
**JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION HISTORY**

**REVUE D'HISTOIRE DE
L'INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE**

**ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DER
EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION**

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Centre d'études et de recherches européennes

Robert Schuman

4 Rue Jules Wilhelm

L-2728 Luxembourg

Tel.: (3 52) 4 78 22 90/4 78 22 91

Fax.: (3 52) 42 27 97

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The Liaison Committee of Historians came into being in 1982 as a result of an important international symposium that the Commission had organized in Luxembourg to launch historical research on European integration. The committee is composed of historians of the European Union member countries who work on contemporary history.

The Liaison Committee:

- gathers and conveys information about work on European history after the Second World War;
- advises the European Union on research projects concerning contemporary European history. Thus, the Liaison Committee was commissioned to make publicly available the archives of the Community institutions;
- enables researchers to make better use of the archival sources;
- promotes research meetings to get an update of work in progress and to stimulate new research: seven research conferences have been organized and their proceedings published.

The Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'intégration européenne – Zeitschrift für Geschichte der europäischen Integration is in line with the preoccupations of the Liaison Committee. Being the first history journal to deal exclusively with the history of European Integration, the Journal offers the increasing number of young historians devoting their research to contemporary Europe, a permanent forum.

The Liaison Committee is supported by the European Commission, but works completely independently and according to historians' critical method.



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- d'aider à une meilleure utilisation par les chercheurs des moyens de recherche mis à leur disposition (archives, sources orales...);
- d'encourager des rencontres scientifiques afin de faire le point sur les connaissances acquises et de susciter de nouvelles recherches: sept grands colloques ont été organisés et leurs actes publiés. L'édition du *Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'intégration européenne – Zeitschrift für Geschichte der europäischen Integration* se situe dans le droit fil des préoccupations du Groupe de liaison. Première revue d'histoire à se consacrer exclusivement à l'histoire de la construction européenne, le *Journal* se propose de fournir un forum permanent au nombre croissant de jeunes historiens vouant leurs recherches à l'Europe contemporaine.

Le Groupe de liaison bénéficie du soutien de la Commission européenne. Ses colloques et publications se font en toute indépendance et conformément à la méthode critique qui est celle des historiens.

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European Public Sphere and European Identity in 20th Century History

Preface by Hartmut Kaelble and Luisa Passerini

This special issue of the Journal of European Integration History will deal with the rise of a European identity and of a European public sphere during the 20th century. The two topics are closely interrelated. It is impossible to investigate European identity without taking into account the history of the European public sphere, and at the same time European identity as a central issue in any European public sphere. In addition, for historians the two topics have four characteristics in common.

First of all, the two topics are not new for historical research in general. Identity as a notion has been used in an almost inflationary sense by historians dealing with national, regional, local, gender, ethnic, or religious identity during the last ten or fifteen years. Historians usually use the notion in the sense of collective identification with larger entities beyond the family and personal local networks. In recent years historians have become interested in the invention and reinvention of historical identities, in the symbols, rituals and *lieux de mémoire* of identities, as well as in the role of historiography, in relation to power and protests, and in the political consequences of misused identities. Public sphere is a notion which was used primarily by historians of the late 18th and early 19th centuries to analyse the rising public exchanges and debates on matters of public interest especially in middle class circles. These ideas have also been deployed in popular circles, accessible for everybody in theory and uncontrolled by the government, and also to analyse the changes in the public presentation of monarchs and governments in the public life. The two notions have undergone an intensive scientific debate among historians about their strength and weakness. Historians frequently read theoretical concepts on identity as well as on the public sphere. No historian can now use these notions in a naive way.

European identity and the European public sphere have been less frequently investigated by the historians dealing with the history of European integration. The history of European public sphere is a theme from which historians have usually kept away, partly because the history of any public sphere during the 20th century is rarely investigated in general by historians, partly also because many historians do not see the *European* public sphere as a topic worth of investigation. There seems to be no book by a historian using this notion in the title. European identity, however, has been studied more frequently by historians. A large program for meetings and conferences of historians, i.e. the program "*identités européennes*" founded by René Girault and directed now by Robert Frank (university of Paris I) and Gérard Bossuat (university Cergy-Pontoise) has been active since 1989. Various meetings are organised each year by members of this program. But the notion of European identity is usually used for studies dealing with the history of policies, institutions, debates, geographical mental maps of Europe rather than identities in the sense used by historians of nations, gender, ethnic groups, including also symbols, rituals,

lieux de mémoires, changing values and changing transfers. There are various collections of essays by historians on the history of European identity. But any bibliography of the historical research on the topic by historians is still relatively short.¹ It is still not a strong topic compared with other themes of the history of the construction of Europe.

This has probably to do with a third common characteristic of the two topics. It is highly controversial whether there is any history of a substantial European identity or a functioning European public sphere. Some historians and social scientists argue that a European identity as well as a European public sphere simply have not existed until the present, and indeed that basic pre-conditions such as a common language, a common memorial culture, common media, common social movements, and a common civil society are still lacking. Other historians and social scientists argue that Europe since its beginnings was an important space of communication and an object of identification by Europeans, and that the major task for historians is to demonstrate the particularities of the 20th century European public sphere and identity rather than to explore a very recent and vague topic of history.

Finally, we would like to add that the assumption underlying our work is that there is a deep, if not always evident, connection between the questions of European identity and of a European public sphere. These are problematic concepts, both because they refer to contradictory processes and because they are used politically by various types of “identity politics”. Daring to connect the two concepts, however, is useful for illuminating them.

A European sense of belonging is in the making and a European public already exists, although still in a sporadic and weak form, riddled with contradictions, as it happens for instance on certain issues, such as the debate on the introduction of the euro, or the public opinion concerning the enlargement of the Union to the East. Therefore we may put forward the hypothesis that there are two ongoing connected processes, whereby the sense of belonging is directly linked to the growth of a public space with European characteristics.

For all these reasons research by historians on the two topics is needed. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to hesitate. Sources are difficult to find. One has to read several languages. Functioning, encouraging and inspiring scientific networks on the history of European integration and more so on these two topics are few and far between. Other topics may be more attractive. But if historians do not do more intensive research on the history of these two topics, it will be done by sociologists, ethnologists and political scientists. This is already true to a certain degree. Most of the recent work on one aspect, on the history of European idea and identity, is written by scholars from other fields, by sociologists such as Edgar Morin, M. Rainer

1. L. PASSERINI (ed.), *Identità culturale europea. Idee, sentimenti, relazione*, La Nuova Italia, Scandicci, 1998; P. M. LÜTZELER, *Europäische Identität und Multikultur. Fallstudien zur deutschsprachigen Literatur seit der Romantik*, Stauffenburg, Tübingen, 1997; R. GIRAULT (éd.), *Identité et conscience européennes au XXe siècle*, Hachette, Paris, 1994; R. GIRAULT (éd.), *Les Europe des européens*, Publications de la Sorbonne, Paris, 1993; J. ROVAN et G. KREBS (éd.), *Identités nationales et conscience européenne*, PIA, Paris, 1992.

Lepsius or Martin Kohli, by political scientists such as Herfried Münkler or Gerard Galanty, by philosophers such as Philippe Nemo, by ethnologists such as Chris Shore, by specialists of antiquity and the Arab world such as Rémy Brague or by specialists of the history of German and French literature such as Paul M. Lützeler.² This is astonishing. During an earlier period of rising interest in the history of the awareness of Europe by Europeans, (i.e. during the period directly after World War II), the major books on history were in fact written by Italian, French, English and German historians such as Federico Chabod, C. Curcio, Carlo Morandi, Pierre Renouvin, Geoffrey Barraclough or Heinz Gollwitzer rather than by specialists in other fields.³ In the new debate on the history of Europe which emerged since the 1980s the role of the historians is much weaker. This is clearly not because historians have nothing to say.

This thematic issue can only give some examples of investigation on the two interrelated topics of research. It comprises six articles, four articles by younger historians. Katiana Orluc, a historian, covers an unexplored project of a European party during the early 1930's, which was part of a rising European public sphere. She is writing a dissertation on the formation and transformation of European consciousness after the First World War at the European University Institute in Florence. Klaus-Peter Sick who is writing a dissertation on the French interwar liberalism at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques in Paris argues that a new liberal internationalism and hence a new and important element of a European identity emerged already in interwar France during the 1920's. Alexander Schmidt-Gernig who teaches at the Humboldt-University Berlin and who is currently writing his "Habilitation", i.e. his second book, on the future studies in Europe during the

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2. Ed. MORIN, *Penser l'Europe*, Gallimard, Paris, 1987; M. KOHLI, *The battle-grounds of European identity*, in: *European societies*, 2(2000), pp.113-137; H. MÜNKLER, *Reich, Nation, Europa. Modelle politischer Ordnung*, Beltz Athenäum, Weinheim, 1996; G. DELANTY, *Inventing Europe. Idea, Identity, Reality*, Macmillan, London, 1995; Ph. NEMO (ed.), *The European Union and the Nation-State*, École Supérieure de Commerce, Paris, 1996; C. SHORE, *Building Europe. The cultural politics of European integration*, Routledge, London, 2000; R. BRAGUE, *Europe, la voie romaine*, Critérium, Paris, 1992; P. M. LÜTZELER, *Die Schriftsteller und Europa. Von der Romantik bis zur Gegenwart*, Piper, München, 1992; S. MACDONALD (ed.), *Approaches to European Historical Consciousness*, Edition Körber-Stiftung, Hamburg, 2000; M. R. LEPSIUS, *Bildet sich eine kulturelle Identität in der Europäischen Union?*, in: *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, 8(1997); R. MÜNCH, *Das Projekt Europa. Zwischen Nationalstaat, regionaler Autonomie und Weltgesellschaft*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1993; H. MENDRAS, *L'Europe des européens. Sociologie de l'Europe occidentale*, Gallimard, Paris, 1997; R. SWEDBERG, *The Idea of 'Europe' and the Origin of the European Union - a Sociological Approach*, in: *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, 23(1994).
3. C. MORANDI, *L'idea dell'unità politica d'Europa nel XIX e XX secolo*, Marzorati, Mailand, 1948; F. CHABOD, *Storia dell'idea d'Europa*, Laterza, Bari, 1961; C. CURCIO, *Europa, Storia di un'idea*, 2 Bde., Vallecchi, Florenz, 1958; P. RENOUVIN, *L'idée de fédération européenne dans la pensée politique du XXe siècle*, Clarendon, Oxford, 1949; ibem., *L'idée d'Etats Unis d'Europe pendant la crise de 1848*, in: *Actes du congrès historique du Centenaire de la révolution de 1848*, PUF, Paris, 1948; G. BARRACLOUGH, *European Unity in Thought and Action*, Blackwell, London, 1963; H. GOLLWITZER, *Europabild und Europagedanke. Beiträge zur deutschen Geistesgeschichte des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts*, Beck, München, 1951.

1960's and 1970's, investigates the different views of the image of the future Europe as an important and attractive debate in the expert public sphere during that period. Hartmut Kaelble presents historical evidence for a beginning trend towards a European public sphere in the second half of the 20th century.

The articles of this special issue were presented and discussed at two workshops organised 1996 and 1998 in connection with two scientific projects: with the international program "identités européennes", founded by René Girault and directed By Robert Frank (university of Paris I) and Gérard Bossuat (university Paris X) in which Luisa Passerini and Hartmut Kaelble are running a subgroup on "European society" and with the research group on "comparative societies" (Historisch-sozial-wissenschaftlicher Gesellschaftsvergleich) at the Humboldt-University Berlin.

In addition, two further articles are included in this thematic issue, which are also related to the general issue of the European public sphere and European identity. Fausto Gualtieri treats a crucial aspect of the European public sphere, the mass media, and explores the highly interesting policy of the European Commission in relation to the mass media, to the cinema, the radio and the television, during the 1980's and the early 1990's. Wolfram Kaiser covers the European concepts and the political activities by Walter Lipgens, a pioneering German historian of the history of European integration, in publishing and commenting an exchange of letters between Lipgens and the leader of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party and former West German foreign minister, Brentano, on European politics in 1964.

The Historical Rise of a European Public Sphere?

Hartmut Kaelble

Did a European public sphere emerge after 1950 at the same time as European integration advanced? Statements by historians and social scientists are clearly to the contrary, though no direct and intensive controversies on this topic have arisen so far. Two contrasting positions can be found: On the one hand historians argue that Europe has always been a sphere of communication in political topics as well as in business, in the ecclesiastical affairs, in the arts, in technology. The courts, the cities, the monasteries, and the universities were initially the major platforms of the European public sphere, enlarged or replaced in the 19th and 20th centuries by journals, newspapers, books, congresses, travelling. According to this view the crucial historical question is how the European public sphere changed because of European integration, rather than whether such a sphere existed at all. On the other hand, historians and social scientists argue that a proper European public sphere does not exist in the same way as national public spheres emerged since the late 18th century. They refer to the fact that almost no European newspapers, magazines, radio stations, TV-stations, no European intellectuals, no European civil society and social movements, no powerful European trade unions and European parties in the full sense emerged and no common European debates were led at the same time in all European countries. Three major pre-conditions which existed in most European nations lacked a public sphere at the European level: a common language, common collective experiences and a sense of a common history, usually major reference points for national public debates.¹

One important reason for these contrasting views has to do with the concept of communication and public sphere. Most, though not all scholars will agree that Europe has always been a space of intensive transcontinental communication, of transfers of concepts, technologies, institutions. But the public sphere is more than just communication. It means that public spheres on all levels – i.e. everyday en-

1. A few articles and books deal with the rise of a European public sphere since 1945: J. GERHARDS, *Westeuropäische Integration und die Schwierigkeiten der Entstehung einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit*, in: Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 22(1993); ders., *Das Öffentlichkeitsdefizit der EU im Horizont normativer Öffentlichkeitstheorien*, in: H. KAEUBLE, M. KIRSCH, A. SCHMIDT-GERNIG (Hrsg.), *Transnationale Öffentlichkeit und Identität im 20. Jahrhundert*, Campus, Frankfurt/M., 2002; G. G. KOPPER (Hrsg.), *Europäische Öffentlichkeit: Entwicklung von Strukturen und Theorie*, Vistas, Berlin, 1997; K. EDER, K.-U. HELLMANN, H.-J. TRENZ, *Regieren in Europa jenseits öffentlicher Legitimation? Eine Untersuchung zur Rolle von politischer Öffentlichkeit in Europa*, in: B. KOHLER-KOCH (Hrsg.), *Regieren in entgrenzten Räumen*, in: *Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Sonderheft*, 29(1998). H. KAEUBLE, *Die europäische Öffentlichkeit in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts. Eine Skizze*, in: H.-G. HAUPT, M. GRÜTTNER (Hrsg.), *Geschichte und Emanzipation. Festschrift für Reinhard Rürup*, Campus, Frankfurt/M., 1999, pp.651-678; ders., *Wege der Demokratie. Von der Französischen Revolution zur Europäischen Union (Ways to democracy. From the French Revolution to the European Union)*, DVA, München, 2001, chapter 8.

counters, local public debates, the media, civil societies – encouraged, supported, criticised, even overthrew governments and, hence, played a crucial role in politics. The public sphere also means that monarchs and governments articulated themselves by public political statements, by publicity, by public rituals and symbols, by public political aesthetics. To be sure, communication is an essential part of the public sphere; the public sphere plays not only a crucial role in politics or political representation, but also in the arts, in sciences and human sciences, in religion, in entertainment. But if one discusses a European public sphere, one can not fully concentrate on mere communication and leave aside the question of whether a European public sphere became influential in politics and a European political representation did emerge. The political impact of the European public sphere is a crucial question.²

Peculiarities of the European public sphere

Another reason for contrasting views on the European public sphere has to do with the model of the national public sphere in Europe.³ Without any reflection and reasoning, the public sphere of the democratic European nation state, as it has emerged since the late 18th century, is used as the definite measure for the extent to which a European public sphere exists. This is however a doubtful measure since

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2. The most inspiring theoretical approaches still are: J. GERHARDS, F. NEIDHARDT, *Strukturen und Funktionen moderner Öffentlichkeit. Fragestellungen und Ansätze*, in: S. MÜLLER-DOOHM, K. NEUMANN-BRAUN (Hrsg.), *Öffentlichkeit, Kultur, Massenkommunikation*, Bibliotheks- und Informationssystem der Universität Oldenburg, Oldenburg, 1991; J. HABERMAS, *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M., 1990; H. MÜNKLER, *Die Visibilität der Macht und die Strategien der Machtvisualisierung*, in: G. GÖHLER (Hrsg.), *Macht der Öffentlichkeit – Öffentlichkeit der Macht*, Nomos, Baden Baden, 1995.
 3. Cf. for the history of the national public spheres in Europe: K. IMHOF, „Öffentlichkeit“ als historische Kategorie und als Kategorie der Historie, in: *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte*, 46(1996), pp.3-25; J. REQUATE, *Öffentlichkeit und Medien als Kategorien historischer Analyse*, in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 25(1999), pp.5-32; H. GERHARDT, *Stationen internationaler Kommunikation vom 17. bis 19. Jahrhundert*, in: L. ERBRING (Hrsg.), *Kommunikationsraum Europa*, Ölschläger, Konstanz, 1995; D. LANGEWIESCHE, „Mehr als je zieht es mich nach Paris“. *Revolution als Medienereignis: 1848 verbreiteten sich die Nachrichten im Nu über alle Grenzen hinweg*, in: *Freiheit, schöner Götterfunken! Europa und die Revolution 1848/49*, Zeitpunkte, 1(1998), pp.92-96, Zeitverlag Bucerius, Hamburg; J. OSTERHAMMEL, *Die Entzauberung Asiens. Europa und die asiatischen Reiche im 18. Jahrhundert*, Beck, München, 1998; A. ERNST, „Sonderweg“ und „Sonderfall“. *Krise und Kontingenz der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklungen in Deutschland und in der Schweiz am Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges*, Phil.Diss., Zürich, 1996; J. SCHRIEWER et al. (Hrsg.), *Sozialer Raum und akademische Kulturen. Studien zur europäischen Hochschul- und Wissenschaftsgeschichte im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Lang, Frankfurt/M., 1993; M. KIRSCH, *Entwicklung der Erfahrungsräume von Europäern im Bereich des höheren Bildungswesens seit 1918*, in: H. KAEUBLE, J. SCHRIEWER (Hrsg.), *Gesellschaften im Vergleich*, Lang, Frankfurt/M. 1998, pp.391-431.

an international European public sphere was different from national public spheres for at least six important reasons.

First, the European public sphere was a *composite* rather than a homogenous public sphere. It consisted to a large degree of the composition of national public spheres. Hence, the rise of the European public sphere meant rising interconnectedness and the breakdown of the isolation between the national public spheres. The history of the European public sphere is the history of transfers and links between national public spheres. One has, however, to take into account that these interconnections do not always include all national public spheres on equal terms. The history of a European public sphere is also a history of hierarchical interconnections. Central national public spheres which invented internationally influential concepts and ideas existed alongside peripheral public spheres which received and transformed concepts, but which were not influential beyond their national borders. The international role of national public spheres does not necessarily depend upon the size of the country. Small countries were much more influential than their size would lead us to expect, and the reverse is also true for some large countries. Furthermore the interconnections between national spaces are far more important for the European public sphere than the interconnections between regional spaces for the national public sphere.

Secondly, the European public sphere has always been *multilingual*. It did not build upon one single language as it is the case in most national public spheres. It was based on a multitude of national mother tongues and several international languages. This is a crucial particularity, but it does not impede the functioning of a European public sphere. Various democracies in the world work well with two or several languages such as Switzerland, India, Canada, and tendencies in this direction are apparent in Spain and the United States. No doubt, the rise of the European public sphere since 1950 would not have happened without a basic change which was almost a cultural revolution in Europe during the second half of the 20th century: the rise of the knowledge of a foreign language. Around 1950 only a small minority of Europeans spoke foreign languages, perhaps ten percent or less. The average European outside border areas and outside ethnically mixed regions spoke only one single language, and this was often in a dialect which was difficult to understand in other regions with the same 'national' language. Around 2000, about half of all Europeans spoke a foreign language, and about two thirds of young Europeans did so. There was a clear hierarchy of foreign languages in the mind of the Europeans. Three quarters of Europeans saw English as a useful international language, one third saw French, and only one quarter German and one sixth Spanish.⁴ The European public sphere could only emerge in a situation in which a substantial number of Europeans, not only an elite, spoke a common international foreign language besides their mother tongue. The European Union became multilingual in two ways. On the one hand, the Union kept all national languages as an official language in which the legal texts and the official publications are written. It is impossible to give up this

4. Eurobarometre, no.52(2000), pp.52ff.

language policy since the law has to be published in each European language, and the identification of the citizens would not work if the Union only operated in English or French. On the other hand, the Union gradually accepted two working languages for parliamentarians, European civil servants, national politicians and experts meeting in Brussels: they are English and French. It has turned out that one has to articulate oneself at least in one of these two international languages. Otherwise one faces the risk of not being heard at the level of the European Union. The need to speak one of these international languages would have been an enormous obstacle for the rise of a European public sphere around 1950. It is much less so around 2000.

A third particularity: International communication in Europe before as well as after 1950 happened less through institutionalised public platforms such as European newspapers, journals, radio stations, TV stations, organisations or centralised European mass meetings than it is the case in national public spheres. The diffusion of concepts, ideas, meanings, and news in Europe usually proceeded without such central institutions. The Enlightenment was a European process, but it occurred without one single European journal or one major European salon or one outstanding European intellectual. Let me refer to another, perhaps paradoxical example: European nationalism, which, despite its search for national profiles, was often very similar in the use of symbols, of myths, of rituals, of history writing, was also not diffused by one single central European agency for nationalism. The diffusion of the idea of Europe also happened without any central European journal or meeting or organisation. The *unstructured, uninstitutionalised* sort of international public sphere was supported by numerous intellectuals, scientists, politicians, civil servants, translators of languages and of cultures. The uninstitutionalised multilateral European public sphere is difficult to investigate, since there is no single archive to be visited, but many tracks and traces must be followed in many languages. Historians usually investigate this diffusion bilaterally rather than multilaterally and often trace the cultural walls between two countries rather than the signs for a European public sphere.

The European public sphere was particular in a fourth sense because for a long time it was *not confronted with a European centre of power* which could be advised, encouraged, criticised, or overthrown. This confrontation with a power centre was lacking in a double sense.

On the one hand there was no European power which presented itself in a European public sphere, no *mise-en-scène* of a European monarch, a European government, a European parliament, a European administration, court or army. Only in two short periods of modern history did such a European power briefly exist: the eight years of occupation of large parts of Europe by Napoleon, and the three to four years of occupation of Europe by Hitler. But these did not lead to the rise of a European public sphere. What emerged under Hitler was a clandestine European resistance movement which became highly influential after his fall.

On the other hand the international European communication was not strongly related to politics. Thus a tradition of international communication about culture, about society, about international law, about religion or economics emerged which was, due to a lack of a European power centre, often rather utopian and oriented to-

wards a remote future or towards a nostalgic interpretation of the past rather than towards actual politics, especially compared with national public spheres at the time. A European political public sphere could not be built easily upon this tradition. Even when a supranational economic decision centre, the European coal and steel community, was founded in 1950, the character of the European public sphere did not develop immediately. For many European intellectuals the beginnings of European integration were too modest, too restricted to a small number of countries, too economic and too distant from culture and politics. Only gradually did the European space of communication become a public sphere, and this with varying intensity from country to country. Various reasons have contributed to this change: the enlargement of the European Community which made it better at speaking for Western Europe; the deepening of the power of the European Union in fields beyond the mere abolition of obstacles to a common market, i.e. in monetary policy, security, foreign policy, social policy, culture which made the European Union appear more important as a power centre in the eyes of the European public; the continuous reforms and new treaties since the Single Act in 1986 which provoked more debates and referendums on the European Union; the decline of the Soviet empire which made Europe also appear more powerful and concluded the period in which crucial decisions on Europe were made outside Europe.

In addition, this European public sphere remained *elitist*. It was by and large confined to a small group of politicians, intellectuals, experts, businessmen, trade union leaders. It was not unpopular, not a closed show, not purposefully restricted to an elite, but it did not mobilise large parts of the Europeans in the way that 19th and early 20th century national public spheres had done. In a way it was similar to the early beginnings of the national movements in the early 19th century. One reason for the restricted European public sphere was the concept of a public sphere by the European Council, by the European Commission and by the European Parliament. The European Council, one of the most important international power centres, was never interested in meeting a European public sphere. It confined its activities in this respect to the usual photo of six to fifteen chiefs of governments and six to fifteen foreign ministers plus the president of the European Commission. After a meeting of the European Council the individual head of government addresses himself or herself to the particular national public sphere. Alongside this the European Commission and the European Parliament have become more active, but they confine their activities largely to a policy of information of experts, journalists, teachers, students. To be sure, the Commission and the Parliament presented reports, white books, green books, memoranda, invited experts to write reports. The Commission sometimes organised large conferences to support and encouraged the development of a European civil society. But they have had no consistent policy on the creation of a European public sphere. Public discussion of European topics was mostly seen as a task of national governments and parliaments.

These particularities of the European public sphere led to contradictory views by social scientists and historians. Some historians and social scientist considered the democratic public sphere of the European nation states of the second half of the 20th century as the norm and have taken it as a mechanism for commenting on Europe. They inevitably

came to the conclusion that a proper public sphere on the European level did not exist. Other historians took into account the particularities of an international public sphere in Europe. They were more interested in what has gradually emerged since 1950.

Eras of the European public sphere

The European public sphere also had, as a sixth particularity, a history that was different from the national public spheres in Europe. It changed fundamentally, but in a particular way during the last two centuries. To appreciate what changed during the last fifty years one needs to take a longer-term view. Hence I shall present a preliminary sketch of the European public sphere since the end of the 18th century. One can discern four eras. The European peculiarities which just have been mentioned changed: the interconnection between national public spheres and the rise of an explicitly European public sphere, the debate on Europe, the relation between political power and the access of European citizens to the European public sphere. These eras are, however, also closely connected with the changes of the national public spheres. Hence, they can not be left aside.

In a first era in the late 18th and early 20th century a public sphere emerged in Europe, first in Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and later on, in the Southern and Eastern parts of Europe. The rise of a public sphere in which independent persons with free and equal access discussed topics of public concern was an important change in European history. However, this early public sphere had various limits. It was mostly confined to the middle class in normal circumstances. The political impact of these public debates on political decisions was also usually limited. As in most countries monarchies were still very powerful, censorship of public opinion was still widely accepted and executed. The market for journals and books was therefore still small and the public space was still largely dominated by the monarchies and the traditional churches.

These new public spheres were national ones, but they were already strongly interconnected, especially in the international “*république des lettres*”. Languages were much less an obstacles than in later eras, since most participants in the public sphere spoke French or Latin, so national languages were still not considered as important as they were later on. Travelling between intellectual and political centres, intensive letter writing, reading international journals and books were major ways of making international connections which are still not sufficiently researched. In spite of national differences in public spheres an international culture of the Enlightenment emerged.⁵

5. K.POMIAN, *L'Europe et ses nations*, Gallimard, Paris, 1990; C. CHARLE, *Les intellectuels en Europe au XIXe siècle, Essai d'histoire comparée*, Seuil, Paris, 1996; U. IM HOF, *Das Europa der Aufklärung*, Beck, München 1993; E. FRANÇOIS, H.E. BÖDEKER (Hrsg.), *Aufklärung/Lumières und Politik. Zur politischen Kultur der deutschen und französischen Aufklärung*, Universitätsverlag Leipzig, Leipzig, 1996; W. SCHNEIDERS, *Das Zeitalter der Aufklärung*, Beck, München, 1997; B. STOLLENBERG-RILINGER, *Europa im Jahrhundert der Aufklärung*, Reclam, Stuttgart, 2000. Fania Oz-Salzberger also intends to write a book on the European enlightenment.

Europe was discussed in these interconnected national public spheres, for European politics as well as the evaluation of other civilisations outside Europe during the period of European expansion were important topics in contemporary debates. These debates were broad, and they covered cultural, social as well as political topics. The idea of a lasting cultural and political superiority of Europe in comparison with all other civilisations was, for example, discussed and developed during this era.⁶

In these debates, however, the majority of the Europeans did not participate. The average European was integrated at the local and regional level rather, than in an international public sphere. Participation was largely limited to local events, festivities, rituals, meetings, markets, court sessions. Only pilgrimages offered a sort of international public sphere for everybody, though obviously limited to the ecclesiastical arena. On the whole European topics and the European public sphere seem not to have touched the average European.

A second era, which probably could be subdivided into further eras, was the 19th and early 20th centuries. National public spheres gradually lost their exclusive character and became more open to the lower middle and lower classes, to minorities, and to women. Alphabetisation, the universal suffrage for men and women, the rise of mass parties and mass organisations, the rise of new media, newspapers with large circulation, radio, the movie, and records were major factors of the change. As a consequence, media, associations and political parties became much more important in the public sphere besides the individuals. It was also important that the role of the intellectual changed during this period. The public role of intellectuals was strengthened after 1848. The market for books, newspapers, journals, theatres and concerts grew. Censorship was reduced. Intellectuals became more active – with the Dreyfus affair as a major turning point. This process advanced with large differences between individual European nations, and has been the object of subsequent controversy. Some scholars believe that, ironically, this was a process of continuous decline of the public sphere, since the sphere was dominated not only by political power but also by private capital invested in the media and, hence, lost its critical function. Other scholars believe that the process led to an opening, and to a stronger impact of the public sphere in politics at least in the democratic European countries.⁷

European interconnections and transfers between the national public spheres were transformed in this era. International contacts changed fundamentally from individual contacts to a large variety of organised general platforms, such as numerous international congresses on various political, social, and technological themes, world exhibitions, the Olympiads, scientific congresses for various special fields, international social movements like the international socialist congresses and the international women's movement, and after World War I, the League of Nations, the International Labour Office, international cartels, the international post and

6. J. OSTERHAMMEL, op.cit.

7. C. CHARLE, op.cit.; J. Requate, *Öffentlichkeit und Medien als Kategorien historischer Analyse*, in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 25(1999), pp.5-32.

telephone associations. This enormous rising network of formalised international European or Atlantic interconnections, however, was ambivalent from the point of view of a European public sphere. Contemporary Europeans saw these platforms as global rather than specifically European, even though they were usually dominated by Europeans. In addition, the spirit of these meetings was less and less oriented towards Europe. Rivalry between European nations predominated. One would have to investigate more intensively in what way these international meetings still made a difference for the transfers between European countries.

The debate on Europe became clearly more intensive after World War I which was seen as the major turning point of a European decline. There were in fact two often rather separate debates: One debate covered European civilisation and its peculiarities, especially in comparison with the new modern society of the USA or also sometimes of the USSR, and also with the non-modern societies in the Near and Far East. Parallel to the gradual and slow recognition of a fundamental crisis in Europe and the end of the global role of Europe, a renewed interest in European civilisation and a new, though often vague, identification with Europe emerged. Another debate covered European political unity and the foundation of common European institutions. The debate did not only occur as it did before 1914 in the marginal political milieus, but became a central topic of official foreign policy in Europe, especially when proposals for a customs union were presented by Briand and Stresemann.

The European public sphere, however, still remained more elitist than the national public spheres. The European movements of the interwar period were movements of notables rather than mass movements. To be sure, these movements and gatherings did not explicitly keep out lower and lower middle classes, and membership did not come exclusively from the middle class. But neither the symbols and rituals, nor the debates and European topics mobilised a large majority of Europeans as did the national public spheres.

A third era coincides with the period covered more specifically by this article, the period between the end of World War II and the early 1980's. The public spheres in this era were characterised by the rise of the TV, professionalisation of journalism and investigation in public opinion, by the unique expansion of secondary and higher education, the definite establishment of the universal suffrage for women, and the rising power of trade unions and later on the new social movements. Differences between national public spheres in Europe did not disappear. Internal European contrasts were even reinforced by the division of Europe into the communist East and the more and more democratic West.

Interconnections between national public spheres in Europe were substantially reinforced during this era with the enormous increase in international travel, international trade in consumer goods, knowledge of foreign languages, of education and studies abroad. In addition, all sorts of platforms emerged which were distinctly European rather than vaguely international: European interest groups were established, European trade unions were founded, European sport competitions such as the UEFA or the association of European mayors or European associations of scientific fields. This is the

era in which a European civil society with an advanced network of numerous associations emerged. What had happened in the European nation states in the decades before World War I now emerged on a European level.

The public debate on Europe changed in this era. The debate on the unity of Western Europe became now the predominant branch of the debate on Europe. For the first time in history this was not only a debate about proposals and hopes, but a debate on existing supranational European institutions, on the enlargement of membership and on the deepening of powers. For the first time, the European public was confronted with a European power centre at least in economic matters. For the first time the European public sphere could comment, criticise, encourage the decisions of a supranational European power centre. However, this new chance for the European public space was only exploited gradually. The other debate on Europe, i.e. on European culture and society also weakened in this era. It was still lively directly after World War II and covered the question whether Europe would play a particular role alongside the new superpowers. But the debate died down during the 1950's partly because the cold war and the division of Europe did not leave much room for a debate on the culture and society of Europe as a whole, partly because of the apparently economic character of the early European integration which did not encourage a social and cultural debate; and partly also because of the revival of the nation state as welfare state.

The European public sphere remained almost as elitist as before. To be sure, the opinion of the citizens about Europe was more intensively investigated than ever before with new methods of opinion polling. The majority of citizens of the European Community approved the construction of Europe and took part in the first election of a European parliament in 1979. The associations to which the European citizens adhered often had in one way or the other links with associations in other European countries. But a direct vital relationship of the European citizen with the European public sphere did not emerge. European civil society was based on cooperation and agreements between national associations. Direct membership in a European association was rare. A European citizenship with clear rights and obligations like national citizenships was not yet established. The opinion of the Europeans about Europe was known, but this opinion could only rarely be expressed in a political sense by European elections, referendums, parties, demonstrations.

Since the 1980s a fourth era seems to begin though this era is too close to the present to be fully sure of. Not everything has changed. The interconnections between the national public spheres were not distinctly stronger than before. One might have expected more intensive connections since the European market only now became fully established and that by the numerous decision on the Single Market in the second half of the 1980s and the early 1990s, also since the technical international connection of the media were reinforced by satellites and by the internet, by multinational enterprises in the media sector and by the establishment of international programs such as Radio Luxembourg, Arte, Euronews. But a European media in the full sense did not appear. Intellectuals who were known across Europe rarely spoke of European topics. European initiatives by intellectuals remained rare.

However the European public sphere became more important for various reasons. The experts who took European decisions and initiatives in their field of expertise became more numerous. Political scientists, economists, lawyers worked more frequently on Europe. The numbers of scientific books, journals, meetings on European topics increased. This public sphere of experts however did not mobilise the large public and, hence, often remained unknown to the large majority of Europeans. Moreover, the media news has covered Europe more intensively since the decisions on the three treaties of Maastricht, of Amsterdam and of Nice, and also since the introduction of the new European currency, the Euro. To be sure, change was gradual. National news in general remained clearly more important than European news. In addition, the character of the debate on Europe became more differentiated. It covered not just economic themes, but many others, especially since the power European Union was extended into various fields outside the European market. Topics of internal and external security foreign policy, social security, unemployment, environment, currency, immigration were discussed not only as national topics, but also as European topics. Moreover, the way of discussing European topics changed. Before the deepening of the power of the European Union, European topics were discussed mainly as those of experts. Reduction of tariffs, the complicated regulations of the agricultural market, the negotiations of the EU with the US or with African and Caribbean countries did not touch many Europeans. But when the power of the EU was extended and when it decided on equal pay for women, on the category of driver's licences, on the quality rules for food and for chemicals, the EU touched the everyday life of Europeans in many ways. As a consequence, the decisions of the European Union became more controversial and the debates on Europe hotter than before. European decisions became as controversial as decisions by national governments. Finally the debate on European culture and society which had weakened since the 1950's re-emerged in the 1980's, but in a different sense than before. It was more directly linked with politics. Discussing European culture and civilisation did not only mean creating a vague identification with Europe for educated Europeans, but now often meant discussing the membership of specific countries in the European Union. Now it could also cover the human rights position of European policy towards Near and East Asian countries.

The participation of Europeans in the European public sphere changed in a somewhat unexpected way. On the one hand, Europeans have more clearly expressed their opinions on Europe in the elections for the European parliament since 1979, also in various national campaigns, in which the European theme played an important role, in referendums on the membership in the European Union, but also on individual European treaties. During the 1990s a European citizenship gradually emerged, with the term being introduced in the Maastricht treaty and with a European charter of human and citizen rights decided in 2000 in Nice. To be sure, European citizenship included no obligations as does national citizenship including tax, schooling, military service, so it was less comprehensive than national citizenship. But a European citizenship was established. According to the opinion polls European citizens also expected an active policy of the European Union not

only in the classical fields such as international relations, but also in immigration, the environment, unemployment, human rights. For all these reasons the European public sphere has become much less elitist than before. On the other hand, support by the Europeans for the construction of Europe weakened during the 1990s, after a rising support during the late 1980s. Not only did opinion polls show a weakening interest in European integration, but participation in elections for the European Parliament also fell. It seems that these contradictions in the attitude of European citizens towards the European Union have to do with the European public sphere which has still not advanced far enough.

Conclusion: Indications for a rising European public sphere since 1950

Has a European public sphere in fact been reinforced since 1950? To be sure, the impact of European integration on the rise of a European public sphere was not a direct one. The supranational European institutions for various reasons were reluctant to create a European public sphere, with European journals, radio stations, TV-stations, any strong and expensive instruments of publicity for the European Commission and the European Council, the two power centres of the European Union. But there are other reasons for the rise of a European public sphere even if it is not as effective and as powerful as one might wish. Six signs for the rise of a European public sphere can be traced. I shall just touch upon these aspects especially since their history is not well-known.

A first long term sign of a European public sphere was the debate on Europe, on European civilisation, on European culture, society, economy, law, and European unity. This debate has been going on since the beginnings of Europe. Three great eras of the debate can be discerned: the debate during the early modern period and the Enlightenment which covered the question of a multiple world of old civilisations or a general superiority of European; after an interruption the debate from the late 19th century until the Cold War, a debate which centered around the decline of Europe as the power centre and as the pioneering civilisation of the world, and after a further interruption the most recent and current debate which started in the 1980s and which centers around the multiple modernities after the decline of the two partite world and after the end of an homogeneous Third World.⁸ This was a debate held primarily among intellectuals, scholars and writers, but it had important consequences for mental maps, for tourist as well as business views, for school books, for the public interpretation of other civilisation as hostile and dangerous or as neighbouring and similar.

A second long-term indicator for a European public sphere has been the rise of European symbols. This is an aspect which is not very well researched in history. To

8. J. OSTERHAMMEL, *op.cit.*; H. KAELBLE, *Europäer über Europa. Die Entstehung des modernen europäischen Selbstverständnisses im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Campus, Frankfurt/M., 2001.

make sure, symbols of Europe always existed. Early modern female symbols for each continent of the world included also the figure of Europe. Especially in the period of European crises political caricatures have used the mythical figure of Europe sitting on a bull, and sometimes the map of Europe as symbols for a threatened or declining Europe. In the post-war period the European movement and the new European enthusiasm led to the invention of new European symbols such as the flag with the green "E" on a white background; the European convention of human rights of 1953; the cities of Strasbourg and Brussels as European sites; Charlemagne as a European figure rather than as a national French or German symbol and the invention of the Charlemagne Award. A final period of invention of public European symbols was the inventive activity of the European Union which, since the 1980s, has tried to create a European identity by symbols in taking over the European flag with the twelve stars on the blue background, in inventing a European day on the 8th of May in memory of the declaration by Robert Schuman in 1950; in creating a European quarter in Brussels with the construction of buildings for the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Council of Europe as well as a building for the European Parliament in Strasbourg; in deciding on a European passport and choosing a European anthem; in designing the new Euro notes and coins; in deciding the Charter of Human Rights of 2000. The success of the European symbols of the European Union in the public space varied: but the European flag has become very present in the public spaces in Europe.⁹

A third, more short-term sign for the rise of a European public sphere was the growing interest of experts for European topics. The public sphere of experts became a crucial element of the European public sphere. As has been mentioned before this is not true for all possible disciplines, but in the fields which were most directly touched by European integration and by the activities of the European Union, i.e. economics, political science, law, the rise of a European public sphere of experts was distinct. In other fields such as sociology, ethnology, history, geography, educational science it was much weaker, though also growing. It seems that the rise of these public spheres of experts is a sustained process, partly because the role of experts on the European level is at least as strong or even stronger than on the national level, partly since the extended power of the European Union which apparently will not be reduced again and was definitely detected by the social sciences, also since the research funds of the European Union are clearly growing.

A fourth sign for the rise of a European public sphere was the formation of a European civil society, i.e. the rise of European interest groups, trade unions, civic

9. M. PASTUREAU, J.-C. SCHMITT, *Europe. Mémoire et emblèmes*, Épargne, Paris, 1990; C. SHORE, *Inventing homo Europeanus. The cultural politics of European integration*, in: *Ethnologia europaea*, 29(1999), pp.53-66; P. NORA, *Les „lieux de mémoires“ dans la culture européenne*, in: *Europe sans rivage. Symposium international sur l'identité culturelle européenne*, Michel, Paris, 1988, pp.38-42; C. LAGER, *L'Europe en quête de ses symboles*, Lang, Bern, 1995; W. C. SCHMALE, *Scheitert Europa an seinem Mythendefizit?*, Verlag, Bochum, 1996; M. BODEN, *Europa von Rom nach Maastricht. Eine Geschichte von Karikaturen*, Olzog, München, 1997; M. GÖLDNER, *Politische Symbole der europäischen Integration. Fahne, Hymne, Hauptstadt, Paß, Briefmarke, Auszeichnungen*, Verlag, Frankfurt/M., 1988; cf. also the book on European symbols edited by L. PASSERINI. It will come out soon.

organisations. The civil society is perhaps the most advanced part of the European public sphere. A whole network of all sorts of European interest groups and European organisation was gradually established in all fields of direct intervention of politics and in the fields of culture, sports, civic associations. It is difficult to say whether European civil society was still less advanced than the different national ones, especially since European civil society again is peculiar: Interest groups for agriculture, industry, commerce were unusually strong because of the traditional economic orientation of the supranational European integration. European civil society was oriented towards a European administration rather than towards parliament because of the traditional weakness of the European Parliament. Hence European interest groups were somewhat more hesitant in mobilising the members in spectacular public demonstrations. The relationship to the members of interest organisations was often more indirect since European organisations often do not have members, but combine national associations. For all these reasons European civil society was often working by negotiation, lobbying, memoranda rather than primarily by public intervention.¹⁰

A fifth indicator for the rise of a European public sphere has been the rising importance of Europe as a topic in election campaigns, and not only in the elections for the European Parliament since 1979, but also in the campaigns for some national parliaments; also in a rising number of referendums on Europe, membership in the European Union or on one of the European treaties. This new role of Europe in public campaigns started mainly in the 1980s and in the 1990s. It became an element of a European public sphere only in a uncompleted, preliminary sense, since so far the election for the European Parliament has rarely had common European topics, because of a lack of competing candidates for a European government. Referendums on Europe have so far always been votes by national constituencies rather than by a European constituency. But since Europe became the central theme of campaigns, it also played a more important role in the public sphere.

A sixth indicator, poorly researched and perhaps more ambivalent than the other indicators treated so far was the rising coverage of European topics in the European national media. As mentioned above, one particular characteristic of the particular European public sphere was its composite character. So coverage of European topics in the national media was at least as important as the rise of international European media. But the research on the coverage of European topics in national

10. J. GREENWOOD, *Representing Interests in the European Union*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1997; J. RICHARDSON (ed.), *Lobbying the European community*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993; R. EISING, B. KOHLER-KOCH, *Inflation und Zersäuerung. Trends der Interessenvermittlung in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft*, in: W. STREECK (Hrsg.), *Staat und Verbände. Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, Sonderheft, 25(1994), pp.175-206; G. KOHLER-KOCH, *Interessen und Integration. Die Rolle der organisierten Interessen im westeuropäischen Integrationsprozeß*, in: M. KREILE (Hrsg.), *Die Integration Europas. Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 23(1992); S. MAZEY, Th. FETZER, *Die europäische Zivilgesellschaft. Ein Forschungsbericht*, in: H. KAEUBLE, M. KIRSCH, A. SCHMIDT-GERNIG (Hrsg.), *Transnationale Öffentlichkeit ...*, op.cit. (with further references); R. TIEDEMANN, *Aufstieg und Niedergang von Interessenverbänden. Rent-Seeking und europäische Integration*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1993.

media is very rare. An investigation used by Jürgen Gerhardts on Germany shows that European topics were not increasingly treated in national German newspapers. Hence, for the time being one can only argue that the enlarged power of the European Union in a rising variety of fields has led to a somewhat larger coverage of European topics, especially in comparison with regional topics. This is to be investigated especially for the second half of the 1990s when the crisis of former Yugoslavia and the Euro, and also the series of new treaties and the permanent projects of further institutional reforms kept European topics and decisions by the European Union in the news.

For all these reasons one has to acknowledge the tendencies towards a European public sphere since 1950. They are, however, peculiar and can not simply be interpreted and criticised as national spheres, but on a European level. A European public sphere emerged with its specific strength and weaknesses. This has clearly been neglected by historians. But in recent years it has become clear that this is an important historical topic not least since it is linked to the rise of one of the most important power centres of the world.

A last Stronghold against Fascism and National Socialism? The Pan-European Debate over the Creation of a European Party in 1932

Katiana Orluc

«Il n'est plus temps de 'penser' l'Europe, il faut la faire»

G. Gerard, (Pan-European Union, Belgium 1931)

On a winter's evening in Berlin, leading figures from the world of politics, economics and culture gathered in the prestigious *S.S.S.-Club*¹ at the hotel *Kaiserhof*. The occasion had been much touted: the founder and head of the largest pro-European organisation, Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, was to reflect on "Germany's European mission". In trying times, Coudenhove-Kalergi argued, a common Europe was the only solution to the post-First World War cultural crisis, and the crucial economic problem of massive unemployment. It was the 30th January 1933. The same night, storm troopers, torches lit, marched through the Brandenburg Gate, while Adolf Hitler, accompanied by wildly cheering crowds, returned to his hotel room in Berlin as the new German chancellor. He, too, stayed at the *Kaiserhof*.

For Karl Richard Ganzer, a second-rank ideologue of the National Socialist concept of Europe, the crossing of Coudenhove-Kalergi's and Hitler's paths in the *Kaiserhof* symbolised a transmission of power, a transition from the old European order to the new era of National Socialism. As he put it, one

"rising [National Socialism] and one sinking political world [Pan-Europe], the latter a true child of the Weimar and Versailles systems, stood together at the same place and time under the critical gaze of History".²

Coudenhove-Kalergi had a similar impression of that evening, as he recollected in his memoirs, which evoke the tense atmosphere at the *S.S.S.-Club*'s meeting.³

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1. The *S.S.S.-Club*'s epithet derived from the founders' names, which all started with the letter "S": Walter Simons (1861-1937), German foreign minister (1920/21), president of the supreme court (1922-1928), and professor of international law in Leipzig; General Hans von Seeckt (1866-1936); Wilhelm Solf, German foreign minister for the *Rat der Volksbeauftragten* in 1918, German governor of Samoa and ambassador.
 2. K. R. GANZER, *Das Reich als europäische Ordnungsmacht*, Hanseatische Verlagsgesellschaft, Hamburg, 1941, pp.5-6. See also I. U. PAUL, *Die Paneuropa 1933-38 und Coudenhove-Kalergi: Ein 'getreues Spiegelbild seines Denkens und Wollens und Wirkens'*, in: M. GRUNEWALD, H. M. BOCK (Hrsg.), *Der Europadiskurs in den deutschen Zeitschriften (1933-1939)*, Peter Lang, Bern, 1999, pp.161-193, p.180 and footnote 55.
 3. R. N. COUDENHOVE-KALERGI, *Crusade for Pan-Europe. Autobiography of a Man and a Movement*, G. P. Putnam's sons, New York, 1943, pp.158-160. The description of the evening of January 30th, 1933 can also be found in his several German autobiographies: *Kampf um Europa. Aus meinem Leben*, Atlantis-Verlag, Zürich, 1949, pp.172-175; *Eine Idee erobert Europa. Meine Lebenserinnerungen*, Desch, Wien/München/Basel, 1958, pp.191-194; and *Ein Leben für Europa*, Kiepenheuer & Witsch, Köln/Berlin, 1966, pp.194-197.

Because Hitler and his new cabinet were holding their first meeting in the *Kaiserhof*, there was tight security at the hotel. The front entrance was reserved for the new government, and Coudenhove-Kalergi was advised to enter through the hotel's back door. Although he recalled that critical voices were raised against National Socialism following his lecture, he felt obliged to admit that, "in the first round, Hitler had triumphed over Pan-Europe".⁴

And so it seemed. For the next twelve years, National Socialism, fascism and aggressive nationalism in Europe made the creation of a united Europe (by consent rather than coercion) appear unlikely. Yet Hitler's accession to power did not necessarily signify the end of the Pan-European idea. Indeed, although working under restrained conditions in Germany due to the dissolution of the movement and a ban of his publications, Coudenhove-Kalergi redoubled his efforts after the "crossing of paths" in the *Kaiserhof*. In fact, at the beginning of 1932 Coudenhove-Kalergi had declared that the years 1932 and 1933 would be decisive ones with regard to the evolution of the movement. In a letter to his fellow Pan-European Gerhard Meyer, he stated that

"Pan-Europe will either be achieved in these two years, or else it will be years before a new international constellation appears again that enables such radical changes".⁵

Coudenhove-Kalergi was, of course, exaggerating his chances. Under the dire economic and political circumstances of the 1930s, neither he nor his movement had the political punch needed to achieve their aims. The history of the Pan-European Union (PEU) is the history of a failure. But historians cannot concern themselves solely with the victors.

The discussion about a united Europe before and after 30th January 1933 has hitherto been ignored by historians as inconsequential. Yet it sheds important light on the development of the European idea. Despite the apparent hopelessness of the situation in the 1930s, the Pan-European Union's mere existence provided a platform for discussion. That realisation reveals much about the state of the European idea at a time of historical crisis. The focus of this article is the manifold and lively reactions Coudenhove-Kalergi provoked with his proposal for the creation of a European Party. As a point of departure, Coudenhove-Kalergi and his closest collaborators' ideas will be introduced, followed by a presentation of the debate between the leaders of the different national sections. Finally, the article examines the views of the broader Pan-European public. This undertaking has only become possible since the PEU archives, which are preserved in the *Centre for Conservation of historical-documentary collections* in Moscow, were opened to researchers in 1989/90. The documents there offer a new perspective on the debate about Europe after the First World War, allowing us to move away from the published sources of

4. R. N. COUDENHOVE-KALERGI, *Crusade for Pan-Europe* ..., op.cit., p.160.

5. Coudenhove-Kalergi to Gerhard Meyer, 20 February 1932. [*Centr chranenja istoricesko-dokumental'nych kolekcij* – Centre for conservation of historical-documentary sources Moscow], CChIDK 500/1/683, f.27. This record (no.500) is entitled "Reichssicherheitshauptamt"; it is a special record, where the Gestapo collected documents it thought of high importance.

an elite to the private letters written by members as well as commentators of the movement drawn from all the European countries and from all social strata.⁶

This plethora of letters can be conceived of as a debate within a public sphere, which is here understood as a constructed cultural place where collective identities are negotiated. This process evolves through various forms of encounters between actors (or subjects) of communication; through personal contacts (which can also be expressed in letters), associations; and through the mass media.⁷ Accordingly, the Pan-European Union constituted a public space where both the meaning of Europe and the vision of a united Europe were discussed. This public space, however, was not homogeneous, but rather, multi-layered and controversial. In this article my interest is directed at the ways the discourse on Europe reflected on and conceptualised the social and political context of fascism and National Socialism. Did it embrace only the essence of the “good European’s” vision, *per se liberal*, democratic and peaceful? Or did it also incorporate non-democratic notions, or even radical nationalistic ideas?⁸

The Development of the Pan-European Union

The aftermath of the First World War saw a proliferation of associations and publications in favour of European unity, which were part of a wider discussion on the perceived European moral crisis and the yearning for peace.⁹ The PEU can be said to have

6. In this sense Hartmut Kaelble’s argument that a European public sphere existed in this period as a space of communication can even be taken a step further, since this European space was not only confined to an intellectual or political elite but was also embracing lower strata of society. See H. KAEUBLE, *Europäer über Europa. Die Entstehung des europäischen Selbstverständnisses im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Campus, Frankfurt/New York, 2001, in particular pp.255-256.

7. This notion of a public sphere is taken from a report by Luisa Passerini and Hartmut Kaelble from the working group on “European Society”, which is part of the programme “Identités européennes au XXe siècle” (pp.3 and 8). The definition and history of the public sphere has always been highly debated, be it in political science, sociology or historiography. Even more controversial is the issue of the history of a European public sphere. On the one hand, it has been argued that, historically speaking, there is no such thing as a European public sphere as compared to, for example, different national public spheres. On the other hand, the argument has been raised that a European public sphere in the sense of a communication space has existed since the middle ages, in the medieval churches, monasteries, courts, etc. (See, for example, K. POMIAN, *Europa und seine Nationen*, Klaus Wagenbach, Berlin, 1990). However, it seems that one can find consensus on the notion that a European public sphere of an intellectual and economic elite, of scholars and experts has existed at least since the Enlightenment, and that European governments have utilised the national public sphere not only for national but also for an international presentation.

8. Many thanks for comments on the earlier versions of this paper to Hagen Schulz-Forberg, Lubor Jilek, Prof. Niall Ferguson, Prof. Bo Stråth, Prof. Pogge von Strandmann, Prof. Hartmut Kaelble and Prof. Luisa Passerini.

9. W. LIPGENS, *A History of European Integration, 1945-1947*, Clarendon, Oxford, 1982, introduction, pp.38-43. See also Jean-Luc Chabot, who counted 600 articles and publications on Europe between the two world wars, without taking into account the daily newspapers and the publications of pro-European organizations. J.-L. CHABOT, *L’idée d’Europe unie de 1919 à 1939*, SRT, Grenoble, 1978.

grown out of this wave of new movements. At the same time, however, it was one of the few organisations which left the sphere of the Europe pensée and aimed at influencing actual policy by creating a pro-European network throughout Europe.

The Union was founded in 1924 and with the support of the Austrian government established its headquarters in the prestigious Viennese *Hofburg*. Two years earlier, Coudenhove-Kalergi had started to publish his ideas on a common European political structure in Austrian and German newspapers. In 1923 his programmatic book *Paneuropa* had appeared, its stated aim being to “create a great political movement that lies dormant in all European peoples”.¹⁰ In the same year Coudenhove-Kalergi had set up a publishing house, the *Paneuropa Verlag*, which published the journal *Paneuropa*.¹¹ The latter was founded in April 1924 and was to become the official discussion platform of the Union until its last edition in March 1938. In a very short time span Coudenhove-Kalergi thus provided his ideas with a quite impressive propaganda apparatus, which – at least theoretically – was able to influence both public opinion and politics. Its aims were to awaken a “latent though dormant European national consciousness,” to remind the Europeans of their common features – what he called “the Occidental cultural community” – and to forge the political integration of the continent on the grounds of this renewed consciousness.¹²

Coudenhove-Kalergi’s early philosophical writings reveal on the one hand his own self-understanding and on the other hand explain his basic political concepts. Although he shared some beliefs and attitudes with the cultural critics and Conservative Revolutionaries, his basic ideas differed fundamentally from theirs.¹³ He had in common with them the belief in authoritarian leadership instead of parliamentary politics. Furthermore, he accepted the notion of the decline of Occidental culture. However, he shared the widespread contemporary pessimism only in his understanding of the immediate post-war situation, whereas his long-term expectations were hopeful. He was filled with a quasi-religious conviction that Europe could still draw enough force from within to rescue itself through unifying. Yet Coudenhove-Kalergi rejected firmly the Conservative Revolutionaries’ restrictive notion of national community (*Volksgemeinschaft*), although the nation remained the nucleus in his political understanding, as it did for his concept of a common Europe. In his philosophical discussions, Coudenhove-Kalergi saw liberal democracy as complementing the rule of a neo-aristocracy, which he defined as a “social aristocracy of the mind”.¹⁴ He favoured the introduction of a two-chamber system in politics. The

10. R. N. COUDENHOVE-KALERGI, *Paneuropa*, Paneuropa Verlag, Wien/Leipzig, 1926, 4th ed.[1923], p.5.

11. For a detailed analysis of the journal *Paneuropa* in the 1930s see I. U. PAUL, *Die Paneuropa 1933-38* ..., op.cit.

12. See R. N. COUDENHOVE-KALERGI, *Paneuropa*, op.cit., introduction.

13. To associate Coudenhove-Kalergi in general with the Conservative Revolutionaries, as some scholars have done, is oversimplifying the question of his political affiliations, which are more ambiguous than it appears at first sight, as shows his rejection of the Conservative Revolutionaries’ negative ideals, such as anti-liberalism, anti-Semitism and anti-urbanism, as well as his distaste for the National Socialists and his participation in the socialist *Politischer Rat Geistiger Arbeiter*.

14. R. N. COUDENHOVE-KALERGI, *Adel*, Der Neue Geist-Verlag, Leipzig, 1922, p.25.

combination of an intellectual-aristocratic upper house with an elected second chamber was intended to even out the defects of universal suffrage, which Coudenhove-Kalergi feared might lead to a regime of “demagogues, capitalists and seducers”.¹⁵ These political-philosophical ideas continued to play a vital role in the development of the Pan-European movement.

Coudenhove-Kalergi explained his politicisation by referring to, on the one hand, his experiences in the First World War – which in his view had been a “European civil war” – and on the other hand, to the new diplomacy of the American President Woodrow Wilson. Coudenhove-Kalergi envisaged a regional organisation of the world into five federations, of which Europe (and its colonies) would be one. Under the supervision of a modified League of Nations, he argued, a British, an East Asian, a Pan-American and a Russian federation should also be established alongside Pan-Europe. The British Empire and the Soviet Union thus fell outside his definition of Europe, constituting independent federations.¹⁶

By October 1926, the PEU had gathered sufficient momentum to hold the first Pan-European Congress in Vienna, attracting some 2,000 delegates from twenty-four states. The French foreign minister, Aristide Briand, had accepted the role of honorary president of the movement in 1927, which was a result of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s efforts to concentrate on the Paris-Berlin axis. The Pan-European movement reached the height of its political influence when Briand circulated his famous memorandum on a European Federal Union at the League of Nations’ Assembly on 17th May 1930 – the same day on which the second Pan-European Congress opened in Berlin.

However, the Pan-European Union took on a new quality with the rise of the National Socialists and the establishment of the German dictatorship. Initially, Coudenhove-Kalergi had planned to create a youth movement, but this turned out to be unsuccessful, leading him to change the structure of the Union’s propaganda towards a ‘leader’-oriented movement revolving around himself and his international network in 1928. In 1932, however, he prepared for a return to a mass organisation by creating a European party,¹⁷ while at the same time trying to win over

15. R. N. COUDENHOVE-KALERGI, *Die Zukunft des Neo-Aristokratischen Prinzips*, in: *idem., Krise der Weltanschauung*, Paneuropa Verlag, Wien, 1923, pp.74-75. In this regard he agreed with the revolutionary socialist Kurt Hiller, in whose socialist *Politischer Rat Geistiger Arbeiter* he had participated. Hiller understood aristocracy as “the teachings of the regime of the minds”, who were to be placed at the head of the state. See K. HILLER, *Leben gegen die Zeit*, Rowohlt, Reinbek, 1969-1973, p.190. See O. BURGARD, *Das gemeinsame Europa – von der politischen Utopie zum außenpolitischen Programm. Meinungs austausch und Zusammenarbeit pro-europäischer Verbände in Deutschland und Frankreich, 1924-1933*, Verlag Neue Wissenschaft, Frankfurt/M., 2000.

16. His personal motivations for this project might also be allegorised as a search for his own identity: in defining Europe, Coudenhove-Kalergi would need to come to terms with his family background – as the son of an aristocratic European father and a Japanese mother: “Our father represented Europe, our mother Asia. These continents were no abstraction for us boys, but realities”. R. N. COUDENHOVE-KALERGI, *Crusade for Pan-Europe ...*, op.cit., p.24. See also *Ein Leben für Europa*, op.cit., pp.37-38: “It would have been difficult for us to identify him (our father) with any one nation. Thus Europe was always in our eyes a self-evident unity, the land of our father”.

17. See L. JILEK, *Pan-Europe dans les années vingt: la réception du projet en Europe centrale et occidentale*, in: *Relations Internationales*, 72(1992), pp.409-432, p.411.

European statesmen to oppose German hegemonic plans by constructing a European defensive front that would minimise the threat of another war.

Coudenhove-Kalergi's Think Tank: Struggling for a Party Programme

It is striking that in his autobiographies Coudenhove-Kalergi only mentioned the creation of the European Party in passing. Even then, he merely stated that after the National Socialists' accession to power, the development of a European Party was no longer viable.¹⁸ However, the documents found in Moscow allow us to construct a much fuller picture. Not only did high hopes rest on the creation of a European party, but huge efforts in its implementation were also made. After Coudenhove-Kalergi had declared at the third Pan-European Congress in Basle in mid-October 1932 that a European Party should be founded in order to both foster the creation of a Pan-European mass movement and put pressure on the European governments in order to pursue a development of a united Europe, the pro-European public reacted with an unexpectedly lively discussion. It is unclear why Coudenhove-Kalergi was so very cautious in his later statements about the European Party. One argument could be, of course, that, given the fact the European Party never came into being, Coudenhove-Kalergi regarded it as a complete failure. Yet judged by its public resonance, manifested in hundreds of supportive letters from all over Europe, it was clearly one of the PEU's most promising projects.

