaborated by the Commission on the issue: F. DUCHÊNE, CEC et al., *The European Community and the Mediterranean Basin: study on the consequences of the process of enlargement both for the Mediterranean zone and for the Community itself and the conditions necessary for the definition of a global and forward-looking policy*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1984. See also A. TOVIAS, *EEC enlargement: the southern neighbors*, in: *Sussex European Papers*, n°5, The Mediterranean Challenge Series, vol.III, 1979.

24. *Vegetable oil tax for Spanish accession to be discussed by Commission*, in: *Agra Europe*, 29.02.1980, P/8; *Commission postpones decision on vegetable oil tax*, in: *Agra Europe*, 07.03.1980, P/5 and 14.03.1980, P/4.

and for trade partners. Notably, the United States opposed the tax vigorously, as it would harm its own exports to the EC of vegetable oil and oilseeds. In 1981, US Agriculture secretary John Block warned European governments of 'massive retaliation' if the EC levy was imposed on oils. In return, in 1984, Commission president Gaston Thorn complained that the United States did not want to pay its part of the bill for EC enlargement.²⁵ EC members were also under pressure from their own large oilseed crushing industries. Thus, the main line of division between the two coalitions was intra-sectoral (olive vs. non-olive oils) and reappeared at international, Community and national levels.

Second, this row was not simply between the protectionist South demanding subsidies and the free trading North refusing to pay up, as it is often portrayed. The Belgian, Dutch, German and British opposition to this tax in the Council was moderated by two important factors, which made the formulation of their national positions on this issue extremely difficult. First, the tax had long enjoyed the support from their own dairy farmers and others as a way to reduce the Community's 'butter mountain': a rise in the price of margarine would stimulate butter consumption and alleviate surpluses of dairy products and reduce the need to cut production or prices. At a CAM meeting in January 1983, 'as a butter producer' Belgium decided to support the tax, illustrating how the North-South divide was not that neat.²⁶ The debate about the tax also erupted among Dutch ministers in August 1983, as the Commission's proposals for the tax were discussed by the Councils of Finance and of Foreign affairs.²⁷

If the tax was not introduced, money to support the olive oil regime needed to be found somewhere to support Spanish producers at the same level as Community producers. A policy of compulsory reduction in production was not viable, at least in the short run, because the social repercussions would be great in a sector that employed nearly three million people, whose *per capita* income was on average the lowest in the agricultural sector, and concentrated in the poorest regions of the EC.²⁸ Without a tax, money would have to come from the Community's budget, which treasuries were struggling to avoid. In this way, the common position on olive oil was linked to the budget row paralyzing the Community at the time. For these reasons, the idea of the tax was never completely rejected, and its discussion kept reappearing and being postponed to a later date. In subsequent proposals for a 'mandate' to negotiate with Spain, the Commission still mentioned the tax, which remained on the agenda for years, as a possible solution.²⁹ In this way, the

25. The United States was the chief supplier to the EC market of other vegetable oils, notably soy beans, and was 'extremely sensitive to any EEC moves on the vegetable oil tax question and would strongly oppose the introduction of a tax', in: *The agricultural implications of EEC enlargement*, part III: Spain, *Agra Europe special report* n.6, London, May 1980, p.165 (subsequently quoted as *Agra Europe special report*); *Agra Europe*, 05.06.1981, P/5; *US protests "informally" at EEC CAP reform proposals*, in: *Agra Europe*, 26.08.1981, P/2; and *El País*, 16/12/1984.

26. *Ministers clash over olive oil*, in: *Agra Europe*, 21.01.1983, P/4.

27. *Agra Europe*, 12.08.1983, P/2.

28. CEC, '1982 Inventory', Annex § 11.

29. *Agra Europe special report*, p.25.

accession of Spain did not create the row about olive oil, but exacerbated already existing ones, notably about finances, the 'butter mountain' and trade with the United States in the area of oils and fats.

The enlargement of the Community was a major event in the olive oil world market, as it would now account for two thirds of world production. Therefore, the discussion on the 'oil tax' involved extra-European actors, like the United States, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey that tried to have a say in the discussion through some member states like the Netherlands, Germany, Britain, and even France, to protect trans-Atlantic and trans-Mediterranean trade.

So many conflicting and diverse interests at all levels had to be taken into account, that quick agreement on reform was impossible, and the Community was unable to establish its common position on the issue until October 1984, eight months after it had presented its first agriculture proposals to Spain.³⁰ Without the tax, the financial problems would be great, so inside the Community, the coalitions of actors for and against it were complex and divided the Commission, the Northern member states and transnational organizations along sectoral lines: consumers (*Bureau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs*) were against, while farmers (*COPA*) were in favour; and along specific product lines (olive vs. non-olive oil producers). At national level, countries like Belgium or the Netherlands had to reconcile the conflicting interests of their oil crushing industries, consumers, dairy farmers, finance, trade and agriculture ministries.

The Decision-Making Process: in Search of Consensus

The identification of the problems and interests involved does not tell the whole story. The process through which these interests were represented, defended and compromised was crucial in determining the outcomes and timing of negotiations. This was shaped, in turn, by the institutional structure of the EC. These inter- and sub-sectoral coalitions of interests produced a logjam in the decision-making process at Community level, which exacerbated member states' domestic dilemmas. The fact that decisions over reform of the olive oil regime and its financing were to be taken at separate venues (CAM and ECOFIN Council) where different conceptualizations of the problems at hand prevailed, complicated things enormously. As there was no hierarchy between the two councils to establish clear priorities, they got caught in disputes over their competencies. Budget commissioner Christopher Tugendhat blamed Agriculture ministers for the continued increases in spending and DG VI officials for ignoring budgetary constraints in their advice to ministers.³¹ Political 'guidance' or 'arbitrage' had to come from the General affairs Council (GAC) and, ultimately, from the heads of state and government at European Council meetings.

30. The EC position paper of 21 February 1984 had remained carefully silent about olive oil. This document is summarized in *Agra Europe*, 24.02.1984, P/2.

31. Tugendhat blames agriculture ministers, in: *Agra Europe*, 08.07.1983, P/3.

Yet the ability of this higher level of decision-makers to prioritize was undercut by the nightmarish degree of complexity and technicality of the issues at hand. After the Brussels summit of March 1983, many details had to be referred back to farm ministers, as the British Prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, pointed out that heads of government did not really understand the detailed issues and 'should not be asked to take decisions from ignorance'.³² However, the danger of letting Agriculture ministers deal with the 'technical details' in their 'closed shop' implied their losing sight of other important related issues, like the financial implications or the political imperatives of going ahead with enlargement. This was particularly problematic for a sector like olive oil which had several ramifications in other areas that institutions separated artificially, like finance, structural reform, trade, other oils and even butter. Proposals for the reform of the Mediterranean acquis were therefore referred up and down to the CAM, the SCA, ECOFIN, the Heads of government, the GAC, etc. as they needed each other's expertise and/or political guidance. This wrangling between the different decision-making instances produced a series of 'bureaucratic delays' in the negotiations with Spain, which only had indirect incidence in the process.

*The beginnings of a solution, at least of the financial issue, appeared at the Stuttgart summit in June 1983, when German chancellor Helmut Kohl agreed to increase the ceiling of VAT national contributions to the Community's budget, on condition that enlargement took place. But the Community took more than a year to translate this agreement in principle into a workable solution for the concrete problem of olive oil. As pressure mounted to establish the deadline of negotiations with Spain, it was agreed to have a series of special councils, joining the Agriculture, Foreign and Finance Councils together, the work of which would be prepared by an ad hoc group (Groupe Unique). In an unprecedented August meeting, the biggest council ever met in 1983 to try to address a bundle of related issues together.*³³ However, disagreements between Agriculture and Finance ministers continued until October 1984.³⁴

When it had become clear to northern countries that they would have to pay the bill of enlargement, they (particularly the United Kingdom) attached the condition that the new funds should not serve to maintain or aggravate agricultural surpluses. The new money, they argued, would have to go to the EAGGF Guidance section and other new common policies to promote structural reform, i.e., improve efficiency and induce producers to switch to new crops in which the Community had a deficit, like corn. In order to control the surplus in the long term, less efficient producers would inevitably need to be made redundant and be helped to switch to other occupations, hence the need to promote industry and services in these regions as part of an overall structural reform package for the Mediterranean, of which funds for supporting agricultural products would only be a fraction. In this way, the

32. *Agra Europe*, 25.03.1983, P/5.

33. *Agra Europe*, 26.08.1984, P/3 and 02.09.1984.

34. *El desacuerdo de los ministros económicos y agrícolas de la CE dificulta la sesión con España*, in: *El País*, 01.10.1984.

Spanish accession negotiations in the olive oil sector became linked to the old discussion about the structural reform of the EC's agricultural sector, and its social implications. This affected uncompetitive Italy, where most of that restructuring would have to take place. The Italian government supported the idea of structural reform as long as there was increased funding for it.³⁵ The Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (IMPs) were created in 1985 precisely for that purpose.

The budgetary costs of enlargement in this sector meant that Italy and France would not be alone in trying to postpone the problems created by Spain's accession. So one of the first decisions, taken in February 1983, that the Ten could agree on was to demand a ten-year transition period for Spanish olive oil and a 'stand still' regime of five years, during which prices and quantities of other oils would be controlled, and consumption aids to olive oils would not be introduced, in order to maintain the *status quo* inside the Spanish market.³⁶

The linkage to other policy areas brought the stalled discussions at the CAM to the GAC, where supposedly the specific discussions on the reform of the oil regime could be put into a macro-perspective, weighed against other issues, and re-connected to the priority of enlargement by Foreign ministers. Yet, at its meeting in early September 1984, close to the deadline fixed by the French presidency for concluding negotiations, the GAC again failed to agree on its common position on olive oil. With regard to trade, Germany argued that since competing oils would not enter Spain at lower prices upon accession (because of the Spanish protectionist regime), Spanish olive oil would be subject to EC intervention and production aid, but not consumption aid. France and Ireland wanted this linked to an agreement to reform the EC's fats and oils sector, including again a discussion on the controversial tax.³⁷ With regard to production, the United Kingdom and most other members were pushing for thresholds, while Italy and Greece firmly opposed them as well as any other measure that would reduce the level of support they received. Italian Foreign minister Giulio Andreotti complained that the northern members were much harsher on Mediterranean products than on northern products, since they were refusing the introduction of similar thresholds for dairy products on the grounds that production quotas were against the principles of the CAP. At this point, the problem of having conflicting principles guiding the CAP became evident, as both sides were right but none could prevail. While Italy and Greece were invoking the principles of free movement of goods (i.e., no quotas) and of sustaining farmers' incomes to make their cases against reform, the northern member states appealed to the principles of offering reasonable prices for

35. C. TIÓ SARALEGUI, *op.cit.*, p.30.

36. *El mercado exterior del aceite de oliva español quedará aislado durante cinco años tras el ingreso de España en la CE*, in: *El País*, 24.02.1983.

37. *Foreign Ministers deadlocked on offer to Spain and Portugal*, in: *Agra Europe*, 07.09.1984, P/2. For a discussion on trade with third countries see J. ORDÓÑEZ FRESNO, *Problemática de la exportación española de aceite de oliva ante la integración de la CEE*, in: *Agricultura y Sociedad*, 22(1982), pp.335-340.

consumers and ensuring the ‘rational development of production’. If technical details mattered at all, it was because of their connection with these higher principles.

Negotiating the Terms of Entry with Spain

The failure of the GAC to agree on the Community’s position on such a central sector was now threatening the whole accession process, and the deadline for concluding negotiations (30 September 1984) had to be extended. Irish Foreign minister and Council president, Peter Barry, announced that if nothing was achieved at the restricted meeting of the Council on September 17, new procedures for speeding up the negotiations would have to be worked out.³⁸ It was becoming clear that, while the ‘bilateral’ negotiating procedure ensured that Spain could not break the cohesion of the Community, it was too cumbersome and was now putting in danger the whole purpose for which it had been designed.

The hope of concluding negotiations in time faded when, in preparation for the meeting, COREPER spent seven hours discussing issues surrounding enlargement – olive oil among them – without progress. On the one hand, Greece announced that it would block agreement unless the financial arrangements for the IMPs were established. On the other hand, Germany with the less determined backing of Britain and the other non-producing countries, took a tough line, insisting on a clear statement that a production threshold would be introduced, and that it should come into force on the day of accession, or the following season at the latest.³⁹ Discussions on olive oil and other issues linked to it were therefore postponed until the next meeting in early October when a parallel Finance, Foreign affairs and Agriculture Council was to be held in Luxembourg.⁴⁰ But instead of representing a solution, this attempt to break the ‘monopoly’ of the CAM over agricultural issues failed because of a new French demand for a surveillance mechanism for all products coming from Spain, instead of only for ‘sensitive’ ones as previously agreed. The debacle was such that it left the Community with nothing to present to the Spanish and Portuguese negotiators at the 25th ministerial meeting of 3 October 1984. After several postponements and hours of waiting, only two EC Foreign ministers showed up to talk to Spanish Foreign minister Fernando Morán, who protested formally and cancelled the meeting.⁴¹ This dramatic episode represented one of the most extreme consequences of the bilateral procedure and the power asymmetry it institutionalized.

38. *Agra Europe*, 07.09.1984, P/3.

39. *Optimism fades on budget and enlargement negotiations*, in: *Agra Europe*, 28.09.1984, P/1.

40. Agriculture ministers would start with a session devoted to wine. Meanwhile, Finance ministers would discuss budgetary discipline and in the late afternoon Foreign ministers would try to tackle the remaining issues of enlargement and the budget together; *Agra Europe*, 28.09.1984, P/2.

41. *Agra Europe*, 05.10.1985; *La CE se mostró incapaz por tercera vez en un mes de presentar una oferta global a España*, in: *El País*, 04.10.1984.

At the end of October, at another tandem of meetings of the Agriculture and Foreign affairs Councils, the Community agreed on a mini-package to present to Spain, and it included a compromise on the olive oil issue. As Germany demanded, the production threshold would be introduced and consumption aid would not be handed out until the fifth year.⁴² The Community's position incorporated COPA's suggestion of a long transition period (although not the twenty years demanded, but ten) in two stages, in which the passage from one stage to the other would not be automatic, but subject to a revision of the situation. The Spanish had insisted all the way that the tax or some equivalent measure be found before their entry, but given the difficulties described above in changing the *acquis communautaire*, the solution had to consist instead of a long transitional period to diffuse the costs over time, together with limits to the expansion of production in Spain.⁴³

The transition period for olive oil finally agreed with Spain was to last ten years. The approximation of prices was divided into two stages. During the first stage, prices in Spain would be raised at a slow rate (5% of the difference) a measure intended to contain EAGGF Guarantee expenditure. During the second stage, approximation would be accelerated, so that the complete alignment of prices would take place at the end of the tenth year. The passage from one stage to the next would occur after the reform in the Community's olive oil regime (possibly the introduction of the tax) had been achieved. This effectively postponed the full integration of Spain in this sector in a way that was somehow open-ended, because failure to agree to the controversial reform would mean that prices would be approximated by only 50% at the end of the tenth year. This was a considerable concession that reflected the weakness of the Spanish position. In exchange, this formula ensured that Spain's interests would have some input in the future reform of the sector. To moderate the impact of opening the Spanish market to imports of other oils and oilseeds, a 'stand-still' period of five years effectively segregated the Spanish market from the Community in a sector that was linked with many others.

*Also, for Spain, displacing olive oil imports from third countries like Tunisia on the EC market could trigger retaliation against its other traditional exports to these Mediterranean non-EC countries. Obviously, the Global Mediterranean Policy of the 1970s was going to need reform as well, to tackle the many disturbances that enlargement would bring to non-member Mediterranean countries. As during the British accession, when Commonwealth interests were excluded from negotiations, in the case of the Spanish accession, third countries from the Mediterranean and Latin America (and even the United States) had only a say in as much they could lobby the member states bilaterally. The revision of relations with them was to occur after enlargement.*⁴⁴

42. *Agra Europe*, 26.10.1984, P/2.

43. *Agra Europe special report*, p.166.

44. *Decisión comunitaria de compensar a los países del Magreb por el ingreso de España y Portugal*, in: *El País*, 26.11.1985. With regard to Latin America, see *EC Bulletin*, 5/1985, 2.2.8.

In sum, the Community needed to take into account a great number of conflicting factors in its plans to reform the olive oil regime: the social importance of the sector; other non-EEC Mediterranean countries (Tunisia and Morocco); the costs; the effects of restrictions (tax) on other vegetable oil producers, EC consumers and the oil processing industry; the United States and other exporters of vegetable oils; the demands of dairy farmers for a tax; and calls to reform the sector and use regional/structural instead of guarantee funds. In this context, it is not surprising that this was on of the most contentious issues in the accession negotiations with Spain, triggering as it did an internal EC debate with multiple ramifications. Olive oil producing countries (Greece and Italy) refused any reduction in the protection levels to the sector, while the United States and those countries with an interest in margarine and oil seeds like the Netherlands refused the tax proposed by the Commission. Divisions cut along sectoral lines at national level, and some countries like Belgium and Germany were torn between supporting the tax or paying up the bill of the EAGGF. These domestic dilemmas were exacerbated by the segmentation of the Community's decision-making structures. The establishment of 'super Councils' showed the need to bridge the different views of the same problem that prevailed in each of the specialized Councils. The main problem was tension between the 'political will' to enlarge and its concrete consequences, which were 'technical' problems that had to be addressed by the 'experts'. Yet, they could not agree on how to solve these problems on their own, as they had political, social and international consequences that had to be addressed at other levels. Thus, the 'de-coupling' of issues by the EC's decision-making structure did not only take place between sectors, but also among different levels of expertise.

The result was that reform in the sector was postponed to a later date, and the transition period for Spain was tied to this. It showed the incapacity of the Community to adjust its rules to a new situation. Internal disagreement about how to reform the EC olive oil regime delayed accession negotiations and even threatened to bring the process to a *cul de sac* as the final deadline approached. In this context, Spain was left in a weak position, with just a few key items on the agenda, by the time the Community presented its views on this difficult issue.

Conclusion

The detailed analysis of Spanish accession negotiations in olive oil reveals how the general idea of enlargement was decomposed into specific parts following the institutional structure of the EC, which not only comprised national, but also sectoral logics that often entered into conflict. Many of the issues at hand did not only confront member states with each other, but also social groups inside them and with the wider world. The coalitions between olive oil and dairy producers in favour of the 'oil tax', is an example of how the complexity of the rules in this sector and decision-making procedures created a multiplicity of coalitions at

several levels that did not stick within strictly national or North-South cleavages. Thus consensus was necessary on each detail and, for that reason, 'technical' difficulties often seemed to obscure the general purpose of the reforms, and sometimes it was feared that they could make the negotiations process fail altogether.

As the consequences of enlargement had to be specified in every area and were linked to the reform of the *acquis*, discussions drifted from the CFM to the CAM, the SCA and specific management committees, and the definition of the 'national interests' varied as their representation slipped away from the hands of generalists to the reign of 'experts' and members of the European agricultural 'policy community', beyond the comprehension of the middle citizen, or even of the heads of state and government. This ubiquity of the 'national interests' made the Community's position *vis-à-vis* Spain extremely tedious and cumbersome to define. Such complexity was not the result of technocratic malevolence, but of the difficulties to reform a centralized policy applying to very different national, regional and sectoral realities, and which had important and clearly visible redistributive consequences, both for national treasuries and for farmers' pockets.

