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The process of European Integration in a historical perspective
Le processus de l’intégration européenne dans la perspective historique
Die Europäische Integration in historischer Perspektive

Gilbert Trausch, coordinator
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Introductory words

Gilbert Trausch

From the immediate postwar years up to the present controversies on the forthcoming intergovernmental conference (1996), now and then already called Maastricht II, the debates on Europe are moving within the frame of two extremes: a model of integration and a model of close intergovernmental collaboration. In between, there is room for a whole range of intermediate solutions, on which discussions actually are focussing, as most observers agree that the possibility to apply the rules of a federal State as well as the return to a mere collaboration are to be considered out of reach.

The discussions are still marked by the vagueness that characterizes the terminology and the ambiguities caused by their translation from one language to another. Common words as "federal" or "integration" don’t have exactly the same meaning in French and in English. One may wonder, whether all those, who like Winston Churchill (1946) or Jean Monnet (1955), have used the phrase "the United States of Europe", always have been aware of the implications that this kind of expression involves in the matter of the organization of Europe.

It is the concept of supranationality, that has been at the heart of the discussions of the last 50 years. From the start (1950), and again since Maastricht (1991), this has been the touchstone on which minds are parting. Well-defined in theory, the lines of cleavage are much less so in practice, especially in the statements of politicians anxious to rally voters.

The years covering the period from the Schuman Plan to the Treaties of Rome, considered the lucky age of European integration, are often opposed to the long period of stagnation that are the sixties and seventies. A European relaunching looms up in the second half of the 80ies, but given the events of 1989-1991, it may not last. Actually, in a deliberately provocative manner, one may think that the concept of a supranational Europe begins to decline in the days following Robert Schuman’s declaration on May 9th, 1950. As a matter of fact, as soon as the general principles elaborated by Jean Monnet are to be put in practice, vigorous national interests emerge, agreeing that transfers of sovereignty shall be reduced to the strict minimum. If nevertheless the Community hasn’t founndered and even could progress, this is due to the same emerging national interests that, to different degrees, saw the possibility to profit from well-aimed transfers of sovereignty.

Historians are discussing interminably the reasons that urged the different States to join the Community and, once entered, to stay there. The discussions on the pre-eminence of the economic or the political factor have not always been very fruitful. If the European Community was constituted on an economic basis, this fact does absolutely not exclude the intervention, right from the beginning, of political factors. According to the good historic method, the reasons, even economic ones, underlying the European process, cannot be postulated, but are to be determined at every stage of the European process, without prejudices. Economic cal-
calculations, the concern for modernization, the solution of the German problem, security, all gets tangled up in an apparently inextricable knot. It is up to the historian, not to cut this Gordian knot, because this amounts to violating the historic reality, but to undo it very patiently.

Recent investigations show that, from the beginning, the European construction has been linked to the question of leadership, which is an important concern, in the French initiative of May 9 1950 as well as in Great-Britain’s first candidature. Beyond the so-called "Realpolitik", preoccupations with rank and prestige are involved, i.e. the – real or imaginary- position that a State assigns itself on the international scene. Now, leadership and integration are terms difficult to reconcile. If, in 1950, Jean Monnet believed that only a small integrated Europe could guarantee France a leading role, Charles de Gaulle and Harold Macmillan, on the contrary, counted on a Europe of States in order to ensure their country the first place.
Un mot d’introduction

Gilbert Trausch

Depuis les années de l’immédiat après-guerre jusqu’aux controverses d’aujourd’hui sur l’imminente conférence intergouvernementale (1996) qu’on commence à appeler Maastricht II, les débats sur l’Europe se situent entre deux pôles: un modèle d’intégration et un modèle d’étroite collaboration intergouvernementale. Entre les deux, il y a place pour toute une gamme de solutions intermédiaires. C’est sur ces dernières que se concentrent les discussions, la plupart des observateurs s’accordant pour estimer hors de portée tant la possibilité d’appliquer les règles d’un Etat fédéral que le retour vers une simple collaboration.

Les débats sont encore marqués par le flou qui pèse sur la terminologie et les ambiguïtés créées par leur traduction d’une langue à l’autre. Des mots courants tels que «fédéral» ou «intégration» n’ont pas tout à fait le même sens en français et en anglais. Est-ce que tous ceux qui, tels Winston Churchill (1946) ou Jean Monnet (1955), ont utilisé la formule «les Etats-Unis d’Europe» ont toujours été conscients des implications que ce genre de formule entraîne sur le plan de l’organisation de l’Europe?

C’est la notion de supranationalité qui a été au coeur des débats du dernier demi-siècle. Elle était dès le départ (1950) et elle est redevenue avec Maastricht (1991) la pierre de touche sur laquelle les esprits se séparent. Les lignes de clivage, bien définies en théorie, le sont beaucoup moins dans la pratique, notamment dans la bouche d’hommes politiques soucieux de rassembler des électeurs.

On oppose souvent les années allant du plan Schuman aux Traités de Rome, considérées comme l’époque faste de l’intégration européenne, à la longue phase de stagnation que sont les années 60 et 70. Une relance européenne s’esquisse dans la seconde moitié des années 1980, mais les événements de 1989-1991 laissent planer un doute sur sa poursuite. En fait, dans une formule délibérément provocatrice, on peut penser que le déclin de la notion de supranationalité commence... au lendemain de la déclaration de Robert Schuman du 9 mai 1950. En effet, dès qu’il s’agit de mettre en pratique les principes généraux élaborés par Jean Monnet, on assiste à une montée vigoureuse des intérêts nationaux qui s’entendent pour réduire au strict minimum les transferts de souveraineté. Si néanmoins la Communauté n’a pas sombré et a même pu avancer, elle le doit à la même montée des intérêts nationaux qui, à des degrés divers, ont pu trouver leur avantage dans des abandons de souveraineté bien ciblés.

Les historiens discutent à perte de vue sur les raisons qui ont incité les différents États à se joindre à la Communauté et à y rester, une fois entrés. Les débats sur la primauté de l’économique ou du politique n’ont pas toujours été très fructueux. Si la Communauté européenne s’est constituée sur une base économique, ce fait n’exclut nullement l’intervention de facteurs politiques et cela dès le départ. Selon la bonne méthode historique les raisons, même économiques, qui sous-tendent le processus européen, ne se postulent pas mais sont à déterminer à chaque étape du
processus européen, sans a priori. Des calculs économiques, le souci de modernisation, la solution du problème allemand, la sécurité s’entremêlent en un noeud apparemment inextricable. Il appartient à l’historien, non pas de trancher ce noeud gordien, car cela reviendrait à violer la réalité historique, mais à le dénouer avec beaucoup de patience.

Des recherches récentes montrent que la construction européenne a été liée dès le départ à la question du leadership qui est une préoccupation importante, tant dans l’initiative française du 9 mai 1950 que dans la première candidature de la Grande-Bretagne. Au-delà même de la «Realpolitik», on y touche à des préoccupations de rang et de prestige, c’est-à-dire à la place – réelle ou imaginaire – qu’un Etat s’assigne sur l’échiquier international. Or leadership et intégration sont des notions difficiles à concilier. Si Jean Monnet croyait en 1950 que seule une petite Europe intégrée pouvait assurer à la France un rôle directeur, Charles de Gaulle et Harold Macmillan comptaient, au contraire, sur une Europe des États pour assurer à leur pays la première place.
Allegiance
The Past and the Future

Alan S. Milward

There are now so many historical journals in which the only page read with any attention is the list of contents that the appearance of a new one demands either an apology or an explanation. The explanation for the appearance of this one is that it is confined to one subject only. It does not concentrate on any particular type of historiography, on any single country, or even in principle on any particular period; it is concerned solely with the history of what has come to be called the 'integration' of Europe. It is not a word whose origins were propitious, the offspring of American disillusionment with the dangerous political disunity of the European continent and naive progressivist optimism. But it has become established in historical, economic and political discussion as summing up all those trends in whatever sphere of activity, business, law, culture, politics, ideology, or the more everyday life of Europeans which are widely, although by no means universally, thought to have brought European nations into a much closer unity. And since the obvious political expression of these trends is the evolution since 1952 of the successive European Communities into the European Union the history of that evolution has been usually called the history of European integration. The subject thus has its own unity and has become an area of historical discussion and analysis in its own right.

As so often happens in historical research this separate historiography of integration was forced into independent existence partly by the conservatism of the historical profession. Early historical research in this area was for example typically published in journals whose primary concern was with political science, international relations, or sometimes applied economics. One distinguishing trait of the historiography of European integration has been its close links to political and economic theory, simply because political scientists and economists had offered theoretical explanations of the process of European integration before detailed historical research became possible. It followed that much research was centrally concerned with testing the validity of these theoretical propositions. The publication of this journal should mark the end of this process and the beginning of a new period of research where history now has its own theories and a research agenda which derives from them. If the theoretical flow were now to be reversed, so that it ran from historical research to the social sciences this journal will mark an important turning-point.

There is not much left intact of the complex rival theoretical positions on this subject of the political science of the 1960s. Under the weight of historical events since then and under factual bombardment by historians political science has retreated to a more pragmatic and less teleological ground. Indeed for many political scientists the process of European integration is now seen much more as one directed by the greater powers in their own interests, – as many diplomatic historians would always have liked to see it –, and not as a new and inevitable trend.1
There is even less left of the economic theories of the same period that linked market expansion in the form of trade liberalisation to economic growth as a permanent characteristic of the modern state, the interest is far more in explaining the continuation of mercantilism and the 'new' protectionism. Having demonstrated in its adolescence that the ideas of its parents were inapplicable to the modern world, the history of European integration is now faced in adult life with the task of replacing them with something better. As it sets about this task what themes could it pursue?

Functionalism and neo-functionalism have all retreated to the periphery of the territory of political science. In economics the so-called 'new growth theory' puts more weight on the microeconomics of market adjustment and trade regulation than on the assertion that market expansion improves productivity rates and incomes and that European integration was a classic example of this process. The serious historical issues of how far the common market of the European Economic Community did contribute to higher growth rates of national income for its member states than, for example, in the United Kingdom before 1973, and how far the relatively faster growth rate of the United Kingdom than the original member states after that date was due to entry into that common market, are only now beginning to be tackled by historians. Their answers will surely be much more complicated than the simplistic assumptions of early growth theory.

For many political scientists the process of European integration is now seen, rather as traditional historians of diplomacy tend to see it, a process directed by the interplay of the foreign policy of great and medium-sized powers in search of the traditional objectives of influence and security. There is a solid core of historiography of the period in which long-run cultural, economic, and social trends do not appear, presumably because they are not thought to explain much. Casting aside its former theoretical dependence on these long-run trends, political science seems increasingly to accept that any theoretical explanation of European integration


should start from and perhaps be confined to those areas of state activity which used to be called ‘Die Grosse Politik’.

The timing by which government archives are opened for inspection – almost nowhere can they be inspected less than thirty years after the event – has enhanced this trend. The biggest contribution of historical research to European integration over the last three years has been made by a cluster of publications dealing with the United Kingdom's first attempt to join the European Economic Community and its failure in 1963. Without exception these publications have depicted the United Kingdom's application and its pre-history of negotiation as the attempt of a declining but still important middle ranking power to retain its worldwide influence by shifting away from its weakening association with the Commonwealth to closer links with Europe. The motivation in this case for European integration has been invariably depicted as an adjustment of the United Kingdom's world strategic position. Similarly, General de Gaulle's veto on the British entry has been portrayed as solely a strategic decision. The major event which currently preoccupies historians in their pursuit of a history of European integration has in fact been analysed as though it were solely a matter of alliances and nuclear weapons. Interestingly enough, the official enquiry into the failure of the negotiations undertaken by the British government immediately came to a similar conclusion. No matter what economic or institutional concessions the United Kingdom might have made in the negotiations, it argued, the general would have still forbidden British entry on strategic and foreign policy grounds.

There can be no doubt that prime minister Macmillan did seek entry into the EEC for foreign policy purposes, to preserve what he could of the United Kingdom's world interests. Most of the conversations between de Gaulle and Macmillan, the sources which have been most used in recent publications, are about foreign policy and the long-term position of their countries. But to draw the sweeping inference from this that for de Gaulle the EEC existed primarily for foreign policy and defence reasons seems unwise and premature. The complexity of the motives which led France to sign the Treaty of Rome has recently been elaborated. Although the essential reason for accepting the Treaty was indeed to secure Fran-

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ce's place in the world, this was also defined as securing France's place in the international economic framework. The Treaty defended France against the arrival of an international economic regime whose only regulatory agencies were GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and incorporated the restructured French empire into the commercial framework and supranationally regulatory European regime which it envisaged. The Quai d'Orsay was not on balance in favour of the Treaty.  

The arrival in power of de Gaulle could hardly have cancelled the conclusions of the long and anxious debate in Paris which finally led to the decision to sign in spite of the anxieties and reluctance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Indeed the failure of his early attempt to modify the régime of agricultural income support in France suggests that de Gaulle, for all his great powers, was bound by the same long-run political and economic circumstances which led the Fourth Republic to the EEC. De Gaulle's opposition to British entry was only clearly communicated to the British government through the British ambassador in Paris on 22 May 1962, and even then the opposition was not absolute and the negotiations in Brussels were allowed to continue despite the general's pessimism about their success. The harsh conclusions of the official British enquiry, that de Gaulle never wanted Britain in the EEC and that his opposition was decisive, can certainly not be accepted until the French archives have been properly examined.

But there may well have been further limitations to the powers of de Gaulle and Macmillan which the narrow concentration of recent publications on their diplomacy fails to take into account. Suppose de Gaulle had not been opposed to British entry and on strategic grounds had preferred British membership. Could France, could even all the other member-states, have accepted the large and numerous exemptions from the economic and social clauses of the Treaty of Rome which the United Kingdom was still demanding when the negotiations were broken off? This was not put to the test. Little is known accurately about the paths of decision-making in the first years of the Gaullist regime. We do not actually know that de Gaulle's veto was uninfluenced by economic and social considerations. We do not know that it was he alone, as much of the comment implies, who took the decision. We can see from the British record that the French economic bureaucracy was divided, and some strongly opposed to British membership. Moreover, within the British government Macmillan had few unequivocal supporters in his pursuit of membership, and equivocation was, it seems, often based on economic, social, and cultural grounds, or even on prejudice.