Throughout 1932, the party programme was prepared and edited by Coudenhove-Kalergi in close collaboration with his fellow Pan-Europeans, the Austrian engineer Leopold Klausner (his brother-in-law) and the German Gerhard Meyer.¹⁹ In its final version it contained six main points, each of which comprised a further four to six articles.²⁰ The first three points called for the creation of a United States of Europe as a federal union and a customs union, including a federal court and army, as well as a common currency. This new union should pursue a common peace policy. The programme envisaged a mutual guarantee of sovereignty and security as well as equal rights for all European countries,

18. In the last version of his memoirs, *Ein Leben für Europa* (Cologne/Berlin, 1966, p.194), Coudenhove-Kalergi stated: "At the centre of the Congress stood the question of the Pan-European people's movement, supported by a 'European party.' In principle, this idea was accepted – but its execution was delayed until after a democratic solution of the German crisis. It was clear to everyone that there was no room for a European party in Hitler's Germany, and that the founding of such a party would not find acceptance in other countries until Germany had decided in favour of Europe and against Hitler". He went on saying that his speech in the *S.S.S.-Club* was "a swan song of the Pan-European movement in Germany. A European party no longer could be considered" (p.197). In his English autobiography he did not even mention the European Party.

19. Coudenhove-Kalergi's wife, the famous Jewish theatre actress Ida Roland, was very influential in his life and work. The marriage had liberated him from his family and their conservative milieu, while at the same time introducing him to a more intellectual and artistic milieu.

20. See Coudenhove-Kalergi's first draft of the *Programm der Europäischen Partei* in: CChIDK, record 554 "Paneuropäische Union, 1923-38", inventory 7, file 465, folio 139; and the final version of the party programme, CChIDK, 554/1/40, f.1-4.

which should be accomplished through the revision of the Peace Treaties of 1919. The last three points provided guidelines for the domestic policy of the proposed European union, generally calling for “social progress on the basis of European individualism”. The last paragraph of the party programme demanded the guarantee of individual freedom, of all religious creeds and of private property against all terror. Obviously, this paragraph was directed against both the National Socialists and the Communists. Moreover, the programme suggested that social legislation be developed in all European member states to achieve a minimum standard of living, the equality of sexes and the education and “advancement of all talented people”. Politically, the programme requested a reform of democracy by strengthening the state’s authority and “stabilising government power”. With regard to economics, it suggested that a co-operative chamber be set up to co-ordinate production and to overcome class struggle. Furthermore, the party programme demanded that the different national cultures and regional traditions of Europe should be preserved, while at the same time rights of minorities should be guaranteed. Finally, the programme called on people to oppose

“war and the armaments race, national oppression and international defamation, poverty and unemployment, plutocracy and communism, corruption and demagogy, and last but not least, nineteenth-century materialism”.²¹

The editing process was a laborious and hotly contested enterprise, as the extensive correspondence shows. Gerhard Meyer, for example, insisted that the Versailles Treaty be revised, particularly given that the Pan-European Union had finally “courageously” altered its position on this question in the late 1920s, having previously supported the Treaty.²² In the first drafts, Coudenhove-Kalergi proposed a revision of the Treaty, but only “in the spirit of Wilson’s Fourteen Points”. Meyer, however, advised him to skip the details on the specific form of the revision, since this point still aroused disagreement and could therefore not be part of a political programme, which was intended to attract as many people as possible.²³

In a later comment on the programme, Meyer also warned against the frequent use of general terms, such as “freedom” and “peace”, and in particular against the formulation “against war”, so that the party would not be seen as just another pacifist party or be confused with the various peace movements. Ever since the World Peace Congress held in Berlin in 1924, one of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s predominant concerns had been to keep the Union distinct from radical pacifism. A clash between the two movements had arisen, since Coudenhove-Kalergi had favoured a re-organisation of the League of Nations through decentralisation, following his concept of five world federations, but even the moderate members of the peace movements were strictly against any change to the Geneva institution.²⁴ The impor-

21. Ibid.

22. Gerhard Meyer to Coudenhove-Kalergi, 22 August 1932. CChIDK, 554/7/68, ff.41-42.

23. Gerhard Meyer to Coudenhove-Kalergi, 6 August 1932. CChIDK, 554/7/68, ff.46-55.

24. For a more detailed examination of the relationship between the Pan-European Union and the peace movements, see, for example, F. K. SCHEER, *Die Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft (1892-1933). Organisation, Ideologie, politische Ziele. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Pazifismus in Deutschland*, Haag + Herchen, Frankfurt/M., 1981, pp.381-385.

tance of pacifism for Coudenhove-Kalergi should certainly not be minimised, since he saw the establishment of a European union as the only means to secure peace. However, he did not aim at peace per se, since he favoured the idea that Europeans should continue to exercise world hegemony given their outstanding cultural and scientific capabilities and achievements.²⁵

Coudenhove-Kalergi's brother-in-law Leopold Klausner also urged him to change the paragraph on the reform of democracy. The original formulation was as follows:

“Reform of democracy through strengthening and stabilising governmental power and state authority in opposition to the excrescence [*Auswuchs*] of parliamentarianism”.²⁶

Coudenhove-Kalergi had not expressed such clear criticism of democracy and parliamentarianism since his early socio-philosophical writings, although in his response to Klausner he specified his point of view:

“I am not concerned with maintaining parliamentarianism, but with strengthening democracy. The parliamentary form of democracy will have to give way to other forms of it”.²⁷

Klausner proposed modifying this passage, since, he argued, the formulation “stabilisation of governmental power” was a National Socialist one and the idea of a reform of democracy in this context was far too aggressive. He preferred the phrasing “reform of parliamentarianism through consolidation of democratic state authority and guarantee of continuity of governmental power”.²⁸ In the end, under the influence of his collaborators, the European party programme lost much of its aggressive and authoritarian character.²⁹

A very revealing manuscript by Coudenhove-Kalergi accompanied the programme, providing guidelines as to how the European Party should constitute itself in relation to the other political parties. Convinced that it should endorse more powerful and appealing slogans than the established parties, Coudenhove-Kalergi requested that the members of the party should behave in the same way the fascists did towards the old national parties and the Communists towards the Social Democrats. He professed that

“our aim must be to absorb the liberal parties so that they will arise again with our ideas, carrying the name: European party”.³⁰

25. R. N. COUDENHOVE-KALERGI, *PanEuropa*, op.cit., p.34, and *Europa und die Welt*, lecture on 9 April 1926, in: R. N. COUDENHOVE-KALERGI, *Kampf um PanEuropa*, vol.III, Paneuropa Verlag, Wien, 1930, pp.53-66.

26. Draft of the party programme by Coudenhove-Kalergi. CChIDK, 554/7/68, f.20.

27. Coudenhove-Kalergi to Leopold Klausner, 22 July 1932. CChIDK, 554/7/68, f.22.

28. Leopold Klausner to Coudenhove-Kalergi, 23 July 1932. CChIDK, 554/7/68, ff.25-27; Leopold Klausner to Coudenhove-Kalergi, 12 August 1932. CChIDK, 554/7/68, f.21.

29. This debate about the European party programme illustrates that Coudenhove-Kalergi cannot simply be regarded as the sole creator of all the Pan-European Union's ideas and activities, as has been argued in most of the older literature.

30. CChIDK, 554/4/302, f.158.

Once more, it is evident how much Coudenhove-Kalergi owed to the Conservative Revolutionaries, who sought to break with that tradition of conservatism which had its roots in Wilhelmine Germany.

Focusing on the German case, he suggested that the party should concentrate on those elements who regarded peace as their ultimate goal. These could be found between two blocs, the Social Democrats and the Nationalists, while excluding the *Zentrum* and other Catholic elements as well as the agrarians. Given their declared commitment to a common Europe, however, the *Zentrum* and the Social Democrats could hardly be ignored by the European Party; all the more given that the latter had adopted on the goal of a United States of Europe in their Heidelberg programme as early as 1925.³¹

With the drafting of the European Party Programme, the whole thrust of the Pan-European movement had shifted. The political purpose behind this new orientation is conveyed most clearly in the arguments put forward at the time by Coudenhove-Kalergi. First, in view of the general political atmosphere in 1932, Coudenhove-Kalergi decided to give up his previous strategy of mainly influencing the elite and political decision-makers in particular. Worried by the 'nationalisation' of the international climate, Coudenhove-Kalergi planned a propaganda campaign to conquer public opinion in the broader sense and to sow the seeds for a political activism which aimed at transcending right and left. At the same time, however, his open rejection of parliamentarianism cost him much credibility among democrats, in particular Social Democrats. Secondly, Coudenhove-Kalergi presented the European Party as a party of the twentieth century in clear opposition to what he understood as nineteenth-century doctrines, namely materialism. This idealistic critique of capitalism was not very original, having already been expressed by many contemporary cultural critics. The third and most important change, however, was the radical *volte-face* from defending the Versailles Treaty to fiercely demanding its revision. Through the revision of the Peace Treaty, Coudenhove-Kalergi now believed it would be possible to put an end to the rise of National Socialism. His envisaged solution to the political *cul-de-sac* in 1932 was a return to Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points; a suggestion he only uttered after a friend had assured him – quite erroneously – that he would find a benevolent reaction within the French government.³² Instead, this change in Coudenhove-Kalergi's attitude not only towards the Versailles Treaty but towards the idea of an Austrian-German customs union led to a rupture between the PEU and the French prime minister,

31. Ibid.

32. R. N. COUDENHOVE-KALERGI, *Zurück zu den 14 Punkten!*, in: *Paneuropa* (Journal), 2(February 1932), pp.33-40. The American engineer Dannie Heineman, administrator of the Electricity Company Sofina in Brussels and treasurer of the Pan-European's Belgian section, was his informant on French governmental affairs in this point.

Edouard Herriot, until then an enthusiastic and influential supporter of the Pan-European movement.³³ According to Coudenhove-Kalergi, however, these concessions to German nationalism were necessary to maintain Germany in the League of Nations and to support the government of the German Chancellor Heinrich Brüning, which he considered the last bastion against the rise of National Socialism.

Widening the Circle: Influencing the Elite to Conquer the Masses

Despite Coudenhove-Kalergi's stated intention to concentrate on the masses, he was still eager to win over important personalities to back up his public activities, since he believed the Pan-European Union "incapable of countering the Hitler Movement with such weighty propaganda that it would not be immediately washed away".³⁴ However, professional diplomats and politicians almost unanimously advised Coudenhove-Kalergi not to launch the party. Their arguments were predominantly pragmatic. First, they pointed to the economic and political situation. Secondly, they believed it would fundamentally change the character of the Pan-European Union, which thus far had representatives in all major political parties (except, of course, the National Socialists and Communists) and still hoped to reach a horizontal, all-party agreement in the near future. Lastly, the creation of a new organisation next to the Union would double the costs and the burdens of leadership.

Coudenhove-Kalergi had exchanged letters with his collaborators in Germany all year long, trying to convince the German Pan-Europeans to participate in the foundation of the party. After all – and on this point nobody disagreed – it was in Germany and France that the European Party had to gain some ground before the smaller surrounding states would follow. In a confidential letter to Fritz Caspari, a German representative of the PEU and a reluctant founding member of the European Party, Coudenhove-Kalergi first suggested a list of twelve possible party leaders, mainly industrialists and bankers. Among them were Coudenhove-Kalergi's closest collaborators in Germany: the industrialist Robert Bosch; Hermann Münch, another industrial leader; Adolf Stauß, director of the *Rüttgerswerke*; Hans Fürstenberg, banker and member of the Berlin Chamber of Commerce; the industrialists Erich Rämisch, Heinz Pulvermann, Karl Gerstenberg and Doherr Gruschwitz; Coudenhove-Kalergi's friend Gerhard Meyer; the writer and former *Deutsche Bank* employee Georg

33. The rupture between Herriot and Coudenhove-Kalergi occurred after the publication of an open letter by Coudenhove where he had sharply criticized the French Prime Minister's declaration, in which the latter had refused to accord the Germans the same military rights. In return, Herriot rejected the honorary presidency of the Basle Congress, which resulted in the absence of the French delegation to the Congress. Coudenhove-Kalergi to Edouard Herriot, 19 September 1932, and Edouard Herriot to Coudenhove-Kalergi, 22 September 1932. FAE [Fondation Archives Européennes, Genève], *Bureau Central, Correspondance, Section française*. See F. THÉRY, *Construire l'Europe dans les années vingt. L'action de l'Union paneuropéenne sur la scène franco-allemande, 1924-1932*, Institut européen de l'Université de Genève, Euryopa études, Juillet 1998, pp.144-146.

34. Coudenhove-Kalergi to Gerhard Meyer, 3 March 1932. CChIDK, 500/1/683, f.19.

Schulze; Richard Gütermann, owner of a sewing company, and a certain Dr. Freundt, a banker. Coudenhove-Kalergi himself did not know whether or not all of these personalities would be willing to join the European Party's leading group. Yet they fulfilled two important criteria. They were not involved in another party, and thus would not raise any immediate friction with established political forces. Nor did they need to be convinced of Pan-European ideas, as they were in fact all fervent Pan-Europeans. Coudenhove-Kalergi was in search of female members as well, yet they were difficult to find, since most well-known women were already affiliated to political parties.

Coudenhove-Kalergi hoped that Robert Bosch would accept the position of party leader.³⁵ On the same day he was writing to Caspari, however, Bosch himself wrote a letter to Coudenhove-Kalergi, which clearly rejected the European Party project:

“Your plan to construct a European party [...] seems to me to be a major detour, if not a mistaken path. I believe it is impossible for you to bring together 26 states of Europe”.³⁶

Fritz Caspari worked overtime during the second half of July. He talked to important people, met with representatives and intellectuals, but could not find anybody suitable who was willing to accept the honour of the post of party leader. He had had a conversation with Joseph Koeth, a former Cabinet minister, a member of the German Democratic Party (DDP) and an influential figure throughout the Weimar Republic. But they had reached nothing more than a “consensus of doubts” towards the European Party.

Caspari and Koeth identified three main obstacles to a new party of this kind. First, there was the question of financing: how and from where would a Europe-wide party find the necessary funds in the middle of an economic depression? Politically, the founding of such a party amidst the likely emerging domestic constellation would be a washout that would harm the Pan-European question more than it could help. It would more or less be forced on the track of left-oriented circles, and even in these circles a programme like that of Pan-Europe and its planned party are seen as self-evident. Thirdly, neither Caspari nor Koeth thought that Coudenhove-Kalergi's list of possible leaders contained any person with the political talent and distinction necessary to mobilize support on a continental stage.³⁷ Coudenhove-Kalergi immediately answered Caspari's doubtful letter on 28 July 1932, rebutting these objections one by one. “As far as the financing is concerned, this could be achieved from those economic circles that are systematically being destroyed by the European customs policies [...]”. He had in mind the financial circles in Germany which had

35. Coudenhove-Kalergi to Fritz Caspari, 12 July 1932. CChIDK, 554/1/39, f.115.

36. Robert Bosch to Coudenhove-Kalergi, 12 July 1932. CChIDK, 554/1/39, f.109.

37. Fritz Caspari to Coudenhove-Kalergi, 26 July 1932. CChIDK, 554/1/39, f.112.

been supporting the Union financially from its very beginning.³⁸ As for the spread of the new party, Coudenhove-Kalergi was optimistic that he would find, especially in Germany, fruitful soil for a new party, “because here the parties of the centre failed due to a lack of leadership and an attachment to the slogans of the 19th century.” It would be the task of the European Party to unite all voters who were neither socialists, nor extreme nationalists, nor members of the Catholic *Zentrum*. It was only on the third point – the lack of a suitable leader – that he admitted that there were difficulties, but he continued to insist on the need for someone not tainted by a previous political career.³⁹

Coudenhove-Kalergi had to read many critical letters in a similar vein. Adolf Stauß, director of the *Rüttgerswerke AG.*, asserted that a European Party was not viable since the most important issue was unemployment. How could an international party address domestic economic problems? Moreover, he argued that the National Socialists represented no long-term threat for Pan-Europe since they had already reached their zenith; a fatal miscalculation.⁴⁰ Rather, he and others suggested that the PEU should strive towards the implementation of the European idea within the existing parties, which should turn the European question into a subject for the electoral campaign.⁴¹

Similar doubts as to how a European Party could be integrated into each country's domestic politics were expressed by the PEU's Dutch section, which believed that the party programme was both too superficial and unable to embrace the heterogeneity of the different nations:

“[H]ave you not forgotten that, for example in Holland, the friends of P.E. [Pan-European] thought belong to many political parties? And that these friends are not of one opinion about the solution of the social question. [...] Some sentences are not to my liking or are still unsolved questions for me. I am thinking of 1 d) the European military alliance, 3 b) mutual customs protection, 4 d) co-operative economic associations (fascism?), 5 b) strengthening of state authority (von Papen, pseudo-fascism?). [...] We were of the unanimous opinion that the Pan-European Union cannot or must not concern itself with the national solution of these social

38. As for example, the banker Max Warburg, who had secured the foundation of the Union through a donation of 60,000 gold-mark in 1923/24. Another long-lasting supporter was Robert Bosch, who in 1927 had become the head of the *Panuropa-Förderungsgesellschaft*, which had been until its dissolution in 1933 the major fundraiser. Other donors were German banks, such as the *Deutsche Bank*, in particular its vice-chairman of the supervisory board and former member of the managing board as well as the PEU's treasurer, Arthur von Gwinner; *Bankhaus Mendelssohn*; the *Dresdner Bank* and the *Darmstädter Nationalbank*, as well as industrialists, like Adolf Stauß, director of the *Rüttgerswerke AG.* and Richard Heilner, director of the *Deutsche Linoliumwerke AG.*

39. Coudenhove-Kalergi to Fritz Caspari, 28 July 1932. CChIDK, 554/1/39, f.111.

40. Adolf Stauß to Coudenhove-Kalergi, 28 September 1932. CChIDK, 554/1/39, f.224.

41. The publisher Hermann Ullstein, for example, could simply not imagine the party as an independent, Europe-wide organisation: “I do not find the goal acceptable of developing this European party into an independent one, because the European idea, as large as it is, nevertheless can still only be part of partisan politics that have political, economic, and cultural goals”.

Hermann Ullstein to Coudenhove-Kalergi, 20 October 1932. CChIDK, 554/1/39, ff.232-233.

questions. There are too many major differences for this in the economic and political situations, in the intellectual sentiments of European countries”.⁴²

The Dutch were clearly uncomfortable with the authoritarian aspects of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s programme. From Belgium, a member of the Union’s managing board, the engineer Henri Masson, informed the Union’s headquarters in Vienna that

“everyone is in agreement and I share their opinion that it is not possible to found a European party in Belgium in opposition to the other existing parties”.⁴³

This was the same tune that his German collaborators had sung. Coudenhove-Kalergi replied with a firm letter. After all, he said, the anticipated decline of National Socialism had not occurred in the elections of 6 November 1932; although the National Socialists lost over 4% of their vote they still remained the strongest party. Coudenhove-Kalergi thus instructed Masson to confront the Belgian parties with their programme:

“If they accept the European programme and participate effectively in its propaganda, I would be ready to renounce the construction of the Belgian European party; otherwise, the parties merit nothing else but to be attacked by a new political concept”.⁴⁴

All in all, Coudenhove-Kalergi received from the different national sections mostly politely phrased refusals; only the Hungarian section actually answered in a positive way. The president of the Hungarian PEU was Paul von Auer, an eminent figure in Hungarian politics, and it was he who signed the official declaration which reads:

“The Hungarian section greets the suggestion of the president of the Union regarding the organisation of a European party with great joy [...]”.⁴⁵

Yet, on the same day, von Auer sat down and wrote a private letter to Coudenhove-Kalergi. Here, he voiced his doubts about the party more clearly. According to his information, it was almost impossible to raise the amount of money needed to finance the organisation of a party in Hungary. In the press too there was little hope of support. And, even more difficult, how could party members in rural areas possibly convince the illiterate peasants to vote for ‘Europe’? Furthermore, for the next Hungarian elections only those parties which were already in the parliament would have a right to run. Thus, the room for manoeuvre was very limited for a European Party. If however – and von Auer used the conditional Coudenhove-Kalergi had often heard – the European Party were to be successful in France and Germany, then he could inaugurate a conference and invite important personalities.⁴⁶

Yet in France, the debate about the European Party was virtually non-existent, given the rupture between Coudenhove-Kalergi and Herriot. Most French Pan-Europeans sided with their Prime Minister, as expressed by the industrialist Louis Marlio:

42. G. W. Melchers, Warga (Holland), priest and member of the Dutch Pan-European Union, 22 October 1932. CChIDK, 554/1/33, f.439.

43. Henri Masson to Coudenhove-Kalergi, 7 November 1932. CChIDK, 554/1/39, f.6.

44. Coudenhove-Kalergi to Henri Masson, 12 Novembre 1932. CChIDK, 554/1/39, f.7.

45. Hungarian Section to Coudenhove-Kalergi, 28 November 1932. CChIDK, 554/1/34, ff.533-534.

46. Paul von Auer to Coudenhove-Kalergi, 28 November 1932. CChIDK, 554/1/34, f.440.

“I returned today to Paris after a rather long voyage, and I found the programme of the European Congress that you have organised at Basle. I had intended to attend, [...], but at the same time this morning in my mail I also found the text of an open letter that you believed to address to Monsieur Herriot. [...] I consider the sending of this letter inopportune, which indicates clearly that you disapprove of the politics followed by the French government in its discussion with the German government, which is however entirely responsible for the actions that have forced Monsieur Herriot to take a stand”.⁴⁷

The Goal Legitimises the Means:

The Pan-European Public between Peace and Fascism

Despite the fact that the European Party had failed to win the support of the Pan-European national sections' officials, many encouraging letters arrived from all over Europe at the headquarters in Vienna following the European Congress in Basle. Through newspapers,⁴⁸ people had heard that a new party was to be founded, and reacted by writing and expressing their hopes and wishes for participation. In fact, the majority of letters illustrates that Coudenhove-Kalergi might have lost some ground in established political circles, but that a growing number of Europeans saw the need for a new mass movement proclaiming a unification of Europe: “The many millions of like-minded, dissatisfied Europeans must be organised into a party that is not political, not an agitator, and does not criticise”.⁴⁹ As Meyer put it:

“A political agitation among non-influential people [...] is almost more significant than by influential personalities. And I believe that we will find the strong personal pillars among anonymous people (who are the only true ones!) rather than among those individuals dependent on and captivated in office and rank”.⁵⁰

How, then, did these “anonymous people” – ordinary Europeans who had no official political position or office within the PEU – envisage a united Europe and what were their motives and aims? Among the hundreds of letter writers, certain themes can be identified. European enthusiasts from Finland to Cyprus believed a united Europe would safeguard them against aggressive nationalism in general as well as against communism; protect them against fascism and National Socialism; and secure a peaceful future. The fear of war is a prominent theme in the letters, as is the hope for a way out of the economic depression dominating the continent. A European customs union was demanded by many, and a few even favoured a European government.

47. Louis Marlio to Coudenhove-Kalergi, 26 September 1932. CChIDK, 554/4/168(3), f.100.

48. As, for example, the *Berliner Tageblatt* and *Vossische Zeitung* in Germany; the *Prager Tageblatt* in the Czech Republic or the *Grenzboten* of Bratislava.

49. Ing. Eichta to Coudenhove-Kalergi, 20 May 1932. CChIDK, 554/1/35, f.98.

50. Gerhard Meyer to Coudenhove-Kalergi, 8 March 1932. CChIDK, 500/1/683, f.18.

In the first place, the European Party was regarded as a means to secure peace on the continent. Friedrich J. von Bülow, an entrepreneur from Baden-Baden, even claimed that for years he had been thinking of a Europe-wide party to foster peace:

“I have had the idea for years – to see the peoples of the continent unified in one big party – in spite of the major battle that still today rages among the nations, and [...] otherwise one day the eruption of this rage will become – a war. What would be the best weapon against all such incidents – a Europe-Party, of which you would be the president”.⁵¹

Another of the European party’s goals which won approval from correspondents was the idea of a European customs union. As a writer from the small “German Culture Party” put it:

“The construction of the ‘United States of Europe’, particularly the economic unification of Europe, the surmounting of old political individual state reactions and customs anachronisms – while still protecting national cultural characteristics – is an explicit point of our programme”.⁵²

This conviction of the necessity of a customs union even permeated Finnish circles, though Coudenhove-Kalergi’s correspondent from Finland acknowledged the difficulty of winning his countrymen over:

“What should one thus do, [...] when people find it ‘extremely original’ or even smile pitifully whenever one openly announces support for the elimination of customs walls or even something like Pan-Europe. People here are protectionist in economic areas, nationalistically intolerant (away with Sweden), and given the Finnish national character – stubbornness – the work of our Pan-European Union could become quite difficult. With such an order of things it is my opinion that there is not much to be done vis-à-vis the broad masses, but rather the efforts of individual Pan-Europeans must be limited primarily to their own circle of acquaintances”.⁵³

Furthermore, the need for greater international co-operation, unfulfilled by the League of Nations, was considered the ultimate justification for Europe to unite. The Pan-European Union was an organisation which aimed at uniting people, at reaching a consensus beyond the quarrels of party politics, and thus winning the support of many disillusioned people and many smaller organisations throughout Europe.⁵⁴

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51. Friedrich J. von Bülow to Coudenhove-Kalergi, 16 October 1932. CChIDK, 771/1/126, ff.26-27.
52. Fritz Tögel, *Deutsche Kultur-Partei*, to Coudenhove-Kalergi, 19 October 1932. CChIDK, 771/1/122, ff.49-50.
53. Baron Gotthard von Knorring, Helsingfors, to Coudenhove-Kalergi, 9 July 1932. CChIDK, 554/1/33, ff.277-279.
54. From Barcelona to Stockholm, peace organizations, cultural organizations, women’s organizations wanted to co-operate with Pan-Europe. The *Deutsche Kultur-Partei*, for example, hailed Pan-Europe and offered co-operation: “We wish hereby not only to state our approval to you, but rather as a young, strong, upward-moving [and] non-partisan organisation to offer you our cooperation where possible”. *Deutsche Kultur-Partei* to Coudenhove-Kalergi, 19 October 1932. CChIDK, 771/1/122, f.49. While the Dutch society promoting a “*Vereenigde Staten van Europa*” wrote: “The debates in the negotiations of our committee were marked by an exceptional interest for the programme of the European party, because therein is much that is also very important to us. [...] [Nonetheless, the problem is that] you still want to maintain the sovereignty of the national governments”. Letter from Haarlem (Holland), to Coudenhove-Kalergi, 6 December 1932. CChIDK, 554/1/33, ff.483-484.

There was, however, disagreement about the timing of its creation: For some the European Party seemed to have been the right idea at the right moment: “I am of the impression that our time is ripe for the Pan-European idea and that Germany in particular offers a favourable ground for it”.⁵⁵ For others, however, the time could not have been worse. As Dr. Friedrich Nelböck, a famous industrialist from Brünn and a supporter of the party idea, argued:

“I was always, as you know, in favour of the call and the most intensive education of the masses [...] because the Pan-European idea is fundamentally something revolutionary, but the time for that would have been a few years ago, when Stresemann was still alive, in the time of the Locarno Treaty and the Kellogg Pact. A wave of believing trust and peace went through the world then – which today appears evil in contrast. Unfortunately, since then we have won neither the all too often changing governments nor the masses to our side”.⁵⁶

Conversely, Walter Kirchner from Berlin regarded the timing as ideal. He also suggested a lesson in propaganda from the National Socialists, even though he felt nothing for them but scorn:

“Let us look at the Hitler movement: if that nonsense has been successful, then there is only one explanation for it: clever advertising. The pre-conditions for Pan-Europe are better than ever; in comfortable times, one believes it can be dispensed of, but now, particularly now the time has come when necessity demands: try it with this”.⁵⁷

Yet the most striking feature of the letters to Coudenhove-Kalergi at this time is that his correspondents saw fascism and National Socialism as possible models for a radical change of society. To win over the masses and thus change the world of politics itself, the Pan-European Union had to become a fascist-like organisation, wrote Fr. Boss-Kaiser from Riehen near Basle. He even proposed a Pan-European dress code and a visual symbolism for the movement:

“Humans have always been more or less tied to appearances. – Earlier, one worked with medals and various decorations, Hitler has put his trusted men in uniforms and Mussolini in black shirts, the Austrian home fighters, too, propagate with special costumes, why should we Pan-Europeans not try it too with a suggestive propaganda even if this were only in the form of a ‘Pan-European insignia’”.⁵⁸

In fact, it cannot be said that all Pan-Europeans opposed fascism or National Socialism, or indeed that they were all democratic. The form of government was for many not the main issue. What was important was peace and economic stability, both demands also made, however insincerely, by Mussolini or Hitler. Racial ideas were mixed with the imagined united Europe as well. “I am convinced that no people's association is capable of achieving the goal for future generations [i.e. peace] that, in contrast, the EUROPA-Party will be called through good organisation and recruiting to bring a better future to successive generations of the white

55. Theo Wienczierz, Berlin, to Coudenhove-Kalergi, 7 October 1932. CChIDK, 771/1/126, ff.5-6.

56. Dr. Nelböck to Coudenhove-Kalergi, 26 November 1932. CChIDK, 554/1/37, ff. 85-88, f.87.

57. Walter Kirchner to Coudenhove-Kalergi, 18 October 1932. CChIDK, 771/1/126, ff.32-33.

58. Boss-Kaiser (“belonging to no party”) to Coudenhove-Kalergi, 6 October 1932. CChIDK, 771/1/122, ff.35-37.

race in Europe. Peace and fraternity,” Georg Hothum foresaw bluntly, concluding his letter with the words: “EUROPA – Peace, Work, and Salvation”.⁵⁹

Although Coudenhove-Kalergi was not at first in favour of a Pan-European dress code, following the Basle Conference in 1932 the Pan-European Youth organisation adopted the blue shirt as its uniform with the Pan-European emblem, the sun cross, on it. As a German journalist, Wilhelm Grottkopp, sardonically remarked:

“In Basle the new party already presented itself in its new robes, which had been designed in the light of Mussolini’s and Hitler’s examples. The party’s young forces wore blue shirts and blouses, the honourable gentlemen the uniform Pan-European tie. The new party’s ‘storm troopers’ greeted their leader enthusiastically. However, the fascist salutation does not seem to have been copied yet.”⁶⁰

Nor did the Pan-European flirtation with fascism stop there. Coudenhove-Kalergi himself had already begun to establish contact with Mussolini,⁶¹ through his Romanian friends Nicolae Titulescu, Romanian foreign minister, and Mihail Manoilescu, who informed Coudenhove-Kalergi that Mussolini was still surprisingly ignorant of the Pan-European goals.⁶² In 1933 an audience took place between Mussolini and Coudenhove-Kalergi. Prior to the meeting, Coudenhove-Kalergi had already expressed his ideas about fascism in several articles published in the Union’s journal.⁶³

In a move to come to terms with the problem of aggressive nationalism in Europe, Coudenhove-Kalergi declared that the Italian fascism was “as much of a reality” as French democracy and that the European governments should merely be judged from the perspective of their “position concerning the European idea and not from the perspective of their domestic politics”.⁶⁴ It should, however, be emphasised that Coudenhove-Kalergi was far less conciliatory towards the German National Socialists, whose ‘*Rassenlehre*’ he rejected as “merely suitable for animal breeding”.⁶⁵ Even some National Socialists converted to the Pan-European move-

59. Georg Hothum, director of the journal *Die Ursache*, to European Party, 6 October 1932. CChIDK, 771/1/126, ff.13-14.

60. Kölnische Zeitung, 10 October 1932, quoted in: R. FROMMELT, *Panuropa oder Mitteleuropa. Einigungsbestrebungen im Kalkül deutscher Wirtschaft und Politik 1925-1933*, in: *Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, dva, Stuttgart; no.34,(1977), p.93.

61. Coudenhove-Kalergi had appealed to Mussolini as early as February 1923 in an open letter (published in the Viennese liberal paper, *Neue Freie Presse*), where he asked Mussolini to become Europe’s saviour in order to restore Europe’s hegemony through European political integration. See R. N. COUDENHOVE-KALERGI, *Crusade for Pan-Europe ...*, op.cit., pp.78-80.

62. Manoilescu also advised Coudenhove-Kalergi not to wait for an official invitation and simply go to Rome as Mussolini had suggested to him. “I believe that the moment is opportune to go to Rome even without invitation as he suggested himself”. Manoilescu to Coudenhove-Kalergi, 22 November 1932. CChIDK, 554/1/34, ff.333-343.

63. See R. N. COUDENHOVE-KALERGI, *Der 30. Januar*, in: *Panuropa* (Journal), 2(February 1933), pp.42-47.

64. *Ibid.*, p.42.

65. R. N. COUDENHOVE-KALERGI, *Panuropa* (Journal), 5(May 1934), pp.99-101. Oliver Burgard rightly remarked that the Pan-European Union was the only pro-European organisation in Germany, which did not collaborate with the Nazi regime. O. BURGARD, *Das gemeinsame Europa ...*, op.cit., pp.229-230

ment, understanding the international constellations as problematic and fearing the idea of another war. Hans Langbein, a young German student from Weimar, wrote to Gerhard Meyer:

“I am contemplating the possibility of joining this party [Europe-Party], but would like to investigate it more closely first. Until recently I belonged to the SA of the NSDAP. The politics of the NSDAP no longer correspond to my philosophy. Yet I remain national. But I have become convinced that the international contradictions cannot be solved with new mass murders. Thus I agree entirely with the Pan-Europe-Party that an understanding must be introduced here – a recognition that the other is also a human being”.⁶⁶

A Pan-European in Italy, Oscar Ebner de Ebenthal from Trieste, confirmed to Coudenhove-Kalergi that at this moment, there was only one statesman in Europe who would be able to act as the point of reference for a European movement on a large scale, one statesman independent and true to his convictions: Benito Mussolini.⁶⁷ One question kept coming up: Could Coudenhove-Kalergi himself become the ‘Duce’ of the European movement? Many urged him to become the true leader, to take swift action and adopt propaganda on a large scale. In the words of one German correspondent:

“The recognition that the time has come when a further step towards the upwards movement of the life of the community of humanity must be taken. And one man must recognise this and himself as giving this an impulse. This man is you, *Herr Graf!* The perceptive people that you are able to interest in the idea have the task, under *your leadership*, to fight the traditionalist and conservationist attempts of more near-sighted individuals, to serve progress. [...] I am devoted to you completely”.⁶⁸

While some projected visions of a sole leader on Coudenhove-Kalergi, others had a more pragmatic approach, as did Coudenhove-Kalergi himself, oscillating between democratic and autocratic political systems. Carl Eisel, for example, offered three possible ways of constructing the European Party in Germany. A fascist, a constitutional and a democratic internal construction of the party could be possible. Even though Eisel rejected the fascist organisation he was able to accept it as a possibly successful form of the party.⁶⁹ As an alternative to a fascist-like structure, some letters suggested that the European Party be turned into an “order”, which would provide a solution to the manifold organisational and political problems. In a letter to Ida Roland, Otto Piedricki elaborated his vision:

“I see [the path] to lie solely in the actions of the party, with which the press of all countries and of every orientation must then debate at their own costs. [...] If the European Party would organise itself as an order that does not solicit numbers of adherents, but rather devoted members, loyal to every battle and every suffering, and if these were to go into action wherever and whenever the justice between peoples and among peoples is flagrantly violated, then I could imagine that the name of the

66. Hans Langbein to Gerhard Meyer, 15 October 1932. CChIDK, 771/1/122, ff.176-177.

67. Oscar Ebner de Ebenthal to Coudenhove-Kalergi, November 1932. CChIDK, 554/1/34, ff.18-20.

68. Adolf Theel to Coudenhove-Kalergi, 20 October 1932. CChIDK, 771/1/122, ff.261-262.

69. Carl Eisel to Coudenhove-Kalergi, 22 October 1932. CChIDK, 771/1/122, ff.54-56.

party and the name of Coudenhove would be associated with a new belief and a new hope for all Europeans, from which the will itself would grow. The actions (and only actions!) would appeal to both components of the European soul from which all dynamic forces of its history [...] have emanated: Christian ethos and heroic consciousness.⁷⁰

He was not the only one who regarded the order as a form of organisation, as others suggested, for example, the *Jungdeutscher Orden* or the *Stahlhelm* as ideal organisations to copy.⁷¹

However, it can be stated that some European enthusiasts did not trust a fascist regime and, if the urge for peace were strong in them, they would usually condemn fascism as a whole since it was a militarist form of society. The most prominent advocate of anti-fascism was the Italian count, Carlo Sforza: “Alas, the pacifist and co-operationist politics of fascism are nothing but a clever tactic to deceive. [...] Fascism cannot want peace: that goes against its essence. Fascism is, from its origins, a case of nationalist militancy.”⁷² It was exactly this aggressive nationalism which had to be overcome to work towards an international understanding. “I learned of the foundation of the European Party from a brief newspaper announcement. This fact, at a time when exaggerated nationalism was growing rapidly, demonstrates that the belief that only international co-operation could resolve the difficulties of the present nevertheless broke new ground.”⁷³

The debate among Pan-Europeans about the idea of a European party illustrates that the borders between inter-war political affiliations were far from clearly defined. Pan-Europe was one of the possible models of social progress, leading away from the confusion of the present, offering room for hope and a projection of a completely different future society. Europe was considered as the guarantee for stability, for economic growth and the symbol of a whole generation, the first European generation, which would lay the foundations of a world-wide society, although under European hegemony:

“The goal of our generation is Pan-Europe. [And] with Pan-Europe [comes] the unifying, refining and strengthening of a European culture, i.e. nationalisation thus up to the moment when the summit is achieved, which from the Pan-European side must offer resistance to an Asian culture that has meanwhile developed to a height, something that is necessary in order to recognise undisputedly the justness of the triumph of the superior culture. [...] Pan-Europe is necessary because the development of humanity, of society demands it. – Individual, family, clan, line, nation, federation, inter-continental, world community. This appears to me to be the path that humanity must consciously follow”.

But the actual political character of the Pan-European movement was ambiguous. Indeed, as Coudenhove-Kalergi’s correspondence shows, there was considera-

70. Otto Piedricki to Ida Roland, 8 November 1932. His italics. CChIDK, 554/1/39, ff.131-134.

71. For example, the letter from Walter Telling to the Pan-European Union, 24 November 1932. CChIDK, 554/1/39, f.302.

72. Count Carlo Sforza to Coudenhove-Kalergi, July 1932. CChIDK, 554/1/33, f.94.

73. A. Rieth, Munich, to Coudenhove-Kalergi, 11 December 1932. CChIDK, 771/1/122, f.246.

ble sympathy among those who favoured his idea of a European Party for adopting at least some of the tactics used so successfully by fascist parties.

In the event, Coudenhove-Kalergi's own enthusiasm for the party was not long-lasting, and with hindsight he even seemed to regret having taken this step, as his scant references to the party in his autobiographies reveal. As early as December 1932, he drew up the idea of a European plebiscite instead of a European Party. This, he believed, would be found an even shorter way towards convincing the European masses to unite Europe.⁷⁴ Pan-Europeans followed him, though not without stating their disagreement, indeed their frustration, with this sudden change of direction: "We had expected that in Germany and all 28 European states a Pan-European party would actually be constructed in each one, which would then work together internationally. *Never have I been so politically disappointed as now*", wrote W. E. Böcking from Rhöndorf on 2 January 1933.⁷⁵

Conclusions

The years 1932/33 are usually seen as the end of the European movement. But, in fact, Coudenhove-Kalergi responded to the crisis by a change of strategy: proposing the creation of a European party to overcome aggressive nationalism, in particular National Socialism, and to win over the European public. This idea was one of the most hotly debated subjects in the letters written to and from the Pan-European Union. Yet, from the very beginning, the idea of a Europe-wide party faced three major problems: First, its finances depended on private donations, which were bound to diminish in the Depression. Secondly, it lacked an adequate leader, i.e. an eminent personality who was not bound to any political party. And finally, Pan-European Union officials themselves were generally sceptical, particularly in France. Nevertheless, there is a striking contrast between the attitude of PEU officials – waiting for the right moment which never arrived – and the enthusiasm, the conviction and determination of 'anonymous' letter writers, people convinced of their European identity and committed to fighting for it in the present. Yet this public debate on Europe's future reveals the political ambiguity of that identity.

Many Pan-Europeans would have preferred a democratic European union, which granted a customs union and thus economic stability and peace. For them, Pan-Europe represented a step beyond the confines of petty nationalism, a protection against National Socialism and communism, and a decisive step towards a truly international organisation which would actually function effectively, something the League of

74. He informed his undoubtedly astonished correspondents, for example Dr. Nelböck, that "as far as the party is concerned, I do not think that anything can be done in Czechoslovakia before Germany and France proceed. On the other hand I place the greatest value in another move that seems to lead the way to the shortest path to the same goals: a European plebiscite". Coudenhove-Kalergi to Dr. Nelböck, 13 December 1932. CChIDK, 554/1/39, f.24.

75. W. E. Böcking to Gerhard Meyer, 2 January 1933. CChIDK, 771/1/122, f.18.

Nations was not generally thought capable of doing. But other Pan-Europeans betrayed quasi-fascist leanings in their letters and could imagine living under a fascist/autocratic regime if it were a European one under Coudenhove-Kalergi's leadership. The biggest problem was, however, that while Coudenhove-Kalergi had a grand theory for the general organisational structure of the party, the realm of everyday politics was impenetrable to him. His programme for the European Party appeared to be a mixture of many different ideologies and was not coherently presented.⁷⁶ Matters were not helped by Coudenhove-Kalergi's fondness for anti-parliamentary and anti-Ver-sailles rhetoric as well as his flirtation with the idea of co-operating with Mussolini.

The years 1932 and 1933 proved to be a hard test for the Pan-European movement and almost tore it apart. Nevertheless, the movement continued to strive for European unification. As another model of a possible future other than fascism, National Socialism or communism, Pan-Europe represented a point of friction within political discourse that provoked new conceptualisations of Europe as a bearer of common identity. It was Coudenhove-Kalergi's and his associates' great achievement to have established this point of friction, a friction that led to the modern debate about a united Europe.

76. Coudenhove-Kalergi to Leopold Klausner, 25 July 1932. CChIDK, 554/4/179, f.23.

Ralf Elm (Hrsg.)

Europäische Identität: Paradigmen und Methodenfragen

Im Spannungsfeld von Globalisierung und ihren Erfordernissen auf der einen Seite und Nationalismus und Regionalismus mit tiefverwurzelten Konfliktpotentialen auf der anderen Seite sucht Europa nach einem Weg, die Vielheit von Staaten und Interessen zu einer Einheit zusammenzuführen. Wie der zukünftige Weg zu welcher Gestalt Europas und entsprechender europäischer Identität aussieht, ist noch nicht entschieden. Um so wichtiger ist die kritische Untersuchung der Leitbilder und Paradigmen europäischer Identität, der dabei verwendeten Methoden, Kategorien und Implikationen.

Europa darf sich nicht im Extrem reiner Konstruktionen verlieren. Inwieweit können also welche gelebten kulturellen Traditionen in welche europäische Identität überführt werden und inwieweit sind neue Wege zu (er)finden? Welche politischen und rechtlichen Europamodelle verdienen eine Leitbildfunktion?

Europaexperten und Kulturphilosophen aus verschiedenen Ländern und Fachrichtungen (der Geisteswissenschaften, Jurisprudenz, Philosophie, Politologie, Soziologie und Theologie) leisten mit diesem Sammelband einen Beitrag zu der wiederholt eingeforderten öffentlichen Debatte über die Grundordnung Europas.

Der Herausgeber ist als Privatdozent Lehrbeauftragter für Philosophie an der Universität Dortmund.

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A Europe of Pluralist Internationalism: The Development of the French Theory of Interdependence from Emile Durkheim to the Circle around *Notre Temps* (1890-1930)

Klaus-Peter Sick

On 5 September 1929, the French foreign minister Aristide Briand addressed the tenth general assembly of the League of Nations in Geneva concerning the perspective of a federal association of European nations. This marked the first governmental initiative in favour of a unified European politics. The most enthusiastic applause for his remarks came from a row of young intellectuals sitting in the audience: the editors of *Notre Temps*, a journal that had been founded two years before. The journal had become a center for the circle of political publicists and publicist politicians of broadly republican conviction – individuals who had supported Briand's policies since the start of the 1920s and who were now among those wishing to help raise his European trial balloon. Even in its intellectually and fiscally most successful years, between 1929 and 1933, *Notre Temps* would never become an established forum of European politics or culture. Nevertheless, it deserves a significant place in the history of the idea of Europe in twentieth-century France. Not least of all, this is because the journal can be viewed as a sort of republican forge in which some of those who would become France's leading publicists and politicians would test out their first ideas.

It is well known that chief editor Jean Luchaire was not the only member of this circle to speak out strongly after 1940 for a collaboration with Nazism.¹ A close analysis of his and similar intellectual biographies would also underscore the strong lines of continuity between the *Notre Temps* of 1930 and later appeasement, then collaboration.² Nevertheless, the lines are too complex to identify the journal with *this* history alone. I hope to show in the following discussion that the ideas expressed in and around *Notre Temps* regarding Europe and foreign policy need also to be understood as part of another, nascent tradition – one of pluralist internationalism. The tradition was doubtless precarious; rich in variants located between reformist socialism and right-wing liberalism, it was open to a wide range of possibilities for development.

1. Thanks to Dr. Joel Golb (Berlin) for translation of this essay from the French and German as well as for his helpful critique. On *Notre Temps* and Jean Luchaire, see Cl. LEVY, *Autour de Jean Luchaire. Le cercle éclaté de Notre Temps*, in: H.-M. BOCK, R. MEYER-KALKUS, M. TREBITSCH (éds.), *Entre Locarno et Vichy. Les relations culturelles franco-allemandes dans les années 1930*, Editions du CNRS, Paris, 1993, pp.121-130; idem, *Les Nouveaux Temps et l'idéologie de la collaboration*, Colin, Paris, 1974, pp.11-28.

2. Cf. K.-P. SICK, *Du Briandisme à la Collaboration*, in: *Sexe et Race. Discours et formes d'exclusion*, 9(1994), pp.65-85.

Consequently, such ideas need to be placed in the framework of a basic paradigm shift in the thinking about international relations. They are, in fact, some of the most innovative ideas to have appeared in French debates over foreign policy. Emerging from a tentative effort to propose a new relation between international diversity and European unity, another sort of continuum is thus apparent – one extending from the first years of *Notre Temps* between 1927 and 1932 up through the postwar period. From this perspective, the ideas at play here are part of the prehistory of present-day institutionalized Europe, a prehistory whose relevance has been explored by Elisabeth du Réau, Carl H. Pegg, and Jean-Luc Chabot.³

Inevitably, the key question of how such lines of continuity could run side by side in opposing directions confronts us with a specific historical moment: that of the crisis of orthodox French republicanism in the wake of the Dreyfus Affair. As an expression of this crisis, the sovereignty of state and parliament, the issue of legality and its sources, were debated with increasing intensity, many of the parties concerned going ever-further beyond the republican model's normative bounds in the course of the years. Although a seldom-studied example, the ideas articulated in *Notre Temps* present one form that a post-Dreyfus Affair critique of the republican tradition could take – that critique being here directed at the doctrine of state sovereignty in an international context. The critique sheds light, in turn, on a central problem of the political history of the Third Republic.⁴

The basis for the (crypto)pluralist European Internationalism of the 1920s and early 1930s was a diagnosis of modernity developed in close connection with the emerging French discipline of sociology and the legal theory it inspired. On the one hand, there was talk of a growing “factual solidarity” between societies organized as nation states and, in an increasingly clear manner, differentiated through labor-division. On the other hand, stress was laid on a steadily more pronounced “formation of groups” by individuals sharing a common functional or ideological identity within the body politic. This French thinking, based on a bipolarity of “interdependence” or “integration” and “concurrence”, had strong affinities with the now much better known British foreign-policy “New Liberalism” of Norman Angell, John Hobson, and Ramsay Muir. In actuality, the relation between British and French theories of interdependence would appear to have by no means been

3. E. DU REAU, *L'idée européenne au XXe siècle*, Complexe, Bruxelles, 1996; C. H. PEGG, *Evolution of the European Idea 1914-1932*, North Carolina University Press, Chapel Hill, N.C., 1983; J.-L. CHABOT, *L'idée d'Europe unie de 1919 à 1939*, Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, Grenoble, 1978; for a collection of sources see: M. DUMOULIN and Y. STELANDRE, *L'idée européenne dans l'entre-deux-guerres*, Académia, Louvain-la-Neuve, 1992.

4. To this extent, my discussion draws on other journals than *Notre Temps*, taking in the broader publicistic milieu: *Vita*, *L'Ere nouvelle*, *La République*, *La Voix*, etc.

one-sided.⁵ In both cases, revision of ideas concerning international relations was the key aspect of a particular transformational process: one drawing liberalism away from its origins in philosophy and natural rights and towards a new sociological-realistic foundation.⁶ The formation of an inter-societal pluralism here ran parallel to a striving for an inner-societal pluralism with its critique of the traditional concept of inviolable state sovereignty. Much even speaks for the development of pluralistic models in the post-Great War period unfolding, at least in France, more quickly on the international level – marked as it was by great foreign-policy challenges – than on that of internal affairs. Publicists and, especially, theorists of international law went so far as to recognize the basis of a “European identity” within a “European Public Sphere”.

In the course of the 1920s, a limited but quickly expanding group of French publicists and academics, along with politicians and high officials, leaned toward a diplomacy of this nature, which was dubbed “new” or “modern”. They viewed the *Mémoire du 17 Mai 1930 sur l’organisation d’un système d’une union fédérale européenne* as a document possessing near paradigmatic status. It is thus useful to first consider initiatives by the *Notre Temps* circle that were closely tied to the document’s import – initiatives underscoring the narrow relation between publicistic and political thinking during this period. This will set the basis for a review of the intellectual origins of interdependence theory and the “new diplomacy”. Both Durkheim’s sociology of labor-division and Léon Duguit’s juridical critique of the doctrine of sovereignty exerted key influence on the reform of French republican ideas in the 1900-1920 period. Duguit (b. 1859) and Durkheim (b. 1858) may have each suggested a transposition of their ideas to the realm of international relations; but such a transposition was only spelled out after, and this by two groups of intellectuals, one group most strongly marked politically by the Dreyfus Affair, the other by the Great War. The first group included the master thinkers and mentors of the *Notre Temps* circle: politicians such as Joseph Paul-Boncour (b. 1873), Albert Thomas

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5. For a first approach to French interdependence theory, see J. DE WILDE, *Saved from oblivion. Interdependence Theory in the First Half of the 20th Century*, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1991, esp. the discussion of Delaisi, pp.116-140. The mutual influence of twentieth century British and French new liberal thought has not been researched. It is noteworthy that Norman Angell was the Paris correspondent for several British liberal papers between 1897 and 1913, which is to say in the period he wrote *The Great Illusion* (1909/1910); it is quite likely he knew Durkheim. On the new liberal internationalism in Great Britain see: D. LONG, *Towards a new liberal internationalism. The International Theory of J.A. Hobson*, Cambridge, 1996 and *Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis. Inter-War Idealism reassessed*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995; J. D. B. MILLER, *Norman Angell and the Futility of War. Peace and the Public Mind*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1986.
6. On French liberalism between 1870 and 1940 with references to recent literature: K.-P. SICK, *Vom Opportunisme zum Libéralisme autoritaire. Die Krise des französischen Liberalismus im demokratisierten Parlamentarismus 1885-1940*, in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 2003 (forthcoming); M. KITTEL and H. MÖLLER, *Demokratie in Deutschland und Frankreich 1918-1933/40. Beiträge zu einem historischen Vergleich*, Oldenbourg, München, 2002, and S. GRÜNER, *Paul Reynaud (1878-1966). Biographische Studien zum Liberalismus in Frankreich*, Oldenbourg, München, 2001. On the origins of a new liberalism in France, the standard study remains: W. LOGUE, *From Philosophy to Sociology. The Evolution of French Liberalism 1870-1914*, Illinois University Press, Dekalb, Ill., 1983.

(b. 1878), and Henry de Jouvenel (b. 1876); jurists such as Georges Scelle (b. 1878) and Joseph Barthélemy (b. 1874); diplomats such as Nicolas Politis (b. 1872); and a range of brilliant political essayists including Maxime Leroy (b. 1873) and Francis Delaisi (b. 1873). The second group was constituted mainly by the journal's authors themselves. Alongside Jean Luchaire (b. 1901), the most well-known names are Bertrand de Jouvenel (b. 1903), Pierre Brossolette (b. 1903), Emile Roche (b. 1900), and Alfred Fabre-Luce (b. 1899); but a figure such as the jurist and later sociologist Georges Gurvitch (b. 1894), while never contributing to *Notre Temps*, also belongs in this context. We will see that a searching analysis of the causes and meaning of the Great War was absolutely central to their emerging theory of international interdependence – hence to the project of a pluralistic European integration that would be formulated at the start of the 1930s. In this manner, the Quai d'Orsay's European plan of 1930 appears as the most advanced diplomatic document within a much broader debate over European unity and differentiation: a debate that could be revived after 1945, in part with the same ideas and protagonists.

The Quai d'Orsay's European Plan 1929-1930 and *Notre Temps*

Following Briand's September 1929 Geneva address on the European federative project, a staff of French diplomats took on the task of giving the European plan precise contours. In the middle of May 1930, they presented the European governments with a memorandum principally authored by Alexis Léger, Jacques Fouques-Duparc, and René Massigli.⁷ In compressed fashion, the text contained French interdependence theory's most important arguments. In assessing their vision's real chances in a period of increasing inner-European – and especially German-French – tension, members of the *Notre Temps* circle were entirely realistic. But the fact that their theses concerning international solidarity and group-formation had made their way into an official diplomatic-political project was grounds enough for enthusiasm. On 17 May, wrote Jean Luchaire, the young intellectuals of his generations would have been willing to literally embrace the memorandum:

“Just as ten years earlier, at the time of the peace treaty, they both had an unstated fear of being disappointed and a hope that the document was offering them the unimpeachable basis for an effort that basically all people sense will play a large role in their generation's future. This time, we can say that our fears were unjustified and our hopes not betrayed”.⁸

The memorandum supported a demand for the “constitution of a federal tie between the peoples of Europe”, subsequently for a basic qualitative shift in political

7. On the memorandum of 17 May 1930 and the Briand Report, i.e. the synthesis of answers by the various European governments: A. FLEURY and L. JILEK, (éds.), *Le Plan Briand d'Union fédérale européenne*, Peter Lang, Berne, 1998. Cf. the synthesis by E. DU REAU, *L'idée européenne*, op.cit., pp.97-123 and for the wider context L. BADEL, *Un milieu libéral et européen. Le grand commerce français (1925-1948)*, Imprimerie Nationale, Paris, 1999.

8. J. LUCHAIRE, *L'Heure de l'Europe*, in: *Notre Temps*, 13 July 1930, col.162.

relations, this premised on a sense that an equally fundamental shift in economic relations had already occurred: “modern laws of the international economy, i.e. the conditions for the well-being of nations”, had produced a condition of “de facto solidarity” on the continent over recent decades.⁹ While remaining autonomous, its nations were now interdependent, which in turn generated a “feeling of common responsibility”, an indispensable factor for confronting “the danger for political and economic peace in Europe”. Interdependence thus meant increased fragility, but also contained enormous constructive potential: a “maximalizing of the standard of living throughout the European community” would take place by means of a Europe-wide “enlargement of the market”, as well as through an “intensified and improved industrial production”, both made possible by an abolition of “barriers to development and efficiency” such as customs borders. The actual precondition for this would be a transposition of “factual solidarity” into “contractual solidarity”, itself presuming a clear “awareness of unity”, i.e. a “community of civilizations” in the sense of a sort of European public sphere. Institutions could then be created not only “representing European unification” but also allowing an optimization of political, economic, and social circumstances by way of a “rational organization of Europe”.¹⁰ An individual nation’s “genius” would then define itself all the more consciously within, precisely, a “collaboration within the common oeuvre”.¹¹ Hence European diversity, in the form of an enduring – indeed deepened – social and national identity, on the one hand, and European unity, on the other, presented no contradiction; rather, they determined each other.

Briand’s Quai d’Orsay was not mistaken: the *Notre Temps* group was eminently suited for raising public interest in such a program. Already in the fall of 1929, the foreign office had decided to financially support the monthly, as – in its own self-definition – a mouthpiece and organizational center for the republican, non-Marxist, and non-nationalist generation coming to age in the war-period and its aftermath. As a result of such support, the journal could soon emerge as a weekly with a respectable circulation.¹² Its authors had begun placing their hopes in Aristide Briand’s policies some years earlier:

“The very next day after the war, we – young people tortured by years of fear and privation – had only one idea: to construct Europe [...]. All young men of the post-war period staring in 1920 or 1921 considered themselves Europeans [...]. They will most likely remain so throughout their lives”.¹³

In the first half of the 1920s, influential mentors like Robert de Jouvenel for the Democrats and Maurice Colrat for the Liberals had opened political and publicist doors

9. All following citations are from the *Mémoire sur l'organisation d'un régime d'union fédérale européenne présenté le 17 mai 1930 par le gouvernement français*, reprinted in: *Le Plan Briand d'union fédérale européenne. Documents*, Genève, 1991, pp.38 and 39.

10. *Ibid.*, pp.42, 38; on optimization, cf. the terms on pp.38, 40, 45: “intensification”, “amelioration”, “enlargement”, “better management”, “elevation to the maximum”.

11. *Ibid.*, p.41.

12. On financial support for Luchaire’s journal by various ministries, cf. the information in C. LÉVY, *Les Nouveaux Temps*, pp.16 and 20 sq.

13. J. LUCHAIRE, *L'Heure de l'Europe*, in: *Notre Temps*, 13 July 1930, col.161.

for this new generation. Starting with 1922, many – not all – its representatives had directed sharp attacks at Raymond Poincaré: in their eyes, *the* head of government representing a republican nationalism steered ad absurdum in a world war that while won, had been won much too dearly. They had condemned his reparations and security policies regarding Germany, especially the occupation of the Ruhr starting in 1923, and in May 1924 had enthusiastically greeted the victory of the anti-Poincarist coalition led by the radical Edouard Herriot. Many had participated in the League of Nations movement that in France was mainly organized by Robert Lange – another *Notre Temps* author. They had also participated in discussions of the *Ecole de la Paix* directed by the foreign-policy journalist Louis Weiss and of Paul Desjardin's *Union pour la vérité*, and followed the development of Coudenhove-Kalergi's *Union Paneuropéenne*. Such activity had produced a network that in the course of a decade would prove remarkably efficient in recruiting members of a new republican elite.

Following the 1924 electoral victory, disappointment in 1926 marked another important caesura. First the majority of 1924 crumbled as a result of budget issues; Poincaré could thus create a new center-right majority in the middle of the legislative period. In this context, the main concern was seeing to a continuation of the new foreign-policy course: one that Poincaré himself had hesitatingly introduced in 1924, and that had then been continued by Herriot and his successors, including the government of Aristide Briand and Joseph Caillaux that took power in July 1926. Manifest in both the Dawes Plan and then the Locarno Conference, the course had produced a clear relaxation of tensions between Europe's former hostile powers. The 1924 elections had brought the young "Europeans" within a hair's breath of power and concrete influence. Following the political turn of 1926, they found themselves forced into the role of a counter-elite – or else felt obliged to reinforce that tendency within the new majority represented by Briand, who in the end had retained his post. What mattered was preventing the second "return of Poincaré" after 1918 amounting to a victory of a "classical" republic, duty-bound to orthodox principles and incapable of either domestic or foreign-policy reform. This was the situation in which the textile industrialist Emile Roche and the foreign-policy editor of *Le Matin*, Jean Luchaire, took the initiative to launch *Notre Temps* in June 1927, at first with financial backing from an organization close to industry, the *Comité franco-allemand d'information et de documentation*.¹⁴

The historian Carl Pegg has emphasized that Briand's Quai d'Orsay had solid grounds for placing its trust in *Notre Temps*: the journal's intellectual circle took on much of the publicity work for Briand's project de facto.¹⁵ Following release of information about Briand's planned address, Jean Luchaire thus described the possible goals of such a project in a brochure published at the end of August 1929.¹⁶ When the journal was made a weekly with a larger circulation a short time after, the editor for European policy, Pierre Brossolette, received his own column, *La Jeune*

14. C. H. PEGG, *European Idea*, op.cit., p.79.

15. *Ibid.*

16. J. LUCHAIRE, *Vers les Etats fédérés d'Europe*, in: *Cahiers bleus*, 31.8.1929, Paris; and idem, *Vers les Etats fédérés d'Europe*, in: *Notre temps*, 9 (1929), p.122.

Europe, in which he was to report on the European plan's progress. Around a month after the appearance of the French memorandum, the *Ligue France-Europe* was founded; its honorary board and directorship included, alongside the foreign-policy editors of *Notre Temps*, leading figures from the new internationalism's older generation: among them, Henry de Jouvenel, Louise Weiss, Louis Loucheur, Yves Le Trocquer, Joseph Paul-Boncour, and Francis Delaisi.¹⁷ From the same circle, a book – to be crowned with a prestigious international prize – was published in time for the September 1930 session of the League of Nations: *La Fédération Européenne*, containing discussions of the possibilities for European federalism from legal and political vantage points.¹⁸ The same month, the journalist Bertrand de Jouvenel (son of Henry de Jouvenel) published a technical study entitled *Vers les Etats fédérés d'Europe*, while Jean Luchaire and Pierre Brossolette supported the European plan through a German-French congress they organized in Mannheim.¹⁹

With the death of Gustav Stresemann, the Nazi success in the German elections in September 1930, and the German-Austrian customs union in March 1931, a federal unification of Europe must have appeared highly illusory indeed. The planning commission's last session was held in autumn 1931. For its part, *Notre Temps* decided to once more underscore the basic justification of a European federation in a publicly effective way, issuing a "European manifesto" on 18 January 1931. Among the 180 French intellectuals and artists, some of them eminent, who signed the document were Julien Benda, Emmanuel Berl, Jean Cocteau, Drieu La Rochelle, Raoul Dufy, Alfred Fabre-Luce, Jean Guehénno, Jean Giono, Gabriel Marcel, and Maurice and Roger Martin du Gard. On 8 March, *Notre Temps* published a parallel German manifesto organized by the Berlin Pen Club and having 188 signatories – a wide range of artists and scholars was represented including Thomas and Heinrich Mann, Carl Sternheim, Arnold Zweig, Lou-André Salomé, and Ernst-Robert Curtius. Reprinted in the French and German daily papers, the two manifestos marked – in what is doubtless an historical irony – the apogee of the influence of *Notre Temps*. A final brochure appeared, written by Jean Luchaire after announcement of the customs-union plan and dedicated to "my friend" Alexis Léger. It was entitled *De l'union fédérale Européenne à la réforme de l'Etat français* – a title that itself suggests a move away from European ambitions and a renewed focus on domestic reform.²⁰ Jean Luchaire may have exaggerated the extent of contacts between the *Notre Temps* group and the Quai d'Orsay's "European Fraction", but the intellectual proximity of these publicists and politicians around 1930 cannot be disputed.