Change, therefore, was not spectacular and, after much haggling, the Community left things pretty much as they were, and patched up at the margins. The modifications to the *acquis* did not take place at the level of principles. It was never questioned, for example that farmer's incomes should be supported. Rather, the argument was about how to support them: with external barriers, quotas, guaranteed prices, or structural funds? Any departures from the CAP's principles (like the introduction of quotas which violated the principle of unity of the market) were, first, intended to keep the *status quo*, and second, clearly established as *transitory* measures. So although arguments were formulated and justified in terms of these higher principles, change occurred at the level of regulations, where such principles (unity of the market or Community preference) could be bent, at least temporarily, without challenging the overall structure of the CAP directly. In this way, and notwithstanding bitter disagreements, the European agricultural 'policy community' was successful in upholding the CAP's main principles, and maintaining the existing situation against strong pressures that came from the budgetary constraints and Spain's accession. Most of the changes to the Mediterranean *acquis* were, in fact, intended to buffer, dilute or counter the effects of enlargement on the CAP.

This article also reveals that the degree of 'obstructionism' of the member states was not necessarily related to whether they were contributors to the budget, as the German and British positions suggest. Neither were they proportional to the actual amount of 'damage' that Spanish accession would inflict on them. While Italy was to suffer most, it was the French who were fiercest and who, in the end, obtained what they had demanded right from the start: a strengthening of the regimes for oils and fats. This has to do with institutional factors at national and EC levels.

The accession of Spain was seen by EC Mediterranean producers as a disaster, because of its size and potential for expansion. Yet, the flooding of the EC market

with Spanish produce was not that obvious and depended on many imponderable factors, like future demand and policy reform. This restricted the debate about accession to 'statistical battles' among the 'experts', which highlighted the role of knowledge and ideas in a negotiations process like this one, because much depended on how problems were defined or 'framed' in the first place. And the ideas and views of those better organized, represented and informed tended to prevail.

Thus, the fact that the 'problem' sectors that delayed the negotiations were those that were 'sensitive' for the Community, instead of those that were 'sensitive' for Spain, puts in evidence the over-representation of Community farmers' interests in the negotiations process, as a result of the biases of Community decision-making structures and of the 'bilateral' procedure. In contrast, the series of concessions that Spanish negotiators made in the agricultural sector led Spanish farmers to claim that they had been 'sacrificed' to the EC. The *Confederación Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos* was about the only group in Spanish society to oppose accession.⁴⁵ When Spanish Agriculture minister Carlos Romero summarized the negotiations, he indicated that Spain had made many concessions and revised its initial positions many times concerning its sensitive sectors while the Community consented to little regarding its own. Spain would open gradually its market from the moment of accession while in certain sectors the Community would not open its doors until the fifth year.⁴⁶ This asymmetry not only reflected the power of the Community over Spain during the negotiations, but also, the fluidity of the Spanish institutional setting during and after the transition to democracy, which had left Spanish farmers divided and disorganized, especially when compared to European ones. These organizational factors allowed the Spanish government to make a number of concessions which would otherwise have been more difficult.

The conclusion of the agricultural chapter was only possible because it was made part of a wider package that provided additional funds to pay for enlargement. Although a certain degree of consensus had to be found for every specific product, this was limited to keeping Spain out with long transition periods. Deadlocks encountered at the level of specific products were overcome by linking them to a wider level and taking their discussion away from the exclusive control of the European agricultural 'policy community', where additional elements for a trade-off could be found. The various efforts to break the monopoly of the CAM, COPA and DG VI with 'Super Councils', working parties of Commissioners and vigorous presidencies eventually succeeded in partially redefining the issues at stake in a 'regional' rather than merely 'agricultural' fashion with the IMPs. These, in turn, were dependent on a wider package, the Single European Act, which underpinned the consensus that was needed to increase the EC's budget resources. The CAP itself changed very little; it was an island of stability at a time when the rest of the Community was being refounded.

45. *No bonanza for Spanish farmers*, in: *Financial Times*, 26.02.1986.

46. *Aubaine ou désastre pour l'Espagne?*, in: *Le Monde*, 12.06.1985.

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen

Claire SANDERSON – *L'impossible alliance? France, Grande-Bretagne et défense de l'Europe (1945-1958)*, Publications de la Sorbonne, Paris, 2003, 471 p. – ISBN 285944-481-5 – 32,00 €.

La Politique étrangère et de sécurité commune (PESC) de l'Union européenne, instaurée par le traité de Maastricht, a longtemps souffert de l'absence d'une capacité militaire. Celle-ci commence à se développer avec l'instauration récente de la Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense (PESD). Alors qu'elle estimait, dès sa création, que le cadre de l'OTAN était le seul valable et ne devait pas être affaibli par l'existence d'organismes européens, la Grande-Bretagne accepte désormais que l'Union puisse agir pour la gestion des crises en Europe avec ses moyens propres, dans le respect des engagements de l'Alliance atlantique. Le Premier ministre britannique Tony Blair s'est ainsi rapproché des positions françaises, le président Jacques Chirac, de son côté, ayant assoupli ses rapports avec l'OTAN. La rencontre de Saint-Malo (3-4 décembre 1998) a consacré une convergence entre la Grande-Bretagne et la France, auxquelles s'est très vite jointe l'Allemagne du chancelier Gerhard Schröder dont la présidence du Conseil européen de Cologne (3 juin 1999) voit les premières mesures concrètes dans le domaine militaire. Toutefois les divergences subsistent en politique étrangère, particulièrement en ce qui concerne les rapports avec les Etats-Unis.

Le nouvel épisode des rapports franco-britanniques en ce qui concerne la défense de l'Europe donne un intérêt supplémentaire au récent ouvrage de Claire Sanderson qui analyse les divergences apparues entre les deux pays dans la période 1945-1958, alors que la sécurité de l'Europe occidentale était un objectif majeur mais que les deux grandes puissances ne s'accordaient pas sur la place à donner à l'Europe dans l'Alliance atlantique, comme dans l'organisation même de l'Europe dans les domaines économique et politique. De nationalité britannique, mais de culture à la fois anglaise et française, Claire Sanderson, maître de conférences à l'Université Paris VII-Denis Diderot, était particulièrement qualifiée pour comprendre les mentalités et les motivations de chaque côté de la Manche et pour expliquer les difficultés des gouvernements à définir des positions communes. D'où l'apport précieux de cet excellent ouvrage, issu de sa thèse de doctorat.

Au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, la Grande-Bretagne et la France apparaissent comme les deux seules puissances européennes sans lesquelles aucun système ouest-européen n'est envisageable. Mais elles l'envisagent de façon différente. La France veut d'abord retrouver son statut de grande puissance et obtenir des garanties à l'égard de l'Allemagne tandis que la Grande-Bretagne, sortie victorieuse de la guerre mais appauvrie, donne la priorité à ses liens avec les Etats-Unis et, pour sa défense en Europe, doit s'appuyer sur la France. Le traité de Dunkerque du 4 mars 1947 prévoit une assistance mutuelle entre les deux pays en cas d'agression de la part de l'Allemagne. Toutefois, c'est le danger soviétique qui se manifeste désormais. Les Britanniques ne pensent plus, depuis 1940, que la

France puisse être leur ligne de résistance. Ils comptent avant tout sur les Etats-Unis et sur la création d'un Etat ouest-allemand. Après le coup de Prague du 28 février 1948, l'alliance anglo-française est élargie aux pays du Benelux. Le Pacte de Bruxelles du 17 mars 1948 n'est que la condition posée par Washington pour s'engager en Europe avec l'Alliance atlantique du 4 avril 1949. Quant à la nouvelle Allemagne fédérale, encore occupée, elle a un gouvernement le 15 septembre 1949 avec le chancelier Konrad Adenauer.

La France, qui a souhaité l'Alliance atlantique et a dû accepter la renaissance d'un Etat allemand, reste préoccupée par le danger que celui-ci risque de devenir. D'où l'orientation prise en 1950, différente de celle de la Grande-Bretagne, d'encadrer la RFA dans une organisation européenne solide. C'est le Plan Schuman du 9 mai 1950 de mise en commun du charbon et de l'acier de la France et de l'Allemagne dans une communauté supranationale à laquelle la Grande-Bretagne refusa de participer. Quand en 1950, avec la guerre de Corée, la nécessité apparaît de réarmer l'Allemagne pour utiliser son potentiel économique et humain à la défense de l'Europe, la France propose une armée européenne intégrée pour éviter la reconstitution d'une armée nationale allemande dans le cadre de l'OTAN. Pour la Grande-Bretagne, qui donne la priorité aux relations transatlantiques et au Commonwealth, il n'est pas question d'en faire partie, alors que sa présence apaiserait les craintes françaises et rétablirait l'équilibre avec l'Allemagne. Tout au plus, le gouvernement de Winston Churchill accepterait-il une association avec la Communauté européenne de défense (CED), souhaitée par les gouvernements français successifs pour obtenir la ratification du traité.

L'apport essentiel de l'ouvrage de Claire Sanderson est de montrer, à partir des archives diplomatiques françaises et britanniques, quelle fut la responsabilité de la Grande-Bretagne dans l'échec de la CED, en raison des lenteurs et des hésitations britanniques à prendre position sur les garanties demandées par la France, pour finalement signer les conventions d'association d'avril 1954 n'ayant aucune valeur d'engagement réel de maintien des troupes britanniques sur le continent pour une période indéfinie, comme le traité CED. Peut-être un engagement véritable aurait-il changé le vote d'une partie des 53 députés socialistes dont l'opposition fut décisive pour le rejet de la CED par l'Assemblée nationale française, le 30 août 1954.

Dès avant cet échec, les dirigeants britanniques pensaient à une solution de rechange permettant le réarmement allemand. En 1952, Anthony Eden avait suggéré à Robert Schuman l'extension à l'Allemagne et à l'Italie des engagements du Pacte de Bruxelles. C'est ce qu'il propose à Pierre Mendès France dès septembre 1954 s'il accepte l'entrée de l'Allemagne dans l'OTAN. Les accords de Paris du 23 octobre consacrent cette formule: l'Allemagne retrouve sa souveraineté et son armée qui entrera dans l'OTAN, l'Union de l'Europe occidentale (UEO) encadrera le réarmement allemand et la Grande-Bretagne s'engage désormais à maintenir quatre divisions sur le continent. Mais l'UEO ne sera qu'une façade à la solution atlantique, les questions militaires et stratégiques continuant à relever du Conseil de l'OTAN. La communauté d'armements souhaitée par Mendès France ne pourra aboutir. En compensation, la France cherchera à développer un partenariat stratégique avec l'Allemagne et à former un axe Paris-Bonn qui supplantera l'axe Paris-Londres.

Certes, une éphémère fraternité d'armes se manifeste en 1956 avec l'expédition de Suez, mais l'échec de celle-ci, en raison de l'opposition américaine, amène les deux partenaires à choisir deux orientations différentes. La Grande-Bretagne donnera la priorité absolue à ses bons rapports avec les Etats-Unis. La France au contraire, avant même le retour au pouvoir du général Charles De Gaulle, va chercher à se doter de l'arme nucléaire, comme ses deux alliés, pour accroître son indépendance à l'égard des Etats-Unis et son rôle dans l'OTAN.

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Michèle WEINACHTER – Valéry Giscard d'Estaing et l'Allemagne. Le double rêve inachevé, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2004, 428 p. – ISBN 2-7475-6655-2 – 31,35 €.

Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, président de la République française de 1974 à 1981, a joué un rôle essentiel dans la consolidation de l'entente franco-allemande, moteur de la construction européenne, après les divergences apparues sous les présidences du général Charles De Gaulle et de Georges Pompidou. C'est alors que l'on commence à parler d'un «couple franco-allemand».

Un excellent ouvrage vient d'être consacré à Giscard d'Estaing et l'Allemagne par une universitaire particulièrement qualifiée, Michèle Weinachter - ancienne élève de l'Ecole normale supérieure de Fontenay-Saint-Cloud, agrégée d'allemand, maître de conférences à l'Université de Cergy-Pontoise et chercheur associée au Centre d'information et de recherche sur l'Allemagne contemporaine (CIRAC) – dont c'est la thèse de doctorat. L'auteur ne se contente pas de retracer l'histoire des relations franco-allemandes pendant le septennat, mais aussi d'analyser l'attitude personnelle de Giscard d'Estaing, ses réactions face à l'Allemagne et à l'évolution des relations franco-allemandes, son engagement et les résultats de son action. C'est donc toute l'existence du personnage qui est retracée sous l'angle de son comportement à l'égard de l'Allemagne et de l'Europe.

La première partie de l'ouvrage retrace les rapports de Giscard d'Estaing avec l'Allemagne depuis sa naissance à Coblenz, le 2 février 1926, alors sous occupation française, ses études à Paris sous l'occupation allemande, son engagement dans l'armée du général Jean de Lattre de Tassigny et sa participation à la campagne en Bavière. Puis il entre à l'Ecole nationale d'administration (ENA) et choisit de faire son stage en Sarre. A l'inspection des Finances, il s'intéresse comme son père Edmond Giscard d'Estaing aux questions monétaires internationales. C'est en commençant sa carrière politique, au cabinet d'Edgar Faure, président du Conseil, puis comme député du Puy-de-Dôme (il est élu le 2 janvier 1956) qu'il aborde les questions européennes en appuyant à l'Assemblée nationale la ratification du traité de la Communauté économique européenne (CEE). Il participe aux débuts de la construction européenne depuis 1959 comme secrétaire d'Etat aux Finances auprès d'Antoine Pinay puis de Wilfried Baumgartner, comme ministre des Finances début 1962 au gouvernement de

Michel Debré, puis de Georges Pompidou. Il s'initie, sous le général De Gaulle, aux relations franco-allemandes mais n'intervient que dans son domaine économique et monétaire. N'étant pas reconduit dans ses fonctions en janvier 1966, il fait sa «traversée du désert» jusqu'en 1969 et prend nettement, avec les Républicains indépendants, position pour l'Europe, «voie d'avenir pour la France». Il n'est pas fédéraliste et préconise une approche empirique intergouvernementale et, surtout, l'adoption d'une union monétaire.

Sous la présidence de Georges Pompidou, de 1969 à 1974, Giscard d'Estaing est ministre de l'Economie et des Finances. Les questions monétaires passent alors au premier plan avec le flottement des monnaies. Mais la mise en place d'une union économique et monétaire européenne se heurte aux divergences franco-allemandes. Les relations entre Giscard d'Estaing et Karl Schiller, son homologue allemand, sont tendues. Elles s'améliorent et deviennent confiantes, lorsque, le 7 juillet 1972, Schiller est remplacé par Helmut Schmidt. Les divergences monétaires ne permettent pas de progresser vers l'union, mais les deux hommes seront d'accord plus tard pour instituer le Système monétaire européen (en 1978).

Giscard d'Estaing est élu président de la République le 19 mai 1974 et le restera jusqu'en 1981, en même temps que Schmidt devient chancelier le 16 mai et le restera jusqu'en 1982. Les deux hommes ne cesseront d'entretenir des relations confiantes, qui permettront la stabilité du «couple franco-allemand». Pour Giscard d'Estaing, c'est la «pierre angulaire» de la construction de l'Europe dans une union non seulement économique mais aussi politique capable d'agir dans les relations internationales. De ce point de vue, le septennat est analysé avec beaucoup de précision dans l'ouvrage de Weinachter qui examine l'héritage du traité de l'Elysée et le passage à une nouvelle étape (deuxième partie du livre), la coopération Giscard-Schmidt et l'union de l'Europe (troisième partie) et Giscard et l'Allemagne entre l'Est et l'Ouest (quatrième partie). Il y a là une matière très riche, appuyée sur une vaste documentation et surtout sur de nombreux entretiens avec le président, le chancelier et leurs collaborateurs, témoins de rapports personnels très étroits qui n'ont pas laissé de traces dans les archives. Le «bilan du septennat» est dressé avec maîtrise (pp.223-230). Les rapports franco-allemands sont passés «de la réconciliation à l'entente» entre les dirigeants, les administrations et aussi les opinions publiques. La coopération bilatérale s'est intensifiée. L'entente franco-allemande a été mise au service de l'union de l'Europe, sur le plan économique avec le SME et institutionnel avec la création du Conseil européen en 1974 et l'élection du Parlement européen au suffrage universel en 1979. Sur le plan international, l'entente a contribué à un début d'émergence d'identité européenne, le président français n'étant pas hostile aux Etats-Unis comme ses prédécesseurs et le chancelier allemand étant convaincu que c'est à la France d'assurer le *leadership* politique de l'Europe.

Mais le «double rêve» reste inachevé: Giscard d'Estaing n'est pas réélu en 1981 et il ne pourra mettre en œuvre le projet d'union politique qu'il avait préparé avec Schmidt et qui lui aurait sans doute permis de devenir le président de l'Europe à l'issue de son second mandat. Toutefois, il ne renonce pas à s'engager en faveur de

l'entente franco-allemande et de la poursuite de l'intégration européenne. Il copréside avec Schmidt un comité pour l'union monétaire de l'Europe qui aura une influence sur la création de la monnaie unique. Il contribue à faire insérer la notion de subsidiarité dans le traité de Maastricht. Son activité en faveur du renforcement des institutions européennes et son autorité personnelle le désignent enfin comme l'homme d'Etat le mieux préparé à diriger les travaux de la Convention pour l'avenir de l'Europe. Grâce au soutien de la France et de l'Allemagne, il est nommé président de la Convention par le Conseil européen de Laeken le 15 décembre 2001. Il va pouvoir conduire les travaux d'élaboration de la Constitution pour l'Union européenne.

Par l'ampleur de la documentation, la finesse de l'analyse et la clarté de l'exposé, l'ouvrage de Michèle Weinachter est désormais indispensable à l'étude des relations franco-allemandes et de la construction européenne.

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Pier Luigi BALLINI, Antonio VARSORI (eds.) – *L'Italia e l'Europa (1947-1979)*, 2 vol., Istituto Luigi Sturzo-Rubbettino, Rome, 2004, 296 + 847 p. – ISBN 88-498-0991-3 – 48,00 €.

L'historiographie relative au rôle joué par l'Italie dans les processus de la construction européenne n'a fort heureusement cessé, ces dernières années, de se développer. Parmi d'autres, Antonio Varsori, aujourd'hui professeur d'histoire des relations internationales à l'Université de Padoue, n'a pas peu fait pour appuyer ces progrès. Ce recueil de textes, publié conjointement avec Pier Luigi Ballini, professeur d'histoire contemporaine à l'Université de Florence, vient en apporter une nouvelle preuve. L'initiative vient d'autant plus à son heure que la collection des *Documenti diplomatici italiani*, issus du ministère des Affaires étrangères, ne dépasse pas encore la date de mai 1948 même si les séries 11 et 12 relatives à la décennie 1948-1958 sont actuellement en cours de préparation sous la direction des professeurs Pietro Pastorelli et Ennio Di Nolfo.

Dans cet ouvrage, les auteurs rassemblent pas moins de 214 notes, comptes rendus, correspondances diplomatiques et déclarations d'acteurs politiques qui, pour la période allant de 1947 à 1979, permettent d'étudier la position des autorités politiques italiennes par rapport aux avancées et aux échecs de l'intégration européenne. Les documents, dont la plupart sont inédits, sont issus de fonds divers: archives diplomatiques italiennes et étrangères, archives communautaires et papiers privés italiens et étrangers. Toujours accompagnés de l'indication précise de leur source, ils sont reproduits dans leur langue originale: l'italien, le français, l'anglais ou l'allemand. Chaque document est également complété par des informations biographiques ou historiques qui en facilitent la lecture et la compréhension. La sélection permet enfin de couvrir, en creux, différents aspects de la situation intérieure italienne face à l'Europe en construction dans ses enjeux économiques, militaires, agricoles, politiques ou sociaux bien que les auteurs aient

volontairement survolé les débats liés au Plan Marshall, au Plan Schuman, au projet de Communauté européenne de défense (CED) et à l'action militante des mouvements fédéralistes d'après-guerre déjà abondamment étudiés par l'historiographie transalpine plus ou moins récente.