There seems therefore little reason why a preliminary history of the British application, based so far almost entirely on foreign office and cabinet papers, should be allowed to further encourage the retreat of political science to mere pragmatism and the growing assumption that the EEC was merely an alliance system, a form of interdependence and not a second stage of supranational integration. Were it so, no theory of integration would be needed, because the assumption would then

follow that the Treaty of Rome was a rejection of the ideas implicit in the Treaty of Paris. To come to such a conclusion, which would also be to ignore the conclusions of research from other sources then foreign ministry papers, would perhaps best expose the danger of pursuing the history of diplomacy as though it had nothing to do with the history of economy and society. It would be wiser to consider the recent spate of publications on the first British application as interesting preliminary comments, from a strictly British perspective, based on a very narrow selection of evidence and paying only scant attention to the history of the Communities themselves. 8

In reality, many of the underlying assumptions in earlier comprehensive theories of integration remain untested by historians. This is particularly the case with assumptions made about long-run social and economic developments. The underlying assumption of Deutsch's 'community' theory, for example, that within western Europe and the north Atlantic area there was a sudden upward leap in the frequency of contacts between elites has not been studied in any systematic way. Neither have the many assertions of theorists of the international economy that increasing international trade in goods and capital has combined with changes in technology to make controls on national frontiers, and thus the demarcation of the nation-state's boundaries, meaningless, together with the concept of 'national income' which governments in the 1950s used as a basic tool of government. There are only observations about these ideas, no chronologically or technologically specific history which could confirm, refute or modify them or make them operable for detailed historical analysis. These are not the only examples. If historical research into the history of European integration is now to have its own proper agenda, including its own theoretical hypotheses, it should certainly not reject the assumptions of earlier integration theory, except where they have been disproved. The working hypotheses of historians in the present state of ignorance have to be heuristic. They must encourage and facilitate as wide a field of enquiry as possible.

At the moment there seem to exist four different, but overlapping, ideas about the fundamental causes of the process of European integration. One is the idea, which the recent literature on the British application seems to support, that it responds to the traditional objectives of the foreign policy of states, a sort of alliance system adjusted to the realities of the world after 1945. Another is the idea that it originates in the modification, perhaps even the rejection, of the traditional objectives of the foreign policies of states. This idea emphasises the altruism of integration and reposes on the belief that its profoundest cause is the will to unify Europe, or parts of it. Integration springs from a deeply-held desire to change, for ever, the nation-state structure of the continent. 9 A third idea is that the process of integration was deliberately conceived and developed to preserve the nation-state by supporting a range of new social and economic policies whose very purpose

was the resurrection of the nation-state after its collapse between 1929 and 1945.  

A fourth idea is that the loss of sovereignty of the European nation-state is inevitable because of the long-run path of economic and social development. The state, this idea emphasises, has lost all control of its own destinies because of the permeability of its frontiers. Its domestic policies can differ from those of other states only in such insignificant ways as to make resistance to integration pointless and costly. Proponents of these four ideas write about different things. The first attracts historians who write about diplomacy and defence. The second attracts those who write about ideas and people and search for hidden motivations behind the public record. The third attracts those who write about the state, its policies, economic growth, the interactions between policy and markets, and the links between democracy and social change. The last attracts historians of the international economic system and its long-run evolution.

The problem in the present stage of research is how to construct a hypothesis about integration which has the same heuristic usefulness as each of these separate lines of enquiry but which brings them together. At the least, historians working in these different fields should be brought to confront each other; at the best, such a confrontation might lead them to adopt each others’ techniques and instead of working in an isolated intellectual tradition reach a new synthesis.

European integration, if we define it as the voluntary surrender of some elements of state sovereignty, may not be new, in principle. There are plausible examples from medieval history. But in modern history on the scale in which it has occurred since 1945 it is a new phenomenon. It is, however, a phenomenon whose only new institutional characteristics are the supranational institutions of the successive European Communities and the European Union. With every respect for the aspirations of those who support these institutions, they have not been the locus of power and decision-making. Everything else than those institutions must have a historical continuity: people and their ideas, the states themselves, which were in most cases much more assertive and securely founded than in the inter-war period, and the gradual long-run developments in the European economy and the societies of which it was composed. The backward linkages of historical continuity must therefore be built into any hypothesis.

Where such backward linkages appear in the present historiography they are as separated as the ideas on present trends. Those who see integration primarily as the

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9. For a recent example of a work in which this is the underlying idea, C. HACKETT, Cautious Revolution: The European Community Arrives, Westport, Ct., 1990. For one in which it is also a prominent, but not the sole, idea, P. WINAND, Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe, New York, 1993.


outcome of the traditional foreign policy objectives of states see the historical continuities in that recently fashionable subject 'The Rise and Fall of Nations'. The United Kingdom, France and Germany all 'fell' and with them Europe, excluding Russia and the Soviet Union which, like the USA, 'rose'. The European Communities are an attempt to protect Europe from the worst effects of its fall, on the whole a predictable foreign policy response to the relentless flow of historical change. From this idea comes the interest in discovering a pre-history of post-1945 integration in the inter-war period, in the way in which it may have been foreshadowed by French diplomacy in the post-1918 settlement or in the Briand proposals, for example. Those who see integration as an act of human will similarly seek its intellectual pre-history in the inter-war period, particularly in European federalist thinking and in the small number of marginal political figures, such as Coudenhove-Kalergi, who propagandised the idea of a European 'unity'. The assumption seems to be that there are intellectual links to the founding fathers of the European Community, although if there are they are proving remarkably hard to discover. Those who interpret integration as the refoundation of the nation-state see a historical continuity from the institution of universal suffrage after the First World War, the growth of mass democratic political parties and their growing domination of both parliaments and executive government, and the inter-war experiments with welfare and employment policies. The Weimar Republic peeps shyly from their work as an infant prototype of the ambitious post-1945 state.

For those, lastly, who see integration as a culmination of irreversible long-run economic trends the continuities are more broken. The permeability of European national frontiers to the movement of goods, capital and people was on all measurements greater between 1870 and 1914 than in the inter-war period and especially greater than in the 1930s. It is thus the inter-war period with its temporary reversal of these immutable economic trends which is the historical puzzle. European integration is the predictable political response to the development of a universal international capitalist economy, a universal path of technological development, and the inevitable fact that the proportion of 'national' income earned outside the frontier will grow as a universal pattern of development requires national economies to

choose between being open or being poor. It is the next step after the gold standard, and taken the more readily after 1945 because inter-war experiments with steps in the opposite direction proved so calamitous.\textsuperscript{17}

One concept which may link these allegedly separate continuities together in one hypothesis from which an eventual model of integration might even be constructed is that of allegiance. By allegiance is meant the analysis of all those elements which induce citizens to give their loyalty to institutions of governance, whether national, international or supranational. It excludes repression. While accepting that repression has never been absent as an element of governance of western European democracies, and even accepting the possibility that it may have increased in the last twenty years, few would doubt the validity of the generalisation that in all the member-states of the successive European Communities government has been in its essentials government by consent. The transition to a greater measure of government by consent seems indeed to have been a fundamental requirement for Greek, Portuguese and Spanish membership. For western Europe outside the Iberian peninsula parliamentary democracy in which political parties have been the main conduits between public opinion and government policy has been the rule. The growing influence of the media does not weaken this statement, for those who react to that influence have almost invariably done so in respect of their function within a political party. Why has this system retained the allegiance of national populations, 'citizens' might be the appropriate term if democratic continuities were to be traced back to the French Revolution, while at the same time a measurable secondary allegiance to the supranational institutions of the European Union has also grown?\textsuperscript{18}

Establishing and retaining allegiance was not a task accomplished with any great success by nineteenth century European states. About thirty-four million people voluntarily and permanently left European states between 1815 and 1914 for a life elsewhere. Perhaps twenty million of these took citizenship of the United States of America. By contrast, only a very small proportion of emigrants to Argentina and Brazil had taken citizenship of those countries before 1914. Even if, as seems to be the case, the preference for a more democratic and participatory form of governance was the main factor in the choice of emigration for only a very small proportion of the emigrants, allegiance to European nation-states was not high. This did not apply only to states like Romania or Russia, where much of the population had little to hope for in their lifetime politically or economically. It applied notably to Norway, which by 1914 could have laid reasonable claim to being the most democratic, at least in terms of its suffrage, of the European states, and to the United Kingdom, which was indubitably the richest and most powerful of them. Norway had the highest proportion of its population leaving the country permanently of all the European states. The United Kingdom provided the largest abso-
lute number of emigrants from Europe, and not only because of emigration from Ireland. The failure of so many emigrants to take up the formal citizenship of a non-European country suggests that allegiance was not especially valued, but regarded by large numbers as something to avoid in all but the most formal sense. This impression is greatly strengthened when it is remembered that the number of emigrants from European states to Europe was much greater over the same period than thirty-four million.

A large body of historical work has concerned itself with the question of how nineteenth-century European states used a mixture of policy, political symbolism, and institutions such as primary education and a conscript army to instil the concept of allegiance to a central national state into their 'subjects'. Although the general relevance of this sort of work to post-1945 European societies is evident, its specific methodological value as an explanatory historical tool in the post-war period is very limited, because of the marked change in the nature of democratic party politics, and in their relationship, of a type, scope and scale utterly different from earlier periods, to newspapers, radio and television. Its relevance is however diminished above all by the much greater complexity of the mutual demands made on each other by government and voters in post-1945 democracies. Some elements of this analysis of nineteenth century practice are still valuable, of course. Until the last ten years the publicly-owned media and the measure of public control over private media meant that government still carried on the national educational role of the nineteenth century state. But the choice of models and images of education for the nation grew so rapidly after 1950 that to study the role of single institutions over the long term in shaping national allegiance – as historians of the nineteenth century have done – would be methodologically unrewarding.

It is a reasonable assumption that allegiance still remains partly determined by the ability of national institutions to protect the citizen, whether from internal or external threats. But all post-1945 historical study shows that what the citizen has demanded as 'security' from the state has widened in range and complexity to the point where protection in the sense of physical safety has rarely been that definition of security which had the highest priority at critical moments of political choice. In short, allegiance since 1945 is given, sold or bought within a complex pattern of relationships between individuals, families and government which would require a wholly different analysis from that used for earlier periods. The fundamental questions for the history of European integration are why allegiance to the Communities grew, and whether the present allegiance to the institutions of the European Union is permanently subsidiary to, and dependent on, or will eventually replace, that tendered to national or regional government.

A pragmatic analysis of that question should probably first concentrate on those issues which have been shown to mainly influence voters' choices in general and European elections in all member-states. Except in moments of perceived danger, or when issues relating to one dominant personality have emerged, personal and family income and the perspective of future income through the life-cycle have been the major determinants of voting. This may mean that they are also major determinants of allegiance. Since 1945 it has been increasingly difficult to separate
them from personal security, because it is long-run expectations of security of income and employment through the life-cycle which have also determined voting patterns.

It would, though, be absurdly mechanistic to suppose that the disposition of allegiance between the different forms of governance on offer has been – or will be – determined by accurate materialistic calculations or even solely by materialistic perspectives. It is obvious that in some member-states the European Communities came to symbolise both physical security, as a guarantee against future wars, and personal security, as the guarantor of social and welfare 'rights'. It is obvious, too, that at most moments both these guarantees had at least as high a symbolical as a practical content.

Secondly, the economic and social issues determining the disposition of national allegiance since 1945 must be fully explored. This requires a programme of research into the public finances and fiscal history of post-1945 western European states. It is an odd fact that when we are extremely knowledgeable about levels of public taxation in the formation of eighteenth century German states no research at all has been undertaken on how voters in west European states were persuaded between 1945 and 1974 to pay continually increasing levels of personal taxation which in most countries culminated in tax rates double those in the 1930s. That was a change in the nature of allegiance of the greatest possible significance both to national states and the Community – as the reversal of the trend since 1984 also is. The connection between personal income, taxation, security in the widest sense of the word and the accepted common policies of the Communities needs therefore to be explored as an issue in both economic and social history. Why did people pay to central government in the 1950s and 1960s so much more money with no diminution, and perhaps an increase, in allegiance?

What was purchased with this extra taxation was not primarily a more robust system of national defence, although that was a big item, but a complex system of social welfare and personal benefits throughout the family life-cycle. National governments became giant insurance companies. How far did the growth of 'the welfare-state' correspond with, and how far did it induce, an increase in national allegiance? President Johnson, copying much of what had happened ten years earlier in western Europe, put it explicitly when he called the expansion of the welfare programme 'giving people a stake in society'. Where primary education and conscription had failed to induce mass allegiance in the nineteenth century, did the welfare state and its accompanying employment policies and agricultural income support policies succeed?

Thirdly, the symbolical role of 'Europe' in political rhetoric, and the changing way in which it enters into national political discourse is a crucial area of research. One weakness of earlier theories borrowed from political science was their false assumption about the causes of popular support for the idea of a united Europe, that it was supported as something better than the nation-state. But there has been no diminution in national allegiance even though there has been a growth of secondary allegiance to 'Europe'. A more valid historical explanation of the symbolical and rhetorical level of what 'Europe' symbolises and represents in its non-
material aspects for national voters and political parties has to be found. What is 'European' allegiance? Is it primarily cultural, economic, idealistically political, realistically political, or simply born from fear or prejudice? And how has it changed since 1945?

This pragmatic programme may well uncover only a small part of the answer to the question of what induces allegiance. Its pragmatism is based essentially on what market research and public opinion polls tell political parties about what will win an election, together with the conclusions of historians of the nineteenth century about the way states then tried to create allegiance. As a working hypothesis for future research however it has the one great virtue of bringing together into one common hypothesis the four separate currently-prevailing ideas about European integration.

Both the materialist and the symbolic motives for allegiance to national and to supranational institutions are relevant to the formulation and execution of an effective foreign policy. Consider the currently-debated issue of the United Kingdom's first application for membership. It was, certainly, an important change in the country's foreign policy, as all commentators have pointed out. But why did the decision to make that change drag out for so long? Even before the Treaty of Rome was signed it had been firmly decided by the British government that it would be harmful to the United Kingdom's interests not to become a signatory, but that membership of the EEC was nevertheless impossible. It was considered impossible because of the Commonwealth relationship, but also because it would not be acceptable to public opinion. Between 1956 and 1961 the economic argument for retaining special Commonwealth commercial links weakened to the point where a small majority of the population accepted that the commercial framework of the EEC was more to Britain's economic advantage than that of the Commonwealth. But that did not necessarily lead them to accept the idea of Community membership, because the argument about the Commonwealth was not just an economic one. For public opinion the links with the Commonwealth had a symbolic value, partly created by seventy-five years of imperialist indoctrination in the school system and partly created by cultural affinities and the ties of personal relationships. Distant Australia and Canada were still in the 1950s more real culturally to the government's supporters and most of the population, no matter how distorted their vision of them, than those brief and unsatisfactory next-door wartime allies Belgium and France, to say nothing of the wartime enemies. Foreign policy towards the Community, in short, could not be made solely on rational strategic and economic grounds. The symbolic aspect of allegiance to the United Kingdom contained within it the symbolic value that the United Kingdom was the centre of a vast Commonwealth for most of whose members the symbolic head of government reigned in London.