17. *Un appel de Gaston Riou pour la Ligue France-Europe*, in: *Cahiers bleus*, 22 November 1930, p.6.

18. The best studies were written by Robert Mangin, Mario Pistocchi, Robert Guye, Charles Serre, Philippe Girardet, and Georges Izard. Alongside the (former) ministers Paul-Boncour, Benes, Cecil, Politis, Seipel, Sforza, Titulesco, Vandervelde, and Zaleski, the prize jury included Heinrich Mann, the Count Bernstorff, and Paul Valéry: *La Fédération Européenne, La Revue des Vivants*, Paris 1930.

19. A. SILBERT, *Le Congrès universitaire de Mannheim*, in: *Notre temps*, 5 October 1930, pp.36-39.

20. J. LUCHAIRE, *De l'union fédérale européenne à la réforme de l'Etat français*, Paris, 1931, dedication, p.3.

Emile Durkheim and International Relations

Mediated through sociologists such as Célestin Bouglé and jurists such as Léon Duguit, Emile Durkheim's theory certainly had an influence on both sides of this equation. In 1930 Bertrand de Jouvenel declared that "today it is in effect nearly impossible to be a man of the left [...] without deriving the fundamental lines of one's thought from Durkheim".²¹ Jean Luchaire's assertion that "everything finds itself in an interdependent relation: diplomacy and sociology" and the concept of an "international sociology" applied by Alfred Fabre-Luce in 1925 could hardly have been formulated before 1914.²² True, Durkheim – who died in 1917 – had never been especially interested in a realm extending beyond a national society; he had merely touched on it briefly in his famous 1893 dissertation on labor division.²³ Nevertheless, this superficial treatment was sufficient for the specifically French theme within the tradition of sociological theory, the relation between labor-division and solidarity, to be transferred from an inner-societal to an inter-societal plane. Léon Duguit, Durkheim's colleague in Bordeaux, took up the theme.²⁴ After the great war, such sociological foundations were developed in a great deal of scholarly and journalistic writing by students of Duguit who were jurists: particularly Georges Scelle, but also the Greek jurist, educated and based in France, Nicolas Politis, and – somewhat later – the younger figures Georges Gurvitch and Marc Réglade. Their thinking led in the direction of a "complete revolution in international law"; it often proceeded along parallel political and publicistic tracks, its impact in any case being felt in both domains.²⁵

In 1893, Durkheim had himself diagnosed the onset on an international level of a new epoch. Through an increase in international labor-division, certain societies would

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21. B. de JOUVENEL, *Un grand sociologue. Albert Bayet. Une morale basée sur l'étude scientifique des faits sociaux*, in: *La Voix*, 13 April 1930, p.3. On the relation between Duguit's legal theory and Durkheim's sociology, the standard texts are E. PISIER-KOUCHNER, *La sociologie durkheimienne dans l'œuvre de Duguit*, in: *L'Année sociologique*, 28(1977), pp.95-114 and S. JONES, *From contract to status: Durkheim*, in: id.: *The French State in Question*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, pp.149-179.
 22. J. LUCHAIRE, *De l'union européenne à la réforme de l'Etat*, in: *Notre Temps*, 3 May 1931, col.7; A. FABRE-LUCE in the article *Après l'élection d'Hindenburg*, in: *Revue européenne*, 1 July 1925, p.53.
 23. E. DURKHEIM, *De la division du travail social*, Alcan, Paris, 1893, p.311.
 24. L. DUGUIT, *Traité de Droit constitutionnel*, 3rd édition, Fontemoing, Paris, 1927, § 17 und § 67; id., *Souveraineté et liberté. Leçons faites à l'Université de Columbia 1920-1921*, Alcan, Paris, 1922, pp.102 sq.
 25. The paradigmatic texts here: G. SCELLE, *La doctrine de Léon Duguit et les fondements du Droit des Gens*, in: *Archives de Philosophie de Droit et de Sociologie juridique*, 2(1932), pp.83-119; id., *Précis du Droit des Gens*, Paris, 1932; N. POLITIS, *Les nouvelles tendances du droit international*, Hachette, Paris, 1927; G. GURVITCH, *La philosophie de droit de Hugo Grotius et la théorie moderne du droit international*, in: *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, 34(1927), pp.365-391; id., *Le temps présent et l'idée du droit social*, Paris, 1931, pp.101-2111; M. RÉGLADE, *Perspectives qu'ouvrent les doctrines objectivistes du Doyen Duguit pour un renouvellement de l'étude du Droit International Public*, in: *Revue générale de Droit International Public*, 37(1930), pp.381-419. The citation of "complete revolution" in G. SCELLE, *La doctrine de Léon Duguit*, op.cit., p.85.

cede particular functions to other societies while specializing in various ways themselves. The nations of geographical Europe, in particular, had entered into such a modernity of international relations by the end of the nineteenth century:

“We can best observe this set of circumstances with the example of the international division of labor, the most striking example that history offers us. One can readily confirm that it exists only in Europe and in our epoch”.²⁶

Having previously been aware of Durkheim’s theses regarding circumstance inside modern societies marked by labor-division, the reader now confronted the question of whether his argument that economic specialization could be a source of a new solidarity – and hence a new morality – applied to relations between states as well. While only sketchily supplying an answer, in the process Durkheim did present his key concepts.

“One must not forget” – he wrote – “that a group [of individuals, here a nationally organized society] is part of another group composed of several similar sub-groups, without thereby losing its individuality. In addition, one can say that a function, economic or otherwise, cannot be divided between two societies unless the latter participate, in one or another way, in a common life, i.e. are part of a shared society. In effect imagine that each collective [national] conscience has nothing at all in common with the others. In such a case, one cannot conceive how the two aggregates could even establish necessary continuous contact, nor, in turn, how one of the two would consent to cede certain functions to the other. One condition is needed for a nation to be ready to let itself be penetrated by another – that it no longer isolates itself in a nationalist manner, but rather has learned a new patriotism taking in other nations”.

The spirit of Durkheim’s observations here is thoroughly optimistic, as revealed in his confirming that “at the end of the last century and the start of our own, a collective consciousness has begun to shape European society”.²⁷

In this passage, Durkheim made clear that his critique of utilitarianism was meant to be continued on the “inter-societal plane”. The revision of classical liberalism by sociology would not draw to a halt before its conceptions of foreign policy. Durkheim thus maintained that a deepening of individuality, hence a placing into relief of certain strengths in a given society through its specialization within a group, could only occur if an awareness of commonalities was already present. In contrast, then, to the postulates of early nineteenth-century liberalism, increased labor-division did not *automatically* lead to cooperation in the sense of contractual solidarity, but only *under certain conditions*:

“Stated briefly: association and cooperation are two social facts that need to be distinguished. Even if the latter has repercussions for the former, and in gradually developing makes it change form, hence even if societies increasingly become groups of function bearers, the duality of the two phenomena would not be reducible”.²⁸

Durkheim then offers a central thesis for the “new liberalism”:

“Collective life has not emerged from individual life; to the contrary, the latter is a product of the former. It is only in this way that one can explain how the personal

26. E. DURKHEIM, *Division du travail*, op.cit., p.311.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., p.309.

individuality of parts of a society was able to develop and gain depth without that society disintegrating as an ensemble [...]. Hence we cannot presume the absolute individuality of a self-sufficient monad with no need for the rest of the world. Rather, we must presume an organ or part of an organ that fulfils a certain function unique to itself, but that can never separate itself from the rest of the organism without exposing itself to deadly dangers”.²⁹

In thus defining mutual dependence as the outcome of labor-division, Durkheim anticipated a key twentieth-century idea: the mutual dependence of modern societies means, above all, their intensified vulnerability, since a break in their relations will have severe social costs.³⁰

European labor-division and European Interdependence

In their critique of classical liberalism and postulation of state interdependence, the post-Great War “Europeans” used formulations in clear debt to Durkheim. This is the case, for instance, in the following remarks by Francis Delaisi:

“The process of specialization and interdependence has now passed beyond a national framework [...]. As a result of sheer autodynamics, nations have been forced to specialize, in the same way that individuals did so earlier; interdependence has thus become a law of nations after having been a law of individuals”.

For this sort of sociologically-grounded internationalism, inter-societal dependence – both economic and intellectual – was what Delaisi termed “the capital event in the modern epoch” itself.³¹ It was, in Célestin Bouglé’s words, “civilization’s most important, its dominant fact”. And the young “industrial civilization” defined in this manner was particularly manifest in European society.³² “In an imperceptible manner”, noted Delaisi, “the mechanism has transformed the economic and social structure of all the European states in the space of three generations”.³³ To be sure, the premises of this modernism were thoroughly novel, as Delaisi tried to make clear with a biologicistic metaphor à la Durkheim:

“The [national] cells no longer face each other autonomous and isolated, but now are specialized and mutually dependent. This interdependence has led to the formation of an organic ensemble whose different geographic regions are no longer anything other than mutually complimentary (solidaristic) members, specializing in well defined functions: alimentation, transformation, distribution, etc.”.³⁴

29. *Ibid.*, p.311.

30. This argument following D. BALDWIN, *Interdependance and Power. A Conceptual Analysis*, in: *International Organization*, 34(1980), p.478.

31. F. DELAISI, *Les Contradictions du monde moderne*, Payot, Paris, 1925, pp.116-117; pp.421 and 133.

32. C. BOUGLÉ, Avant-propos, in: *id.*, *Le Guide de l'Etudiant en matière de Société des Nations*, Rivière, Paris, 1933, p.IV.

33. F. DELAISI, *Contradictions*, *op.cit.*, p.140.

34. *Ibid.*, pp.174-175.

At stake here was a new “unity”, an “ensemble” – whether it was also referred to as an “international community” or “European society”.³⁵ Again following Durkheim, the actual *cause* of European interdependence was understood to be a steady increase in labor-division. Such division’s “law” or “mechanism”, Delaisi summarized, had specialized nations as much as enterprises.³⁶ And again with Durkheim (himself following Darwin), the increase was for its part explained in terms of the principle of competition – the chance offered “by progressive specialisation” to “attenuate” rather than eradicate the struggle for survival being understood as modernity’s motor. In this manner, nations were perceived as gradually becoming parts of a single system, each major event necessarily being of urgent concern to all.³⁷

This new sociology of international relations laid much stress on one particular point: international labor-division meaning a need for goods and services – raw materials, credit, outlets – impossible to satisfy on a national level.³⁸ It was no longer possible for France to be self-sufficient “like in the age of Henry the Eighth”.³⁹ The degree of internationalization of trade and consumption became the central indicator of international interdependence – hence modernity – itself always construed in constructive fashion: as a relation whose sum bestowed benefits on all. The constructive thesis was in turn based on a fundamental axiom: that production-surpluses could be achieved through *both* international specialization and an accruing of national resources.⁴⁰ The basic thrust of such an approach was to view labor-division as the only way for a “community of nations” – just like a community of individuals – to achieve maximum efficiency.⁴¹

The initial goal of European unification was thus entirely pragmatic: “Through hard experience”, noted Jean Luchaire, “we know that all our prosperity stands in very narrow relation with that of our neighbors – a prosperity that in any event presumes a condition of at least relative peace”.⁴² Bertrand de Jouvenel very clearly stated that in this point, the “realistic internationalism” of the “new liberals” was essentially different from the foreign-policy idealism of a Léon Bourgeois.⁴³ Comparing Europe with the model offered by the British Empire and the United States, Luchaire himself maintained the centrality of unity for achieving a higher standard of living, with concomitant military security and political and cultural competitive-

35. Cf. the term *communauté internationale* in G. GURVITCH, *L'idée du droit social*, Recueil Sirey, Paris, 1931, p.103; that of *société européenne* in G. SCHELLE, *Essai de systématique du droit international*, in: *Revue générale de Droit International Public*, 30(1923), p.119; see *La doctrine de Léon Duguit et les fondements du Droit des Gens*, in: *Archives de Philosophie du Droit et de Sociologie juridique*, 2(1932), p.104.

36. F. DELAISI, *Contradictions*, op.cit., p.136.

37. F. DELAISI, *Contradictions*, op.cit., pp.131 and 188.

38. *Ibid.*, pp.136-137.

39. B. de JOUVENEL, *Premier principe d'une politique de bon sens*, in: *Vita*, 4(1924), p.88.

40. F. DELAISI, *Contradictions*, op.cit., p.137; retrospectively: B. de JOUVENEL, *D'une guerre à l'autre. La décomposition de l'Europe libérale*, Plon, Paris, 1941, pp.438 sq.

41. B. de JOUVENEL, *Vers l'union économique européenne*, in: *La République*, 14 March 1931, p.1.

42. J. LUCHAIRE and E. ROCHE, *Europe, ô ma patrie, Notre Temps*, February 1928, p.2.

43. B. de JOUVENEL, *L'Economie dirigée*, Librairie Valois, Paris, 1928, p.14.

ness.⁴⁴ Already by the end of the Great War, intercontinental competitiveness had thus emerged as a central motive in the demand for European integration.⁴⁵

European Labor-Division and European Collective Awareness

The pioneers of international interdependence thus assumed that increasing labor-division within Europe would produce a functional differentiation between various nations. This would lead in turn to increasingly intense cooperation, eventually creating international solidarity – and European integration. While some theorists followed Georges Scelle in embracing vitalistic models, others shared Nicolas Politis' concern with economical solidarity alone. In contrast, a third direction, taking up a late phase of Léon Duguit's writing, emphasized the role of a necessarily "conscious" solidarity elevating factual material solidarity to a new level through contractual confirmation. Classical liberalism had already postulated free trade leading to increased international labor-division and contractual contacts. But crucially, these "solidarists" did not adhere to the belief of Smith, Cobden, and Say that individualism, a minimal state, and the market were sufficient in themselves; with Durkheim, they rather maintained that interdependence, hence the integration of an internally self-differentiating unit, required more regulation on the national level. This thesis had its international counterpart, Célestin Bouglé proclaiming that "if all types of relations become more and more numerous [...] if the shuttle tirelessly weaves an ever-denser fabric [...] then it is indispensable that one day these regulations are regulated in a pacific manner".⁴⁶ The development of international exchange thus required regulative instances coordinating the cooperation of individual societies, seeing to maintenance of contracts and possibly imposing sanctions. While the intensifying organization of interdependence might proceed through contractually regulated agreement, a spontaneous harmony of interests remained insufficient:

"For the survival and well-being of a society, it is necessary that well-defined institutions correspond to each of its current needs. These can only be efficient when every individual has a clear awareness of the ties between his particular interests and these institutions. But it is these clear, simple, and universally accepted ties that both allow the institution to impose necessary restrictions on individuals and guarantee the masses' respect and obedience".⁴⁷

Consequently without organization international labor-division would only unfold with difficulty. In any event, such organization itself required basic conditions rendering conflicts between the contractual partners improbable, i.e. generating

44. J. LUCHAIRE, *Une génération réaliste*, Librairie Valois, Paris, 1929, p.73.

45. *Ibid.*, p.55. ("We must organize the Old World so that it does not succumb to the hegemony of the New World [...]. We must create the European block in order to hold our own in the domains of world-wide political and economic struggle").

46. C. BOUGLÉ, *Avant-propos*, *op.cit.*, p.IV.

47. F. DELAISI, *Contradictions*, *op.cit.*, p.512.

trust in the fulfilment of mutual obligations – this a second large difference with classical liberalism. For the new internationalists, uncomplicated exchange within the network of international did not only result from the interests of the contractual partners, but also – and mainly – from their awareness of belonging to such a network and having to respect its rules. Hence beyond forms of contractual solidarity, what was needed was an awareness of the solidarity of interdependent national societies as a basis of international normative order. Durkheim had spoken of “moral ties” in a context of national societies. With nearly paradigmatic clarity, Francis Delaisi translated this context onto an international level:

“We need to consider our own affairs in functional relation to the ensemble; we have to view them in a world-wide context and understand the need to resolve them through cooperation. An awareness of universal interdependence gradually grows in this manner. This fact is certainly of first-rank importance. The problem [...] is thus above all of a psychological nature: it is insufficient for interests to coincide, but the partners involved must have an awareness of this factual harmony”.⁴⁸

Bertrand de Jouvenel formulated this thesis in a pointed sequence: “Human beings are no longer independent, but dependent. They can no longer be individualists, since all their labor is collective labor. They can no longer be particularists, because their market is the entire world. They can no longer be nationalists: looking for work *here*, his work-power is needed *there* at the same time”.⁴⁹ In this way the nation-state was defined as a dysfunctional entity, and nationalism – particularly in its protectionist form – as a dysfunctional doctrine suitable for autarkic agrarian societies, but no longer for interdependent modernity (this Delaisi’s central thesis). When, Delaisi observed, before 1914 all the European nations gradually became materially interdependent, they nevertheless clung to their autonomy and sovereignty.

“Now this signified a flagrant contradiction between a political myth and economical reality. Thinking logically, one could only discern two alternatives: either, in a movement of ‘economic Malthusianism,’ nations would strictly limit their industrial development to needs of the national market, or they would specialize their industry to a maximum, finding a political formula adapted to the state of economic interdependence and thus abandoning the dogma of national sovereignty”.⁵⁰

Jean Luchaire considered the latter alternative entirely possible. A change in the “material conditions of life” would gradually lead to a change of consciousness:

“Love within the family was equivalent to the material solidarity uniting the first tribes. It was prolonged in love for the city, itself created by the solidarity of citizens of a city. Patriotism then emerged from the material solidarity of a nation’s people. From the solidarity of a continental group of people, a European spirit will emerge – roughly in the same way that an American consciousness has already existed for a long time”.⁵¹

48. Ibid.

49. B. de JOUVENEL, *Economie dirigée*, op.cit., p.9.

50. F. DELAISI, *Contradictions*, op.cit., p.326.

51. J. LUCHAIRE and E. ROCHE, *Europe, ô ma patrie*, op.cit., p.3.

The dialectic of European diversity and unity thus concretized itself in Alfred Fabre-Luce's insight that "one can no longer defend one's own interests in isolated fashion if they coincide with those of allies or even enemies". Fabre-Luce's hope was that "efforts aiming at an international entente and the defense of each national culture will be tied together".⁵²

This functional European consciousness had its normative counterpart. According to Durkheim, the modern collective awareness *directly* stemming from shared goals and values and relative equality was increasingly being overtaken, without being fully supplanted, by labor-division as the source of an *indirectly* integrative moral order. The economist Maxime Leroy was convinced this was also the case for nations linked by labor division. In 1917 he indicated that a state federation could only survive "if it possesses, as a glue that has to be as strong as it is invisible, several uncontested ideas thanks to which the associated states consider themselves solidaristic and similar in their foundations".⁵³ Leroy thus esteemed the same form of solidarity on an international level that Durkheim had designated as "mechanical": an undisputed, normative collective consciousness running throughout European societies, this consciousness directly tying the individual members of individual states to the broader unit. In the same context, Leroy spoke of "deep civilizational" and Jean Luchaire of "cultural" similarities. Luchaire also cited a "European mentality" based on "European Individualism".⁵⁴ In 1929, Bertrand de Jouvenel cited a European political tradition distinguishable from both Asian despotism and the American negation of political authority.⁵⁵ Fabre-Luce's version of the theme involved a "common cultural patrimony". As Fabre-Luce saw things – once again following Durkheim – "organic solidarity" had to play the preponderant role in modern interdependent Europe, the "mechanical" form being auxiliary to it; at the same time, the development of a network of mutual dependence produced its own morality:

"The person who formerly would have searched for the common characteristics of Europeans would have above all emphasized a religion and common ethnic origins [...]. In our epoch its most important characteristic being international exchange of a new intensity, the conception of a civilization plays a unifying role".⁵⁶

In this manner, "a new political feeling" would emerge, one expressing a collective awareness of interdependence.⁵⁷

52. A. FABRE-LUCE, *A propos de La Victoire*, in: *Revue Hebdomadaire*, 25 October 1924, pp.491-492 and id. under pseud. Jacques SINDRAL, *Réponse à l'enquête sur 'La jeunesse devant la politique'*, in: *Revue Hebdomadaire*, 30 January 1926, p.611.

53. M. LEROY, *L'ère Wilson. La société des nations*, Giard et Brière, Paris, 1917, p.35.

54. J. LUCHAIRE and E. ROCHE, *Europe, ô ma patrie*, op.cit., p.2 and J. LUCHAIRE, *De l'union fédérale Européenne à la réforme de l'Etat français*, Notre temps, Paris, 1931, p.25.

55. B. de JOUVENEL, *Peut-il exister un nationalisme européen. Testament de l'Europe*, in: *La Voix*, 15 September 1929.

56. A. FABRE-LUCE, *Pélerinages européens*, in: *Nouvelle Revue Française*, August 1924, p.218.

57. Very clearly formulated in N. POLITIS, *Le problème des limitations de la souveraineté et la théorie de l'abus des droits dans les rapports internationaux*, Hachette, Paris, 1926, p.31.

The Idea of a European Public Sphere?

All the new internationalists would thus have subscribed to Léon Duguit's focus on the emergence of "relations between members of various groups" as a basic sociological fact: relations

"so frequent and abiding that what I have termed feelings of socialization and justice [...] have emerged from them, here, however, as extended, inter-social feelings: hence feelings that a narrow interdependence not only exists between members of a single societal group, but also between different such groups".⁵⁸

What emerges here is that for many of these thinkers international relations were not only relations between states or governments but also – if not exclusively – between individuals. In 1925, Nicolas Politis thus wrote that the "basic fact of our epoch is solidarity of human relations within and outside of national borders [...]. Building on this great sociological fact, one juridical direction of thinking has completely renewed concepts of public law" in both the domestic and international realms. In any case, the sovereign national state, appearing – in one way or another – ever-more abstract to many holding such a sociological orientation, was no longer the sole agent on the international playing-field. Correspondingly, this field was no longer – or at least no longer only – to be defined as a collection of states, but rather of individuals, coming together into groups taking the form – among other things – of states.⁵⁹ It was here deemed incontrovertible that in their "exchange of products, services, and ideas, hence in their 'international trade' in the broad sense, modern, differentiated, democratic societies produced such transnational groups, composed of individuals with common interests or convictions."⁶⁰ These "inter-social groups are thus formed from individuals belonging to pre-existing political collectivities". Alongside official relations between states, one finds, for example, international economic relations, those between firms and various organizations, as well as international political groups such as the League of Nations movement, "upon which maintenance of [...] international order increasingly depends".⁶¹

For these sociologically arguing jurists – and then their students in the 1920s, the *Notre Temps* authors – international law could no longer be considered a manifestation of the will of individual states, *tout simple*. Rather, they spoke of a kind of "objective" order that in a certain way "pressed itself" on the states. As a legally-subject entity, every group of individuals, even groups crossing borders, engendered rules to which even states could be bound – these rules then being incorporable into contractual law or rules of behavior. But the sheer existence of principles manifestly considered binding – e.g. those such as human rights, "generally recognized among

58. L. DUGUIT, *Traité de Droit constitutionnel*, op.cit., p.187.

59. N. POLITIS, *Le problème des limitations de la souveraineté*, op.cit., p.5; but cf. already: M. LEROY, *L'ère Wilson*, op.cit., p.56.

60. G. SCELLE, *Essai de systématique du droit international*, in: *Revue générale de droit international public*, 30(1923), p.119.

61. Cf., e.g., N. POLITIS, *Les nouvelles tendances*, op.cit., p.240; F. DELAISI, *Contradictions*, op.cit., p.501; A. FABRE-LUCE, *La crise des alliances*, Grasset, Paris, 1922, p.386.

civilized nations”, already signified international legal unification.⁶² These jurists consequently maintained a “general stream” unifying persons from various nations into something like a cross-border public. The rules prompting the development of such an “embryo of modern international law” (Léon Duguit) had various designations, Duguit speaking of *discipline inter-sociale*, Georges Gurvitch of *droit inorganisé*, and were understood as clearly applicable whether or not already expressed in positive legal form.⁶³ The process was seen as closely related to that which had previously led to the emergence of individual states, itself readily interpretable as “genuine international progress” in view of the earlier independence of the provinces.⁶⁴

The same jurists were involved in a debate over whether the “sociological realists” offered a basically negative assessment of the individual in “functionalistic” or “organic” terms or, on the other hand, a basically positive assessment in “democratic” or “pluralistic” terms, thus stressing the individual’s status vis-à-vis the state and participation in a variety of social groupings. The debate was marked by growing general emphasis on the role of “consciousness”, seen as rendering interdependence part of a valid (legal) order through volitional action.⁶⁵ And this transformed individuals with shared trans-national interests into conscious actors. In a space marked by interdependence, i.e. especially in Europe, they were obliged to first confront their common identity with other identities of interest, then to resolve the conflict, termed “everlasting”. In the first number of the journal *L’Esprit international* – as with both *Notre Temps* and the *Revue de Droit International*, first published in 1927, and itself an important French organ of the new internationalism – the editors correspondingly indicated that “the public has always played a great role” in the “new direction” of international relations since the end of the Great War. Extending beyond national borders, that public had been sensitized to ties of solidarity through the facts of economic life: ties prevailing over all conflicts between nations and preparing them for a greater understanding of their political relations.⁶⁶ For Nicolas Politis, the “European idea” was penetrating this extra-national public to ever-greater degree; new concepts had been developed and there was talk

62. N. POLITIS, *Le problème des limitations de la souveraineté*, op.cit., p.10 and pp.30-32; id., *Les nouvelles tendances*, op.cit., pp.48 sq.; L. DUGUIT, *Traité de Droit constitutionnel*, op.cit., p.188.

63. The precise term of Nicolas Politis is “un courant général d’opinion”: N. POLITIS, *Le problème des limitations de la souveraineté*, op.cit., p.32. L. DUGUIT, *Traité de Droit constitutionnel*, op.cit., p.186.

64. M. LEROY, *L’ère Wilson*, op.cit., p.53.

65. Cf., e.g. Roger Bonnard’s juridical critique of Léon Duguit and Célestin Bouglé’s sociological critique of Durkheim.

66. Cf. N. POLITIS, *La nouvelle politique internationale*, in: *L’Esprit international*, 1(1927), p.20; that journal appeared from the start of 1927 until 1940 as a quarterly directed by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Along with Nicolas Politis, Henri Lichtenberger was on the editorial board, and Pierre Renouvin was editorial secretary; *La Revue de Droit International* appeared between 1927 and 1940 under Nicolas Politis’ direction. On its juridical program see the foreword in vol. 1(1927), pp.5-7.

“not only of European solidarity, but also of a European spirit, a European mentality, and a European way of speaking and acting, even of a European nation and the ‘birth of the European citizen’”.⁶⁷

The Vulnerability and Opportunities of an Interdependent Europe

Profoundly marked during their adolescence by the Great War, the younger theorists of European interdependence promoted the notion of a new quality of relations between advanced nations more sharply than had their mentors. “If there is one thing that shocks most members of the postwar generation, than it is the manner in which the younger generations approached international questions”, indicated Jean Luchaire.⁶⁸ For the latter, the recent catastrophe had clarified the far-reaching impact of international labor-division in twofold fashion: on the one hand, developments within the different alliances had underscored the *chances* for interdependence; on the other hand, in both the war and the postwar period, its *dangerous potential* had become clear.

Such potential was especially manifest in the economic difficulties stamping the first half of the 1920s – difficulties understood to result from the war’s destruction of the interdependent network. For Fabre-Luce writing in 1924, “the interdependence spoken of so much at present already existed before 1914. Now, having grown more and more dense in a period of peace, it had to be interrupted by the war for its existence to be noticed”.⁶⁹ Europe’s postwar crisis indicated the futility of victory in an age of economic interdependence. It was necessary to recognize, noted Jean Luchaire, that “exercising power whose basis is solely political and military would be illusory in face of economic power”, the strongest members of the human community being those who were the most economically indispensable – “the greatest producer, most clever merchant, most fertile banker”.⁷⁰ But systems of credit, communication, and production, playing such a decisive role in a nation’s prosperity, could not simply be transferred to a victorious power, something shown in the difficulties linked to collecting reparations.⁷¹ Norman Angell’s contention in *The Great Illusion* (1910) that war between interdependent nations was fundamentally unproductive was thus shared by the circle around *Notre Temps*.⁷² Fabre-Luce spelled this out eloquently enough:

67. N. POLITIS in a retrospective look at the opportunities and failings of the post-1918 period: *La solidarité européenne*, in: *L’Esprit international*, 10(1936), p.159; cf. e.g., H. de JOUVENEL on Henri de Saint-Simon, *De la réorganisation de la société européenne*, Les Presses françaises, Paris, 1925.

68. J. LUCHAIRE and E. ROCHE, *Europe, ô ma patrie*, op.cit., p.2.

69. A. FABRE-LUCE, *Locarno sans rêves*, Grasset, Paris, 1927, p.11.

70. J. LUCHAIRE, *La tragédie britannique*, in: *Notre Temps*, 7(1929), p.207.

71. B. de JOUVENEL, *Premier principe d’une politique de bon sens*, op.cit., p.98. (“Invasion and conquest are useless military operations in a time when forcing a rival to his knees simultaneously destroys a supplier, a client, even a partner”).

72. Reception and thesis in J. LUCHAIRE, *L’Heure de l’Europe*, in: *Notre Temps*, 13 July 1930, col.161; and F. DELAISI, *Contradictions*, op.cit., p.419.

“Previously one thought of a short conflict and a productive victory [...]. One did not recognize that revenge for an earlier defeat had to give way to a new catastrophe, compared to which it would seem to have nearly minimal importance”.⁷³

That increased vulnerability accompanied interdependence was a central thesis of Durkheim, one gaining contour in the war’s wake. Francis Delaisi, Georges Scelle, and Alfred Fabre-Luce sharpened it into the thesis of “vital interdependence”: already before 1914, European labor-division had created a degree of mutual dependence that made international exchange nothing short of imperative for survival. Gains in productivity and loss of independence were two sides of one coin:

“No nation is any longer capable of self-sufficiency. The mechanism’s development has specialized each of them, in the process increasing the prosperity of each to a previous unknown degree. But at the same time it imposed an inevitable economic interdependence. One aspect cannot be separated from the other. Together they can become more prosperous; isolated from one another they will perish”.

The sense was that for the first time in human history, war was threatening societies in their substance.⁷⁴ Purely pragmatic considerations – not idealistic ones – pointed to the uselessness of war for the interconnected nations of Europe.

Many in the *Notre Temps* circle viewed war-related phenomena as clarifying both the dangers of interdependence and the opportunities it offered. They defined war between industrial nations as war of a new character: On the one hand, the opponents attempted to exploit each other’s vulnerability – hence economic blockades. At the same time, they were forced to exploit the potential of their own interdependence to a maximal degree: “The nation could only be saved after the entire universe had been called on to co-operate”.⁷⁵ To great extent, optimization of military security was now synonymous with optimization of economical productivity. During the war, the two systems of alliance were thus obliged to mobilize resources through economic units integrated to the greatest extent possible, advanced labor-division developing in this framework. The middle-European and West European-Atlantic economic realms emerged in this manner. In both cases, interdependence could now be institutionalized – through international credit and so forth – as never before.⁷⁶ This development seemed to demonstrate that effective integration demanded centralized regulation. Gradually in both economic realms, organization of the most varied resources was withdrawn from the nation-state’s sovereignty, in order to be seen to in a centralized manner. This “law of interdependence” even extended from the “economic domain” to the “military domain” itself:

73. A. FABRE-LUCE, *Locarno sans rêves*, op.cit., p.9.

74. F. DELAISI, *Contradictions*, op.cit., p.421; more drastically: G. SCELLE, *La doctrine de Léon Duguit et les fondements du Droit des Gens*, in: *Archives de Philosophie de Droit et de Sociologie juridique*, 2(1932), p.104; also pointed: A. FABRE-LUCE, *Locarno sans rêves*, op.cit., pp.219-220.

75. A. FABRE-LUCE, *A propos de La Victoire*, in: *Revue Hebdomadaire*, 25 October 1924, pp.491-492.

76. F. DELAISI, *Contradictions*, op.cit., pp.382 sq., similarly in B. de JOUVENEL, *D'une guerre à l'autre. De Versailles à Locarno*, op.cit., pp.40 sq.

“The army, as the very myth of the nation, as the tool and guarantee of national sovereignty, disappeared in its turn. In the middle of the noise of battles, of hailing projectiles and mortal remains from every nation, the world unknowingly groped toward its unity”.⁷⁷

According to Emile Roche and Jean Luchaire, a “collective Europe” thus loomed within the war, which had ruptured individual sovereignty in favor of supranational decisions in each alliance. “Following this first proof of the necessity of a hypernational union”, they concluded, “it is no longer possible simply to return to the concept of a sovereign nation, now, when this concept [...] has shown itself to contradict the manifest interdependence of the old continent’s nations”.⁷⁸

Differentiation was thus compensated for by integration, which only became usable in this manner. Jean Luchaire was very direct in describing the need for European unity so strongly felt within a political generation stamped by the war:

“The enormous ravages that we witnessed were, as paradoxical as that might now seem, a lesson in favor of solidarity. We had the impression that the laws of economic independence [...] had been confirmed [...]. Almost instinctively, we had an internationalist attitude”.⁷⁹

Elsewhere he stressed the centrality of the idea of pluralist, federative integration for the revision of classical liberalism in general. The idea reflected, he indicated, an

“irresistible inclination toward the laws of association, demanded by the modern world: action within both group and team; toward political association as well: League of Nations, United States of Europe; and toward economic association: syndicalism – all forms of action rejecting the particularism of the old parties, the particularism of the ‘liberals’ following the pure theory drawn on eighteenth and nineteenth century lines”.⁸⁰

Already by the early 1920s, the war generation’s pluralistic internationalists could build on both an earlier generation’s concepts of international interdependence and the historical experience of supranational regulative instances. For just this reason, Jean Luchaire observed a conceptual adherence to “the categories of European solidarity”, and a subordination of the old national interests to them “without hesitation”.⁸¹ A first question that could now be posed was whether the system of majority decision as practiced by the inter-allied committees did not have to be continued through an increasing democratization of diplomatic *methods*. All gestures in that direction were welcome:

“In the reparations commission, none of the participating nations is absolute master of its foreign policy [...]. The debate over foreign policy unfolds in conferences or in the press, with open or half-open doors: parliamentarianism here and parliamentarianism there”.⁸²

A second question was whether the supranational wartime institutions could not be used to democratize the *goals* of diplomacy: would it not be possible to make

77. F. DELAISI, *Contradictions*, op.cit., p.399.

78. J. LUCHAIRE and E. ROCHE, *Europe, ô ma patrie*, op.cit., p.3.

79. J. LUCHAIRE, *L'Heure de l'Europe*, op.cit., 13 July 1930, col.161.

80. J. LUCHAIRE, *Bilan de trois ans*, in: *Notre Temps*, 1 December 1929, p.3.

81. J. LUCHAIRE and E. ROCHE, *Europe, ô ma patrie*, op.cit., p.2.

82. J. LUCHAIRE, *De l'union fédérale Européenne à la réforme de l'Etat*, op.cit., p.6.

use of the huge productivity stemming from labor-division within the wartime alliances to significantly increase general living standards? “More than a hundred milliard work days were used for the war”, wrote Francis Delaisi. “With an effort as centralized and organized as that during the war, it would have been possible to change the face of the world and create an enormous prosperity. Instead of doing so, it was only arranged in order to be destroyed”.⁸³

European Anomy after the Versailles Treaty

Following Europe’s division during the war, a conviction had thus emerged that a shift in international relations had become indispensable. Luchaire was not the only one who hoped that “the unity of Europe might emerge from the shards of the past”. But the policies of the majority in power since 1919, the *Union nationale*, pointed in an entirely different direction:

“Since the armistice and the signature of the peace treaty, we have to confirm each day anew that these truths [of international interdependence] are continuously disdained by politicians, the press, the large majority of the older generation”.⁸⁴

In the eyes of the new internationalists, Europe was sinking ever-more deeply into a condition that, in line with Durkheim, could be interpreted as anomic European labor-division. With the concept of anomie, sociology had described a condition of societal disintegration, of inadequate organization with concurrent highly developed labor-division, marked by unregulated competition, the prevalence of individual interest, and extensive absence of order. Alfred Fabre-Luce meant nothing less when he wrote that “the nation’s political spirit no longer fully corresponds to the circumstances of today’s international relations”. And likewise with Jean Luchaire, for whom “the intellectual development of people presently limps behind the transformation of material conditions of life”.⁸⁵ Why, for example, did the inter-allied regulative instances, created because of the war, have to be done away with in 1919 – this although it was clear that the League of Nations could hardly achieve similar efficiency? And again, why was reconstruction in France mainly funded with national resources? Clémenceau’s protectionism was the return to the ideal of unassailable national sovereignty. But *this* “moral” of international relations could only be interpreted as an enormous step backwards in face of both advanced international interdependence and the solidarity emerging from the war. Luchaire thus observed that

“for all of Europe, this triumph of economic nationalism has had the worst possible results [...] but especially for France. It has produced artificial industries here, ones not emerging spontaneously [...]. It has nullified the competitive specialization of

83. F. DELAISI, *Contradictions*, op.cit., p.415.

84. J. LUCHAIRE, *Une génération réaliste*, Paris, 1929, p.54.

85. A. FABRE-LUCE, *Crise des Alliances*, op.cit., p.404; J. LUCHAIRE and E. ROCHE, *Europe, ô ma patrie*, op.cit., p.3.

our metals industry [...]. It has led through protectionism to loss of readiness for industrial and above all even agricultural innovation”.⁸⁶

In the same vein, Francis Delaisi remarked that “in effect, the lesson of the war was forgotten”. Instead of gradually extending throughout Europe, “awareness of the interdependence of nations, which had truly existed for a moment due to the circumstances of combat, disappeared as soon as the danger was past”. Even the relations with England were increasingly determined by inefficient anarchic individualism: “In this way the entire system of mutually completing countries was [...] completely torn asunder”.⁸⁷

A sociological framework was not only suitable for interpreting inter-allied relations, but also for those with the former enemies. Could not the situation resulting from the Versailles Treaty be understood as a second form of anomic labor-division, which Durkheim described as “forced labor-division”? He saw this as being present when the rules of cooperation had a compulsory quality expressing the enduring strength of traditional structures conflicting with modern consciousness. Assuming de facto interdependence with Germany before 1914, was it not necessary to consider – at least in the long term – the Versailles Treaty as an arrangement reflecting the persistence of an obsolete nationalism and idea of sovereignty – hence only maintainable through constant force? For Bertrand de Jouvenel, these classical principles were responsible for various nationalisms becoming stronger rather than weaker after 1919: “That was nothing other than a recognition of everyone’s right to act in a selfish manner, or put otherwise, that was European anarchism”.⁸⁸ France’s own interests involved integrating both Germany and – above all – the small successor states of the “Austro-Hungarian economic space”, dependant on functioning European labor-division, into a network of pan-European interdependence. “The victors are thus confronted with a great duty – reintegrating the vanquished into the community of European states after a just penance” was Alfred Fabre-Luce’s formulation as early as 1922.⁸⁹ For Francis Delaisi, this meant recognizing the need for a “peace of interdependence”, while the Versailles Treaty involved “peace by violence, depending on the army’s power, entirely in the old tradition”.⁹⁰

The Project of a Pluralist European Integration

The pioneers of French interdependence theory consistently maintained that international relations could take on sharply competitive character. They viewed competition for scarce resources as such an anthropological constant – as much of one as the capacity to draw pragmatically rational conclusions from crises. And the same

86. J. LUCHAIRE, *De l'union fédérale européenne à la réforme de l'Etat*, op.cit., p.24.

87. F. DELAISI, *Contradictions*, op.cit., p.436.

88. B. de JOUVENEL, *Vers les Etats-Unis d'Europe*, Paris, 1930, p.6.

89. A. FABRE-LUCE, *Réponse à André Germain*, in: *Ecrits Nouveaux*, November 1922, p.70.

90. F. DELAISI, *Contradictions*, op.cit., p.399; *ibid.*, p. 441.

convictions informed their sense that cancelling European disintegration might now succeed. Many, including Bertrand de Jouvenel, went so far as to cast – “unhesitatingly”, despite “justified reservations” – the idea of unity in terms of a “birth of European nationalism”, “given that nationalism is the expression of an awareness of mutual solidarity”.⁹¹ Until the start of the 1930s, the circle around *Notre Temps* remained convinced that unity could be achieved peacefully and according to liberal principles: the goal was pluralistic federalism. Integration was thus not meant to emerge by way of a strong center à la Comte; in this period there was outspoken criticism of the idea of integration through a disciplining primacy of politics. To the contrary, the circle maintained its Durkheimian tenets, placing its faith in what Fabre-Luce termed the “laws of the economical”, i.e. the self-healing capacity of economic labor-division, its potential for softening anachronistic resistance to integration, generating “organic solidarity” and a sense of social cohesion. These laws, Fabre-Luce observed, “had been rendered dysfunctional and subordinated to a strong will” during the war; they would now “exercise their effect again, with greater power; the pendulum has swung back”.⁹² Francis Delaisi defined “the ideal” as an

“establishment of absolute free trade among the nations. Everyone would specialize in the industries allowing realization of best production at an optimal price. Everyone would purchase where the best product is offered at the lowest price – the interest of the consumer, hence the person in truth best representing the national interest, would be the highest priority [...]. This will certainly be the greatest task of the twentieth century”.⁹³

And Fabre-Luce observed that in a Europe where “the solidarity of interests and even existences is so great”, a rapprochement of nations was “inevitable”, constituting “the precondition for their survival”.⁹⁴

In accordance with the principle that form follows function, the “new liberals” were convinced that the emergence of transnational interests would lead to the development of a supranational (and supralinguistic) pluralism, first of opinions, then, in the phrasing of Bertrand de Jouvenel and Jean Luchaire, of groups oriented toward “points in common between corporations, toward needs of production”.⁹⁵ The new morality of international solidarity, Alfred Fabre-Luce and others insisted, was already spreading among an economic, political, and cultural avant-garde.⁹⁶ Implicit here is the widely spread embrace, on an international level, of the integrative hopes Durkheim had attached to the intermediary organizations and their elites. The transposition becomes explicit in some remarks of Henry de Jouvenel:

91. B. de JOUVENEL, *Peut-il exister un nationalisme européen*, in: *La Voix*, 15 September 1929.

92. A. FABRE-LUCE, *Crise des alliances*, op.cit., p.333.

93. F. DELAISI, *Contradictions*, op.cit., pp.488-489.

94. A. FABRE-LUCE, *La Victoire*, Paris, 1924, p.416.

95. B. de JOUVENEL and J. LUCHAIRE as signatories of the manifesto of the *Groupe de conférences démocratiques et d'action sociale*, in: *Ere Nouvelle*, 10 November 1922.

96. A. FABRE-LUCE, *Locarno sans rêves*, op.cit., pp.17 and 21.

“The regular meetings [of international elites] in a way render their life in common more regular. These men, belonging to different nations and at the same time to identical institutions, are searching in a virtually natural manner for the point where their country’s national interest [sic] coincides with that of the institution for which they feel themselves responsible together with the other representatives [...]. Each representative can only succeed together with the others – a great bonus for international entente”.⁹⁷

Francis Delaisi even hoped that the Geneva International Labor Office (I.L.O.), the International Chamber of Commerce, and the League of Nations would together serve as crystallization points for the eventual emergence of a functioning supra-national social, economic, and political regulative association.⁹⁸

Inter-societal “anomie” was thus meant to be gradually corrected by way of transnational, federal integrative mechanisms. But in the long term, the “new liberals” indicated, even the “forced labor-division” within the international system of 1919 could not be maintained if Europe was to return to peace and prosperity. Unhindered progress of European labor-division and hence solidarity needed a stable framework, only assured if the nations involved participated in their exchange voluntarily. This, however, presumed an at least relative equality of opportunity among the agents. Concretely this meant that Germany had to be allowed to emancipate itself from parts of the Versailles Treaty – a point that was spelled out very clearly by, for example, Jean Luchaire:

“The ‘classicists’ repeat in unison: ‘adherence to treaties’! The ‘modernists’ answer: ‘European unity’. But even if it were not to produce a revision of the 1919 borders, a European Union is a concept standing in contradiction to Versailles. To the victors’ favor, Versailles created a condition of inequality, where a European Union can only emerge on condition that it offers its members equal chances for expansion”.⁹⁹

On just these grounds, the French “new liberals” joined their British counterparts in criticizing the extent and modality of reparation demands being made of Germany. At the same time, they stressed that in circumstances of more open competition, France could only preserve its advantageous position of 1919 with determined modernization. The country had to focus on and improve its strengths within the imminent European economic space. In this framework, Jean Luchaire described those wishing to preserve the “classical” French diplomacy as follows:

“They imagine the forty million French citizens, economically poorly organized and used to living comfortably, being oppressed and ruled by seventy million Germans [...]. The politics of French nationalism is a politics of national cowardice, a politics of mistrust of France [...]. We do not cultivate it, because we trust a younger generation that knows that if it works for Europe it needs to also reform France from within”.¹⁰⁰

At the same time, under the maxim that an ordering of international relations had to follow a rearrangement of international structures, there were reflections on

97. H. de JOUVENEL, *La Société des Nations et les nouvelles générations françaises*, in: *Revue de Paris*, 15 February 1924, p.7.

98. Cf. the final chapter of *Contradictions*, op.cit., pp.467 sq.

99. J. LUCHAIRE, *De l’union fédérale européenne à la réforme de l’Etat*, op.cit., p.8; cf. also p.24.

100. *Ibid.*, p.25.

the possibility for a “peaceful transformation”. Francis Delaisi was convinced that following the experience of the Great War, it should no longer be possible for

“the fragile continuum [of interdependence] to once more be torn apart by forms of imperialism and nationalism [...]. If interdependence is to triumph, it must be supported by permanent institutions with the task of binding centrifugal forces together and uniting opposing interests”.¹⁰¹

For this reason, the “new liberal” circle around *Notre Temps* placed much hope in the League of Nations. Was it really impossible for it to become an active instrument of international and especially European solidarity? Célestin Bouglé defined the fundamentals of this Durkheimian international functionalism in exemplary fashion:

“A complex organism has thus emerged in Geneva, an organic complex that, as much as possible, tries to fulfil the needs felt by individual nations because of the multifaceted forms of solidarity linking them ever more closely [...]. It is almost unavoidable [...] that regulated relations lead to the formation of central institutions. The League of Nations wishes to be one of these coordinating centers. Already for this reason, it is and will remain a sociological phenomenon of the highest interest”.¹⁰²

At the same time, the circle was convinced from the start that the League’s “Europeanization” was the true precondition for its fulfilling its regulative purpose. “We demanded that the League of Nations be regionalized”, wrote Pierre Brossolette retrospectively. “Experience teaches that the experiment [of international integration] be first essayed in the framework most closely suitable for it, and that is Europe”.¹⁰³ It was thus only consequent to support the Geneva Protocol in 1924, the treaty of Locarno in 1925, and the European plan in 1929. “European federation is no panacea”, indicated Jean Luchaire.

“It is not one of those wonders letting us forget all danger. But it is a logical and general solution for problems darkening the horizon of the old continent. It sets its hopes on the principle of cooperation rather than the principle of conflict, organized trust rather than instinctive mistrust, acknowledged solidarity rather than a disintegrative particularism still holding aloft a now illegitimate ideal”.¹⁰⁴

Following publication of the French memorandum on European policy in 1930, Luchaire knew that a European federation hardly stood a chance at that time. But was he so mistaken in writing that “we are presently experiencing, if not the birth than at least the ripening of the unified Europe of tomorrow”?¹⁰⁵

101. F. DELAISI, *Contradictions*, op.cit., p.491.

102. C. BOUGLÉ, *Avant-propos*, op.cit., p.IV.

103. P. BROSSOLETTE, *Les possibilités de la S.D.N. dans le conflit sino-japonais*, in: *Notre Temps*, 29 January 1933, col.234.

104. J. LUCHAIRE, *L'Heure de l'Europe*, op.cit., col.162.

105. J. LUCHAIRE, *La fédération européenne. La première Assemblée européenne*, in: *Notre Temps*, 21 September 1930, col.591.

Scenarios of Europe's Future – Western Future Studies of the Sixties and Seventies as an Example of a Transnational Public Sphere of Experts

Alexander Schmidt-Gernig

The 'public sphere' can generally be understood as a kind of arena in which political actors are observed and at the same time controlled by various participants in regard to the decisions that, in principle, apply to all.¹ The public sphere therefore not only consists of all sorts of public forums and institutions such as the mass media, universities, associations, etc., but is constituted in a quite central way by its reference to a power and decision centre in the sense of critique of power and control, as well with regard to the public effect and staging of power.² In modern democracies it is above all the people, the nationally more or less homogeneous 'demos', that is of decisive importance, through which the public sphere can legitimate itself and toward which the public sphere is directed. The central reference of the power structures and their control is to the people. From this viewpoint no genuine 'European public sphere' was able to develop until the emergence of a European centre of power in Brussels. Despite significant progress in the nineties, a serious deficit in the public sphere of the European Union is rightly found by some, not lastly due to the relatively remote character of European institutions.³ However, if the concept of the 'public sphere' is oriented less toward the example of the nation-state with a largely (linguistically or ethnically) homogeneous public and one centre of power, and more strongly presupposes the concrete political challenges and 'agendas' in their contemporary context, then a very different perspective on the emergence of a transnational or European public sphere arises. From a historical perspective various 'partial public spheres' with transnational objectives and organizational structures (e.g., the circle of Enlightenment philosophers, scientists and intellectuals, or organizations and associations that act trans-

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1. See the theoretical model of J. GERHARDS, F. NEIDHARDT, *Strukturen und Funktionen moderner Öffentlichkeit. Fragestellungen und Ansätze*, in: S. MÜLLER-DOHM, K. NEUMANN-BRAUN (Hrsg.), *Öffentlichkeit - Kultur - Massenkommunikation. Beiträge zur Medien- und Kommunikationssoziologie*, BIS, Oldenburg, 1991, pp.31-89.
 2. Compare the various contributions in G. GÖHLER (Hrsg.), *Macht der Öffentlichkeit – Öffentlichkeit der Macht*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1995.
 3. See for example: JOURNALISTS ANNUAL REPORT, *The European Union in the Media 1995*, Fundesco, Madrid, 1995, especially pp.79-85 as well as J. GERHARDS, *Westeuropäische Integration und die Schwierigkeiten der Entstehung einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit*, in: *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, 22(1993), pp.96-110 and J. GERHARDS, *Das Öffentlichkeitsdefizit der EU im Horizont normativer Öffentlichkeitstheorien*, in: H. KAEUBLE, M. KIRSCH, A. SCHMIDT-GERNIG (Hrsg.), *Transnationale Öffentlichkeiten und Identitäten im 20. Jahrhundert*, Campus, Frankfurt/M., New York, 2002, pp.135-158.

or internationally, such as the workers' and women's movements) shift to the centre of attention as building blocks of a 'European public sphere'.⁴

From this viewpoint it can be seen – particularly for the second half of the Twentieth Century – that transnational public spheres primarily develop out of political problem situations that do not appear to be resolvable through regional or national participants or strategies alone. The repeatedly claimed transnational character of individual media or media forms is far less decisive for the development of transnational public spheres than the tendency to perceive particular political challenges as tasks that point beyond the competencies of the nation-state and can only be dealt with effectively on an international or transnational level. At the European level this can be well observed in recent years. Transnational problems and risks like the BSE crisis, migration problems, or the corruption cases in the E.U. Commission are perceived as genuinely European challenges and at the same time addressed directly to European political authorities, so that there is no question that one can speak of a 'European public sphere'.⁵

From this viewpoint of transnational issues it is interesting to analyze which participants define particular issues as 'transnational', 'global' or 'European' and try to make them have a public effect, for what reasons, and which political authorities are addressed with them. In this respect the unusual boom in the last decades of transnationally oriented non-governmental organizations like Greenpeace, Oxfam, or Amnesty International, as well as international expert groups like the Club of Rome is very instructive. For these 'new' participants have effectively set on the agenda of the emerging 'world public sphere' genuinely transnational problems (e.g., environment, human rights, migration, etc.), and have therewith sometimes achieved considerable political influence.⁶ Particularly the (late) sixties and (early) seventies can be seen as the key decade of such a transnationalization of public spheres, especially in the Western societies. For, in the light of the worsening political conflicts (Berlin, Cuba, Africa, Vietnam, etc.), the global interrelation of political and economic problems became a central topic of concern as it had never

4. On the subject of a 'European public sphere' in comparison with 'national' public spheres, see H. KAELBLE, *Wege zur Demokratie. Von der Französischen Revolution zur Europäischen Union*, DVA, Stuttgart, 2001, pp.160-179.

5. See the very revealing article by K. EDER, *Zur Transformation nationalstaatlicher Öffentlichkeit in Europa. Von der Sprachgemeinschaft zur issuespezifischen Kommunikationsgemeinschaft*, in: *Berliner Journal für Soziologie*, 10, 2(2000), pp.167-184, esp. pp.169-171.

6. See among others J. BOLI, G. M. THOMAS, *World Culture in the World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organization*, in: *American Sociological Review*, 62(1997), pp.171-190 and D. A. SNOW, R. D. BENFORD, *Alternative Types of Cross-national Diffusion in the Social Movement Arena*, in: D. DELLA PORTA, H. KRIESI, D. RUCHT (eds.), *Social Movements in a Globalizing World*, Macmillan/St. Martin's Press, Basingstoke et al., 1999, pp.23-39 as well as D. RUCHT, *The Transnationalization of Social Movements: Trends, Causes, Problems*, *ibid.*, pp.206-222. According to Rucht there were 83 TMSOs in 1973. Ten years later the number had risen to 348, and in 1993 even to 631. In twenty years the number had increased more than sevenfold; however, the most important Western TMSOs were founded prior to 1973, and the strong expansion after that time can primarily be attributed to numerous foundations in developing nations.

been before, especially within the framework of the Western student movement, so that one can rightly speak of the '68ers' as the first 'global generation'.⁷

Furthermore, this transnational orientation was supported and spread by an increasingly transnationally or transculturally shaped youth culture, which, through rock music, drug consumption, Asian forms of meditation, etc. tried out new experiences that were radically different from the society of their parents, and so called into question the long dominant identificatory reference points of national identity.⁸ In the U.S. this came to be expressed with the wave of refusals to fight in the Vietnam War. In this context of a growing transnationalization of identificatory reference points the space travel boom also played an important role. For it was through the photos from the July 1969 moon landing showing the Earth as a small ball in endless black space that the 'blue planet' was able to become a considerably publicly-effective symbolic icon of all globally oriented social movements (especially the environmental movement).⁹ However, the reference to the considerable public-symbolic effect of space travel also makes clear that the sixties were also the decade of an extraordinary economic boom in which the number of scientists, publications and institutions increased exponentially in ever shorter intervals. This triggered a broad wave of scientization and professionalization of entire occupational fields.¹⁰ Against this background, the social figure of the 'expert' gained considerable importance, not only within the framework of specific professions, but also with respect to the wider public. For the public presentation of complex facts made increasing subject-specific expertise necessary and, at the same time, led to an increase in the number of 'experts' that appeared publicly in this function not only to name complex problem areas, but also to legitimate or de-legitimate particular political strategies. Since the sixties public spheres of experts have become considerably more important for political legitimation strategies, particularly since the central good of public credibility is increasingly linked to scientific expertise, especially in the area of comprehensive risk calculations.

In this context a new scientific discipline emerged – known as 'future research', 'futurology', 'future studies', 'forecasting', or also 'prospective' – that knew an extraordinary boom in the sixties. It is of particular interest with regard to the subject of transnational or European public spheres because the public effect of this

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7. See D. DELLA PORTA, „1968“ – *Zwischennationale Diffusion und transnationale Strukturen*, in: I. GILCHER-HOLTEY (Hrsg.): *1968. Vom Ereignis zum Gegenstand der Geschichtswissenschaft*, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1998, pp.131-150 and B. FIETZE, *1968 als Symbol der ersten globalen Generation*, in: *Berliner Journal für Soziologie*, 7, 3(1997), pp.365-376.
 8. See P. ZIMMERMANN, *Aufwachsen mit Rockmusik - Rockgeschichte und Sozialisation*, in: U. PREUSS-LAUSITZ u.a. (Hrsg.), *Kriegskinder, Konsumkinder, Krisenkinder. Zur Sozialisationsgeschichte seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg*, Weinheim, Basel, 1989, pp.107-126 and K. MAASE, *Grenzenloses Vergnügen. Der Aufstieg der Massenkultur 1850-1970*, S. Fischer, Frankfurt/M., 1997, pp.252-258.
 9. Compare W. SACHS, *Der blaue Planet. Zur Zweideutigkeit einer modernen Ikone*, in: M. SALEWSKI, I. STÖLKEN-FITSCHEN (Hrsg.), *Moderne Zeiten. Technik und Zeitgeist im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Franz Steiner, Stuttgart, 1994, pp.197-209.
 10. Compare D. J. DELLA SOLLA PRICE, *Little Science, Big Science. Von der Studierstube zur Großforschung*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M., 1974, esp. pp.13-42.

new ‘futurology’ was not inconsiderable, at least until the end of the seventies. In 1969 the political scientist Hermann Lübke so outlined very trenchantly the boom of “future studies” and their growing public resonance in western societies as follows:

“Futurology is current. The so-called futurology is establishing itself as a new scientific discipline. Its publicity is large and growing. The staged PUBLIC reasoning adopted its reasoning. Futurology meetings take place; nightly programs are dedicated to it. Futurology institutes are working; the establishment of futurology university chairs is being proposed, even demanded”.¹¹

The driving force behind this attempt to investigate “the future” more closely was the perception of an ever greater discrepancy between the techno-scientific developmental dynamic on the one hand, and the means to control it politically on the other. Just after the war, Einstein had seen this as humanity’s central survival problem, when he said that the splitting of the atom changed everything but human thought.¹² The exponential accumulation of knowledge, in particular of the foundations of physical and biological systems and the ever shorter phases of technological conversion of this knowledge in the form of supercomputers, nuclear technologies, satellites, radar technologies, rockets and numerous automation technologies (pushed ahead, not least because of World War II and the Cold War), appeared to cause and drive forward a kind of evolutionary quantum leap of history – the French philologist and author of a very well known future study Pierre Bertaux even spoke of a “mutation of humanity”.¹³ This “quantum leap” resulted in an economic boom unlike any seen before that led to sometimes exponential growth rates in, e.g., real wages, mass consumption, and also social state benefits, but whose Janus-headed character also manifested itself in “negatively” exponential growth rates in e.g., the world population, world arms spending, or in the generally accelerated exploitation and destruction of natural resources. In 1973 the political scientist and leader of a “critical” futurology in West Germany Ossip K. Flechtheim put his finger on the essential elements of this central “transnational” or “global” agenda of futurologists as follows:

“It’s about the elimination of war and the arms race, the conquering of hunger and misery in the Third World, the ending of the overexploitation of nature, the reduction of violence and making the state and society more humane, the dismantling of alienation and the creation of a new homo humanus”.¹⁴

That this agenda for the future was able to spread its political effectiveness beyond the circle of the political and scientific elites had to do with a change in values in all

11. H. LÜBBE, *Ernst und Unernst der Zukunftsforschung*, in: *Merkur*, 23(1969), p.125 (all translations generally by the author). The sociologist Helmut Schelsky made similar claims three years earlier. See H. SCHELSKY, *Planung der Zukunft. Die rationale Utopie und die Ideologie der Rationalität*, in: *Soziale Welt*, 17(1966), p.155.

12. See the contribution by Ch. E. OSGOOD, *Conservative Words and Radical Sentences in the Semantics of International Politics*, in: R. JUNGK, J. GALTUNG (Eds.), *Mankind 2000*, Allen & Unwin, Oslo and London, 1969, p.54 and following, *passim*.

13. See P. BERTAUX, *La mutation humaine*, Payot, Paris, 1964. German version: *Mutation der Menschheit. Zukunft und Lebensinn*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. 1979.

Western countries, especially since the sixties. This change in values, which was described as individualization, democratization and politicization, brought about a spirit of optimism which manifested itself concretely in the student movement and the beginnings of the peace, women's and civil rights movements. But it also showed, in part, in far reaching educational, marriage and penal reforms and in an increasingly critical orientation of the mass media.¹⁵ Moreover a generally increased consciousness of the risk of the growing divide between technological feasibility (and its potential risk) and the rather mentally trailing (political) regulatory authorities may have been decisive for this relatively broad resonance with the public in the West.¹⁶ In this connection the first studies for the (internationally composed) Club of Rome, founded in 1968, represent the best and most penetrating example,¹⁷ in particular the 1972 study "Limits to Growth" by Dennis and Donella Meadows and others at M.I.T.¹⁸ In the light of the accelerated growth rates due to the economic boom, the attempt was made, with the use of computer supported "world models", to extend linearly into the future the basic parameters of industrial society such as energy supply, environmental pollution, the exploitation of resources, capital investments and the development of food bases in their reciprocal relations. In a sort of neo-Malthusian basic assumption, the study came to the conclusion that, under the assumption of further exponential growth rates of the given variable, the entire system would collapse in the course of the next hundred years. The researchers therefore pleaded for an immediate reversal of the trend or (more strongly in later studies) radical ecological modifications of the course of growth. Although the study was hardly made for easy reading, its translation into thirty-five languages and the circulation of several million copies show the exceptional explosive force and broad impact this future model had on the public, amazingly before the collapse of the boom unfolded. The outlook on the "limits of growth" that appeared to emerge a year later in the light of the oil crisis, became, in the course of the seventies, a central argument of the newly forming eco-movements found in almost all Western countries. Without doubt, few future studies had such a lasting impact, but the abundance of translations (above all of American studies), the sometimes large printings and amazing resonance in the electronic mass media¹⁹ of many best-sellers on the future

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14. O. K. FLECHTHEIM, *Futurologie in der zweiten Phase?*, in: D. PFORTE, O. SCHWENCKE (Hrsg.), *Ansichten einer künftigen Futurologie. Zukunftsforschung in der zweiten Phase*, Hanser, München, 1973, p.17.
 15. For Western societies generally, see R. INGLEHART, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1989.
 16. This concern is expressed in all contributions to the first international conference on the future in Oslo in 1969. See R. JUNGK, J. GALTUNG, *Mankind ...*, op.cit.
 17. See J. STREICH, *30 Jahre Club of Rome. Anspruch, Kritik, Zukunft*, Birkhäuser, Basel et.al., 1997, as well as P. MOLL, *From Scarcity to Sustainability – Future Studies and the Environment. The Role of the Club of Rome*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt/M., 1991.
 18. Other representatives would include J. W. Forrester, Ed. Pestel, M. Mesarovic, but also, with somewhat different emphases, H. Brown, P. Ehrlich, R. Dumont and H. Gruhl.
 19. See, e.g., the work derived from a German television series by R. PROSKE (Hrsg.), *Modelle und Elemente künftiger Gesellschaften. Auf der Suche nach der Welt von morgen*, Reinbek b. Hamburg, 1971 or the American CBS-series documented in F. WARSHOFSKY, *The 21st Century: The New Age of Exploration*, New York. 1969.

refer to a rising public interest (supported by surveys)²⁰ in the future of not only one's own nation, rather also – and that is crucial here – in the future of mankind as a whole. The futurology, particularly of the sixties and seventies, is an especially interesting case for the question of the development of a transnational or European public sphere because here 'experts' were occasionally able to reach beyond their own partial public sphere and have a considerable influence on the mass media. However, this was only successful because these 'experts' did not express themselves as specialists in their subject, but with the project 'Futurology', rather tried to develop a sort of synthesis of knowledge at the disposal of concrete political practice in opposition to the increasing specialization of systems of knowledge (which was seen as increasingly risky).