Les deux volumes du livre s'articulent successivement autour de cinq thèmes - L'eupéisme nationaliste (1947-1950), l'eupéisme d'Alcide De Gasperi (1950-1953), Du nationalisme de Giuseppe Pella à l'eupéisme pragmatique (1953-1957), De l'eupéisme italien d'Amintore Fanfani à celui d'Aldo Moro (1958-1967) et enfin l'eupéisme occidental transalpin (1968-1979) - qui constituent autant de phases majeures dans l'évolution de la politique européenne de Rome. Chacune des rubriques est introduite par un texte de synthèse qui, en rappelant les temps forts de la période, replace utilement les documents sélectionnés dans leur contexte national, communautaire et international. On regrettera toutefois que l'ouvrage, qui s'appuie solidement sur la production scientifique des historiens italiens de l'unité européenne, ne comporte aucune bibliographie, même indicative, de travaux qui hélas demeurent souvent méconnus à l'étranger. L'index onomastique rend aisé l'usage de cet instrument de travail dont la mise en page est particulièrement agréable et soignée.

Très utile à la communauté scientifique, cet outil de référence donne aussi à un plus large public international les éléments nécessaires à la compréhension de l'évolution de la politique étrangère de l'Italie dans la seconde moitié du XX^e siècle.

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Craig PARSONS – *A Certain Idea of Europe*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca & London, 2003, 249 p. – ISBN 0-8014-4086-6 (hb) – 34,96 \$.

This is a very important book. It is important not so much as a study of French European policy over the entire post-war period, but for our understanding of the influence of ideas on the European integration process more generally. From the perspective of a professional historian, Parsons' book is actually quite disappointing in a number of ways. To begin with, it is largely based on the existing historical and political science literature on French European policy. Although Parsons claims in the introduction (as all social scientists do) that he only draws upon such secondary works as supplementary weak proof of his overall thesis, he has not actually utilized any primary sources of significance with the partial exception of newspaper reports for the later periods. Moreover, he only draws upon literature in French as well as English. This is perhaps not so bad in view of the fact that much French literature on the same topic does not recognize anything not published in French. As a result, however, Parsons largely misses out on the multilateral and transnational dimensions of French policy-making. The bilateral relationship with Germany in particular has been extremely important for French European policy, and at least fifty per cent of the literature on this dimension of is in German.

Worse still, Parsons has ignored some works in French which are highly relevant for his topic and more importantly, could perhaps undermine some of his general arguments about the role of 'policy entrepreneurs' and their ideas in determining French European policy at decisive moments in the post-war period such as the creation of the ECSC in 1950-51 and German unification and the Maastricht Treaty in 1989-92. For example, Parsons largely ignores the recent contributions by Georges-Henri Soutou and others who have revisited the evolution of the European policies of MRP politicians in the early post-war period. This research has corrected the earlier view of antagonistic policy conceptions within the MRP between on the one hand, Robert Schuman's Catholic 'core Europe' programme and on the other hand, Georges Bidault's allegedly nationalistic 'Gaullist' approach of great power policy coordination with the US and Britain.¹ Recently, research on secret Franco-German consultations during 1948-49 involving Bidault and Konrad Adenauer has shown that Bidault was hostile to British involvement in continental European attempts at integration from 1947-48 onwards, and fully agreed with the future West German chancellor on the desirability of the United Kingdom's exclusion from a 'core Europe' integration process.² Although the MRP elite was less united concerning the most desirable institutional forms of integration, their solid support for 'core Europe' without Britain undermines Parsons' argument that the European issue cut across party lines from the beginning of the Fourth Republic through to the present. In fact, the MRP preference for the exclusion of Britain stood for a long time against the SFIO preference for British participation under the Labour government during 1945-51. Some SFIO leaders like Guy Mollet needed a long time before they gave up on Britain. This inter-party conflict is important for understanding early French European policy, however, as the issue of Britain's involvement or not in the integration process was of crucial significance for the question as to what kinds of domestic coalitions could be formed for what types of institutional concepts.

Despite these shortcomings, Parsons, who is not a historian, but a political scientist, has made an important contribution to the study of the history and politics of the integration process. He develops a coherent historical-institutionalist argument (as it would be called in political science speak) for the importance of domestic policy actors and their values, ideas and European (institutional) preferences for the development of the current European Union. Parsons claims with some justification that without French support, no significant progress would have been possible at critical junctures in the post-war period. Although the same

1. G.-H. SOUTOU, *Georges Bidault et la construction européenne 1944-1954*, in: *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, 105(1991), pp.267-306. See also, for example, D. HÜSER, *Frankreichs „doppelte Deutschlandpolitik“*. *Dynamik aus der Defensive – Planen, Entscheiden, Umsetzen in gesellschaftlichen und wirtschaftlichen, innen- und außenpolitischen Krisenzeiten 1944-1950*, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1996.

2. See especially the protocols of the Geneva Circle meetings of Christian democratic politicians in: M. GEHLER and W. KAISER (eds), *Transnationale Parteienkooperation der europäischen Christdemokraten. Dokumente 1945-1965 / Coopération transnationale des partis démocrates-chrétiens en Europe. Documents 1945-1965*, K.G. Saur, München, 2004.

could be said, for example, for (West) German policy over the creation of the ECSC and giving up the German Mark at the beginning of the 1990s, which were hotly contested domestically there, Parsons' concentration on the French case can nevertheless be justified. Within France, so the argument continues, the European issue always cut across party lines. Moreover, many major decisions, especially on what might be called European constitutionalization, were not driven by domestic economic interests which were often marginal in these debates. Indeed, the recent French referendum debate about the European constitution is an excellent example of the politicized nature of major constitutionalization decisions. In such a complex domestic political environment, where European preferences have not always corresponded with general ideological fault lines, energetic 'policy entrepreneurs' (like Robert Schuman or François Mitterrand, for example), have often succeeded in forging cross-party domestic *ad hoc* coalitions for fostering their integration agenda when the prevailing political circumstances allowed it. In line with his larger argument Parsons claims, for example, that the failure of the EDC in the *Assemblée Nationale* in 1954 was ultimately due not to concerns about its watered-down supranationality, the future of the French nuclear force in planning, early détente after Stalin's death or American policy over Vietnam (to name but a few standard explanatory arguments), but the collapse of the 'pro-European' Third Force over *domestic* issues like the school question during 1952-53.

Parsons' rediscovery of the domestic political ideas dimension of European policy-making amounts to a frontal attack on different traditional accounts of the integration process. It calls into question neo-functionalist type interpretations which have emphasized the role of (partly transnationally constituted) societal actors (although not so much political parties) and functional pressures to advance the integration process. In contrast, Parsons emphasizes the significance of political will and strategy for *overcoming* domestic pressures of a political or economic nature against (further) integration. Parsons also refutes intergovernmentalist accounts of integration by Andrew Moravcsik³ and others who have exaggerated the influence of well-organized short-term economic interests in influencing national European policy-making and 'grand bargains' at EU level. In fact, Moravcsik has flatly denied that ideas could matter in a significant way as informing national policy-making on 'Europe'.

Parsons' argument can, and should be, related to parallel historiographical debates, too. Walter Lipgens' earlier claims about the importance of ideas for the integration process were weak because they failed to establish a causal link between ideas in the resistance and European movements, and the actual integration process after 1945. Parsons makes a much more powerful argument about the influence of ideas on European policy-making. His intelligent conceptualisation of the role of domestic politics for national European policy-making could be read as an attack on geopolitical as well as economic

3. A. MORAVCSIK, *The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose & State Power from Messina to Maasticht*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1998.

historical explanations of the integration process. Traditional diplomatic history accounts of European integration usually see 'national interests' as given or formulated by a government elite. They tend to have an extremely underdeveloped understanding of the domestic politics of European and foreign policy-making in pluralistic democratic societies. At the same time, Parsons' contribution to the debate would also appear to undermine the claims by Alan S. Milward and other economic historians who have explained national preference formation with the influence of economic concerns (not so much, domestic pressures) on apparently largely autonomous bureaucratic policy-making by governments.⁴

In this way, Parsons might well stimulate the historiographical debate about the integration process as well as contributing to larger theoretical debates in political science and International Relations. However, his approach is also limited in its own ways. In particular, Parsons largely ignores the role of multilateral and transnational networks and communication for influencing domestic preference and policy formation. The exclusive focus on national policy making, although instructive for his larger argument, cannot be recommended for innovative historiographical studies. They increasingly need to adopt transnational and supranational perspectives including the role of (partly transnationally constituted) societal actors if they want to make a significant contribution to the study of the present-day European Union.

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Philippe MIOCHE – *Les cinquante années de l'Europe du charbon et de l'acier*, Office des publications officielles des Communautés européennes, Luxembourg, 2004, 128 p. – ISBN 92-894-8259-1 – diffusion gratuite.

En s'apprêtant à enterrer la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier (CECA) – les cérémonies officielles eurent lieu en juillet 2002 –, l'assemblée à Strasbourg avait manifesté son désir d'obtenir un bilan général récapitulant l'essentiel d'un partenariat transnational demeuré unique dans son genre. Mais qu'on ne s'y trompe pas. Le vœu exprimé par les députés n'a pas pour autant débouché sur un ouvrage de complaisance du type discours funèbre qui, plein d'éloges, mettrait en exergue les hauts-faits d'une construction à l'origine de l'union actuelle, en passant discrètement sous silence ses faiblesses et ses défaillances. Au contraire, afin de répondre aux attentes du Parlement, la Commission eut en effet la sagesse de confier l'appréciation du dossier de l'intégration des industries lourdes à un historien, Philippe Mioche, connu pour être un des grands spécialistes de la question.

4. See in particular, A.S. MILWARD, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, Routledge, London, 1992.

Euvrant en toute indépendance, celui-ci nous propose une publication maniable composée d'une centaine de pages régulièrement entrecoupées de graphiques faciles à interpréter, de séries statistiques sommaires néanmoins fort expressives, ou de schémas en couleur qui permettent d'embrasser au premier coup d'œil les évolutions majeures. Aussi le choix judicieux de ces moyens didactiques contribue-t-il à la clarté d'un exposé sobre qui renonce aux digressions anecdotiques et aux divagations sur des détails futiles. Le style employé se distingue du reste par une symbiose réussie entre l'effort de vulgarisation d'un côté, et de l'autre côté la méthode critique propre au monde des scientifiques. Tandis que cette première préoccupation se veut au service notamment des jeunes générations en mal de comprendre l'audace dont Robert Schuman et les autres pères-fondateurs ont fait preuve en décidant, cinq années seulement après la fin du second conflit mondial, la mise en commun des deux secteurs-clé qui ont parrainé l'Europe unie, cette dernière exigence s'avère indispensable pour faire la juste part entre les heures de gloire et les échecs d'une expérience pilote initiée il y a un demi-siècle dans l'intention de préserver la paix et de stimuler la prospérité des peuples. A propos d'amélioration de la condition humaine. Dans un débat européen trop souvent focalisé – autrefois comme de nos jours – sur l'économie et le politique, l'auteur ne manque pas de ménager aux mineurs du fond et ouvriers métallurgistes une place privilégiée. En leur dédiant son fascicule, il ne rend pas seulement hommage à ces légions anonymes de travailleurs largement impliqués dans la reconstruction du vieux continent ruiné par le cataclysme de la guerre; en les faisant intervenir, il insuffle une âme à l'énoncé brut des principaux articles du traité de Paris qui forment en quelque sorte la toile d'arrière-fond reliant en filigrane les cinq grands chapitres du volume. Il en naît une présentation de la CECA à l'image des hommes: une histoire pleine de contradictions.

A cheval «entre archaïsme et modernité», le plan jadis forgé par Jean Monnet est certes novateur à bien des égards. Au niveau institutionnel en l'occurrence, l'invention d'un organisme supranational confère d'emblée à l'entreprise communautaire une originalité incontestable marquée par la volonté de rompre avec les égoïsmes nationaux des temps antérieurs. Il n'en demeure pas moins que cette vision très progressiste succombe bien vite à l'intergouvernementalisme reconquérant. Son action érosive est déclenchée dès avant la clôture des négociations de Paris. Elle émane des trois pays du Benelux déterminés à imposer le Conseil des ministres comme rempart contre les aspirations hégémoniques franco-allemandes. Accéléré après la débâcle de la CED en 1954, le grignotage des pouvoirs d'une Haute Autorité en perte de prestige s'achève au plus tard à l'instant de la fusion des exécutifs. Le passage de la CECA sous les ailes de la CEE sonne alors le glas d'une des composantes sans doute les plus prometteuses de l'Europe de la première heure, ... tout en étant cependant générateur de nouveaux atouts. Le pool du charbon et de l'acier est en fait depuis lors libéré des espoirs et des enthousiasmes excessifs suscités durant la phase de son démarrage. Il retrouve ainsi sa «seconde vie» au cours de laquelle il passe à «un régime de croisière et approfondit ses missions initiales».

Celles-ci sont à leur tour pionnières. Dans le domaine de la lutte concurrentielle par exemple, l'abolition des arsenaux protectionnistes des Etats se double d'un contrôle des concentrations et de l'interdiction des cartels entre producteurs. Et pourtant, la Haute Autorité à Luxembourg comme son successeur, la Commission de Bruxelles, n'ont ni pu ni voulu empêcher la résurgence des ententes internationales calquées sur le modèle des syndicats de l'entre-deux-guerres. La raison est facile à comprendre. Sans le concours des organisations patronales, la gestion de nombreuses difficultés d'ordre pratique se serait avérée illusoire.

Des antinomies, on en relève aussi dans le management pratiqué en vue de maîtriser les graves problèmes structurels des charbonnages ou les récessions cycliques de la sidérurgie. Tandis qu'en octobre 1980 la CECA décrète l'état de «crise manifeste» avant d'imposer le plan Davignon grâce auquel l'acier européen a bénéficié d'un renouveau sur des bases assainies, la communauté assiste en spectateur impuissant aux signes avant-coureurs qui, vingt-cinq ans plus tôt, annonçaient la mort lente des bassins houillers. La disproportion entre les objectifs déclarés et les réalisations concrètes est apparente également en matière des prêts consentis aux industries, des fonds affectés au développement de la recherche scientifique, des ressources consacrées à l'amélioration des logements ouvriers, etc.: à chaque fois, la contribution de la CECA se limite à la portion congrue en comparaison avec les investissements totaux déboursés tantôt par les entrepreneurs privés tantôt par les pouvoirs publics nationaux. Bref, l'apport de l'Europe du charbon et de l'acier demeure finalement assez «timide».

Ce constat appelle toutefois deux remarques fondamentales. Il s'explique d'abord par la dialectique des rapports de force réels. Les hauts responsables de l'exécution du traité de Paris n'ont pu s'acquitter que des seules missions auxquelles les Etats ont voulu les associer! Ensuite, la part réduite de la CECA exprimée en termes d'espèces sonnantes et trébuchantes doit être relativisée en envisageant le côté moins matériel des choses. L'inauguration du pool n'a-t-elle pas tenu sur les fonts baptismaux un formidable «laboratoire» du processus d'intégration? Les «modèles de référence» y testés n'ont-ils pas permis à l'Europe unifiée d'apprendre à marcher? Sous cet angle, l'aventure amorcée au lendemain du 9 mai 1950 valait bien la peine d'être vécue. Philippe Mioche nous en brosse une fresque complète. En synthétisant dans une coulée la somme de nos connaissances actuelles sur un édifice aux retombées multiples dans des sphères qui s'étendent de la grande diplomatie à la technologie du recyclage des métaux en passant par les formations professionnelles offertes aux salariés menacés du chômage, son travail mérite de figurer parmi les ouvrages de référence et ce, d'autant plus que l'édition originale en français sera sous peu disponible en onze langues différentes à un prix défiant toute concurrence. Il suffit d'envoyer une commande à l'Office des publications de l'Union européenne.

Desmond DINAN – *Europe recast. A history of European Union*, Palgrave MacMillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, 2004, IX + 371 p. - ISBN 0-333-98734-9 – 23,50 \$.

Ten years after his excellent contribution to the study of the history of European integration and the functioning of European institutions (*Ever closer union? An introduction to the European Community*) Desmond Dinan has now written probably the best overview in English of the construction of Europe from the end of the Second World War until the start of the twenty-first century, ending just before the conclusion of the writing of the European Constitution.

The objective of the book is clear: “‘Europe recast’ seeks to explain and describe the development of European integration as comprehensively as possible within a manageable length, hoping to avoid Euro-fatigue [...]. Yet, as this book shows, the making of the EU combines idealism and ideological struggles, the initiative and political entrepreneurship of strong individuals, national interests and international relations, and institutional design and bureaucratic intrigue” (p.10) Totally unprejudiced and without any desire to detract from the achievements of European integration, Dinan also avoids the risk of determinism or of glorifying particular protagonists and events. For Dinan, there is nothing inevitable about the process; the state governments are in no way predisposed to share or concede sovereignty. Nonetheless, if European integration has been achieved this has been “because of a rational response by politicians, businesspeople, and other key actors to changing economic, political, and strategic circumstances” (p.2) – that is, because national leaders have understood that sharing sovereignty is in the interests of the states that they represent. For Dinan this spirit underpinned the start of the adventure in 1950; the symbolism of the Schuman Declaration only five years after the end of the war was undeniable, but it would have had no tangible consequences “if the undertaking had not worked to the ultimate advantage of the countries concerned” (p.11). As it is the states that have been the protagonists of the process, the influence of individual leaders has depended on the importance of the states to which they belong. Since the construction of Europe has revolved around the Franco-German axis, it is no surprise that the figures seen as the great protagonists of the process should have been either French or German (Schuman, Monnet, De Gaulle, Giscard, Mitterrand, Adenauer, Hallstein, Erhard, Kohl or Schmidt) This Franco-German axis has worked both bilaterally (*Traité de l’Élysée*) and multilaterally (prior agreement on issues in the European Council) but is now challenged by a European Union enlarged to 25 states, including ten new members for whom France does not seem to be a model to imitate or a point of reference. In the words of France’s minister of the interior, Nicolas Sarkozy, the Franco-German alliance is no longer sufficient to lead the new Europe.

Chapter 1, which focuses on the genesis of the Schuman Plan, discusses the role of the United States in the promotion of European integration and the French dependence on German coke as catalysts of a project which, in Jean Monnet, found a figure able to find a practical solution to a structural problem in his country, and,

in Robert Schuman, a minister who espoused it out of pure political necessity and who in fact would have done exactly the opposite if the circumstances had so required (p.37). In this section it would have been interesting if Dinan had devoted a little more time to the subject of the United Kingdom's refusal to take on the leadership of Europe, since it was this that led to the choice of France for this role, shown in the letter from the US secretary of state, Dean Acheson, to Robert Schuman, quoted by the author (p.35).

The lack of a will to construct Europe as an end in itself, over and above the interests of individual states, is painfully clear in the failure of the European Defence Community (1954) though paradoxically, as Dinan notes, it was this failure that allowed the solution of the German question, the cementing of Franco-German relations and the relaunch of the European project after the Messina meeting (1955) which would pave the way for the Treaty of Rome (1957). On this occasion the exercise of leadership fell to a small country, the Netherlands, dependent on external markets, dissatisfied with the speed at which international trade barriers were being removed and well aware that the symbolic and political importance of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) bore no relation to its economic importance. However, the ECSC had had a positive influence in laying the groundwork for community negotiation, based on continuous contact between the representatives of the member states, and a negative effect by bringing to the fore something that would be a constant feature of European dealings from that point onwards: the distrust felt by small states towards the larger ones, reflected in the Netherlands's position in the negotiations on the ECSC High Authority.