Consider, also, that the sharpest divide between the current British government and its chief opposition party over policy towards the European Community is over social policy. This divide was in fact already becoming apparent at the time of the first application, but it ran in the opposite direction. Then the popular fear was thought to be that membership of the Community might reduce levels of personal
social benefits by diluting the welfare state or burdening it with payments to poorer foreigners. When the Labour Party opposed the application this train of thought was important in its decision to do so. Now, the European Union is seen by the Labour Party as the last defence of what is left of employee protection and trade union rights in the United Kingdom and a better defence of accumulated welfare benefits than the national government. Unless opinion polls are entirely wrong the Labour Party's foreign policy has been reorientated partly through the development of a European allegiance for those specific social reasons among its supporters.

These points are made here about the United Kingdom, because that has been the country most under discussion in the recent literature. But they are equally valid for the foreign policies towards the Communities of all other member states. A remarkable exception to the narrowness of recent diplomatic history on European integration is the excellent official history of the Coal and Steel Community by Poidevin and Spierenburg, as inquisitive and informative on business and social history as on diplomacy. Working with the hypothesis suggested here might help further scholars to emulate the effort made by Poidevin and Spierenburg and put the history of European business and domestic politics into the foreign policy formulation process.

As for the intellectual history of European integration the same point is almost too obvious to make. Jean Monnet was surely an interesting and persuasive man in the corridors of government. But he was never required to win an election. If European integration has been an act of political will, how has the idea spread and what forms has it taken at a popular level? This is a question from which historians have fled. It has been much easier to write the history of federalist groups; they were very small and unimportant so their papers and speeches are easily mastered. But what has 'Europe' meant to the electorate when governments have had to win elections, and how have they used it? We are only as yet scratching the surface of that history. We need to dig more deeply to find the roots of European allegiance, and that must mean linking intellectual history to the mechanics of the society in which it evolves.

Is it true, for it is currently a matter of dispute, that the social and economic policies of western European governments after 1945 successfully recreated the nation-state on a much solider basis of popular allegiance than before? If so, how exactly was this done? We have no thorough history of the welfare-state in any country which identifies the precise beneficiaries of particular acts of policy. Who gained and who lost from these complex redistributional structures seems essential knowledge to explaining the extent of national allegiance, and subsequently of alle-

20. Useful thoughts about how it may be approached can be found in A.D. SMITH, "National Identity and the Idea of European Unity", *International Affairs*, vol. 68, no. 1, 1992.
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Allegiance to the Communities. This is difficult, technical, statistical work if it is done on a comparative basis, but its absence means that argument about the validity of the hypothesis that integration was one aspect of strengthening the nation-state expires in baffled ignorance of the real historical detail needed to confirm or refute it.

Lastly, what proportion of national populations has responded to the long-run trends of international economic development in such a way that its national allegiance has been weakened? Is it in fact correct, as much of the literature on the evolution of the international economy implies, that the policies by which nation-states may actually have increased national allegiance between 1945 and 1968 have become impossible since then, so that national allegiance becomes in part a pointless romanticism? Of those French taxpayers, for example, notorious for tax evasion before the mid-1950s who then faithfully paid swingeing tax increases in return, it could be assumed, for massive increase in state welfare from the mid-1950s onwards, what proportion now avoid paying taxation by devices which, if not strictly legitimate, are at least in conformity with modern economic trends and the state's new policies? Has the proportion of 'citizens' with foreign bank accounts, untaxed, increased? Has the proportion of the income of a growing and significant proportion of private citizens earned abroad increased? Or have these considerations only been of real financial significance for multinational corporations? Has decontrol of capital movements allowed citizens to escape the ties of national allegiance? Has that and the weakening of other controls, including within the Union controls over Union citizens, returned the situation to that of the nineteenth century when national allegiance was much weaker? Has the trend of national allegiance over the long-run been one in which it was maximised during the 1960s by state benefits and has been diminishing ever since? To what extent decontrol has been a considered trend in policy and to what extent it has been merely accepting the inevitable, as this fourth idea of European integration would imply, is another unanswered historical question. But the implications for allegiance are unmistakeable, and since all these policies or their abandonment have been put to the test of general elections the research hypothesis proposed here would embrace them too.

Of course, the idea that everyone can write every kind of history is unrealistic. Yet any review of the present state of research into the history of European integration is bound to come to the conclusion that we are far from being able to explain it convincingly. The historiography of the subject has been effectively destructive, sweeping aside inapplicable and inapposite theory. But where it is constructive it appears to be engaged, like children on a crowded beach, in building separate small sandcastles, all of which look very vulnerable to an incoming tide. The suggestion made here for a common working hypothesis does at least deal with the central political issue of the whole story and it is only intended to persuade or help scholars to consider the kind of history they write about European integration in the light of the kind of history others write.

Alan S. Milward
American Monnetism and the European Coal-Steel Community in the Fifties

John Gillingham

The European Coal and Steel Community (CSC) represents the crowning achievement of American integration policy in the decade that began with the Marshall Plan and ended with the Treaty of Rome. This coincides, of course, with the era of the "Dollar Gap" and of maximum American influence in Europe, the period in which the vast resources of the United States helped transform a landmass of hostile states and discredited governments into what would eventually become a cooperative, prosperous, and stable collective venture that someday may be referred to officially and without qualification simply as Europe.

The creation of such a federal union was the supreme objective of an American postwar policy that, as it took form, came to be described as a structure of mutually interlocking concentric circles. At the periphery were organizations like GATT for global trade liberalization plus the International Monetary Fund and World Bank for promoting currency convertability. From there one moved inwards to NATO, which provided the bonds of a trans-Atlantic security community, and thence to Marshall Plan-derived, strictly intra-European commercial organizations like OEEC and its functionally significant financial offshoot, the European Payments Union. The Coal and Steel Community described the inner ring of "The Six." Europe's original "supranational" institution, it was important not only because in creating it the contracting states had for the first time delegated sovereign powers to an authority vested with a specific mandate to govern over them according to its own rules; two of the states in question were Germany and France, whose conflicts, centering on the domination of Western Europe's heavy industry, were at the source of the two great wars of the century. The CSC solved an historical problem and at the same time provided a model for the future. A Europe solid at the core would develop and expand into a bloc equal in strength to the United States and the Soviet Union but joined by tradition, values, organizations, economic interest, and political cooperation to the sponsoring superpower.¹

Seen from the vantage point of the present, American integration policy appears far-sighted and beneficent as well as triumphant. The historian who subjects it to critical, microscopic examination must therefore be prepared to defend himself from charges of nit-picking. It is nevertheless important to understand both what the CSC was and how it functioned as well as its impact on American diplomacy and foreign relations. If in so doing, one can distinguish more clearly between integration as represented in the official American scenario and what actually happened, the real nature of the United States' contribution to the reconstitution of

postwar Europe can be better appreciated and the sources of European integration more thoroughly understood than at present.²

The European Coal and Steel Community was historically significant less for what it did than because of its mere existence. The diplomacy that led to its founding gave West Germany an escape from the European doghouse. It also sealed a tacit and enduring understanding by which the potentially stronger power, Germany, would subsidize the weaker one, France, into equal partnership. The CSC enshrined this commitment. Undergirding it was an acknowledgement by both parties that the United States would make and enforce the rules. Although Jean Monnet, who inspired the Schuman Plan proposal, drafted these rules, they were modelled on the American antitrust tradition. As the first President of the High Authority, in office from August 1952 when the CSC commenced operations, to June 1955 when he finally stepped down, Monnet's main challenge was to break up the trusts and cartels that regulated coal and steel outputs in Western Europe.³

The incompatibility between the reformist ideology of Washington and traditional continental "organized capitalism" nevertheless paralyzed the Coal and Steel Community. The High Authority did not in any sense "govern" the heavy industries of Germany, France, the Benelux nations, and Italy, which continued to do business as usual.⁴ Nor did it have any of the "spillover effects" attributed to it by optimistic social scientists⁵; the CSC neither spontaneously generated complementary institutions nor otherwise gave rise to new ways of doing business and changed relationships between government and industry. Indeed the whole episode of inspiring, negotiating, and operating the coal and steel community if anything simplified and accelerated the restoration process. It strengthened an only slightly reformed old order and helped foreclose the chance of generating a new one. In practice supranationalism was a farce and treated as such by the governments of the The Six which, after resuming the negotiations in May 1955 that led ultimately to the Treaty of Rome, abandoned it as a model. Its most important legacy was to have set in motion a diplomatic process which, taken in hand by the Europeans themselves, developed new approaches, better suited to local conditions, that in the end fulfilled the hopes of American policy-makers⁶.

The myth of supranationalism nevertheless had in its most extreme form what amounted to a stranglehold on American integration policy during the 1950's. Its real heyday was in the years of Eisenhower and Dulles, and the same somewhat cloudy concept even continued to command loyalty during the presidency of John F. Kennedy.⁷ Its hold can be explained partly by parallels in the American experi-

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4. Ibid, pp. 319-332.
5. Ibid, ix-x.
ence: Why could not Europe, in breaking away from its past, form a federal union as did the thirteen colonies in parting company with the British? More immediately, the chokehold had to do with the existence of a State Department clique derived by its policy-making enemies as "The Theologians". These were disciples Monnet had gathered after the war, men committed to framing American policy around his ideas. The faction operated under the patronage of Secretary of State Dulles, a pious devotee of Monnetism, as well as with the blessing of President Eisenhower, a man also under the Frenchman's spell. To discuss the influence of this faction without prior description of its origins would invite suspicion as a conspiracy theorist. Fortunately, the memoirs, both published and unpublished, of many of its members together with a growing body of officially-sponsored writings as well as a budding scholarly literature leave no doubt about its immense influence. What does remain to be determined is its full extent and the nature of its legacy.

One cannot expect too much of a brief essay like this one, if only because American foreign policy is a coat of many colors. The National Security Council is where, since 1947, the patches comprising it have been stitched together into a complete garment, however ill-fitting. The influence of particular agencies of government, then as now, varies immensely by issue. No line of policy is ever without institutional challengers. On the issue of European integration in the 1950's, some of the more prominent among them were the Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and Agriculture; the Federal Trade Commission; the Bureau of the Budget; the Atomic Energy Commission; the Marshall Plan and its successor organizations; the Pentagon and the security apparatus; important ad hoc creations like the Council on Foreign Economic Policy; and, as always, the United States Congress.

The State Department itself was by no means single-minded, even as regards Europe. Advocacy for Asia and the Third World was strong and Europeanists were themselves divided. Opposed to the "Monnetists" were "Atlanticists" whose guru was the world federalist, Clarence Streit. Suspicious of French designs as well as of Monnet, they warned incessantly that a Europe of The Six could someday turn hostile to the United States. Their objective was to cement the nations of the continent, along with Britain, into a security structure built around American nuclear power, to turn NATO, as it were, into an economic and political organization by replacing institutional buttresses of bricks and mortar with pre-stressed girders of ferro-concrete.

8. Th. ACHILLES, "Memoirs of an Irresponsible Memory", ms.737N f.
9. Ibid, 520f.
11. Achilles, 329E f
12. Ibid, 460H-495F; Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS),1952-1954/VI "Memorandum by the Minister in France (Achilles), 28 November 1952
Yet the Atlanticists remained for the most part outsiders and the Monnetists dominated the European agenda. The Schuman Plan, along with the Coal and Steel Community, was their baby: It had to be protected, alternatives to it discouraged, and its legacy built upon. Monnet's disciples in the foreign policy community like David Bruce, William Tomlinson, and Robert Bowie were not only vigorous advocates of the European Defence Community and EURATOM, both brain-children of the master: they managed to create an air of mystique around his work that elevated it above critical scrutiny. The message seldom varied: Monnet was indispensable and he alone had the necessary vision and experience to end the historic antagonism between France and Germany, integrate Europe, and protect the free world from communist subversion. The United States, it followed, would be delinquent in denying him the wherewithal to do the job. Cost was irrelevant, given the stakes, and support had to be constant and unstinting. Monnet's projects were, however, unrealistic; the institutions he inspired were all practical failures. They did, however, result in a fast and furious wheel-spinning.

The State Department Monnetists did not, however, crowd out the pursuit of better alternatives. The Atlanticist approach, which would have resulted in a thoroughgoing militarization, was surely worse than theirs and no other more coherent American design for Europe was in the offing. Nor was one really necessary. American-aided recovery, along with profound war-induced changes within European society, was the prime mover of the integration process, which had its own dynamics; and the American Monnetists could do little to influence either it nor the fundamental policy decisions of the individual European nations. At worst, Monnet's American friends can be accused of squandering resources that might have been used better at home. Rare indeed, however was the critic who made this point. The Monnetists operated with the blessing of the Administration, especially after 1953, and their opponents had little fight in them. A mood of national complacency increasingly clouded over the Eisenhower years. The Pax Americana, at least in Europe, seemed assured. Philosophers of the Affluent Society maintained that domestic problems were all but non-existent. The State Department Monnetists were hardly alone in failing to recognize that with the end of the Dollar Gap and the return to convertability on the one hand and the creation of the European Community on the other, the era of America's European hegemony was, by 1958, rapidly drawing to a close.

The Coal and Steel Community

American policy towards the CSC must be placed against a broader background of Monnet's ideas and their influence on American policy. Of his three main initiatives, only the heavy industry pool was of lasting importance. The European Defence Community, though the most ambitious and potentially significant, never materialized. EURATOM came into being but was soon eclipsed by the EC and had little more than a statutory existence. The CSC was an operational institution
that formulated ambitious policies, published innumerable orders and decrees, and sought high public visibility. It was the centerpiece of integrationist diplomacy during most, though not all, of the period between the Schuman Plan announcement and the founding of the European Economic Community, with both the Coal and Steel Community and EURATOM subsequently merged.