With this in mind, I will first outline some important characteristics of the future studies in the sixties and seventies which will be followed by some prominent visions of the "post-industrial society" directed specifically at the European situation. A final conclusion is meant to put the topic within the broader framework of a European public sphere.

Characteristics of the Futurology of the Sixties and Seventies

From the late fifties onwards, for the first time a futurology was developed that, unlike in the pre-war era, was systematic with the claim to be scientific. This futurology of the sixties had a focus on prognoses as well as planning that, unlike its predecessors, on the one hand can be defined as a "science" of prognoses and projections, and on the other as a theory and application of "programming" and "planning". Finally – often within the framework of a "philosophy of the future" – it was an (ethically) oriented sketch of alternatives to detected mistakes, although all three elements were closely integrated and for the most part mutually dependent.²¹ Moreover what is important is the rejection of the classical utopian or historicist thinking in teleological laws and the stronger focus on possible futures or more or less probable scenarios. In this respect the point for the futurology of the sixties was less to predict the future than to achieve conceivable and desirable scenarios

20. See the documentation of an international survey on "the future" by J. GALTUNG, *Images of the World in the Year 2000. A Synthesis of the Marginals of the Ten-Nations-Study*, European Coordination Centre for Research and Documentation in Social Science, Wien and Oslo, 1970. See also Th. KUTSCH, *Die Welt im Jahr 2000. Analyse einer internationalen Umfrage über die Einstellung zur Zukunft*, Diss., Köln, 1973. Scriptor, Kronberg 1974.

21. See G. BÜSCHGES, *Zukunftsforschung*, in: G. ENDRUWEIT, G. TROMMSDORF (Hrsg.), *Wörterbuch der Soziologie*, Bd.3, Enke, Stuttgart, 1989, p.841, where he writes, explaining the unclear variations in the meaning of 'futurology':

"a: to predict, forecast or conjecture possible or probable developments of historical-sociological reality, or b: to outline scenarios, projections, or models of conceivable, probable, desirable or undesirable future social conditions, particularly taking into account the consequences of technological or social *innovations* as material for political *planning* and decisions".

See *ibid.*, pp.840-844.

and models of the future on the basis of comprehensive empirical data, and thereby to positively influence political decisions through the broadening of knowledge of the future in the sense of “planning structuring”. Of course this does not mean that certain basic assumptions about the courses of development were given up. On the contrary, the sixties were dominated by prognoses, which (particularly under the sign of the new evolutionary teachings) succeeded to ‘very probable’ future scenarios in the sense of a ‘most probable’ world. But by the early seventies this view had developed clear rifts and, increasingly, a stance grew that found expression in scenarios in the sense of ‘uncertain futures’.²²

In the light of an increased need for political advice in the context of the confrontation of the blocs, as well as the economic reconstruction and the ensuing boom, this approach was reflected institutionally in Western Europe in the founding of various state-run or partly state-run institutions such as, in the case of France, the Commissariat Général du Plan. This was a high-ranking administrative agency which from 1946 to the seventies coordinated the French state’s economic planning in the sense of a “mixed economy” of private industry with large shares in nationalized companies, and state guidance of the economy through loans, taxes, etc. Through the awarding of contracts to private institutions, but also through subordinate agencies such as, for example, the regional development agency “DATAR”, the “Commissariat” supported not only work on long-term economic and societal prognoses, but also their concrete political conversion.²³ Structurally similar state-run or partly state-run planning and development agencies or commissions were also founded in Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden. In Great Britain between 1964 and 1970 state-run or partly state-run institutions like the “Committee on the Next Thirty Years” of the “Social Science Research Council” (1966-68) or the “National Economic Development Council” were turned to within the framework of the “National Plan”.²⁴ Similar approaches can also be observed in Eastern Europe at the end of the sixties, whereby – as in the cases of the USSR, Poland, Romania and the CSSR – prognostic planning studies were conducted primarily

22. On this see paradigmatically the title of the two American futurologists S. CHASE, *The Most Probable World*, Harper and Row, New York, 1968 and from R. U. AYRES, *Uncertain Futures. Challenges for Decision-Makers*, Wiley, New York, 1979.

23. See the detailed overview by P. H. MOLL, *Länderbericht: Zukunftsforschung in Frankreich*, in: R. KREIBICH, W. CANZLER, K. BURMEISTER, *Zukunftsforschung und Politik in Deutschland, Frankreich, Schweden und der Schweiz*, Beltz, Weinheim und Basel, 1991, pp.204-255. Here I only name as an example the “Groupe 1985” led by Pierre Guillaumat and called into life by the Pompidou government. This group was to outline a comprehensive picture of France in the year 1985, and the results of their work served as the basis for the fifth National Plan (1966-1970). See: GROUPE 1985 (sous la dir. de P. GUILLAUMAT), *Réflexions pour 1985. Travaux pour le plan*, Documentation française, Paris, 1970.

24. See the complexly detailed work by B. KOHLER, R. NAGEL, *Die Zukunft Europas. Ausgewählte Bibliographie zur zukünftigen Entwicklung Europas. Überblick über Organisationen und Institute für Zukunftsforschung. Methoden der Vorausschau*, Europa Union Verlag, Köln, pp.13-20.

within the framework of the respective scientific academies. However, due to the strong ideological demands, overall little independence could be gained.²⁵ On the other hand, in the forerunner country of futurology, the U.S., it was above all private institutions like the RAND Corporation (founded in 1948) or the Hudson Institute (founded in 1961) that developed scenarios for the American government. These were at first, in view of the Cold War, primarily of military strategic nature.²⁶ It was, above all, within the framework of these American think tanks that new methods were developed to provide the central tools for a genuinely scientific futurology, which had been seen more as a synthesis of knowledge than as a completely new science. Methods of intuitive, explorative, and projective forecasting were developed and combined. Intuitive forecasting referred primarily to the collecting of specialized information and sounding out the scope for development. One important method was brainstorming, which consisted in the relatively open and unprepared collection of suggestions and ideas for the solution of a sketched problem, and where all suggestions were generally admitted and not immediately evaluated. This was developed by the American scientists Olaf Helmer and Theodore Gordon at rand and supplemented by the Delphi method, named after the ancient oracle. Repeated written surveys of experts were coupled with a regular 'opinion feedback' and, in the case of strongly differing opinions, with additional questions about their reasons, so that, in the search for consensus, prognoses, like alternative suggestions, were repeatedly tested in reciprocal exchange and had to be justified. Such methods calculated for 'openness' were often supplemented by an orientation on models from science fiction and 'utopias'. In contrast, explorative methods were applied much more concretely and more often (particularly in the area of economic planning). On the basis of 'solid knowledge' these methods projected possible future developments under different assumptions. One of these methods is the classic form of trend extrapolation. Here, current trends are (often mistakenly) extended into the future on the basis of statistics and through causal links. Also included here are more complex methods such as contextual mapping: the development of various scenarios and the designing of systemic morphologies that investigate the interaction of individual system parameters, primarily in view of new discoveries.²⁷

In the face of a rapid globalization of international trade as well as the potential of world-wide destruction, the fields of military or even economic planning made particularly clear how limited purely national perspectives must be and how little they promised to

25. See K. STEINMÜLLER, *Zukunftsforschung in Europa – Ein Abriss der Geschichte*, in: K. STEINMÜLLER et al. (Hrsg.), *Zukunftsforschung in Europa. Ergebnisse und Perspektiven*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2000, pp.43 and following. On the history of Soviet futurology, see the short overview by the perhaps most prominent futurologist of the Soviet Union, I. V. BESTUZHEV-LADA, *A Short History of Forecasting in the USSR, 1927-1990*, in: *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 41(1992), pp.341-348.

26. See, among others, G. SCHMÉDER, *Prévision technologique, rétrospective critique*, in: *Futuribles*, 124(1988), pp.5 and following or B. L. R. SMITH, *The RAND Corporation*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1966.

27. For more details on these methods see the study by the OECD economist E. JANTSCH, *Technological Forecasting in Perspective*, OECD, Paris, 1967.

do justice to the complexity of the logic of modern development. Therefore, Western futurology generally tended to give up very quickly the narrow administrative or corporate demands and turn to global socio-political problems.²⁸ Particularly from a scientific point of view a theoretically or practically purely nationally fixated prognosis appeared to make little sense and promise little success. So it was individual scientists from the fields of the natural and social sciences who first of all tried new transnational forms of cooperation on the global problems of humanity, and tried to institutionalize a new, genuinely transnational as well as transdisciplinary futurology. In view of the general scepticism of the scientific disciplines about the new and principally interdisciplinarily organized futurology, it was no surprise that, above all at European universities, the institutional level remained underdeveloped and therefore the private institutions were far more important for the establishment of futurology. Exemplary here are, for France, the renowned "Association Futuribles Internationale" and its renowned journal "Futuribles", both founded in 1960 by Bertrand de Jouvenel. For the German-speaking countries, worth mentioning are the "Berlin Zentrum für Zukunftsforschung" with its publication "Analysen und Prognosen über die Welt von morgen", or the "Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Zukunfts- und Friedensforschung", founded in Hannover in 1965, and its journal "Zukunfts- und Friedensforschung" (1965-72). However, futurologically oriented journals such as the "Atomzeitalter. Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaften und Politik" (1959-68), or "Futurum – Zeitschrift für Zukunftsforschung" appeared without direct institutional ties. The latter, a mouthpiece edited by Ossip K. Flechtheim, only appeared from 1968-71, which sheds light on the problems of the institutionalization of (particularly 'critical') futurology for lack of state as well as private support in the Federal Republic of Germany.²⁹ In the English-speaking countries the following journals distinguished themselves: the journal "Futures – The Journal of Forecasting and Planning", published in Oxford from 1968 in association with the American Institute for the Future; the international journal "Technological Forecasting and Social Change" (which also began publishing in 1968); as well as the more popular scientifically oriented periodical "The Futurist – A Newsletter of Tomorrow's World", begun by the World Futures Society in 1967.³⁰ If one browses the magazine

28. See J. MacHALE, M. CORDELL-MacHALE et.al., *The Futures Directory. An International Listing and Description of Organizations and Individuals Active in Future Studies and Long-range Planning*, Westview Press, London, 1977.

29. On the specifically West German problem of an acceptance of "futurology", which also had to do with the negative picture of "planned economy" in the G.D.R. see R. KREIBICH, *Zukunftsforschung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, in: R. KREIBICH, W. CANZLER, K. BURMEISTER, *Zukunftsforschung ...*, op.cit., pp.42 and following, as well as, on the approaches and limitations of political planning in West Germany, M. RUCK, *Ein kurzer Sommer der konkreten Utopie – Zur westdeutschen Planungsgeschichte der langen 60er Jahre*, in: A. SCHILDT, D. SIEGFRIED, K.C. LAMMERS(Hrsg.), *Dynamische Zeiten. Die 60er Jahre in den beiden deutschen Gesellschaften*, Christians, Hamburg, 2000, pp.362-401.

30. For an overview of private institutions worldwide see the detailed bibliography by J. MacHALE, M. CORDELL-MacHALE et.al., *The Futures Directory ...*, op.cit., pp.367-374 as well as B. KOHLER, R. NAGEL, *Die Zukunft ...*, op.cit., pp.40-51 and 124-127. Also K. BURMEISTER, *Einrichtungen der Zukunftsforschung*, in: R. KREIBICH, W. CANZLER, K. BURMEISTER, *Zukunftsforschung ...*, op.cit., pp.339-378 and, for French details, P. H. MOLL, *Länderbericht ...*, op.cit., pp. 258-271.

volumes of the various futurological institutes, the transnational character of these expert groups becomes very quickly apparent. Almost every issue of “Futuribles” or “Futures” among other periodicals – most of them on specific topics – includes authors and articles as well as book reviews from almost all highly-industrialized societies (often including the so-called Eastern bloc). This goes even more for international conferences such as “Mankind 2000” (Oslo 1967), “Challenge from the Future” (Kyoto 1970) or the “Third World Conference” (Bucharest 1972). These conferences created transnational networks that often led to the founding of new institutions (e.g., the “World Futures Studies Federation” 1973) and almost gave the developing field of futurology the character of a transnational (even though, due to the strong American influence, primarily Western) “social movement”.

But the specific transnational character of “future studies” consisted not only in new forms of transnational interaction but also in a common scientific “agenda”. Due to the strong focus on the problem of risk management on a transnational scale, it was no surprise that the future studies concentrated time and again on the central problem of “control” or “controllability” of complexes of problems. At this point “cybernetics” came into play. This science, developed in the fifties and based on the older system theory, suddenly promised decisive answers to the central question of “control” of complex systems, and so formed the central reference point or unifying bracket of the new futurology, in particular in view of its transnational character.³¹ Cybernetics³² can generally be understood as the systematic comprehension of communication and control processes in systems or organizations of all kinds, whereby above all decision, regulatory and control mechanisms are at the centre of attention. The fundamental epistemological presupposition consists in the idea that biological, technological and social systems resemble one another in certain respects and are held together first and foremost by communication in the sense of information transfer. The emphasis of cybernetic analyses lies therefore in the dynamic interaction between the structural elements of a biological, technological or social system, or between the system as a whole and its environment, supported by the analysis of control-loop mechanisms. The idea of the control-loop is of decisive significance insofar as the concept of the “intelligence strengthening” of an (open) system is based upon it, since information about the effects of its own operation are to some extent repeatedly (potentially) fed back to the system, and therefore influence more strongly or weakly its succeeding operations. In principle, the adaptability, and therefore ability of a system to handle complexity, depends upon how much information it can take in and process. Through the observed

31. Under the new model of cybernetic system theory, at the beginning of the seventies in the new climate of détente, for the first time a research context was attained that transcended the ideological blocs. This context was expressed in the founding of the “International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis” (IIASA) in Laxenburg, Austria, in 1972, which was decidedly geared an exchange of ideas between East and West. See K. STEINMÜLLER et al (Hrsg.), *Zukunftsforschung in Europa* ..., op.cit., p.44.

32. See generally R. KREIBICH, *Die Wissenschaftsgesellschaft. Von Galilei zur High-Tech-Revolution*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M., 1986, pp.246-280.

scientific as well as biological and communication technological “revolution” beginning in the thirties and, in particular, through the broad computerization beginning in the sixties, the system of the highly developed societies seemed to have entered into an intensified dynamic based in cybernetic system logic. This “cyberneticization” of society would – on that point almost all studies were in agreement – in the near future (around the year 2000) lead to a far-reaching transformation of the industrial to a post-industrial society. How this post-industrial society would look more concretely, here opinions clearly differed with the perspective and paradigmatic orientation.

Even though there was repeatedly an overlap in the details of individual studies, a distinction can be made in this, at core, system-theoretic cybernetic based sketch of the post-industrial society among ideal types in three different variations. These ideal types follow far less national lines of separation than other emphases and normative standards. In this respect, in view of the core overlapping cybernetic approach, the transnational commonalities outweigh the national differences, so that one can more readily speak of a “Western” than a specifically “European” futurology. European commonalities come to light in the differences from American futurology merely in regard to a more strongly “ideological” debate over the pros and cons of “futures” in general (above all in West Germany) and in a stronger emphasis on alternatives and societal counterexamples to American “forecasting” (above all in France).³³ Furthermore, “Europe” as a focus of research played a somewhat larger role, although most future studies took on a fundamentally global orientation or remained attached to primarily national or regional questions about the future.

Scenarios of the Post-industrial Society

Perhaps the most important and influential paradigm, especially among futurists of the sixties and early seventies, was the model of the post-industrial society based on new technologies of communication and information. The observed exponential growth of knowledge and technological innovations and the growing applications of cybernetics on society itself, according to these analyses, were about to create a “cyberneticization” of society and therefore would change the character of the traditional industrial society profoundly, turning it into a society essentially based on „knowledge“ and permanent learning, dominated by new intelligent (information) technologies.³⁴ It was no wonder

33. See, among others, H. de JOUVENEL, *Futuribles – ein Gesamtkonzept der Zukunftsforschung*, in: K. STEINMÜLLER et al (Hrsg.), *Zukunftsforschung in Europa ...*, op.cit., pp.55-67.

34. Perhaps the most important representatives in the U.S. were Herman Kahn (and his colleagues at the Hudson-Institute), Stuart Chase, Peter F. Drucker, Olaf Helmer, John Naisbitt, Robert Ayres, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Burnham P. Beckwith, Theodore Gordon and, above all, Daniel Bell, Alvin Toffler and (with a more pessimistic perspective) Robert Heilbroner. See also K. GILLWALD, *Zukunftsforschung aus den USA – Prominente Autoren und Werke aus den letzten zwanzig Jahren*, WZB-Bericht, Berlin, 1990, pp.90-106.

that many of these studies (especially in the U.S.) primarily focused on technological and scientific progress particularly in the fields of nuclear power, electronics, computers, information processing, and automation as well as with regard to the increasing biological manipulation on man. In one of the most prominent future studies of the time, the founder of the American Hudson Institute Herman Kahn gives a list of one hundred concrete technological achievements predicted to be very likely to be realised by the year 2000, referring to scenarios based on current scientific expertise.³⁵ Looking back today, many of these predictions were amazingly realistic, for example the general use of automation and cybernation in management and production, pervasive business and other widespread use of computers for intellectual and professional assistance including home computers communicating with the outside world as well as home education via video and computerized learning. The predictions of direct broadcasts from satellites to home receivers, multiple applications of lasers, the emergence of new techniques for very cheap and reliable birth control, the increase in life expectancy, increasingly inexpensive world-wide transportation of passengers and cargo as well as new and possibly pervasive techniques for surveillance, monitoring, and control of individuals and organizations also sound quite familiar from today's perspective. On the other hand, many of the technological forecasts especially in the field of space exploration and biological manipulation look like mere science-fiction, for instance the construction of enormous artificial moons, (some) control of weather and climate, permanent inhabited undersea installations or colonies, permanently manned lunar installations and interplanetary travel to extraterrestrial cities, an extensive use of robots and machines 'enslaved' to humans, a major reduction in hereditary defects, the extensive use of cyborg techniques, the practical use of direct electronic communication with and stimulation of the brain, the genetic mastery over the 'basic constitution' of an individual, new improved plants and animals or human hibernation for relatively extensive periods.³⁶ In such scenarios of extremely advanced techno-scientific feasibility, which had a wide-ranging effect on popular culture in the form of films, comics, lowbrow novels and books of popular science,³⁷ the experiences of the extraordinary economic

35. See H. KAHN, A. WIENER, *The Year 2000. A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years*, Macmillan, New York/London, 1967, pp.51-55 and in general the comprehensive interpretation of this book in Th. E. JONES, *Options for the Future: A Comparative Analysis of Policy-Oriented Forecasts*, Praeger, New York, 1980, pp.85-110.

36. See also the RAND study by Th. GORDON, O. HELMER, *Report on a Long-Range Forecasting Study*, Basic Books, Santa Monica, 1964, based on the Delphi technique. Roughly eighty experts from different fields were asked to answer a long list of questions in order to sketch their 'most probable world' focusing on topics such as scientific breakthroughs, population control, automation, space progress, war prevention and weapons systems. The characteristic elements of the world (and especially the highly developed countries) in the year 2000 looked in many ways similar to those predicted by Kahn and Wiener (and many others).

37. See the overview in Ch. CANTO, O. FALIN, *The History of the Future. Images of the 21st Century*, Flammarion, Paris, 1993. It is also notable how far such scenarios were disseminated through popular publications in the style of "This is how we'll live". Exemplary for West Germany is Robert Brenner's richly illustrated "study", published, significantly, by Bertelsmann: R. BRENNER, *So leben wir morgen. Der Roman unserer Zukunft*, Bertelsmann, München u.a., 1972. Such publications popularized futurology as a realistic vision of the year 2000.

boom are directly reflected. This boom implied the unforeseen ability of the “system” to stabilize itself (after the destructive collapse of the World War) and above all a mechanism of the almost exponential expansion of affluence. Especially European studies (such as, e.g., those of the French economist Jean Fourastié)³⁸ concentrated on the long-term prospects or consequences of the boom, which promised West European societies not only a steadily increasing purchasing power, and therefore a material land of milk and honey for the great mass of the population, but also a dramatic reduction in working hours, and with it unforeseen consumer and educational possibilities for the individual. On a global scale however – as for example Kahn and Wiener expected – this impressive acceleration of economic growth world-wide meant that at the same time the GDP gap between rich and poor countries would widen significantly and would thus increase the pressure for world-wide modernization due to rising global conflicts.³⁹

The cybernetic aspect of these approaches consisted (often only implicitly) in the idea of the dynamic or self-stabilization of complex systems, and in the assumption that technology and science should be the deciding regulatory mechanism within the functional logic of modern societies. In this respect “control” in this model consisted above all in the state’s not hampering or, conversely, actively furthering the potential of techno-scientific development as the main resource of the future by leaving “ideologies” behind. This also implied the necessity of an increased adaptability of the population to rising scientific and technological standards which would only be achieved through the considerable expansion and restructuring of the educational system (as the West German futurologist Karl Steinbuch repeatedly emphasized). The U.S. appeared, not only in American studies, naturally to be the leader in such a development, although Europe (at least Western Europe), not least as the continental source of modernity, formed, in many (European) scenarios, a central bearer and motor of this long-term globally conceived socio-cultural revolution to the information society. The French publicist Pierre Bertaux wrote in his strongly cybernetic inspired future bestseller *Mutation of Humanity* in 1963:

“Europe brought into motion the movement that the entire planet is taking up today and, it appears, in the near future will reach its “escape velocity” [...]. The exchange of information, the ‘friction of brains’ [...] is nowhere more intense than in Europe. Precisely because it is disintegrating in different languages, exchange of thoughts is more fruitful in Europe than in every other part of the world. The freedom of the mind, that is, the possibility to ask questions is nowhere greater [...] Europe is not ‘old’, not ‘tired’, up to now it has always known the right time to become young again”.⁴⁰

38. Standing for this approach in West Germany were (among others), Karl Steinbuch, Richard F. Behrendt and Frederic Vester; in France, Jean Fourastié, Jean Meynaud, Pierre Piganol, François Hetman, Pierre Massé and in a certain sense also Bertrand de Jouvenel; as well as Arthur C. Clarke, Christopher Freeman and H.S. Cole in Great Britain and Jan Tinbergen in the Netherlands.

39. H. KAHN, A. WIENER, *The Year 2000 ...*, op.cit., pp.58 and 140-144.

40. P. BERTAUX, op.cit., pp.203ff. The idea of a Europe shaped by opposing worldviews brought on by a peculiar dynamic based on a stronger flood of information is found time and again, particularly with French authors. See, e.g., L. MOULIN, *Introduction*, in: EUROPEAN CULTURAL FOUNDATION (ed.), *The Future is Tomorrow. 17 Prospective Studies*, Nijhoff, The Hague, 1972, Vol.1, pp.3-6. Similar sketches of a “promethean” trait in Europe or the Europeans are found in M. BOLLE de BAL, *The European of the Year 2000*, in: *ibid.*, pp.44-56.

A second group of future studies focused the cybernetic approach more strongly on the field of international politics and transnational institutional integration. In many of these studies the “cyberneticization” of society led, either as a concrete prediction or as a desired projection of a growing scientific-technological and economic integration of society, in the long term to a growing global integration in the sense of an emerging globalized or planetary society.⁴¹ In most cases this did not mean that the system of nation states appeared replaceable by a form of “world government” in the foreseeable future. But, above all, studies of the newly forming peace research repeatedly pushed into the centre of their deliberations the transformation of the relations among the nation states, in the sense of growing communicative integration and supranational mergers on the basis of the new computer and satellite technologies, as a fundamental new perspective for the future. In particular, the contribution of the basic founder of peace research, the Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung at the first large international future conference “Mankind 2000” in 1969 in Oslo can serve as an expressive example.⁴² His sketch of the future was also strongly influenced by cybernetic thought, even in its wording, with the dynamic of (historical) development traced back, above all, to the processing of (complex) information. In accordance with this logic Galtung developed an evolutionary stage model of history typical of the thought of many futurologists. This extended according to the ability to process information, and therefore complexity, from “primitive” to “traditional” and from “modern” to “neo-modern” societies. Such a model appeared not only adequate to explain the stage of development of the “neo-modern” (post-industrial) societies, but also made renewedly plausible, in terms of the non-simultaneity of the simultaneous, the rise in worldwide conflict situations due to increasing communicative integration. In order to be able to lessen this increased potential for conflict of the ever more strongly confronted “traditional”, “modern” and “neo-modern” societies, the classical model of completely sovereign and extremely “egotistical” nation states seemed normatively increasingly less appropriate, and therefore had to be supplemented with transnational and supranational institutions in order to make diverse communication processes of equalization and conflict settlement possible. That such a long term global integration already appeared to loom at the end of the sixties, according to Galtung and many other peace researchers, was due to “good cybernetically” new forms of subnational, crossnational, transnational and supranational identifications accompanying the communicative integration and found, above all, among the elites of the highly developed industrial societies. The cybernetic element of “control” consisted at this global or international level primarily in the basic idea of the somewhat “automatic” creation of an abundance of new intermediary mediation and communication

41. Here should be mentioned, above all authors (sometimes with very different backgrounds and intentions) such as Lester Brown, Richard A. Falk, Kenneth Boulding, Erwin Laszlo, John R. Platt, Erich Jantsch, Victor Ferkiss, John McHale, Buckminster Fuller, Johan Galtung, Arthur J. Waskow, Nigel Calder, and, in some respects Karl W. Deutsch.

42. J. GALTUNG, *On the Future of the International System*, in: R. JUNGK, J. GALTUNG, *Mankind ...*, op.cit., pp.19-41.

authorities, whose integration would transform the international system. What is interesting, however, is his scepticism about the political unification of Europe, which he saw at the beginning of the seventies as an attempt at restoring Europe's position as a world power. Galtung therefore regarded European unification as an attempt to exclude the peripheries in favor of an imperialistically tinged "pax bruxellana" with which the European will to self-assertion toward Japan and the U.S. appeared not only to divide Europe more and more, but also created further tensions and conflicts in the so-called Third World: a strikingly exceptional viewpoint given the abundance of pessimistic scenarios, typical of the time, in which reference is made to the political "impotence" of Europe between the blocs and the expected tendency to "Eurosclerosis".⁴³

It was with this aspect of the critique that a third group of future studies started. In the course of the seventies, not least in the context of the oil crises and the end of the long economic boom, this group gained a great deal of influence. The main focus of these duties lay above all on the ecological and social costs of the rapid techno-scientific change, which had been neglected up to that time. On the other hand, this group focused on the idea of an ever clearer general consciousness of these costs and a long-term change of norms and values following as a consequence. This change seemed already to have become apparent in social movements such as the student movement, the civil rights movement, feminism or the forms of "counterculture" found since the end of the sixties; all of which had increasingly strongly articulated themselves in public. Many of these studies therefore understood themselves to be explicit critiques of the post-industrial society of the information society. A fundamental criticism of the "established" forms of "futurology" – the think tanks that often advised governments – consisted in the accusation, often appropriate, that actually this form of futurology actually only practiced a more or less profound analysis of short-term developments, and therefore simply extended observed contemporary trends into the future without "social imagination". Often related to this was another point of criticism, namely the accusation that futurology often simply ignored the decisive factors of existing (political) interests and power structures, or adopted these power structures without criticism as the basis of outlines of the future, whereas, in the view of this third group, real "futurology" began with sketches of alternatives to existing power structures. The political scientist and sociologist Dieter Senghaas formulated this criticism in 1968 as follows:

"There is no larger futurological study that places the problematic nature of power at the centre of its analysis [...]. This is the real reason for the often boundless naïveté that sticks to futurology to this day [...]. Futurologists develop programs of the future for the most part under the sign of the current status quo. Their appeal to imagination is mostly part accompanied by a lack of imagination. The conjectures about the year 2000 not

43. See J. GALTUNG, *Kapitalistische Großmacht Europa oder: Die Gemeinschaft der Konzerne*, Rowohlt, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1973, passim. See the very instructive contribution on further political Europe scenarios by G. KÜMMEL, *Prognosen wiedergelesen. Szenarien über die Zukunft Europas vom Ende der sechziger Jahre*, in: Th. JÄGER, M. PIEPENSCHNEIDER (Hrsg.), *Europa 2020. Szenarien politischer Entwicklung*, Leske und Budrich, Opladen, 1997, pp.165-190.

seldom betray the existing preferences of the sixties. There is a reason for such a lack of imagination. In it the suppressed problem of power pushes to the surface”.⁴⁴

As an alternative plan to this concept of “control” Senghaas, significantly, brought a model of social cybernetics into play. There, unlike in the technocistic or economic models, the increased ability of modern societies to learn and control was ensured above all by the institutionalization of societal and political emancipatory and learning processes:

“The effectiveness of a system can be increased, and complex performance processes can be effectively controlled, when a system is not only capable of learning, but also expands its ability to learn: that is, learns to learn [...]. The learning of learning – a reflexive mechanism – increases the ability of complex systems to survive in complex environments [...]. Social cybernetic analysis projects this observation into the area of politics. The question there is how far societies and their political systems are capable of developing and tolerating self-consciousness, as well as raising the potential for self-regulation”.⁴⁵

Political and societal “systems” would only be able to develop and ensure both more independence from repressive power and better (global) chances of survival through an emancipatory restructuring of societal institutions. The cybernetic approach to these studies consisted in the system-theoretic assumption of the uncontrollability of the current system on account of too much complexity and false power structures. A fundamental change in system structure therefore appeared necessary in order to brake and reverse the self-destructive logic of the economic and military systems, whose dynamic threatened to overwhelm its own control potential. In 1964 in the introductory volume of the *Models for a New World*, with the significant title *Reaching for the Future - Planning and Freedom*, Robert Jungk, perhaps the most prominent futurologist in West Germany, formulated the “utopian” claims of the futurologically supported societal planning “in democratic intent” as follows:

“However, if the debates about the respective plans for the future, which will probably be at the centre of political disputes of the coming decades, are not to degenerate into a quarrel between experts, then millions more people that have not dealt with planning as part of their careers will have to be trained to plan up to a certain level in order to be able to have a say in the debates. The planner type – the heralded homo novus – will become the prototype of a new humanity that must further develop itself in a continual growth process of mind and character: ‘horizontally’ (due to the narrow division of labour brought on by the awareness of the abundance of accumulating

44. D. SENGHAAS, *Rückblick auf die Zukunft. Futurologie und ihre Leerstellen*, in: *Neue Politische Literatur*, 13(1968), p.176 (Italics in original). See also *ibid.*, pp.171-177.

45. D. SENGHAAS, *Sozialkybernetik und Herrschaft*, in: *Atomzeitalter. Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaften und Politik*, 7/8(1967), p.397. See also generally *ibid.*, pp.386-399.

knowledge), 'vertically' (for a complete overall view), and 'forward' (into the future sketching new goals)".⁴⁶

In Jungk's sketch, which anticipated his later realized model (at least in his essays) of future workshops in principle open to everyone, a vision of a "further development" of humanity appeared, in the sense of a higher degree of rationality, carried out by means of societal planning. The higher degree of rationality reached through this "planning" would lead to the insight that "humanity" would only be in the position to avert and overcome the "out of hand" contingencies of the atomic age by turning away from the still dominant purely instrumental, and therefore dangerously reductionist notion of "reason". With respect to "Europe", it's interesting that, as with Galtung, the European political institutions were seen more as part of the problem than as part of its solution. Conversely, just this insistence on rational "planning" was a typically European phenomenon which stood out clearly from the outstanding American studies, such as Willis W. Harman's (system theoretician and director of the Center for the Study of Social Policy at the Stanford Research Institute) concept of a "transindustrial society", which tended to sketch a quasi-automatic "self-transformation" of society.⁴⁷

The final short sketch of a genuinely European future scenario, developed under the aegis of Amsterdam's "European Cultural Foundation", is intended to make clear how strongly this approach of a trust in "planning", in the sense of an increased and simultaneously transformed rationality, represented, to a certain extent, the common sense of not only Western European futurologists, but also that of European scientists in general. This comprehensive project, with the name "Plan Europe 2000", in which sixty international specialists took part between 1967 and 1975, understood itself decidedly as an historically-based project rather than as genuinely "futurological". This shows, once again, the "spill over effect" that the approaches of a new "science" of the future set in motion, despite all (methodological and theoretical) criticisms and scepticism from the side of the "established" sciences.⁴⁸ In over twenty individual studies possible scenarios of European devel-

46. R. JUNGK, *Gesucht: Ein neuer Mensch*, in: R. JUNGK, H. J. MUNDT (Hrsg.), *Der Griff nach der Zukunft. Planen und Freiheit. 19 Beiträge internationaler Wissenschaftler, Schriftsteller und Publicisten*, Verlag Kurt Dresch, München u.a., 1964 (Modelle für eine neue Welt Bd.1), pp.515ff. See also *ibid.*, pp.505-516. This widening gap between expert planning and democratic claims was much more sharply formulated by another author in the same volume: "As far as we can see, no satisfactory solution to the problem of democratic control of conventional governmental advisors as well as scientific planning and strategy experts stands out." (Otto Walter Haseloff: *Strategie und Planung*, in: *ibid.*, p.152).

47. See W. W. HARMAN, *An Incomplete Guide to the Future*, San Francisco Book Company, San Francisco, 1976.

48. This is also to be seen in the fact that the European Commission, at the initiative of its member Ralf Dahrendorf, felt induced to commission a comprehensive prognostic study "Europe + 30". See also the German version of the final report: KOMMISSION DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN, *Europa und 30 Jahre. Abschlußbericht*, Köln, 1976. The founding of the program FAST (Forecasting and Assessment in Science and Technology) in 1978 followed from this report. FAST has since made prognoses primarily in the areas of biotechnology, information systems and employment structures. See K. STEINMÜLLER et al (Hrsg.), *Zukunftsforschung in Europa ...*, op.cit., pp.47ff.

opment in the eighties and nineties were to be systematically thought about. Large topics like education, people and industry, city and regional development and planning, as well as environment and agriculture were the forefront next to general developmental trends. After a few intermediate publications,⁴⁹ the final results were summarized in the 1977 study *Europe 2000*, edited by Peter Hall⁵⁰ (and, ironically, published by an American publisher). On the basis of extensive empirical and decidedly historically grounded individual studies, and their discussion at the conference, the research groups, in true futurological manner, came up with the following five possible scenarios for European development in the coming twenty to thirty years:⁵¹ The first scenario provided for the continuation of the current situation, in the sense of a generally weakened Europe between the Blocs. At the core, the situation of the sixties continued with a progressive easing of tensions, although an unresolved debate aimed at the issue of whether it would more likely come (in the light of the Vietnam War and its consequences, among other things) to a relative weakening or strengthening of the American dominance over Europe. A second scenario foresaw the construction of a unified Europe on the basis of more severe economic problems and challenges. Here a looming and growing susceptibility to economic crises, already seen in the seventies, was predicted for the eighties in the form of increasing export problems, the intensification of resource inflation, the increasing inefficiency of “Keynesian” methods of the state, sinking profit rates, the switching over of industry and capital export to the American model, lower wages due to the growing internationalization of markets, and a generally sinking domestic demand. Given such problems, an increased protectionism and an accompanying stronger inner-European fusion seemed probable as a logical consequence. A specifically European problem could be seen above all in the discrepancy between a high technological standard in the areas of consumer and industry goods and the by and large relatively limited research expenditure. Inner-European cooperation appeared too underdeveloped to be a dominant technological power in the future: a version of the classic thesis of the European “technological gap” with the U.S. Remarkably, most of the authors expected an opportunity for the economic strengthening of Europe to come from closer ties with the “Third World” (as manifested in the Lomé Agreement of 1975) through simultaneous de-colonization and the new regulation of “terms of trade”. Against this background, a Europe that was economically well integrated – even in conflict with the U.S. – could rise to become a new “third power” on the basis of a specific relationship with the “Third World”. With this concept of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) the Dutch economist Jan Tinbergen

49. E.g., the two-volume study edited by the EUROPEAN CULTURAL FOUNDATION (ed.), *The Future is Tomorrow ...*, op.cit., and the abridged French version: *L'Europe en l'an 2000*, Fayard, Paris, 1972.

50. See P. HALL (ed.), *Europe 2000*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1977.

51. See *ibid.*, pp.14-30. See similar scenarios in the contribution of the Indian social scientist R. IYER, *The Great Challenge*, in: EUROPEAN CULTURAL FOUNDATION (ed.), *The Future is Tomorrow ...*, op.cit., Bd.1, pp.100-116.

(who belonged to the research team of "Europe 2000") gained some prominence during the seventies.⁵²

A third scenario, somewhat indebted to the "realistic school" of international relations, projected, in contrast, the failure of further integrative tendencies, and hence the model of a Europe of nations that is averting the warring past, but that is based on economic competition with strong individual states following first and foremost the laws of national sovereignty. Despite the further development of various bilateral and trilateral agreements, at the end of the nineties (not least of all due to the continuing confrontation between the Blocs) the European system of states would be characterized by the fact that virtually no decisive rights of national sovereignty would have been transferred to the European Community, which was equivalent to saying that European tendencies toward integration would stagnate. In contrast, a fourth scenario focused on a "Europe of regions" on the basis of an already emerging "revolt" of the peripheries against the economic centres. The analysis of this scenario revealed a strong and expanding opposition between the economic and cultural centres and the "old" northern, western and southern European peripheries (peninsulas, mountainous regions, etc.), as well as the "new peripheries" of the older, increasingly economically devalued industrial regions (Ruhr valley, English midlands, Pas de Calais, etc.). The foretold acceleration of economic decline, of emigration to the cities, and of the inefficiency of state help would lead to a more or less militant separatism, above all in areas with strong regional identities (Scotland, Brittany, Corsica, Basque country, etc.). This transfer of power, also in the sense of fierce struggles between regional and national elites, would mean a remarkable challenge for the nation-state, so that the splitting off of smaller states by the year 2000 seemed quite possible. Against this background, the main task of the EC would be to even out such tensions through "redistribution". A fifth and last scenario seems particularly interesting from today's perspective. It anticipates an explosive transformation in East Europe in view of the possible intensification of the uprisings of 1953, 1956, 1968, and 1970, and with it the end of the hegemonic power of the Soviet Union. However, and this seems an irony of prognostication, this scenario was judged as the least probable of all because a generally limited social mobility, a limited economic basis, strongly conservative mentalities (family structures, authoritarian thinking, etc.), a strategy of pacification through consumer concessions by governments, and a generally growing "bourgeois" standard of consumption would secure a relative satisfaction that would allow no room for political protest organizations. However, growing trade integration between East and West, and with it the partial alignment of economic structures were promised. Considering how little, at the core, this scenario departs from the situation of the seventies, it's all the more striking that the collapse of the "Eastern Bloc" was at least considered as a possibility. What was considered most probable

52. During the conference "Mankind 2000" in 1967, Tinbergen had already demanded the establishment of a "world planning agency" in order to organize with the help of the UN a world development policy. See J. TINBERGEN, *International Planning of Peaceful Economic Development*, in: R. JUNGK, J. GALTUNG, *Mankind ...*, op.cit., pp.42-47.

was a synthesized scenario which projected a Europe that was indeed split, but was ever less dependent on the superpowers. The national sovereignty rights would be solely restricted in the area of economic and technological cooperation within the framework of the EC, so that a comprehensive political integration appeared rather improbable. Dangers and weaknesses, above all in regard to regional separatism and (the accompanying) radical-leftist tendencies to split off, stood in the way of opportunities such as the more intensive economic integration with the up-and-coming countries of the “Third World”.

Interesting, against this background, is the “dream scenario” put forward by the scientific community, which refers to the idea of “increased rationality” mentioned earlier. In accordance with the growing perception of new social and ecological crises, which came with the end of the economic boom, the researchers sketched a desired projection of an ecological, decentralized, “communitarian”, and – through a strong welfare state – socially “equalized” Europe of individual states with strong identities. Significantly, forms of integration did not play an independent role, rather they were primarily seen as a means to an end (as a “European database”, among other things), or were rejected on the grounds of an ecological vision of clearly decreasing traffic density, or declining mobility, and of a population with stronger ties to localities, that is only indirectly interconnected (e.g., by work at home on a PC).⁵³ One such alternative model shortly indicated here is strongly reminiscent of the previously mentioned studies realized in the wake of the work for the Club of Rome, which postulate or predict a profound change in mentality through the increasing awareness of the “costs” of industrial modernization.⁵⁴ Similarly this study planned, ideally, for the long-term relief of a purely “scientific” rationality in favour of an “alternative rationality” based on processes of individualization and democratization.⁵⁵ This approach shows how strongly in the end cybernetically based thinking about the future in terms of strengthened knowledge circulation and “learning capacities” entered into the social sciences and, at the same time, radiated into the general public through various educational reforms or reform proposals, despite all the decisive rejection of futurological methods and approaches. Conversely, one can see the distance to the sometimes strongly deterministic or voluntaristic framework of the sketched futurological models. For the clear distinction between probable and desirable scenarios left no doubt that the majority of the specialists predicted a generally limited developmental dynamic and a stronger persistence of existing structures and institutions, which was certainly a result of the specific European situation (in contrast to the U.S.), but, basically, goes back

53. See R. IYER, op.cit., pp.245-263.

54. In contrast to the clichés of a fundamentally technocratic futurology in the U.S.A, it was particularly the American studies that put forward as a model this type of “counterculture”. See, e.g., the work of authors like Willis W. Harman, William I. Thompson, Gordon R. Taylor, Theodore Roszak, Robert Heilbroner, John R. Platt, Warren W. Wagar or Robert Theobald. On the dystopian sketches see Ed. CORNISH et.al., *The Study of the Future. An Introduction to the Art and Science of Understanding and Shaping Tomorrow's World*, The World Future Society, Washington, 1977, especially pp.21-34.

55. See P. HALL, op.cit., pp.34ff. and pp.226-238.

(rightly) to a stronger weighting of social participants, in contrast to the momentum of cybernetic processes. In retrospect it is not without irony that both predictive strategies were wrong in their way, by, on the one hand, underestimating the developmental dynamic (so that, as shown, the collapse of the "Eastern Bloc" as well as the great progress in the integration of the E.U. were "given a thought", but classed as least probable); while, on the other hand, the developmental dynamic, for example, with regard to the cyberneticization of everyday life was clearly overestimated.

Conclusion

The achievement of futurology lay, in addition to some remarkably exact predictions (above all with regard to technology), first and foremost in a wide sensitization of the public for the enormous developmental dynamic of the modern "knowledge society" and its increasingly global dimensions. By formulating various "expectation horizons" disseminated by the media, it helped, in the sense of a self-fulfilling or self-destroying prophecy, to make public collective needs with regard to the configuration of the future (e.g., with regard to the risks of technologies). In this way it was also able to achieve an influence on political decision processes (e.g., in the form of new social movements). But this could only succeed because many future studies also mirrored wider public conceptions of the future, and so, to a certain extent, formulated the decisive (transnational) agendas on the basis of which an increasingly transnationally-oriented public sphere could form itself. This circumstance of taking a very publicly-effective look at the dramatic risks as well as the enormous opportunities of the techno-scientific developmental dynamic in the Cold War, setting this the limits of purely national problem solving, points to the characteristic blind-spots of these future studies. With all the variety of individual paradigms, the studies had in common that they, in general, clearly overestimated the influence of techno-scientific developmental logic on societal change, as well as the idea of 'controlling' this change with increased rationality. Therefore, despite their pioneering orientation on globalization processes, most of the studies hardly took notice of those trans-national integrative processes that could not be directly traced back to technological bases. This is why such central topics of the nineties as (poverty-caused) migrations, mass tourism, the development of various international and supranational organizations and multinational companies as well as the internationalization of organized crime were rarely recognized as the central problems of the future. The situation is similar at the national level where, for example, the integration of societal minorities, the formation and growing significance of individual and therefore heterogeneous lifestyles and, above all, the role of women in the future, when not ignored, were relatively underestimated in their significance even in the eighties.⁵⁶ The most important reason for

56. See J. F. COATES, J. JARRATT, *What Futurists Believe*, Lomond, Bethesda, 1989, p.24.

this misjudgement was certainly that the majority of the future studies especially in the sixties and early seventies generally thought too little about social actors and institutions and their ‘power of inertia’ against too massive changes in the social environment. Similar to the leading sociological schools of the fifties and sixties such as structuralism and functionalism, the future studies tended to overestimate the rule and system character of societies and so underestimate the relative autonomy of individual and collective actions. A consequence of this underestimation of the relative autonomy of participants and institutions with respect to the (cybernetic) system logics consisted in an often confused or latent ‘totalitarian’ idea of social planning which, in most cases, hardly dealt with the complex conflicts among interest groups in modern societies and corresponded to either the idea of a ‘systemic’ control by groups of experts or the generally equally confused idea of a ‘total’ democratization of the controlling hierarchies and authorities ‘from below’.

Even if comprehensive “planning” appears increasingly anachronistic today in the light of the knowledge about the “chaotic” complexity of “systems”⁵⁷ – and contemporary future studies have become somewhat more modest in their prediction given the “end of utopias” – this does not change the fact that “the future” has shifted to the centre of strategies of legitimation of political action to the public. That this future is perceived by the public as both essentially “European” and “global” can be traced back, at least in part, to the effect of this new form of expert public sphere.

57. See for instance Th. J. GORDON, *Chaos in Social Systems*, in: *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 42,1(1992), pp.1-15.

La Communauté européenne et l'audiovisuel: des Assises de Paris à la Conférence de Bruxelles (1989–1994)

Fausto Gualtieri

Au début des années quatre-vingt, il parut évident que l'innovation dans les nouvelles technologies de l'information et de la communication a été exceptionnellement rapide. Les nouveaux satellites de la télévision ne respecteraient plus les frontières nationales et, par conséquent, la réglementation nationale de la radiodiffusion ne serait plus suffisante pour contrôler un marché de dimension transnationale. Il ne s'agissait pas seulement d'un défi technologique et économique, mais de la mise en jeu de l'identité culturelle européenne à travers le secteur audiovisuel. Une grande quantité de programmes étaient nécessaires pour les nouvelles télévisions, surtout que depuis la fin des années soixante-dix, avec l'avènement des télévisions commerciales, commençait la course à l'achat massif de programmes américains ou japonais et latino-américains. Cette situation posait de gros problèmes d'ordre économique et ouvrait un nouveau champ de bataille pour l'Europe. Le processus d'unification européenne ainsi que l'évolution technologique de la télévision allaient se poser dans un contexte plus général, celui de la globalisation des économies et des cultures.

Le développement des *mass-médias*, inconcevable au moment de la signature du Traité de 1957, exigeait, dans l'intérêt de l'unification européenne, l'instauration d'une politique européenne des moyens de l'information. L'arrêt *Sacchi* de la Cour de Justice européenne de 1974 assimilait la radiodiffusion à un service de façon à ce que le secteur entre dans le cadre des Traités de Rome.¹ Dès lors, la CEE qui, jusqu'au Traité de Maastricht d'Union européenne, n'avait pas acquis de compétences explicites dans le champ culturel, considéra les messages de la télévision comme des prestations de services. L'arrêt devint de la sorte un repère fondamental auquel on peut faire remonter la naissance des politiques communautaires pour l'audiovisuel.

L'incorporation de la politique de l'audiovisuel dans le processus de la construction européenne ne pouvait pas être différée. La Commission et le Parlement tombèrent d'accord: l'objectif à poursuivre était l'ouverture des secteurs nationaux des *mass-médias* des différents Etats membres dans leur intérêt mutuel, la création de règles et de dispositions techniques et juridiques sur l'espace commun radiotélévisé et

1. Cour de Justice des Communautés européennes, Arrêt *Sacchi*, 30.04.74, cause 155/73, Récueil 1974, Office des publications officielles des Communautés Européennes, Luxembourg, p.409.

l'utilisation de la télévision transnationale par satellite et par câble, afin d'encourager la connaissance européenne, fondement nécessaire à toutes les formes d'unification politique.²

Dès son avènement, le président Jacques Delors avait manifesté sa préoccupation pour la faiblesse de l'industrie des programmes audiovisuels: des mesures spécifiques d'encouragement au développement et à la distribution d'œuvres européennes devenaient nécessaires. Un des objectifs que la Commission se fixa, était la promotion de la production et de la distribution d'œuvres audiovisuelles communautaires à travers le développement d'une industrie culturelle européenne compétitive et capable de s'opposer à la position dominante des producteurs américains. Cela permettait à la Commission d'aborder les problématiques plus étroitement culturelles et politiques:

«Encourager et préserver l'identité et la créativité culturelle de chaque Etat membre afin d'édifier une Europe des citoyens, une Europe consciente de sa propre union fondée sur la diversité».³

Toutes ces mesures visaient globalement à établir une politique cohérente qui, au-delà de la réalisation d'un marché intérieur des radiodiffusions, comme on l'a dit, cherchait en outre à stimuler à la fois le développement des industries connexes et l'identité politique, sociale et culturelle de la Communauté en respectant et en encourageant la diversité et la spécificité des cultures des Etats membres.⁴

Sous la poussée du Parlement européen, la Commission considéra indispensable de prendre des mesures actives de soutien pour l'expansion de l'industrie européenne de l'audiovisuel et, en mai 1986, présenta le *Programme d'action pour la production audiovisuelle européenne*,⁵ qui fut à l'origine du programme *Media*,⁶ le premier programme culturel de la Communauté européenne pour la communication. Défendre la culture européenne signifiait, par conséquent, coordonner les politiques des Etats pour la défense économique du secteur de l'audiovisuel, un aspect qui concernait certainement les intérêts des Etats. Mais encourager la créativité culturelle européenne à travers l'audiovisuel, cela signifiait défendre une autonomie politique et culturelle face aux Etats-Unis d'Amérique qui occupaient une position de plus en plus prédominante sur le marché européen. En effet, l'audiovisuel fut un des éléments les plus controversés des négociations de

2. Documents de séance du Parlement européen. Rapport fait au nom de la Commission de la jeunesse, de la culture, de l'éducation, de l'information et des sports sur un règlement-cadre établissant une politique européenne des médias sur la base du Livre Vert de la Commission sur l'établissement du marché commun de la radiodiffusion, notamment par satellite et par câble, COM(84)300 final, Rapporteur M. W. Hanh, 05.07.85, doc.A2-75/85, Parlement Européen, Bruxelles.

3. Commission des Communautés européennes. Proposition de directive du Conseil visant la coordination de certaines dispositions législatives, réglementaires et administratives des Etats membres, relative à l'exercice d'activités de radiodiffusion, COM(86)146, 30.04.86, Journal Officiel [JO], C 179/4, 17.07.86, Office des publications officielles des Communautés Européennes, Luxembourg.

4. *Ibid.*, pp.8-16.

5. Commission des Communautés européennes. Communication au Conseil, Programme d'action au service de la production audiovisuelle européenne, COM(86)255 final, 23.05.86, Office des publications officielles des Communautés Européennes, Luxembourg.

6. Mesure pour encourager le développement de l'industrie de production Audiovisuelle.

l'Uruguay Round ouvertes en 1986 et entrées dans la phase chaude au début des années quatre-vingt-dix. Nous essaierons de fournir le tableau général nécessaire pour comprendre les éléments de la vive dispute entre les Etats-Unis et la Communauté Européenne, qui, à huit ans de la signature à Marrakech, ne semble pas avoir trouvé une issue dans les négociations actuelles de l'OMC.

1. Les années quatre-vingt en résumé

Au départ, la Communauté détermina trois chemins distincts et superposés à parcourir: un tableau normatif minimum pour garantir l'ouverture des frontières; les choix technologiques pour les satellites, le câble et la haute définition; la voie plus proprement culturelle, liée à la production d'œuvres audiovisuelles. Dans les premiers documents communautaires, les trois volets n'étaient pas encore distincts. Au cours des années quatre-vingt, la complexité des problèmes rencontrés sur le terrain imposa à la Communauté de poursuivre des pistes différentes et de confier à diverses Directions Générales de la Commission la charge de l'étude et de l'élaboration de propositions.

Si dès la signature de la *Convention Européenne des Droits de l'Homme*, le Conseil de l'Europe s'était occupé de la plus grande partie de ce secteur, on se serait aperçu que les transformations des moyens de communication imposaient une norme communautaire dépassant les règles typiquement nationales. La première élection directe du Parlement européen en 1979 mit en évidence, en outre, la carence d'informations des électeurs européens sur la Communauté même. Comme l'indiquait le rapport du *Comité Adonnino* sur l'Europe des citoyens (le comité était chargé d'étudier et de proposer tout ce qui aurait pu contribuer à créer une identité européenne à travers les programmes culturels, sportifs, les initiatives de renseignements, les échanges d'expériences de participation à la vie sociale et politique), chaque Européen devait avoir «accès au plus grand nombre possible de programmes» transmis en Europe. La demande toujours croissante de programmes audiovisuels ne pouvait pas être satisfaite par les seules productions européennes dont la circulation était entravée par le cloisonnement de plusieurs marchés nationaux, tandis que la force de l'industrie audiovisuelle américaine était déjà un fait bien réel. L'Europe devait endiguer une véritable «invasion culturelle».

Une fois la crise économique des années soixante-dix dépassée, l'industrie européenne, désormais reconvertie aux nouvelles technologies, exigeait un espace libre et une vraie concurrence. C'est ainsi que les décisions sur le parachèvement du marché commun furent prises, de manière rapide et insolite, au milieu des années quatre-vingt. Avec les négociations pour l'élimination des obstacles à la libre circulation des marchandises et des services, ainsi qu'avec la signature de l'Acte Unique européen de 1986. L'exigence de réaliser le marché commun des télécommunications devint inéluctable, en particulier, pour les émissions télévisées.

Avec la naissance du Marché commun, une des premières préoccupations de la Commission économique européenne fut le soutien de la production cinématographique à travers la suppression des mesures discriminatoires sur la base de la nationalité. En ce sens, deux directives à caractère transitoire furent adoptées durant les années soixante: elles n'étaient évidemment pas inspirées par des politiques à caractère culturel.⁷ On doit attendre les années quatre-vingt pour voir la Commission européenne intervenir directement afin d'inciter les Etats membres à modifier les dispositions juridiques et administratives considérées comme discriminatoires. La première et emblématique résolution sur les services de radiotélévision dans la Communauté européenne de mars 1982⁸ fut rédigée par le député allemand démocrate-chrétien Wilhelm Hahn, auquel on attribue volontiers le mérite d'être le père de la «télévision européenne». Son papier fut suivi du rapport *Pruvot* sur le cinéma. Celui-ci était élaboré par la commission parlementaire pour la jeunesse, la culture, l'éducation, l'information et les sports et fut approuvé par le Parlement européen, le 10 octobre 1983.⁹ L'Europe, comme on dit dans le rapport, entendait voir les bons films américains, mais escomptait que cette connaissance et la confrontation d'idées, de méthodes créatrices, d'éthiques civiles, de cultures, toucheraient le public européen dans des conditions d'égalité économique et de marché. Ce dernier aspect résume – à mon avis – l'esprit sur lequel se basèrent toutes les initiatives ultérieures de la Communauté. La résolution qui en sortit, demandait la création de chaînes européennes pour les produits cinématographiques d'origine européenne. Entre 1982 et 1983, la Direction Générale X de la Commission élabora le Rapport provisoire *Réalité et tendances de la télévision en Europe: perspectives et options*,¹⁰ dans lequel elle mit particulièrement en évidence les aspects liés aux nouvelles technologies des télécommunications et surtout à la télévision directe par satellite. Cependant, la première étape du processus de réglementation de l'espace audiovisuel communautaire commença vraiment avec la publication –

7. Directive du Conseil, en vue de la mise en œuvre des dispositions du Programme général pour la suppression des restrictions à la libre prestation des services en matière de cinématographie, 63/607/CEE, 15.10.63, JO no.B159, p.2661, 02.11.63, Office des publications officielles des Communautés Européennes, Luxembourg. Deuxième directive du Conseil, en vue de la mise en œuvre des dispositions des programmes généraux pour la suppression des restrictions à la liberté d'établissement et à la libre prestation des services en matière de cinématographie, 65/264/CEE, 13.05.65, JO no.B85, p.1437, 19.05.65, Office des publications officielles des Communautés Européennes, Luxembourg.

8. Documents de séance du Parlement Européen. Documents de séance. Rapport fait au nom de la commission de la culture, de la jeunesse, de l'éducation, de l'information et des sports sur les services de radio-télévision dans la Communauté européenne, rapporteur M. W. Hahn, 23.02.82 PEdoc.1-1013/81, PE73 271/final, Parlement Européen, Bruxelles.

9. Résolution sur la promotion du cinéma des pays de la Communauté, sur la base du rapport Pruvot, doc.1-504/83, 10.10.83, JO C307/16, 14.11.83, Office des publications officielles des Communautés Européennes, Luxembourg.

10. Commission des Communautés européennes. Rapport provisoire. *Réalité et tendances de la télévision en Europe: perspectives et options*, COM(83)229 final, 15.06.83, Office des publications officielles des Communautés Européennes, Luxembourg.

en juin de 1984 – du Livre Vert sur la Télévision sans frontières.¹¹ Dans ce document, la Commission exposait toutes les raisons qui poussaient à la constitution d'un espace de libre circulation pour les télévisions européennes. On analysait les relations existantes entre identité et intégration européenne. L'information était considérée comme un facteur décisif, peut-être le plus important de l'intégration. A travers la réalisation d'un espace libre pour la Télévision sans frontières, on avait essayé de donner une impulsion à l'émergence de l'identité européenne, condition nécessaire pour que les citoyens puissent accepter d'appartenir à une Europe intégrée. Une Europe politique se serait constituée «du bas» grâce aux contacts établis entre les populations. L'importance d'une telle idée est confirmée par le fait qu'elle était exprimée deux fois dans le document de la Commission.

La quintessence de l'argumentation communautaire sur l'identité européenne résidait dans la formule de «l'unité dans les diversités» qui figurait aussi dans le document de la Commission. Si la télévision devait révéler l'identité européenne, une telle identité était aussi, d'une façon ou d'une autre, présupposée: en d'autres termes, une ressemblance, une parenté, préexistait. C'était une dimension fondée sur un héritage culturel commun qui dépassait la diversité superficielle des langues, des goûts et des styles artistiques. Les Etats ont toujours considéré la culture comme ayant une particularité propre, et ils ont plutôt évoqué une dimension culturelle européenne seulement en rapport avec l'extérieur. Cette position était clairement exprimée par le Conseil qui avait dû plusieurs fois modérer les impulsions idéalistes de la Commission et, encore plus, celles du Parlement.¹² La Communauté entendait se placer vis-à-vis de l'extérieur comme une entité uniforme, culturellement réunie par d'anciennes racines et pour ceci, prête à se défendre et à renouveler la capacité d'attraction culturelle de l'Europe; à l'intérieur cependant, les Etats préféraient souvent sauvegarder les prérogatives nationales.

Afin d'assurer la libre circulation des marchandises et des services, le Livre Vert promouvait une réglementation minimale qui harmonisait le panorama audiovisuel en Europe. La directive Télévision sans frontières qui en découla cinq ans plus tard en 1989, établit un nombre minimum d'œuvres européennes à transmettre sur les télévisions. Au grand désappointement des professionnels du secteur, le texte final se contentait d'une recommandation aux Etats membres de faire diffuser une majorité d'œuvres européennes suivant la fameuse formule «les Etats membres [y] veillent chaque fois que cela est réalisable ...». Par rapport au 60 % retenus à l'origine, le compromis final marqua un net recul. Le résultat imposé par le Conseil fut déterminé par la crainte de quelques Etats, préoccupés du fait que cela puisse représenter une autre concession de souveraineté, qu'ils n'étaient pas disposés à accorder. Les gouvernements qui s'opposèrent à une telle règle tinrent compte de l'atti-

11. Commission des Communautés européennes. Livre Vert de la Commission sur l'établissement du marché commun de la radiodiffusion, notamment par satellite et par câble, COM(84)300 final, 14.06.84, Office des publications officielles des Communautés Européennes, Luxembourg.

12. Sur le problème de l'identité européenne, voir, R. GIRAULT, *Identité et conscience européennes au 20e siècle*, Paris, Hachette, 1994.

tude américaine. Malgré la formule édulcorée, la directive suscita les colères de la Présidence américaine, partisane de l'industrie de Hollywood.

Le Livre Vert ne considéra pas crucial le problème de la production audiovisuelle et il donna plus de relief aux aspects de la circulation: c'était une fois de plus les aspects économiques qui l'emportaient sur les aspects culturels. Le Livre Vert et la Directive représentèrent deux étapes d'un même processus qui, à travers la constitution d'un marché unifié et l'abolition des frontières, visait à favoriser les grands groupes multimédias européens, qui se trouvaient dans une situation d'urgence par rapport aux entreprises américaines. De tels groupes étaient sur le point de s'internationaliser, puisque c'était pour eux la seule manière de survivre.