At the end of the nineteen fifties Charles de Gaulle returned to politics. he could have put an end to the community project, but decided instead to promote it, understanding, like his predecessors, that Europe was a means and not an end, one that could permit the modernization of French industry, provide subsidies for agriculture and affirm France's status as leader of the group. His plan required two things: the agreement of the Federal Republic of Germany, and the marginalisation of the United Kingdom. De Gaulle threw himself into the task, cultivating his relationship with the German chancellor Konrad Adenauer and twice vetoing the entry of the United Kingdom into the EEC in 1963 and 1967. A third fundamental aspect of de Gaulle's relation with the EEC was the latter's control of supranational elements. The key event, as the author notes, was the "Empty Chair crisis" of 1965 which established once and for all, through the Luxembourg Compromise, the right of veto of states against the ambitions of the Commission. Indeed, the Commission never fully recovered from the defeat.

Chapter 3 on the beginnings of the community institutions is excellent: in little more than 40 pages it provides a broad overview of their workings, which can be summarised as follows: "The history of the EC is really a history of meetings" (p.88). This "history of meetings" benefited from the climate of unprecedented economic stability and growth in the nineteen sixties – in marked contrast to the situation today, as the European Union is taking on the biggest and most complicated enlargement of its history. As regards the most important community

policy to emerge from those years, the Common Agricultural Policy, Dinan makes the important point that Washington continued to attach great importance to European integration by accepting the CAP despite the fact that it was not in its interests (p.97)

Nineteen sixty-nine, the year of the Hague conference, signalled the end both of the period of economic growth and of the Bretton Woods system. Europe began to search for a system of stability of its own, a process that would culminate in the establishment of Economic and Monetary Union three decades later. The states opted for national rather than community solutions, but the community machinery never ceased to operate which impeded the disintegration of the European system. In fact the start of the seventies saw a set of important developments for the community: the creation of the European Council of heads of state and government, the increase in the prerogatives of the European Parliament, the end of the dictatorships in Greece, Portugal, and Spain (later to join the EEC in the second and third enlargements) and de Gaulle's retirement, opening the way for the entry of the United Kingdom which, together with Denmark and the Republic of Ireland joined the EEC in the first enlargement in 1973. Before this, however, one of the main conditions for the entry of new states was established, that is, that all issues which current members consider that new members should accept as "faits accomplis" should be resolved beforehand; candidates could negotiate their adaptation to existing community treaties but could not negotiate the content. So, the author says, the CAP and its funding had to be definitively established before the United Kingdom could join (p.111). Paris now supported the accession of the UK, which saw it as a strong counterweight to an economically powerful FRG which was beginning to show signs of an alarming independence in its foreign policy (in the form of Ostpolitik) (pp.127-128). The first half of the seventies were also the years of the appearance of the first community regional policy, advances in social policy, the birth of environmental policies inside the community, the first conventions on development aid (Lomé 1975) and a very timid European dimension in foreign policy in the framework of the European Political Cooperation. The first elections to the European Parliament by universal suffrage, in 1979, signalled the end of a decade of crisis and raised high hopes for the new decade.

For Dinan, the great novelty of the eighties was the fact that to face the new challenges – the new recession after the Iran crisis, strong global competition in the area of new technologies and the growing tensions between East and West – national leaders began to look for solutions at community level. Three key national leaders in those years, François Mitterrand, Helmut Kohl and Margaret Thatcher, none of whom were whole-hearted supporters of the European cause on taking office (indeed Thatcher never became one) pushed forward the construction of the Single Market by signing the Single European Act (1986). For Dinan it was the support of these three leaders (rather than any personal dynamism of his own) that allowed the president of the Commission Jacques Delors to pursue his policy of dismantling internal trade barriers (p.213).

The second and third enlargements (the entry of Greece in 1981 and of Spain and Portugal in 1986) presented these states with an opportunity to consolidate their

democratic systems, increase prosperity, and recover international respectability. For the Community these two enlargements meant a real challenge. Consider the case of Spain: with Spain's entry, the amount of agricultural land in the EU rose by 30% and the number of farmers by 25%; France and Italy now faced direct competition in fruit and vegetable production and olive oil. (p.185) Faithful to tradition, the Community decided to resolve the financial questions first; at the Fontainebleau Summit in 1984 the issue of the British rebate was settled, and the decisions to increase income from VAT and to reduce the CAP budget were taken (p.188).

The move from the Single European Act to the Treaty of Maastricht and the change in name from the European Economic Community to the European Union were overshadowed by geopolitical changes such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of Yugoslavia, which transformed the context of European integration, rekindled mistrust of a unified Germany (which the other nations were determined to maintain firmly committed to Europe via the Economic and Monetary Union) and highlighted Europe's inability to coordinate policy abroad during the wars in the former Yugoslavia. On this last point, Dinan is quite right to state that the change from European Political Cooperation to a Common Foreign and Security Policy is more a question of terminology than of substance (p.257) since the states lack the necessary will to provide the new system with the instruments required. All this contributed to obscuring the implications for the construction of Europe of the Treaty of Maastricht, "one of the greatest milestones in the history of European integration [...] the Treaty produced an impressive political entity: an organization of European states with strong federal attributes" (p.233). In other words, the treaty conferred on the construction of Europe the political dimension that was lacking in the Treaty of Rome.

The last enlargement and the incorporation of central and eastern Europe has given rise to two processes that are theoretically complementary: the adaptation of the candidate states to the requirements of the EU for member states (this against a general background of suspicion and lack of generosity on the part of current members facing a development that they nevertheless describe as historic) and the adaptation of the European institutions to a new reality comprising 25 states, an issue that the Treaties of Amsterdam, Nice and the European Constitution project have not resolved successfully. Desmond Dinan is particularly hard on Nice: "Rarely did an intergovernmental conference devote so much time to so few issues with so few consequential results" (p.288). In addition there is the battle that has raged since the times of High Authority of the ECSC between large and small states, in which the latter fear that the wishes of their bigger neighbours will be foisted upon them; France's struggle not to lose its scope of influence; and, finally, a split between the states that support a higher level of supranational governance and those who advocate intergovernmentalism as the best formula for the future. For the latter the enlargement is a way to avoid a higher level of supranational governance and for the former "enhanced cooperations" constitute the best way to bring about the construction of Europe.

Dinan ends by listing the main challenges facing the European Union today:

“More jobs, better quality of life, less crime, decent education and better health care” (European Council, December 2001) which, combined with the objectives of Lisbon in March 2000, namely that by 2010 the European Union “should become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world” would produce what Dinan perceptively defines as a European Union that resembles the United States economically but not socially (p.307). He is pessimistic about this objective: “Although European integration undoubtedly helped the member states economically, the E.U. seemed unlikely ever to achieve its full potential for growth and job creation” (p.308);

Reform of the CAP;

The question of cohesion in the context of an enlarged European Union but with a limited budget;

Improving communication with the citizenry of Europe to ensure that they understand and support the EU’s activity;

Providing the EU with a foreign and defence dimension to match its economic and commercial capacity, an objective about which Dinan remains pessimistic, stating that “few member states wanted to hand over responsibility for national defense to a European supranational authority” (p.318) while the limited objectives regarding foreign policy expressed in the position of Mr. PESCE, “as a senior official he was inferior in rank to the foreign minister of even the smallest member state”(p.316).

Questions of internal security deriving from terrorism, organized crime and illegal immigration without falling into the demagoguery of the extreme right.

The book has a full bibliography and the maps, chronological tables and appendices help to clarify a complex set of events. This is an important text for students of the history of the integration of Europe and will also be a useful reference for researchers.

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Fatih TAYFUR - *Semiperipheral Development and foreign policy. The case of Greece and Spain*, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Aldershot, 2003, vii + 259 p. – ISBN 0-7546-1964-8 – 99,06 €.

Fatih Tayfur’s book is not about history, but about political science. The objective is to demonstrate that Immanuel Wallerstein’s world system model of states and the concept of “semiperiphery”¹ is a useful tool for explaining the economic and

1. See for example I. WALLERSTEIN, *The Modern World system: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, Academic Press, New York, 1974.

political development and the foreign policy orientation of Spain and Greece, two states which Wallerstein's model defines as semiperipheral.

According to this model, the world system of states is based on an international division of labour which determines the relations between states, and therefore their foreign policy, and the conditions of labour inside each one. A state's political system is also directly related to the place it occupies inside the world system. There are four categories of state: core, semiperipheral, peripheral and external. The core states are those that derive maximum benefit from the capitalist world economy and are characterised by a strong central government, a large bureaucracy, a high concentration of capital, a well qualified workforce, high wages and the establishment of unequal trade relations with the periphery to which they also offer banking services, professional training, trade and so on. The situation is repeated, to a lesser extent, in relation to the semiperiphery. A semiperipheral state is a central state in decline, or a peripheral state seeking to improve its position inside the world system. Semiperipheral states act as "buffers" between the core and the periphery and are characterised by the central role of the state in economic activity, tensions between the state and a strong local landed class and the difficulty in establishing a position of predominance in international trade.

In this regard, Fatih Tayfur states: "I shall consider the economic environment to investigate the production patterns, the role of the state in the economy, the nature of the dominant economic elite, the nature of the relationship between the state and the economic elites themselves, and also the nature of the relationship between foreign capital and the Greek and Spanish states and the domestic economic elites. Furthermore, in the second period (mid-1970s to 2000s), I shall also investigate whether both Greece and Spain experienced upward mobility towards the core zone in the world-system hierarchy" (p.30) In the first chapter, after presenting the objectives, Tayfur describes Wallerstein's model. In the following chapters he applies the model to analyse the history of Spain and Greece since 1945, dividing the analysis into two periods: a period of expansion (1945 to the mid-1970s) and another of contraction (mid-1970s to the 2000s). According to Wallerstein's model, during a period of expansion the foreign policy of a semiperipheral state centres on meeting the overall objectives of the hegemonic power that dictates the policy to be followed. In contrast, during a period of contraction this same state changes its international alliances, no longer acting as a satellite of the hegemonic power, and aiming to develop a relatively independent foreign policy. For his part, Fatih Tayfur proposes that in the period of contraction these states also seek to raise their international status by acting as bridges between core states and areas to which they are linked either historically or by geographic proximity.

In his general analysis of the history of Spain and Greece, Tayfur finds all the necessary elements to confirm the validity of Wallerstein's model for explaining the development of both states during the Cold War. However, the work raises serious doubts about the model's validity in the globalised world of the start of the twenty-first century, which is still searching for an international system able to define it.

To summarise, this book will be of great interest to students of international systems of states but not to those wanting to study the history of Spain and Greece since 1945, about which relatively little is known outside the countries themselves. Nonetheless the author deserves credit for the attempt to combine a comparative analysis of the formulation of states' foreign policy with the application of theories of international relations.

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Michael GEHLER – *Europa. Ideen, Institutionen, Vereinigung*, Olzog Verlag, München, 2005, 477 S. – ISBN 3-7892-8129-8 – 24,50 €.

Nach den gescheiterten Referenden in Frankreich und den Niederlanden muss sich Europa mit der Frage beschäftigen, wie es weiter gehen soll mit dem Integrationsprozess. Wie aber die Auswertung der Gründe des „Nein“ in den Abstimmungen nahe legt, ist es diesmal nicht mit technokratischen Antworten und inkrementalen Methoden getan. Vielmehr besteht mehr denn je die Notwendigkeit, sich über Sinne und Zweck der europäischen Einigung zu verständigen, insbesondere nachdem Friede, Wohlstand und die Wiedervereinigung des Kontinents erfolgreich erreicht und als Ziele an Strahlkraft verloren zu haben scheinen.

Im Kern geht es also darum, auf welchen Ideen Europa seine weitere Entwicklung gründen will. Solche Grundsatzdebatten wurden bislang zugunsten einer pragmatischen Politik der kleinen Schritte vermieden. Oder sie beschäftigten nur einen kleinen Kreis von Experten, wie zum Beispiel nach der Humboldt-Rede von Joschka Fischer im Jahr 2000 und den anschließenden Repliken und Gegenentwürfen einiger Politiker und Wissenschaftler.

Nützlich für eine solche Debatte über das Wesen eines vereinten Europas, seiner Identität und seiner Grenzen wäre eine Bilanz, die Antwort auf die Frage gibt, welcher Bestand an Ideen, Leitbildern und Visionen bislang dem Projekt der europäischen Integration zugrunde lag. Auf dieser Grundlage ließe sich diskutieren, was davon heute in einer EU von mindestens 25 Mitgliedern unter den Bedingungen der Globalisierung noch relevant und wirkungsmächtig ist.

Auf den ersten Blick verspricht „Europa. Ideen, Institutionen, Vereinigung“ eine solche Bestandsaufnahme zu sein. Das Buch des österreichischen Historikers Michael Gehler ist 500 Seiten stark und gliedert sich in drei Teile: es behandelt die „Ursprünge und Charakteristika“ Europas, es stellt die „Europa-Ideen im Spannungsfeld von Idee und Wirklichkeit“ vor und zeichnet den „Weg vom Europa der Institutionen zur Vereinigung des Kontinents“ für den Zeitraum 1947 bis 2004 nach. Schon der Umfang eines solchen Vorhabens beeindruckt. Aber vor Größe ist dem jungen Innsbrucker Professor nicht bange, zeigt seine Veröffentlichungsliste doch bereits mehrere Hundert Einträge.

Auch dieses Buch zeugt vom Fleiß seines Verfassers, denn es liefert neben dem Textteil zahlreiche Illustrationen, Karten, Schaubilder und Cartoons. Es verfügt

über ein umfassendes Personenregister, ein Glossar, eine Liste von Webadressen und ein Abkürzungsverzeichnis, eine Chronologie der europäischen Integration und eine umfangreiche Literaturliste zu Geschichte und Ideen der europäischen Einigung. Dies alles hilft dem Benutzer bei der gezielten Suche. Denn ein solches Buch liest man nicht an einem Stück, sondern es dient eher als Nachschlagewerk.

Unter den vielen Titeln der Bibliographie finden sich kaum Beiträge, die nicht in Deutsch oder Englisch verfasst sind. Andererseits ist das Buch selbst auf Deutsch verfasst und richtet sich schon deswegen nicht an ein internationales Publikum. Das mag wohl auch der Grund sein, warum der deutschen Einheit relativ viel Raum gegeben wird, ohne dass in diesem Teil ein direkter Bezug zum Thema des Buches hergestellt wird.

Die Materialfülle und die Breite seines Anspruchs verlangen von Gehler einerseits Kürze der Darstellung und gleichzeitig einen umfassenden Blick. Dadurch entsteht ein hohes Tempo. Der Text zieht den Leser von einem Ort zum nächsten, von einer Zeit und einer Idee zur folgenden. Dabei gibt es aber kein Leitmotiv, auch keine zugrunde liegende Theorie oder Hypothese, die die einzelnen Teile aufeinander bezögen oder woran das Material gemessen werden könnte. Gehler sagt nicht – und ebenso wenig der Klappentext –, was genau das Buch will oder an wen es sich richtet.

Es bleibt offen, was die Auswahlkriterien und Filter sind, die bestimmte Personen und ihre Europaideen in dieses ambitionierte Geschichtsbuch kommen lassen und wer oder was nicht aufgenommen wird. Ein Blick in das Personenverzeichnis zeigt, dass europapolitisch rührige Premiers wie Thatcher – als Gegenspieler Delors – oder Major (dessen Europapolitik unter dem Titel stand „to be at the heart of Europe“) fehlen. Ebenso wenig erscheint z.B. US-Präsident Bush, während dessen Amtszeit der Eiserne Vorhang fiel und der deswegen zu einem zentralen Akteur bei der Neuordnung Europas wurde. Das betraf nicht nur die deutsche Vereinigung sondern auch z.B. die Unabhängigkeit der baltischen Staaten, die Bush aktiv gegenüber der Sowjetunion unterstützte.

Auch was die Ideen betrifft, wird offenbar nur das aufgenommen, was dem Autor persönlich als relevant erscheint. Die Europakonzeption der „Drei Weisen“ Dehaene, von Weizsäcker und Lord Simon schafft es beispielsweise nicht, erwähnt zu werden.

Das Problem der Auswahl stellt sich auch in den Kapiteln, die sich mit länger zurückliegenden Zeiten befassen. Denn hier dehnt Gehler das Spektrum seiner Betrachtung aus und es geht nicht nur um Ideen und Institutionen, sondern um das, was in der Überschrift unter „Charakteristika“ firmiert. Auch dieser Begriff bleibt unscharf. Und so stellt sich hier wieder die Frage, wie es etwa die Architektur einer bestimmten Zeit schafft, in die Darstellung aufgenommen zu werden, während andere Aspekte nicht berücksichtigt werden, die aber mit vergleichbarer Plausibilität bei der Bestimmung „Europas“ helfen könnten.

Ein solcher Vorwurf der Unvollständigkeit an ein Projekt dieses Umfangs ist natürlich billig und mag ungerecht erscheinen. Denn auch 500 Seiten stellen eine Begrenzung dar und es lässt sich schlicht nicht alles einbeziehen, was zum Thema

gehört. Gerade wegen der Größe des Vorhabens wäre es aber eine Absicherung gegen den Vorwurf der Beliebigkeit oder der Subjektivität, wenn die Auswahlkriterien oder wenigstens die Absicht dieses Buches offen gelegt würden.

Das mag möglicherweise in Überblicksdarstellungen nicht üblich sein oder methodologisch auch zu anspruchsvoll erscheinen. Aber auch dann gäbe es die Möglichkeit, in einer Einführung oder in einer Bilanz den Versuch einer Synthese oder wenigstens einer Gewichtung zu wagen. Diese Chancen bleiben ungenutzt.

Anfangs wird eher beiläufig bemerkt, Europa ließe sich objektiv nicht definieren. Damit stellt sich die Frage, ob das ein Spezifikum Europas ist oder ob das für andere Kontinente, regionale Integrationsprojekte oder Kulturräume mehr oder weniger gilt. Antworten auf derartige Fragen hätten das Buch zu einem wertvollen Beitrag zur gegenwärtigen Diskussion um die Selbstbestimmung Europas werden lassen. Dies hätte aber übergeordnete und vor allem die einzelnen Kapitel verbindende Perspektiven verlangt, die das Buch nicht liefert. Stattdessen ist es nicht mehr als die Summe der einzelnen Teile.

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Henri VOGT – *Between Utopia & Disillusionment. A Narrative of the Political Transformation in Eastern Europe*, Berghahn Books, New York/Oxford, 2004, 352 p. – ISBN 1-57181-895-2 (hardcover) – 75.00 \$.

What is the meaning with my life? This profound question is at the heart of Henri Vogt's analysis of how in the 1990s young people confronted the transition from communism to democracy in the Czech Republic, East Germany and Estonia. The heritage from the 1989-91 revolutions, ambivalence, disillusionment, individualism and collective identities are the five social psychological themes chosen to capture the confrontation between individual utopian perspectives and actual experiences.

Vogt's point of departure is that the notion of utopia usually has been defined as a grand scheme for a whole society, or for the whole mankind. Thus the collapse of the communist system in Europe could be interpreted as the end of both kinds of utopias. However, Vogt argues that the significance of the political change in 1989-1991 is that the concept of utopia is well and alive, because a whole generation, those who in these years were in their teens or twenties, perceive democracy as fundamentally good, *a conditio sine qua non*. This is a perception which implies a certain kind of utopianism. The future is not closed but open and "an open future can be a utopia" (p.8) and "it is precisely the idea of an open future that defines the open society" (p.97).