State Department discussions of integration policy, particularly after 1953, took place in a cloud-cuckoo land of soaring ambition, wishful thinking, bold posturing, and fabulism. From the moment of its inception in the Schuman Plan, Monnet presented the CSC as something unique and unprecedented in history to which the old rules did not apply. Embodying, as it did, the most profound hopes of war-weary nations, the initiative was indeed an experiment whose success was devoutly to be wished and whose failure almost too painful to contemplate. Thus the CSC seldom faced a reality check. Apart from Luxembourg officialdom and Community coal and steel producers, few realized that the intellectual turbulence with which Monnet loved to surround himself was producing little by way of concrete results. Only belatedly did it dawn upon the makers of American foreign policy that their confidence in the heavy industry pool had been misplaced.

Without American backing the European Coal and Steel Community would have come to naught. The United States was more than a silent partner to the Schuman Plan negotiations, which began in June 1950 and concluded with the initial-ling of the Treaty of Paris in April of the following year. Monnet's American friends intervened massively to save the coal-steel negotiations from being swept under by the crisis that broke out in September 1950, when, without prior warning, Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced that the United States planned to begin arming the West Germans. At a single stroke, Acheson had inadvertently turned the tables on France's Schuman Plan negotiators: a scheme calculated to redress a strategic imbalance between the two big Rhine-straddling nations now, it seemed, was to produce the opposite effect. To save the day, Monnet, through Prime Minister Pleven, proclaimed that France was ready to join, with the Germans or anyone else, a European army composed of nationally-integrated units. The United States immediately endorsed the idea. There was, at this point, nothing more to the proposal than a declaration of intent; no one, Monnet included, had a clue as to how such an organization would either function or fit into the "big picture." From this point on, however, and until the demise of the Euro-army project, the histories of the CSC and the European Defence Community proposal were intertwined.13

Although the Pleven Plan offered at least a hope of containing West German rearmament, it did not address French fears that the powerful neighbour to the east would dominate the Schuman Plan organization. To prevent this from happening the Allied High Commissioners, effectively under the direction of Monnet's old friend John J. McCloy, cranked up a long-idled program to decartelize and destrustify German industry. Indeed, by force majeure they forced Chancellor Adenauer and the smoke-stack barons of the Ruhr to accept it. The price the Federal Republic

paid for respectability gained by participation in the Schuman Plan, as written into the Treaty of Paris, was the continuation of occupation controls over heavy industry until the High Authority deemed them no longer necessary.\textsuperscript{14}

### The CSC and the European Defence Community

The CSC did not begin operations in Luxembourg until late-August 1952, by which time its importance in American policy had been overshadowed by planning for the European Defence Community (EDC), which paralleled the build up of NATO decreed after the outbreak of the war in Korea. The Euro-army had a preeminently political purpose, to make West German rearmament palatable to France and the rest of Europe. One need not dwell on the obvious military shortcomings of a combat unit in which companies in the same battalion (or "battle group") could not have communicated in the same language. The main point is that the polyglot force was never intended to exercise operational independence but to remain under NATO command and be firmly embedded in its organizational structure. The alternative, which remained alive as an option, would have allowed West Germans to form nationally homogenous units but only within the NATO framework. In any case, well before the big Korean build up had been completed, the United States, and therefore NATO too, shifted to a strategy of massive retaliation in which ground forces served merely as unwitting tripwires.\textsuperscript{15}

The diplomacy surrounding the European Defence Community had less to do with how war should be waged than how the peace should be secured. The United States bore the bulk of the costs for the massive post-Korea rearmament in Europe because, quite simply, its NATO allies lacked the wherewithal to pay for their share of it. In the twelve months after the outbreak of hostilities, the European NATO allies doubled defense expenditure from four and a half billion dollars to nine billion dollars. At this point, American aid entered the picture. In the not uncharacteristic case of France it equalled about half of total defense expenditure or about one-quarter of the national budget in the years 1951-1954. He who controlled the aid tapline, it was obvious, could make or break governments, set the pace of rearmament – in West Germany, for example – and guide economic development.\textsuperscript{16}

The so-called Commissariat, inspired by Monnet, was at the very heart of the EDC proposal. "More than a defense ministry," according to a West German military historian, "it [resembled] a European government with four ministries, with the military commissariat being like a ministry of defense." He adds that "the contractually guaranteed independence of the commissioners from their governments,

\textsuperscript{14} J. GILLINGHAM, \textit{Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe}, pp. 266-283.


the huge [planned] budgets, and the immense defence administration which practically nullified national boundaries(...)would surely have given the Commissariat immense powers.17 The most important of them, under the EDC treaty, was to have been over a budget that the Commissariat could set and to which it could compel member nations to contribute. American aid administrators, troubled by immense wastage, welcomed the vast concentration of power. It would, wrote one of them, "enable the EDC procurement services to establish a large, completely centralized procurement programme during the first year of its existence."18 Another official proposed paying all aid monies into a European Production Fund that would "combine elements of the programs previously administered separately as offshore procurement and defence support(...)".19

The Commissariat, as planned, needed to be put under some form of political control, or so argued the French socialists whose support was required for ratification of the EDC treaty, which was initialed by the foreign ministers of The Six on 27 May 1952. The document itself made provision for a Council of Ministers similar though not necessarily identical – the matter was left deliberately ambiguous – to the body that supervised operations at the High Authority. In addition, there was to be a popularly elected Assembly, once again, either similar to or identical with that of the CSC. To deal with these and still more weighty issues arising from the EDC proposal, discussions began in September 1952 on the subject of a European Political Community (EPC). The talks, which were to continue for a year, are memorable mainly because they gave the Dutch the first opportunity to air fresh plans for a customs union. Although viewed by American observers as an unwelcome diversion, the discussions would lead to the creation of the European Economic Community five years later. In its final, though never ratified, version, the EPC treaty called for combining the EDC, the CSC and future sectoral and supranational institutions into a federal European union.20

Under the Truman administration, integration policy was informally coordinated and non-Monnetist views could be mooted. Secretary of State Acheson, though an acquaintance of Monnet, was no acolyte of his and on matters European, listened respectfully to Averell Harriman, William Draper, and others of pronounced and independent outlook. In early 1952 Acheson in fact recalled Ambassador David Bruce from the Paris Embassy on the grounds of his extreme integrationism. During his exile in Washington as Undersecretary of State without portfolio, Bruce continued to promote supranationalism but William Tomlinson of the Treasury

18. United States National Archives (USNA) RG 469, Box 15 "Aid to EDC", "Draft Statement for Mr. Wood", 5 February 1952.
Department, his deputy in Paris since 1947, was responsible for liaison with Monnet. In securing Tomlinson's designation as delegate in Luxembourg to the Schuman Plan in the face of intense Atlanticist opposition, Bruce not only pulled off something of a coup but ensured that all reporting from there would be favorable to Monnet.21

The changing of the guard in Washington resulted in a new policy-making atmosphere and the institutionalization of Monnetist power. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles tolerated only happy-talk about integration. Those weak in the faith faced enormous pressure, according to Townsend Hoopes, who described Dulles' first tour of European posts as having been "(...) notable for the sheer intensity of will-power he applied to the discouraging prospects for the EDC. Gathering all the mission chiefs or their deputies at a meeting in the embassy in Paris, and after rather curtly paraphrasing his expectation of 'positive loyalty', he stressed the absolute necessity for full ratification of the [treaty] within six months and ordered those present (...) not to tolerate any discussion of alternatives within their embassies, nor to admit in their dealings with European officials and the press that alternatives even existed".22 To enforce this policy, Dulles took the unusual step in February 1953 of appointing Bruce Special Representative in Paris.

The odd nomenclature was evidence of lip service to the propriety of American non-intervention; yet the immediate purpose behind the appointment, as opposed to the more general one of policy coordination, was to give Bruce the authority to browbeat the Europeans into ratifying the EDC treaty. This was an exercise in futility. The EDC was wildly unpopular everywhere except in Germany, where acceptance was the price that had to be paid for ending the occupation. Not even Dulles' December 1953 "agonizing reappraisal" threat, by which he meant that the United States would pull the rug out from under Europe if the EDC failed, defused the opposition. The French in fact buried the plan at the first opportunity, in August 1954. Only after the Dien Bien Phu defeat and the decision to withdraw from the US-financed Indochina War was the cabinet in a position to risk an aid cutback.23 "The rejection of the EDC treaty", Bruce prophesied in his diary "[would be] the greatest diplomatic triumph ever achieved by the USSR. In Russia, as well as in the iron curtain countries and amongst the Communist parties of other nations, including the Soviet-controlled Communist delegation in the French National Assembly, the cardinal principle of Soviet policy has been, for some years, to prevent the coming into being of the European Defence Community. The men of the Kremlin (...) realize that the EDC has become the symbol of unity of the free world (...)".24 Dulles went into a still deeper funk: The defeat of plans for the Euro-

Army had brought on, he warned "(...) a crisis of almost terrifying proportions." Even Monnet was, at least for the moment, nonplussed. Although confiding to Bruce on 31 August that he would resign from the High Authority in consequence of the EDC rejection, he changed his mind two days later because the scheme was not "dead but only wounded" and could be "bandaged up for the next campaign." The rejection of the EDC treaty had astonishingly few consequences. Within two months Britain, France, and the United States had agreed to adopt the NATO alternative to German rearmament. Yet never again could European integration be equated with Monnet's version of supranationalism. In November Monnet resigned without prior warning as President of the High Authority, then rescinded the offer and finally had to be forced out of office in June 1955. The official explanation given for his abrupt decision to step down was disappointment at the failure of the EDC. He may also have been influenced by the less spectacular, and only slightly less ambiguous, failure of the Coal and Steel Community.

The American Loan

The CSC tended to be overlooked in the drama that unfolded around the EDC. This result may not have been unintended. In Luxembourg things were a mess. At the root of the problem was Monnet's refusal to cede any authority to, or share influence with, others. In retaliation the producers therefore quite simply sabotaged his work. The much touted openings of the common markets for coal and steel in Spring 1953 had negligible effect. Everywhere output of the combustible continued to be regulated by quasi-official national cartels. Faced with the prospect of competition, the steel industry tightened informal alliances and even openly formed a new International Steel Cartel to regulate exports. Although the High Authority issued flurry of regulations governing price, marketing, investment, and so on, their only real function was to conceal its impotence in masses of verbiage. The only really important issue in the relationship between Washington and the CSC was money: How much would be given in aid and for which purposes? A decision to provide it, based simply on the notion that "some degree of financial power will be essential to the Schuman Plan", antedated the actual existence of the organization, something that caused at least one official, Miriam Camp, to warn on 18 July 1952 that "No case has yet been made out, either by the MSA (Mutual Security Administration) or by the Schuman Plan countries, as to why dollar assis-

25. T. HOOPES, p. 246.
29. a. FRUS 1952-1954/VI "Memorandum of the Acting Director of the European Regional Staff, Mutual Security Agency (Hulley) to the Assistant Director for Europe, Mutual Security Director (Cleveland)", 21 July 1952; ibid "The Assistant Director for Supply of the Mutual Security Agency (Fitz Gerald) to the Office of United States Special Representative in Europe," 2 August 1952.
tance is [actually] required.\textsuperscript{30} Indeed no adequate rationale was ever forthcoming, nor any real accountability ever requested.

The election of Eisenhower made a difference here. William Draper, the US Special Representative in Europe under President Truman and as such the chief dispenser of assistance, believed that "the [CSC's] taxing power, and the inherent strength of the coal and steel industries should make it possible and desirable that the necessary coal and steel financing can be arranged internally by particular companies, as part of an overall High Authority investment program through private and public sources or the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and that US aid should not be necessary." He added, slightly bemused, that "The High Authority has not developed its survey of industries and their needs for investment [and] has made no approaches to private or public sources or IBRD for financing ..."\textsuperscript{31} His successors expressed few such reservations.

Preparations for the loan began in April 1953, when Columbia University invited Monnet to receive an honorary doctorate at the June graduation ceremonies. Taking advantage of the Frenchman's impending visit, Dulles arranged a series of meetings with key Washington policy-makers, including the president, who after a head-to-head discussion wrote Congress on 15 June to request loan authorization.\textsuperscript{32} Eisenhower did not ask for a special appropriation, which would have figured in the budget, but rather the opening of a 500 million dollar line of credit from the Treasury Department that the CSC could draw upon as required.\textsuperscript{33} Since no guidelines were set for the use of this facility, Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey felt obliged to warn Dulles that businessmen would object strenuously to "using our tax money to finance additional steel competition from abroad." Humphrey added, though without elaborating, that using the funds to rehabilitate the coal and iron mines, as discussed by Monnet during his June visit, "would involve no such sums as 400 million or 500 million dollars."\textsuperscript{34}

Monnet turned up at the December 1953 NATO meeting in Paris with a vigorous defence of the loan request against both Treasury objections and in the face of queries from Harold Stassen. Stassen directed the Foreign Operations Administration and, in spite of the new title, succeeded Draper. The Frenchman put on an outrageous performance, at once forceful, even arrogant, and completely disingenuous. One marvels that it was even partly persuasive. After repeated prodding, Monnet admitted that the CSC could possibly get by with as little as $400 million but denied that the expenditure would in any way affect the competitive position of the American steel industry on the grounds that the sums in question would be channelled into modernizing mine operations. When reminded by Humphrey that

\begin{footnotes}
\item[30] FRUS 1952-1954/VI "Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Economic Organization Affairs (Camp) to the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Byington)", 18 July 1952.
\item[31] FRUS 1952-1954/VI "The United States Special Representative in Europe (Draper) to Under-secretary of State (Bruce)", 3 November 1952.
\item[33] FRUS 1952-1954/VI "The Secretary of the Treasury (Humphrey) to the Secretary of State", 8 December 1953.
\item[34] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
anything involving costs in coal somehow also involves costs in steel, he diverted
the discussion by insisting – as was in fact patently untrue – that "most cokeries in
the Community are located near the coal mines and belong to the mining firms,
instead of being located near and owned by the steel plants as is generally the case
in the United States. The gas produced by the coking plants, to the extent that it is
not used in the same ovens, is generally piped into the industrial gas network for
sale to the processing industries and to domestic consumers. It is often piped long
distances; for example from (...) the Ruhr to Berlin."35 It was as if the famous Ver-
bundwirtschaft, a root source of German industrial strength and object of nearly a
decade of intermittent decartelization warfare, did not exist!