2. Les Assises Européennes de l'Audiovisuel et la «Télévision sans frontières»

Le 30 septembre 1989 s'ouvrirent à Paris les Assises de l'Audiovisuel auxquelles participèrent les membres du Conseil de l'Europe ainsi que les représentants de la Hongrie, de la Pologne, de l'URSS et de la Yougoslavie en tant que pays invités. L'initiative, vivement soutenue par le gouvernement français, visait à définir les moyens pour permettre à l'Europe – selon l'expression utilisée à l'ouverture de la conférence par le président français François Mitterrand – «d'affirmer sa propre personnalité culturelle». L'urgence des mesures à prendre était due à l'évidente suprématie américaine.¹³ Durant ces mêmes jours – entre les Assises et l'échéance imposée par le Parlement européen – le Conseil des Affaires générales de la Communauté se vit contraint d'approuver à la majorité la directive très discutée de la Télévision sans frontières.¹⁴ Conformément au rituel habituel, le Président du Conseil évalua positivement la mesure approuvée: d'après le ministre des Affaires étrangères français, Roland Dumas, il s'agissait de corriger le lourd handicap de l'Europe dans le secteur de l'audiovisuel et de contribuer à édifier l'espace culturel européen.¹⁵ Le vice-président de la Commission, l'allemand Martin Bangemann, et le commissaire aux Affaires culturelles, le luxembourgeois Jean Dondelinger, rassurèrent encore une fois les Etats qui entendaient supprimer l'article 4, qui établissait une majorité d'œuvres européennes pour les émissions télévisées.

Au cours des discussions, les délégations du Royaume-Uni et de l'Allemagne firent pression pour un assouplissement substantiel de la norme. Le compromis fut

13. Des informations exhaustives sur l'importance de la circulation d'œuvres américaines sont contenues dans le rapport Papapietro, *op.cit.*, et dans M. MAGGIORE, *La production audiovisuelle dans le marché unique*, Commission des Communautés européennes, Luxembourg, 1990.

14. Pour la phase de préparation parlementaire, cf. la Recommandation de la Commission juridique et pour les droits des citoyens concernant la position commune du Conseil sur la proposition de directive visant à la coordination de certaines dispositions législatives, réglementaires et administratives des Etats membres relatives à l'exercice d'activités de radiodiffusion télévisuelle (doc.C2-23/89), Rapporteur Barzanti, A2-159/89, 22.05.89, Parlement Européen, Bruxelles.

15. Bulletin de l'Agence Europe no.5103, 04.10.89.

atteint à travers une déclaration conjointe Commission–Conseil insérée dans le procès-verbal et par laquelle on reconnaissait que l'article 4 sur les œuvres européennes et l'article 5 sur la part d'œuvres de producteurs indépendants, représentaient une obligation «politique» et n'avaient pas un caractère coercitif du point de vue juridique. La Commission n'aurait pu recourir à la Cour de Justice au cas où les Etats membres ne feraient pas respecter à leurs chaînes de télévision nationales les dispositions des deux articles. Telle était du moins l'interprétation de la délégation britannique que M. Bangemann confirmait: la directive dans son ensemble avait un caractère juridique qui, suite à la déclaration conjointe, devenait une «obligation» politique.¹⁶ Le vice-président de la Commission évalua les critiques répétées émanant depuis plusieurs mois des Etats-Unis, en rappelant que ces derniers avaient exclu les produits culturels de l'accord de libre échange signé avec le Canada en reconnaissant qu'ils ne pouvaient pas être considérés comme des marchandises. Ainsi – d'après M. Bangemann – la directive, outre la permission de libre circulation des programmes dans toute la Communauté européenne, ne violait aucune des règles du GATT et encore moins les engagements pris durant l'Uruguay Round.

Plus de trois ans passèrent depuis la première proposition de directive de la Commission. Affirmer que la directive aboutissait après ces trois années de négociations laborieuses ne suffit pas pour décrire les nombreuses péripéties qui en avaient marqué la préparation. Rarement un acte communautaire avait suscité, tant à l'intérieur qu'en-dehors de l'Europe des Douze, un intérêt aussi vif, un débat aussi passionné, des réactions aussi contrastées. Rarement aussi un acte communautaire avait parcouru des étapes aussi mouvementées et des phases d'incertitude frôlant à maintes reprises l'échec et ce, jusqu'au dernier moment.¹⁷ En définitive, le Conseil avait adopté un texte au contenu minimaliste si on le considérait sous l'angle de la logique d'intégration et d'harmonisation des législations nationales; sans parler des mesures de promotion d'une télévision européenne de qualité, ni des possibilités de contrôle et de sanction. Au fil du parcours institutionnel, la directive avait perdu une grande partie de sa substance sous l'effet conjugué de pressions multiples, en l'occurrence l'opposition de l'Angleterre ou de l'Allemagne partisans d'une politique libre-échangiste plus marquée, les réticences de petits Etats comme la Belgique et le Danemark, décidés à sauvegarder des compétences qu'ils considéraient être exclusivement nationales, ou encore les obstructions émanant de ceux qui privilégiaient le Conseil de l'Europe comme organe le plus approprié pour traiter les problèmes culturels. Au sein de l'Europe, il existait par ailleurs d'importants lobbys opposés à toute forme de limitation de la publicité, limitation que la Commission, et plus encore le Parlement et le Comité Économique et Social,

16. Ibid.

17. A. TIZZANO, La direttiva CEE sulla «televisione senza frontiere», *Il Foro Italiano*, partie IV, 1990, p.92, Roma.

voulaient pourtant introduire dans les textes. En tout cas, la directive devait être approuvée pour sauver l'image de la cohérence institutionnelle communautaire, de sorte qu'une grande partie de la classe politique européenne reléguât au second plan le problème du contenu.

La directive se contentait finalement d'énoncer les dispositions minimales nécessaires pour garantir la libre circulation des programmes de télévision. Elle ne proposa pas d'harmoniser les politiques nationales des médias et encore moins les politiques culturelles; elle ne toucha pas à la structure, au financement et d'une façon générale à l'organisation des émetteurs de télévision, ni aux contenus et à la structure de leurs programmes ni aux rapports entre la télévision publique et la télévision privée ou entre les moyens audiovisuels et les autres médias, en particulier la presse. Tous ces aspects restaient soumis à la compétence des Etats membres qui conservaient d'importantes marges de liberté. La directive – et cela pouvait être sa valeur – s'imposa comme une première et – selon certains – comme une «considérable» prise de position de la Communauté face aux principales questions de la télévision et de l'audiovisuel. Jusque là, les autorités nationales avaient toujours considéré l'activité de la transmission radiotélévisée et l'importance culturelle de cette industrie comme un service public où l'Etat jouait un rôle prépondérant. Le développement technologique, la disponibilité de nouveaux canaux de diffusion et l'augmentation du nombre de télévisions commerciales firent tomber le monopole d'Etat et rendirent possible une évolution plus marquée vers une dimension européenne.¹⁸ Avec l'élimination des barrières nationales, on offrait aux producteurs audiovisuels des opportunités bien plus larges. Selon ce courant de pensée, la directive pouvait représenter le début d'une période d'expansion et d'amplification de la commercialisation; la Communauté avait évité le chaos audiovisuel en posant les bases pour la recherche d'un équilibre entre expansion et déréglementation. En conciliant ces deux exigences, on évitait d'un côté que le marché de la télévision se développe sans limite, et d'un autre côté que les réglementations ne compriment les investissements dans le secteur.

Sur l'autre front, le plus critique, les auteurs et les opérateurs du secteur soutenaient par contre que la Communauté n'avait pas réussi à élaborer une approche globale et intégrée des problématiques de l'audiovisuel et qu'elle avait sous-estimé ses différentes dimensions économique, sociale, politique et culturelle. Selon cette vision, l'unique objectif poursuivi était commercial: les associations d'artistes européens soutenaient que les gouvernements des Douze avaient «vendu» des millions de téléspectateurs aux agents de publicité. L'abandon des quotas d'œuvres européennes dissuada les professionnels de la culture de croire en la volonté politique de la Communauté à défendre le projet d'une culture européenne face à l'invasion des productions américaines et japonaises.

18. C.-D. RATH et autres, *Le televisioni in Europa, storia e prospettive della televisione nella RFT*, in: Gran Bretagna, Francia e Italia, Edizioni della Fondazione Agnelli, Torino, 1990. R. BARBERIO, C. MACCHITELLA, *L'Europa delle televisioni, dalla vecchia radio alla TV interattiva*, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1992.

Sur le plan politique, cette réglementation reflétait la «philosophie» de la société du libre-échange, inspiratrice du marché unique. Elle représentait selon certains la volonté politique de discréditer les modalités de gestion publique de la télévision et elle accentuait les processus de commercialisation de l'information et de la culture. Il n'existait pas de règles de coexistence entre les secteurs privé et public qui auraient permis à ce dernier de préserver sa mission de service public; il n'y avait pas de réglementation qui aurait empêché les processus de concentration aussi bien au niveau européen que national pour garantir le pluralisme, et donc les fondements démocratiques des Etats européens.

Le parcours institutionnel de la directive mit par ailleurs en évidence la fragilité du processus de légitimité démocratique au sein de l'Europe des Douze. Ceux qui avaient décidé n'avaient pas tenu compte de la volonté du Parlement européen, l'unique organe bénéficiant d'une légitimité directe.

L'année 1989 fut décisive. En avril, la directive sur la télévision haute définition aboutit et, en octobre, c'est le tour de la directive de la Télévision sans frontières à voir le jour. En outre, avec les Assises Européennes de l'Audiovisuel de Paris s'ouvrit une nouvelle voie qui allait au-delà des frontières de la Communauté. Durant les journées qui suivirent la chute du Mur de Berlin, le système de la télévision européen eut un nouveau rôle: la force et la présence dans l'Histoire des télévisions comme protagonistes directs dans les révolutions de 1989 fut encore plus manifeste qu'auparavant. Le pouvoir ne se trouvait plus seulement dans les palais de gouvernement, mais aussi dans les rédactions des télévisions, souvent élevées au rang de symboles du régime ou d'instruments de la liberté. L'année 1989 représenta, ou du moins aurait dû représenter, la chute des barrières opposées à circulation de l'audiovisuel en Europe. La synergie entre le programme communautaire de soutien aux œuvres audiovisuelles Media et le programme Eureka qui s'étendait au-delà des frontières de la Communauté, furent une première et timide tentative d'élargir à l'Est les frontières de l'audiovisuel Européen.

3. Les lignes directrices de la Commission

Au terme du semestre de la présidence française, à l'occasion du Conseil européen de Strasbourg du 8-9 décembre 1989, François Mitterrand voulut accorder un large place à l'idée de l'Europe des citoyens et ensuite à la promotion d'une culture européenne pluraliste. La volonté du président français représenta une sorte de «bénédiction» vis-à-vis de tout ce qui jusqu'ici avait été fait pour la politique audiovisuelle dont la consolidation devait être entreprise: il fallait concrétiser les conclusions des Assises de l'audiovisuel, poursuivre avec les programmes de la télévision de haute définition, encourager la production cinématographique et de la télévision à travers le programme communautaire Media et le développer en synergie avec le projet de coopération Eureka.

A partir de ces fondements, la Commission travailla sur un document d'orientation pour déterminer les stratégies de la Communauté.¹⁹ Celles-ci furent présentées le 28 février 1990 par le commissaire Jean Dondelinger qui indiqua les trois axes fondamentaux sur lesquels serait basée la politique de la Commission: un espace audiovisuel ouvert et compétitif, une industrie des programmes et, finalement, l'innovation technologique. Ces éléments clé furent – pour reprendre la terminologie des négociations pour Maastricht – définis comme étant les trois piliers de la politique audiovisuelle de la Communauté.

L'organisation de l'espace audiovisuel en Europe ne pouvait pas reposer uniquement sur la volonté de promouvoir l'industrie audiovisuelle. On devait par ailleurs garantir et satisfaire les aspirations d'une société démocratique. Le développement du secteur audiovisuel ne pouvait en effet pas être réalisé au détriment du pluralisme, qui devait être renforcé en favorisant, en particulier, la diversité des programmes à offrir au public. La nécessité d'endiguer les concentrations, aussi bien sur le plan national que sur le plan transnational, ne devait pas constituer un obstacle aux entreprises qui, dans des limites physiologiques, devaient se développer vers des formes d'expansion et d'accroissement du système concurrentiel en train de se profiler. Un système réglementé à l'excès n'aurait pas survécu et il n'aurait surtout pas pu s'insérer dans les cycles du progrès technologique.

En ce qui concerne les aides nationales aux productions cinématographiques, la Commission déclarait son intention d'établir un encadrement communautaire à partir du moment où les financements pouvaient entraîner une distorsion de la concurrence; mais elle s'occupait surtout d'interdire chaque discrimination fondée sur la nationalité.²⁰

Le diagnostic de la Commission européenne était clair: l'audiovisuel européen s'était essentiellement développé au niveau national. Le phénomène expliquait le faible rendement de ce secteur dans une Europe caractérisée par le fractionnement du marché qui recueillait en 1987 environ 16 milliards d'ECU contre 33,5 pour les Etats-Unis. Une des carences spécifiques soulignées par l'analyse de la Commission était la distribution. En ce qui concerne le cinéma d'outre-Atlantique, les grands studios hollywoodiens pouvaient compter sur un vaste réseau de distribution, impensable en Europe. En outre, le marché des vidéocassettes était estimé à environ trois milliards d'ECU, soit moins de la moitié du chiffre d'affaires réalisé par des sociétés américaines qui, par surcroît, contrôlaient 40% des distributeurs européens. En 1988 par exemple, l'Europe avait acheté des programmes aux Etats-Unis pour un montant de 700 millions de dollars. Le déséquilibre entre l'offre et la demande de la part des organismes de diffusion devait donc être interprété comme un signe manifeste de difficultés majeures constituant un problème à part entière. Le manque de productions audiovisuelles européennes était également lié à

19. Communication de la Commission au Conseil et au Parlement sur la politique audiovisuelle, COM(90)78 final, 28.02.90, Office des publications officielles des Communautés Européennes, Luxembourg.

20. Bulletin de l'Agence Europe, no.5203, 28.02.90, Agence Europe, Bruxelles.

l'augmentation des coûts de réalisation, surtout dans le domaine des films de fiction, ainsi qu'à l'extension progressive de la durée journalière des programmes transmis par les chaînes de télévision. Les téléfilms américains occupaient en moyenne la moitié du temps consacré à la fiction, aussi bien dans les stations publiques que privées. La présence de films américains dans les salles de cinéma était en moyenne supérieure à celle des réalisations européennes.²¹ La situation à la fin des années quatre-vingt montrait clairement la dépendance de l'Europe qui produisait environ 25.000 heures d'audiovisuel: pour l'avenir, on estimait cependant une «demande» d'environ 130.000 heures de programmes que les Etats-Unis pouvaient offrir à des prix défiant toute concurrence.²² Le problème de la diminution du nombre des productions cinématographiques s'était accentué par suite de la baisse d'environ 40% du taux de fréquentation des salles de cinéma pendant les années quatre-vingt et ce, sans que la baisse des spectateurs soit compensée par une augmentation correspondante des recettes réalisées sur la distribution de cassettes vidéo ou le recouvrement des droits de diffusion payés par les chaînes de télévision.²³ L'ordre dispersé dans lequel l'industrie européenne agissait, bloquait sa possibilité de s'imposer sur le marché mondial: sa présence aux Etats-Unis ou au Japon ne dépassait pas 2% du total de l'audiovisuel. L'Europe risquait de devenir victime de la position dominante américaine en matière des programmes et de la suprématie japonaise au niveau des technologies.

On peut du reste se demander si la participation du commissaire Dondelinger au dixième meeting annuel du marché américain du film à Los Angeles fut un hasard,²⁴ ou si elle préfigurait déjà la prochaine étape de la présentation de la politique audiovisuelle de Bruxelles. De fait, Dondelinger, dut à l'occasion exposer la directive Télévision sans frontières aux industriels américains du cinéma de façon à ce qu'elle n'apparaisse pas hostile à leurs intérêts. Un espace audiovisuel européen plus large n'était pas seulement une opportunité pour les Européens mais aussi pour les Américains qui auraient continué à dominer un marché dans lequel 30% des programmes de la télévision étaient constitués par des productions américaines. L'intérêt européen et américain – Dondelinger le confirmait à la même occasion – était représenté également par le choix de la norme de la télévision de haute définition, qui devait contribuer à la relance des produits audiovisuels.

4. Les programmes de la Commission dans le cadre du programme Media

Sur la base des prémisses établies par Dondelinger au cours du mois de février, la Commission européenne présenta au Conseil deux propositions de décision. La première concernait la réalisation d'un programme d'action axé sur la promotion du

21. M. MAGGIORE, *op.cit.*, p.57.

22. Bulletin de l'Agence Europe, no.4870, 10.11.88, Agence Europe, Bruxelles.

23. Cf., COM(90)78 final, *op.cit.*

24. Bulletin de l'Agence Europe, no.5205, 02.03.90, Agence Europe, Bruxelles.

développement de l'industrie audiovisuelle européenne dans le cadre du programme Media;²⁵ la deuxième visait la réalisation d'une action communautaire de formation professionnelle dans le secteur audiovisuel.²⁶ Ces deux projets représentaient selon Dondelinger une action stratégique pour faire sortir le secteur audiovisuel de son grand handicap: le cloisonnement des marchés nationaux. La «stratégie audiovisuelle» élaborée par la Commission devait être soutenue par un financement de 250 millions d'ECU pour une période de cinq ans, dont 40 millions devaient être dépensés pendant l'année du lancement, en 1991. En 1990, la première phase de la stratégie audiovisuelle de la Communauté européenne marquée par le programme expérimental Media arrivait à terme. Elle avait bénéficié au total de treize millions d'ECU. L'échéance imposait une certaine urgence dans la réalisation du nouveau programme qui devait éviter l'interruption de la politique communautaire pour ce secteur. A travers la création de son propre programme pour la coopération audiovisuelle au-delà des frontières, la Commission avait essayé de réaliser les décisions prises au sommet de Strasbourg du mois de décembre précédent et d'établir de cette façon une synergie avec l'Eureka Audiovisuel, né des Assises de Paris, qui groupait 26 Etats européens. Il s'agissait donc – et la Commission tenait à le souligner – d'un programme communautaire original en tous ses aspects, dont le financement dépendait de la décision des différents pays. La Commission n'entendait pas intervenir de manière directe avec des financements aux productions audiovisuelles: une série d'initiatives concrètes devaient stimuler la coopération à travers les frontières de la Communauté européenne. On visait à développer de manière considérable les initiatives déjà entreprises durant la phase expérimentale.

Les questions posées à la Commission furent reprises au Conseil des Affaires culturelles du 21 mai. Dondelinger énonça les étapes suivantes de la Commission. Pour l'achèvement de la directive Télévision sans frontières, il était nécessaire de résoudre le problème de la propriété intellectuelle à travers des normes applicables aux droits d'auteurs. Le second problème était représenté par les aides de chaque Etat au cinéma. Certes, la Commission n'avait pas l'intention de les interdire, mais il était cependant nécessaire de les insérer dans une stratégie globale en fixant des limites compatibles avec les règles communautaires de la concurrence. L'affaire déboucha entre autres sur la prise de position du ministre français de la Culture Jack Lang qui accusa ceux qui entendaient remettre en cause les aides nationales aux productions cinématographiques de vouloir infliger le coup de grâce au cinéma et qui s'insurgea contre ceux qui ne soutenaient pas leurs propres artistes avec conviction. Lang demanda une fois de plus une plus grande liberté d'accès au marché

25. Proposition de décision du Conseil concernant la réalisation d'un programme d'action dirigée pour recevoir le développement de l'industrie audiovisuelle européenne «Media» (1991-1995), COM(90)132 final, 18.04.90, JO C127/5, 23.05.90, Office des publications officielles des Communautés Européennes, Luxembourg.

26. Proposition de décision du Conseil relative à la réalisation d'une action communautaire de formation professionnelle dans le secteur de l'audiovisuel, COM(90)139 final, 18.04.90, JO C127/13, 23.05.90, Office des publications officielles des Communautés Européennes, Luxembourg.

américain car, à son avis, la Communauté européenne était un marché ouvert, alors que pour les USA il existait un véritable protectionnisme culturel.²⁷

5. Maastricht et la nouvelle Commission Delors

La recherche d'une collaboration plus étroite avec les pays extra communautaires était certainement le résultat des négociations pour le renouvellement des Traités. La chute du mur de Berlin et l'effondrement du bloc communiste de l'Europe de l'Est, effaçaient l'opposition idéologique et la dichotomie qui avait marqué les destinées des peuples européens depuis la Guerre Froide et poussaient à rejoindre des valeurs communes. Les événements politiques qui avaient mené droit à Maastricht, obligeaient également les Etats membres de la communauté à reconsidérer le problème de l'identité européenne en de nouveaux termes, de façon que la culture ne soit plus ignorée ou considérée comme un appendice indésirable. Durant les diverses phases préparatoires du nouveau Traité, on comprit que le processus d'intégration fondé sur les seuls critères économiques et monétaires n'aurait guère une chance d'aboutir si les Douze ne renonçaient pas à une partie de leur souveraineté en étendant le champ d'action de ce qui allait devenir l'Union Européenne. C'est à ce stade que la culture devint partie intégrante du Traité de Maastricht et que l'audiovisuel fut mentionné explicitement dans le second paragraphe de l'article 128, celui qui introduit la culture dans les Traités de l'Union européenne.

Les initiatives de coopération intergouvernementale, à propos des Pays tiers, inspiraient la philosophie de tels articles dont le but était de défendre la spécificité de la culture européenne en évitant cependant l'isolement vis-à-vis du monde extérieur: «autarcie et homogénéisation»²⁸ étaient les deux maux que les Douze, puis les Quinze, voulaient absolument éviter. Dans la même logique, les politiques de l'audiovisuel poursuivies jusqu'à ce moment et inspirées par les mêmes principes s'accomplissaient dans les Traités.

L'entrée en vigueur du traité de Maastricht, le 1er janvier 1993, était accompagnée de l'installation de la troisième Commission Delors. C'est le professeur portugais João Deus de Pinheiro – à la place de Jean Dondelinger – qui s'occupa de la culture et de l'audiovisuel. Au cours de l'année 1993, les efforts de la Commission se concentrèrent principalement sur les aspects plus typiquement technologiques de la télévision de haute définition et sur les négociations en sein du GATT.

27. Bulletin de l'Agence Europe, no.5259, 21-22.05.90, Agence Europe, Bruxelles.

28. G. MAMMARELLA, P. CACACE, *Le sfide dell'Europa*, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1999, p.99.

De l'évaluation des deux premières années de fonctionnement du programme Media (juillet 1993),²⁹ la Commission tira, entre autre, la leçon que le programme était considéré comme un catalyseur efficace en mesure de rendre plus compétitive l'industrie audiovisuelle. L'analyse de la communication de la Commission tablait sur une évaluation des répercussions pratiques dans le secteur de l'audiovisuel, mais sans référence explicite aux effets à caractère plus spécifiquement culturels. Aux Assises de Paris, Delors avait énoncé deux pivots, deux certitudes sur l'audiovisuel européen:

«La première, c'est que la culture n'est pas une marchandise comme les autres et qu'on ne doit pas la traiter comme telle. La seconde, c'est que la culture ne peut s'épanouir aujourd'hui que si la maîtrise des outils technologiques est assurée».³⁰

Si la priorité avait été accordée au second aspect de l'expression de Delors et si le Conseil et la Commission avaient misé de manière prioritaire sur la norme européenne pour la télévision par satellite de haute définition, cette politique aurait visé à protéger et à développer surtout le secteur de la microélectronique, considéré comme étant capital pour la formation d'un espace industriel européen. La possibilité de sa chute aurait également eu une incidence sur la position culturelle.

Sur le plan technique, les pays européens qui, par le passé, n'avaient pas été capables de se doter de règles techniques unifiées pour la télévision en couleurs,³¹ avaient l'occasion, avec l'avènement de la télévision par satellite, d'avancer dans la direction d'une harmonisation pour rationaliser le marché intérieur. Cet aspect pouvait également rendre plus efficace au niveau mondial la présence de l'Europe dans les secteurs de l'industrie et du commerce d'exportation liés à la télévision. Le problème de l'harmonisation des règles techniques concernait surtout l'industrie européenne et influençait ses perspectives d'avenir à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur de la Communauté. Les industries intéressées s'étaient déjà concertées et elles avaient conjointement proclamé leur accord sur le principe des normes et sur l'introduction de la haute définition (TVHD). La Communauté devait développer dans ce secteur un rôle de catalyseur en favorisant l'élimination des obstacles techniques à l'unification du marché intérieur. Pendant que la Commission travaillait à son Rapport provisoire,³² l'Union Européenne de Radiodiffusion (UER) était en train d'examiner un projet de

29. L'étude avait été confiée à une société allemande (Roland Berger und Partner) avant d'être reprise par une communication de la Commission relative à l'évaluation du Programme d'action pour encourager le développement de l'industrie audiovisuelle européenne "media" (1991-1995), COM(93)364 final, 23.07.93, Office des publications officielles des Communautés Européennes, Luxembourg. Voir aussi la Proposition de décision du Conseil concernant la mise en œuvre d'un programme d'action pour encourager le développement de l'industrie audiovisuelle européenne «MEDIA» (1991-1995), COM(93)462 final, 29.10.93, JO C322/15, 30.11.93, Office des publications officielles des Communautés Européennes, Luxembourg.

30. Discours de Jacques Delors, Assises européennes de l'Audiovisuel. Projet Eureka Audiovisuel, Paris, octobre 1989, p.23.

31. Deux types de codage existaient en Europe pour la télévision en couleurs: le Secam français, aussi utilisé en Grèce et dans les pays de l'Europe de l'Est, et le Pal, adopté dans les autres pays. Les deux systèmes étaient incompatibles aussi avec les systèmes utilisés aux Etats-Unis et au Japon.

32. Cf., note 10.

normes techniques unifiées: entre 1982 et 1983 le système MAC (Multiplex Analogical Components) pour la transmission par satellite et par câble était déjà défini. Le principal concurrent était représenté par la norme de transmission japonaise MUSE (Multiples Sub-Nyquist Sampling Encoding). Analogique comme le MAC, elle était totalement incompatible avec les postes de télévision européens, mais elle avait de grandes possibilités d'être exportée sur le marché américain (les Etats-Unis n'avaient pas produit d'équivalent du MAC ou du MUSE) et, en second lieu, elle avait derrière elle une règle de production à haute définition sur laquelle on avait déjà produit une série de programmes. Depuis presque vingt ans, le Japon dominait le marché mondial de la vidéo. Il était clair que la première tentative d'imposer des normes de TVHD provenait de ce pays. Dès la fin des années soixante, les grandes industries japonaises et le NHK (la télévision publique) avaient investi des sommes considérables pour le développement de la haute définition. En 1978, le MUSE était déjà plus ou moins au point et, en 1982, les Japonais, appuyés par les Etats-Unis, le présentèrent au Comité international pour les radiocommunications (CCIR). Pour relever le défi industriel avec le Japon, la Communauté européenne accorda des sommes considérables et approuva les financements nationaux des industries du secteur (environ 1 milliard d'ECU entre la fin des années 1980 et le début des années 1990).

Seulement, au moment où le système européen semblait s'imposer au niveau mondial au détriment de celui mis au point par les Japonais, la révolution numérique américaine fit irruption. Elle fraya la voie à un système de télévision entièrement numérique. Ce bond technologique en avant préfigurait la possibilité d'une intégration totale de la télévision de haute définition avec le système informatique et avec celui des télécommunications. Il ouvrait soudain des perspectives de développement inimaginables qui dépassaient les technologies européennes et Japonaises jusqu'à les rendre – peu de temps après – obsolètes avant d'avoir eu vraiment la chance de se développer. Entre 1991 et 1992, la Communauté continua à soutenir et à financer le MAC, même si à l'époque il semblait déjà clair que l'avenir serait différent. On finança non seulement les grandes entreprises européennes, mais aussi les multinationales asiatiques qui avaient leurs sièges en Europe, en particulier en Grande-Bretagne. Face à l'évidence, la Communauté se rabattit sur le format de la télévision 16/9 qui rendait les proportions de l'écran égales à celles du cinéma. Une décennie plus tard, nous pouvons affirmer que ces nouvelles télévisions restent des produits marginaux.

Des progrès furent réalisés également dans le domaine des antennes paraboliques: la réception domestique des satellites de moyenne puissance devenait possible. L'association des télévisions commerciales européennes, l'ACT, présidée par l'ancien président de la Commission Gaston Thorn, était allée à l'encontre de la norme unique européenne d'émission télévisée.³³ Les entreprises européennes de la micro-électronique qui avaient par contre toujours soutenu la norme, étaient affaiblies à

33. E. LE BOUCHER, Les chaînes privées refusent qu'on leur impose le D2-MAC, in: *Le Monde*, 23.04.91.

cause d'une dispute interne au vieux continent³⁴ et, malgré les efforts économiques de la Communauté, elles n'avaient pas réussi à lancer le MAC en temps utile.

Au début des années quatre-vingt-dix, au moment où le programme Media entraît dans une phase décisive, ce support technologique évoqué par le président Delors en 1989 à Paris et que la Communauté avait poursuivi au début des années quatre-vingt venait à manquer. La cause principale en est l'indiscutable décollage manqué de l'industrie européenne de l'audiovisuel. La fragmentation du marché et les limites imposées par les diversités linguistiques se chargeaient du reste. Elles constituaient des obstacles trop importants pour être dépassés au cours d'une décennie de politique communautaire. Les efforts fournis pour aller au-delà des frontières de la Communauté à travers les synergies avec Eureka Audiovisuel et Eurimages du Conseil de l'Europe, montraient leurs limites devant la position dominante que Hollywood avait acquise grâce à une longue expérience. Les majors disposaient non seulement d'un marché immense, mais ils combinaient à la stratégie ouvertement industrielle, une politique commerciale protectionniste qui assure la domination de la langue anglaise. Devant la suprématie américaine, les instruments avec lesquels l'Europe avait tenté d'endiguer les tendances négatives apparaissaient dérisoires.

Le système très controversé des quotas d'œuvres européennes de la directive Télévision sans frontières pouvait soulager une situation qui, dans les faits et dans les chiffres, se présentait négativement. Ceci était du moins l'opinion la plus exprimée au Parlement européen. En vérité, le système des quotas aurait non seulement rééquilibré la disparité avec l'industrie américaine mais, associé aux autres mesures de promotion de la culture audiovisuelle, respectivement de protection du pluralisme au niveau européen, il aurait peut-être permis une inversion de la tendance. Le programme Media, malgré les ressources financières modestes, semblait pouvoir donner, depuis les premiers bilans, des résultats appréciables. Mais isolé, il ne pouvait pas aller au-delà de cette logique financière et de marché, qui était propre à l'inspiration fonctionnaliste dont la mise en œuvre avait été souhaitée à plusieurs reprises par le président de la Commission Jacques Delors. Les initiatives entreprises avaient en pratique dépassé les différentes formes de réglementation nationale et avaient pris en charge l'urgence apparue dans les années quatre-vingt à cause de l'émergence des télévisions commerciales, en contribuant à consolider ce secteur et en mettant fin aux monopoles publics de radiotélévision. Paradoxalement – quelle que soit la façon dont on évalue l'avènement des télévisions commerciales – ce phénomène que la Communauté avait avalisé, est à l'origine de l'importation massive de produits culturels extra-européens.

34. E. LE BOUCHER, Le discours alibi de l'Europe sur l'électronique. Les échecs passés forcent au scepticisme. Les divisions présentes au pessimisme, in: *Le Monde*, 05.04.91. Interview du président de Thomson, Alain Gomez, in: *Le Monde*, 20.04.91.

6. Les négociations difficiles de l'Uruguay Round

Les ministres des Douze responsables du secteur audiovisuel se réunirent le 4 octobre 1993 à Mons pour un séminaire ministériel durant lequel tous les problèmes relatifs à l'audiovisuel furent débattus.³⁵ Les suggestions de la Commission furent accueillies favorablement par les ministres qui allèrent plus loin, jusqu'à mentionner un programme Media 2 jugé nécessaire pour assurer la continuité du premier. Ces positions furent confirmées par le Conseil «Culture» du 5 novembre³⁶ qui se réunissait pour la première fois après l'entrée en vigueur du Traité de Maastricht, dont l'article 128 introduisait un cadre juridique à l'action communautaire dans le secteur culturel. Pendant la réunion de Mons, les ministres affrontèrent aussi les problèmes du pluralisme et de la concentration des médias, analysés dans le Livre vert adopté par la Commission en décembre 1992.³⁷ On parla, en outre, de la situation de la télévision européenne face aux défis des nouvelles techniques de transmission, mais le sujet principal concernait le secteur audiovisuel dans le contexte des négociations de l'Uruguay Round qui passaient une phase plutôt délicate: l'audiovisuel fut un des aspects les plus controversés des négociations.

Les restrictions au commerce international des productions audiovisuelles de la part des pays voulant préserver leur identité culturelle avaient été, depuis les années trente, l'objet de conflits avec les Etats-Unis. La plus grande partie des gouvernements – et pas uniquement des gouvernements européens – avaient, depuis toujours, adopté des mesures favorisant leur propre industrie nationale et imposant des limitations aux importations. La légitimité de telles interventions fut reconnue dans les années quarante par les accords du GATT. Contrairement aux productions cinématographiques, les programmes télévisuels n'avaient jamais été traités explicitement. Le problème fut soulevé en 1961 par les Etats-Unis qui demandaient la possibilité de concourir – au moins pour une part raisonnable du temps de transmission – avec les industries nationales de télévision. Aucun projet concret n'a cependant jamais pu être adopté, surtout à cause de l'opposition de la France.³⁸ La situation particulière de l'industrie audiovisuelle anglaise constituait à son tour un des plus grands obstacles. Le facteur linguistique mettait le Royaume-Uni dans une position différente de celle des autres Etats européens: le problème de la distribution sur le marché européen était d'une importance secondaire, en sorte qu'il n'y avait pas de nécessité absolue à coordonner les politiques européennes d'exportation vers les Etats-Unis. Les producteurs anglais n'avaient en effet jamais été convaincus par le système des quotas de norme européenne qui – selon eux – auraient probablement apporté des

35. Bulletin de l'Agence Europe, no.6077, 02.10.93; no.6079, 06.10.93; no.6080, 07.10.93, Agence Europe, Bruxelles.

36. Bulletin de l'Agence Europe, no.6102, 06.11.93, Agence Europe, Bruxelles.

37. Pluralisme et concentration des médias dans le marché intérieur - Evaluation de la nécessité d'une action communautaire, COM(92)480 final, 23.12.92, Office des publications officielles des Communautés Européennes, Luxembourg.

38. C. DOUTRELEPONT, L'Europe et les enjeux du GATT dans le domaine de l'audiovisuel, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1994.

résultats négatifs sur les exportations des programmes aux Etats-Unis, au Canada, en Australie, en Nouvelle Zélande et dans les autres pays du Commonwealth³⁹. D'autres obstacles supplémentaires à une politique commune pour les exportations renforçaient les divergences au sein de la Communauté. Il s'agit en l'occurrence des différents liens historiques, culturels et linguistiques de l'Espagne avec l'Amérique Latine ou de la France avec l'Afrique.

L'adoption de la directive Télévision sans frontières en octobre 1989, avait suscité l'hostilité des producteurs américains et de leur gouvernement. En mai déjà, à l'occasion du débat parlementaire qui avait réussi probablement à catalyser à Strasbourg le plus grand nombre de députés jamais vus, l'Administration américaine était intervenue de manière virulente. Par le biais d'une lettre de la présidence des Etats-Unis signée par la représentante spéciale aux problèmes commerciaux des USA, Carla A. Hill, remise par l'ambassadeur Alfred H. Kingon au Président du Parlement européen Lord Plumb et à plusieurs députés, les autorités américaines manifestaient leur désapprobation à la proposition de directive. Imposer une proportion majoritaire d'œuvres européennes apparaissait aux yeux des producteurs américains comme un attentat à leur libre accès au marché européen. La lettre évoquait un refroidissement des relations commerciales bilatérales avec la Communauté européenne en cas d'adoption de la directive. Elle dénonçait en même temps une violation ouverte du GATT.⁴⁰ Comme le rappelle Roberto Barzanti, rapporteur de la proposition de la commission parlementaire pour la jeunesse, la culture, l'éducation, l'information et les sports, la lettre provoqua «un frémissement de rébellion qui a gagné aussi les bancs des conservateurs anglais».⁴¹ Le débat parlementaire, malgré les différentes approches sur la directive, mit en lumière la profonde irritation de tous les députés face à cette ingérence américaine dans les affaires européennes.⁴²

Le 16 juin, Delors se rendit à Washington pour rencontrer le président Bush et cinq ministres américains: le secrétaire d'Etat Baker, le secrétaire au Trésor Brady, le secrétaire au Commerce Mosbacher, le secrétaire à l'Agriculture Yeutter et la représentante spéciale Carla Hill. Si les relations entre la Communauté et l'Europe de

39. A. LANGE, J.L. RENAUD, L'avenir de l'industrie audiovisuelle européenne, The European Institute for the Media, Manchester, 1988.

40. On lisait en synthèse: «The United States Government is seriously concerned with the Television Broadcasting Directive which became the subject of a common position in the Council on April 13. [...] We maintain that enactment of such a local content requirement would be a violation of the MFN provision of Article I of the GATT and the national treatment provision of Article III of the GATT, notwithstanding the provisions of Article IV of the GATT. [...] This Directive sends a message to Americans that the "EC 1992" initiative is indeed being used as an excuse to construct a "Fortress Europe". [...] I urge you and your colleagues to do whatever you can to oppose this measure's final passage in the Parliament and the Council of Ministers. Whatever benefits this television directive might promise to bring to Europe will undoubtedly be outweighed by its extremely negative impact on our bilateral trade relations». Le texte de la missive américaine est tiré de R. BARZANTI, *op.cit.*, p.109.

41. R. BARZANTI, *op.cit.*, p.35.

42. Débats du Parlement européen, no.378/122, 24.05.89, p.123, Parlement Européen, Bruxelles.

l'Est et les projets d'accords avec l'URSS et la Pologne furent les principaux sujets, les problèmes de politique commerciale et industrielle ont été aussi abordés, notamment la politique audiovisuelle. Delors défendait le projet de directive communautaire que les autorités américaines contestèrent vigoureusement. Les explications du président de la Commission firent en partie renoncer les Américains à leurs accusations à l'adresse des Européens auxquels la Maison Blanche reprochait de vouloir créer moyennant le marché unique de 1992 une «forteresse Europe». Même un domaine tel que celui de l'audiovisuel, faisait transparaître l'ambiguïté américaine vis-à-vis de l'intégration européenne. L'ambivalence de la politique américaine que Henry Kissinger n'a jamais cachée, était confirmée par la politique de l'administration Bush vers la fin de la guerre froide. Cette ambiguïté n'était pas seulement propre à la classe politique mais aussi – le cas de l'audiovisuel le confirme – à celle des milieux intellectuels et culturels. Les causes des craintes américaines ne peuvent pas uniquement être recherchées dans le sentiment de leur supériorité ou dans les aléas de l'intégration, mais surtout dans l'évaluation des conséquences économiques et politiques d'une expansion possible de l'économie européenne, qui pouvait s'activer avec le lancement du marché unique et de la monnaie commune. Le début d'une ère potentiellement conflictuelle n'était pas à exclure et les négociations de l'Uruguay Round montrèrent que les deux parties percevaient ce nouveau «conflit» poindre à l'horizon. L'audiovisuel en faisait partie.

En effet, lors de sa visite en Europe au mois de septembre, Carla Hill poursuivait deux objectifs: donner une impulsion politique à l'Uruguay Round et obtenir des garanties à propos du marché unique, qui – selon la représentante spéciale des Etats-Unis pour les problèmes commerciaux – devait aboutir à une plus grande ouverture de la Communauté européenne vers l'extérieur et non pas à la construction d'une forteresse Europe. La question la plus débattue, et d'ailleurs vivement critiquée par Carla Hill, fut plus spécifiquement la limitation des importations de programmes télévisuels non européens. Lors de ses escales dans les capitales européennes, elle ne manqua pas de rappeler que pour les autorités américaines il s'agissait d'une discrimination inacceptable qui violait les dispositions du GATT pour le commerce cinématographique. Carla Hill refusait la thèse européenne selon laquelle l'objectif était de protéger l'identité culturelle européenne.⁴³ Peu de temps après l'approbation de la directive, le représentant des Etats-Unis auprès du GATT, Rufus Yerka, dénonça le caractère unilatéral de la directive et menaça de créer un groupe d'arbitrage si aucune solution satisfaisante n'était trouvée.⁴⁴

Depuis 1985, la Communauté s'était appliquée à être unie aux négociations de l'Uruguay Round qui débutèrent en septembre 1986 à Punta del Este pour être prolongées jusqu'en décembre 1993 avant d'être clôturés par la signature des accords de Marrakech, le 15 avril 1994. La prolongation des négociations au début des années quatre-vingt-dix était surtout due aux importantes différences de positions

43. Bulletin de l'Agence Europe, no.5088, 13.09.89, Agence Europe, Bruxelles.

44. J. CLUZEL, L'émergence d'un droit communautaire de l'audiovisuel. Revue des affaires européennes, no.4, Gent, 1992, pp.47-60.

entre l'Union européenne et les Etats-Unis pour l'agriculture, l'acier, l'aéronautique et, en particulier, pour les produits audiovisuels. La France restait la principale ennemie de l'industrie cinématographique américaine. La question prit aussi une tournure politique considérable par l'accusation explicite d'hégémonie culturelle adressée par la France aux Etats-Unis. Le gel des positions de chaque camp rendit impossible un accord définitif, renvoyé à une négociation ultérieure.⁴⁵ La France luttait pour insérer, dans l'Acte final, le principe de l'exception culturelle qui établissait les exceptions générales aux obligations et aux règlements du Traité.⁴⁶

A la fin du mois d'août 1990, une réunion exploratoire de l'Uruguay Round se tint à Genève sur le droit des gouvernements à établir des quotas sur les programmes nationaux. Les Etats-Unis et le Japon s'opposèrent à tout genre d'exemption à caractère culturel, en contradiction avec le principe du libre échange stipulé pour le secteur des services. La Communauté Européenne avait cependant l'intention de faire adopter le principe des quotas établis par la directive de l'année précédente. L'Inde et l'Egypte appuyaient également ce principe, étant d'importants producteurs d'œuvres cinématographiques.⁴⁷

A Mons, le conseil des ministres des Douze d'octobre 1993 établit une position commune en vue des négociations de l'Uruguay Round. La France défendait la clause d'exception pour le cinéma et l'audiovisuel. Ce faisant, elle signifiait que le secteur ne devait pas être couvert par les dispositions générales sur le libre échange. Une position plus souple reconnaissait la spécificité culturelle, c'est-à-dire que l'audiovisuel entraînait dans le cadre des services, mais avec un traitement spécifique. Le ministre belge Elio di Rupo estimait durant le débat, qu'au moins sept pays pouvaient être fondamentalement favorables à cette formule de l'exception culturelle. En réalité, les délégations du Royaume-Uni, des Pays-Bas, du Luxembourg, de l'Allemagne et du Danemark s'étaient montrées sceptiques face au risque d'accentuer le fossé avec les Etats-Unis. Elles craignaient de mettre en danger l'Uruguay Round. Pour arriver à un accord, l'Europe a dû se contenter de la soi-disant formule des objectifs minimums de compromis. Au Conseil de Mons, l'expression «traitement exceptionnel» insérée dans un texte très vague semblait être «la formule la plus appropriée». Parmi les points décisifs des conclusions, on distingue le maintien et le développement des aides publiques et des subventions aux niveaux communautaire et national; la faculté de réglementer les technologies; l'exclusion du secteur audiovisuel du principe d'élévation progressive du niveau de libéralisation dans le projet d'accord; la liberté de développer à l'avenir toute politique jugée nécessaire au développement du secteur audiovisuel; la maintien de l'acquis communautaire avec une attention spéciale pour la directive Télévision sans frontières. Lors de son intervention, le commissaire Pinheiro tint à préciser que la position de la Commission ne viserait pas à protéger

45. G. MAMMARELLA, P. CACACE, *op.cit.*, p.260.

46. On considérait telles les mesures nécessaires à la protection de la morale et à la sauvegarde de l'ordre public, à la protection de la santé et de la vie des personnes et des animaux, au respect des lois et des réglementations incompatibles avec les dispositions de l'accord GATT. Cf. J.M. WAREGNE, *Le GATT et l'audiovisuel*, Courrier hebdomadaire, CRISP, no.1449-1450, Bruxelles, 1994.

47. Bulletin de l'Agence Europe, no.5308, 30.08.90, Agence Europe, Bruxelles.

éternellement un secteur faible. Il s'agissait au contraire, selon lui, d'accorder à l'audiovisuel le temps et les moyens nécessaires afin de pouvoir devenir fort et compétitif à tel point que la branche deviendrait exportatrice et diffuserait les valeurs européennes à travers le monde entier.⁴⁸

Durant le mois d'octobre, la situation des négociations de l'Uruguay Round apparut assez dramatique: la personnalité des négociateurs, la médiatisation des porte-paroles, la date limite fixée au 15 décembre pour la signature des accords et les résultats de Mons faisaient croire que le désaccord profond entre les Etats-Unis et l'Europe était irréconciliable. Le négociateur américain Mickey Kantor s'érigeait en défenseur des promesses électorales faites par son président à l'électorat californien et au monde du spectacle. Sir Leon Brittan, un ancien ministre de Margaret Thatcher, au nom de la Commission, devait défendre une position soutenue de manière inégale par chacun des pays membres.⁴⁹ A la mi-octobre, selon la Commission, onze Etats membres avaient trouvé un accord précis sur les positions à soutenir: seule la France maintenait ses réserves estimant que les effets réels et concrets des objectifs de Mons n'étaient pas clairs.⁵⁰ L'intervention de Bill Clinton fut catégorique: dans un communiqué diffusé par la Maison Blanche le 15 octobre. Il excluait tout type de traitement préférentiel en faveur de l'audiovisuel. Le président américain, en confirmant l'importance fondamentale des accords, affirma qu'il s'agissait pour les Etats-Unis d'un problème vital en termes d'emploi et d'équité. Il confirma le 15 décembre comme date buttoir pour atteindre l'accord.⁵¹

La Commission continuait son œuvre de médiation afin de trouver une position unitaire – et surtout claire – entre les Etats membres, mais par l'intervention de Sir Léon Brittan au Parlement à la fin du mois, il était facile de comprendre qu'il n'était pas encore possible de rédiger un «document juridique» à présenter au Conseil. Le 5 novembre, les délégations maintinrent leurs propres positions au Conseil «Culture»: l'Irlande soutenait avec la France l'exception culturelle.⁵² Le Conseil des Affaires Générales du 7 décembre demanda aux négociateurs communautaires de maintenir dans les négociations de l'Uruguay Round, qui entre-temps s'étaient déplacées à Genève, les mêmes positions exprimées par les précédents Conseils, et de reporter à un plan multilatéral les résultats des négociations bilatérales avec les Etats-Unis.⁵³ Mais à Paris, Alain Juppé communiquait que rien n'avait été conclu à Bruxelles et Jacques Delors déclarait inacceptables les nouvelles prétentions américaines sur l'audiovisuel, l'unique problème resté ouvert, avec l'aéronautique et l'acier, deux secteurs qui cependant pouvaient donner lieu à des accords séparés.

Le 11 décembre, Sir Leon Brittan présenta aux Douze réunis en Conseil extraordinaire des Affaires Générales, un bilan des négociations désormais considérées comme closes: sept ans de négociations avaient mené à des «résultats globalement

48. Bulletin de l'Agence Europe, no.6080, 07.10.93, Agence Europe, Bruxelles.

49. A. MEYER-HEINE, *Le droit européen des émissions de télévision*, Economica, Paris, 1996, p.215.

50. Bulletin de l'Agence Europe, no.6087, 16.10.93, Agence Europe, Bruxelles.

51. *Ibid.*

52. Bulletin de l'Agence Europe, no.6102, 06.11.93, Agence Europe, Bruxelles.

53. Bulletin de l'Agence Europe, no.6123, 08.12.93, Agence Europe, Bruxelles.

satisfaisants». Par rapport à l'audiovisuel, les travaux devaient nécessairement continuer au-delà du 15 décembre. A la clôture des négociations, la solution finale se présenta d'une manière assez complexe: avec sa formule de «spécificité culturelle» pour l'audiovisuel, l'Europe obtenait que l'industrie européenne fût soumise à la seule obligation de la transparence, qui signifiait de pouvoir continuer à bénéficier de l'intervention et des aides publiques pour autant que celles-ci étaient dévoilées. On ne pouvait pas parler, techniquement, d'une exception pour l'audiovisuel incluse dans le GATT, mais, comme le précisait le négociateur européen, elle ne serait plus soumise aux «menaces» de représailles unilatérales.⁵⁴ Dans les déclarations rendues au Parlement européen le 17 décembre 1993, le commissaire à la concurrence Karel Van Miert déclarait que la liberté d'action de la Communauté et des Etats membres restait inaltérée, en particulier pour le régime de la Télévision sans frontières et l'adoption d'une législation pour la télévision de l'avenir. L'unique obligation était justement la transparence. Le commissaire Pinheiro définit l'Uruguay Round comme «un bon match nul»: les Etats-Unis n'avaient obtenu ni l'abolition, ni les modifications au régime de soutien législatif et financier en Europe; l'Union n'avait pas obtenu le traitement exceptionnel, comme la France l'avait proposé. Selon le commissaire, Européens et Américains devaient continuer le dialogue et chercher des instruments concrets de coopération.⁵⁵ La Communauté et les Etats membres ne s'engageaient pas à garantir une plus grande ouverture du marché audiovisuel communautaire et par conséquent, maintenaient le droit de nier ou de limiter l'accès au marché communautaire, aux services provenant d'Etats tiers ou de leur réserver un traitement différent par rapport à celui réservé aux services et aux investisseurs communautaires.⁵⁶

7. Du Livre Vert à la Conférence européenne de l'audiovisuel de Bruxelles

«Les négociations sur la libéralisation des services dans le cadre de l'Uruguay Round ont eu le mérite de mettre en lumière l'importance stratégique du secteur de l'audiovisuel en général, ainsi que les importantes conséquences des développements futurs du système de l'image en Europe».⁵⁷

C'est ce qu'on peut lire dans le Livre vert sur la politique audiovisuelle que la Commission rédigea à la suite de l'accord sur les services, ou plutôt de l'absence d'accord, qui, dans le cadre de l'Uruguay Round, offrait à l'Union européenne et aux Etats une plus grande marge de manœuvre. La trêve accordée à l'industrie

54. Bulletin de l'Agence Europe, no.6130, 16.12.93, Agence Europe, Bruxelles.

55. Bulletin de l'Agence Europe, no.6181, 02.03.94, Agence Europe, Bruxelles.

56. L. DANIELE, Antitrust, servizi audiovisivi e Gats, *Annali italiani del diritto d'autore, della cultura e dello spettacolo*, sous la direction de L.C. Ubertazzi, Milano, 1996, p.65.

57. Commission des Communautés européennes, *Options stratégiques pour le renforcement de l'industrie des programmes dans le contexte de la politique audiovisuelle de l'Union européenne - Livre Vert, COM(94)96 final*, 06.04.1994, Office des publications officielles des Communautés Européennes, Luxembourg.

cinématographique européenne devait, selon Pinheiro, être exploitée par les Etats membres et par les professionnels du secteur. Ces derniers devaient choisir entre une restructuration nécessaire pour s'opposer à la concurrence américaine et l'acceptation des conséquences économiques et culturelles liées à l'abandon de l'intervention publique. Le Livre vert adopté en avril 1994 par la Commission, se limitait à analyser la situation et à poser des questions sur l'avenir du secteur; il entendait donc ouvrir, à la lumière des résultats des accords de l'Uruguay Round sur les services, une vaste consultation en relation avec le Livre blanc de Delors sur la croissance, la compétitivité et l'occupation adopté par le Conseil européen en décembre 1993.⁵⁸ La Société de l'information,⁵⁹ et en particulier le secteur audiovisuel, étaient identifiés dans le Livre blanc avec des secteurs ayant le meilleur potentiel de croissance et de création de postes de travail. Parallèlement à ses réflexions sur la «Grande Europe», le président de la Commission confirma tout ce qui était déjà exprimé dans le Livre blanc: le développement de la Société de l'information représentait une révolution comparable à celle de Gutenberg, et sur une telle question le Conseil européen de Bruxelles – affirma Delors – «n'est pas allé jusqu'au fond». Il souligna, en outre, que – après l'accord de l'Uruguay Round – l'audiovisuel représentait un des problèmes les plus importants pour l'année à venir: «dans ce domaine où la technologie fait des pas de géant, ce ne sera pas simple de faire vivre l'identité culturelle européenne».⁶⁰

Le nouveau document de la Commission fut aussitôt examiné par les ministres et les experts de l'audiovisuel des Douze réunis, le 22 avril 1994, à Athènes pour un séminaire sous la présidence du ministre grec Evangelos Venizelos.⁶¹ Des conclusions de la présidence il apparaissait que des frictions étaient nées au moment où le problème de la révision de la directive Télévision sans frontières avait été soulevé. On se remit à parler de la célèbre directive après que la Commission eut présenté en mars le rapport sur l'étendue de son exécution.⁶² Ce dernier mit en lumière quelques données importantes comme le respect des dispositions de promotion de la production et de la distribution établies par les articles 4 et 5. Selon ce même rapport 65 à 70% des télévisions examinées respectaient la «proportion majoritaire d'œuvres européennes» et la proportion d'œuvres de producteurs indépendants. Lorsque le seuil n'était pas atteint, il y avait néanmoins une tendance à la hausse. Selon l'estimation du commissaire Pinheiro, les résultats étaient encourageants.⁶³ Une série de problèmes d'ordre

58. J. DELORS, Livre blanc sur la croissance, la compétitivité et l'emploi. Pour entrer dans le XXIème siècle, Office des publications officielles des Communautés Européennes, Luxembourg, 1993.

59. Le Conseil européen de Bruxelles du 10 décembre 1993 prend note du Livre blanc sur la croissance, la compétitivité et l'emploi, où apparaît pour la première fois l'expression de "société de l'information".

60. Bulletin de l'Agence Europe, no.6159, 29.01.94, Agence Europe, Bruxelles.

61. Bulletin de l'Agence Europe, no.6217, 23.04.94, Agence Europe, Bruxelles.

62. Communication de la Commission au Conseil et au Parlement Européen relative à l'application des articles 4 et 5 de la directive 89/552/CEE «Télévision sans frontières», COM(94)57 final, 03.03.94, Office des publications officielles des Communautés Européennes, Luxembourg.

63. Communiqués des Institutions européennes. Informations à la presse, IP/94/175, 03.03.94, Commission Européenne, Bruxelles.

méthodologique, technique et juridique, dus à la diversité des critères appliqués par les Etats membres et aux différences de présentation des rapports nationaux, compliqua le travail d'évaluation de la Commission. Ces problèmes concernaient la définition du concept de producteur indépendant, la fixation de la période de référence ou encore le manque de statistiques communiquées par les Etats membres.

A Athènes, les positions de la France et de l'Allemagne furent divergentes. Le ministre français de la Communication, Alain Carignon, présenta un ensemble de propositions afin de rendre la réglementation communautaire plus coercitive en renforçant les obligations imposées par la directive de 1989; ces mesures pouvaient aller jusqu'à la suspension des programmes des émetteurs défaillants. Contrairement à cette position, la délégation allemande affirma clairement que les bases d'une politique européenne n'étaient pas en place. Partant, l'unique solution demeurait nationale.⁶⁴

Les deux résolutions du Parlement européen, approuvées en mai, allèrent dans le sens de la position française. Elaborées toutes deux par la Commission pour la culture, la jeunesse, l'instruction et l'information, la première était rédigée par le démocrate chrétien allemand Hoppenstedt. Elle concernait les modifications du programme Media⁶⁵ pour lequel, il s'agissait entre autres d'obtenir plus de moyens financiers. La seconde, rédigée par le député Barzanti, remettait au premier plan, après la réunion d'Athènes, la directive Télévision sans frontières.⁶⁶ La validité de la structure globale de la directive fut confirmée et l'on insista sur le fait qu'elle devrait être renforcée. Comme par le passé, les parties les plus controversées, et donc sujettes à discussions, concernaient les articles 4 et 5. L'analyse de la commission parlementaire abondait dans le même sens que celle de la Commission en insistant sur la nécessité de «méthodologies de relevés statistiques opportuns et homogènes». Les politiques communautaires devaient prendre en compte le cinéma dans sa globalité (celui des salles comme de la télévision) sans opérer des distinctions; seule une telle attitude pouvait mener à la création d'un marché européen du cinéma et «dépasser la fragmentation scandaleuse»⁶⁷ en élaborant également une directive sur le cinéma dont le rapporteur parlait déjà depuis 1992.

Le débat parlementaire, un des derniers avant la fin de la législature, introduisait la question bien plus complexe de la Conférence européenne de l'audiovisuel, qui se déroula à Bruxelles au cours de la première semaine de juillet, et à laquelle par-

64. Bulletin de l'Agence Europe, no.6217, op.cit.

65. Documents de séance du Parlement européen. Rapport de la Commission de la culture, de la jeunesse, de l'éducation, des médias et des sports, sur la Proposition de Décision du Conseil modifiant la décision 90/685/CEE concernant la mise en œuvre d'un programme d'action pour encourager le développement de l'industrie audiovisuelle européenne (COM(93)462 - C3-486/93) «Media» (1991-1995), rapporteur Hoppenstedt, A3-241/94, 12.04.94, Parlement Européen, Bruxelles.

66. Documents de séance du Parlement européen. Rapport de la Commission de la culture, de la jeunesse, de l'éducation, des médias et des sports, sur la Communication de la Commission au Conseil et au Parlement Européen relative à l'application des articles 4 et 5 de la directive 89/552/CEE «Télévision sans frontières», COM(94)57 final, rapporteur Barzanti, A3-297/94, 26.04.94, Parlement Européen, Bruxelles.

67. Débats du Parlement européen, no.3-448/288, 06.05.94, Parlement Européen, Bruxelles.

tipicèrent non seulement les représentants politiques mais aussi les représentants des associations du secteur, les experts et les opérateurs de l'audiovisuel de l'Europe entière.⁶⁸ L'ensemble des participants souhaitait une augmentation des ressources publiques nécessaires à l'industrie audiovisuelle européenne pour atteindre une masse critique de productions. La Conférence suggéra, entre autres, la création d'un fonds européen qui ne devait pas être inférieur à un milliard d'ECU ou à un montant équivalent à 1% du bilan communautaire. La quantité des sommes demandées se justifiait par le fait que l'audiovisuel représentait – par rapport aux autres secteurs de l'économie – un secteur stratégique.

L'affirmation de Pinheiro qui, grâce à la Conférence, se déclarait «sensiblement plus optimiste», fut emblématique: «... c'est d'envisager le prix de l'échec qui rend inévitable notre réussite».

L'été 1994 représenta une ligne de démarcation dans la politique communautaire pour l'audiovisuel. La législation s'achevait et un nouveau Parlement approuvait la nomination de Jacques Santer pour la présidence de la Commission. Delors et ses commissaires se préparaient donc à la passation des pouvoirs en portant à terme les projets annoncés. La Conférence européenne de l'audiovisuel marquait l'aboutissement d'une période à partir de laquelle s'ouvrait le chemin pour le nouveau programme Media et pour la révision de la Télévision sans frontières. Dans le courant du mois de juillet, la Commission présenta le Plan d'action destiné à frayer la voie européenne vers la société de l'information globale⁶⁹ qui confirmait l'importance du secteur pour l'emploi et qui ouvrait de nouvelles perspectives à la révolution numérique en raison de l'inévitable convergence de tous les secteurs des télécommunications. La Commission inaugurerait une révolution qui viendrait bouleverser les maigres certitudes du passé.

9. Conclusions

Les programmes européens de soutien au cinéma élaborés depuis la deuxième moitié des années quatre-vingt ont principalement misé sur les coproductions cinématographiques, mais ne sont pas parvenus en réalité à engendrer un cinéma européen inspirateur d'une identité commune. Ils se sont plutôt limités à produire des films nationaux plus faciles à exporter. Le nombre des œuvres audiovisuelles qui circulent entre les pays européens est encore à l'heure actuelle modeste par rapport à la «mobilité» des productions américaines. Il en résulte que l'Europe de l'audiovisuel est le premier marché des Etats-Unis et, par un cruel paradoxe, ce sont les Américains qui considèrent l'Europe comme un marché libre et unifié.

68. Bulletin de l'Agence Europe, no.6266, 04-05.07.94, Agence Europe, Bruxelles.

69. Vers la société de l'information en Europe: un plan d'action - communication de la Commission au Conseil et au Parlement européen et au Comité Economique et Social et au Comité des Régions, COM(94)347 final, 19.7.94, Office des publications officielles des Communautés Européennes, Luxembourg.

Si on examine bien les crédits affectés aux différents programmes, on peut déduire que le problème de la production audiovisuelle n'a jamais été considéré comme étant crucial: la plus grande attention a été accordée à la circulation des productions et au développement technologique. On confirmait substantiellement l'importance accordée à une approche économique des problèmes inhérents à la radiodiffusion. Comme pour d'autres secteurs, l'objectif était la construction d'un grand marché unique. La Communauté – derrière la déréglementation diffuse dans l'Europe des années 1980 – poussa substantiellement les gouvernements à rompre avec le monopole du service public, une condition nécessaire à l'ouverture d'un marché libre et pluraliste. C'étaient encore une fois les aspects économiques qui surclassaient les aspects culturels et l'idée fonctionnaliste qui l'emportait. Dans l'Europe de la Communauté économique, la force des industries de l'électronique a certainement été plus décisive que celle des producteurs de contenus. Les deux groupes de pression ont eu des rôles importants dans les processus décisionnels. L'industrie de l'électronique – certainement plus puissante que les producteurs audiovisuels – a bénéficié dans une large mesure du soutien économique de la Communauté.