The notion of utopia, which is applied by Vogt, is taken from Ernst Bloch. It is not about a vision for society's future but about the ability to reflect upon the consequences of the opening of horizons in both time and space thanks to the breakdown of the totalitarian dictatorship. It is evident from Vogt's investigation

that young people experienced that they became free not only to move but also to choose their future life. The future was seen not in the shape of a preordained course but as a series of changing options. This dynamic, individualized utopia is the direct opposite to the closed boundaries – literally exemplified by the Berlin wall – and the closed future in the societies of “really existing socialism”. The East German dissident Rudolf Bahro used this expression in a very critical sense about the GDR. However, also the communist leaders used it, as a positive definition of their own society. This latter meaning was shared and accepted by many people in the West up to 1989. Vogt’s point is that the death of the realized socialist “utopia” made possible the emergence of real utopia!

Between Utopia and Disillusionment is a carefully composed narration of experiences. This means that the author does not heed common positivist norms of how to present theory, methodology and previous research in the field. Instead the book is steeped in the mould of social constructivism. The theoretical observations are intertwined with the presentations of the sources that constitute the empirical basis of the analysis. These sources are not only the different interviews but also novels by the Czech Ivan Klima (*The Ultimate Intimacy*), the Estonian Emil Tode (*Piiririk /The Borderland/*) and the (East) German Monika Maron (*Animal Triste*) and essays, commissioned by the author and written by Czech students, and political speeches, notably by the Estonian president Lennart Meri. The interviews and the submitted essays are the products of the author’s own fieldwork. This fact and the choice of novels and speeches as additional source material reveal the author’s intimate knowledge of the respective national cultures. His personal experiences and reflections are part of the “sources”. This is typical of social anthropology but nowadays also quite common in works labeled “political science”. The choice of method has consequences for the epistemological status of *Between Utopia & Disillusionment*.

The book thus should not be evaluated according to the usual standards of the reliability of the data presented or rules of representativity in political science. Concerning the reliability and the absolutely basic concept ‘validity’, the author has the following to say when he discusses the significance of the interviews that constitute the bulk of the empirical material:

“Ultimately, the reliability and the validity of the data is entirely dependent on the forms of contextualisation, of systematisation and to a certain extent on common sense and even intuition. In principle one could construct an all-encompassing narrative of the change in Eastern Europe on the basis of only one person’s ideas and experiences – and do this in a strictly scientific way” (p.267).

It is not clear what the author has in mind as “a strictly scientific way”. The anxious declaration reveals uneasiness concerning how his work will be received in the scientific community. This points to the hegemony in contemporary political science of real existing positivism. However, if the English word “science” is exchanged for the German word “Geisteswissenschaft” the author can be confident that his results will be taken seriously.

Consequently, *Between Utopia and Disillusionment* is not a report of laboratory experiments or a demonstration of the validity of certain general laws. Instead, the book offers new insights for anyone who is acquainted with everyday life and political rhetoric in the countries under scrutiny in the twilight of real socialism, at the dawn of democracy in the 1990s, and in today's post-modern Europe. The book should be equally fruitful reading for anyone *not* acquainted with these countries (or with their post-socialist proxies) but concerned with the question of reflective and theoretically conscious narration as a method of presentation of data in social science.

Last but not least, Henri Vogt's book may well be read as an insightful traveler's report from the virgin lands of the new democracies in Eastern Europe. The book is free from a condescending tone concerning the people that are the object of study. Vogt demonstrates that disillusionment and even nostalgia do not imply that those directly concerned with building the contemporary society in Eastern Europe view real existing socialism as a mythical Golden Age.

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Gérard BOSSUAT – *Faire l'Europe sans défaire la France: 60 ans de politique d'unité européenne des gouvernements et des présidents de la République française (1943-2003)*, P.I.E. Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2005, 630 p. – ISBN 90-5201-249-0 – 54,50 €.

This book is aptly titled in view of the recent referendum in France on the European constitution, in which French electors shrunk back from the next step in integration amid warnings that France might in some way be “unmade” or deconstructed as Europe was built. Nothing could be further than the truth: in fact, Bossuat shows, sixty years of French European policy has consistently pursued policies designed to ensure that Europe would be constructed “sans défaire la France”. The federalist schemes of Schuman and Monnet, which underlay the plan for a European Coal and Steel Community in 1950 were swiftly abandoned. The phrase itself, “faire l'Europe sans défaire la France”, was first uttered by Georges Bidault, but it was repeated again by Prime ministers Pierre Bérégovoy and then again by Lionel Jospin in describing French policy in the 1980s and at the turn of the 21st century. And Bossuat's point is just that: the French have consistently pushed for the construction of Europe, regarding Europe as their primary sphere of diplomatic activity and the means by which French power and influence in the world can be best manifested and projected. The aim from very early was “Europe-puissance” under French impulsion if not direction. But at the same time it was to be a “Europe of states” as firmly enunciated by de Gaulle, and repeated by Jospin himself in calling for a “confederation of nation-states”. And need one repeat that Europe today insofar as it exists is governed by its council, by means of intergovernmental negotiation, and not by the Commission? De Gaulle's vision has

been fulfilled. Bossuat seems to echo the general in asking rhetorically, after all, what would France be without its own foreign policy, and how could July 14 be celebrated without the army? It is perhaps easier for a foreigner to imagine answers to these questions than for a French person, perhaps; but as an American, whose country is now the most “sovereignist” in the world, I should not throw stones.

The book consists of a long, incisive essay by Bossuat, by way of introduction to 300 plus pages of documents from the French archives and published sources that show clearly the directions of French policy. The archives do reveal some surprises. Indeed Jean Monnet himself emerges in this text as a French nationalist, amply justifying François Mitterrand’s placement of his ashes in the Pantheon. Monnet was hardly alone among those French who constructed visions of various kinds of European “entities” during the war, while the Committee of National Liberation remained still in Algiers, but he emerges as extraordinarily hardheaded, aiming frankly at getting control of the German coal and steel industries, if not by an international authority, then what he called a “coal and steel dictator”, which later became the “High Authority”. Virtually all the early French schemes wanted to unify the economies of France, the Benelux, and a “Rhennish state” in a common economic entity, thus sealing the division of Germany, decentralizing it, and integrating its industrial economy and resources with the West. France alone could build Europe, Monnet writes in one of the many excellent and carefully chosen texts which appear in this volume; it alone is European, unlike the US, the USSR, or the UK. Monnet early understood that the British would not be part of any serious effort at European reconstruction. When, as expected, they reacted negatively to the Schuman plan, Monnet wrote that he could only regret this, but the differences between Britain and France were doctrinal and substantive, not susceptible to compromise. France had no choice but to go ahead. And Monnet appears again in a surprising role in support of de Gaulle’s plan for a European Political Community built around the notion of a Europe of States, without the British. If the Fouchet plan did not go as far as he would have liked, Monnet said, it still represented progress. But Bossuat might have pointed out that that the Fouchet plan’s rejection by France’s five partners had more to do with de Charles de Gaulle’s arrogant assumption that he could force, rather than persuade, the five to fall into line with his policies; the problem was the content of the plan, not its form. It was not so much rejected because it was not federalist enough, as because it was anti-US, anti-British, and anti-NATO as well. There never seemed an option of accepting de Gaulle’s proposals without fully accepting his policies.

If Monnet was a nationalist, still, de Gaulle was a European. He envisioned European economic unity and political cooperation himself during the war, and as president after 1958 it fell to him to implement the Treaty of Rome, which he embraced ultimately as a good thing for France economically. He disliked the powers given to the Commission by the treaty, however, and he firmly insisted that France could not fully join unless there were a Common Market in agriculture and a common external tariff. These were the issues that underlay his rejection of the British in 1963 and the “empty chair” crisis of 1965. And while the rejection of

Britain was reversed by Pompidou ten years later, the crisis of 1965-66 ended with a French victory. By the terms of the Luxembourg compromise a unanimity rule was preserved for what any of the member states declared to be in its “vital interests”, while the Common Agricultural Policy, still the largest part of the EU’s budget today, was created and fully funded by France’s partners. De Gaulle ultimately forced the European Economic Community into his mold of a “Europe of States”, shifting power away from the Commission, which he condemned as an unelected technocracy, and toward the Council, where heads of government and ministers of the member states meeting together determined policy by intergovernmental negotiations and unanimously. It took another twenty years, until the Single European Act, for some decisions to be determined by weighted voting, and even today the Luxembourg compromise remains in effect.

Four French presidents subsequently, Bossuat shows, gave their own particular impulsion to European unity, each carefully continuing the Gaullist policy of building a “Europe of States”. Indeed, Georges Pompidou wanted the British in the community in the last resort because he knew they would be more Gaullist than de Gaulle in preserving a “Europe of States”. Pompidou also worried whether the Franco-German tandem that gave impetus to almost all decisions toward further unity might in the long run turn into a German-French team with Bonn-Berlin in control. British entry would counter this menace. Historians will one day decide whether British entry did not sabotage the European project; but the contradictory aspects of Pompidou’s policies emerge all the more clearly in that at the same time he understood the need for European currency alignment leading to currency union. It was, not incidentally, the dollar crisis that spurred the first projects toward European currency union, as it was the American challenge that helped Europe along at the time of Suez and challenged it to achieve a common defense policy in the 1990s. Although the Americans were critical to the success of Europe in its early stages by their enthusiastic, often naïve support, they more often pushed it along by frightening the Europeans with their power. The process of creating a European currency took twenty more years to conceptualize and another eight years beyond that, to achieve. The euro became a reality January 1, 1999; Bossuat is a sure guide in analyzing the complex stages and negotiations along the way.

Valéry Giscard d’Estaing similarly pushed Europe along: he with Pompidou, gets credit for yet another “relance” of the European project, which culminated in direct elections to a European parliament in 1979. But François Mitterrand emerges from this account as the arch-European. Europe became the fulcrum of his policy once the experiment of “socialism in one country” of 1981-83 stalled. The French president faced a stark choice between trying to go it alone and tying France to Europe once and for all; he saw no choice but Europe, which he struggled mightily to endow with a social orientation. He was helped by the singularly creative powers of Jacques Delors as head of the European Commission. We thus get the second period of creativity in the construction of Europe, from the Single European Act (1986) through Maastricht (1992). Both these treaties foresaw the need once again for a common currency, but they also enshrined the principles of a single market for

goods, labor, services, and capital, while anchoring the project in the common pillars of a security and defense policy, foreign policy, and harmonized system of justice. It is more a tribute to Helmut Kohl than to Mitterrand, however, that the German unification of 1989-90 resulted in yet a new realization of the importance of anchoring Germany once and for all within the European project. Mitterrand and Delors were able to cap the edifice with a social charter of rights as well. But this, with the plan for the creation of the euro, again foundered on the hard rock of British dissent, introducing the possibility of the European project proceeding at different speeds, or even with the specter of possible British secession in its future.

Jacques Chirac, Bossuat shows, never was a European, but he became one as president. Bossuat remains skeptical of his sincerity, but it is he who has built the prospect of Europe-puissance under French supremacy into a sufficient bogey-man to frighten the Bush administration away from traditional American support for European unity. At the same time he caused the current European crisis by tying ratification of the constitution to his own declining political fortunes. Bossuat has made a brilliant argument which is shored up by a superb collection of documents. The documents suffer, however, as Bossuat is aware, from the obvious disability that their first part is choice, based on archives now available to scholars, while the period of the last 30 years must be covered by selections from memoirs and published sources, official speeches, and the press. These are not satisfactory in terms of giving us the full story. But we are able to see clearly all the same the fundamental unity of French policy toward Europe, and its relative success, over the period of the last sixty years.

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Gabriele CLEMENS (Hrsg.) – *Nation und Europa. Studien zum internationalen Staatensystem im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Festschrift für Peter Krüger zum 65. Geburtstag*, Peter Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2001, 350 S. – ISBN 3-51507790-1 – 61,- €.

Von Peter Krüger stammen einige der wichtigsten Forschungsarbeiten über die internationalen Beziehungen der Neuzeit. Aufbauend auf seiner 1962 eingereichten Dissertation über „Die Beziehungen der Rheinischen Pfalz zu Westeuropa 1567-1582“¹ publizierte Krüger in den letzten vier Jahrzehnten zahlreiche geschichtswissenschaftliche Studien, die das auswärtige Handeln von Staaten in den Mittelpunkt rückten, aber auch das komplexe Beziehungsgeflecht des internationalen Systems im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert beleuchteten. Als Professor für Neuere Geschichte in Marburg sowie als Herausgeber der „Akten zur deutschen

1. P. KRÜGER, *Die Beziehungen der Rheinischen Pfalz zu Westeuropa 1567-1582. Die auswärtigen Beziehungen des Pfalzgrafen Johann Casimir 1576-1582*, Diss. München, 1964.

auswärtigen Politik 1918-1945“ und der „Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik“ richtete er besonderes Augenmerk auf die deutsche Außenpolitik und Aspekte der (west)-europäischen Einigung. Behandelt wurden diese Themen von Krüger aus unterschiedlichen disziplinären Blickwinkeln – sowohl aus der Perspektive der politischen Geschichte, als auch aus Sicht der Wirtschafts-, der Verfassungs- und der Ideengeschichte. Einige der Publikationen Krügers haben mittlerweile den Charakter von Standardwerken erreicht – darunter vor allem seine beiden Bücher zur Außenpolitik der Weimarer Republik.²

Angesichts der breiten Rezeption seiner Forschungen scheint es nur folgerichtig, wenn Schüler und Kollegen Peter Krüger mit einer Festschrift ehren, die unter der Überschrift „Nation und Europa“ die beiden wichtigsten Spannungspole seiner Forschungsthemen im Titel vereint. Worin liegt aber der Wert dieser Festschrift für die Forschung? Angesichts der inflationären Zunahme von Festschriften in den vergangenen Jahren wird ihnen mit wachsender Skepsis begegnet. Nicht selten sind Festschriften bunte Zusammenstellungen ohne größeren inneren Zusammenhalt, durchzogen von solchen Beiträgen, die andernorts keinen Platz gefunden haben. Obgleich Letzteres auch für einige Beiträge der hier zu besprechenden Festschrift gelten mag, verdient diese dessen ungeachtet in doppelter Hinsicht besondere Beachtung. Auf der einen Seite enthält sie zahlreiche Beiträge, in denen Historiker, über den Rahmen des „Forschungsalltags“ hinaus, den Blick auf Brüche und Kontinuitätslinien richten und sich über empirisch abgesicherte Forschungsarbeiten zu neuen Interpretationen vorwagen. Auf der anderen Seite dokumentiert die Festschrift aber auch den grundsätzlichen Wandel der Forschung zu den internationalen Beziehungen. Sowohl die Festschrift selbst als auch das Œuvre des zu ehrenden Wissenschaftlers zeugen exemplarisch von einer zunehmenden Verlagerung des Forschungsinteresses. Bildeten lange Zeit die Diplomatiegeschichte und die „klassische“ auswärtige Politik einzelner Staaten das Gerüst der Forschung zu den internationalen Beziehungen, so wird Außenpolitik mittlerweile immer häufiger als eine Verknüpfung zwischenstaatlicher Beziehungsmuster und innerstaatlicher Verhältnisse interpretiert und analysiert.³ In zunehmendem Maße wächst das Bewusstsein dafür, dass selbst die Nationalstaaten des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts sich nicht hermetisch abriegelten, sondern intensive Beziehungen sowohl politischer wie auch wirtschaftlicher, sozialer und kultureller Art miteinander pflegten. Unter dem Rubrum der transnationalen Geschichte erfährt die Analyse nationalstaatenübergreifender Beziehungsmuster gegenwärtig geradezu eine Konjunktur in der historischen Forschung. Ein wesentlicher Katalysator dieser Entwicklung ist der Prozess der europäischen Einigung, der dazu geführt hat, dass gerade mit Blick auf Europa nationale Außenpolitik in zunehmendem Maße als

2. P. KRÜGER, *Die Außenpolitik der Republik von Weimar*, Darmstadt, 1985 und ders., *Versailles – Deutsche Außenpolitik zwischen Revisionismus und Friedenssicherung*, München, 1986.

3. Vgl. grundlegend zu diesen Tendenzen E. CONZE, U. LAPPENKÜPER, G. MÜLLER (Hrsg.), *Geschichte der internationalen Beziehungen. Erneuerung und Erweiterung einer historischen Disziplin*, Köln, 2004.

europäische Innenpolitik verstanden wird und sich die bisher vergleichsweise strikt getrennten Felder der Innen- und Außenpolitik in zunehmendem Maße vermischen.

Der erste thematische Block der Festschrift beleuchtet aus ideengeschichtlicher und politischer Sicht Friedenskonzepte und internationale Beziehungen im langen 19. Jahrhundert – Forschungsfelder, die jene Wissenschaftler lange Zeit bearbeitet haben, die sich heute den Grundlagen des europäischen Einigungsprozesses zuwenden. Diese Fokussierung auf die Perspektive der europäischen Einigung spiegelt sich auch in fast allen Beiträgen dieses Themenblocks wider. Hellmut Seier, Krügers ebenfalls emeritierter Weggefährte aus der Abteilung für Neuere Geschichte der Universität Marburg, eröffnet die Festschrift mit einem Beitrag zur Rolle des Deutschen Bundes als militärisches Sicherheitssystem. Seier verweist darauf, dass der Bund als Defensivsystem konzipiert war, angesichts struktureller Schwächen als militärische Kraft aber nur eine begrenzte Rolle spielte. Gleichwohl spricht er dem Heer eine wichtige Bedeutung – stärker als die Forschung sie aktuell akzentuiert – bei der Friedenssicherung zu, da es einen zentralen Beitrag zum Ausgleich leistete und damit als früher „Versuch einer multistaatlichen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft mit bundesstaatlichen Zügen“ interpretiert werden kann. Die Studie des Magdeburger Privatdozenten Ulrich Sieg zur Revolution von 1848 geht ebenfalls der Frage nach gesamteuropäischen Grundlagen im frühen 19. Jahrhundert nach. Sie untersucht, inwiefern die Revolution 1848 als gesamteuropäisches Ereignis zu bewerten ist. Sieg deutet die Revolution – oder präziser: die europäischen Revolutionen von 1848 – als erstes und einziges wirklich europäisches Revolutionsphänomen, angesichts des Verlaufs und Ausgangs aber auch als Vorbote des modernen Nationalismus. Der nächste Beitrag dieser Sektion stammt mit Klaus Malettke von einem weiteren Marburger Historiker. In einer knappen Skizze untersucht er Victor Hugos viel zitierte Idee der „Grands États-Unis d’Europe“. Malettke betont die ausgesprochen föderale Konzeption Victor Hugos und bilanziert aus dem Blickwinkel der Rezeptionsgeschichte, dass Hugos Vorstellungen weniger durch die konkrete Ausgestaltung eines Konzeptes, denn durch die generelle mobilisierende Werbung für die europäische Einigungsidee Bedeutung entfaltet haben. Den ideengeschichtlichen Kontrapunkt liefert der Beitrag des Mainzer Historikers Heinz Duchhardt, der die Ausführungen des Berliner Geschichtsprofessors Friedrich Rühs zusammenfasst. Rühs hatte in seinem 1815 erschienenen ‚populärwissenschaftlichen‘ Buch die Rolle Frankreichs als Aggressor in der europäischen Politik und als Gegner der Deutschen betont einseitig dargestellt. Duchhardt erörtert kritisch die Wirkung dieser mit großer Resonanz wahrgenommenen Publikation und konstatiert, dass anti-französischen Ressentiments erheblicher Vorschub geleistet wurde. Der in englischer Sprache abgedruckte Beitrag des Metternich-Experten Enno E. Kraehe thematisiert am Beispiel des Verhältnisses von Spanien und Russland in den Jahren 1812-1823, welche Faktoren gemeinsame pan-europäische Allianzen beeinträchtigten oder zunichte machten. Aus „realistischer“ Perspektive schlussfolgert Kraehe auf Grundlage von neu erschlossenem Material aus spanischen und russischen

Archiven, dass den materiellen Ressourcen eine zentrale Bedeutung für die jeweilige Politikgestaltung zukam. Der in italienischer Sprache publizierte Beitrag des in Florenz lehrenden Ennio di Nolfo beschäftigt sich mit dem zwischen Österreich, Frankreich und Sardinien abgeschlossenen Züricher Frieden vom 10. November 1859 und erörtert dessen Bedeutung für die Entwicklung der italienischen Nationalbewegung.