Since no one present at the meeting had either the wit, knowledge, or intention
to challenge the statement, Monnet pressed home his advantage. He candidly
admitted that the High Authority had not drawn up an investment program, cagily
hinted that such an approach smacked of socialism, and reassuringly added that the
individual firm could best determine its own investment requirements. He did not
deny that the High Authority (HA) would take a percentage cut on loans to firms,
requested the longest possible duration for the loan, and proposed that it be allowed
to make repayment in local currencies. In response to Humphrey's query as to why
the HA had failed to approach the World Bank, he answered revealingly that "this
would defeat the desired purpose of demonstrating continued United States support
for an integrated Europe."36

He might have added that neither the World Bank, the Ex-Im Bank, nor any
other non-private bank could have made a loan without at least some strings
attached. But what Monnet had in mind was nothing less than carte blanche: "Per-
haps," he mused, "the United States Government could in the very near future
announce that it will ask Congress to approve a loan to the Coal and Steel Commu-
nity of a certain amount, with terms and conditions to be determined by subsequent
negotiation," adding that this method would meet the need for reaffirmation of
United States support for the European Community." Such a reaffirmation could
not be bought at a discount, he warned: "Whereas a smaller loan would, of course,
still be interesting as a business proposition, a loan in the order of $400 million was
necessary to give full political significance to United States recognition of the new
prospects for economic development opened by the European Community (sic)."37

Overriding the heated insistence of Dulles that anything less than the $400 mil-
lion demanded by Monnet would fail to produce the desired results, Stassen author-
ized only $100 million.38 In April 1954 President Eisenhower signed a bill
appropriating this amount on very generous terms, twenty-five years at 3 7/8 per-
cent not payable until 1958. The reduction, though drastic, hardly constituted a
defeat for Monnet. The money was unneeded. The High Authority levied a turn-

36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. FRUS 1952-1954/VI "Memorandum by the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration
(Stassen) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Kyes)", 12 February 1954.
over tax on steel output that covered its operating expenses, while companies could, and did, resort to either conventional or government financing. In fact, the HA soon began to run up embarrassing surpluses, never borrowed the full $100 million available to it, and indeed soon found itself in the enviable position of looking for constructive ways to spend the money.39

The purposes to which it was put continued to be a source of worry. Monnet, with Dulles' encouragement, refused categorically to accept Treasury demands for project-by-project review.40 This presented real problems, as the astute Camp, now attached to the Foreign Operations Administration, warned in December 1953: "The High Authority has, as yet, (she emphasized) made no strong move against the powerful coal and steel cartels known to be operating within the Community." Camp added that the investment policy of the High Authority was not to expand but lower costs in the steel industry by re-equipping the mills and raising productivity in the coal and iron ore mines.41 The funds could, in other words, create serious and possibly unfair competition for American industry. To deflect this kind of criticism, Monnet channelled as much as possible of the American loan into the construction of socially desirable company housing.42 Thus a Republican government found itself in the awkward position of perpetuating a way of doing business it was committed to eliminating and subsidizing in Europe the kind of program it opposed at home.

The American loan episode was an embarrassment but little more; the amounts involved were trifling in comparison to the overall aid flow. It nevertheless aroused suspicions that, in spite of the heroic pretentions of the Monnetists, the CSC was, "at bottom", a fraud. This, in so many words, was the conclusion of the Dodge Memorandum. It issued from the special committee that undertook the most important policy review of the Eisenhower years, the Council on Foreign Economic Policy (CFEP). Its voluminous reports documented beyond the shadow of a doubt that far from de-cartelizing, Western European heavy industry was rapidly re-cartelizing.43

Summoned to Washington to justify this state of affairs, Albert Coppé, a member of the High Authority, made no denial but explained the persistence of restrictive practices as the result of tradition, and, though promising action in the future, refused to use the US loan as a lever for reform.44 The State Department's definitive response of 28 October 1955 to the CFEP queries, though hedged in amb-

40. FRUS 1952-1954/VI "Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant of State for European Affairs (Bonbright) to the Acting Secretary of State", 4 February 1954.
41. FRUS 1952-1954/VI "Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Economic Organization Affairs (Camp) to the Assistant Director for Policy and Planning, Office of the Director of Foreign Operations Administration (Gordon)", 18 December 1953.
42. J. GILLINGHAM, Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, p. 343.
43. FRUS 1955-1955/IV, "Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Waugh) to the Undersecretary of State (Hoover)", 14 February 1955.
guous language, admitted defeat but recommended pressing on anyway.\textsuperscript{45} The key passage noted that "If the High Authority had made no loans to firms believed to be involved in restrictive arrangements pending the outcome of its investigations or efforts to modify broadly the structure of coal marketing in the CSC area, coal companies would have been eliminated from consideration as loan recipients, since the loan would have had to be drawn by 30 June 1955."\textsuperscript{46} The State Department nevertheless continued to lend credence to the innumerable plans and projects rolled out of the Luxembourg papermill and above all rejected the idea that faith either in the Coal and Steel Community or the supranational principle upon which it had been constructed had in any way been misplaced.

\section*{EURATOM and the Scrapping of the CSC}

The so-called re-launching of Europe in June 1955 indeed breathed new life into Monnetism in general and the CSC in particular. The problem with the organization, "The Theologians" now argued, was that it operated in a sector of industry governed by entrenched interests; the supranational principle should therefore be applied elsewhere, in a related field just beginning to develop – atomic power for instance. Coppé had floated such a notion as a trial balloon at his 28 April 1955 meeting in Washington and received an encouraging response. Was it not a brilliant idea to link the European Idea to an industry of the future rather than those of the past? His interlocutors seized upon the logic of connecting energy to coal, which called for broadening the competence of the High Authority as well as the opportunities opened for long-term planning and development presented by the exciting new technology.\textsuperscript{47} In addition, they could not have overlooked the fact that by controlling the supply of fissile material the United States could restrain the development of national nuclear programs. The EURATOM proposal was ready to be hatched, and indeed soon was. The Messina conference of 3-5 June, convoked to re-start the integration process, placed it at the top of the European agenda. Along with the plans for a customs union, it would become part of the Treaty of Rome. EURATOM was stillborn not least of all because atomic power would not prove to be the promised panacea. More immediately, West German industry wanted to develop its own nuclear technology and, supported by the government, had no intention of subjecting itself to regulation by a supranational authority.\textsuperscript{48}

46. Ibid.
nuclear weapons development; before the Treaty of Rome was even initialled it had a timetable for the testing and deploying them.\footnote{J. DELMAS, "Die Entstehung und Entwicklung einer militärischen Atompolitik in Frankreich (1945-1956)" (manuscript), p. 7.} France was by no means ready to compromise on nuclear issues. The American side presented problems as well. Although Eisenhower and Dulles resolutely backed the EURATOM proposal in the interests of integration, it encountered such dogged opposition from the Atomic Energy Commission that, in the end, it never became operational. There was, quite simply, no way to prevent the organization from diverting nuclear material obtained from the United States to national weapons programmes. Without such deliveries, however, the proposal had no value as an integrative mechanism from Washington's viewpoint: the trans-Atlantic linkage would be broken and the new organization lack the resources with which to get operations underway.\footnote{FRUS 1955-1957/IV "Letter from the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Strauss) to the Secretary of State", 7 March 1957.}

EURATOM dominated American integration policy during the relance, which was fortunate if only because the State Department kept its hands off what most of its leading lights considered an unpromising attempt to form a customs union. Official Washington nonetheless responded graciously once it was in operation.\footnote{FRUS 1955-1957/IV "Memorandum from the Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs (Dillon) to the Chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy (Randall)", 11 April 1957.} Big business, to the extent that could be said to have cared at all, recognized that capital flows more easily than trade; direct investment was easier than exportation.\footnote{FRUS 1955-1957/IV "Memorandum from the Deputy Director of the Office of International Trade and Resources (Frank) to the Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs (Dillon), 24 May 1957.} American labor was almost wholly unconcerned with the issue of a European customs union. Among major economic interest, only the farm lobby raised anti-protectionist warning flags.\footnote{Romero, p. 173}

The main practical consequence of the EURATOM episode was the partial rehabilitation of the CSC. A 9 January 1956 memorandum from Dulles to Eisenhower reiterated the official line: The CSC was "a proven and successful institution in European political and economic life" and the Community, "still recovering from the EDC setback", would require "concrete United States support" in order to discharge the new responsibilities devolving upon it as a result of the EURATOM initiative. Once again: it was too important to put at risk.\footnote{FRUS 1955-1957/IV "Memorandum from the Secretary of State to the President", 9 January 1956.} Absurdly enough, the comeback grew out of a dispute over the supply of scrapiron, a raw material needed for steel production that was in short supply owing largely to Europe's post-Korea boom.

Scrap was a perennial problem for the High Authority. Prices were volatile and varied nationally. The dependence of the different regions on the material differed in degree as did reliance upon domestic sources of supply. National cartels existed in each member state to deal with such difficulties. The problem was that West Germany, with low scrap requirements and abundant supplies, held the whip hand. The
High Authority in an uncharacteristically sound and decisive move, created a mechanism to coordinate and level prices as well as regulate supply community-wide; it re-allocated the German surplus, in return for which the national cartels, including the reluctant Germans, declared themselves "voluntary organizations". To complement this set up, the High Authority founded a sole purchasing agency for imports, which bought only from designated American sellers.55

In March 1955 the Commerce Department attacked this system on the grounds that it drained scrap from the US economy, presumably raising prices and causing shortages56 and proposed instituting export controls.57 At his 20 April meeting in Washington, Coppé warned that such a measure would force the High Authority to declare an emergency, impose maximum prices, and in general benefit cartelism.58 On 15 June, "following several months of negotiation," the State Department, however, registered "a complete victory" over the Commerce Department; the existing program would continue and export controls not be imposed.59 The Messina process apparently had made the difference.

The persistence of shortages nonetheless kept the issue alive for the rest of the year. René Mayer, Monnet's successor as the CSC president, warned on 9 February 1956 that controls on scrap exports would result in the imposition of emergency measures for Community coal and steel outputs as well as scrap.60 In October the Commerce Department resumed the campaign61 and in the face of mounting exports actually suspended export licenses in February of the following year as a prelude to the introduction of controls.62 Once again, however, the CSC, assisted by the State Department, prevailed. The sellers' cartel was abolished and an agency of the United States government prevented from protecting American interests with the very methods whose use its money promoted in Europe.63 The scrapiron dispute was a final, inglorious chapter in the history of American promotion of supranationalism during the 1950's. The downdraft that began to blow through the

55. FRUS 1955-1957/IV "Report by the Department of State to the Council on Foreign Economic Policy", 16 March 1955 (CSC Scrap Importing Arrangements); also J. GILLINGHAM, Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe, pp. 323-325.
56. FRUS 1955-1957/IV "Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Barbour) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Kalijarvi), 28 March 1955".
57. Ibid.
58. FRUS 1955-1957/IV "Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 20, 1955".
60. FRUS 1955-1957/IV "Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of Commerce, February 9, 1957".
61. FRUS 1955-1957 "Memorandum from the Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs (Timmons) to the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick)", 4 October 1956.
62. FRUS 1955-1957/IV "Telegram, from the Acting United States Representative to the European Coal and Steel Community (Boochever) to the Department of State", 21 February 1957.
63. Ibid.
world steel industry in late-1957 ended shortages of the material and the coal-steel pool soon merged into the European Economic Community.

**Conclusion**

American integration policy during the fifties, which in the Eisenhower-Dulles years was intimately associated with Monnetist supranationalism, accomplished little after the launching of the CSC, an institution of little more than symbolic importance. The proposals for the EDC and EURATOM, though in some respects reckless, were too unrealistic to have done much damage. American Euro-diplomacy of the era was, in fact, largely irrelevant; other forces drove the historical process. American productivist ideology, as spawned in Europe by the Marshall Plan, was one of them. Though obviously no blueprint, it provided hope in a civilization where such a commodity was in short supply. A determination to modernize was a common denominator of the emergent, though amorphous new European collectivity. American aid, another agent of change, gave Europe the wherewithal for industrial re-equipment. The impact of this assistance is only beginning to be examined in detail and must be better known if one is to determine whether integration could have been speeded up or better promoted by different methods.\(^{64}\) The study of integration must go beyond American policy and its consequences; it requires searching investigations of the changes in European society that made it possible.\(^{65}\)

\[\text{John Gillingham}\]

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Elena Calandri

Looking back to the European Defence Community – The Crisis in Context

In May 1950, partly as a response to American pressures to end obstruction of West Germany's full industrial recovery and political rehabilitation, the French foreign minister Robert Schuman launched a plan to pool production and development of the essential strategic materials and set the goal of European political union, to be built up gradually "par des réalisations concrètes créant une solidarité de fait". In September 1950, despite rapid progress, the Schuman Plan negotiators had only started to sketch a framework for Franco-German reconciliation so America's uncompromising pressure to have West Germany contributing to Western defence disrupted the tempo of the process. Isolated among his colleagues, who were afraid of fomenting American disengagement from Europe at the New York NATO Council meeting, the French government's representative rejected German membership of the North Atlantic Pact, arguing that this did not offer any means of limiting and controlling rearmament. The French Premier, René Pleven, put forward therefore a supranational solution worked out by Jean Monnet. In January, 1951, representatives of the Six opened negotiations in Paris to create a "European army".1

As negotiations went ahead, the plan started a chain reaction which transformed the distant, almost visionary, European union into an entangling, imminent reality. In the autumn of 1951 the Benelux and Italy called for a political roof over an economic framework to complement the common army. After the Six had signed the European Defence Community (EDC) Treaty on 27 May 1952 the ad hoc assembly, formed under the terms of Article 38, elaborated upon the rules for the European Political Community. Plans for "pools" in such varied fields as transport and milk products proliferated. By the end of 1953, rumours were spreading about the establishment of a common market within six years.2

In France, initial mixed feelings towards the Pleven Plan turned into hostility concerning the Defence Community. Not only did it become clear that France could only exact controls over Germany at the price of undercutting her own autonomy but in March, 1953, Stalin's death defused the fear and urgency that had been so effective in pushing together "the West" in the aftermath of the Korean war.

2. Among them, Pierre Pfimlim's "Green" pool, the so called White Pool, Malagodi's transport Pool; on the EPC and its economic spill-over, Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris (AMAE), DECE 1944-60, vols 582 and 584.