La télévision et ses progrès techniques ont posé des problèmes de nature politique, culturelle et économique en sorte que les tentatives de la contrôler ont été particulièrement difficiles. Les institutions communautaires n'ont pas eu un rôle et un parcours facile et aisé. La capacité de prévision des développements, surtout technologiques, a souvent été insuffisante et a contraint les institutions à poursuivre les changements déjà initiés. Le Parlement – nous l'avons vu – a souvent été une arène de discussions importantes et constructives. Il a recouvré un rôle technico-politique considérable si on regarde les innombrables travaux produits à l'intérieur des commissions parlementaires. Mais, ni la procédure de coopération introduite par l'Acte Unique, ni celle de la codécision retenue après Maastricht, ne sont parvenues à élever son rôle au niveau de celui d'une représentation populaire qu'il occupe normalement dans les démocraties nationales. Les décisions politiques, souvent transversales aux coalitions, ont été accueillies par la Commission quand elles ne s'opposaient pas aux positions du Conseil. La Commission, même disposée à seconder la volonté parlementaire, a joué dans différents cas un rôle médiateur entre l'Assemblée et les représentants des gouvernements. Son rôle de protagoniste a cependant été, dans les affaires liées à la télévision et à l'audiovisuel, voilé par la volonté dernière du Conseil dont les retards et les veto ont ralenti – et dans certains cas annulé – l'action de la Commission guidée pendant une décennie par Jacques Delors, lui même protagoniste et partisan convaincu de politiques audiovisuelles volontaristes.

Par rapport à l'ampleur des problèmes économiques, intellectuels et organisationnels de la constitution d'un marché européen de l'audiovisuel, le rôle des institutions communautaires s'est indubitablement révélé moins facile et incisif qu'on n'aurait pu le croire. La Communauté s'est vue dépasser par l'innovation numérique qui a ouvert une époque entièrement nouvelle: «la société de l'information globale» vers laquelle l'Europe évolue en cherchant péniblement sa propre voie.

Lüder Gerken/Jörg Märkt/Gerhard Schick/Andreas Renner

Eine freiheitliche supranationale Föderation

Zur Aufgabenverteilung in Europa

Die europäische Integration befindet sich derzeit an einer Wegscheide: Das bisherige intergouvernementale Modell der europäischen Integration wird zunehmend in Frage gestellt. Die staatliche Vereinigung zu einem Bundesstaat scheidet jedoch an der fehlenden Zustimmung in den einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten.

Die Autoren verfolgen vor diesem Hintergrund die Konzeption einer freiheitlichen supranationalen Föderation. Sie zielt auf ein demokratischeres Europa, das die Chancen föderaler Differenzierung intensiv nutzt und das Freiheitsrecht der Individuen umfassend gewährleistet. In der gegenwärtigen Debatte um eine künftige europäische Verfassung weist diese Konzeption auf eine Option hin, die jenseits traditioneller föderaler Staatsformen liegt.

Neben Vorschlägen für die institutionelle Ordnung Europas diskutieren die Autoren Anforderungen an die Aufgabenverteilung zwischen Union und Mitgliedstaaten in einer solchen freiheitlichen supranationalen Föderation für die Bereiche Beihilfenpolitik, Umweltpolitik, Beschäftigungs- und Sozialpolitik sowie Steuerpolitik.

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Andreas Maurer

Parlamentarische Demokratie in der Europäischen Union

Der Beitrag des Europäischen Parlaments und der nationalen Parlamente

Die Studie untersucht die dem Europäischen Parlament und den nationalen Parlamenten der EU-Mitgliedstaaten in den letzten 15 Jahren zugestandenen und von ihnen genutzten Optionen zur Kontrolle und Mitgestaltung europäischer Politik. Grundfrage ist, in welcher Form und unter welchen Umfeldbedingungen den beiden parlamentarischen Ebenen Anreizstrukturen geöffnet wurden, die zur substantiellen Reduzierung des Demokratiedefizits in der EU beitragen. Die Studie zieht hierzu die im Maastrichter Vertrag erstmals angelegte Verknüpfung der beiden Parliaments-ebenen als Ausgangspunkt einer in dieser Form neuartigen Untersuchung heran. Analysiert werden Chancen und Grenzen eines europäischen Mehrebenenparlamentarismus. Die Studie bietet damit eine aktuelle und empirisch gesättigte Grundlage für die europäische Verfassungsdebatte. Sie wendet sich an Praktiker der Europapolitik, Sozialwissenschaftler und Europarechtler sowie an interessierte Journalisten und Multiplikatoren der politischen Bildung.

Andreas Maurer ist wissenschaftlicher Referent der Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin (Forschungsgruppe Europäische Integration) und Lehrbeauftragter an den Universitäten Osnabrück und Berlin (FU).

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„Überzeugter Katholik und CDU-Wähler“: Zur Historiographie der Integrationsgeschichte am Beispiel Walter Lipgens

Wolfram Kaiser

Historische und sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung ist stets in gewissem Maße von aktuellen politischen und gesellschaftlichen Entwicklungen und von der lebensweltlichen Erfahrung des jeweiligen Forschers abhängig. Das gilt gerade auch für die Integrationsforschung, weil es sich hierbei um ein gegenwartsnahes Phänomen handelt und in einer EU mit immer stärker bundesstaatlichen Zügen mehr und mehr Fragen ihrer zukünftigen Entwicklung politisch kontrovers sind.

Wie stark gerade die Integrationsforschung von einem dominanten politischen Zeitgeist abhängig sein kann, zeigt sich besonders krass in der Integrationstheorie. Obschon der Neo-Funktionalismus partiell auf David Mitrany's Funktionalismus aus der Zwischenkriegszeit zurückgriff,¹ entwickelten ihn Autoren wie Ernst B. Haas erst angesichts der tatsächlichen Erfahrungen mit der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl (EGKS) und der Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (EWG) und von EURATOM.² Diese schienen wichtige Grundannahmen des Neo-Funktionalismus, wie etwa die führende Rolle bürokratischer Eliten in der Integrationspolitik, weitgehend zu bestätigen. Als Charles de Gaulle dann in den sechziger Jahren die EWG auf den Wirtschaftssektor beschränken, die Kompetenzen der Kommission beschneiden und zwischenstaatliche Kooperation außerhalb der bestehenden Verträge entwickeln wollte, verstärkte dies die Skepsis gegenüber dem Neo-Funktionalismus. Stanley Hoffmann formulierte seine Kritik daran in einem Aufsatz, der manche Hypothesen späterer intergouvernementaler und wirtschaftsgeschichtlicher Studien vorweg nahm, nicht zufällig direkt nach der Krise des leeren Stuhls und dem Luxemburger Kompromiß von 1965/66.³ Schließlich ist auch der liberale Intergouvernementalismus, den Andrew Moravcsik als hegemoniale Theorie durchsetzen wollte, stark von der politischen Erfahrung der neunziger Jahre geprägt, dass die Mitgliedstaaten, vor allem das vereinigte Deutschland, nach dem Fall des Eisernen Vorhangs größere Handlungsfreiheit hatten, Vertragsrevisionen kontrollierten und darüber hinaus die laufende EU-Politik über den Europäischen Rat und den Ministerrat zu dominieren schienen.⁴

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1. Siehe etwa D. MITRANY, *The Progress of International Government*, London, 1933.
 2. E.B. HAAS, *The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957*, Stanford, 1958.
 3. S. HOFFMANN, *Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation State and the Case of Western Europe*, in: *Daedalus*, 95/3(1966), S.862-915.
 4. Siehe vor allem A. MORAVCSIK, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, London, 1998.

Je etablierter dieses Forschungsfeld ist, um so mehr erscheint auch in der historischen Integrationsforschung eine vertiefte Reflexion und Diskussion wünschenswert, inwieweit und auf welche Weise lebensweltliche Erfahrungen und der eigene „europäische“ Standpunkt womöglich die Auswahl der Forschungsthemen wie auch dominante Interpretationsmuster beeinflussen können. Als insoweit aufschlussreich erweist sich der hier dokumentierte Briefwechsel aus dem Jahr 1964 zwischen Walter Lippens, dem ersten europäischen Historiker, der sich anhand von Quellen mit der (Vor-) Geschichte der europäischen Integration nach 1945 befasste, und Heinrich von Brentano, dem Vorsitzenden der CDU/CSU-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag.⁵ Dieser Briefwechsel soll hier zumindest ansatzweise biographisch und europapolitisch eingeordnet werden, um so zu einer historiographischen Aufarbeitung der Integrationsgeschichte anzuregen.⁶

In Düsseldorf im Rheinland am 12. Juni 1925 geboren, wurde Lippens im Mai 1943 in die Wehrmacht eingezogen. Im April 1944 entlassen, studierte und promovierte (1948) er sodann an der Universität Tübingen. Anschließend war er bis 1950 Assistent am Historischen Seminar der Universität Münster. Danach beschäftigte er sich bis 1954 als Stipendiat der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft mit den Beziehungen zwischen Staat und Kirche in Münster zwischen 1789 und 1835. Zwischen 1955 und 1960 arbeitete Lippens als Westeuropareferent für die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik in Bonn, wo er für die Jahrbücher *Die Internationale Politik* verantwortlich war, und habilitierte sich 1960 in Neuerer Geschichte an der Universität Heidelberg, wo er anschließend bis 1967 als Universitätsdozent blieb. Im Jahr 1964/65 war Lippens vertretungsweise Professor an der Universität Bonn, 1966/67 Fellow am Institute for Advanced Study der Universität Princeton und 1973 Gastprofessor an der Universität von Missouri in Columbia. Im Jahr 1967 erhielt Lippens einen Ruf an die Universität Saarbrücken, wo er bis 1976 und erneut von 1979 bis zu seinem Tod am 29. April 1984 tätig war. Zwischenzeitlich war er von 1976 bis 1979 der erste Professor für Neueste Geschichte mit einem Schwerpunkt in der europäischen Integration am neu gegründeten Europäischen Hochschulinstitut in Florenz.⁷

Mit seinen politischen Bedenken hinsichtlich der zukünftigen Europapolitik der Bonner Regierung wandte sich Lippens nicht zufällig an von Brentano, der schon von 1949 bis 1955 und wieder seit 1961 Fraktionsvorsitzender war. Zwischenzeitlich war er von 1955 bis 1961 Außenminister gewesen. Von Brentano war ein konservativer katholischer CDU-Politiker aus Hessen, der in der frühen Nachkriegszeit über intensive Kontakte zu Institutionen wie der Abendländischen Akademie in Eichstätt und Medien wie der Zeitschrift (*Neues*) *Abendland* im katholischen Milieu verfügte, die dezidiert anti-bolschewistisch ausgerichtet waren, ein christlich-„abendländisch“ geprägtes Westeuropa anstrebten und hierfür vielfach gegenüber supranationalen Lösungen offen

5. Bundesarchiv (BA) Koblenz, N 1239 (Nachlaß Heinrich von Brentano) / 30.

6. Der Nachlaß von Walter Lippens befindet sich im Historischen Archiv des Europäischen Hochschulinstituts in Florenz (www.iuearc.it). Er umfasst Quellen aus der Zeit von 1940 bis 1970, allerdings primär Materialsammlungen für Bücher und Aufsätze.

7. Vgl. Professor Dr. Walter Lippens, Lebensdaten, Stand: 1979. Für die Kopie des Lebenslaufes danke ich Dr. Wolfgang Müller, Archivoberrat, Archiv der Universität des Saarlandes, Saarbrücken.

waren.⁸ Er war ein enger Vertrauter Konrad Adenauers und stand nicht in dem Ruf, ein besonders eigenständiges Profil zu haben.⁹ Als sich die engen transnationalen Kontakte der europäischen christlichen Demokraten nach der Wahl Adenauers zum ersten Bundeskanzler 1949 stärker auf die Regierungsebene verlagerten, vertrat von Brentano diesen oft in den *Nouvelles Equipes Internationales*, der Vorläuferorganisation der heutigen Europäischen Volkspartei, und in dem informellen Genfer Kreis, in dem vorwiegend Themen des Kalten Krieges und der westeuropäischen Integration vertraulich besprochen wurden.¹⁰

In diesem in der CDU/CSU zunächst noch dominanten katholischen Milieu herrschte eine transnational verbindende, kritische Sicht des Protestantismus, vor allem des deutschen Luthertums, vor, der einer forcierten Industrialisierung mit ihren schwerwiegenden sozialen Folgen, einer übermäßigen gesellschaftlichen Individualisierung und einer Überhöhung des Nationalen anstelle „abendländischer“ Gemeinsamkeiten in Europa Vorschub geleistet und somit erst die totalitären Ideologien und die beiden Weltkriege möglich gemacht habe. Genauso kritisch sahen viele katholische CDU/CSU-Politiker wie auch ihre christlich-demokratischen Partner in Westeuropa die Rolle Preußens in der deutschen und europäischen Geschichte, das für die Unterdrückung des Katholizismus im Kulturkampf und seine spätere Marginalisierung, für eine verspätete Demokratisierung sowie für den deutschen Militarismus und somit indirekt für die Verbrechen des Nationalsozialismus verantwortlich gemacht wurde. Dementsprechend war das katholische Milieu in der CDU, in dem sich von Brentano bewegte, stark auf eine möglichst enge Kooperation mit Frankreich in einem „Kerneuropa“ kontinentaler Staaten orientiert, das in dieser Sicht in der mittelalterlich-karolingischen Reichstradition weitgehend supranational organisiert sein sollte.¹¹

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8. Vgl. zu diesem Milieu auch A. SCHILDT, *Zwischen Abendland und Amerika: Studien zur westdeutschen Ideenlandschaft der 50er Jahre*, München, 1999. Siehe auch im europäischen Kontext G. MÜLLER und V. PLICHTA, *Zwischen Rhein und Donau. Abendländisches Denken zwischen deutsch-französischen Verständigungsinitiativen und konservativ-katholischen Integrationsmodellen (1923-1957)*, in: *Journal of European Integration History*, 5(1999), S.17-47; P. CHENAUX, *Une Europe Vaticane? Entre le Plan Marshall et les Traités de Rome*, Brüssel, 1990, S.210 ff.
 9. Bisher liegt keine quellengesättigte wissenschaftliche Biographie Heinrich von Brentanos vor. Vgl. einführend H. BRUNCK, *Heinrich von Brentano (1904-1964)*, in: B. HEIDENREICH (Hrsg.), *Einheit und Freiheit. Hessische Persönlichkeiten und der Weg zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Wiesbaden, 2000, S.73-94; A. BARING (Hrsg.), *Sehr verehrter Herr Bundeskanzler! Heinrich von Brentano im Briefwechsel mit Konrad Adenauer, 1949-1964*, Hamburg, 1974.
 10. Vgl. hierzu M. GEHLER und W. KAISER, *Transnationalism and early European integration: The NEI and the Geneva Circle 1947-57*, in: *The Historical Journal*, 44(2001), S.773-798; ausführlicher die Beiträge derselben Autoren in: M. GEHLER, W. KAISER und H. WOHNOUT (Hrsg.), *Christdemokratie in Europa im 20. Jahrhundert*, Wien-Köln-Weimar, 2001 sowie mit mehr als 200 Dokumenten M. GEHLER und W. KAISER, *Europäische Christdemokraten: Transnationale Parteienkooperation in NEI und Genfer Kreis 1947-1965. Darstellung und Dokumente*, i.E.
 11. Zu den institutionellen Ordnungsvorstellungen westdeutscher und westeuropäischer christlicher Demokraten im Kontext ihrer transnationalen Parteienkooperation siehe auch W. KAISER, „L'ennemi héréditaire, c'est l'Angleterre“. *Les démocrates-chrétiens français et allemands face aux questions institutionnelles (1947-1963)*, in: M.-T. BITSCH (Hrsg.), *Le couple France-Allemagne et les institutions européennes*, Brüssel, 2001, S.307-323.

Innerhalb der CDU geriet diese katholisch-, „abendländische“ Sicht Europas Anfang der sechziger Jahre immer mehr unter Druck. Erstens war die ideologische Motivation für ein geeintes Europa aus der frühen Nachkriegszeit nicht mehr so stark, nachdem EGKS und EWG erfolgreich gegründet waren, sich die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen im Kontext der Integration entspannt hatten und eine technokratische Auffassung des Integrationsprozesses stärker wurde. Zweitens legte die CDU-Führung unter Adenauer aus innerparteilichen und innenpolitischen Gründen großen Wert auf eine umfassende Integration protestantischer Mitglieder und Wählerschichten, um den Charakter der CDU als Volkspartei zu stärken.¹² Diese waren jedoch kulturell (und somit oft auch außenpolitisch) eher auf die Vereinigten Staaten und Großbritannien ausgerichtet und weniger zu einer engen Zusammenarbeit mit Frankreich *zu deren möglichem politischen Nachteil* bereit. Dies wurde rasch deutlich, als der Protestant Ludwig Erhard im Jahr 1963 Adenauer als Bundeskanzler ablöste. Schon als Wirtschaftsminister hatte Erhard 1955/56 für globale Handelsliberalisierung und gegen eine Wirtschaftsintegration in einem „Kerneuropa“ plädiert, von dem er befürchtete, dass dieses unter französischem Einfluss protektionistisch ausgerichtet sein und den Welthandel eher behindern würde.¹³ Sein Außenminister (seit 1961) Gerhard Schröder, der auch Vorsitzender des Evangelischen Arbeitskreises innerhalb der CDU war, galt als starker Befürworter einer Erweiterung der EWG um Großbritannien und einer engen transatlantischen Partnerschaft mit den USA.¹⁴ Schließlich erschwerten drittens de Gaulles Führungsanspruch, seine Politik einer kontrollierten Konfrontation mit den USA innerhalb der NATO sowie seine institutionellen Präferenzen eine weitreichende bilaterale Kooperation mit Frankreich.¹⁵ Dies war bereits im Zuge der Fouchet-Verhandlungen 1961/62 und erneut nach de Gaulles Veto des britischen EWG-Beitrittsantrags und dem Abschluß des deutsch-französischen Elysée-Vertrags im Januar 1963 deutlich geworden, dem der Deutsche Bundestag mit starker Unterstützung aus der CDU eine „atlantische“ Präambel vorangestellt hatte.¹⁶ Als Lipgens am 8. September 1964 den hier dokumentierten Brief schrieb, waren die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen bereits in eine Krise geraten. Von Brentano hatte zwar schließlich die Ablösung Adenauers durch Erhard mit betrieben, um die Wahlchancen der Union zu verbessern,¹⁷ galt jedoch innerhalb der CDU weiterhin als führender Vertreter von dessen europapolitischer Linie.

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12. Zur Strategie des innerparteilichen konfessionellen Ausgleichs in der CDU vgl. neuerdings F. BÖSCH, *Die Adenauer-CDU. Gründung, Aufstieg und Krise einer Erfolgspartei 1945-1969*, München, 2001, Kapitel 3 und 4.
 13. Zu Erhard siehe D. KOERFER, *Kampf ums Kanzleramt. Erhard und Adenauer*, Stuttgart, 1987; V. HENTSCHEL, *Ludwig Erhard. Ein Politikerleben*, München, 1996.
 14. Vgl. T. OPPELLAND, *Gerhard Schröder (1910-1989). Eine politische Biographie*, Düsseldorf, 2002.
 15. Für eine von der vorherrschenden Meinung abweichende Interpretation von de Gaulles Europapolitik siehe W. LOTH, *De Gaulle und Europa. Eine Revision*, in: *Historische Zeitschrift*, 253(1991), S.629-660.
 16. Siehe auch W. HÖLSCHER, *Krisenmanagement in Sachen EWG. Das Scheitern des Beitritts Großbritanniens und die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen*, in: R.A. BLASIUS (Hrsg.), *Von Adenauer zu Erhard. Studien zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1963*, München, 1994, S.9-44.
 17. H.-P. SCHWARZ, *Adenauer. Der Staatsmann: 1952-1957*, Stuttgart, 1991, S.830 ff.

In seinem Schreiben an von Brentano bezeichnet sich Lippens zunächst als „überzeugter Katholik“. Die Erwähnung seiner konfessionellen Zugehörigkeit kommt nicht von ungefähr. Sie unterstreicht nicht nur seine Verbundenheit mit von Brentano als wichtigem Vertreter des politischen Katholizismus in der erst allmählich stärker volksparteilichen CDU; vielmehr bezieht sich Lippens ausdrücklich auf die Vorbildfunktion des katholischen Widerstands gegen den Nationalsozialismus und dessen Nachkriegspläne für eine „föderalistische Ordnung Europas“. Diese hätten sein eigenes politisches Denken über Europa geprägt, seit er 1943 als Siebzehnjähriger „unter der Kanzel Bischof von Galens stand“. Lippens hatte von 1940 bis 1943 das Schiller-Gymnasium in Münster besucht und dort sein Abitur abgelegt. Clemens August Graf von Galen (1878-1946) war seit 1933 Bischof von Münster gewesen und wurde 1946 zum Kardinal ernannt. Er trat auch während des Zweiten Weltkrieges nachdrücklich gegen die Kirchen- und Rassenpolitik der Nationalsozialisten auf.¹⁸

Zugleich versichert Lippens von Brentano, er sei seit 1945 Stammwähler der CDU. Angesichts der protestantischen Prägung der liberalen FDP, die noch dazu nach 1945 besonders viele Nationalsozialisten integrierte, und der bis zu ihrem Parteitag in Bad Godesberg 1959 noch programmatisch, wenn auch nicht immer in ihrer praktischen Politik klassenkämpferischen und anti-kirchlichen Ausrichtung der Sozialdemokraten war eine solche politische Orientierung vor dem Hintergrund seiner familiären Herkunft und konfessionellen Zugehörigkeit nach 1945 durchaus typisch. Lippens betont jedoch darüber hinaus, dass er die CDU bis dato vor allem wegen ihrer europäischen Politik der Westintegration unterstützt habe. Seit die CDU nach vier Jahren Alleinregierung ab 1961 wieder mit der FDP koalierte und Adenauer seit 1963 nicht mehr Kanzler war, erschien Lippens diese Politik gefährdet. Es drohe die Gefahr, dass der Nationalismus der FDP „von Achenbach bis Zoglmann“ die CDU „infiltriert“. Vielleicht müsse er sogar bei der nächsten Bundestagswahl die Sozialdemokraten wählen.

Lippens bezieht sich hier auf den Einfluss des nationalliberalen und -konservativen Flügels auf die FDP unter Erich Mende, ihrem Parteivorsitzenden von 1960 bis 1968. Ernst Achenbach hatte als Rechtsanwalt im Nürnberger Kriegsverbrecherprozess 1947/48 Vertreter der IG Farben und des Auswärtigen Amtes verteidigt. Er war von 1950 bis 1958 für die FDP im Landtag von Nordrhein-Westfalen und von 1957 bis 1976 Mitglied des Bundestages. Als Mitglied der EG-Kommission schon von der SPD/FDP-Regierung nominiert, verzichtete Achenbach 1970 auf eine Kandidatur, als bekannt wurde, dass er als Leiter der Politischen Abteilung der deutschen Botschaft im besetzten Paris zwischen 1940 und 1943 an der Deportation von Juden in Konzentrationslager beteiligt gewesen war. Siegfried Zoglmann, der zweite von Lippens stellvertretend genannte FDP-Politiker, war von 1957 bis 1976 Mitglied des Bundestages. Er war Gebietsführer der Hitlerjugend im sogenannten

18. Vgl. einführend J. KUROPKA (Hrsg.), Clemens August Graf von Galen: Menschenrechte – Widerstand – Euthanasie – Neubeginn, Münster, 1998; DERS. (Hrsg.), Clemens August Graf von Galen: Neue Forschungen zum Leben und Wirken des Bischofs von Münster, Münster, 1992.

Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren gewesen. Im Jahr 1948 war Zoglmann Mitbegründer des Witikobundes, einer Organisation am äußersten rechten Rand der Sudetendeutschen Landsmannschaft, der Interessenvertretung der deutschsprachigen Vertriebenen aus der Tschechoslowakei. Während Achenbach auch nach der Bildung der SPD/FDP-Regierung 1969 in der FDP blieb, wechselte Zoglmann im Oktober 1970 aus Protest gegen die Ostverträge zur CSU.¹⁹

Die in Lipgens Schreiben an von Brentano vermittelten lebensweltlichen Erfahrungen und politischen Orientierungen beeinflussten stark die Auswahl seiner Forschungsthemen und deren Untersuchung. Das gilt schon für seine Dissertation und Habilitation, in denen er sich biographie- und ideengeschichtlich mit der inneren Reform des Katholizismus während der Reformation und nach der französischen Revolution befasste.²⁰ Es trifft ebenso zu für seine damals noch aufsehenerregende, durch eine positive Sicht des Altreichs geprägte kritische Beurteilung des Reichskanzlers Otto von Bismarck. Diesem warf er in einigen Aufsätzen vor, die Annexion von Elsaß-Lothringen gezielt betrieben und inszeniert zu haben, die Nord- und Westdeutschen von den deutschsprachigen Österreichern abgetrennt und den Gegensatz zum französischen Nachbarn geschürt zu haben.²¹ In einem gewissen, bereits von Elisabeth Fehrenbach anlässlich von Lipgens Tod in der Historischen Zeitschrift aufgezeigten inneren Zusammenhang mit diesen beiden Schwerpunkten²² ist der Einfluss seiner lebensweltlichen Erfahrungen und seiner politischen Ansichten auf die Auswahl seiner Forschungsthemen und deren Analyse in der Integrationsgeschichte, mit der er sich ab Mitte der 1960er Jahre ganz überwiegend befasste, besonders offensichtlich.

Das unmittelbare persönliche Vorbild des katholischen Widerstands gegen Hitler und die politische Orientierung am Ziel einer „föderalistischen Ordnung Europas“ motivierten Lipgens, mit Hilfe seiner Mitarbeiter akribisch Quellen aus dem europäischen Widerstand und Exil zusammenzutragen, die sich mit deren Nachkriegsplänen befassten und die er in mehreren deutsch- und englischsprachigen Editionen für die wissenschaftliche Forschung zugänglich machte.²³ Diese Forschungen gingen

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19. Vgl. die Einträge unter Ernst Achenbach und Siegfried Zoglmann im Munziger-Personenarchiv. Zum Kontext siehe auch N. FREI, *Vergangenheitspolitik. Die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-Vergangenheit*, München, 1999.
 20. W. LIPGENS, *Kardinal Johannes Gropper (1503-1559) und die Anfänge der katholischen Reform in Deutschland*, Münster, 1951; DERS., *Ferdinand August Graf Spiegel und das Verhältnis von Kirche und Staat 1789-1835. Die Wende vom Staatskirchentum zur Kirchenfreiheit*, Münster, 1965.
 21. W. LIPGENS, *Bismarck, die öffentliche Meinung und die Annexion von Elsaß und Lothringen 1870*, in: *Historische Zeitschrift*, 199(1964), S.31-112; DERS., *Bismarck und die Frage der Annexion von 1870. Eine Erwiderung*, in: *Historische Zeitschrift*, 206(1968), S.586-617; DERS., *Zum geschichtlichen Standort der Reichsgründung 1870/71*, in: *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, 22(1971), S.513-528. Vgl. auch W. LOTH, *Saarbrücker Historiker im Dienst der Versöhnung. Zum Tode von Professor Walter Lipgens*, in: *Saarbrücker Zeitung*, 10.5.1984.
 22. E. FEHRENBACH, *Nekrolog. Walter Lipgens 12.6.1925-29.4.1984*, in: *Historische Zeitschrift*, 239(1984), S.757-759, hier S.758.
 23. W. LIPGENS, *Europa-Föderationspläne der Widerstandsbewegungen, 1940-1945: eine Dokumentation*, München, 1968; DERS., *Documents on the History of European Integration*, 4 Bde., Berlin, 1984-1991; DERS., *45 Jahre Ringen um die Europäische Verfassung. Dokumente 1939-1984. Von den Schriften der Widerstandsbewegung bis zum Vertragsentwurf des Europäischen Parlaments*, Bonn, 1986.

auch in den ersten, alleine erschienenen Teilband seiner umfangreichen Integrationsgeschichte der frühen Nachkriegszeit ein.²⁴ Diese zeitaufwendige Aufgabe war für Lipgens keinesfalls von einem nur dokumentarischen, wissenschaftlichen Wert. Vielmehr konstatierte er wie schon in seinem Brief an von Brentano eine nachlassende Europabegeisterung und eine zunehmende Bürokratisierung der europäischen Politik, die durch den Rückbezug auf die weitreichenden Pläne aus Widerstand und Exil eine neue Dynamik erhalten sollte. Seiner posthum erschienenen Dokumentation europäischer Verfassungspläne zwischen 1939 und 1984 wünschte er:

„Möge der Band der (...) Debatte in den nationalen Parlamenten [über den damaligen Verfassungsentwurf des Europäischen Parlaments] und in der Öffentlichkeit auch als Maßstab dienen, die entscheidenden Einsichten dieser jahrzehntelangen Planungsarbeit zu verwirklichen“.²⁵

Lipgens Auffassung seiner wissenschaftlichen Forschung zu Widerstand und Exil und zur europäischen Nachkriegsgeschichte war dezidiert und explizit normativer Natur. Es ging ihm nicht nur – und vielleicht nicht einmal in erster Linie – darum aufzuarbeiten, wie und warum es so und nicht anders gewesen war. Lipgens hat sich auch im ersten Teilband seiner Integrationsgeschichte nicht systematisch darum bemüht nachzuweisen, wann und wie die Nachkriegspläne vor 1945 oder die Aktivitäten der verschiedenen Europabewegungen danach einen nennenswerten Einfluss auf die Europapolitik nationaler Regierungen hatten. Für ihn hatten diese Pläne schon dadurch Gewicht, dass sie in der einen oder anderen Weise für die von ihm persönlich bevorzugte bundesstaatliche Option plädierten und als Argument für die politische Debatte über Europa eingesetzt werden konnten. Dass für Lipgens in diesem Sinne Integrationsgeschichte eine politische Wissenschaft war, hat er selbst nachdrücklich deutlich gemacht, vor allem in den 1983 erschienenen programmatischen „Leitlinien für den historischen Unterricht“. Darin heißt es, die Integration müsse in der Schule „als bisher erfolgreichste Friedensbewegung“ dargestellt werden. „Mängel und Schwächen, die Reden von Brüsseler Bürokraten und Krisen [...] resultieren fast ausnahmslos aus den Bereichen, in denen die Integration noch nicht weit genug gediehen [...] ist.“ Der Schulunterricht müsse deutlich machen, dass nationale Bürokratien den europäischen Bundesstaat verhindern wollten. Dies sei lediglich ein „Trick“ und „föderale Formen“ für Europa absolut verzichtbar.²⁶ Wegen Lipgens föderalistischem Engagement betonte der heutige Kölner Politikwissenschaftler Wolfgang Wessels in seinem Nachruf auch nicht dessen wissenschaftliche Verdienste, sondern seine Rolle in der Europäischen Bewegung, als Mitglied des Direktoriums des Instituts für Europäische Politik in Bonn und (seit 1980) als Träger der Europa-Union-Medaille.²⁷

24. W. LIPGENS, Die Anfänge der europäischen Einigungspolitik 1945-1950, Band 1: 1945-1947, Stuttgart, 1977.

25. W. LIPGENS, 45 Jahre Ringen, S.9.

26. W. LIPGENS, Der Zusammenschluß Westeuropas. Leitlinien für den historischen Unterricht, in: Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, 34(1983), S.345-372.

27. W. WESSELS, In Memoriam Prof. Walter Lipgens, in: Europäische Zeitung, Juni 1984.

Seine persönliche Identifikation mit dem Ziel einer bundesstaatlichen Ordnung dürfte Lipgens dazu verleitet haben, den Einfluss der Nachkriegspläne im Widerstand und Exil und denjenigen der Europavverbände auf die Integrationsgeschichte nach 1945 zu überschätzen. Alan S. Milward hat darauf mit seinen Arbeiten hingewiesen, die den Integrationsprozess ähnlich wie bei Moravcsik als einen Ausgleich primär wirtschaftlicher Interessen zwischen Nationalstaaten interpretiert haben.²⁸ Selbst beim katholischen Exil, für das Lipgens wie für den katholischen Widerstand besondere Sympathie empfand, zeigt eine genauere Analyse, dass nur wenige Exilanten überhaupt eine signifikante politische Rolle nach 1945 spielten und die praktische Nachkriegspolitik stark von ihren Vorstellungen während des Exils abwich.²⁹ Neben der ausdrücklich normativen Ausrichtung seines Forschungsinteresses liegt dieses grundsätzliche Problem von Lipgens Studien zur Integrationsgeschichte sicherlich auch daran, dass dessen stark biographisch auf kleine intellektuelle Eliten ausgerichtete Ideengeschichte nach heutigen Maßstäben veraltet und beziehungs- und wirkungsgeschichtlich nicht aussagekräftig ist.

Die kulturellen Prägungen und politischen Ziele bei Lipgens und anderen Forschern kritisch historiographisch aufzuarbeiten und zu diskutieren, wird es der Integrationsgeschichte erleichtern, ein höheres Reflexionsniveau zu erreichen und einen nachhaltigeren Einfluss auf die europäische Zeitgeschichte insgesamt zu erzielen, als dies bisher der Fall ist. Seit Lipgens Studien zu den Europaplänen im Widerstand und Exil und bei den Europabewegungen hat sich die Integrationsgeschichte als geschichtswissenschaftliche Teildisziplin sicherlich professionalisiert. Das heißt jedoch nicht, dass die Arbeiten der gegenwärtig forschenden Integrationshistoriker nicht auch von kulturellen Prägungen, lebensweltlichen Erfahrungen und politischen Überzeugungen mit geprägt wären – oder wenig einfallsreich ausschließlich Regierungsakten konsultierten, die nahezu zwangsläufig ihre realistischen Annahmen von der Integration als zwischenstaatlicher Verhandlungsprozess nationaler (wirtschaftlicher) Interessen bestätigen.³⁰ Um so wichtiger erscheint es, die Pluralität der Perspektiven in der Integrationsgeschichte und einen fruchtbaren Austausch zwischen ihnen wo immer möglich entschieden zu fördern. Das gilt erst recht, weil die stark katholisch-christdemokratisch geprägten Traditionen des alten „Kerneuropa“ zwar bis heute fortwirken, jedoch in einer mehrfach erweiterten und demnächst auch mittelosteuropäische Staaten einschließenden größeren Europäischen Union. Als solche lässt sich deren historische Genese durch eine karolingische Sicht aus Aachen oder Reims kaum adäquat erfassen.

28. A.S. MILWARD, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51*, London, 1984; DERS., *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, London, 1992.

29. W. KAISER, *Co-operation of European Catholic Politicians in Exile in Britain and the USA during the Second World War*, in: *Journal of Contemporary History*, 35(2000), S.439-465.

30. Siehe hierzu kritisch W. KAISER, *Culturally Embedded and Path-Dependent: Peripheral Alternatives to ECSC/EEC „core Europe“ since 1945*, in: *Journal of European Integration History*, 7(2001), S.11-36.

Walter Lipgens an Heinrich von Brentano, 8. September 1964 [Bundesarchiv (BA) Koblenz, N 1239 (Nachlaß Heinrich von Brentano) / 30]

Sehr geehrter Herr von Brentano!

Bitte erlauben Sie mir, Ihnen zu Ihrer Genesung glückwünschen und Ihnen sagen zu dürfen, wie sehr mich die Nachrichten über Ihren bevorstehenden Wiedereintritt in die Bonner Arbeit gefreut haben.

Es drängt mich, Ihnen mit wenigen Worten anzudeuten, welche Hoffnung ich insbesondere an Ihr Wirken knüpfe. Seit ich 1942 als Siebzehnjähriger unter der Kanzel Bischof [Clemens August Graf] von Galens stand, ist mir das Ziel der föderalistischen Ordnung Europas vor Augen, und seit 1949 habe ich jede noch so erfreuliche Leistung unserer Politik in ihrem Bestand letztlich davon abhängig gesehen, ob schrittweise die Schaffung des europäischen Bundesstaates gelingt – als Partner der USA, als Voraussetzung jeder Lösung Richtung Osten etc. [...] Seit etwa 1960 hat sich, glaube ich, die weltpolitische Konstellation erneut um einige Elemente verändert, die die Notwendigkeit des europäischen Zusammenschlusses noch deutlicher hervortreten lassen, während zugleich nicht nur in der jungen Generation, die den zweimaligen Zusammenbruch des nationalstaatlichen Systems nicht mehr erlebt hat, der Impuls zur politischen Sicherung des erreichten „Reise-Europa“ nachläßt. Ich bin überzeugt, dass die Politik des Minimalprogramms, die nach dem Scheitern der E[uropäischen] V[erteidigungs] G[emeinschaft] das Richtige war,³¹ jetzt ersetzt werden müßte durch eine entschiedene Herausstellung des eigentlichen Zieles, über das [der französische Präsident Charles] de Gaulle dann nicht mehr, wie in der Pressekonferenz vom 23. Juli 1964,³² spotten könnte.

Ich breche ab, um Sie nicht aufzuhalten, und bezeichne, zur Rechtfertigung dieser Zeilen, nur noch den Gewissenskonflikt, den ich 1965 auf mich zukommen sehe: Seit Kriegsende überzeugter Katholik und CDU-Wähler höre ich nun mit steigender Beunruhigung alle außenpolitischen Äußerungen der jetzigen Bundesregierung. Wenn nicht mehr die CDU die FDP an eine echte Europa-Politik fesselt, sondern der Nationalismus („von Achenbach bis Zoglmann“) der FDP die CDU infiltriert, muß ich SPD wählen. Doch jetzt hoffe ich auf Sie.

31. Lipgens bezieht sich auf die vorläufige Beschränkung auf Marktintegration in einer gemischten institutionellen Ordnung im Kontext der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und von EURATOM, die nach dem Scheitern der stärker supranationalen EVG 1957/58 gegründet wurden. Zu der Frage, inwieweit dies damals eine „relance européenne“ markierte, vgl. mit verschiedenen Nuancierungen, aber durchweg aus einer einzig adäquaten multilateralen Sicht A.S. MILWARD, *The European Rescue*, Kapitel 6; G. THIEMEYER, *Zwischen deutsch-französischem Bilateralismus und europäischer Solidarität: die „relance européenne“ (1954-1955)*, in: *Francia*, 26(1999), S.49-75; W. KAISER, „Une bataille est perdue, mais la guerre reste à gagner“ – Das Scheitern der Europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft 1954 und der Durchbruch zur horizontalen Wirtschaftsintegration, in: R. KIRT (Hrsg.), *Die Europäische Union und ihre Krisen*, Baden-Baden, 2001, S.79-95.

32. H. STERCKEN (Hrsg.), *Vive la France - vive l'Europe! Aus den Reden Charles de Gaulles 1958-1968*, München, 1969, S.221-226; siehe auch E. JOUVE, *Le général de Gaulle et la construction de l'Europe (1940-1966)*. Préface de Maurice Duverger, 2 Bde., Paris, 1967.

In großer Verehrung und mit allen guten Wünschen bin ich Ihr Ihnen sehr ergebener Walter Lipgens.

Heinrich von Brentano an Walter Lipgens, 29. September 1964 [BA N 1239 / 30]

Sehr geehrter Herr Dr. Lipgens,

ich danke Ihnen aufrichtig für Ihren Brief vom 8. September und freue mich besonders über das lebendige Interesse an der politischen Entwicklung, das aus Ihrem Briefe spricht.

Um es kurz zu machen: Ich teile Ihre Auffassung, dass die europäische Einigung vielleicht heute wichtiger ist denn je zuvor. Und jeder denkende Mensch sollte sich darüber im klaren sein, dass der Weg zu einem geeinten Europa über Paris führen wird und über Paris führen muß.

Damit ist aber auch unsere Beziehung zu den Vereinigten Staaten eindeutig festgelegt, denn es ist töricht, von der Alternative Paris – Washington zu sprechen. Das Verhältnis Europas zu den Vereinigten Staaten sollte auf der von Washington selbst vorgeschlagenen Partnerschaft beruhen;³³ aber wir können nur Partner werden, wenn Europa in einer Sprache spricht.

Jeder Rückfall in einen Nationalismus wäre von unabsehbaren Folgen begleitet. Sie dürfen überzeugt sein, dass meine Freunde und ich alles tun werden, um eine solche Entwicklung zu verhindern, und ich hoffe sehr, dass ich nach meiner langen Krankheit meine Tätigkeit doch noch im Laufe dieses Jahres in Bonn wiederaufnehmen kann.

Mit verbindlichen Empfehlungen und Grüßen, Ihr gez. von Brentano

33. Heinrich von Brentano bezieht sich auf die „Grand Design“-Rede des amerikanischen Präsidenten John F. Kennedy in Philadelphia am amerikanischen Unabhängigkeitstag, dem 4. Juli 1962, in der dieser vorgeschlagen hatte, die NATO solle zukünftig auf zwei Pfeilern ruhen, einem amerikanischen und einem europäischen. Vgl. P. WINAND, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe, New York, 1993, S.139 ff.

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen

Roland MAURHOFER – *Die schweizerische Europapolitik vom Marshallplan zur EFTA 1947 bis 1960*, St. Galler Studien zur Politikwissenschaft, Haupt, Bern, 2001, 490 p. – ISBN 3-258-06383-4 – 49,00 €.

Présentée comme thèse de doctorat en droit à la Handelshochschule de St-Gall, cette étude est le fruit d'une recherche minutieuse entreprise dans les archives suisses et britanniques. Elle permet à l'auteur d'enrichir considérablement nos connaissances sur des aspects essentiels, voire de mettre en cause certaines interprétations sur la politique européenne de la période cruciale qui va de la création de la première organisation de coopération européenne (OECE) et de la mise en œuvre du Plan Marshall, à la création du Marché commun et de son organisation rivale qu'a été l'Association européenne de Libre-Echange.

Faisant montre d'une grande maîtrise des publications disponibles en anglais, allemand et français, l'auteur confronte les interprétations existantes à l'enquête fouillée à laquelle il a procédé dans les archives aussi bien à Londres qu'à Berne. A vrai dire, le titre de l'ouvrage ne suggère pas la richesse des informations sur les arguments développés au sein des administrations et des gouvernements des principaux États européens interpellés par la question de plus en plus déterminante de l'intégration européenne. En d'autres termes, il ne s'agit pas tant de la politique européenne de la Suisse en tant que telle, mais surtout des enjeux que revêtent les choix de politique européenne aussi bien à Londres, à Paris, à Stockholm qu'à Berne. L'auteur élargit considérablement les perspectives qui se dégagent des négociations autour de la question de l'union européenne, notamment en complément ou en opposition à la dynamique que génère le programme de négociations des Six qui a abouti au Traité de Rome. Son investigation fouillée sur la formation d'une Grande Zone de Libre Echange, formulée dans le cadre de l'OECE, développée en parallèle aux négociations des Six, puis en prolongement du Traité de Rome, dans un round de négociations entre les Six et les Non-Six, sous la présidence du Britannique Maudling, enrichit considérablement la connaissance de ce chapitre crucial de la construction européenne. L'analyse détaillée de cette négociation montre surtout l'importance qu'il convient d'accorder aux positions particulières de chacun des protagonistes, notamment des petits États tels que la Suède, la Norvège, le Danemark et la Suisse. Si l'on connaît mieux le rôle joué par les Grands États européens et le poids de leurs arguments en faveur de telle ou telle solution d'union européenne, on connaît moins les arguments que font valoir les petits États, pour lesquels la défense d'un intérêt particulier est considéré comme vital à leur survie. Ainsi, les arguments avancés par ces derniers ne sont que rarement partagés par les autres; par conséquent l'idée séduisante d'une coalition des petits États, défendant des intérêts communs ne résiste pas à l'étude des prises de position des uns et des autres et surtout des raisons fondamentales qui les ont motivées.

L'auteur prend aussi en compte – il s'agit ici d'une des perspectives encore peu étudiées par les historiens – les grands débats menés, notamment dans le cadre du GATT, en vue d'organiser les relations économiques internationales sur une base de libération concertée des échanges et d'élimination progressive des obstacles au commerce mondial. L'alternative Genève ou Bruxelles constitue un choix extrêmement éprouvant pour la plupart des gouvernements; le recours à l'argument GATT contre Marché commun et vice-versa ne recouvre cependant pas toujours une vision claire des intérêts nationaux à long terme; il sert parfois simplement à camoufler une politique d'extrême prudence à s'engager ou à affirmer une position d'autorité par rapport aux autres partenaires. L'analyse de la position britannique que nous livre Maurhofer est particulièrement révélatrice de l'impossible politique européenne de Londres. Parmi ses partenaires – qu'il s'agisse des Scandinaves ou des Suisses,

dont on a souvent dit que leur politique européenne durant cette période trouvait son inspiration du côté de la Tamise, – le soupçon apparaîtrait que le gouvernement britannique cherche simplement à instrumentaliser la position des petits États dans le bras-de-fer qui se dessine entre la Grande-Bretagne et la Communauté européenne naissante.

Pour démontrer les échanges complexes qui s'instaurent entre Londres et les Non-Six, l'auteur résume avec beaucoup de clarté les options que les Britanniques examinent tour à tour, sans parvenir concrètement à choisir l'une ou l'autre; testant simultanément les diverses options qu'ils ont formulées sur le plan interne, leur politique extérieure en vient à perdre non seulement toute visibilité, mais surtout toute crédibilité aux yeux de ceux qui auraient souhaité appuyer leur propre politique sur la position de la Grande-Bretagne. Ainsi, les Britanniques, encore imprégnés de leur capacité à exercer une influence prépondérante dans les affaires mondiales, ont envisagé d'établir de nouvelles préférences impériales, qui auraient permis à l'Angleterre de reconstituer une nouvelle puissance hégémonique bâtie sur une nouvelle prospérité commerciale comme celle qu'elle avait exercée avant la Première Guerre mondiale, même si cette option l'avait placée en contradiction avec les objectifs du GATT; la deuxième option consistait plus modestement d'inclure le Canada dans une Grande Zone de Libre Echange; la troisième prévoyait l'extension des préférences impériales aux pays européens, toujours dans l'idée que Londres exercerait le leadership sur ce nouvel espace économique; la quatrième option préconisait l'adoption d'un pacte de non-discrimination entre les pays de l'OECE en matière commerciale tandis que la cinquième option consistait à établir une Zone de Libre Echange entre l'Angleterre, la Scandinavie et la Suisse. C'est cette dernière option qui eut la faveur des dirigeants britanniques en automne 1958, car elle leur parut la plus efficace pour renforcer la position de l'Angleterre elle-même par rapport à la Communauté économique européenne, qui allait entrer en vigueur entre les Six; pour la Grande-Bretagne, il s'agissait avant tout de prévenir tout élargissement de la CEE vers d'autres pays européens, car une telle évolution aurait provoqué un isolement particulièrement redouté à Londres. Dans ce contexte, la diplomatie britannique craignait en particulier que l'Union scandinave ne traitât directement avec Bruxelles; ainsi a-t-elle déployé des démarches pour prévenir les Non-Six d'engager des négociations bilatérales avec les Six, une négociation dispersée étant à ses yeux préjudiciable aux intérêts de chacun. En fait, Londres s'illusionnait encore de pouvoir exercer un leadership dans les affaires européennes, son but étant de contrer le développement d'un Marché commun qui lui paraissait néfaste à ses intérêts qu'elle considérait encore comme mondiaux avant tout.

Le jeu entre Berne et Londres par rapport au Marché commun est bien entendu au cœur de la démonstration de Maurhofer. Celui-ci a d'ailleurs organisé sa recherche dans les archives autour de cette relation placée sous l'angle des conceptions et des contraintes d'une réorganisation de l'économie européenne, qui soit la plus profitable aux atouts et aux besoins économiques tels qu'ils sont évalués à Berne et à Londres. En outre, l'intégration, dans son analyse, des positions des autres acteurs de la politique européenne permet à l'auteur de détruire quelques légendes sur l'originalité de la position suisse, sur la paternité de certaines initiatives relatives notamment à la formation d'un groupe des Non-Six qui a débouché sur l'accord de Stockholm, donnant naissance à l'Association européenne de Libre Echange, en 1960. Il montre aussi que l'élite dirigeante suisse est beaucoup plus partagée qu'on a eu tendance à l'admettre sur la participation à l'intégration européenne dans le sillage des accords de Rome. Certes, l'idée d'un aménagement spécifique avec la CEE était présente dans l'esprit de certains dirigeants avant que Berne ne s'engageât aux côtés de Londres et des Scandinaves dans la création d'une AELE. En effet, au nom de la neutralité, certains responsables à Berne pensaient que la Suisse devait se garder de contribuer à une nouvelle division de l'Europe, en favorisant la création d'un groupe à partir des Non-Six qui s'opposerait aux Six. Si le gouvernement suisse a jugé plus crédible de suivre finalement la voie lancée par Londres, c'est que l'opposition britannique au Marché commun naissant

permettait aux responsables helvétiques d'échapper au sacrifice d'une part importante de leurs propres conceptions, empreintes d'universalisme et de libre-échange, en matière d'organisation de l'économie mondiale, qu'une négociation avec Bruxelles aurait impliqué. Ces dirigeants n'avaient pas perçu que la politique européenne de Londres n'était nourrie d'aucune perspective lointaine, mais qu'elle était dictée par le seul souci des Britanniques, d'empêcher les petits Etats européens de s'aligner chacun pour soi sur la dynamique de l'union européenne, inscrite au cœur du traité de Rome.

C'est dire l'apport de cette étude historique pour comprendre les prises de position des acteurs de la politique européenne dont les raisons fondamentales ne pouvaient se lire dans les déclarations officielles de l'époque; contrairement aux diplomates et aux hommes d'Etat qui ne disposent pas de toutes les informations sur leurs partenaires et leur stratégie, l'historien est habilité à déchiffrer et à reconstituer les prises de décisions, les motivations et les circonstances qui les ont façonnées, en croisant à la fois les sources et les travaux historiographiques de provenances diverses. C'est ce qu'a fait Roland Maurhofer avec beaucoup de talent et d'esprit critique pour expliquer les choix de politique européenne pris par toute une série de protagonistes entre la fin des années quarante et le début des années soixante du siècle passé.

Antoine Fleury
Université de Genève

Godfried KWANTEN – *August-Edmond De Schryver 1898-1991. Politieke biografie van een gentleman-staatsman*, KADOC-Studies 27, University Press Leuven, Leuven, 2001, 688 p. – ISBN 90-5867-1518 – 37,18 €.

The start of the Western European integration is often – with good reason – linked with Christian Democratic statesmen. Most of the time, the names of the first West German federal chancellor Konrad Adenauer, the Italian Prime Minister Alcide de Gasperi and the French Foreign minister Robert Schuman are mentioned in this regard. Sometimes, the name of the long-term Foreign minister of Luxembourg Joseph Bech is added to this trio. The Belgian contribution to the starting phase of the integration process is usually attributed to the socialist Paul-Henri Spaak. However, some of the most prominent Christian Democratic politicians were convinced Europeans. That was the case for Paul Van Zeeland, whose life has recently been described by Vincent Dujardin and Michel Dumoulin,¹ but certainly also for his contemporary August-Edmond De Schryver (1898-1991).

The Flemish catholic De Schryver had originally been a lawyer in his native town Gent, when he became a member of the Belgian Chamber of representatives in 1928. He was to remain a member of parliament until 1965. Between March 1935 and October 1937 he had been minister of Agriculture and Internal affairs respectively. Although he did not aspire to a ministerial office hereafter, a sense of duty made him accept cabinet positions in 1939 (Justice) and 1940 (Economic affairs). When the Germans invaded Belgium, he fled to France. Not until April 1942 did he join his Cabinet colleagues in London, where he remained a member of the War Cabinet. After the liberation of Belgium De Schryver was for a short time a minister without portfolio.

In August 1945 De Schryver became the first chairman of the Christelijke Volkspartij / Parti Social-Chrétien. He led the party until 1949. In September 1959 he was once more

1. V. DUJARDIN and M. DUMOULIN, *Paul Van Zeeland 1893-1973*, Brussels, 1995.

appointed to a ministerial office when he was made responsible for the decolonisation of the Congo and Rwanda-Urundi. In January, at a round table conference in Brussels, the independence of the Congo was settled to be realised half a year later. After the resignation of the third Eyskens cabinet as a consequence of the March 1961 elections, De Schryver would not take up ministerial office again. As a *grand old man* he remained a figure of influence within his own party until he died in 1991.

De Schryver never occupied government positions which bore any relation to the process of European integration. However, this applied all the more to one of his additional offices: the chairmanship of the European organisation of Christian Democrats. Recently, Godfried Kwanten, who earlier took care of the papers of De Schryver, took his doctoral degree at Louvain with a biographical thesis on De Schryver. Sixteen of the almost seven hundred pages of this sympathetic, but not uncritical biography, are dealing with his period of office as chairman of the Christian Democrat International, the *Nouvelles Equipes Internationales* (NEI) (pp.478-493) De Schryver presided over this informal organization of Christian Democratic politicians between 1949 and 1959. In this review we shall focus on De Schryver's European involvement and his ideas about European integration.

Kwanten shows us how De Schryver, after being asked by several parties in the fall of 1949 to consider his candidature for the NEI chairmanship, took more than a year to accept the post. He eventually became convinced because of the unanimity of the appeal, which can be explained by the lack of interest shown by other political parties in the NEI. Most of the Christian Democratic party prominent were preoccupied by home politics and used their contacts at government level. For De Schryver, the NEI presidency also offered him an opportunity to escape the tensions of sometimes heated home politics (p.395). In June 1950 he even used it as an argument to refuse the premiership (p.404). This did not mean that the NEI-presidency was a full-time job; as Kwanten points out De Schryver refused to spend more than one day a week on the NEI affairs (p.481)

De Schryver, generally regarded as honest and unselfish, played his role as a mediator between the heterogeneous Christian Democratic parties with great skill. As a consequence, De Schryver was allowed to stay on as chairman for ten years: the statutes of the NEI, which layed down elections of a new president every three years, were changed for this purpose. On the other hand, De Schryver was at the same time one of the impediments to the further evolution of the NEI towards a more formal transnational organization of European Christian Democratic parties. During his tenure as president De Schryver remained faithful to the original position of the CVP-executive in 1947. The NEI had to be a meeting-place for Christian Democratic politicians without formal commitments by the parties. The latter would – unintentionally – suggest the image of a Vatican-led confessional umbrella organization. As a consequence, the NEI remained a weak organization. Oddly enough, Kwanten did not consult the highly critical article by the Dutch historian Bosmans about the NEI dating from 1996.²

During the years of his chairmanship, opposition to this 'minimalist' idea grew, amongst the other parties as well as within the CVP, which did not become a full member of the NEI during the presidency of De Schryver. The development of the European co-operation forced the like-minded parties to co-ordinate their activities. Especially after the NEI-congresses in Sorrento (1950) and Bad Ems (1951), where De Gasperi and Adenauer respectively called for a closer co-operation between the Christian Democratic parties of Europe, De Schryver found himself more and more in a difficult position. When the Italian Christian

2. J. BOSMANS, *Das Ringen um Europa. Die Christdemokraten der Niederlande und Deutschlands in den "Nouvelles Equipes Internationales" (1947-1965)*, in: idem. (Hrsg.), *Europagedanke, Europabewegung und Europapolitik in den Niederlanden und Deutschland seit dem Ersten Weltkrieg*, Münster, 1996, pp.123-148.

Democratic leader Amintore Fanfani ended up joining the criticism in December 1954, comparing the NEI with the Socialist International, the leaders of the Belgian parties, too, accepted the necessity of a change of direction. Although in the end De Schryver himself agreed with the plans for change in organization, he saw himself unfit to execute this process. In July 1959 he announced his retirement as NEI chairman. Kwanten denied the story, that De Schryver left his international post because of his appointment as minister of the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi in the Eyskens cabinet, which only took place in September. De Schryver's successor was CVP-chairman Theo Lefèvre. However, the reproach made to De Schryver that he blocked the organisational evolution of the NEI applied all the more so to the presidency of Lefèvre.

Kwantens positive appreciation of the secretary-general who had assisted De Schryver since 1955, the Frenchman Alfred Coste-Floret ('de dynamische Fransman', p.487), is rebutted on the basis of other sources. Especially the non-French-speaking parties were annoyed by the dismal activity of the NEI-secretariat in Paris and – at the end of the 1950s – Coste-Floret's political declarations as NEI representative, in which he showed scepticism towards the American foreign policy under the Eisenhower administration. His departure in 1960, more or less imposed on him by the retirement of De Schryver, was generally welcomed.

The biographer tries to draw the picture of De Schryver's vision of the European integration (pp.430-435). It appears that his views sometimes were inconsistent. In 1953, De Schryver became a supporter of the European Defence Community (EDC), which he had opposed in the beginning. Initially sceptical about all forms of supranationality he gradually became a firm 'European' in the fifties. According to Kwanten, pragmatism and opportunism played a role in this changeover. He suggests that the climate in NEI circles might have influenced his change of opinion. De Schryver never became a federalist like Spaak. He was, however, convinced, that Western Europe, lacking geopolitical powers after the loss of most of its colonies, had to co-operate 'functionally' to keep a relevant position between the two power blocks, the United States and the Soviet Union. Also, a united Europe was a necessity against the communist danger. The sovereignty of every single European country had to be guaranteed; inevitably the process of integration had to be developed gradually and within the framework of the Atlantic co-operation with the US and Great Britain. The anglophile De Schryver advocated Britain joining the Common Market.

The fact that De Schryver usually is not mentioned as one of the Christian Democratic patriarchs of the European integration, is mainly due to his never being Prime minister or Foreign minister, in contrast with Adenauer, Schuman and De Gasperi. To this we have to add his late conversion to the European cause: he was not a pioneer, but a (late) proselyte. However, this in no way detracts from his merit of having rallied support for the integration process within his own party and country, as this biography shows.

*Alexander van Kessel
Catholic University Nijmegen*

Frank BÖSCH – Die Adenauer-CDU. Gründung, Aufstieg und Krise einer Erfolgspartei 1945-1969, Deutsche-Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart/München, 2002, 575 S. – ISBN 3-421-05438-X – 39,80 €.

La CDU, un des partis politiques d'Europe les plus couronnés de succès? Tels sont en tout cas les premiers mots de l'avant-propos du livre de Frank Bösch. Au regard des crises qui ont marqué ces dernières années et révélé bien des faiblesses internes au parti chrétien-démocrate allemand, on serait plutôt porté à en douter. Pourtant, si le titre de sa thèse de doctorat, qualifiant la CDU de «parti de la victoire» (*Erfolgspartei*) semble provocateur, il invite néanmoins le lecteur à réfléchir sur les facteurs endogènes et exogènes qui lui ont permis, à plusieurs reprises, de se maintenir avec succès et longévité au pouvoir.

Le livre de Frank Bösch poursuit une double ambition. Il s'agit pour l'auteur de montrer la place du parti chrétien-démocrate dans la société allemande de l'après-guerre à la fin des années soixante à la lumière d'une étude minutieuse de son organisation et de son fonctionnement interne. Il cherche en outre à déterminer, en allant au besoin à l'encontre de certaines idées reçues, l'influence et le rôle qu'exerça Konrad Adenauer qui, selon lui, outre le fait d'être «un chancelier puissant, était en même temps un chef de parti qui marqua la CDU d'une façon déterminante» (p.419).¹ Ainsi qu'il le suggère d'entrée de jeu, le but de son analyse est bien de mettre en exergue la spécificité de la «CDU d'Adenauer».

De l'étude de Frank Bösch, il est possible de définir deux caractéristiques intrinsèques à la CDU. La première d'entre elles, et l'auteur insiste en particulier sur cet aspect qu'il considère manifestement comme décisif, réside d'une part dans sa capacité à intégrer en son sein les confessions catholiques et protestantes et d'autre part dans son aptitude à rassembler sous un même concept diverses composantes aussi bien sociales que politiques. Quant à la seconde caractéristique, elle a principalement trait à la structure et à l'organisation même du parti.

Selon l'auteur, la première composante se définit en premier lieu par la recherche constante de la parité confessionnelle entre catholiques et protestants, car la CDU se concevait comme la force politique qui devait rassembler et représenter l'ensemble des Chrétiens. Cette politique, mise en pratique à tous les échelons du parti butait toutefois, ainsi que le souligne F. Bösch, sur ses propres limites avec par exemple la persistance de la règle de l'égalité confessionnelle pour l'attribution des postes, les divergences de vues au sujet de l'école confessionnelle ou bien encore sur certains sujets politiques sensibles à l'instar de la réunification ou de la politique à suivre vis-à-vis de la France. En second lieu, le succès de la CDU tient aussi à ce qu'elle réussit à s'imposer comme un parti de centre-droit sur la scène politique ouest-allemande. Bösch illustre ainsi l'absorption progressive par la CDU de ses partis concurrents, tels le *Bund der Vertriebenen und Entrechteten* ou le *Deutsche Partei*, et la récupération de l'électorat tenté par le vote d'extrême-droite. Il expose enfin comment la CDU s'est efforcée de rallier les diverses catégories socioprofessionnelles, pointant à cet égard le rôle de la *Junge Union* et la (faible) place des femmes dans le parti. De cette analyse systématique, l'auteur conclut que la CDU est bien «un parti du rassemblement interconfessionnel» (*eine interconfessionelle Sammlungspartei*, p.429).

La seconde composante originale de la CDU, telle qu'elle se dégage de l'étude de Bösch, tient à la structure et à l'organisation du parti. Celle-ci se distingue par une relation assez lâche entre les organes fédéraux de la CDU et ses associations régionales affiliées. Non sans esprit, l'auteur remarque à cet égard que la CDU est «un parti organisé sans organisation de parti» (*«eine organisierte Partei ohne Parteiorganisation»*, p.282). Il montre également que le parti chrétien-démocrate, contrairement à l'idée communément acceptée, est à l'époque moins structuré au niveau fédéral qu'au niveau régional. Que la CDU ne dispose pas d'un appareil centralisé, n'empêche pas son président d'avoir une place centrale et décisive qui

1. „mehr als ein starker Kanzler, war zugleich ein Parteivorsitzender, der die CDU maßgeblich prägte“.

tient, pour une grande partie, à la volonté et à la forte personnalité d'Adenauer, dont l'auteur met en évidence «la direction souveraine et intégrative» («*die souveräne und integrative Lenkung*», p.355). Il pointe aussi que les succès électoraux de la CDU, de sa fondation à 1969, tiennent en majeure partie à un complexe système de financement dont il étudie en détail la mise au point et le perfectionnement progressif. Celui-ci, organisé sous forme de dons de plus en plus opaques, lui fournissait les moyens financiers de mener des campagnes électorales coûteuses mobilisant les moyens techniques les plus modernes. Bösch fournit ainsi un arrière-plan historique afin de mieux mettre en perspective le récent débat sur les diverses malversations auxquelles ce système de financement a pu donner lieu.