Mit den Folgen der Pariser Friedenskonferenzen 1919 für den Zeitraum bis 1945 beschäftigt sich der zweite thematische Abschnitt der Festschrift. Klaus Schwabe, einer der ‚Nestoren‘ der Forschung zum Versailler Vertrag, zeigt am Beispiel von vor allem Fiume (Rijeka) die Schwierigkeiten des US-amerikanischen Präsidenten Woodrow Wilson, dem vehement vertretenen Anspruch des Selbstbestimmungsrechts der Völker Rechnung zu tragen und zugleich den Frieden dauerhaft zu sichern. Schwabe folgert aus diesem Spannungsverhältnis, dass es Wilson letztlich um die Einpassung des Selbstbestimmungsrechts in eine internationale Friedensordnung ging, Letztere aber beim amerikanischen Präsidenten höhere Priorität genoss. Die Bedeutung ethnischer Minderheiten für die europäische Einigung, die auch in Peter Krügers Forschungen eine wichtige Rolle gespielt hat, wird von Hans Lemberg behandelt. Lemberg hat die Korrespondenz der tschechoslowakischen Exilregierung in London im Hinblick auf die dort angestellten Überlegungen zu Maßstäben und Kriterien einer künftigen Volkszählung ausgewertet. Dabei kommt er zu dem Schluss, dass mit der Zerstörung der Versailler Friedensordnung auch die Regeln und Werte des Minderheitenschutzes ins Wanken gerieten. Der Beitrag des an der LSE lehrenden Robert Boyce zeigt, dass bereits in den 1920er Jahren eine eingehendere Debatte über die Implikationen von neuen technologischen und ökonomischen Entwicklungen geführt wurde, der zufolge vor allem die großen Staaten begünstigt wurden. Nach der Weltwirtschaftskrise ebte diese Debatte aber rasch ab. Mit den Schwierigkeiten der Etablierung eines Systems der kollektiven Sicherheit nach „Locarno“ greift Georges-Henri Soutou von der Sorbonne ein weiteres Schwerpunktthema von Peter Krüger auf.

Der Beitrag von Reiner Marcowitz eröffnet die dritte Sektion der Festschrift, die das Verhältnis von Nation und Europa nach 1945 ausleuchtet. Der Dresdner Hochschuldozent vergleicht die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik mit derjenigen der DDR und kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass – ungeachtet anders lautender Forschungspositionen – erhebliche strukturelle und inhaltliche Unterschiede berücksichtigt werden müssen, die gerade nicht teleologisch auf den Fluchtpunkt 1989 hinausliefen. Die Herausgeberin der Festschrift, Gabriele Clemens, Privatdozentin für Neure Geschichte und Geschichtliche Landeskunde an der Universität Trier, dokumentiert mit ihrem Beitrag die viel diskutierte außenpolitische Ambivalenz des Bundeskanzlers Ludwig Erhard. Mit seiner Europa-Initiative vom November 1964 gelang es ihm nicht, der Integration neue Impulse zu verleihen. Stattdessen manövrierte sich Erhard in weitere innen- und außenpolitische Schwierigkeiten. Die Konsequenzen des Sechs-Tage-Krieges für das deutsch-israelische Verhältnis werden von der amerikanischen Historikerin

Carole Fink ausgelotet. Sie wertet die deutsche Politik gegenüber Israel als Ausdruck einer wohlwollend-neutralen Haltung und sieht darin einen weiteren Schritt sowohl zur Normalisierung der besonderen Beziehungen zu Israel als auch zu einer aktiveren außenpolitischen Rolle der Bundesrepublik. Ein spannendes Thema stellen auch die von der Forschung bisher weitgehend vernachlässigten euroapolitischen Konzeptionen der SPD dar, die in dem Beitrag von Wilfried Loth dargelegt werden. Der Essener Historiker zeigt, dass die deutsche Sozialdemokratie ihre prinzipiell internationale Ausrichtung stets beibehielt, angesichts mangelnder Einsicht in die realen Machtverhältnisse nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg sich aber nicht in der Lage zeigte, eine tragfähige Europapolitik bis zum Ende der 1950er Jahre zu entwickeln. Mit einer Fallstudie unterstreicht der mittlerweile verstorbene Hallenser Historiker Hermann-Josef Rupieper, wie stark die Vergangenheitsbewältigung in Frankreich politisch durch den Kalten Krieg und das Bemühen um eine deutsch-französische Aussöhnung geprägt wurde. Wie eng Zeitgeschichte und Politik miteinander verwoben sind, dokumentiert der Beitrag von Wilfried von Bredow, der das rein geschichtswissenschaftliche Terrain verlässt und politikwissenschaftlichen Boden betritt. Von Bredow skizziert die Entwicklung der 1999 initiierten Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik vor dem Hintergrund der schwierigen Entwicklung einer politischen Dimension der europäischen Einigung und erörtert die Perspektiven multinationaler militärischer Zusammenarbeit im europäischen Rahmen. Die zivilen Aspekte europäischer Zusammenarbeit stehen im Blickpunkt des Beitrags von Wolfgang Krieger, der die Bedeutung des Airbus-Konsortiums behandelt. Auch wenn Airbus als Erfolgsmodell der Kooperation im Bereich der zivilen Luftfahrt in Europa gilt, ist das Konsortium, so Krieger, doch nicht allein als Gegenpol zu den USA zu sehen. Vielmehr hat es mit Amerika in vielerlei Hinsicht eine symbiotische Beziehung entwickelt.

Spätestens mit dem Beitrag von Krieger, dem noch ein vierter, hier nur erwähnter thematischer Block mit epochenübergreifenden Beiträgen zu Fragen von Kontinuität und Brüchen folgt, wird deutlich, wie stark sich die historische Forschung zu den internationalen Beziehungen verändert hat und weiter verändern wird. Die Begleiterscheinungen der europäischen Integration – sowohl die politischen wie auch die wirtschaftlichen und sozialen – spielen eine immer wichtigere Rolle. Infolgedessen gilt es, nicht allein nationale Außenpolitiken zu verfolgen, sondern auch die sich vielfach überlagernden inneren und äußeren Bedingungsfaktoren der Zeitgeschichte in den Blick zu nehmen. Der sorgfältig redigierte – leider aber nur wenige Informationen über Peter Krüger und die beteiligten Autoren präsentierende – Band liefert zahlreiche Mosaiksteine für eine solche Vorgehensweise. Gerade die Geschichte der europäischen Einigung, die nicht erst 1945 einsetzt, wie Peter Krüger vielfach deutlich gemacht hat, scheint in der Lage, diese Synthese zu leisten, ohne dabei in Verlegenheit zu kommen, eine retrospektive Legitimierung aktueller politischer Entwicklungen zu leisten. Im Gegensatz zu anderen Disziplinen hat die geschichtswissenschaftliche Forschung sich der europäischen Einigung jedoch erst in Ansätzen gewidmet. Nicht zuletzt die

vorliegende Festschrift macht deutlich, dass bei aller kulturalistischen Begeisterung für transnationale Fragestellungen hier noch zahlreiche Felder zu beackern sind. Inwiefern auf absehbare Zeit dabei Syntheseleistungen zu erwarten sind, bleibt abzuwarten. Vielleicht liefert sie der zu ehrende ja selbst, mit seiner angekündigten Publikation über „Das unberechenbare Europa“.

Jürgen Mittag

Justine LACROIX – *L'Europe en procès. Quel patriotisme au-delà des nationalismes?*, coll. Humanités, Éditions du Cerf, Paris, 2004, 205 p. – ISBN 2-204-07598-1 – 20,00 €.

A entendre les discours de gauche comme de droite, qui s'accordent pour dénier une personnalité européenne à la Turquie, on peut s'attendre à ce que tous se retrouvent sur la définition d'une identité propre à l'UE. Or, on sait qu'il n'en est rien, bien au contraire. Justine Lacroix, enseignante à l'ULB, tente non seulement d'éclairer ce paradoxe, mais encore, entreprise fort louable, de définir l'intégration politique européenne et les principes d'une légitimité autre que nationale. On connaît le débat déjà ancien entre les libéraux et les communautaristes, les premiers partant d'un postulat universaliste et formaliste, par lequel l'intégration fonctionnelle, fille de la raison, permettrait d'aboutir à une Europe véritable, les seconds estimant que doit se manifester au préalable un sentiment d'appartenance, qu'ils ne voient pour l'instant s'exprimer qu'à l'échelle des nations. Cette dernière orientation, qui ne pousse pas aux adhésions autres que celles sanctifiées par l'enracinement collectif et l'histoire, et donc repousse par principe l'idée d'une entité politique européenne, est aujourd'hui majoritaire: l'UE souffrirait avant tout non pas d'un déficit de légitimité, mais de crédibilité ou d'identification. Pourtant certains penseurs, parmi lesquels Jürgen Habermas et Jean-Marc Ferry, avancent depuis quelques années le paradigme postnational, qui débouche sur l'idée tant discutée du «patriotisme constitutionnel». C'est de ce principe dont l'auteur va nous entretenir tout au long de l'ouvrage, en étudiant les arguments qui sont en faveur comme en défaveur, et en tentant de convaincre le lecteur que le patriotisme constitutionnel peut lui aussi nourrir un rapport intime à la culture et à l'histoire.

Face à l'imprécision des fondements normatifs de l'UE, un renouvellement des catégories classiques de la pensée politique semble nécessaire pour enfin donner une forme, si ce n'est un visage, au plus célèbre OPNI contemporain. C'est bien ce vers quoi tend la thèse des partisans du patriotisme constitutionnel, pour lesquels les principes mêmes d'appartenance ne relèvent pas de la parenté géographique ou de la proximité culturelle, mais s'appuient sur la reconnaissance commune de bases constitutionnelles: ainsi, l'identité démocratique de l'UE pourrait se stabiliser autour des principes d'universalité, d'autonomie et de responsabilité qui sous-tendent les conceptions de la démocratie et de l'Etat de droit. Le patriotisme constitutionnel qualifié en ces termes est par conséquent avant tout juridique et politique, à rebours de la définition traditionnelle de la nation, entité pré-politique

où l'individu, membre d'un peuple «organique», ne compte pas. Certes, depuis Renan, on a vu la république se présenter comme un mode d'accomplissement du nationalisme et d'affranchissement de l'homme, mais le système ainsi créé bute de toute façon sur les limites nationales: le lien Etat/Nation reste tellement intime que la construction européenne, qui est censée transformer ce dernier, ne peut être vue que comme anti-démocratique. Contre cette idée largement partagée, l'auteur donne sa définition de la communauté politique, qui fait la différence entre l'être et l'agir: cette communauté n'existe pas a priori, mais s'affirme par la pratique et le mode participatif. C'est donc l'activité démocratique qui établirait l'unité politique, n'ayant pas besoin de la nation pour s'épanouir, mais de l'acceptation pleine et entière par les citoyens de principes éthico-juridiques, définis et garantis par l'Europe.

Ces arguments portent-ils face à la renaissance incontestable de l'intérêt pour la nation? Cette renaissance, l'auteur le démontre, touche tous les milieux et, élément nouveau, une grande partie de la gauche, qui passe de l'universalisme civique au «nationalisme culturel», en s'appuyant sur différents arguments. Le premier d'entre eux s'inspire du postulat classique de Benedict Anderson, suivant lequel la nation est «subjective», en appelle ainsi à la passion et au passé, et s'identifie à ce lieu et ce lien du sens collectif si nécessaire à toute collectivité et que ne pourrait garantir l'approche post-nationale. Par voie de conséquence, la nation resterait le seul espace de démocratie et de partage véritable, de solidarité et d'équité sociales: les nations seraient des «communautés éthiques», dans le même temps où l'universalisme déresponsabiliserait, débat évidemment relancé par la condamnation de la mondialisation, dont l'Europe ne serait qu'un apanage. Pour ses détracteurs de divers horizons, l'UE ne peut être une nation, car elle n'aboutirait que par le mode économique, la gestion des biens plutôt que celle des hommes. Autre argument, qui sonne comme une forme de tautologie: introduire un semblant de démocratie dans le système actuel ne serait qu'un moyen de «vendre» l'Europe (par l'intermédiaire des élections au Parlement européen par exemple). Cette dernière serait par définition dépolitisante, ne tenant que par le «gouvernement des juges», portée par des idéologies «antipolitiques» (principe de subsidiarité, libéralisme économique) qui orchestreraient une dépréciation de la souveraineté populaire au profit de l'extension des droits individuels ainsi qu'une dualisation du corps civique en fonction du degré d'éducation, ce qui saperait le principe d'égalité.

L'histoire et la théorie des idées politiques sont-elles aussi radicales dans leurs constats? L'auteur démontre que non, en citant pourtant certains des plus grands noms parmi les penseurs historiques du contrat social, établissant que pas un n'a spécifié l'idée de liens impératifs entre des institutions libres et une communauté particulière. Une Constitution est par exemple à même de conditionner tout un ensemble pour Rousseau, alors que le patriotisme peut être bien assimilé à l'exercice des droits et à l'intérêt personnel pour Tocqueville. Certaines idées reçues sont également condamnées par Justine Lacroix à propos de la dimension «sécurisante» du nationalisme: son aspect belligène, que la crise yougoslave

devrait toujours rappeler à l'esprit de certains intellectuels patentés, et les multiples débats nationaux relatifs à la «fracture sociale», qui démontrent que la solidarité n'est pas toujours une évidence à l'échelle nationale, servent de points de repère efficaces dans le débat. Il est en tout cas salubre de nous rappeler la plasticité du mot «nation», principe qui peut bien servir toutes les causes, y compris les plus viles (pp.107, 122).

Cependant, tout n'est pas à écarter des critiques des nationaux-souverainistes (terme pratique qui permet de ne pas cantonner l'opposition à la construction européenne à un simple repli nationaliste), ce que reconnaît Justine Lacroix: il est impossible d'«inventer une nation européenne» (pp.132-133), et les faits prouvent qu'élaborer une euro-histoire n'est pas une entreprise évidente. Malgré ces éléments rédhibitoires, l'auteur va tout de même procéder à une défense du patriotisme constitutionnel, mais qui soit raisonnée, c'est-à-dire en répondant aux principales critiques de ses détracteurs: c'est ainsi qu'elle dénie au patriotisme constitutionnel un quelconque aspect abstrait, estimant que le «peuple européen» a pu parfois se reconnaître dans certains principes qui, menacés, ont provoqué une réaction en chaîne (elle cite la manifestation du 20 février 2000 contre l'entrée des ministres du FPÖ dans le gouvernement autrichien). Dans la même optique, l'auteur estime que le rapport à l'histoire de cette citoyenneté «élective» n'est pas dénué de sens, comme on a pu le voir dans les tentatives de définir le nationalisme allemand de l'après-guerre (n'oublions pas que les origines du terme «patriotisme constitutionnel» viennent précisément du débat politique d'outre-Rhin): il s'agissait de réfléchir à une identité instruite des abominations du passé par la mise en place d'une histoire argumentative, critique et non commémorative, à même de légitimer et d'assumer pleinement une reconnaissance réciproque dont l'Europe est la logique. Enfin, Justine Lacroix en termine avec les critiques concernant la place de l'Etat dans l'ensemble européen, que les nationaux-souverainistes voient menacée. Or, pour l'auteur, le patriotisme constitutionnel permet avant tout de concilier un cadre universel avec la pluralité des identités nationales. C'est au niveau du partage et de la confrontation que cette combinaison peut fonctionner: les contentieux et la participation autorisent l'élaboration d'une culture politique commune («consensus par confrontation», p.164). Il faut pour cela de vrais partis, un espace public à l'échelle européenne, une base linguistique commune et, évidemment, un processus de constitutionnalisation. Pas question cependant d'effacer les nations d'un revers de main, l'Union restant ce qu'elle indique être dans son préambule, une union «entre les peuples d'Europe»: le patriotisme institutionnel ne vaudrait ainsi que par son caractère réflexif, nous obligeant à nous questionner sans cesse sur nos attachements nationaux, à nous poser en nous opposant à un Autre qui ne nous est pas si étranger, puisqu'il s'agit de nous-mêmes, cette Europe des nationalismes populistes d'il y a quelques décennies contre laquelle le projet communautaire a été bâti. En ce sens, les propos de Justine Lacroix sont plus réalistes que ceux du manifeste sur l'identité européenne du 31 mai 2003, signé par Jürgen Habermas et Jacques Derrida: ces derniers estimaient qu'un espace public européen était né du refus de la guerre en Irak, précisément le

15 février où plusieurs manifestations s'étaient tenues dans les différentes capitales européennes. Outre que cet acte de naissance paraît bien incertain, il ferait peser sur l'identité européenne une pression intolérable et un destin bien négatif: constituer un contrepoids systématique à la puissance américaine ...

Évidemment, à l'heure de la débâcle de l'idée constitutionnelle européenne, ces propos peuvent paraître vides de sens, et les appels à la création de l'espace public européen autant de vœux pieux. Les arguments présentés par Lacroix ont pourtant toute leur importance, puisque, par leurs conclusions éclairées, ils démontrent que le principe d'appartenance à l'Europe n'est pas conditionné par les mêmes idéaux absolus, exclusifs et intransigeants des autres identités collectives: ces dernières pourront continuer à s'exprimer, mais devront apprendre une certaine discipline. Si l'UE ne veut plus s'obstiner à exister de manière négative, temporairement et d'une manière maladroite (contre les Etats-Unis, la Turquie, la Chine, ... la liste n'est pas close), il faudra bien réussir cette gageure qui est à la base du projet européen: pouvoir atteindre un niveau d'intégration comparable à celui des pays fédéraux les plus avancés, tout en maintenant des Etats-nations puissants, voire renforcés. En un mot, bâtir consciemment une Fédération d'Etats pourrait être l'alternative dont le projet européen a tant besoin pour se relancer et être accepté par le plus grand nombre ...

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Karoline POSTEL-VINAY - *L'Occident et sa bonne parole. Nos représentations du monde, de l'Europe coloniale à l'Amérique hégémonique*, Flammarion, Paris, 2004, 219 p. – ISBN 2-08-210446-X – 20 _.

Un pays peut-il procéder à une mise en scène de l'histoire, et, si oui, comment peut-il rendre cette vision acceptable aux yeux de tous? Karoline Postel-Vinay, spécialiste de l'Asie, part de la «prééminence de l'Occident» (p.9) dans la lecture d'une histoire globale pour répondre à cette question. L'occidentalisation du monde qui en est la marque (apparente) renvoie d'abord à deux prétentions à l'universalisme, celle de la France et celle des Etats-Unis. La prime revient aujourd'hui aux seconds, qui ont les moyens de la puissance bien évidemment, mais également la capacité de formuler une vision du monde et l'imposer. A preuve, pour Postel-Vinay, depuis le 11 septembre 2001, le mot mondialisation n'a plus la même valeur explicative qu'avant, de par la volonté américaine: le paradigme dominant est désormais la «guerre contre la terreur», formulée et incarnée par les Etats-Unis, qui opèrent ainsi sans complexe une confusion entre eux-mêmes et l'universel. Certes, la propension de l'Occident à définir l'agenda international a toujours eu cours, mais la concurrence que se livrent France et Etats-Unis pour mettre en scène l'Histoire n'est pas innocente et mérite une étude approfondie: formuler une vision du monde en incarnant une vérité et une valeur universelle est bel et bien un enjeu de puissance, et la guerre que l'on définit, de

même que les ennemis que l'on fustige, peuvent aussi bien être une réalité qu'une représentation subjective des faits internationaux, dont il faut connaître l'origine.