Dieses Dokument wurde erstellt mit FrameMaker 4.0.4.
Above all though from 1950 onwards, while France struggled under the burden of the Indo-China war, West Germany's economic performance and international status improved dramatically so, besides repugnance towards the partial watering down of the French army into the "mélange apatride" denounced by General de Gaulle, economic opposition to the EDC evolved also from the belief that it would be the precursor to a common market and that this "would merely lead to German industrial domination whilst France reverted to agriculture with the help of a flood of surplus Italian and Dutch labour". All these arguments came to a head with the painful disengagement that culminated on 30 August 1954 with the French Assembly rejecting the Paris Treaty.

The way out of the crisis was to be found in Germany's dual admission to NATO and a revamped Brussels Pact, to be renamed the Western European Union (WEU). Working out this settlement, secured a place in history for Anthony Eden, the British foreign secretary, who committed British troops to the defence of the Continent while shrewdly driving France to compromise. However, since the failure of the EDC had been due to psychological, economic and political reasons allied to complex changes, the Paris Agreements were not just a brilliant diplomatic settlement but deeply influenced also the political and economic history of Western Europe. It is from this viewpoint that all the competing plans, aborted proposals, parallel political and economic initiatives need also to be taken into account. The French government's initiative for an Armaments Agency and for the pooling of the whole of the Continent's arms production fell into all three categories. It deserves attention and deeper analysis than has been given to it thus far.

**Searching for new Directions, Armaments and France's German Policy**

In their efforts to deny Germany the means for military and political dominance in Europe, French governments considered armaments to be a key issue. Limiting and controlling armaments had been an essential task for the EDC. During the Paris negotiations the Armaments Committee had worked out a comprehensive system whereby Member States would lose their freedom to manufacture strategic materials. Instead powers were granted to a Board of Commissioners, assisted by a Consultative Committee, to prepare and execute joint programmes for armaments, equipment, supplies and the infrastructure for European forces, granting the Member States permits for producing weapons for non-NATO national forces and for

3. Public Record Office, Kew (hereafter PRO): FO 371/112794 WF1103/12, O. Harvey (Paris) no.82 (E), 26 February 1954, thoroughly analyses the economic roots of "the very noticeable waning of French enthusiasm for European integration schemes in recent months"; on the military attitude toward the EDC see especially P. GUILLEN, "La France et l'intégration de la RFA dans l'OTAN", *Guerres Mondiales et conflits contemporains*, Jul. 1990, 73-9.

export. Labelled a "strategically exposed area" West Germany renounced the right to build atomic, biological and chemical weapons, the so-called ABC weapons, as well as several classes of heavy armaments.5

Provisions on the subject of armaments formed an almost self-contained whole within the Paris treaty. At all events, some in France saw it this way and became convinced that an armaments community could offer a substitute for the EDC. A leading proponent of this argument was Pierre-Olivier Lapie, an anti-cédiste socialist deputy who, in 1953, called for reconsideration of the emotional concept of merging national armies and launched a campaign for an armaments community as a "formule de remplacement ou d'étape de la CED". His call fell upon authoritative ears at the Centre d'études de politique étrangère. A "European Armaments Community Study Group" operated there from November 1953 to June 1954 and, in February 1954 sponsored a project of Lapie's for an interim convention. It was suggested that, pending implementation of the Paris Treaty, the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs should establish an organization to prepare joint programmes for armaments, equipment, supplies and infrastructures.6

At all events, outside anti-cédiste circles it ricocheted and in the Quai d'Orsay diplomats involved in trying to reconcile German rehabilitation with France's interests confirmed the crucial role of armaments. Although the emotional mixture of fears and national emotion which had fuelled French opposition to Germany's membership of NATO in 1950 had partially evaporated by 1954 the Foreign Ministry still maintained that NATO, owing to its purpose and structure, lacked the tools for keeping German rearmament under control. It was exactly for limiting and controlling the quality and quantity of weapons available to German armed forces that NATO was specially unsuited, because it had no means of governing the distribution of foreign aid, of limiting Germany's independence in the deployment of her potential and the manufacture of arms, no means of imposing Continent-wide standardization, the division of labour, joint production and the enforcement of controls.7 During the search for alternative courses of action open to the Brussels conference a working group chaired by the Secretary General, Alexandre Parodi, came up with a project, in the summer of 1954, for replacement of the Paris Treaty by two agreements to establish a European armaments community and a seven-power defence organization, respectively.8 Early in September, deeply shocked by the setback in the construction of Europe, Jean Monnet himself was to consider

7. AMAE, Wormser, 23, sous-direction d'Europe centrale, Note n. 3, 26 June 1954.
relaunching the process by starting out from an armaments community, although he soon abandoned the idea lest the unpopularity of military issues sully European federal ideas and instead selected nuclear energy as the next target for European integration.9

So, in the wake of the vote on 30 August, an armaments community was likely to be among the options considered in Paris. On 10 September the secretary general of the Centre d'études de politique étrangère, Jacques Vernant, made sure that it would be considered by the highest authorities by sending a note to Georges Boris, chargé de mission at Matignon and perhaps the closest adviser to the Prime Minister, Pierre Mendès France.10

At the same time a change of heart was taking place in quarters as far apart as the Foreign Ministry, the High Commissariat in Germany and private enterprise.

Economic relations between French and German firms were flourishing, making each country the other's best partner in a number of sectors. Heavy industry unions, in particular, had developed relationships, partly through partnership in the Coal and Steel Community, and fully independent of official connections. The official rethink which took place in the summer of 1954 was seen to be overdue therefore.

It combined economic awareness with acknowledgement of the need for political cooperation with Germany and mixed feelings about supranationalism. It was when ways of escaping from the European Defence Community were being pondered upon, in July 1954, that the Sous-direction d'Europe centrale concluded that the answer lay in Bonn and that in Brussels Mendès France should seek an entente with Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in order to drop the most extreme parts of the Paris Treaty and revert to a gradual, functional approach as opposed to the institutional one, which was driving the Six to become a technocratic superstate.

After the Saar question, it singled out canalization of the Moselle, the project for a Grand Canal d'Alsace and "Franco-German cooperation in the field of the Paris Treaty interdictions" as concrete bases for cooperation to be developed further.

"L'arme atomique, avions militaires, engins téléguidés: ces interdictions – he explained in mid-July – (avaient) été dès l'origine conçues par nous comme destinées à permettre une coopération franco-allemande en dehors du territoire de l'Allemagne.

Il n'y avait en effet aucune raison pour que l'Europe de l'Ouest soit seule à ne pas profiter de l'apport technique et intellectuel allemand, alors que ce sont les savants allemands qui ont permis à différents pays de réaliser des avances importantes dans ces mêmes domaines. D'autre part, il était évident que si une telle coopération ne pouvait s'instaurer, les interdictions seraient très rapidement remises en question par

l’Allemagne, qui ferait valoir la nécessité de ne pas stériliser le capital intellectuel et technique que représente l’Allemagne de l’Ouest pour la défense occidentale... Pour prévenir cette évolution, un programme de coopération franco-allemande dans un cadre européen est indispensable”.

Not only had cooperation with Germany become necessary. Changing relationships in the West were making it urgent as well. Despite the impasse in the EDC ratification process, news from military quarters confirmed that things were moving and induced French diplomacy to adopt a long-term view. It was argued, for example, by the French component of the Military Security Office in Koblenz that since American and British attitudes were rendering controls short lived and fragile, the French should cast about for long-term indirect means of keeping German rearmament under control. Since West Germany did not yet have any armaments industry, and her lack of geographical depth was an argument which pleaded against implanting military production on her territory, the time was ripe for advancing proposals for "constructive programmes for the joint financing, study and manufacture of armaments" which could be safely sited in France where manufacturing for the military was both advanced and underexploited. News about the activities of German technicians in a number of different countries as well as about American employment of German technicians in Spain, confirmed that time for taking the initiative was indeed running short.

On 8 September, the same day the Brussels Pact escamotage for German rearmament was first mentioned in Paris the government endorsed, in an unofficial note, the idea of an armaments community. The day after, the Economic and Financial Directorate of the Foreign Affairs Ministry gave it a fresh start. On 11 September, Olivier Wormser circulated a note on the subject among high-ranking officers of the Foreign and Defence Ministries.

Then, on 15 September, when Eden arrived in Paris to discuss plans for the London conference he transmitted the note to the President of the Council. He indicated three "impératifs" which any six-power agreement on German rearmament should comply with, namely,

a) Permettre de connaître et de limiter la nature et la quantité d’armes disponibles pour l’Allemagne d’une part, l’importance et l’autonomie du potentiel militaire allemand d’autre part;

b) Permettre d’implanter les industries d’armement le plus à l’ouest et au sud possible, éventuellement en Afrique du Nord, cette conception étant stratégiquement saine et politiquement heureuse;

12. AMAE, Wormser, 23 Coignard, s.d. sept 1954.
c) Permettre une utilisation rationnelle des crédits militaires par répartition des taches, cette conception étant économiquement saine, militairement satisfaisante (pas d'autonomie du potentiel militaire allemand), et politiquement opportune puisqu'elle montrera que la construction d'une Europe unie n'est pas abandonnée".

In addition he considered four caveats to the effect that there should be no supranationalism, no new technocracy, no obstacle to France's freedom of action in nuclear matters, no automatic machinery leading to a general common market or a single currency. Wormser, therefore, envisaged an agreement fixing the number, the type and the actual arms for each country's divisions together with the establishment of a Common Armaments Agency empowered to deal with control and production i.e. a study of financial allocations, the distribution of orders, the redistribution of products and the administration of foreign aid. The Agency was to be directed by a Council of Ministers and Deputies and consist of a secretariat plus technical and control offices. The Agency would exercise its authority by distributing production orders and would be open to participation on the part of all West European non-neutral states. Two clauses indirectly discriminated against Germany by stipulating that the member states would be allowed to manufacture only those armaments requested by the Agency, except as regards the needs of forces overseas. The Agency would also control the establishment of new industries.16

Later on Wormser's further elaborations with a view to the London conference threw light on the ambiguities, difficulties and arrière-pensées of the plan.17 He put standardization in the forefront, perhaps echoing a Defence Ministry recommendation to push European strategic-cum-technical arguments and aims, instead of turning obsessively around limitations and national interests.18 He sketched out the secretary general's powers and made them at least as wide as those of the corresponding body in the OECD Even after the official governmental line had taken shape, which appeared to be that "selling" the armaments agency as possessing supranational character was the right thing, Wormser persistently ruled out supranationalism and envisaged a "juxtaposé" budget consisting of allocations voted by each Parliament and a majority voting procedure which would be qualified and weighted so as not allow a veto by either the major powers or one major power plus one minor power. However, his handling of budget and voting procedures which are as it were the litmus paper for supranationalism, remained embryonic.

Both questions interlocked with the problem of Britain's position, obviously one of the knots in the plan and a revealing test for France's economic ambitions. In fact, Britain's accession to the Agency was fraught with difficulties and perils for France. On the one hand Britain notoriously refused to accept majority voting rules and any a priori brake on national independence. On the other, Britain's policy for the arms trade was to sell to West European states but without supplying her own needs on the Continent for which she pleaded strategic and technical reasons. The

17. AMAE, Wormser, 23, service de Coopération économique, Notes 1 à 6, 23-25 September 1954, "peu complet".
The Western European Union Armaments Pool

field was open therefore for competition between France's arms industry which had considered the EDC and would consider any new arrangement to be a channel for securing the Continental European market for its own products and Britain's industry, which was technically and financially stronger and more competitive thanks to its worldwide dimension. Standardization would be playing a part in such competition and Wormser openly planned to use it to drive Continental armed forces away from British standards and cause them to accept French standards. He suggested setting ceilings for the percentage of national budgets which could be diverted abroad while downgrading the importance of price in favour of technical features when it came to the assignment of production orders. He also expected the "strategically exposed regions" clause to channel German and Benelux capital into the development of joint industries in southern and western France and North Africa.

The Armaments Agency Project launched at the London Nine Power Conference from 28 September to 3 October 1954

Although Mendès France personally disliked the armaments community concept the idea became part and parcel of French plans for Germany's integration into the Western military alliance at the London conference. Before that, it had been adapted to fit in with the dual membership scheme for Germany worked out by Anthony Eden.

During the discussions with Eden on 15 to 16 September which produced the NATO formula for German rearmament Mendès France put forward the idea of an armaments agency. In an interview granted to the then Manchester Guardian he declared that mutual confidence in Europe was possible only if an agreement could be reached among Europeans on the subject of an effective system for the limitation and control of armaments.

On 18 September France's position had been clarified enough to be circulated among the French Ambassadors in the NATO capitals for presentation to the Allied governments. In the memorandum delivered to the Allies Mendès France endorsed the NATO WEU scheme and confirmed that the rationale behind it was to ensure, through the establishment of a European organization, that NATO membership did not foster unlimited German rearmament. NATO's annual fixing of a minimum national contribution in terms of armaments and manpower would become the maximum contributions allowed to the WEU countries. The WEU Council's powers concerning armaments were magna pars in France's proposals. In addition to checks to ensure that no manufacture of Category A weapons, namely,

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ABC weapons and the heavy weapons listed in Annex 2, Article 107 of the Paris Treaty, was going on in strategically exposed regions, the Council would direct and control the manufacture of all other armaments, namely, Category B.

On 20 September the plan was outlined in Strasbourg before the Council of Europe Assembly at which Winston Churchill had first mooted the idea of a European army in August 1950. In a cold atmosphere, Mendès France explained the French Assembly's vote as a condemnation of the far-reaching supranational implications of the Paris Treaty and of Britain's inadequate involvement in the Continent's security. However, he argued, a return to the Brussels Pact pure and simple would not suffice, for its inter-governmental character would frustrate the need for closer cooperation among the Western European nations. He suggested, therefore, the admission of Italy and Germany to the five-power alliance, the spirit of which France wanted to revive by injecting into it a dose of supranationality. The day before Pierre-Olivier Lapie had been explaining to delegates how supranationality was to be applied to armaments.22

One week later the foreign ministers of the Six, of Britain, the United States and Canada met in London. All the ministers summoned to Lancaster House agreed to set limits on Germany's rearmament and to establish ways and means of putting to the test her commitment to abstain from the manufacture of certain types of armaments as well as the desirability of supervising weapons stockpiles across the Continent of Europe. The British as well as the German memoranda to the conference, retained the EDC Treaty provisions concerning the manufacture of ABC weapons in strategically exposed areas.23

Mendès France, however, went much further. He claimed continuity with the Treaty of Paris, also as regards the role assigned to the armaments issue. In his opening statement on 28 September he declared that he would consent only to a package that included the means of controlling German rearmament, settlement of the Saar question and an Anglo-American commitment to maintain a military presence in Europe until expiry of the Brussels Pact. The rationale behind Germany's dual admission to NATO and the WEU found its fullest application in the field of armaments as Mendès France explained:

"(...) notre effort pour établir une limitation et un contrôle des armements ne peut pas trouver son implantation exclusivement dans le NATO, puisque le NATO a pour objet fondamental de chercher à organiser une meilleure défense commune à l'Occident et que pour réaliser ce but le NATO (...) cherche systématiquement à établir des forces de plus en plus larges (...)."