En s'appuyant sur des sources archivistiques diverses, dont un nombre important de fonds jusqu'alors inexploités, et sur une lecture souvent critique de l'abondante littérature existante, Frank Bösch nous donne à lire une étude synthétique et extrêmement fouillée du parti chrétien-démocrate. On pourra néanmoins regretter qu'il passe totalement sous silence les relations de la CDU avec son parti «frère» de Bavière, la CSU. Celle-ci joua pourtant un rôle non négligeable dans la formation des coalitions gouvernementales qui permirent à la CDU de se maintenir au pouvoir et présentait en outre un contenu confessionnel, social et politique sensiblement différent. Enfin, d'un point de vue strictement pratique, l'absence d'index rend également une utilisation sélective du livre plus ardue lors même que le livre constitue une mine d'information sur un grand nombre de personnalités politiques chrétiennes-démocrates.

En dépit de ces deux carences, Frank Bösch démonte admirablement les mécanismes qui permirent à la CDU de s'imposer et de régner sur la scène politique allemande pendant plus de 20 ans et l'on ne peut qu'abonder dans son sens lorsqu'il qualifie le parti chrétien-démocrate de «modèle du succès» («*Erfolgsmodell*», p.7). Tout modèle ayant cependant ses propres limites, il montre aussi que sa réussite quasi exceptionnelle recelait déjà en elle les faiblesses qui deviendront rapidement flagrantes après le retrait de celui qui en fut à bien des égards l'organisateur et provoqueront en 1969 son basculement dans l'opposition. Le livre illustre enfin comment un certain nombre des problèmes récents de la CDU trouvent leur source dans les origines mêmes du parti.

Carine Germond
Université Robert Schuman, Strasbourg III
Universität Essen, FB Geschichte

Martin CONWAY, José GOTOVITCH (eds.) – *Europe in Exile. European Exile Communities in Britain 1940-45*, Bergahn Books, New York/Oxford, 2001, 281 p. – ISBN 1-57181-759-X (hb) – 47,00 £., ISBN 1-57181-503-1 (pb) – 17,00 £.

Beim Exil in Großbritannien denken deutschsprachige Historiker zunächst an die Flucht von etwa 80.000 Personen aus Mitteleuropa auf die britischen Inseln, die Aktivitäten von Exilparteien, die Spuren von Wissenschaftlern und Künstlern im Kulturleben ihres Aufnahmelandes sowie die nachhaltigen Erfahrungen, die Remigranten nach dem Kriege auf in ihre frühere Heimat zurückbrachten. Vernachlässigt wird hierbei oft das Exil größerer Flüchtlingsgruppen aus den von Nazi-Deutschland besetzten Ländern. London war der Sitz von mindestens acht Exilregierungen oder politischen Führungsinstitutionen, überdies zahlreicher Parteien und internationaler Organisationen. Diesem Kosmos politischer Zentren, ihren Beziehungen zum Gastland wie auch untereinander, widmet sich in verdienstvoller Weise der von Martin Conway und José Gotovitch herausgegebene Sammelband.

Die Auswahl der Beiträge ist allerdings einseitig. Allein sechs der fünfzehn Aufsätze untersuchen das belgische Exil, je einer die Exil-Gruppierungen aus Norwegen, der Tschechoslowakei, Polen, Frankreich und den Niederlanden sowie die Sozialistische Internationale. Je ein Beitrag untersucht die britische Flüchtlingspolitik und das Vermächtnis der in London angesiedelten Exilregierungen in der Nachkriegszeit. Von „Europe in Exile“ kann also keine Rede sein; dennoch ist der Band trotz des irreführenden Titels zu begrüßen, weil er erstmals eine komparatistische Sicht auf diesen Themenkomplex bietet.

Im ersten Aufsatz skizziert Colin Holmes die britische Flüchtlingspolitik während des Krieges. War sie zunächst von starken Reserven gegenüber einem unkalkulierbaren Personenkreis bestimmt, auf Grund derer (mitteleuropäische) Flüchtlinge zeitweilig interniert oder nach Kanada und Australien deportiert wurden, so erkannte die britische Regierung auch den Nutzen, den die Kontakte zu Exilregierungen und politischen Führungsgruppen der besetzten Länder bringen könnte. Nicht zuletzt der Einsatz exilierter Soldaten an der Seite britischer Streitkräfte sollte im Laufe des Krieges eine zunehmende Rolle spielen. – Mehr der fehlenden Beziehung zwischen Belgien und Großbritannien ist ein weiterer Aufsatz (Jean Stengers) gewidmet, der unter belgischen Politikern der Vorkriegszeit Spuren von Anglophilie und Anglophobie verfolgt. Wichtiger war, dass sich dieses Verhältnis während des Krieges änderte und Großbritannien für viele Exil-Belgier eine künftige zentrale Rolle in Europa übernehmen sollte.

Das Exil in London umfasste nicht nur Regierungen und Führungsgremien von Parteien und Gewerkschaften, sondern auch und vor allem Menschen. Hierauf verweisen zwei weitere Artikel. Der eine (Luís Ángel Bernardo y García, Matthew Buck) untersucht das Eigenleben der belgischen Exil-Regierung sowie das Alltagsleben von knapp 15.000 überwiegend flämischen Belgiern in Großbritannien, ihre politischen und kulturellen Zentren, Schulen, Kirchen und diversen Aktivitäten. Auf die besonderen frauenspezifischen Belange weiblicher Emigranten geht der zweite Beitrag (Françoise Raes) in diesem Kontext ein. Wenig bekannt ist der Einsatz von über 1.000 belgischen Soldaten auf alliierter Seite (Luc De Vos). Die meisten waren aus dem geschlagenen Frankreich nach Großbritannien geflüchtet und formierten sich hier in verschiedenen Einheiten, die von den Briten auf zahlreichen Kriegsschauplätzen eingesetzt wurden. Der militärischen Sicherheit des in zwei Weltkriegen besetzten Belgiens widmeten sich belgische militärische Exil-Kreise, wobei in ihren Plänen neben einer völligen Entwaffnung Deutschlands die britische Schutz- und Führungsrolle für die kleineren europäischen Länder eine zentrale Bedeutung einnahm (Pascal Deloge).

Das Königreich Belgien verfügte im Londoner Exil nicht nur über einen intakten Regierungsapparat mit vier Ministerien (Äußeres, Inneres, Finanzen und Kolonien), sondern auch über Institutionen, die sich in planerischer Absicht mit politischen Fragen befassten. Die "Commission pour l'Étude des Problèmes d'Après-Guerre" (CEPAG) vereinigte in sich hochrangige Politiker, Diplomaten, Militärs und Wissenschaftler, die sich über die künftige politische Gestalt Europas und vor allem die Rolle Belgiens nach dem Kriege Gedanken machten (Diane de Bellefroid). Ein zentrales Thema bildete dabei die künftige Rolle Deutschlands. Das Meinungsspektrum hierüber reichte von Plänen einer völligen Zerstückelung Deutschlands bis zur Integration Europas mit deutscher Beteiligung. Diese letztgenannte Position vertrat der Exil-Außenminister und zeitweilige Ministerpräsident Paul Henri Spaak. Eine weitere belgische Institution im Londoner Exil, das „Haut Commissariat pour la Sécurité de l'État“, bereitete die innere Sicherheit nach dem von den Besatzern befreiten Landes vor (Eric Laurys).

Ein weiterer interessanter Beitrag (Chris Mann) befasst sich mit dem norwegischen Exil in Großbritannien. König, Regierung und Teile der norwegischen Marine konnten rechtzeitig nach Schottland entkommen. Dreizehn Kriegsschiffe (unter ihnen zwei Zerstörer) mit 400 Soldaten bildeten den Grundstock der Exil-Marine, die noch durch zwei Torpedo-Boote vergrößert wurde. Dieser Kern wurde personell erweitert durch Matrosen der weltweit ver-

kehrenden norwegischen Handelsmarine, die rasch ausgebildet und in den Flottenverband aufgenommen wurden. Unter britischem Oberkommando operierte dieser Verband auf zahlreichen Seekriegsschauplätzen. Norwegische Verbände waren es auch, die am 9. Mai 1945 in Oslo einmarschierten. – Dagegen war das seit dem Münchener Abkommen getrübt britisch-tschechoslowakische Verhältnis Grund für wechselseitiges Misstrauen. Die meisten tschechoslowakischen Soldaten, überwiegend Luftwaffeneinheiten, hatten in französischen Einheiten gekämpft und waren nach der Niederlage Frankreichs nach Großbritannien geflüchtet. Das britische Oberkommando misstraute ihnen ebenso, wie Churchill Beneš misstraute, unter anderem wegen der vermuteten – und später bestätigten – starken kommunistischen Infiltration der tschechoslowakischen Streitkräfte.

Besondere Bedeutung kam dem polnischen Exil in Großbritannien zu, war doch das Vereinigte Königreich für Polen in den Krieg eingetreten. Auch stellten die Exil-Polen, wie der aufschlussreiche Artikel von Jan E. Zamojski darlegt, eine der größten und komplexesten Exil-Gemeinschaften überhaupt dar. Über 90% der ca. 25.000 Polen, die nach 1939/40 auf die britischen Inseln geflüchtet waren, waren Militärs. Neben der Exilregierung unter Sikorski konstituierte sich ein Nationalrat als Quasi-Parlament, in dem alle wichtigen politischen Parteien vertreten waren, und mehrere Institutionen für diverse Aufgabenbereiche, zu denen auch die spärlichen Verbindungen nach Polen zu den dort operierenden Widerstandszentren im Untergrund gehörte. Daneben bildete sich in der polnischen Kolonie ein umfassender "Exil-Kosmos" heraus mit Schulen, sozialen und kulturellen Einrichtungen. Das ganze Spektrum dieser Aktivitäten fand natürlich in enger Abstimmung mit den britischen Stellen statt, zu denen sich das Verhältnis stets recht gut gestaltete, wogegen die Beziehungen zwischen Sikorski und de Gaulle nicht ohne Spannungen waren. Nach Kriegsende befasste sich die polnische Exilregierung mit der Repatriierung der vielen Exil-Polen, aber auch mit den Auseinandersetzungen mit dem Lubliner Komitee, das infolge massiver sowjetischer Unterstützung den Kampf um Nachkriegs-Polen gewann.

Gemeinhin denkt man beim französischen Exil in Frankreich vor allem an die „France Libre“. Nicholas Atkin erinnert in seinem interessanten Beitrag daran, dass es auch eine aus Zivilisten bestehende französische Flüchtlingskolonie gab. Sie umfasste nach zeitgenössischen Schätzungen knapp 4.000 Personen, die unmittelbar nach dem Zusammenbruch Frankreichs über den Ärmelkanal geflüchtet waren. Hinzuzurechnen sind mehrere Tausend französische Militärs, von denen bis Ende 1940 etwa 6.500 auf eigenen Wunsch oder auf britische Initiative repatriert wurden – aus Misstrauen gegen die unter ihnen verbreiteten Sympathien für das Vichy-Regime. Schließlich gab es noch die etwa 11.500 Personen umfassende alteingesessene französische Kolonie, die durch kriegsbedingte Zuzüge vergrößert wurde. Nur etwa 600 von ihnen bekannten sich zu Charles de Gaulle und formierten als zivilen Zweig des Freien Frankreich die „Français de Grande Bretagne“ (FGB). Diese Organisation war aber nicht nur innerhalb der französischen Kolonie isoliert, sodass sich als Konkurrenzunternehmen die „Union des Français d'Outre-Mer“ (UFOM) konstituierte, sondern auch innerhalb der Exil-Organisationen anderer Ländern. Sowohl in der UFOM als auch in der französischen Kolonie waren Sympathien für Vichy oder zumindest Loyalität gegenüber Pétain verbreitet, ohne dass dies für das Gastland eine Gefahr dargestellt hätte.

Etwa 1.800 Niederländer flüchteten nach Großbritannien und verstärkten die dort ansässige, ca. 6.000 Personen umfassende niederländische Kolonie. Wichtig war das Entkommen der niederländischen Marine, vor allem aber die Flucht von Königin und Regierung. Beide versuchten vom Exil aus die Kontinuität des niederländischen Staates unter Einschluss des Kolonialreiches zu erhalten (David J. Barnouw). Da es kein Exil-Parlament in Großbritannien gab, kam der Königin eine nach der Verfassung nicht zustehende Bedeutung zu. Ihre Pläne, die künftige Rolle der Krone auf Kosten der Demokratie zu stärken, scheiterten zwar langfristig, aber ihre strikte Ablehnung jeder Konzession an das Dritte Reich und ihr Fest-

halten am Bündnis mit den Alliierten trugen dazu bei, den Widerstandswillen auch in der besetzten Heimat zu stärken.

Nicht nur Regierungen und Flüchtlinge gingen ins britische Exil, auch Organisationen – so die Sozialistische Internationale, die 1940 ihren Sitz von Brüssel über Paris nach London verlegte. Eine knappe Übersicht (Herman Balthazar) über die SI zeigt, dass in eingeschränktem Maße internationale Parteienzusammenschlüsse im Exil Einfluss gewinnen konnten. Naturgemäß übernahm hier die britische Labour Party eine führende Rolle, aber selbst die Vorstände und Führungsgremien der deutschen und österreichischen Sozialdemokratie hatten ungeachtet aller Ausgrenzung hier ihre Stimme.

In einem abschließenden Resumé prüft Martin Conway die Folgen des britischen Exils. Es ermöglichte einigen Staaten die Fortexistenz unter den Bedingungen einer fremden Besatzung. Bis auf die polnische Exilregierung kehrten alle anderen in ihre befreite Heimat zurück und spielten, wenn auch oft nur kurzfristig, eine wichtige Rolle. Andererseits herrschte keineswegs immer volle Einmütigkeit mit dem Gastland, das die exilierten Kräfte – Regierungen wie militärische Einheiten – vielfach als Schachfiguren auf dem Kriegsschauplatz benutzte und auf deren eigene Wünsche wenig Rücksicht nahm. Auch dies hinterließ – zumal in Frankreich – nachhaltige Verstimmungen. Als Letztes aber kehrten alle mit neuen Erfahrungen zurück, und sei es nur die einer europäischen Schicksalsgemeinschaft, aus der für die Zukunft die notwendige Überwindung nationaler Interessengegensätze abgeleitet wurde.

Ein kritisches Resumé dieses durchgehend interessanten Sammelbandes sollte – außer auf den irreführenden Titel, der besser "Belgium and Europe in British Exile" heißen sollte – auf die Lücken verweisen. Es fehlen Beiträge über die Präsenz anderer besetzter Länder im britischen Exil (Luxemburg, Griechenland), über das Exil politischer Führungsgruppen aus dem früheren republikanischen Spanien, aus den "Achsenländern" (Deutschland, Österreich, Italien) sowie aus den nacheinander von Sowjets, Deutschen und wieder Sowjets besetzten baltischen Staaten. Ein weiterer Band mit breiterem Themenspektrum könnte unter Bezug auf Martin Conways letztgenannten Beitrag erneut die Frage prüfen, wie weit in diesem Londoner Exil-Kosmos Konzeptionen für ein Europa nach dem Kriege diskutiert, befürwortet und verworfen wurden, dem sich ausgerechnet das Gastland so spät und mit so vielen Vorbehalten angeschlossen hat.

*Patrik von zur Mühlen
Bonn*

Helen DRAKE – Jacques Delors. Perspectives on a European leader, Routledge, London and New York, 2000, 185 p.- ISBN 0-415-12424-7 – 16,99 £.

Die mehr als zehnjährige Amtszeit von Jacques Delors als Präsident der Europäischen Kommission (1985-1995) war schon öfters Gegenstand von Untersuchungen (C. Grant 1994, G. Ross 1995, K. Endo 1998). Helen Drake fügt ihnen nur wenige weitere Insider-Informationen hinzu, insbesondere zur Entstehung der beiden „Weißbücher“ der Kommission von 1985 und 1993; hier stützt sie sich auf Interviews mit Mitgliedern, Beamten und Beratern der Kommission. Ihr eigentliches Anliegen ist vielmehr, präzise zu bestimmen, welche Art von *leadership* Delors ausübte, warum er dies tat und welche Ergebnisse seiner Aktion zu verzeichnen sind. Dazu bietet sie Überblicke über die politische Karriere von Jacques Delors vor und nach seiner Amtszeit als Kommissionspräsident, eine Analyse des politischen Systems der EU und eine Skizze der vorangehenden Präsidentschaften von Walter

Hallstein bis Gaston Thorn. Im Mittelpunkt stehen Darstellungen der Entstehung und der Funktionen des Weißbuchs zur Vollendung des Binnenmarktes vom Juni 1985 und des Weißbuchs über Wachstum, Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und Beschäftigung, das im Dezember 1993 vorgelegt wurde.

Drake sieht den Erfolg Delors' im Zusammentreffen eines spezifischen Politikstils mit den konstitutionellen Besonderheiten der Gemeinschaft begründet, für die er hervorragend geeignet war: Delors strebte stets mehr nach Einfluß als nach Macht, war mehr ein Mann der Kontakte und des Dialogs als des Apparats und des populistischen Appells, er setzte auf die Kraft des Arguments und der Vernunft. Diese Eigenschaften erlaubten es ihm, den Mangel an direkter Legitimität, der dem Amt des Kommissionspräsidenten anhaftet, durch vertrauliches *consensus building*, gepaart mit zielgerichtetem Auftreten in der Öffentlichkeit zu kompensieren. Er konzentrierte sich zunächst auf die Vollendung des Binnenmarktes, weil dieses Ziel weit eher konsensfähig war als weitergehende Zielsetzungen wie die Währungsunion oder die Politische Union. Die Proklamation eines Zeitpunkts für seine Vollendung („Ende 1992“) und die Präsentation eines detaillierten Maßnahmenplans („300 Maßnahmen“) erlaubten es ihm, beständig kraftvoll zu agieren und die institutionelle Reform, insbesondere den Übergang zu Mehrheitsvoten bei der Implementierung des Weißbuchs als unabweisbare Bedingung für den Erfolg des Binnenmarkt-Programms auf die Tagesordnung zu setzen.

Die Stärkung der Gemeinschaft wie der Kommission, die er damit erzielte, rief dann allerdings die Kritiker eines allzu mächtigen Europas auf den Plan; und diese Kritik führte zu einem Zerbröckeln des intergouvernementalen Konsenses. Entsprechend konnte Delors die Methode, die zum Erfolg der Einheitlichen Europäischen Akte geführt hatte, in den Verhandlungen über den Maastricht-Vertrag nicht ein weiteres Mal erfolgreich anwenden. Er behalf sich mit verstärktem öffentlichen *agenda setting*, wobei das Zielbild der „Föderation von Nationalstaaten“ nun deutlicher in den Mittelpunkt seiner Bilder und Präsentationen rückte. Dem Weißbuch zur Bekämpfung von wirtschaftlichem Niedergang und Arbeitslosigkeit, viel mehr ein persönliches Produkt des engagierten Anwalts einer „neuen Gesellschaft“ als das erste Weißbuch, war demzufolge nur begrenzter Erfolg beschieden: Delors erreichte zwar, daß die Bekämpfung der Arbeitslosigkeit und das „soziale Europa“ auf die Agenda des Europäischen Rates gerieten und sich dort auch dauerhaft behaupten konnte. Mit koordinierten oder gar gemeinsamen Maßnahmen war es jedoch nicht weit her.

Nach dem Ende seiner Amtszeit nutzte Delors die erworbene Reputation, um das *consensus building* und die Beeinflussung des öffentlichen Diskurses höchst erfolgreich weiter zu betreiben. Insbesondere der "Studien- und Forschungsgruppe Unser Europa“, die Delors im August 1996 nach dem Muster von Jean Monnets "Aktionskomitee für die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa“ ins Leben rief, kommt hier eine Schlüsselrolle zu, die in der Öffentlichkeit wenig bekannt ist. Vieles spricht dafür, daß Delors die - durchaus erfolgversprechende - Kandidatur für das Amt des französischen Staatspräsidenten im Herbst 1985 bewußt ausschlug, weil er sich von der Rolle, die er statt dessen wählte, größeren Einfluß versprach.

Drakes schmale Studie setzt die Kenntnis der Vorgängerarbeiten voraus, zumindest eine allgemeine Kenntnis der europapolitischen Entwicklung in der Ära Delors. Für das Verständnis dieser Ära ist sie aber außerordentlich hilfreich. Gleichzeitig bietet sie eine hervorragende Bilanz der politischen Leistung eines Mannes, der die EU um *eine* (nicht die einzig mögliche) neue Methode des Regierens bereicherte. Sie ist nicht nur den Historikern und Politikwissenschaftlern zur Lektüre zu empfehlen, sondern auch Romano Prodi und denjenigen Politikern, die einst über die Nachfolge Prodis werden bestimmen müssen.

Prof. Dr. Wilfried Loth

Fachbereich I / Geschichte der Universität Essen

Marie-Claire CONSIDÈRE-CHARON – Irlande. Une singulière intégration européenne, (Préface de Ken WHITAKER), Economica, Paris, 2002, 291 p. - ISBN 2-7178-4379-5 - 30 €.

Ireland's apparently sudden lurch into the camp of the Eurosceptics, following the rejection of the Treaty of Nice in the referendum of June 2001, was a puzzle for many both inside the country and throughout a Europe on the brink of EU enlargement. Professor Considère-Charon's timely study of Ireland's involvement in European integration goes a long way to providing explanations for this particular development, though the scope of her work is broader since it covers the whole experience of Ireland as a member state, and before that as a potential and actual candidate for membership.

This is not a conventional narrative history, punctuated with occasional analytical conclusions. On the contrary, the author concentrates on the interplay between the singularity of the Irish case and the wider logic of integration. To work effectively, such an approach requires a judicious balance between the insights afforded by a multi-disciplinary approach and a wide range of historical evidence (not excluding that of very recent times). This challenge has been met in a book which at the same time reflects a high quality of scholarship and is accessible to the general reader. Nor does the empirical focus on Ireland limit its interest; not the least of its merits is to suggest conclusions about the process of integration which transcend this particular case.

Nevertheless, the key to this approach is the close attention paid at the outset to the elements of "singularity" in this member state. Size, peripherality and underdevelopment combined with historical and cultural experience to produce an uncertain route to accession. Yet these objective and subjective impediments were, in a material sense at least, largely overcome by the end of the century. In explaining in considerable detail just how this occurred, in the first part of the study Professor Considère-Charon takes care to weigh the positive effects of integration (re-distributive effects of the CAP and structural funds) against those deriving from other sources (development of the international economy, national policies). Nor does she lose sight of the fact that the consequent "Celtic Tiger" of the late 1990s still has to survive in a global jungle. Simply replacing a tradition of pessimistic fatalism with expectations (and illusions) of irreversible wealth will not provide a satisfactory basis for future policies.

Turning from what is nonetheless a fascinating story of economic "catch-up", the second part of the book looks at the more ambiguous questions concerning the impact of integration on the role of the state, and attitudes towards sovereignty and a European consciousness. It traces the adaptation of an administrative elite with a pragmatic focus allowing it to take maximum advantage of the opportunities of membership. This was an important advantage, though I feel insufficient emphasis is given to just how narrow is this technocratic base, especially now that the innovations of the pioneering generation of civil servants with a European vocation have given way to bureaucratic routines.

Administrative adaptation coincided with a rather less straightforward adaptation of the national constitution. This, among other things, has made membership a hostage to ever more frequent referendums (four in the last fifteen years). Ireland's political elites have been far from comfortable in these tests of popular sovereignty, especially where the nature of integration itself was at stake, rather than a narrow construction of national interests. Coping with apprehensions about a loss of national sovereignty has not been the strong point of Irish governments. In the field of foreign policy, for example, there has been a constant balancing between influence and autonomy, especially on the elusive issue of "neutrality". Whatever it is - and Irish politicians tend to be neither articulate nor convincing on this matter - it must be protected, but at what cost it is not clear. Likewise, another sensitive issue examined in detail is the impact of integration on Catholic social doctrine. Here we find that, in spite of

the dramatic recent decline in the authority of the official church, EU membership has become embroiled in a divisive internal debate about abortion.

The author concludes that Ireland has not found a comfortable balance between national identity (itself derived from a patchwork of cultures) and a coherent appreciation of "Europe". Against the background of the analysis in the second part of the book, the result of the first referendum on the Treaty of Nice does not look so surprising. There is much in European integration that the Irish body politic has found difficult to digest.

Professor Considère-Charon also warns the candidates for EU membership against a facile acceptance of the "Irish model" of economic modernisation. For the most part, they come from further back (in administrative as well as economic capacity). In any case, Ireland's status as an economic model rests very much on the 1990s rather than on previous decades. Perhaps the most important lesson they can learn is that the European Union gives plenty of scope to its members to make their own mistakes - the Irish political elite's original complacency about the Nice Treaty is only the latest example in this regard! This study suggests that no member state can afford to be complacent about the legitimacy of integration, which in this view is bound forever to be a work in progress.

The sober tone of the conclusions may reflect the political circumstances in which Professor Considère-Charon finished her book, but even a successful second referendum on Nice (by no means assured at the time this review was written) will hardly invalidate them. This is an excellent introduction to the Irish case, well-documented and presented in a thoroughly professional and stimulating way.

Patrick Keatinge
Fellow Emeritus, Trinity College Dublin

James ELLISON - *Threatening Europe. Britain and the Creation of the European Community, 1955-58*, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2000, 328 p. - ISBN 0-333-75363-1 - 45 £.

A lot has been published in the last few years on British European policy in the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, the United Kingdom is now by far the best-researched member state of the European Union in terms of its historical relationship with the ECSC and the EEC before it joined in 1973. The high intensity of research in this area is partly due to the perception of Britain as an "awkward partner" (Stephen George) in the EU and partly to the partisan domestic political conflicts over "Europe". Moreover, British European policy is linguistically easily accessible. This has led to some interesting research by non-British contemporary historians which is not true to the same extent for other EU member states. Thus, it is perhaps understandable that James Ellison feels a need to justify the publication of yet another study of British European policy covering the period from the conference of Messina in early June 1955 through to Charles de Gaulle's veto against the free trade area in late 1958. Yet, some of his claims to novelty are misleading. This is true, for example, when he says (p.222) about the British Plan G for a free trade area and its treatment by Kaiser (1996/1999) and Moravcsik (1999) that this is "a historical question too complex to lend itself to condemnation or vindication". Both studies actually analyse the motives behind this initiative and its diplomatic chances of success and they do not pass any normative value judgements on its inherent merits. If one discounts the sales rhetoric for a book based on a PhD, which is reminiscent of one of Arthur Miller's famous characters, Ellison's main original contribution concerns, as he is quite justified in claiming (p.9), British policy during the free trade area negotiations of 1957-8.

Ellison begins by tracing the origins of Plan G inside Whitehall. He rightly comes to the conclusion that it was “inherently conservative” in its attempt “to protect the traditional British trade patterns while securing European export markets” (p.63). The British preoccupation was how to avoid possible trade disadvantages resulting from the formation of a continental European economic organisation without having to give up the remaining Commonwealth preferences, and this was only possible inside a free trade area, not a customs union with a unified external tariff. Ellison emphasises the degree to which the British initiative was determined by the existing external and domestic political commitments to the Commonwealth under the Ottawa agreements of 1932 and the British farmers under the Agriculture Act of 1947/57 (p.90). The original Plan G included no provisions for significant concessions to continental European countries, especially France, over the future tariff levels in a free trade area or trade in agricultural goods. This was despite the fact that the French were at that time securing, in the ongoing intergovernmental negotiations, albeit in general terms, a progressive Europeanisation of agricultural trade and policy inside the future EEC which was a key part of the overall package deal. Moreover, the British government also managed to alienate its continental European partners with other policy initiatives. These included the “Grand Design” proposed by Selwyn Lloyd, the foreign secretary, to streamline European and Atlantic institutions, and the threat to reduce the British Army on the Rhine because of balance of payments problems (pp.119/175), which complicated the important relationship with West Germany. British politicians, including Harold Macmillan, also frequently used wild threats, especially when talking to the Germans, which proved counterproductive.

Ellison shows in his discussion of the actual free trade area negotiations in the Maudling Committee from the autumn of 1957 that the British government failed to deal with two substantive problems of its proposal. The first was the lack of an attractive offer for an increase in agricultural imports from continental European countries like France and Denmark, as a *quid pro quo* for their agreement to industrial free trade. In particular, the French governments of the Fourth Republic desperately needed such an offer because of the strong influence of the farmers’ organisation and the quite violent opposition of the Patronat, the employers’ organisation, against an industrial free trade area. Even before de Gaulle came back to power in the spring of 1958, French governments were no longer interested in British inclusion for political reasons alone. The British government also failed to deal effectively with the origin problem. This question concerned the rules governing the free trade area content of a particular product for it to qualify for free trade area treatment (p.163). The French and Italian governments were interested in an illiberal definition which would have excluded as many products as possible from free trade area treatment, and they used this issue to delay the negotiations in the spring of 1958. Ellison concludes that despite Macmillan’s attempt to dramatise the conflict over de Gaulle’s veto later in the same year, the British government was fully aware from July 1958 onwards (p.212) that the negotiations were doomed to fail. Accordingly, they already had informal contacts with business representatives and the governments of other West European countries, which were not in the newly founded EEC, about the possible formation of a peripheral organisation of the “outer Seven”, the later European Free Trade Association.

Ellison’s treatment of Plan G and the ensuing free trade area negotiations is solid and allows some interesting insights into British policy-making over Europe in this crucial formative period of the EEC. Yet, there are also very narrow limits to what it can achieve, raising a fundamental issue which is of wider concern to the study of post-war European integration more generally, and not just in Britain. This book is based exclusively on British government records. As a result, it fails to fully take account of domestic political influences on the policy-making process. These were especially significant, however, in converting the British government during 1958 to the idea of a peripheral organisation of the “outer Seven”. This in turn led to a temporarily more relaxed reassessment of the importance for Britain of

the initial Plan G for a larger free trade area encompassing all of Western Europe. Moreover, the book is based on archival research in Britain only. As a result, it fails to grasp the *inter-active* character of intergovernmental negotiations like those about a free trade area during 1957-58. Ellison's understanding of and references to the six EEC countries are based on a selective reading of British assessments and literature in English. This means, for example, that he is not even aware of the existence of the excellent study of the free trade area negotiations by Karl Kaiser (unrelated to the reviewer) published in 1963. This book is of course not based on sources, but it actually deals very effectively with many of the technical issues of the free area negotiations. Ellison even thanks a colleague for the personal translation of one published article in French so that he could understand its essence (p.287, footnote 157). His admission of foreign language illiteracy at least is frank. Other British and American authors nowadays quote publications in foreign languages, but cannot even cite titles correctly or put special signs in the right place, which makes one think how good their language skills really are, and this does happen elsewhere. Thus, for anyone who wants to make a *major* contribution to the study of the history of European integration, the future clearly lies in multi-archival research in more than one country based on a thorough reading knowledge of foreign languages.

Wolfram Kaiser
University of Portsmouth

Alfred CAHEN – *L'Alliance atlantique pour le XXI^e siècle*, P.I.E. Peter Lang, Bern, 2001, 139 p. – ISBN 90-5201-945-2 – 32,00 SFR.

Alfred Cahen, Belgian honorary ambassador and secretary general of the Atlantic Treaty Association, who died in 2000, intended this study for the allied Heads of State and Government gathering in Washington for a summit on 23 and 24 April 1999 to commemorate NATO's 50th anniversary.

By way of introduction, Eric Remasle and Pascaline Winant recall in the first 14 pages the double tropism of Alfred Cahen - the European construction and the Atlantic solidarity - and paint a picture of the international and the European context since the fall of the Berlin Wall referring to the recent transformations of the Atlantic Alliance, the orientations of George W. Bush's new administration regarding its European policy and finally the evolution of the role of the common security and defence policy (CFSP) since 1992.

The working paper written by A. Cahen consists of two parts entitled: Antecedents and the elements of the "Alliance of the 21st century".

In the first part, Alfred Cahen states that the profound transformations of the late 80s did not remove all threat from the international scene and from the world, on the contrary. In reality, the threat, more dangerous than ever, has become different in nature. Cahen recalls that the Atlantic Alliance initiated several adaptations at the Summit of London (5-6 July 1990), at the Council of ministers of Copenhagen (6-7 June 1991) and at the Summit of Rome (7-8 November 1991). The Madrid Summit of the Heads of State and Government (8-9 July 1997) resulted in a declaration that defined a new Euro-Atlantic architecture of security. Fifty years after its creation, a summit of the Heads of State and Government of the countries of the Alliance meeting in Washington on 23 and 24 April 1999, gives birth to an "Alliance for the 21st century", according to the title of the communiqué of 24 April 1999.

In a second part, Alfred Cahen analyzes each of the pillars of the new Euro-Atlantic architecture outlined in Madrid in 1997 and realized in Washington in 1999. Thus he successfully takes up 10 points characterizing the new orientation.

The updated strategic concept, whose elaboration had been decided in Madrid, stipulates that the Euro-Atlantic area remains the essential area of intervention without excluding other parts of the world. Besides, the text clearly refers to the emergence of a “European identity of security and defence”.

No sooner than their new situation had been established, the former Soviet “satellites” and certain new European states have shown an undeniable interest in joining the Alliance and NATO. Thus the problem of the enlargement arises: 12 countries have applied for membership. Only three of them – Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, joined in April 1999. France and other European states as well as Canada wanted to admit simultaneously Romania and Slovenia whereas the Scandinavian countries paid special attention to the Baltic States. But other European States as well as the United States considered these memberships to be premature, especially in order not to weigh on the strained relations with Russia. The question will again be examined at the Summit of 2002.

A. Cahen considers that the “Kosovo crisis constituted a significant – not to say an essential - incentive for the European Union to progress more determinedly towards the implementation of the security-defence component of a common European policy on security and defence [...]. Yet even more than the preceding ones, this crisis proved the absolute necessity for the European Union to have true diplomatic and military capabilities, if it wants to play a part on the world political scene and first of all on its own continent” (p.70). Cahen wonders whether the beginning of the new millennium could well mark a turning point: the dimension of security and defence of the European construction process seems well on the way to concretization, as shown by the declaration of Cologne (June 1999) and the conclusions of Helsinki (December 1999). It is planned to dissolve the WEU whose missions and structures will have to be transferred to the European Union.

Cahen rightly points out that one may wonder what in this event would become of the collective defence alliance provided for in the Treaty of Brussels. Can the European Union possibly adopt it in its own name? The five WEU observers, full members of the European Union, won't hear of it.

A. Cahen also wonders how the European Security and Defence identity and the security-defence section of the CFSP will be linked up with each other. He shows optimism when asserting that “up to now cooperation between NATO and WEU has developed quite satisfactorily” (p.81). Nevertheless he adds that “it must not be concealed that this cooperation raises quite a lot of problems: the understanding of the concept of an autonomous European defence may vary from one side to the other of the Atlantic just like within the European Union itself, by the way”. Cahen considers that the development of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy will in fact be able to strengthen the European Identity of Security and Defence (EISD) for the great benefit of both the Alliance and the European Union, provided they make them progress at the same pace and favour pragmatic solutions.

Cahen then refers to the NATO “Defence Capabilities Initiative” adopted by the Washington Summit as well as to the enhancement of the Partnerships for Peace, including the 19 Atlantic allies (with Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic) and 25 partners (Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Kazakstan, the Republic of Kirgizia, Latvia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Lithuania, Moldova, Uzbekistan, , Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine).

Like the European Union, only to a lesser extent, the Atlantic Alliance is concerned with the development of a privileged relationship with the southern Mediterranean rim countries.

Arms control, limitations and reductions, a matter of long-standing concern for the Atlantic Alliance, have been brought up again in Washington in April 1999. The obligation to fight terrorism has also been stated.

Russia, that for several years has been going through a national crisis and that has been in search of a new identity in the diplomatic scene still has to find its place in the international chorus and especially in relation to Europe and the West. “Russian diplomacy is characterized by a definite ambiguity and unpredictability that affect above all its relations with the Atlantic Alliance” (p.100). That’s the reason why the signing of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation on 27 May 1997 in Paris has been such an important historic event.

While Russia signed this Act, it publicly maintained its opposition to certain elements of the new Euro-Atlantic architecture of security and first of all to the enlargement of the Alliance. Although it tacitly accepted the membership of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, Russia seriously warned against any NATO enlargement involving a former Soviet republic.

A. Cahen points out that the Kosovo crisis fully revealed the ambiguity of the relationship between Russia and NATO. The NATO air raids, which started on 23 March 1999, led Russia to break off the formal relations with the Alliance and to suspend the application of the Founding Act. These difficulties, including the surprise landing of some Russian parachutists in Pristina in the night from 11 to 12 June 1999, did not prevent a rapprochement between Moscow and the Allies, nonetheless. The formal relations between Russia and NATO have been resumed on 23 July 1999. Even so, Cahen stresses that “the ambiguity and the unpredictability that hamper Russian diplomacy and Russia’s relations with the Atlantic Alliance remain and will continue to create difficulties every now and then” (p.106).

As regards Ukraine, its entry into the Atlantic Alliance is impossible due to Moscow’s opposition, hence the solution of a special relationship that has been realized by the adoption of a Charter for a distinctive partnership, signed in 1997. During the Kosovo crisis, Ukraine showed solidarity with NATO.

A. Cahen finally analyzes the relations of the Alliance with other international organizations competent to act in the field of peacekeeping and international security, especially in the Euro-Atlantic area: OSCE, UNO. He points out that the updated strategic concept nevertheless doesn’t go as far as to formally demanding an explicit mandate by the Security Council of the United Nations or by the OSCE for a NATO crisis management task and doesn’t formally exclude a right of initiative for NATO. “Does this lead to the conclusion that this right of initiative is possible, especially in situations where a humanitarian catastrophe or serious violations of human rights have to be prevented, i.e. when immediate action becomes necessary for humanitarian reasons. It well seems to be the case” (p.116).

The work ends abruptly; the author had not the possibility to finish it. Alfred Cahen planned to analyze a decisive and totally new phase in the lifetime of the Alliance, then to draw the lessons from it, i.e. the Kosovo crisis and its different stages. Time had been lacking.

Yves-Henri Nouailhat

Emeritus Professor of the University of Nantes

Maurice FITZGERALD - *Protectionism to Liberalisation, Ireland and the EEC, 1957 to 1966*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2000, 427 p. – ISBN 0-7546-1456-5 – 49,59 £.

Depuis les années 1990, l'historiographie a été marquée par une floraison d'ouvrages qui portent sur les bienfaits de l'intégration de l'Irlande dans l'Europe. L'idée originale de Maurice Fitzgerald, dans son ouvrage intitulé *Protectionism to Liberalisation, Ireland and the EEC 1957 to 1966*, est d'analyser la période charnière 1957-1966 qui devança l'entrée de l'Irlande dans le Marché Commun et traça en quelque sorte la voie de l'adhésion. Ces quelques années, comme le titre l'indique, furent marquées par l'ouverture tardive du pays au libre échange après des décennies de protectionnisme plus ou moins rigide. Entre le Traité de Rome et le compromis de Luxembourg, l'Irlande, où l'idée de coopération économique avait vu le jour grâce à sa participation au plan Marshall, allait observer avec un intérêt croissant l'évolution d'un grand dessein. Si le parcours «précommunautaire» fut semé d'embûches et d'entraves, la marche vers un avenir prospère et communautaire semblait irréversible. Cette page d'histoire davantage faite d'interrogations et de recoupements que de ruptures nettes représente un véritable défi pour l'analyste, à la mesure de ce que fut la perspective de l'intégration. Il s'agit de répondre à une question majeure: Quelle relation convient-il d'établir entre le changement de politique économique de l'Irlande à la fin des années cinquante et la perspective de l'adhésion et comment analyser et interpréter le cheminement du pays au cours de ces années qui furent décisives?

Le découpage en phases chronologiques s'articule autour de questionnements qui préoccupèrent les responsables irlandais de l'époque. Dans son introduction l'auteur explique d'emblée la méthode utilisée qui consiste à mettre en relief les moments de crise où l'avenir du pays semblait en suspens.

Le premier chapitre, *Small power and peripheral: Ireland in the 1950s*, replace l'Irlande dans son contexte historique et géopolitique du milieu des années 1950, à la fois partie intégrante de l'Europe mais également restée à l'écart des grands bouleversements du continent. L'auteur y dresse un tableau très clair d'un petit pays sous-développé et relativement insignifiant, aux marges de l'Europe, à qui tous les ingrédients du progrès économique et d'une véritable indépendance faisaient cruellement défaut. Il explique comment l'apparition d'une nouvelle génération de décideurs allait toutefois faire naître une approche novatrice, où l'économique allait prendre le pas sur le politique comme priorité nationale.

Le deuxième chapitre, *From the OEEC to the EFTA*, est consacré à l'exclusion de l'Irlande de l'AELE. Cette zone occidentale de libre-échange, créée sous l'initiative de la Grande-Bretagne était largement destinée à contrecarrer les initiatives des Six. Elle regroupait sept Etats: la Grande-Bretagne, la Suède, le Danemark, la Norvège, l'Autriche, la Suisse et le Portugal. L'auteur montre à cette occasion à quel point l'Irlande était tributaire du Royaume-Uni dans son approche communautaire. Si la Grande-Bretagne ne montrait guère d'enthousiasme pour un engagement qui dépassait le stade de la coopération intergouvernementale, il n'était pas envisageable pour l'Irlande d'y souscrire seule, compte tenu de l'étroitesse des liens économiques avec l'île voisine. La conscience que les deux îles constituaient une économie intégrée pratiquement autonome, et, grâce à l'intensité de leurs échanges dans le domaine agricole, une entité organique autant que géographique, était largement présente en Irlande. Tandis que des divergences entre les différents ministères sur les choix stratégiques allaient surgir, le Secrétaire Général aux finances, T.K. Whitaker allait s'imposer comme le futur artisan de la reprise économique.

Le troisième chapitre, particulièrement réussi, fait état des raisons qui motivèrent le choix de la Communauté d'une telle décision et analyse les facteurs et les motivations tels qu'ils apparurent dans le Livre Blanc et l'aide-mémoire destinés à mettre l'accent sur les liens économiques qui unissaient l'Irlande à la Grande-Bretagne. Il n'est pas abusif, en l'occurrence, de parler d'un volontarisme irlandais au niveau des dirigeants, qui allait prendre des dimensions

quasi prométhéennes. Il incombait en effet au premier ministre, Sean Lemass, dont la marge de manœuvre était très étroite, de dissiper les doutes et de craintes des responsables européens. Il lui fallut déployer des trésors d'astuce et de diplomatie pour éviter tout faux pas. Comment en effet paraître crédible avec ses propres arguments tout en restant, par nécessité, dans le sillage du Royaume-Uni. Il lui incombait également de persuader la Communauté des potentialités économiques de son pays et de ses capacités à maîtriser son destin, afin d'arracher une adhésion à part entière et non un statut de membre associé.

Ce furent des moments particulièrement difficiles pour l'Irlande, en butte aux méandres de la conjoncture internationale, où les enjeux étaient gros et où l'optimisme et la confiance pouvaient, d'un moment à l'autre faire, place au découragement et au scepticisme.

Le quatrième chapitre, *De Gaulle's refusal of the UK*, est consacré au refus de De Gaulle, au sens et aux conséquences de ce rejet pour l'Irlande. Il apparaît clairement que l'Irlande ne put faire accéder sa requête car elle n'était pas en mesure de se faire admettre pour elle-même. Mais c'est sans doute dans cet échec que se forgea sa volonté inébranlable, avec les multiples moyens mis en place pour satisfaire aux exigences communautaires. L'auteur jette un regard sans complaisance sur la stratégie mise en place par le premier ministre Sean Lemass tout en révélant ses qualités d'homme d'Etat et son aptitude à gérer une crise grave.

Le cinquième chapitre, *The 1965 Anglo-irish FTA agreement*, porte sur les préliminaires à l'accord de libre-échange anglo-irlandais de 1965, signé sans doute par défaut de solution de rechange mais aussi dans la perspective d'ouvertures économiques. Il montre bien comment l'entrée de l'Irlande dans la Communauté s'est construite sur des principes apparemment contradictoires, l'idée étant de se rapprocher encore de sa partenaire historique afin de pouvoir ensuite se libérer de cette relation bilatérale, combien étouffante, au sein d'une confédération d'états partenaires interdépendants. Ce qui a pu apparaître comme un geste paradoxal de la part d'un Etat soucieux de se doter d'une véritable indépendance économique s'éclaire de façon logique.

Dans le sixième chapitre, *Ireland's European integration, 1957 to 1966*, l'auteur dresse un état des lieux au seuil de l'année 1966 après le grand tournant de la fin des années 1950. Il anticipe l'issue des négociations qui ne viendraient que six ans plus tard après le départ du Général de Gaulle et la réouverture des négociations sous la présidence de Georges Pompidou. L'Irlande allait en effet essuyer un autre revers dû au second veto de la France à la candidature du Royaume-Uni. Mais ses progrès économiques la feraient apparaître sous un nouveau jour aux yeux des Six. La dynamique Whitaker-Lemass, habilement décrite comme l'alliance d'un visionnaire à celle d'un pragmatiste, commençait à porter ses fruits. L'Irlande était également devenue pleinement consciente du lien entre son intérêt propre et la nouvelle collectivité, née du Traité de Rome tout comme du prix à payer pour son entrée dans la Communauté.

L'ouvrage se conclut par une forme de bilan assorti de perspectives d'avenir où l'auteur revient également sur l'échec de la première candidature de l'Irlande. Si la France lui avait en contrepartie, proposé de souscrire un régime d'association qui pouvait déboucher, à terme, sur une adhésion à part entière, l'Irlande ne pouvait accepter cette option qui la désolidariserait du Royaume-Uni avec qui elle avait signé, deux ans plus tôt, l'accord de libre-échange.

Dans cette étude dense rien n'est négligé pour restituer au lecteur une réalité politique et diplomatique extrêmement complexe et l'auteur puise abondamment dans une multitude de sources primaires et secondaires pour enrichir et illustrer son propos. Il y a de très bons passages sur des sujets largement débattus tels que la neutralité, la partition et l'émigration comme sur d'autres qui le sont moins tels que l'évolution comparative des deux économies irlandaises, la visite du premier ministre irlandais au Vatican et les relations irlando-italiennes.

L'ouvrage n'en suscite pas moins quelques petites insatisfactions et frustrations. La démarche linéaire ne lui permet pas d'échapper à des lourdeurs et des redites. Il est parfois

difficile de garder le fil du raisonnement dans ce dédale de discours, de déclarations et de prises de positions, mais l'auteur en est conscient et n'hésite pas à faire un effort de synthèse en reprenant à la fin des chapitres les points essentiels de son analyse. Quelques aspects auraient gagné à être plus approfondis comme celui des différentes approches des partis irlandais vis-à-vis de l'idée d'Europe. Il aurait été peut-être plus satisfaisant pour l'esprit de poursuivre l'étude jusqu'à l'entrée effective de l'Irlande dans la Communauté. On peut enfin déplorer l'absence d'un index et d'une chronologie des événements. Ces quelques réserves n'enlèvent rien à la rigueur et à la richesse de cette démonstration qui constitue une contribution de premier ordre à la connaissance de l'Irlande contemporaine.

Si toute étude approfondie vise à contribuer, au delà de la période historique choisie, à une réflexion plus générale sur la vocation et la place d'un Etat, peu d'ouvrages s'en acquittent aussi magistralement que celui de Maurice Fitzgerald. Eloigné des simplifications et des fausses évidences, il condense des interrogations relatives aux problèmes économiques et politiques d'un petit Etat, en butte aux méandres de la politique internationale. L'Irlande illustre par son choix de l'intégration, le souhait de se tourner vers un progrès aux contours de l'Europe; ses tâtonnements qui firent suite à ceux de l'Europe occidentale entre libre-échange et protectionnisme tout comme les attermolements du Royaume-Uni vis-à-vis de l'idée d'intégration participent à la recherche de solutions concertées pour édifier un espace économique homogène et cohérent. Comme l'a dit John Hume, même si l'Irlande restera toujours une île, son entrée dans la Communauté a mis un terme à son insularité. En marquant la fin d'une existence bornée par le chez-soi ou le voisin immédiat et le refus de tout accommodement avec la culture étrangère, l'entrée dans la Communauté allait mettre un terme définitif à la démarche solitaire qui avait renforcé l'étroitesse de l'univers mental irlandais. Maurice Fitzgerald démontre avec conviction que son adhésion se situe également dans la droite ligne des programmes de développement économique inspirés de la pensée de Ken Whitaker et mis en place sous l'égide de Sean Lemass. Si les vetos du Général de Gaulle à la candidature britannique ont bloqué, pendant une décennie, toute procédure d'adhésion de l'Irlande, ces reports dilatoires lui ont permis, en revanche, de mieux affronter le grand marché à la date de son entrée dans la Communauté. En reconnaissant les potentialités économiques de l'Irlande, la Communauté a en quelque sorte accredité les dirigeants irlandais pour des politiques opportunes et judicieuses et une bonne préparation aux défis de l'intégration. A la veille d'un prochain élargissement de l'Union Européenne, c'est peu de dire que cet ouvrage vient à son heure. Bien au delà des spécialistes en études irlandaises, ce sont tous les lecteurs curieux d'observer la transformation d'un pays qui y trouveront matière à réflexion.

Marie-Claire Considère-Charon

Maître de conférences à l'Université de Haute-Alsace

Comité pour l'histoire économique et monétaire de la France – *Le rôle des ministères des finances et de l'économie dans la construction européenne (1957/1978)* – actes du colloque tenu à Bercy les 26/28 mai 1999, Ministère de l'Économie, des Finances et de l'Industrie, Paris, 2002, (2 volumes) 572 et 210 p. – ISBN 2-11-091048-8 – 39,00 €.

It is not easy to give an account of such a rich publication: with the preparatory conferences on tax harmonisation (1997) and the Werner plan (1998) published in volume two there are 46 contributors who have set to the task, thirty of whom are French or foreign university researchers and 16 government officials who also took part in the negotiations. This combination is one of the assets of the colloquium because it allows to complete the archive work done by historians with the negotiators' personal recollections as not all discussions leave written traces.

Obviously, and that seem to be the rule of the genre, personal explorations sometimes go too much into details and overall problematizing is not easy. From all these papers one may get a slightly kaleidoscopic impression because the field is not always easy to respect as the Ministries of Finance interfere with other institutional organs.

Please forgive the author, who is an economist, his somewhat offhand view of this important research. The first impression, faithful to the spirit of the colloquium, is that taking into consideration the ministries of Finance, usefully completes an approach which is generally centred on the ministries of Foreign affairs which, when it comes to international diplomatic talks, are obviously in the front line. The contributions show that the ministries of Foreign affairs often approach negotiations in a doctrinal or even doctrinaire way, while the ministries of Finance were often more pragmatic because more concerned about the practical aspects of integration. Furthermore, they were often more used to European negotiations through their experience within the frameworks of the OECE and ECSC. The result was a problem of cooperation and organisation between the ministries concerned and the prevalent role of the head of the government. Essential decisions were often taken for reasons of national politics rather than as a result of the talks themselves. Germany in particular often had to compromise with France in order to maintain the dynamics of reconciliation. It is fascinating to glimpse behind the scenes of the big negotiations and to notice the absence of monolithic national positions: for example, the elaboration of the French position collates the points of view of different actors and institutions and depends on the internal balance of power, which finds itself modified by the course of the negotiations.

The majority of papers (one does regret that the organizers did not try harder to work out the problematic of the contributions) is divided into four major topics:

1. “Economic policies, national finances and the international dialogue in the sixties and seventies”

This part is given over to the analysis of foreign approaches; British (Ludlow), Italian (Segreto), German (Bührer), French/German (Lefèvre), Dutch (Brouwer, Harrywan). Its interest lies in the diversity of institutional configurations and strategic positions. The attitude towards British candidature in particular (and more indirectly the feelings regarding the United States) affects the position towards a deepening of the integration. From this point of view the thesis of the “friendly five”, formulated by the British ministry of Foreign affairs does not appear as completely devoid of significance and France, is often isolated in spite of its power to block decisions. National conditions also play an important role. Thus, the Italian crisis starting in 1969 or the sensitivity of the Netherlands regarding the rates of exchange may explain why they rally round the projects of monetary cooperation.

2. “Administration and European culture”

Despite its title this part mainly focuses on the French administration, through the training of government officials (contributions by Mangenot and Bossuat), the role of the *Secrétariat général du Comité interministériel pour la coopération économique européenne* (de Castelnaud) and that of the post of economic expansion in London (Badel). These papers (as well as the one by de Lattre) clearly bring out the importance of personal relations, on the fringe as well as at the top of official talks, of networks and, concerning interdepartmental questions, the importance of intersecting structures.

3. “The origins of the Euro”

We will come back to this part in a more detailed way in our conclusion. Note that the question initially asked by de Boissieu is not really answered: to what degree is the European monetary cooperation endogenous (a product of the dynamics inherent in the economic integration) or exogenous (a response to the International Monetary System becoming unsettled). On the one hand, the 1969 decision of The Hague to launch the EMU project is the product of European politics; to give the process of integration a new impulse after the completion of the customs union (and the end of the Gaullist period). On the other hand, it is the impossibility of finding an international solution, that leads its advocates to withdraw to the European level. Feiertag presents the international emergence of a monetary Europe through the shared position, at the general meeting of the IMF (International Monetary Fund), on the GAB (General Agreement to Borrow) in Vienna (18th/20th September '61). The other contributions (including the preliminary colloquium of 1998) focus on the Werner plan; Frank analyses Tietmeyer's conference on “The EMU at the center of the political debate”. Milward and Bussière respectively study the British and French positions and Acharid is interested in the monetary constraints brought about by common policies.

4. “Markets”

This part, which has a slight rag-bag character, comprises meticulous analyses of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the French approach (Noël), France and tax harmonisation (Tristram), the United Kingdom and its energy policy (Chick), the role of customs (Jacquemart), the European Investment Bank (Kipping) and international commercial negotiations, contributions by Hazoumi, Perron, Wahl and Mioche for aluminium.

In the absence of synthetic conclusions, which would allow us to draw lessons from this enormous research project it is not for us to take over the editors' parts. Let us only come back to what is most contemporary, namely monetary Europe. At the end of the sixties the French initiative is suspect because the stabilising mechanism that had been contemplated would mean that the partners would have to finance the French foreign deficit. The solution consists in thinking up a framework of collective discipline which, although not mentioned in the intermediate report of the Werner committee, is put into the final report by the partners. Thus, as an aside, the French refusal to endorse the final report and the French-German compromise which replaces “harmonisation” of economic policies by “dialogue” but in exchange makes the implementation of the plan subject to the progress of cooperation. What

one can see here is the matrix of the Maastricht process, even if Werner thought about a monetary union with neither a single nor a common currency.¹

Note also that the European level was far from evident in monetary matters (except for the agricultural common market) and that, initially (cf. the GAB of 1962) the question about cooperation was to know if it was to happen in Basle (G-10) or in Washington (IMF). In fact, even if most contributions are centred on the ministries of Finance (Tietmeyer, whose stimulating conference has been reprinted and analysed, was a member of the Werner group as representative of the ministry of Finance), the Central Banks played an essential part in this cooperation. The monetary committee created at the beginning of the 1960s and today called the “economic and financial committee” brings together the Central Banks and the ministries of Finance and is therefore the major place for monetary cooperation even if, and this quite naturally, the ministers are at the fore-front of the political scene. Be it in Italy (cf. the paper by Segreto), in Germany, in the Netherlands or in France (in particular through Baumgartner’s double career as a governor and then Minister of Finance), the Central Banks play an important part in economic policy-making and, even though they lack formal independence, in taking decisions in monetary matters.

As a conclusion one can therefore only wish for a big colloquium on “the role of Central Banks in the construction of Europe”.

*Jean-Louis Besson,
Chaire Jean Monnet, Université Pierre Mendès-France de Grenoble,
codirecteur du Centre universitaire de recherche européenne et internationale*

Michael BURGESS – *Federalism and European Union: The Building of Europe, 1950-2000*, Routledge, London, 2000, 290 p. – ISBN 0-415-22647-3 – 20,99 £.

Michael Burgess est un politiste. Depuis bientôt dix ans, il enseigne à l’Université de Hull, en Grande Bretagne, où il dirige le *Centre d’étude sur l’Union européenne* (il enseignait précédemment aux universités de Keele et de Plymouth). Son intérêt pour les questions communautaires l’a conduit à mettre sur pied un pôle d’excellence Jean Monnet. Il a lui-même obtenu une Chaire Jean Monnet en intégration politique européenne.

Avec son dernier livre, *Federalism and European Union: the Building of Europe, 1950-2000*, Michael Burgess cherche semble-t-il à compléter, tant sur la durée que dans la réflexion, une étude publiée dix ans plus tôt et déjà consacrée aux rapports entre l’Europe et le fait fédéraliste (*Federalism and European Union: Political Ideas, Influences and Strategies in the European Community, 1971-1987*, Londres, Routledge, 1989). Car c’est bien là l’une des préoccupations centrales des travaux de Michael Burgess: qualifier le fédéralisme européen. Une tâche délicate si l’on en croit l’auteur, puisque ce dernier confesse qu’à la fin des années quatre-vingt, dans la Grande Bretagne thatchérienne, il était plutôt mal venu de revendiquer un quelconque intérêt pour l’idée fédérale.

Les choses ont-elles semblé-t-elles changées, Michael Burgess n’hésitant pas, aujourd’hui, à proposer une relecture complète des cinquante dernières années de la construction européenne à la seule aune du fédéralisme ou, pour reprendre ses propres termes, à rétablir l’idée fédérale en tant que principal moteur de la construction européenne. Un tel essai mérite l’attention puis-

1. By “monetary union” the Werner group understands unlimited and irreversible convertibility of the currencies of the member states, the elimination of a fluctuation margin and the immutable fixing of parity.

que Michael Burgess doit être considéré comme un spécialiste en matière de fédéralisme, son attention s'étant portée tour à tour sur l'Union européenne aussi bien que sur le Canada, la Grande Bretagne, les époques contemporaine et moderne, quelque fois dans une perspective comparatiste.²

A bien des égards, *Federalism and European Union: the Building of Europe* laissera l'historien perplexe. Bien qu'il se veuille livre d'histoire, l'ouvrage de Michael Burgess prend, dès le début, ses distances avec la méthode historique. «J'ai depuis longtemps la conviction – explique-t-il dans son introduction – qu'il est dangereux de laisser l'étude de l'histoire aux historiens».

Les deux premiers chapitres demeurent les plus intéressants et certainement les plus convaincants. Burgess y passe en revue les différentes définitions possibles du fédéralisme et de ses origines, traçant une carte politique et théorique très utile qui remonte jusqu'au XVI^e siècle. Ce faisant, il rappelle que la mécanique fédéraliste n'est pas de la même nature que celle qui anime l'Etat nation. Dans ces conditions, explique-t-il, la confrontation traditionnelle entre fédéralisme et souveraineté nationale perd beaucoup de son sens, rien ne permettant d'opposer le contraignant contrat social de l'Etat nation avec le libre regroupement fédéral d'entités plurielles. Le fédéralisme décrit par Burgess relève en effet plus de l'association politique composite et souple que du centralisme. D'où un fédéralisme parfaitement compatible avec l'idée de souverainetés multiples, tirant son essence d'une certaine pratique politique plutôt que d'un aboutissement institutionnel. Finalement, assure Burgess, le fédéralisme peut parfaitement se passer de fédération. Et c'est précisément ce qui se passe au sein de l'Union européenne.

Une fois défini ce qu'est, à ses yeux, le fédéralisme et classé l'objet Union/Communauté européenne dans la catégorie *nouvelle confédération animée d'un fédéralisme de progression*, Burgess cherche à démontrer la pertinence de son approche au regard de l'histoire de la construction européenne. Pour cela, il s'appuie sur deux «héros» de l'intégration – Jean Monnet et Altiero Spinelli, dont il commente largement l'action et les positions –, il se livre à une description des principaux événements constitutifs de l'Europe communautaire et à une étude très méticuleuse – tatillonne? – des principaux textes et traités européens. Sur chacun de ces points, il insiste sur l'apport des milieux ou des théories fédéralistes.

En elle-même, l'approche n'est pas contestable. Le problème est qu'à elle seule, elle reste incomplète. Le résultat est une révision brutale de l'approche de la construction européenne – à peine nuancée – où seul le fait fédéral serait agissant. Ce faisant, Burgess tire un trait sur la totalité des autres théories explicatives de l'intégration des Etats membres entre eux, tant historiques que politiques; certaines des conclusions d'Allan Milward faisant d'ailleurs l'objet d'un «démantèlement» en règle. On serait tenté d'écrire «règlement de compte», mais les deux hommes ne se connaissent apparemment pas.

2. Nous indiquons ici les principales publications (ouvrages, contributions et articles) de Michael Burgess sur le fédéralisme: *Federalism and Federation in Western Europe*, (dir.), Croom Helm, London, 1986; *Mrs. Thatcher, Federalism and the Future of Europe*, in: *European Access*, 1(1989), pp.9ff.; *Canadian Federalism: Past, Present, Future*, University of Leicester Press, Leicester, 1990; *Comparative Federalism and Federation*, (co-ed.), Wheatsheaf, Harvester, 1993; *The british tradition of federalism* (co ed.), Cassell, 1995; *Federalism and building European Union*, in: *The Journal of Federalism*, Vol.26, numéro spécial, automne 1996, pp.1ff.; *Federalism in anglo-american political thought during the xvii^e and xviii^e centuries*, in: J. KRAMER, H.-P. SCHNEIDER (dir.), *Federalism and Civil Societies*, Nomos-Verlag, Baden-Baden, 1999, pp. 53ff.; *Obstinate or Obsolete? The State of the Canadian "Federation"*, in: *Regional and Federal Studies: an international journal*, 9(été 1999), pp.4ff.; *The Federal Spirit as a Moral Basis to Canadian Federalism*, in: *International Journal of Canadian Studies*, 22(automne 2000), pp.13ff. Il prépare actuellement une importante étude comparatiste des pratiques et des théories fédéralistes.