C'est donc «l'écriture du monde» qui fait l'objet d'une première partie dans cet ouvrage, laquelle doit servir à démontrer l'ancienneté de ces récits géopolitiques qui ont reflété la puissance d'une nation par sa capacité à mobiliser la communauté internationale autour de certains thèmes forts. Dans les faits, une «conscience globale» commence au début du XVI^e siècle, qui pousse déjà à une interprétation de l'espace mondial; cependant, le sentiment de rétrécissement de l'espace et du temps est surtout le fait du XIX^e siècle, perceptible dans cette ruée vers l'inconnu qui caractérise l'effort de colonisation. C'est à cette époque-là que s'affirme la prégnance du discours géopolitique, qui acquiert son statut scientifique pour répondre à une «obsession de la globalité» (p.36) échappant à tout contrôle (développement technologique, interdépendance) mais répondant également à un désir d'expansion (*Weltpolitik*). Il s'agit ainsi pour l'auteur d'une première version de la mondialisation, qui se confond avec l'Occident, et qui n'est pas comprise par les Orientaux, persistant à fonder leur légitimité sur une «cosmologie à échelle locale». Cette époque permet un renouvellement de la géographie qui intègre certains postulats politiques de base (unicité du monde, souveraineté de chaque Etat) légitimant la supériorité des pays occidentaux qui «disent le monde», malgré leurs luttes incessantes pour la primauté. C'est ainsi que l'Occident impose ses règles dans tous les domaines internationaux (Convention de La Haye, télégraphie, poids et mesures, chemins de fer, postes), ce qui participe de la définition d'un nouvel ordre mondial qui intègre quelques rares pays non-occidentaux prêts à jouer le jeu, par l'imposition des repères temporels et géographiques que les pays dominés doivent reprendre: la représentation de l'espace national subit donc une forme de mondialisation des connaissances et des règles. Cette supériorité est intériorisée grâce aux différents systèmes éducatifs des pays colonisateurs, appelant la jeune génération à penser un monde dans lequel elle est naturellement supérieure («*think imperially*»): l'espace national se trouve ainsi projeté dans un espace mondial (l'hexagone parfait qui se mue en une «plus grande France»).

Le grand récit géopolitique du XX^e siècle s'insère dans cette vision occidentaliste du monde, comme le montre la définition même des conflits «périphériques» de la Guerre froide. Cela étant dit, on assiste dès 1914 à la fin de la première mondialisation, bien que la «Grande Guerre» est une illustration de la victoire de l'Occident dans la définition de l'agenda historique mondial: les relations internationales, depuis Wilson, restent marquées par cette origine tout au long du siècle, cette «unité de temps et d'espace qui est en partie artificielle» (p.88). L'auteur nous invite à comprendre comment ce discours naît et s'impose en insistant précisément sur la «puissance narrative des Etats-Unis», dont elle voit les origines dès Wilson et la création du think tank *The Inquiry*, très vite baptisé *Foreign Affairs* (1922), groupe de pression proche du pouvoir qui élabore une représentation du monde et travaille à son exportation. On peut ajouter, à la même époque, la création du *Reader's Digest* en 1922, qui lui aussi contribue à la production et la diffusion des valeurs américaines et, par conséquent, au

rayonnement d'un modèle par définition universel. Cette même vision, encore concurrencée par celle de certains pays européens, occupe seule le devant de la scène dès 1945, et ne sera que très légèrement recyclée au moment de la Guerre froide, afin de correspondre à un message plus adapté à une culture de masse (romans, films d'espionnage). Les notions Est et Ouest dénotent plus que jamais alors une vision ethnocentrique, qui renvoient à une dichotomie et à une globalisation que George Kennan jugeait nécessaire pour faire la part entre la «grande nation», capable d'incarner l'universel, et tout ce qui s'y oppose. Le récit bipolaire qui en découle s'impose à tous, même si l'on trouve par moments certains contre-récits géopolitiques (non-alignés, tiers-monde) qui atteignent un semblant d'existence avec le Nouvel Ordre Economique International (1974), complétés plus tard par ceux des ONG qui veulent ignorer la grande frontière qui coupe le monde en deux, ou plutôt affirmer que cette dernière sépare prioritairement le Nord du Sud. On sait cependant que ces révoltes n'ont pas eu l'impact espéré, ce qui nous renvoie au fait que seul un acteur de poids peut se permettre d'imposer sa grille de lecture du monde sur le long terme.

Ce point n'empêche pas les remises en cause, et le fait qu'aujourd'hui, une véritable bataille est livrée pour repenser le monde. L'agenda international restera-t-il déterminé par les Occidentaux et leur *Welthanschauung*? La mondialisation actuelle n'est qu'en partie une réalité. Elle est cependant plus tangible que la précédente, mieux partagée (que l'on pense à la thèse d'Ohmae Kenichi), alors que la démocratie a fait des progrès incontestables; même l'altermondialisme, contrairement au tiers-mondisme, ne remet pas en cause l'idée fondamentale qui sous-tend le récit de la mondialisation. Cependant, le discours optimiste autour d'une gouvernance mondiale, à la Fukuyama, subit depuis le début des années 90 les assauts du contre-discours d'un Huntington, qui a pris un poids incontestable avec le 11 septembre. Dans ce monde sans frontières, l'Autre est défini dans des termes qui font penser à la Guerre froide: le rapport de la commission du 11 Septembre a ainsi repris le thème de la Liberté en lutte contre ses ennemis, préconisant des mesures de type idéologique pour déclarer la «guerre contre la terreur», celle-ci incarnée par le terrorisme islamique. Dans une telle perspective, les considérations socio-économiques passent nécessairement au second plan: le danger étant idéologique, il doit d'abord être combattu par la force. Or, l'Europe et les Etats-Unis n'ont pas la même réponse au problème. Le discours américain puise dans un vieux fond (Wilson, doctrine Truman, Dulles, Reagan, Bush), et reste fidèle aux origines de 1917, et par-delà au principe de la Destinée manifeste. Dans cette optique, un ennemi est finalement nécessaire, comme le Bien a besoin du Mal pour exister, d'où un flottement de la diplomatie américaine après la perestroïka et une réelle angoisse après l'implosion de l'URSS.

Les Européens ne peuvent pas compter sur une telle pensée monolithique: la décolonisation et la construction européenne sont passées par là. L'UE a ainsi plus tendance que les Américains à déduire du récit géopolitique de la mondialisation la vision d'un monde global supposant des actions négociées entre le plus grand nombre. Dans cette optique, combattre le terrorisme n'est qu'un aspect de la

gouvernance mondiale. C'est précisément ce que l'Amérique ne peut accepter: détenant une vérité universelle qu'elle incarne et qu'elle défend, elle ne peut adhérer à l'idée de communauté internationale. L'une des conséquences de cet état de fait est qu'Europe et Etats-Unis ne se comprennent plus. Or, l'auteur le rappelle, ces deux ensembles sont fondés sur des valeurs similaires. En l'occurrence, c'est à l'Europe de prendre ses responsabilités si elle veut continuer à adhérer à la lecture du monde actuel (que l'on pense aux dérives que peuvent amener le projet Google Print), et jouer un rôle ou non dans cette «guerre contre la terreur» qui semble contenir tout l'agenda international: c'est un défi à sa propre existence, qui implique enfin de se pencher sur ses frontières, son identité et son propre destin, sans pour autant tomber dans des dérives culturalistes stérilisantes.

En conclusion, on peut dire que ce travail sur la puissance et son ombre portée sur le monde atteint son objectif, en même temps que l'approche globale ici pratiquée permet d'éviter de nombreux lieux communs sur les rapports entre l'Occident et le reste du monde, l'enjeu de puissance étant clairement et sans fausse pudeur posé comme moteur de l'histoire. On reste simplement sur sa faim à l'évocation des rapports que doivent entretenir les Etats-Unis et l'Union européenne: que peut faire cette dernière si les Etats-Unis refusent toute discussion sur la lecture du monde et sur la délimitation du camp adverse, qui est immanquablement amenée à évoluer? La réponse repose sûrement sur l'Europe et sa volonté ou non de parler d'une seule voix.

Bertrand Vayssière

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Alan S. Milward, *Politics and Economics in the History of the European Union*, Routledge, London/New York, 2005, 127 pp. – ISBN 0-415-32941-8 – 65,00 £.

Wenn sich der Nestor der kritischen Integrationsgeschichtsschreibung mit einem neuen Buch zu Wort meldet, ist die Erwartung groß, zumal wenn es Antworten auf die so zentrale Frage nach der Rolle von Politik und Wirtschaft im Prozess der europäischen Einigung verspricht. Es handelt sich indes nicht um eine monographisch angelegte Studie; Milward geht das Thema vielmehr auf unterschiedlichen Wegen und aus unterschiedlichen Blickwinkeln an, nämlich mittels dreier Aufsätze, hervorgegangen aus den „Joseph Schumpeter Lectures“, die er an der Universität Graz hielt. Die Aufsätze stützen sich überwiegend auf die einschlägige Literatur, nur für den letzten verwendete Milward auch Archivmaterial aus dem britischen Nationalarchiv.

Im ersten, umfassendsten Beitrag geht es um die Rolle wirtschaftlicher und politischer Faktoren bei der Entscheidung, der Europäischen Gemeinschaft bzw. Union beizutreten. Er stellt zugleich eine Auseinandersetzung mit gängigen Erklärungsansätzen wie den Theorien von Jacob Viner oder von Ernst Haas und Leon Lindberg dar. Milward erinnert daran, dass die europäischen Staaten die europäischen Institutionen gründeten, um „nationale“ Ziele zu verfolgen: „They kept too tight a rein and too close a supervisory control over the institutions for

functionalist policies to emerge independently through the interplay of their own functionaries dispatched to serve in those institutions... 'Spillover', like Europeanising its policies, remained something that the state could still choose or reject" (S.34). Aus seiner Analyse des Einigungsprozesses seit der Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl und der verschiedenen Erweiterungsrounds zieht er den Schluss, dass weder die Annahmen der Zollunionstheorie noch jene des Neofunktionalismus zuträfen: „Indeed, on the basis of the historical evidence it could be more plausibly argued that the expansion of the European Communities was not attributable to any long-term economic or political forces, but was, rather, a series of stochastic events, each separate expansion requiring its own historical explanation“ (S.36).

Die restlichen beiden Aufsätze sind spezielleren Themen gewidmet. Zunächst fragt Milward nach den Motiven Dänemarks und Irlands – zwei Sonderfällen insofern, als sie nicht von der Bundesrepublik Deutschland als Abnehmer für Exporte von verarbeiteten Gütern und Lieferant von Investitionsgütern abhängig waren – für den Beitritt zur Gemeinschaft. Er betont dabei insbesondere das Interesse an einer Industrialisierung und an Agrarexporten. Im letzten Beitrag steht „Europas Afrika“ im Mittelpunkt. Anhand einer Analyse der Abkommen von Yaoundé und Lomé werden vor allem die gemeinsamen und gegensätzlichen Interessen der beiden einstigen Kolonialmächte Frankreich und England verdeutlicht.

Selbst wenn grundlegend neue Thesen diesmal fehlen, erweist sich Milward mit seiner Aufsatzsammlung einmal mehr als streitbarer und anregender Integrationsforscher. Der absurd hohe Preis des Buches dürfte seiner Verbreitung indes bedauerlicherweise enge Schranken setzen.

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Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen

Ann-Christina L. Knudsen

The Politics of Financing the Community and the Fate of the First British Membership Application

The purpose of this article is shed new light on the failure of the first British membership application to the EC in January 1963. It does so through the perspective of the simultaneous negotiations within the Community about a permanent financing settlement. It focuses in particular on the way in which the internal negotiations and disagreements among the six and the Commission over the issue of own resources – the central feature of the revenue of financing the Community – reflected the Community's capacity to negotiate the enlargement. Based on a wide range of new archival evidence, the article shows that the French government, in concert with the French Commission members, tried to push through a particular French interpretation of what the financial deal underlying the Community should look like through formal and informal political channels. The article shows how a serious political drama was unfolding during 1962 as the German government became increasingly dissatisfied with the French tactics, and that it teamed up with the Dutch and British governments in opposition to the French. The article suggests that the issue of financing the Community was much more central to the French rejection than assumed in most studies so far, and that the result can also be seen as an exit strategy by the French of shipwrecked internal negotiations inside the Community.

La politique de financement communautaire et le sort de la première demande d'adhésion de la Grande-Bretagne

Cette contribution se propose d'éclairer l'échec de la première demande d'adhésion de la Grande-Bretagne à la Communauté européenne en janvier 1963 et ce, notamment sous l'angle des négociations qui se déroulent simultanément au sein de la Communauté en vue de réaliser un accord de financement durable. L'article analyse dans quelle mesure les négociations internes et les désaccords entre les Six et la Commission au sujet des ressources propres – elles étaient censées devenir un élément central des recettes destinées au financement de la Communauté – reflétaient l'aptitude de la CEE à négocier l'élargissement. Basé sur un large éventail de nouvelles sources d'archives, l'article démontre que le gouvernement français, en concertation avec les membres français de la Commission, essayait de faire accepter par des voies politiques officielles et officieuses une interprétation française particulière de ce que l'accord financier sous-tendant la Communauté devrait avoir l'air. L'article montre aussi comment un sérieux drame politique commençait à se développer au cours de l'année 1962, quand le gouvernement allemand, de plus en plus mécontent de la tactique française, se ralliait aux gouvernements néerlandais et britannique en opposition avec Paris. La contribution suggère que le problème du financement de la Communauté jouait, au niveau de la position adoptée par le gouvernement français, un rôle beaucoup plus important que ne le font supposer la plupart des études réalisées jusqu'à présent, et que le rejet de la demande d'adhésion britannique peut ainsi être considéré comme étant une stratégie déployée par la France pour sortir de l'échec des négociations internes au sein de la Communauté.

Die gemeinschaftliche Finanzierungspolitik und das Los des ersten Beitrittsesuches von Großbritannien.

Dieser Beitrag will Großbritanniens gescheitertes Beitrittsesuch zur Europäischen Gemeinschaft im Jahre 1963 unter dem Blickwinkel der zeitgleich innerhalb der Gemeinschaft stattfindenden Verhandlungen über ein unbefristetes Finanzierungsübereinkommen neu beleuchten. Insbesondere wird dabei untersucht, inwiefern die internen Verhandlungen und Meinungsverschiedenheiten zwischen den sechs Mitgliedsstaaten und der Kommission über die Frage der Eigenmittel – laut Vorschlag Hauptbestandteil der Einkünfte, die die Finanzierung der Gemeinschaft ermöglichen sollen – die Kompetenz der Gemeinschaft zu Erweiterungsverhandlungen widerspiegeln. Der Artikel stützt sich auf neues Archivmaterial um aufzuzeigen wie die französische Regierung, gemeinsam mit den französischen Mitgliedern der Kommission, versuchte über offizielle und inoffizielle Kanäle seine Vorstellungen betreffs das der Gemeinschaft zugrundeliegende finanzielle Abkommen durchzusetzen. Der Artikel zeigt dabei auch, wie sich im Laufe des Jahres 1962 ein ernsthaftes politisches Drama entwickelte, als die deutsche Regierung zusehends unzufriedener mit dem Vorgehen Frankreichs wurde, und sich mit der niederländischen und der britischen Regierung gegen Frankreich verbündete. Es kann daher vermutet werden, dass die Finanzierungsfrage der Gemeinschaft eine wesentlich zentralere Rolle spielte in der französischen Haltung als die meisten bisher veröffentlichten Studien annehmen lassen, und dass die Ablehnung des britischen Beitrittsesuches folglich auch als eine Ausstiegsstrategie Frankreichs aus den gescheiterten internen Verhandlungen innerhalb der Gemeinschaft angesehen werden kann.

N. Piers Ludlow

A Welcome Change:

The European Commission and the Challenge of Enlargement, 1958-1973

Enlargement requests played a prominent part in the European Commission's first fifteen years of existence. This article will therefore trace the way in which both the Commission's attitudes towards enlargement *and* its contribution to the membership negotiations themselves evolved in the course of the 1961-1972 period. It will note the significant change that occurred in the basic Commission judgement about the desirability of welcoming new member states – a shift from ill-concealed hostility in 1961-3 to a much more favourable position in 1967-72 – but explain why the Brussels body chose not to express these views openly. And it will argue that although the Commission was always deeply involved in EEC discussions about enlargement and in the talks with potential new members, its contribution was much more assured whenever the talks were essentially technical rather than overtly political. The enlargement issue thus represents a useful indicator both of the Commission's underlying strengths and weaknesses and of the manner in which its basic ambitions evolved during the EEC's first decade and half.

Un changement heureux:

La Commission européenne et le défi de l'élargissement. 1958-1973

Les demandes d'adhésion ont joué un rôle important durant les quinze premières années de l'existence de la Commission européenne. Aussi cet article retrace-t-il l'évolution notée à la fois en matière de l'opinion de la Commission face à l'élargissement et de sa contribution directe aux négociations d'adhésion entre 1961 et 1973. Il souligne un changement majeur intervenu à propos du jugement fondamental porté par la Commission sur les avantages et les inconvénients de l'arrivée de nouveaux Etats membres: l'hostilité à peine voilée de 1961-63 céda la place à une attitude nettement plus favorable en 1967-72. La contribution

explique en outre pourquoi l'institution de Bruxelles a renoncé à exprimer ouvertement ses opinions, tout comme elle dégage comment la contribution de la Commission aux pourparlers entre les Six à propos de l'élargissement et aux négociations proprement-dites avec les pays candidats était davantage assurée quand les discussions visaient des questions d'ordre technique, plutôt que d'ordre politique. Le problème de l'élargissement jette ainsi la lumière sur les forces et les faiblesses de l'organe central de la CEE d'une part, et d'autre part sur l'évolution de ses ambitions principales pendant cette période précoce de son existence.

Ein erfreulicher Sinneswandel:

Die europäische Kommission und die Frage der EWG-Erweiterung (1858-1973)

Die Beitrittsgesuche spielten im Dasein der Kommission eine wesentliche Rolle während den ersten fünfzehn Jahren ihrer Existenz. Der vorliegende Aufsatz behandelt deswegen sowohl die Entwicklung ihrer Meinung zur Frage der Erweiterung als auch ihren direkten Beitrag zu den Verhandlungen die sich über den Zeitraum von 1961 bis 1973 erstreckten. Auffallend wird dabei der bemerkenswerte Sinneswandel in der Beurteilung der Vor- und Nachteile der Aufnahme neuer Mitgliedstaaten. Legte das zentrale Organ der EWG noch zwischen 1961 und 1963 eine eher abweisende Haltung an den Tag, so wurde diese zwischen 1967 und 1972 zunehmend freundlicher wobei – der Artikel erklärt die Hintergründe – die Kommission allerdings stets vermied ihre Meinung offen kundzutun. Bemerkenswert ist auch der Beitrag der Brüsseler Institution zu den Erweiterungsgesprächen unter den Sechs und den eigentlichen Verhandlungen mit den Kandidaten: er kommt wesentlich deutlicher zum Vorschein in Bezug auf technische Sachthemen als im Bereich allgemeiner Politikfragen. Die Aufnahme neuer Länder wirft somit ein interessantes Licht nicht nur auf die Schwächen und Stärken der Kommission, sondern auch auf die Entfaltung ihrer Ambitionen während der Frühzeit der EWG.