To be effective, controls should apply not only to armaments in stock but in production as well. A general rule would thus put the entire Continent's production under the control of the agency, which would be the sole client for continental industry, the only exception being production for export and for national forces not committed to NATO. The distribution of American aid would rank among the

WEU's most relevant assignments. On 30 September the French position was reformulated in a "Note sur le problème de la production des armements." 24

Greeted by the foreign ministers of Belgium, Paul-Henri Spaak, and of the Netherlands, Johann Willem Beyen, as the most difficult issue on the table, the rechristened Armaments Pool was the topic of lively discussions and the one point which almost split the conference. The Italian Foreign Minister, Gaetano Martino, gave it his qualified support. But Beyen roundly condemned it as an attempt to preserve the EDC provisions without the EDC guarantees and the necessary political and economic environment. The Benelux ministers hinted that the proposal sought to give the edge to French industrial interests by encouraging the concentration of industry in Southern France and North Africa under the cloak of security reasons, that it might foster Franco-German industrial hegemony and rendered British membership impossible. As representatives of small countries they felt their countries' interests would not be protected by the Agency's weak and questionable supranational character. In addition, all the countries rejected WEU control over American military supplies. On 30 September the United States Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, declared bluntly that Washington would not accept interference regarding where American aid went which was "to a certain extent a reflection of American policy". 25

Chancellor Adenauer did not openly dismiss the French plan but flatly stated that Germany would not accept any discrimination. In fact, he considered the plan to be heavily discriminatory against his country because it denied the German contingent its basis for armaments. It used the concept of a "strategically exposed area" as a discriminatory device, virtually preventing any armaments industry from being built up on German soil, while aiming to concentrate the whole of arms production for the Brussels Pact's continental territory in France. As did his Benelux colleagues, Adenauer criticised the Agency's inconsistent status and disproportionate powers which did not provide the guarantees of impartiality and non-partisanship that the EDC Treaty granted the Commissariat. While he acknowledged Mendès France's domestic difficulties, he suspected that the French Minister could be seeking a settlement which could serve later for a deal with the Soviet Union to Germany's disadvantage. 26

On 29 September the Belgian delegation circulated an alternative memorandum on armaments control. It gave NATO exclusive competence in defining the military needs of Brussels Pact members and reduced the WEU armaments agency to a simple control body. 27

Under the chairmanship of Lord Hood a working group discussed both memoranda over the next few days. It was a very lively discussion indeed since the German delegate rejected the definition of a "strategically exposed region" covering only Germany, while the French delegate refused to countenance all the continental countries having to renounce the manufacture of ABC weapons.

Britain's undertaking to keep military units on the Continent was an important achievement for France and made the London Conference a turning point in the German question. A Franco-German meeting was scheduled in November to seek a settlement for the Saar so the WEU powers on armaments were the only part of the package Mendès France was unable to secure. On 1 October the armaments issue was again considered by the foreign ministers in a very tense atmosphere, Mendès France making it clear that he was ready to make the conference fail on it. On 2 October, Adenauer cut the Gordian knot of the definition of what constituted the "strategically exposed area" by voluntary renunciation of ABC weapons production, a declaration which Foster Dulles quickly interpreted on a rebus sic stantibus basis. But Germany obtained the right to produce virtually all other kinds of armaments including aircraft but not guided missiles on her territory. In the end the Seven agreed on an Agency which would control the stocks of arms held by WEU continental members and enforce Germany's commitments. The American and Canadian governments would notify the Agency of all military aid given to the European allies while, in accordance with the suggestion put forward by the Canadian Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Lester Pearson, a working group would examine further assignments in the fields of standardization and joint production and report back to the next conference to be held in Paris later in October for signing the agreements.

Domestic Constraints, economic Security, global Policy and Mendès France's German Policy

In France the plan for the armaments pool had gathered widespread support in parliament, each group being keen to use it to foster its own aims. As the charismatic, but little-loved leader of a divided country, Mendès France needed to pay the utmost attention to the domestic mood which could jeopardize both the survival of his government and the ratification of the forthcoming Paris Agreements. The rejection of the EDC had stimulated pro-European feelings towards the French premier but the anti-cédistes as well were far from ready to accept uncontrolled German rearmament and urged that France's international position should be better protected. Finally, Mendès France needed to avoid alienating those forces spread throughout the parliamentary spectrum who wanted to keep open the door for

negotiations with the Soviet Union and lent weight to Moscow's threats about the dire implications of the decision to rearm Germany. In October, during the debate on the London agreements in the National Assembly, representatives from such varied quarters as the Gaullist, Jacques Soustelle, the Radical, Maurice Bourgès-Manoury, the Socialist Secretary Guy Mollet and the Progressiste, René de Chambrun, called for broadening of the Agency's powers. The Mouvement Républicain Populaire declared that it would vote in favour of the WEU only on condition that arms production was unified. While paying lip service to European cooperation, all the speakers emphasized the pool's value as a means of restraining German rearmament.  

After the vote on 30 August the risk that the National Assembly might fail to ratify the Agreements could not be discounted and Mendès France was fully aware of it. The domestic situation was a useful tool for his diplomatic action and the Allies feared that he would exploit it to secure better conditions for France. In fact, after the London conference, the French government made no effort to revise the armaments pool plan in order to render it more palatable to its partners. When the Working Group met in Paris the French encountered firm resistance on the part of both the British and the Benelux representatives. At the Paris Nine Power Conference in late October Mendès France failed to overcome Allied opposition so the Seven confirmed both parts of the London decisions concerning the WEU's powers on the subject of armaments. The Fourth Protocol to the Agreements continued to state that Western European Union would be setting up in Paris an Agency for Armaments Control only endowed with control powers over existing arms stocks over Continental Europe. The proposed Standardization and Production Pool was further deferred for discussion at an ad hoc conference scheduled to take place in Paris on 17 January 1955. Halfway lay the French Assembly's ratification of the Paris Accords. 

By way of contrast with the inertia displayed on the armaments pool issue, in preparing for the Paris conference the Quai d'Orsay energetically pushed forward on bilateral relations with Germany.

On 6, 7 and 12 October, Parodi presided over meetings where Colonel Bernard Duperier, the Secretary of State for the Air and Charles Cristofini, Programmes Director at the Ministry of Defence, expounded upon studies of the prospects for Franco-German cooperation in aircraft and other arms manufacture. In a comparative study of aircraft industries in the four major Western countries sent to Mendès France on 15 October, Duperier stigmatized the "ultra-nationalistic commercial

31. On this point in particular G.-H. SOUTOU, "La France".
32. The Allies however recognized that Mendès France did not try to link the plan to the ratification, e.g. National Archives, Washington (hereafter NARA), RG59, 3114, 740.5/1-2455, Conant (Bonn), no.2105, 24 January 1955.
33. DDF, 1954, Annexes, Procès-verbal of the Paris Conference. Initially, the opening date for the ad hoc conference was 1 December 1954, PRO: FO 1086/184, NPC/Paris-D/11, 21 October 1954.
policy" of Britain, which preferred a worldwide mercantile policy instead of joining in European integration. He set the agenda for a union of Europe's industries.

"Ce projet – he conceded – ne peut malheureusement pas se réaliser en un seul stade. Il y a lieu, croyons-nous, d'unir pour commencer les industries françaises, allemandes et italiennes, auxquelles il sera ensuite possible de faire s'adjoindre les industries belges, hollandaises, suédoises et espagnoles. A cette union seulement, il est possible d'envisager l'adhésion de l'Angleterre qui, en maintenant sa position extérieure, se trouverait dans une position extrêmement mauvaise. Ainsi se trouverait enfin réalisée l'industrie aéronautique européenne complète, vers laquelle nous tendons".35

On 8 October Adenauer accepted an invitation for German military experts to go to France to visit a display devoted to French aircraft production. Subsequently Parodi endorsed Cristofini's suggestion that weapons for the army be put on display as well. Finally, the French upgraded the whole exercise which it was hoped could be organized before Adenauer's visit to Paris for the Nine Power conference. It would be transformed from a simple display of French products into an occasion for in depth discussion of how to develop Franco-German technical cooperation.36

Foreign Ministry zeal in the field of armaments did not occur in isolation but rather as part of an ongoing movement towards a Franco-German entente, which was to be sealed in October at the Adenauer-Mendès France meeting on the Saar question. The meeting, held in the suburb of La-Celle-Saint-Cloud the day before the opening of the Paris Conference, was in fact a turning point in bilateral relations. The conversations touched upon the topics singled out in previous months at the French Foreign Ministry as suitable for fruitful long-term cooperation. The two leaders settled the Saar question, signed minor but symbolic agreements on cultural cooperation, war graves and deportation victims and set the scene for far-reaching economic relations.

They agreed upon an increase of French agricultural exports to Germany, the creation of canals along the Moselle, the setting up of a Franco-German Economic Committee specially designed to foster, as the official joint declaration put it, "(...)la réalisation des plans élaborés, parfois depuis plusieurs années, par des groupements économiques des deux côtés du Rhin en vue d'une étroite collaboration des capitaux, des techniques et de l'industrie(...)" in Europe and overseas.37

So France's German policy moved away from military security to the economic sphere. Rapprochement with Bonn corresponded with Mendès France's prior aim which was to put right France's economic situation. In the summer of 1954, while he concentrated upon disentangling France from Indochina and the EDC the Minister of Finance, Edgar Faure, had been sharpening the teeth of economic measures launched in the spring and which centred upon tight budgets and eco-

35. AMAE Wormser, 86, Bernard Duperier, Note sur les situations respectives des industries aéronautiques françaises et allemandes, to Mendès France, Parodi, Charpentier, 15 October 1954. He argued that, after having recovered in London the right to built air craft on her territory, Germany would abandon plans for North Africa, and admitted that owing to infrastructures and labour conditions, plans for a big military industrial pole there were unrealistic.
nomic expansion led by exports. The French agricultural surplus was growing into an economic and political problem and the government was determined to find markets for it. In Mendès France's policy, however, economic balance was not an end in itself but aimed rather at re-establishing his country as an influential and independent force in the West while rendering credible France's role as one of the Big Four. Defence could hardly be Mendès France's choice for cooperation with Bonn or indeed with any other country since he believed that military power and nuclear status were political tools for France's individual role in the world arena. 38

Suggestions from the Ministry of Defence to use the armaments agency to pool European financial and technical resources and foster France's accession to nuclear status "alone or in a community" were not retained 39 so the French premier's genuine interest and rational appreciation of relations with Bonn did not obliterate the ambiguity of his attitude towards Germany.

It was complemented and partly explained by an equally opaque attitude towards Moscow and East-West relations. Convinced that the post-Stalin Soviet leadership might be driven to accept realistic, if not cordial, relations with the West based on mutual interest he considered German rearmament to be a preliminary step in this direction. So it was that, speaking before the General Assembly of the United Nations on 22 November, he proposed that the East European countries adopt the WEU rules of control and publicity concerning weapons stockpiles which could then become part of a joint system of control and disarmament in Europe. Eventually, in early January 1955, he invited the heads of government of Moscow, London and Washington to meet together at a four-power European security summit.40

**European Political and Economic Manoeuvres**

Until the meeting at La-Celle-Saint-Cloud, the other European governments and the US government mainly regarded – and severely criticized – the armaments pool as a French tool for discriminating against Germany and furthering French industrial interests. This perception changed subsequently.

The shadow of a cartel between French and German heavy industry had begun to worry Italian economic and political circles. It was the Ministry for Industry and Commerce that first sounded the alarm. Since external, i.e. American financial participation in the pool's operations was not allowed Italy would be confined, by rea-

son of her financial weakness, to a subordinate position. This, together with national specialization and technical backwardness would destroy Italian heavy industry. Moreover, the industrialization of French North Africa would create competition for Italian products in the Mediterranean. The Ministry strongly urged that if the government did decide, for political reasons, to support the French plan it should defend national economic interests by requesting that American financial contributions be admitted and that bilateral economic links with the United States be allowed as well. Existing production capabilities should be fully exploited before creating new capacity while Southern Italy and the Italian islands should be considered for industrial development "before or at least at the same time" as French North Africa.41 Italian industrialists, meeting on 13 November in Milan to discuss the case of the threatened Franco-German cartel, urged the Government to insert Italy into the Franco-German system and decided to seek understandings with French and German industrialists.42

The Foreign Ministry added to the economic worries. It considered that exclusion from a Paris-Bonn axis would be as dangerous as getting involved in a French autonomist manoeuvre which would annoy the United States. Hence, it sought a broad discussion of Franco-Italian relations with Mendès France, which was scheduled for January 1955.43

Instructions sent to Quaroni on 3 December recommended a balanced approach which, in an attempt to protect Italy's European image by proposing that the project's integration features be reinforced, would cautiously establish a three-power dialogue while firmly thrusting to the fore Italy's economic demands and requests for political equality.44 With peculiar realism and a sceptical view of French politics, Quaroni implemented the instructions.45

The Franco-German economic rapprochement antagonized London as well. Since late 1953, the British government had been looking with benevolence on the purposefulness deployed by French governments in confronting the country's economic problems. It had applauded the launching of the Second Modernization and Equipment Plan, congratulated Edgar Faure's initial achievements and praised Mendès France's economic realism.