Bien entendu – et les historiens le savent plus que d'autres, puisqu'ils sont nombreux à s'intéresser aux milieux, aux biographies, aux idéologies –, l'idée fédérale est une composante de la dynamique historique de la construction européenne. Mais l'isoler trop strictement, revient à appauvrir considérablement la complexité du fait européen. Au contraire, on aurait aimé découvrir un fédéralisme tel que défini par Burgess dans une confrontation/coopération avec ces autres facteurs. Ce n'est pratiquement jamais le cas. Les pages consacrées au Traité sur l'Union européenne de 1984 – plus connu sous le terme de projet Spinelli – restent ainsi purement analytiques. Comment croire que les députés européens et Spinelli lui-même n'aient pas été influencés par le contexte de l'époque? A aucun moment, par exemple, Burgess ne rappelle les tensions dans les relations est-ouest – la «guerre fraîche», la crise des Euromissiles, le projet de défense spatiale américaine –; tensions qui, alors, animent pourtant bon nombre de milieux européens, y compris chez les fédéralistes. Lorsque Spinelli présente personnellement son projet à François Mitterrand, en avril 1984 (Archives nationales, 5AG4; *Quelques réflexions concernant la possibilité d'une initiative européenne du Président de la République*, 22/02/1984, Spinelli [Altiero], Parlement européen), c'est sur la nécessaire solidarité européenne face à la crise économique et diplomatique qu'il insiste et non sur l'idée fédérale.

Bref, on regrette de découvrir un fédéralisme dénué de tout réalisme.

Il aurait fallu, pour cela, que l'auteur ne balaie pas d'un trait la méthode historique, Burgess allant jusqu'à regretter l'aveuglement des historiens devant les sources officielles. Il aurait fallu, d'autre part, que l'ouvrage s'ouvre plus largement aux historiens français ou allemands, ce que la bibliographie ne semble pas indiquer. Sur Jean Monnet, qui est pourtant largement utilisé, nous n'avons relevé que cinq références. On y trouve ses mémoires, bien entendu, mais pas les *Repères pour une méthode: propos sur l'Europe à faire*. On trouve l'ouvrage de François Duchêne, mais pas la biographie d'Éric Roussel ni les actes du colloque *Jean Monnet, l'Europe et les chemins de la paix*. Il nous semble pourtant que ces ouvrages sont au cœur du sujet.

Pariant sur l'idée d'un fédéralisme souple, le livre de Michael Burgess tente de conclure la vieille controverse entre fédéralistes et intergouvernementalistes. Les résultats, au regard du comparatisme historique systématiquement opéré par l'auteur, mériteraient d'être nuancés. Ce dossier a-t-il été trop vite refermé? Faut-il saisir l'occasion et le rouvrir? Peut-être. Là réside certainement le principal mérite du livre de Michael Burgess: son introspection au cœur de l'idée fédérale, les discussions théoriques qu'il présente sur ce thème, amènent l'historien à s'interroger sur de tels concepts et sur leur viabilité. Et puisque l'histoire se nourrit – entre autre chose – du rapport concepts/interprétations/sources, la lecture de *Federalism and European Union: the Building of Europe, 1950-2000* ne doit pas être négligée.

Georges Saunier
Université de Cergy-Pontoise

UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN – Belgique et l'Europe. Annales d'Études Européennes de l'Université Catholique de Louvain, Vol.5, Institut d'Études européennes, Bruylant, Brussels, 2001, 398 p. – ISBN 2-8027-1523-2 – 82,00 €

The Annals of European Studies are an annual journal of the *Institut d'études européennes de l'Université Catholique de Louvain* and contains research publications of current and past members of the University. On the occasion of the Belgian Presidency over the Euro-

pean Union during the second half of 2001, the fifth volume of the Annals had been dedicated to the theme “Belgium and Europe”. It contains twelve contributions arranged in five parts. The contributions cover a very wide array of themes ranging from European agricultural policy to Belgian diplomatic relations during the Second World War, and except for its major theme there is little relation between the articles.

The volume opens with three contributions under the heading “The European idea in Belgium”. In the first article, Oliver Depré analyses the European political philosophy of the current Belgian Prime Minister, Guy Verhofstadt. Depré gives an overview of Verhofstadt’s main speeches on European philosophy over the past years, which can be summarized as follows: since the French Revolution the principles of freedom and equality have marked European history. Although these democratic principles originate from the antic city-states, it wasn’t until modern times that they became accepted as universal human rights. In the aftermath of the events of 1989 and the end of the Cold War the national and ideological divisions within Europe have finally been resolved, which means that any longer nothing prevents these principles to exert their influence on the political development within an extended European Union. Depré’s most interesting criticism to this European philosophy of Verhofstadt is that the values currently put forward by him as a basis for European unification, are in fact the so-called western democratic values, which brings up the question *„ce qui distingue l’Europe de l’Occident et pourquoi celle-là ne se confond pas avec celui-ci?”*. Why should a European unification be essential for the promotion of freedom and liberty throughout the world? Instead, Depré suggests looking at the European unification as a continuous process without a final goal.

The next article by Geneviève Duchenne is on the life and work of Jules Destrée (1863-1936), a Wallonian regionalist, socialist and “early European” of the first half of the last century. Destrée, who was a member of the Coudenhove-Kalergi-movement and an adept of Aristide Briand, was an early Belgian spokesman for a united Europe. As early as the interwar period he saw the continent’s unification as a measure of last resort, necessary for avoiding a new disaster. Duchenne points out how Destrée, as a representative of the Belgian government to both Soviet-Russia and Italy during the First World War, personally experienced the rise of communism and had personal contacts with Mussolini, at that time a famous socialist and in favour of Italy’s entrance in war on the allied side, while fiercely condemning Bolshevism from the start, Destrée was a few years later somehow fascinated and attracted by fascism, which he did not consider contradictory to his socialist convictions until the 1930s – *„[f]rappé par la personnalité de Mussolini et par la présence d’éléments populaires dans les rangs des fascistes, Destrée refuse d’opposer fascisme et socialisme“*, Duchenne writes. Yet, according to the author, Jules Destrée would never have tolerated a unified Europe under nazi-German dominance. As she describes him, he was a person with some strong cultural-determined political prejudices, who, although ideologically quite unstable, was a true European intellectual living ahead of his time. Her case however is not entirely convincing.

Gaëlle Rony examines the general Belgian attitude towards Europe. Thereby she tries to reconstruct the image Belgians have of their *own* identity by analysing newspaper articles written at the time of the Nice Summit of the European Union (December 2000). To compare differences, she does the same for France. Each newspaper article, Rony claims, shows a number of so-called “white spots”, which tell us about the “narrative identity” of the nation, or *„[c]’est dans ces blancs du discours que prend forme l’ordre symbolique des acteurs médiatiques, et donc les identités narratives belge et française, élaborées dans leur rapport à l’Europe“*. She concludes that Belgium sees herself as being a small country, but nonetheless big through her ambition, belief and idealism. Contrary to that, France sees herself as standing in the centre of a European construction, which is an expression of the country’s *grandeur*. What Rony clarifies is that the national identities still stand in the centre of the European debate.

The Annals' second part is titled "Belgium politics with regard to Europe". Vincent Dujardin includes a contribution on Pierre Harmel, a Belgian Foreign minister from 1966 to 1972, whose "doctrine" during the Cold War pleaded for a strong defence while pursuing better relations with the East and had a considerable influence on NATO-policy at that time. In 1966 France's President Charles De Gaulle decided to leave the military wing of NATO and started direct talks with Soviet-Russia on the issue of Europe's future. Harmel's doctrine, as laid down in a document before the Atlantic-Board in 1967, was a reaction to the Gaulle's actions, and helped to bring back the initiative to the Alliance (meaning the Americans) and to restrain France at the same time. As for the ideas themselves, Dujardin points to the Christian inspiration that underlay the doctrine, citing the Roman Encyclical *Pacem in terris*, of which Harmel said to have been particularly inspired by. Furthermore, the author gives a detailed account on the many talks of Harmel with Eastern colleagues, through which he intended to contribute personally to a better understanding. With this, Harmel might have helped to pave the way for negotiations between the USA and the Soviet Union, which finally led to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1973), the first big gathering of all European heads of state and government since 1815. According to the author, Pierre Harmel was in some the Belgian artisan of Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*.

The article by Véronique Fillieux examines the Belgian "access to property" policy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, which according to the author, is a political domain that didn't lose anything in importance. The origins of this kind of policy are to be found in the fear for social agitation, moral degeneration and epidemics. Workers had to be integrated into the civil society by an active policy, making them respectable property-owners. This involved the state becoming an interfering actor in social and economic life. Fillieux believes that most of what counted yesterday still counts today: governmental action can only be successful if supported by local actors – bringing in their knowledge of the local environment, if it proves to be adaptable and if it has clear objectives and long-term views.

Thierry Grosbois includes a contribution on the diplomatic relationships of the Belgian government in exile (in London) with the Gaullist Movement for the Liberation of France and the Soviet-Union during World War II. Concerning France, the Belgian government, and more specifically its minister of Foreign affairs Paul-Henri Spaak, was very determined to acknowledge De Gaulle and his movement as the rightful French government. This had become clear from the promptness with which the French National Committee (1941), the French Committee of National Liberation (1943) and the Provisional Government of the French Republic (1944) had been recognised. Grosbois points out that it weren't francophile feelings that had created this benevolent attitude – in fact many obstacles made it very difficult to develop good relations. On the one hand Spaak believed that the revival of a strong and independent France was necessary for future European stability, and on the other hand, he wanted to show that Belgium did not have to constantly agree with her two big western allies, although he was very careful not to go too far. Belgian relations with the Soviet-Union during the war were a lot more complicated. After the German invasion of the Soviet-Union, Spaak again proved to be an advocate of establishing a strong diplomatic relationship with the new Russian ally, this time with full support of the British. According to Grosbois, this was partly because of his own ideological background: although Spaak had never been a Marxist, in the 1930s he had been part of the left wing of the socialist party, and as such had not been unimpressed by the Soviet experiment. His conservative colleagues however felt little but repugnance for the ideological opponent and were a lot less eager to re-establish diplomatic contacts. Secondly, it was Spaak's hope that he would be able to contribute to stable relations between the big powers after the war. According to Grosbois, Spaak even saw himself as a future mediator between East and West, a role that he would outstandingly play later on during the 1945 San Francisco-Conference. However, Grosbois points to the fact that Spaak completely failed in this regard, and not only because of the

almost immediate outbreak of the Cold War after Germany's defeat. From 1944, Spaak also fell increasingly out of favour with the Soviets, because of a project about European unification he had presented to Churchill and which was interpreted in Moscow as being directed against communism. The Belgian government in exile had always thought about post-war order in terms of establishing a close West-European alliance under British leadership – directed against Germany and including Benelux and France. This would explain the positive attitude towards De Gaulle, in the hope for a rapid revival of a free France, and the objective impossibility of Belgium – in particular – to develop cordial long-term relations with the Soviets.

Gilbert Noël examines Belgium's position in the discussions concerning plans to create an agricultural community – initially at the level of the Benelux countries and later on at European level – before the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957. In the negotiations for a common Benelux-market, Belgium took a very defensive stand; the main consideration was to guarantee a transition period for the Belgian farmers to adjust to and prepare for competition with Dutch farmers. An agreement on low prices to support consumers and to stimulate exports had to go together with subsidies for farmers to enable them to improve their techniques and to ensure sufficient levels of income. This was laid down in the “Guiding Lines for Communal Agricultural Policy” of 1949. The Belgian position changed after 1950, when the Netherlands and France decided to work towards a European agricultural community. Knowing that there was no way to abstain from what seemed to be inevitable, Brussels took a moderate positive stand on European agricultural integration. Yet, professional organisations, like the *Boerenbond*, stiffened their position, according to which, market integration should be restricted to only six countries and to a limited number of products. Furthermore, they argued that it should be introduced progressively, in accordance with labour unions, and not without a preceding harmonisation of agricultural and economic policies. In the end, so Noël concludes, the Belgian government took a very defensive stand at the 1958 Agricultural Conference of the member states of the European Economic Community, which created the basis for a joint agricultural policy within the newly founded European Community. However the author doesn't touch upon the question to what extent Belgian pressure influenced the finally concluded constitution of the agricultural community, and neither does Noël give us a clue whether the line of conservative Belgian positions, set in the early 1950s, also continued after 1958.

The third part of the *Annals* contains two contributions on “Belgium and European policy”. Véronique Rousseaux contributes with “a comparative analyse of Walloon and European environmental planning”. The point of departure for this analysis, are the reports adopted with reference to environmental planning in 1999 by both the Walloon regional government and the European Commission. Firstly, Rousseaux looks into both cases separately by giving an overview of earlier political decisions that resulted in the adoption of these plans and shortly describing what each plan exactly implies. Then she compares the regional with the European plans, to see in how far they are compatible with each other. Rousseaux further compares both schemes with regard to transport-mobility, natural environment and emphasis on cooperation, pointing out their similarities and differences. To conclude, the author stresses that the schemes were nothing more than strategic documents with no normative authority, which at the same time, according to her, may have been an advantage, because it enables them to go beyond environmental and sectoral limitations.

Lorenzo Campolini, Guy Jucqois, Fiorella Flamini and Silvia Lucchini include an article on an ongoing project within the French-speaking Community of Belgium. The idea of this project is that its pupils can choose to attend class in a language different from their native French, preferably in the native language of children of the same age, together with whom they would attend these classes. This is expected firstly to improve understanding between natives and immigrants and secondly, to stimulate the creation of a truly multicultural

Europe instead of a “melting pot” as in the USA. Next the authors point to the many problems that can be expected beforehand, like differences in the level of knowledge of the language in question, objections by the parents, etc. Then they describe what has been achieved until now. It started with a directive of the Boarder of European Communities in 1977, which brought about two initiatives from the Belgian French-speaking Community: the “Pilot-projects of Multicultural Education” and the “Charters of Partnership”. The authors stress the many structural and other problems that emerged, like tensions between native and foreign teachers, differences between standard languages and the dialects spoken by immigrant pupils, the unadjusted behaviour of students, etc. In their opinion, there is not enough opportunity for consultation, with the result that little experience is exchanged and no suggestions for improving the program are being made. To conclude, the authors call on the politicians to show more commitment.

In the first article regarding “institutional aspects” of the European construction, Delphine Colard analyzes how far the Belgian government influenced the negotiations with reference to the foundation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – the so-called second pillar of the EU-Treaty. The Belgian views come out as being most pro-European, thereby hoping to gain some influence in international policy-affairs, which are regarded as being too much the exclusive field of the three big European states. The Belgian position was therefore very clear from the beginning: the CFSP must stand for external relations on a European level in the most broadest sense of the word; the working-procedures must be as much communal – which means not-intergovernmental – as possible, meaning that the consensus-rule had to be abandoned. And thirdly, a European Defence must be set up, to which purpose the Western European Union (WEU) would have to be integrated into the Union. Colard comes to the conclusion that the pillar-system which the Maastricht-Treaty (1993) envisaged, was a disappointment for Belgium. The Amsterdam-Treaty (1998) on its part could be seen as a big step forward, mostly because of the extension of the communal method, besides other things – like the appointment of a High Representative. Finally the Nice-Treaty was regarded as unsuccessful, implying nonetheless some little steps forward. To conclude Colard examines the “mediums” at Belgium's disposal to influence the European debate: being a little country, having a federal state-structure, a pro-European public opinion and Brussels. Aside from being a little country it remains unclear how these qualities represent “mediums” for European policy. They do, however, explain why Belgium is almost predestined to see herself as a motor of European integration.

Regardless of Belgium's pro-European attitude, indicated by most of the contributions, Belgium has until recently been one of the worst students in class when it comes to the transposition of European legislation, says Fabienne Demain. She takes a closer look at the measures taken by the Belgian Government to improve the situation, after having set out the measures which can be taken by the European Commission against an obstructive state – which hasn't until now been applied to Belgium. So which measures did Belgium take? Firstly, a European coordinator was assigned to each ministerial department, and secondly the minister of Foreign affairs reports every three-month on the progress made by all departments. But most important was the appointment of a government's commissioner, Freddy Willockx, with the specific duty to accelerate transposition. According to Demain, these measures have already had some results: “We're not any longer a bad student, we've become fair average”. To conclude, the author still proposes to lobby the Commission, in order to make the Commission bring European legislation more into line with Belgian legislation and to get European support with the transposition.

Where to with Europe? This was already the key-issue of Depré's contribution on Guy Verhofstadt and is subjected to discussion again in the last contribution by Christian Arnsperger, under the caption “miscellany”. Arnsperger argues that a free market incorporating an “authentic universalism” should be the main European organizing principle, which he contrasts to the “non-authentic universalism” of “capitalist rationalism”. He means, that

Europe should become the place where the free market functions should be free of all interest calculation, „penser à tout prix la marchandise sans le capital“. This would also imply that Europe says no to “pseudo-community-thinking”, meaning thinking in terms of an “exclusive unity”, which he believes can only represent another base-camp for capitalist conquest. With this, Arnspurger pleads for a whole new philosophy with regard to the nation-state and for a Europe as the political expression of social-economic postmodernism. One could object however that the functioning of a free market is exactly based on each market participant pursuing his/her own interest. A free market economy implies freedom of exchange, which needs the exchanging partners to decide individually in accordance with their own interest, not the interest of a community. Arnspurger seems to be on a dead track.

Stefaan Marteel

Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung, Bonn

Jukka SEPPINEN – *Paasikiven aikakauteen* [Into Paasikivi's epoch], Ajatus Kustannusosakeyhtiö, Helsinki, 2001, 506 p. - ISBN 951-566-064-5

and

Jukka SEPPINEN – *Mahdottomasta mahdollinen. Suomen tie Euroopan unioniin* [From the Impossible to the Possible. Finland's Path into the European Union], Ajatus Kustannusosakeyhtiö, Helsinki, 2001, 918 p. - ISBN 951-566-063-7

For this two volume history of Finland's relations to European integration, Jukka Seppinen has conducted a research work of monumental scope. Actually, the two books have been published separately but are being declared as closely linked to each other by the author in the prefaces of both books. Thus, Seppinen's epos covers a time span of ca 55 years. It is his clearly expressed aim to explain the history of Finland's accession to the EU from the very beginning. He takes up the classical model of writing the chronological political history of the events.

Chronologically seen, *Paasikiven aikakauteen* is the first part of this study; it reaches back to the beginning of the so-called Continuation War (1941-44), where Finland fought on Nazi Germany's side in an alliance never formalized. The volume takes up a topic which is one of the most prominent in Finnish historiography, namely Finland's position in the Second World War. It is indeed rather astonishing that the events preceding the first beginnings of Finnish integration policy are given such a broad space here. Seppinen explains that he simply had first to find out how the circumstances, under which Finland's relation to Europe developed after World War II, came about. Without that explanation, one would hardly understand how far the two volumes are linked up together. We see here one predominant characteristic of the whole two-volume study: Seppinen is eager to explain many links, mainly those between Finnish domestic and foreign policy, but also the role of recent history and how it shaped developments in Finnish integration policy.

Contrary to the first volume, the second one covers a much longer time span, roughly the time from 1945 until Finland's accession to the European Union in 1995. Seppinen uses an impressive amount of source material, not only from archives in Finland, but also from Sweden, Russia, Great Britain and France. This is indeed the first study on Finland's policy with regard to integration processes in Western Europe that on one side covers such a time span and on the other side makes use of source material even from the recent past. The field of

Finnish political history has seen several of such special allowances for researchers in the past decade.

Seppinen follows the welcome strategy of calling several tendencies towards political and economic co-operation in different European regions "integration". He considers the different approaches towards supranational integration, but also regional co-operation as equal - yet alternate - models of European integration. This is in my opinion highly desirable. The historiography of European integration need not be restricted to writing the history of the EEC/EU as the only possible and successful path in uniting Europe. However, in my opinion Seppinen goes too far in renaming the "Nordic co-operation" "Nordic integration". It might be original and intended to bring about a fresh perspective, but it doesn't take into account the central characteristic of inter-governmental and interparliamentary co-operation. And any time the governments of Northern Europe tried to take serious steps towards integration, they failed. In other words, the term "Nordic co-operation" is very exact and justified.

The central topos in the second volume is Finland's fate as a European outsider during most of the time period analysed within the book. To a wide extent, this description is embedded into Cold War history. The special relationship to the Soviet Union is in Seppinen's opinion the most important reason, which hindered Finland from getting what it wanted: its own place in an integrating Western Europe. He goes very far in criticizing namely the leaders of the country's foreign policy, the three presidents of the republic J.K. Paasikivi (1944–56), Urho Kekkonen (1956–81) and Mauno Koivisto (1982–1994). In Seppinen's eyes they all are in their own way responsible for Finland's partial isolation from Europe during the Cold War. Especially Paasikivi and Koivisto are being harshly criticized for showing too much anticipating obedience towards the Soviet leaders. They are accused of having acted as a brake that slowed down Finland's constant movement towards Western Europe. Kekkonen is nevertheless credited with Finland's association to the EFTA by means of the FINEFTA treaty in 1961; the author speaks of Kekkonen's perhaps most important achievement as a statesman. Considering the worship shown for the long-time president even today, for many Finns such words verge on sacrilege. Another refreshing aspect is the unmasking of Koivisto, the electorate's darling and Finland's anti-Kekkonen, who always tried to play down his own will for political power.

As becomes obvious from these remarks, this book is much more about Finnish domestic policy than about integration processes. This study can therefore be regarded as a part of the currently ongoing finlandization debate. Indeed, anyone not familiar with Finnish politicians and political culture could hardly follow the course of events. Even if one does, the matter-of-fact style in which the book is written wouldn't make it an especially exciting reading experience. With a view to give a background explanation for everything, the main lines of the development disappear. Seppinen gets indeed a bit lost in the amount of material and in his own enthusiasm for the theme.

Nevertheless the endeavour made to gather the material must be acknowledged. Especially the last chapters deal with the most recent political events, i.e. Finland's way into the European Union in the early 1990s. This is the most interesting and fascinating piece. It is definitely this part that should carry the book's subtitle: Finland's way into the European Union. If it's being applied to all of the account given here from 1941 onwards, this would testify to a rather teleological view of history.

It would have been an advantage for the interested reader, if Seppinen had taken one more step to line out the overall development of the time span he covers. The fact that Seppinen took over larger parts of his own doctoral thesis (about Finland's EFTA association) word-by-word is perhaps not very convincing in that context. Length isn't everything.

Jan Stämpel, M.A.

Alfried-Krupp-Wissenschaftskolleg, Greifswald

Uwe RÖNDIGS - *Globalisierung und europäische Integration. Der Strukturwandel des Energiesektors und die Politik der Montanunion, 1952-1962*, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 2000, 472 S. – ISBN 3-7890-6606-0 – 62,00 €.

Röndigs' substantial and important book, a revised version of his doctoral thesis written under the supervision of Wolf D. Gruner at the University of Hamburg, analyses the development of the energy sector of Western Europe after the Second World War, especially the energy policy of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the tensions between national, European and business interests. Since most scholars working on the ECSC concentrated on the steel industry, this perspective undoubtedly deserves credit.

For the most part, the book is based on material from the archives of the High Authority of the ECSC and from the *Bundesarchiv Koblenz* (ministry of economics and Etzel papers). Its focus on the German side, at least as far as the national level is concerned, is justified by the author with the economic and political importance of the Ruhr area. Besides these sources, Röndigs went through lots of relevant books and articles, as his introduction of more than fifty pages and the bibliography of more than forty pages strongly demonstrate. Whereas the latter is very useful to every scholar in the field of European integration, the introduction with its vast number of references sometimes gives the impression of nothing but name-dropping.

The first part of Röndigs' thesis gives an overview of the energy problems within post-war Europe including the rise of the oil industry and the attempts on the national and international level to solve these problems. Special attention is paid to the role of the European Coal Organization (ECO), the Organization of European Economic Cooperation and the International Ruhr Authority. Within this context, Röndigs opposes Régine Perron's argument that ECO served as a model for ECSC. The second part deals with the responses of the High Authority to the energy policy challenges – a mixture of measures to strengthen the coal industries' competitiveness, *planification* and protectionism. In the last part the author concentrates on the High Authority's attempts to establish a real European coal policy and the failure of these efforts, caused by structural problems of the European coal industry, an institutional crisis of the ECSC, and antagonistic interests of the important actors.

Röndigs' book is a valuable contribution to our understanding of the ECSC's performance during its first decade. His main argument – that the ECSC should be seen as an attempt to formulate and organize a coordinated or even common European response to the structural change of the energy sector during the 1950s, and not so much as a unilateral French initiative to guarantee coal supply from the Ruhr area for the reconstruction of France's economy – deserves further consideration. He, too, provides new evidence of the orientation of the ECSC towards competition and not towards rebuilding cartels. Nevertheless, faced with the coal crisis of the late 1950's the only task of the High Authority, as Dirk Spierenburg once put it, seemed to be to manage for an "orderly retreat" of the coal industry.

Priv.Doiz. Dr. Werner Bühner
Technische Universität München

Justus WILHELM – *Deutschland, Polen und die Politik in der NATO, 1989 bis 1997*, Peter Lang GmbH, Frankfurt am Main etc., 2001, 310 S. – ISBN 3-631-37868-8 – 72,00 Sfr.

When Germany turns to the East, others are not sure whether to cheer or to tremble, the British *Economist* argued in February 1992. Indeed, German foreign policy after 1990 has attracted considerable attention. Germany has been equally blamed for a lack of commitment (abstention from the Gulf War in 1991 and caution vis-à-vis a “Gulf War II”) as well as for its activism (its internationalisation of the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991). Germany’s relations towards its Eastern neighbours have been followed with a great deal of suspicion and anxiety. Could Germany try to create a German-led *Mittleuropa* or make use of its crucial role in the dual (NATO and EU) enlargement process? Or was Germany to be expected to neglect its neighbours and seek short term benefit from its unrivalled position in the region? The book under review presents German policy as co-operative and multilateral, based on both interests and norms/values. The German role has undoubtedly increased. However, the book does not produce any evidence that would suggest that Germany could have achieved or, for that matter, sought *dominance* of the eastern regions.

The author discusses the specifics of German–Polish relations, dealing in particular with the compatibility of national interests between the two countries and the congruence in their concept of European security. The current constellation has no precedence either in German or in Central European history as a whole.

The author applies an analytical concept, based on the “rationalist (rational) theory of co-operation”, encompassing neorealist as well as institutionalist and constructivist approaches (part I). The author’s conclusion (pp.209-210) that German-Polish co-operation has been influenced by both norms/values and interests seems indisputable. There is no single cause nor a single theoretical explanation for the unprecedented rapprochement between the two countries. The author engages in an analysis of the broad theme on three levels: first, the macro-level (looking at the international system and its structures, focussing on European security), second, the level of relations between the two countries. The third, micro-level of analysis, deals mainly with bilateral German-Polish security and military co-operation. The book presents a thorough account of the developments in the German-Polish relationship since 1989 (part II), defining three periods – 1989-1991 (the “new start”), 1992-1995 (a period of “discussion and consolidation”), and 1996-1997 (a time of “standardisation”). Structuring the story along a ‘territorial principle’ offers a new and interesting perspective, though it rather dilutes the dynamics of the developments. The macro-level of the analysis is mainly centred on the concept of a European Security Community. The author leaves some questions open – for instance that of an alternative to NATO (p.149) - and thus invites the reader to consider the issues involved without bias or preset conceptions. While the role of a wide spectrum of actors (both institutional as well as individual) is discussed in all parts, it is the case study of the more narrowly defined area of security and military co-operation (analysis on the micro-level, part IV) which offers the most detailed and convincing picture.

What has the book to offer by way of conclusions regarding German-Polish co-operation? First of all, effective co-operation represents an aim *per se*: it binds partners together, facilitates their integration and reinforces confidence. Even in such a sensitive area as security, completely new patterns of relations can develop in a relatively short time. A general compatibility between the security interests of both partners as well as of norms and values is a precondition. However, even dysfunctional interests – those, which represent a challenge to mutual relations – can inspire an intensification of mutual links. Also, Germany has had to embed its co-operation within a broader framework, for instance within the Weimar triangular co-operation with both Poland and France. The general framework, of course, represents

NATO itself (after all, the annual plans for co-operation between the individual military services with the new NATO member states are co-ordinated at NATO HQ).

The book raises a number of interesting questions and invites us to develop some of the issues. For example, while discussing the financial basis of German-Polish military co-operation, it might be interesting to emphasise that it is the German side that mostly 'pays the bill'. The aim to establish 'NATO normality' (each state pays for itself) was postponed at Polish request for one more year – until 2003. The other two new NATO member countries (the Czech Republic and Hungary) profit from this arrangement too. What does the intensity of security and military co-operation tell us about the real or supposed closeness of the relationship between Germany and Poland, particularly in their attitude to major security issues? Does the co-operation create the conditions for co-ordination or even a "division of labour"? The divergent views in Warsaw and Bonn regarding Russia are thoroughly discussed in the book. The much-debated Polish preference for Atlanticist, US-centred security arrangements, however, poses another question. Could the Weimar triangle serve as a bridge between Eurocentrism and Atlanticism? Neither the author's analysis nor more recent developments do suggest this. Also, considering German-Polish co-operation as a "policy transfer exercise" shows the limits of the co-operation. Our experience is that the *Modell Deutschland* (or rather *Modell-Bundeswehr*) has attracted considerable attention. However, it has not been emulated by any other of the East central European countries.

The book is based on the author's PhD thesis and, therefore, is not easy to read: the structure as outlined above, is complicated enough to puzzle even an informed reader. Nonetheless, packed with analytical information, it represents essential reading for all who study the evolution of German security policy.

One minor nuisance is, as always, the occurrence of misprints, more frequent than one would expect in a book published by *Peter Lang Verlag*.

Vladimir Handl,
Institute of International Relations, Prague

Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen

Hartmut Kaelble

The Historical Rise of a European Public Sphere?

This article covers the controversial issue of the rise of a European public sphere. It first shows that the European public sphere was and is different from national public spheres in Europe. Thereafter it describes the various eras of the emergence of the public sphere since the 18th century. Finally it presents various historical trends which indicate the gradual rise of a European public sphere.

L'émergence historique d'une sphère publique européenne

Cet article porte sur la thématique controversée de l'émergence d'une sphère publique européenne. Il montre d'abord que la sphère publique européenne était toujours différente de la sphère publique nationale. Ensuite il traite les époques différentes de l'émergence de la sphère publique européenne depuis le XVIIIe siècle. Finalement il présente les tendances historiques vers une émergence lente de la sphère publique européenne.

Die historische Entstehung einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit

Dieser Artikel behandelt das umstrittene Thema der Entstehung einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit. Er zeigt zuerst, dass sich die europäische Öffentlichkeit in wichtigen Aspekten von den nationalen Öffentlichkeiten in Europa unterschied und unterscheidet. Er behandelt dann die verschiedenen Epochen der Entwicklung der europäischen Öffentlichkeit seit dem 18. Jahrhundert. Am Ende werden die historischen Trends aufgeführt, die für das allmähliche Entstehen einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit sprechen.

Katiana Orluc

A last Stronghold against Fascism and National Socialism?

The Pan-European Debate over the Creation of a European Party in 1932

This article offers an analysis of the Pan-European debate on the idea of a united Europe in the interwar period with a particular focus on its relationship to Fascism as well as National Socialism. It examines whether Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi's idea of a European Party in 1932/33 was in fact intended as a means to overcome Fascism and National Socialism, or whether it also incorporated quasi-fascist leanings. The article follows the wide discussion about the creation of a European party through the correspondence between the head of the Pan-European movement (PEU) and his followers. The argument is in three parts. First, it outlines Coudenhove-Kalergi's ideas and their evolution within his own 'think-tank'. Secondly, it considers the views of the leaders of the different national sections of the PEU. Lastly, it examines the attitudes of the broader public. This multifaceted debate about the creation of a European party shows that there existed a European public sphere within which present and future visions of a common Europe were addressed.

**Le dernier bastion contre le fascisme et le nazisme?
Le débat paneuropéen sur la création d'un parti européen en 1932**

Cette contribution examine le débat paneuropéen du concept d'une Europe unie pendant l'entre-deux-guerres et ce, en vouant une attention particulière à ses relations avec le fascisme et le national-socialisme. Au centre de l'analyse se trouve la question à savoir, est-ce que, en 1932/33, l'idée du comte Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi de constituer un parti européen visait à surmonter le fascisme et le nazisme, ou est-ce que, au contraire, elle incorporerait des éléments quasi fascistes? L'article suit la grande discussion autour de la fondation d'un parti européen à travers la correspondance entre le leader du mouvement paneuropéen et ses partisans. L'argumentation se divise en trois parties. Primo. Elle développe les idées de Coudenhove-Kalergi et leur évolution dans les différents groupes de réflexion du mouvement. Secundo. Elle souligne les points de vue adoptés par les différents chefs de file des sections nationales du mouvement. Tertio. Elle examine l'attitude du grand public. Cette façon variée d'envisager la problématique de la création d'un parti européen démontre qu'il existait une sphère publique européenne au sein de laquelle on échangeait des visions actuelles et futures d'une Europe communautaire.

**Die letzte Bastion gegen den Faschismus und den Nationalsozialismus?
Die paneuropäische Debatte über die Schaffung einer europäischen Partei (1932)**

Der vorliegende Aufsatz analysiert die paneuropäische Debatte über das Konzept eines vereinigten Europas in der Zeit zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen. Besonderes Augenmerk gilt dabei den Beziehungen zu Faschismus und Nationalsozialismus, vor allem aber der entscheidenden Frage ob Graf Richard Coudenhove-Kalergis Idee zur Gründung einer europäischen Partei darauf abzielte, den Faschismus und den Nationalsozialismus zu überwinden, oder ob sein Konzept im Gegenteil quasi faschistische Elemente enthielt? Der Beitrag verfolgt die große Diskussion um die Bildung einer europäischen Partei anhand der Korrespondenz des Leiters der paneuropäischen Bewegung mit seinen Anhängern. Die Argumentation umfaßt drei Teile. Erstens, die Entfaltung der Ideen Coudenhove-Kalergis und ihre Entwicklung in den verschiedenen Expertenkommissionen seiner Bewegung. Zweitens, die unterschiedlichen Standpunkte der führenden Mitglieder der nationalen Sektionen Paneuropas. Drittens, die Haltung der öffentlichen Meinung. Diese vielseitige Betrachtungsweise belegt, dass es eine öffentliche, europäische Sphäre gab, innerhalb derer man aktuelle und auch zukünftige Visionen über ein gemeinsames Europa austauschte.

**Klaus-Peter SICK
A Europe of Pluralist Internationalism:
The Development of the French Theory of Interdependence from Emile Durkheim
to the Circle around *Notre Temps*
(1890-1930)**

The article considers the "European memorandum" drafted by Briand's staff at the Quai d'Orsay in 1929-30 — the *Mémoire du 17 mai 1930* — as the endpoint of a fundamental revision in ideas about international relations at the time of the Third Republic. It begins with an analysis both of the main arguments contained in this text and of certain initiatives undertaken by the group of mainly younger intellectuals around the periodical *Notre Temps*: initiatives directly linked to the launching of Briand's "European plan". These publicists had quite clearly seen through such a paradigm - change, which involved a critique of the principle of national sovereignty by way of a principle of interdependence; they were fervent supporters of Briand's project, which in their eyes encapsulated much of the new thinking. The article then seeks to uncover the

origins of this intellectual development. The sociologist Durkheim and the jurist Duguit appear to have been two of its pioneers, its basic premises than being furnished with more precise contours by a new generation: the intellectuals born during the decade after the founding of the Republic in 1870 and awakened to politics at the time of the Dreyfus Affair at the turn of the century. These figures in turn transmitted their concepts to the “generation of 1914”, the authors of *Notre Temps*.

All these advocates of the thesis of international interdependence started from the position that in a modern world transformed by industrialization and democratization, the traditional theory of sovereignty had lost its centrality. Competition for resources and the subsequent division of labor had created a new “solidarity of fact”, itself responsible for a new “consciousness” shared by the main agents in international relations. It was viewed as crucial that such agents were no longer to be conceived as mere states or governments, but rather as *individuals* and the groups to which they belonged – understood by some of the “new internationalists” as having already created something like a European public sphere. At the same time, they placed great stress on their theory’s “realist” as opposed to “idealist” nature: put otherwise, on interest in prosperity and integrity within fragile but highly efficient modern societies. The result was both a European federalist project and a concrete perception of foreign policy.

**L'Europe de l'internationalisme pluraliste:
La théorie française de l'interdépendance d'Emile Durkheim au cercle *Notre Temps*
(1890-1930)**

L'article considère le plan d'Europe conçu en 1929/30 sous l'égide du ministre des Affaires étrangères Briand comme l'aboutissement d'une révision fondamentale de la pensée en relations internationales à l'époque de la Troisième République. Il commence par présenter les arguments du *Mémoire du 17 mai 1930* et les initiatives du groupe autour du périodique *Notre Temps* qui y furent directement liés: Les jeunes auteurs qui y écrivaient avaient accompli de manière particulièrement nette le changement de paradigme dont il est question – la critique de la théorie de la souveraineté par celle de l'interdépendance – et ils soutenaient par conséquent de manière particulièrement forte le «plan Briand» qui leur semblait déjà le contenir. L'article cherche par la suite les origines de cette révision intellectuelle. Ainsi souligne-t-il le rôle pionnier de Durkheim et de Duguit dans la conception d'un nouveau républicanisme. Or, sur le plan des relations internationales, il faut attendre une nouvelle génération, celle éveillée à la politique à l'époque de «l'Affaire Dreyfus», pour que cette nouvelle pensée prenne véritablement forme. Celle-ci est ensuite transmise à la génération de la guerre, aux auteurs donc de *Notre Temps*. Tous les penseurs de l'interdépendance portaient de la thèse selon laquelle la modernité industrielle et démocratique avait rendu désuète la notion de la souveraineté: La concurrence pour les ressources et la division du travail qui s'ensuivait auraient créé une «solidarité de fait» suscitant une nouvelle «conscience» chez les acteurs. Ces derniers ne sont plus comme autrefois les Etats, mais plutôt les individus et leurs groupements qui – selon certains auteurs contemporains – seraient déjà en train de créer une sorte de sphère publique à l'échelle européenne. On tenait cependant à souligner que le fondement de cette nouvelle pensée était moins un «idéisme», qu'un «réalisme» mettant l'accent sur l'intérêt des individus à la prospérité et à la sécurité à l'époque de sociétés certes hautement efficaces et pourtant hautement fragiles. Le projet d'une organisation fédérale de l'Europe, mais aussi une politique étrangère concrète en étaient la conséquence.

**Das Europa des pluralistischen Internationalismus:
Die französische Theorie der Interdependenz von Emile Durkheim
bis zum Kreis um *Notre Temps*
(1890-1930)**

Der Beitrag stellt den Europaplan des französischen Aussenministers Aristide Briand von 1929/30 als Endpunkt einer grundlegenden Revision des Denkens über internationale Beziehungen zur Zeit der Dritten Republik dar. Zunächst werden die Argumente des briandschen *Memorandums*

vom 17. Mai 1930 herausgearbeitet und die mit ihm verbundenen Initiativen der Gruppe um die Zeitschrift *Notre Temps* rekonstruiert. Diese jungen Publizisten hatten den Paradigmenwechsel – die Kritik der Theorie der nationalen Souveränität durch die der Interdependenz – besonders klar vollzogen und unterstützte den „Europaplan“ aus diesem Grund besonders stark. Im weiteren wird den Ursprüngen dieser Revision nachgespürt: Deutlich wird hier die Rolle Durkheims und Duguits als Pionieren eines neuen Republikanismus. Wirklich ausgearbeitet wurde dieser auf dem Gebiet der internationalen Beziehungen aber erst durch deren „Schüler“, den nach 1870 geborenen Intellektuellen der „Generation der Dreyfus-Affäre“, die ihrerseits dann die Kriegsgeneration um *Notre Temps* beeinflussten. Alle diese „Denker der Interdependenz“ gingen davon aus, dass die industrielle und demokratische Moderne die Souveränitätsdoktrin ausgehöhlt habe. Stattdessen habe Konkurrenz um Ressourcen und darauffolgende Arbeitsteilung eine „faktische Solidarität“ hergestellt, die ihrerseits ein neues „Bewusstsein“ der Akteure hervorbringe. Akteure seien also weniger die Staaten als vielmehr die Individuen und ihre Gruppen, die – so manche Autoren – bereits eine europäische Öffentlichkeit erzeugten. Dabei wurde betont, dass nicht „Idealismus“ sondern „Realismus“, d.h. das Interesse an Wohlstand und Sicherheit unter den Voraussetzungen fragiler aber hocheffizienter Gesellschaften, die Grundlage des neuen Denkens bilde. Das Projekt eines europäischen Föderalismus aber auch eine konkrete Außenpolitik waren die Folge.

Alexander Schmidt-Gernig

Scenarios of Europe's Future – Western Future Studies of the Sixties and Seventies as an Example of a Transnational Public Sphere of Experts

Due to a felt need for a 'holistic' perspective in an era of unprecedented technological as well as social and economic transformation, beginning in the early 1960s an increasing number of not only economists and political or social scientists, but also engineers, system analysts and physicists in the US as well as in Western Europe started to focus on the future of Western society as well as on the future of the entire globe. In this regard one can observe the emergence of a new (academic) field of future(s) studies or futurology by means of new interdisciplinary methods, combining *prognoses and projections*, the theory and practice of *programming and planning*, and finally, in the context of a "philosophy of the future", ethically based designs of *alternatives*. Given the extraordinary organisational and ideological diversity of institutions and authors that performed research on the future (NGO's, governmental research institutes and those with close ties to governments, academies, independent research groups, individual authors), it is obvious that we are confronted with a special but influential form of a *transnational public sphere*, covering almost the entire spectrum of political interests and ideas rather than only several interest groups and lobbies. But despite this fundamental diversity, most of these new futures studies had characteristic elements in common which were based on the shared intention to overcome not only disciplinary but also national boundaries of social thought and planning. These trans-disciplinary as well as transnational characteristics could be described first of all as a *common "agenda"*, secondly as *common media and channels of information* and thirdly – above all – as a *basic common scientific paradigm*.

Scénarios de la future Europe – Les études futurologiques du monde occidental des années soixante et soixante-dix: un exemple de la sphère publique transnationale des experts

En dépit de l'expérience catastrophique faite durant la première moitié du XX^e siècle, l'opinion publique occidentale vit renaître, durant les années 1960, un large intérêt pour les études de l'avenir. Cette véritable «euphorie du futur», qui s'était d'ailleurs déjà manifestée au cours des années trente, mobilisa non seulement un nombre impressionnant d'économistes, de politologues et de sociologues, mais encore des ingénieurs, des analystes ou des physiciens américains et européens qui se mirent à examiner l'avenir de la société occidentale, voire du futur sort du globe entier. Il en résulta – fait absolument nouveau – une véritable «science du futur», qui se distinguait de ses

antécédents d'avant-guerre en ce sens qu'elle se caractérisait à la fois par son approche systématique, ses théories des prévisions et des projections, ses pratiques de la programmation et de la planification ou encore, et ce particulièrement dans le cadre d'une «philosophie de l'avenir», ses propositions (souvent esthétiques) d'alternatives pour corriger des évolutions négatives. Un autre fait nouveau marquant consistait en la circonstance que, pour la première fois, l'«avenir» devenait désormais l'affaire d'experts et de scientifiques travaillant dans des réseaux transnationaux constitués autour des trois principaux axes suivants: premièrement, un agenda commun; deuxièmement, une forme spécifique de «publicité» grâce à des médias et des canaux d'informations communs (think tanks, etc.); et troisièmement, un paradigme scientifique commun, qui – avant toute autre chose – caractérisait les développements prévisibles de la société «post-industrielle».

Europas Zukunftsszenarien – Westliche Zukunftsforschung in den 60er und 70er Jahren als Beispiel transnationaler Netzwerke der Wissenschaft

In den 60er Jahren kam es trotz aller katastrophalen Erfahrungen der ersten Jahrhunderthälfte noch einmal zu einer breiten Zukunftsorientierung bzw. „Zukunftseuphorie“ in den westlichen Öffentlichkeiten, was vor allem mit einer quantitativen wie qualitativen „Wissenschaftsexplosion“ zu tun hatte, die sich bereits in den 30er Jahren angekündigt hatte, durch den Krieg aber enorm beschleunigt worden war und nun ganz neue wissenschaftliche Horizonte für die globale Entwicklung der Menschheit bereithielt. Vor diesem Hintergrund entwickelte sich als Novum im westlichen Zukunftsdiskurs erstmals eine systematische, ihrem Anspruch nach wissenschaftliche „Zukunftsforschung“ mit prognostischen wie planerischen Schwerpunkten, die sich im Unterschied zu ihren Vorläufern zum einen als eine Lehre der *Prognosen und Projektionen*, zum anderen als eine Theorie und Umsetzung von „*Programmierungen*“ und *Planungen* und schließlich – häufig im Rahmen einer „Zukunftsphilosophie“ – als (ethisch) ausgerichteter Entwurf von *Alternativen* zu festgestellten Fehlentwicklungen definierte. Neu war dabei auch, daß „die Zukunft“ nun zum ersten Mal zu einer Sache *transnational* orientierter wissenschaftlicher Experten (Netzwerke) wurde, die wesentlich durch drei Elemente konstituiert und „zusammengehalten“ wurde, nämlich erstens durch eine gemeinsame *Agenda*, zweitens durch eine *spezifische Form von Öffentlichkeit* bzw. durch *gemeinsame Medien und Informationskanäle* (think tanks u.a.) und drittens schließlich durch *ein übergreifendes wissenschaftliches Leitbild*, durch das neue Leitbild der Kybernetik, das die prognostizierten Entwicklungen einer zukünftigen „post-industriellen“ Gesellschaft bei allen Unterschieden im Detail im Kern prägte.

Fausto Gualtieri

The European Community and the audiovisual landscape: from the Assises of Paris to the Brussels Conference (1989-1994)

Innovation in information technologies and the development of mass-media in the eighties, pushed Europe toward the opening of the national audio-visual markets. In order to encourage European awareness - viewed as essential for all shapes of political unification - the European Community established technical and legal rules for a common broadcast space along with an economic relief program for the audiovisual sector. These policies implied a defence of European cultural and political autonomy vis-à-vis the United States that occupied an increasingly predominant position on the European market. Indeed, the audiovisual policy was one of the most controversial elements of the Uruguay Round negotiations opened in 1986.

**La Communauté européenne et l'audiovisuel:
des Assises de Paris à la Conférence de Bruxelles (1989–1994)**

L'innovation dans les technologies de l'information et le développement des mass-médias des années quatre-vingt, poussaient l'Europe vers l'ouverture des marchés nationaux de l'audiovisuel. La Communauté européenne établit un cadre de règles et de dispositions techniques et juridiques pour un espace commun radiotélévisé et réalisait un programme d'aides économiques au secteur audiovisuel afin d'encourager la connaissance européenne, fondement nécessaire à toutes les formes d'unification politique. Cela signifiait aussi défendre une autonomie politique et culturelle face aux Etats-Unis qui occupaient une position de plus en plus prédominante sur le marché européen. En effet, l'audiovisuel fut un des éléments les plus controversés des négociations de l'Uruguay Round ouvertes en 1986.

**Die Europäische Gemeinschaft und die audiovisuellen Medien.
Von den Pariser Assises zur Brüsseler Konferenz (1989-1994)**

Die Innovation im Bereich der Informationstechnologien und die Entwicklung der Massenmedien in den Achtzigerjahren führten in Europa zu einer Öffnung des nationalen audiovisuellen Mediengewerbes. Die Gemeinschaft schuf hierfür den allgemeinen Rahmen der technischen und juristischen Regeln. Die Bildung einer gemeinsamen Radio- und Fernsehlandschaft wurde zusätzlich gefördert durch finanzielle Hilfsprogramme die darauf abzielten Europa dem Bürger näher zu bringen und damit eines der wichtigsten Fundamente der fortschreitenden politischen Vereinigung Europas zu legen. Dies beinhaltete auch die Verteidigung politischer und kultureller Eigenständigkeit gegenüber der wachsenden Übermacht der USA auf dem europäischen Medienmarkt. Die audiovisuellen Produktionen bildeten in der Tat eines der kontroversesten Themen der 1986 eingeläuteten Uruguay Runde.

Notices – Informations – Mitteilungen

**XIIIth Congress of the International Economic History Association
in Buenos Aires, 22-26 July 2002, session n°34**

**“The Common Market from 1958 to 1968: towards a European Integration
of Industrial and Financial Markets?”
(Organizer: Régine Perron)**

This research project arose out of the desire to give a historical perspective to the enlargement of the European union to the East countries as to stability. It is a first collection to analyze the impact of the European Economic Community both on European countries and on national industrial sectors. The aim is to give a comprehensive, global perspective of the European market itself.

The description of the project was the following: We look at the consequences of the EEC treaty of 1957, concentrating on the development of intra-EEC trade in manufactured goods. We also look at the effects of trade liberalisation, resulting from the interaction of the EEC and actions taken by EFTA and GATT. The period of time extends from 1958 to 1968. We are interested in an empirical approach based on statistical sources, on government and business archives. We are also interested in examining how the strengthening of the ties among the Six affected trade between the Common market and countries belonging to EFTA. We also consider studies at business or sector level on changing patterns of multinational investment within the Six. Our project is an attempt to develop market research on the basis of industry and country studies. We start from the question: how did the Common market work? What were its elements of stability and instability?

The participants were: Prof. Gerold Ambrosius (University of Siegen, Germany), Prof. Dominique Barjot (University of Paris-VI Sorbonne, France), Dr. Oliver Daddow (King's College, London, Great-Britain), Prof. Francesca Fauri (University of Bologna, Italy), Dr. Birgit Karlsson (University of Götteborg, Sweden), Dr. Régine Perron (University of Paris-IV Sorbonne), Sigfrido Ramirez (European University Institute, Florence, Italy), Dr. Catherine Schenk (University of Glasgow, Scotland), Dr. Guido Thiemeyer (University of Kassel, Germany).

The session papers will be published in 2003.

Régine Perron

(Regine.Perron@paris4.sorbonne.fr)

Tanja Malek

Politikgestaltung auf europäischer Ebene

Die europäische Strukturfondsförderung hat sich in den letzten Jahrzehnten zu einem der wichtigsten Politikbereiche der EU entwickelt. So steht sie seit ihrer ersten großen Reform im Jahre 1988 paradigmatisch für die Ausbildung eines europäischen Mehrebenensystems. Gleichzeitig ebneten die periodisch wiederkehrenden Beschlüsse zu den Strukturfondsreformen vielfach auch den Weg zu einer weiteren Vertiefung oder Erweiterung der EU. In diesem Buch wird die Entwicklung der Strukturfonds im Kontext der Politikgestaltungsprozesse auf europäischer Ebene analysiert. Im Gegensatz zu bereits vorliegenden Erklärungsmustern wird ihre Entwicklung jedoch nicht darauf reduziert, dass sie als institutionalisierte Ausgleichszahlungen in strategischen intergouvernementalen Verhandlungsprozessen im Rat fungierten. Vielmehr wird der Frage nachgegangen, inwiefern ihre Entwicklungsgeschichte auch als ein kumulativer Lernprozess verstanden werden kann. Ins Blickfeld rücken damit Prozesse der Problemdefinition und der Auseinandersetzung um Problemlösungen, die sich im Zusammenspiel zwischen Kommission und Rat entfaltet haben. Die Autorin ist wissenschaftliche Assistentin an der Universität Bielefeld.

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NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft
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Contributors - Auteurs - Autoren

GUALTIERI Fausto, Master en études européennes, Université de Florence. Consultant en affaires européennes.

Personal address: 12, Via Quintino Sella, 50136 Firenze, Italia.

Tel: (+) 39 328 717 58 75

e-mail: *fausto.gualtieri@libero.it*

KAELBLE Hartmut, Dr. Phil., Professor for Social History at the Humboldt University of Berlin, Germany.

Personal address: Humboldt-Universität, Philosophische Fakultät I, Unter den Linden 6, 10099 Berlin.

E-mail: *kaelbleh@geschichte.hu-berlin.de*

KAISER Wolfram is a FWF Senior Research Fellow, Professor at the University of Portsmouth (School of Social and Historical Studies, Milldam Building, Burnaby Road, Portsmouth PO1 3AS, UK) and Visiting Professor at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium.

Personal address: Cäcilienstraße 1, D - 40597 Düsseldorf.

Tel/Fax: (+) 49 (0) 211 7100443

E-mail: *Wolfram-Kaiser@t-online.de / Wolfram.Kaiser@port.ac.uk*

ORLUC Katiana, studied History, Comparative Literature and Law at the Free University of Berlin and took a Masters Degree at Oxford University in Modern History. Researcher at the Department for History and Civilization at the European University Institute Florence, where she is writing her Ph.D. on European Consciousness after the First World War.

E-mail: *katiana.orlduc@iue.it*

SCHMIDT-GERNIG Alexander, assistant professor at the department of history at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin/ Germany. His research interests, publications and seminars are focused on the social history of cultural transfers between modern societies, the development of collective identities and the role of the public sphere in Western societies in the 19th and 20th century.

E-Mail: *schmidtgerniga@geschichte.hu-berlin.de*

SICK Klaus-Peter, Chercheur et enseignant au Centre Marc Bloch de Berlin, Centre franco-allemand de recherches en Sciences sociales, Berlin, RFA.

Personal address: Centre Marc Bloch, Schiffbauerdamm 19, 10117 Berlin.

Tel: (+) 49 30 2093 3786

E-mail: *skp@cmb.hu-berlin.de*

Nina Philippi

Die Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union

Entstehung, Inhalt und Konsequenzen für den Grundrechtsschutz in Europa

Die am 7. Dezember 2000 auf dem Gipfel von Nizza proklamierte Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union stellt einen wichtigen Schritt zur Verbesserung des Grundrechtsschutzes in der EU dar.

Die Studie beschreibt die Entstehungsgeschichte der Charta der Grundrechte und nimmt eine kritische Analyse ihres Inhalts vor. Im Anschluss daran wird die Bedeutung der Charta für den Grundrechtsschutz in der EU diskutiert. Dabei wird auch der Frage nachgegangen, wie der mehrstufige Grundrechtsschutz in Europa institutionell ausgestaltet werden sollte, insbesondere hinsichtlich des Verhältnisses zwischen dem Europäischen Gerichtshof in Luxemburg (EuGH) und dem Europäischen Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte (EGMR) in Straßburg.

Das Buch wendet sich an Juristen mit europarechtlichem Interesse, Politologen und Zeithistoriker sowie an politisch und rechtlich interessierte Bürger, die sich einen Überblick über die Grundrechtecharta der EU verschaffen wollen.

Die Juristin und Politologin Nina Philippi beschäftigte sich während ihres Studiums schwerpunktmäßig mit Fragen der Europäischen Integration und absolvierte einen Teil ihres Rechtsreferendariats beim Europäischen Gerichtshof in Luxemburg.

2002, 83 S., brosch., 17,- €, 30,10 sFr, ISBN 3-7890-7949-9

(Schriften des Europa-Instituts der Universität des Saarlandes – Rechtswissenschaft, Bd. 38)



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Heinrich P. Kelz (Hrsg.)

Die sprachliche Zukunft Europas

Mehrsprachigkeit und Sprachenpolitik

2001 war das europäische Jahr der Sprachen. Dies war ein guter Anlass, intensiv über die Frage der Mehrsprachigkeit nachzudenken, Bilanz zu ziehen und Perspektiven zu öffnen. Experten aus dem In- und Ausland versuchen auf die sprachpolitischen Fragen eine Antwort zu geben, Modelle für Europa zu entwickeln und Möglichkeiten für den Erhalt der Vielsprachigkeit aufzuzeigen.

Inwieweit die auswärtige Kulturpolitik zum Erhalt der Mehrsprachigkeit beitragen kann, ist eine weitere Frage, die im Hinblick auf politische Konzepte und politische Praxis überprüft wird. Insgesamt hat der Fremdsprachenunterricht – auch dank EU-initiiertes (und EU-finanzierter) Programme, allen voran Lingua und Erasmus – zugenommen.

Diese pauschale Zunahme entpuppt sich jedoch hauptsächlich als eine überwältigende Zunahme des Englischunterrichts bei gleichzeitigem Stagnieren oder gar Rückgang des Unterrichts in anderen Sprachen. Daher bot sich die Frage an, ob sich Englisch als europäische lingua franca überhaupt eignet.

Bei der Frage nach einem europäischen Modell ist es wichtig, auch einen Blick auf bereits praktizierte Modelle mehrsprachiger Länder zu werfen. Dabei standen die Schweiz und Spanien im Mittelpunkt. Diese Modelle wurden kritisch hinterfragt und ihre Eignung für Europa reflektiert.

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Schweden und die Europäische Union

Europadebatte und Legitimität

Quo vadis Schweden? Wie sollen nationales Selbstbestimmungsrecht und Wohlfahrtsstaat beibehalten sowie eine glaubwürdige Neutralitätspolitik vertreten werden, wenn gleichzeitig auf supranationaler Ebene ein bedeutendes Politikfeld nach dem anderen vergemeinschaftet, an der GASP teilgenommen sowie die Deregulierung weiter vorangetrieben wird?

Der Autor untersucht die Hintergründe dieser widersprüchlichen schwedischen Europapolitik anhand einer Analyse der Europadebatten, die vor dem EG/EU-Beitritt in Schweden geführt wurden. Er weist nach, daß der schwedischen Bevölkerung nicht vermittelt wurde, wie die für das Land grundlegenden legitimitätsstiftenden Faktoren unter den Anforderungen des europäischen Integrationsprozesses zu verändern sind.

Die Studie wendet sich an die Wissenschaftler, Politiker wie interessierte Laien, die sich ein Überblick über die im deutschen Sprachraum bisher kaum dargestellten Hintergründe der schwedischen Europapolitik verschaffen wollen. Besondere Authentizität erhält die Untersuchung durch die zahlreichen ins Deutsche übersetzten Primärquellen.

2001, 367 S., geb., 66,- €, 112,- sFr, ISBN 3-7890-7641-4

(Schriften des Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (ZEI), Bd. 47)



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Armin von Bogdandy/Stefan Kadelbach (Hrsg.)

Solidarität und Europäische Integration

Kolloquium zum 65. Geburtstag von Manfred Zuleeg

Der Band vereinigt Vorträge, die auf einem Geburtstagskolloquium zu Ehren von Manfred Zuleeg gehalten wurden. Sie zielen auf Spannungsfelder zwischen europäischer Integration und Bereichen, die eine ordnungspolitische, lange dem Staat zugeordnete Handlungsmacht voraussetzen.

Aus diesem Bereich wurden Themen des Sozialrechts und des Umweltrechts ausgewählt: Kann der Marktbürger auch soziale Rechte haben? Muss sich das Sozialversicherungsrecht am europäischen Wettbewerbsrecht messen lassen? Wie weit kann Solidarität außerhalb des Staates gefördert werden? Und wie verträgt sich umweltrechtliche Regulierung mit der Marktfreiheit? Die Beiträge arbeiten Konfliktfelder heraus und zeichnen bereichsspezifische Lösungen auf, die teils zu einer gemeinsamen Ordnungspolitik auf mehreren Ebenen, teils zu einer europäischen Koordination staatlicher Politikfelder geführt haben.

Die Herausgeber und Autoren sind seit langem in Wissenschaft und Praxis auf den Gebieten des Rechts der Europäischen Union bzw. des europäischen Sozialrechts tätig.

2002, 76 S., brosch., 20,- €, 35,20 sFr, ISBN 3-7890-8048-9



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Markus Jachtenfuchs

Die Konstruktion Europas

Verfassungsideen und institutionelle Entwicklung

Ist der Verlauf der europäischen Integration nur von materiellen Interessen bestimmt oder spielen auch Ideen eine Rolle? Zur Beantwortung dieser Frage wird zunächst eine konstruktivistische Theorie der Bildung staatlicher Präferenzen entwickelt. Der zweite Teil bietet eine methodisch reflektierte, systematisch vergleichende Untersuchung europapolitischer Vorstellungen (»Verfassungsideen«) in Deutschland, Frankreich und Großbritannien seit 1950. Der dritte Teil analysiert ihre politische Wirksamkeit anhand der Verhandlungen zum Amsterdamer Vertrag. Ergebnis ist, daß in Bereichen, wo objektive Interessenlagen unklar sind, Ideen auch in zwischenstaatlichen Verfassungskonferenzen eine wesentliche Rolle spielen.

Das Buch wendet sich an Leser, die an den Wurzeln der gegenwärtigen Debatte um die EU-Verfassung interessiert sind wie auch an Wissenschaftler, die im Bereich Theorien der internationalen Beziehungen arbeiten.

Markus Jachtenfuchs ist Professor für Politikwissenschaft an der International University Bremen.

2002, 302 S., brosch., 20,- €, 35,20 sFr, ISBN 3-7890-7906-5
(Weltpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert, Bd. 9)



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Filippo Ranieri (Hrsg.)

Die Europäisierung der Rechtswissenschaft

Die Europäische Union hat sich in den letzten Jahrzehnten dank der Judikatur des EuGH, aber nicht zuletzt auch wegen der umfassenden normativen Tätigkeit des Rates, zu einer Rechtsgemeinschaft entwickelt. Kaum ein Segment einer nationalen Rechtsordnung bleibt heute von dieser europäischen Rechtsentwicklung unbeeinflusst. Umgekehrt, wesentliche Teile der nationalen Rechtsordnungen sind heute im Kern europäisches Recht. Gerade dieses Anliegen wollen die hier versammelten Beiträge verdeutlichen. Durch sie werden zahlreiche Mitgliedsländer der EU vertreten. Die Aufsätze stammen aus den verschiedensten Fächern. Alle zeigen jedoch – aus unterschiedlicher Warte –, wie die rechtswissenschaftliche Doktrin heute in Europa eine »europäische Rechtsliteratur« geworden ist.

2002, 228 S., *brosch.*, 37,- €, 64,- sFr, ISBN 3-7890-7648-1
(Schriften des Europa-Instituts der Universität des Saarlandes –
Rechtswissenschaft, Bd. 32)



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