Morten Rasmussen

The Hesitant European

History of Denmark's Accession to the European Communities, 1970-73

This article outlines the history of Denmark's accession to the European Community on 1 January 1973. Two large historical trends shaped the Danish road to EC-membership. On the one hand, the fight for survival that the Danish Nation-State had experienced from 1864-1945 produced a particular Danish model of democracy and social stability, an affinity for Nordic co-operation and a lasting negative perception of Continental Europe in general and Germany in particular. On the other hand, the increased economic interdependence in Western Europe after 1945 included and benefited the Danish economy. It was the latter that induced Denmark to apply for membership of the EEC. Both the Danish membership negotiations and the domestic decision to join were dominated by Denmark's ambivalence towards Europe. It proved decisive that the enlargement negotiations secured the economic benefits from Danish EC-membership from day one without seriously threatening Danish welfare legislation or Nordic co-operation. Confronted with significant internal opposition, the Social Democratic Party leadership proved instrumental in formulating the vision that not only held the party together, but also won the referendum on 2 October 1972. Danish accession was ultimately sold as an economic decision and the political perspectives of EC-membership were played down.

L'Européen hésitant

Histoire de l'accession du Danemark aux Communautés européennes, 1970-1973

En retraçant les étapes majeures qui mènent à l'accession du Danemark à la CE, le 1^{er} janvier 1973, la présente contribution dégage les deux grands thèmes historiques caractéristiques du cheminement d'un petit pays vers l'adhésion à l'Europe communautaire. Il s'agit d'une part du combat pour la survie de l'Etat-nation. Mené entre 1864 et 1945, celui-ci avait donné naissance au «modèle danois» de la démocratie et de la stabilité sociale, à une affinité particulière pour la coopération nordique, ainsi qu'à une profonde perception négative de l'Europe continentale, en l'occurrence de l'Allemagne. D'autre part, le Danemark était impliqué dans la croissante interdépendance économique de l'Europe occidentale après 1945. Elle faisait entrevoir un bénéfice pour l'économie nationale et de ce fait, devenait l'argument déterminant qui motivait le pays à poser sa candidature. Il n'en demeure pas moins que les négociations d'adhésion, tout comme la décision, au plan national, de joindre la CE, furent dominées par une attitude ambivalente face à l'Europe. Sous cet angle, il fut de la plus haute importance de s'assurer que les clauses économiques du traité d'accession jouaient pour le Danemark dès le premier jour de son ralliement à la communauté, sans pour autant menacer sérieusement ni sa législation sociale ni sa coopération avec les pays nordiques voisins. Confronté à une vive opposition intérieure, le *leadership* du parti social-démocrate s'avéra à la hauteur, à la fois pour maintenir l'intégrité du parti et pour remporter la victoire lors du référendum du 2 octobre 1972 dont l'issue positive a également été influencée par la circonstance que l'accession a été présentée au public comme une décision avant tout économique. Les conséquences politiques du ralliement à la communauté furent par contre minimisées.

Der zögernde Europäer Geschichte des dänischen EG-Beitritts. 1970-1973

Dieser Beitrag behandelt die Geschichte des dänischen Beitritts zur Europäischen Gemeinschaft am 1. Januar 1973. Zwei wesentliche historische Faktoren beeinflussten Dänemarks Weg in die EWG. Einerseits hatte der Kampf um den Fortbestand eines eigenständigen Nationalstaats zwischen 1864 und 1945 ein besonderes «dänisches Modell» der Demokratie und der sozialen Stabilität hervorgebracht. Es kennzeichnete sich darüber hinaus durch eine Präferenz für nordische Kooperationsformen und eine dauerhafte, negative, Wahrnehmung Kontinentaleuropas, insbesondere des deutschen Nachbarn. Andererseits wurde das Land nach 1945 zunehmend in die wachsende wirtschaftliche Interdependenz Westeuropas mit einbezogen. Dänemark profitierte davon. Der Reichtumszugewinn wurde dann auch zum entscheidenden Auslöser für das EG-Aufnahmegesuch. Die Beitrittsverhandlungen an sich, so wie die interne Entscheidung über die Zukunft des Landes waren allerdings beide stets durch ein gewisses Misstrauen gegenüber dem vereinten Europa geprägt. Insofern war es von größter Bedeutung, dass die Aufnahmebedingungen dem Land die wirtschaftlichen Vorteile der Gemeinschaft vom ersten Tag des Beitritts an gewährten, ohne weder die dänische Gesetzgebung im Bereich der Wohlfahrt noch die nordische Kooperation ernsthaft zu gefährden. Die mit einer scharfen inneren Opposition konfrontierte führende sozial-demokratische Partei war schließlich geschickt genug, um eine Vision zu entfallen die nicht nur den Zusammenhalt der Partei gewährleistete, sondern überdies zum Sieg anlässlich der Volksbefragung vom 2. Oktober 1972 führte: Dänemarks Beitritt hatte man vordergründig als eine wirtschaftliche Entscheidung dargestellt, während die politischen Folgen einer EWG-Mitgliedschaft heruntergespielt worden waren.

Andrea Benvenuti Dealing With an Expanding European Community: Australia's Attitude Towards the EC'S 1st Enlargement

This article assesses the political, economic and strategic implications of the European Community's first enlargement for Australia. It also examines how Canberra perceived the challenges posed by British entry into the EC and how it responded to them. In doing so, the article aims to throw light into a hitherto under-researched aspect of the EC's first enlargement by drawing extensively on newly released Australian and British archival material. While a number of scholars have looked at the impact of EC enlargement upon Australia and the Commonwealth, they have almost exclusively focused on Britain's first application to the EC in 1961-63. Britain's renewed bid for EC membership in 1967 and the resumption of EC-UK negotiations in 1970-72 have drawn very little interest. So has their impact on Australia and the Commonwealth. Similarly, scant attention has been devoted to the impact of British entry on Australia's strategic interests in Cold War Asia. This is a rather remarkable oversight since British forces in the Far East, in addition to their role in defending Britain's remaining colonial possessions and supporting Western military objectives in the region, provided Australia with an important security guarantee.

**Le dossier d'une communauté européenne en pleine expansion:
L'Australie et le 1^{er} élargissement de la CE**

Cet article évalue les conséquences politiques, économiques et stratégiques du premier élargissement de la Communauté Européenne (CE) pour l'Australie. Il traite en outre de la manière dont Canberra a perçu les enjeux liés à l'entrée du Royaume-Uni dans la communauté et comment elle y a réagi. Une étude approfondie des archives australiennes et britanniques accessibles depuis peu a permis d'éclairer un aspect du premier élargissement peu examiné jusqu'à présent. La plupart des travaux sur les répercussions de l'élargissement européen en l'Australie et au sein du Commonwealth sont en fait focalisés sur la première candidature britannique en 1961-63. La tentative renouvelée de 1967, la reprise des négociations entre la CE et le Royaume-Uni en 1970-72 ainsi que l'impact de ces événements sur l'Australie et le Commonwealth ont par contre suscité peu d'intérêt. Il en est de même de l'attention très limitée portée aux conséquences de l'entrée des Britanniques dans la CE sur le plan des intérêts stratégiques de l'Australie dans le cadre de la Guerre Froide en Asie. Cette omission historique est d'autant plus remarquable que les forces britanniques en Extrême-Orient, outre leurs fonctions de défense des dernières possessions coloniales du Royaume et du soutien des objectifs militaires occidentaux dans la région, offraient à l'Australie un important gage de sécurité.

**Betrifft die erste Europäische Erweiterung:
Australien und die expandierende EG**

Der Aufsatz beschäftigt sich mit den politischen, wirtschaftlichen und strategischen Auswirkungen der ersten EG-Erweiterung auf Australien. Er untersucht gleichzeitig wie Canberra die durch den britischen EWG-Beitritt aufgeworfenen Herausforderungen wahrgenommen und beantwortet hat. Dabei wird versucht, einen bisher wenig erforschten Aspekt des ersten Erweiterungsprozesses zu erhellen, indem kürzlich freigegebenes Archivmaterial aus Australien und Großbritannien herangezogen wird. Diejenigen Wissenschaftler die die Auswirkungen der damaligen Vorgänge auf Australien und das Commonwealth untersucht haben, richteten ihr Augenmerk fast ausschließlich auf Großbritanniens erste Bewerbung in den Jahren 1961-1963. Englands erneute Kandidatur im Jahre 1967, sowie die Wiederaufnahme der Verhandlungen zwischen der EG und dem Vereinigten Königreich zwischen 1970 und 1972 haben allerdings kaum Beachtung gefunden, ebenso wenig wie ihre Konsequenzen für Australien und das Commonwealth. Die

Rolle des britischen Beitritts im Zusammenhang mit Australiens strategischen Interessen in Asien während der Zeit des kalten Krieges hat übrigens bislang genauso wenig Aufmerksamkeit erfahren. Die Vernachlässigung dieses Themas ist bemerkenswert, besonders da die britischen Streitkräfte in Fernost nicht nur die Aufgabe hatten, Großbritanniens verbleibende Kolonien zu verteidigen und die militärischen Ziele des Westens in der Region zu unterstützen, sondern auch eine bedeutende Garantie für Australiens Sicherheit darstellten.

Lorena Ruano

**The Consolidation of Democracy vs. the Price of Olive Oil:
The Story of why the CAP Delayed Spain's Entry to the EC**

Why did agriculture, a supposedly 'low politics' issue area, become so salient and delayed the accession negotiations between Spain and the EC? This article points out three clusters of institutional 'biases' that operated during the negotiations and had the effect of over-representing agriculture over other interests that were more favourable to a steadfast enlargement. First, the 'bilateral' format of the negotiation procedure between Spain and the EC favoured existing members, protected the *acquis communautaire*, and under-represented the applicant. Second, at the EC level, the Common Agricultural Community (CAP) exhibited great capacity to withstand the changes required by this enlargement, due to EC decision-making structures which insulated the agricultural 'policy community' from the pressures in favour of enlargement that came from other issue areas. Third, at the national level, members states' national positions with regard to enlargement were mixed, with no clear priority over conflicting sectoral views. The operation of such biases is illustrated with a historical review of the process of reforming and negotiating with Spain its adoption of a key regime: olive oil. Spain's accession only became possible when new redistributive policies were put in place to compensate those Community farmers who were to lose out from the Iberian enlargement.

**Consolidation de la démocratie versus prix de l'huile d'olive:
Histoire du retardement de l'entrée de l'Espagne dans la CE**

Pourquoi un domaine politique qualifié de «mineur» comme celui de l'agriculture a-t-il pris de l'importance au point de retarder les négociations d'adhésion de l'Espagne à la CE? Cet article dévoile trois aspects qui ont trait aux «déformations institutionnelles» à l'œuvre pendant les pourparlers, et qui ont eu pour effet d'octroyer au dossier de l'agriculture un poids démesuré par rapport à d'autres enjeux plaidant en faveur d'une accession rapide. D'abord, la nature «bilatérale» des entretiens entre l'Espagne et la CE protégeait l'acquis communautaire. Elle favorisait les anciens Etats membres, tandis que le candidat était placé dans une position d'infériorité. Ensuite, au niveau communautaire, la Politique Agricole Commune (PAC) se distinguait par une remarquable résistance aux réformes nécessaires en vue de l'élargissement. Cette opposition émanait des mécanismes européens de prise de décision qui isolaient la «communauté politique» agricole face aux pressions exercées par d'autres secteurs plus favorables à l'entrée de l'Espagne. Troisièmement, au niveau national, les positions des Etats membres sur l'élargissement étaient ambivalentes, sans priorité claire entre les visions sectorielles en conflit. L'opération de ces déformations institutionnelles est illustrée par l'historique des négociations menées avec l'Espagne et des réformes effectuées en matière d'huile d'olive, un régime communautaire clé. L'admission du candidat ibérique fut en fait subordonnée à l'adoption de nouvelles politiques qui permirent aux agriculteurs communautaires de compenser les pertes essuyées dans la foulée de l'élargissement.

Festigung der Demokratie *contra* Olivenölpreise Geschichte des verspäteten spanischen Beitritts in die EG

Obwohl die landwirtschaftlichen Belange eigentlich ein „politisch weniger bedeutsames“ Feld darstellen, wurde gerade ihretwegen der Beitritt Spaniens zur Europäischen Gemeinschaft (EG) beachtlich verzögert. Warum? Der vorliegende Aufsatz verweist auf drei institutionelle Einschränkungen welche, im Rahmen der Verhandlungen, die Forderungen der Agrarwirtschaft anderen Themen überordnete und dies obwohl letztere für das Abkommen auf Dauer eigentlich wichtiger gewesen wären. Erstens, der „bilaterale“ Charakter des Aufnahmeverfahrens schützte das *Acquis Communautaire* indem er den EU-Mitgliedsstaaten einen Vorteil verschaffte. Spanien übernahm dagegen die Rolle des untergeordneten Bittstellers. Zweitens, auf EU-Ebene, hat die Gemeinsame Agrarpolitik die durch den Erweiterungsvorgang notwendig gewordenen Reformen hartnäckig abgewiesen. Diese, durch die Struktur der europäischen Entscheidungsmechanismen begünstigte Beharrlichkeit, führte zu einer Abkoppelung der agrarpolitischen Themen von jenem Druck der seitens anderer Stellen ausgeübt wurde die einen raschen Beitritt befürworteten. Drittens, auf nationaler Ebene, waren sich die einzelnen EG-Partner nicht einig in Bezug auf eine mögliche Erweiterung. Sie hatten darüber hinaus keine klare Vorstellung über die gegensätzlichen Interessen verschiedener, sektoraler Betrachtungsweisen. Dieser Zwiespalt sticht besonders hervor im historischen Rückblick über die Verhandlungen und die damit verknüpften Reformen im Bereich der Olivenölproduktion, dem wichtigsten landwirtschaftlichen Erzeugnis der iberischen Halbinsel. Spaniens Aufnahme in die Gemeinschaft wurde in der Tat erst möglich nach der Einführung neuer Verteilungspolitiken, die den Bauern der alten Unionsländer als Kompensation für die aus der Erweiterung resultierenden Verluste gewährt wurden.

Notices – Informations – Mitteilungen

Colloque Cultures politiques, opinions publiques et intégration européenne,
Luxembourg, 15-17 juin 2005

Compte rendu succinct

Parmi les nombreuses manifestations organisées à l'occasion de la présidence luxembourgeoise de l'UE, s'est tenu, sous la responsabilité scientifique des professeurs Marie-Thérèse Bitsch (Université Robert Schuman, Strasbourg) et Wilfried Loth (Université Duisbourg-Essen), un colloque dont le thème prend un intérêt particulièrement vif à un moment où le double non français et néerlandais au traité constitutionnel plonge l'Europe dans une grave crise d'identité. Environ quarante spécialistes de l'histoire de la construction européenne, venus d'une douzaine de pays de l'Union, se sont interrogés sur les interactions entre cultures politiques et intégration européenne. Il s'agissait de comprendre comment les multiples cultures, qui coexistent et s'interpénètrent, contribuent à façonner l'Europe et comment les différentes sensibilités, notamment nationales, influencent le débat politique. Pour reprendre la formule du professeur Robert Frank (Université Paris I) dans sa conclusion, les travaux du colloque ont porté sur «la politisation de l'Europe et l'eupéanisation du politique».

Avec des approches diverses, beaucoup de communications se sont intéressées aux opinions publiques qui sont la révélation, à un moment précis, des cultures politiques, un peu comme la partie émergée d'un iceberg, sans doute plus visible par temps agité qu'en période de grand calme. Comment se forment ces opinions publiques? Les expériences vécues, l'ancienneté de l'appartenance à l'Union, les peurs de perdre des avantages acquis comptent sans doute autant, sinon plus, que l'éducation. Force est de constater qu'il est très difficile de faire émerger un espace public européen. Si les référendums sont une occasion de confrontations animées sur l'Europe, le débat reste en général inscrit dans le cadre national de même que les campagnes pour les élections européennes qui, de plus, se font essentiellement sur des questions internes.

Ce colloque, dont les Actes devraient être publiés prochainement, s'intègre dans un vaste programme de recherches international, piloté par l'Institut Pierre Renouvin (Paris I). Dans ce cadre, les responsables scientifiques du colloque de Luxembourg, tous deux titulaires d'une chaire Jean Monnet et membres du Groupe de liaison des professeurs d'histoire contemporaine auprès de la Commission européenne, ont déjà dirigé plusieurs ouvrages publiés chez Bruylant (Bruxelles): *Institutions européennes et identités européennes* (1998); *Le fait régional et la construction européenne* (2003); *Gouvernance supranationale et construction européenne* (2005).

Création du Prix Emile et Aline Mayrisch

Au cours d'une conférence de presse qui s'est déroulée le 25 janvier 2005, Madame Annette Schwall-Lacroix, présidente du *Cercle des Amis de Colpach*, et Monsieur Joseph Kinsch, président du conseil d'administration d'Arcelor, ont présenté officiellement le «Prix Emile et Aline Mayrisch».

Ce prix qui entend honorer la mémoire d'Emile Mayrisch et de son épouse Aline de Saint-Hubert, a pour objectif de promouvoir «l'esprit de Colpach» caractérisé par l'ouverture aux courants culturels et la promotion de l'entente entre les peuples européens. Le prix est doté par Arcelor à hauteur de 14.000 _ et est décerné tous les quatre ans.

Le «Prix Emile et Aline Mayrisch» s'adresse aux chercheurs, étudiants, journalistes et autres auteurs résidant en Allemagne, en Belgique, en France ou au Luxembourg et qui sont âgés d'au moins 24 ans.

Les travaux présentés au concours porteront sur des recherches dans les domaines de l'histoire, de la politique, de l'économie, de la vie sociale et/ou de la culture dans l'espace franco-germano-belgo-luxembourgeois.

Les travaux présentés au concours pourront aussi consister en des dossiers relevant de la presse écrite, radiophonique et audiovisuelle se distinguant par leur intérêt pédagogique du traitement des thèmes décrits ci-dessus.

Les œuvres seront rédigées en langue allemande, française ou anglaise.

Seront pris en considération pour ce prix, les travaux non publiés de même que les travaux publiés dans l'intervalle entre la date de l'appel aux candidatures (pour la première promotion, cette date a été fixée exceptionnellement au 1^{er} janvier 2004) et la date limite de remise des travaux au jury.

Pour la première promotion, la date limite pour la remise des travaux par les candidats est fixée au 31 décembre 2006. Le prix sera remis pour la première fois en 2007.

Le jury du Prix Emile et Aline Mayrisch se compose comme suit:

Présidents: Madame Annette Schwall-Lacroix ; Monsieur Joseph Kinsch

Membres: Professeur Rainer Hudemann de l'Université de la Sarre ; Professeur Jean-Paul Lehnert, Vice-Recteur de l'Université de Luxembourg ; Professeur Patrick A. Messerlin de l'Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris ; Professeur Gilbert Trausch, Directeur honoraire du Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert Schuman ; Professeur Alfred Wahl de l'Université de Strasbourg ; Monsieur Michel Wurth, Directeur général Arcelor ; Monsieur Mario Hirsch, journaliste, pour les travaux relevant de la presse.

Pour de plus amples renseignements, notamment à propos du règlement du concours, veuillez contacter svp.

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