42. ASMAE, Parigi, 1955, b.55, fasc. Patto di Bruxelles..., Nota, All.B.
However, Britain was keen to retain her economic leadership in Europe, to secure implementation of the liberalization programme under the aegis of the OECD and the GATT and prevent the continental countries shying away from the so-called "Collective Approach to Freer Trade and Currencies", engineered in late 1952 to protect Britain's world role at the centre of the sterling area. France was considered a major obstacle on the way towards economic liberalization in Europe. London had been closely watching the turn taken by French economic policy since the beginning of 1954 and in the autumn praise for efforts in the direction of financial rigour had gradually been giving way to some degree of excitement not far short of alarm. Although the agreement on French agricultural supplies to Germany, agreed upon at la Celle-Saint-Cloud, had been intended to come into force after the liberalization of 80% of both countries' external commerce, the authorities in London suspected that protectionist and bilateral tendencies in France and Germany underlay a thin veneer of free trade rhetoric. Although the agreement secured a market for French agricultural products in Germany only, the Treasury was convinced that Germany would want "one for one" as it was put and expected that France would increase her imports of German engineering goods, especially cars and tractors, thus reducing Britain's share of the French market. In early December Britain expressed her worries to the French. The somewhat rough response she received as well as derogatory comments by Mendès France about minor European countries' role on the Continent painted a bleak future.

In Germany, after the universal uproar about France's almost avowed discriminatory aims at the London Conference, positions became more differentiated. The top political authorities showed varying degrees of hostility to the plan. Seen through French eyes, the contest was between advocates of the dogmatic and unthinking free market liberalism of the Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard, and other groups which were ready at least to listen to French schemes. The free marketers would not allow armaments production its own peculiarities, resisted the rebirth of a national armaments industry and relied on continuing American supplies. The groups who were prepared to listen, among whom the French listed Adenauer, the Auswärtiges Amt and, to a certain extent, the so-called Amt Blank, the future Defence Ministry, were either considering political motives for an entente with France or acknowledged that armaments, as industrial goods, were indeed peculiar while seeing defence needs as unrelated to economic priorities.

On the other hand, at non-governmental level, the prospect of Franco-German cooperation in armaments production called forth different reactions in the various

47. PRO: FO 371/109448.
48. See PRO: FO 371/109448, CF 11318/10, E.W. Meiklereid (Paris) 6 December 1954; in late December Mendès France roughly declared that if the Benelux did not want to take part, the Armaments Pool could well become a Franco-Italo-German enterprise.
sections of Germany's enormously articulate and influential industry whose attitude was, of course, crucial to the future of any Franco-German cooperation.

And yet the Joint Economic Committee on which sat all the large organizations representing economic groups shared and supported Erhard's position and dismissed the armaments pool as a typical product of French "dirigisme". This was mainly under the influence of the powerful Bund der Deutschen Industrie (BDI) which had set up a commission to deal with the French plan. At meetings with French and Italian partners in December 1954 the BDI underwrote such general aims as European standardization and the coordination and rationalization of production but refused any shift towards centralized control, maintaining that such aims should be implemented outside any supranational scheme, in free market regimes and through direct relations among firms, although the lobby argued in favour of a clearing house for armaments production.50

The French plan enhanced contacts between German and French industrialists. The Conseil National du Patronat Français was itself mildly enthusiastic at the prospect of the new outburst of regulations and centralized control which the armaments pool would produce. But French firms were keen to secure markets, to protect their leading position in fields from which their German competitors had been excluded since the end of the war and to develop links with German firms, so the BDI's display of interest did not fall on deaf ears. The aircraft industry, in particular, was an area suitable for rapid entente. Short of capital and with plant still not rebuilt after the war some German aircraft firms, among whom were well-known prewar names such as Dornier, Messerschmitt and Heinkel were casting about for ways of restarting their production so were all keen to cooperate with French aircraft firms which had been successfully re-started after the wartime halt to production and research but were still far behind the British and Americans. They readily appreciated the advantages of coordinated production and division of labour as well as a measure of state intervention and welcomed the initiative taken by M. Jarry, President of the Association française des Ingénieurs et Techniciens de l'Aéronautique (AFITA). After organizing in Paris, in December 1954, a congress of European aeronautical technicians and producers M. Jarry accepted, early in January, an invitation by the Deutsche Aeronautische Gesellschaft (DAG) to attend the Association's General Assembly in Düsseldorf. There, in front of representatives of federal and local ministries, the Amt Blank and various aircraft industry unions he proposed a quick move towards the development of an exclusive bilateral Franco-German partnership in aircraft manufacture.51


50. E.g. ibidem. The attitude of industrial circles was regularly monitored by Coignard Winter to Summer 1954; details about German attitudes and actions in this article are mainly drawn from his dispatches to Wormser, 87.
The proposal was well received and not only by German industrialists who made it clear that, provided cooperation was strictly non discriminatory, they were keen to join in but also by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs. The officer in charge of Aeronautical Affairs, Sacher, was reported in France to be actively fostering the case for Franco-German joint action at local government level, especially in Rhineland Westphalia. In the end, while the German delegation was taking part in the WEU working group conversations, which had opened on 19 January, he also travelled to Paris.52

Towards the Paris Conference

The debate on the Paris Agreements at the French National Assembly was scheduled for the end of December 1954. As the moment for it drew near tension was high both in France and the other Western capitals. A few days before it opened Foster Dulles made his contribution to ratification in the form of two letters to the French government. The first promised "strict coordination" between the United States officers and the WEU Armaments Agency, the second confirmed the US President's determination to keep American forces in Europe. The National Assembly's debate began on 20 December. In the course of it the rapporteurs of the Committees for Foreign Affairs, General Pierre Billotte, for Defence, Vincent Badie, and for Industrial Production, Pierre-Olivier Lapie, all criticized the Agency's limited powers.53 Nonetheless, despite scant enthusiasm in European and Gaullist circles, the Assembly ratified the Agreements. Before the last step, ratification by the Conseil de la République, lay the Paris appointment.

On 5 January, the French government circulated to WEU members and the American government a note which was meant to serve as the basis for the negotiations due to open on 17 January.54 It divided the build-up of the Armaments Pool into two stages, a provisional one and a permanent one. During the first period the Pool was to promote standardization and joint production on a voluntary basis. A Military Standardization Committee composed of military personnel and technici-
ans was to perform the first task while an Armaments Production Committee was to establish programmes and place orders for the materials approved by the Standardization Committee. From 1 January 1957 onwards the permanent regime was to come into effect automatically and the Pool

"(...)aurait à établir pour tous les pays membres des programmes d’ensemble de production coordonnée d’armements en s’efforçant de pousser la standardisation aussi loin que possible, et elle définirait les plans d’investissements correspondant aux fabrications à exécuter. D’autre part elle assurerait l’exécution des programmes soit directement en passant elle-même les commandes pour le compte des Gouvernements, soit en autorisant les commandes passées par les Gouvernements."

Under the definitive regime, both the WEU Council of Ministers and the Permanent Committee – which would have meanwhile replaced the two committees of the provisional period – were to reach decisions on the basis of a two thirds majority, except on standardization, where unanimity would be required. Decisions would be binding on all members and production programmes would be extended to cover all production for the forces assigned to NATO. But the Pool would review only production for non-NATO national forces and for export. Finally, the French aired an even more far-reaching hypothesis to the effect that the permanent committee of national representatives and the director could both be replaced by an independent board of commissioners, appointed by the Council of Ministers reaching its decisions by simple majority.55

The draft did not drop any of the aims outlined in London, the only change being insertion of the provisional regime which delayed implementation until January 1957. The return to a supranational scheme could be explained as a response to Benelux criticism of the ambiguous nature of the Pool, as well as a concession to pro-European opinion. But it is hard to believe that the French government thought this suggestion would be accepted, especially as it was putting forward a supranational concept while eliminating the special status which the London draft accorded to Britain. At the same time, the clauses concerning production for non-NATO-forces and for export barely concealed the aim of protecting France’s special status.

In the fortnight before the meeting of the working group diplomatic activity flourished. The Italian government was alone in applauding the French draft.

As an official of the Italian Foreign Ministry explained to an American colleague, Rome felt virtually compelled to support any initiative that would foster European integration.56 In fact, Italy’s position was developing along lines set out in advance. During Mendès France’s visit to Rome from 10 to 13 January President Scelba and Foreign Minister Martino approached the broad question of Italy’s place in Europe and sought guarantees regarding her association with Franco-German undertakings. Finally, they confirmed their reservations to the effect that the pool arrangement should not take away from Italy any production which might other-

56. NA, RG 59, 3113, Memorandum of Conversation, January 11, 1955.
wise come to her, that it should not prejudice "OSP" or other military arrangements with the United States. Likewise, the Italian representatives rejected discrimination against Germany or holding up the development of the Coal and Steel Community.

On his way back from Rome to Paris, the French Premier met Adenauer at Baden-Baden. He emphatically stressed the tentative character of the 3 January draft and French readiness to delay, soften or otherwise change its terms. Adenauer ostensibly appreciated the French initiative, he had in hand a counter memorandum and promised that Ludwig Erhard would personally submit it to the Paris conference. Even though Adenauer minimized objections, lest they hold up ratification of the Paris Agreements, he and his main colleagues in the government remained unwilling to yield to French pressures. Despite their differences, Blank, Ludwig Erhard and Walter Hallstein, Secretary of State in the Auswärtiges Amt, supported Adenauer's refusal of any arrangement which would exclude the Benelux countries and stress the inconsistency between national control over troops and budgets and international control over armaments production – a joint budget appeared to them to be a necessary complement.

The supposed victims of the three-power entente vocally stigmatized the plan. Spaak severely attacked the French. Since September he had been encouraging studies by the Belgian administration for relaunching integration in the economic field. While he was possibly influenced by a vague distrust of Mendès France, he consistently stuck to the position which Belgium had assumed in the autumn of 1951 during the EDC negotiations when Van Zeeland had joined forces with his Dutch and Luxembourg colleagues in order to curb the major powers' hegemony. Whilst he recognised the theoretical value of an armaments pool, he maintained that the project was unworkable and unacceptable to the United Kingdom and Germany. Belgian, as well as Dutch, industrial circles supported their governments' objections to the pool.

60. In autumn 1951 the Foreign Ministers of the Benelux had agreed to resist the major powers' attempts to impose upon them a settlement of the Defence Community which underplayed their role. American pressures finally won them over; see e.g. E. FURSDON, European Defence Community, pp. 130-132.
Once again, the more outspoken opposition came from Beyen. Having no hope of attracting the British into a supranational system by slowing the integration process and fearing that removal of the clauses granting Britain special status would jeopardize the freshly established bonds between Britain and the Six he questioned the core of Mendès France's project, id est the attempt to turn the inter-governmental cooperation of the Brussels Pact into more binding integration. He also criticized the project on political and economic grounds. The provisional period appeared to him unnecessarily to duplicate NATO functions and revived his old suspicions about French ambitions to develop a European structure that would rival NATO. Since Dutch heavy industry was working to a great extent for the Defence Ministry it risked having its hands tied. Furthermore, Dutch commercial partners such as Sweden and Switzerland would remain outside the Six.62

British attitudes confirmed Dutch worries. Although the press praised the French initiative and René Massigli was able to write to the Quai d'Orsay that the Defence Minister, Harold Macmillan, and Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, Permanent Under-secretary at the Foreign Office, had assured him that the plan was being carefully examined 63 Whitehall characterized it as "irrealistic and unpractical" and did not waste time in burying it.

Nevertheless, the British shared the common concern that its abrupt dismissal might affect ratification of the Paris Agreement by the French Conseil de la République. Thus, as early as 10 January, they focused on working out a formula to "kill it with kindness". As an American diplomat reported to the State Department,

"(...) (the) Foreign Office considers timing of any such recommendation (to be a) critical factor. It should be proposed after it becomes clear to arms pool working group members (including, it is hoped, French) that French proposals are unworkable, but before (the) negotiations have dragged on so long that French public believes they have actually failed". 64

The American administration had kept a low official profile throughout the affair. Mendès France's policies in the summer of 1954 had sown deep and lasting distrust in the mind of John Foster Dulles, who blamed Mendès France for the EDC defeat and for exciting deep-rooted French neutralism. In the tense atmosphere at the London and Paris conferences the United States had interpreted the French plan as merely an attempt to delay settlement of the crisis and to maintain controls on German rearmament. In London Dulles, who shared Erhard's mistrust of the somewhat "New Deal" aspects of the pool proposal, had severely criticized it for discriminating against Germany.65 He also coldly rejected French requests for

63. AMRE, série Papiers d'agents, 217 René Massigli, 80, tel. R. Massigli, no. 122-123, 11 January 1955 and no.139-141, 12 January 1955; R. MASSIGLI, Comédie, p. 492.
channelling American aid through the Brussels Pact. In Paris, Dulles vaguely agreed to a cover up.

The Armaments Control Agency was to receive information regarding the levels of United States "end items aid" in connection with its function of controlling arms stocks, while any further question of distribution or channelling of aid would be deferred to the Paris conference in January.\(^66\)

In the wake of the French note of 3 January American diplomacy stuck to the position adopted after the EDC defeat, namely, that European institutions and their powers should be exclusively in the hands of the Europeans themselves. On these grounds the State Department turned down moderate French requests for "lobbying" the Armaments Pool \(^67\) and did not send representatives to the Paris Conference. Reality, however, was slightly different. All the European governments anxiously inquired about the American position and kept the State Department constantly informed. Dulles was aware of European reservations regarding the French project and shared many of the worries of those in Europe who opposed it. So although the EDC experience restrained Dulles from openly taking part, Washington's diplomacy was able to inspire "sabotage" of the Pool. In the guidelines sent to the Paris Embassy before the opening of the conference, the State Department deprecated the duplication of NATO functions in the provisional period and doubted whether France's partners could accept the permanent regime. Washington encouraged Erhard's free trade concepts rather than the suspect French dirigism but the State Department cautioned the European governments to avoid an open break at the Conference. As a way out, it suggested either revising the French proposal by eliminating the objectionable features of the first stage and virtually abolishing the second one, or supporting the British plan for absorbing European standardization and coordinating production in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.\(^68\)

Moving forward – The WEU Working Group's Paris Conference

Although the fate of the Armaments Pool appeared gloomy even before the opening of the conference, on 17 January the NATO deputies of WEU members met at the Palais de Chaillot. A few days before the start of the conference Mendès

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France had resigned as foreign minister to dedicate himself to restoring France's economic situation. Edgar Faure had become the head of the Quai d'Orsay. In early January René Massigli, Ambassador in London and a supporter of European non-supranational policy, was called to replace Alexandre Parodi as Secretary General of the Quai d'Orsay.

The meeting opened with statements of each country's position. Significantly, the Italian representative jockeyed for position and spoke first, thus avoiding having to deal with counter proposals. The Dutch and Belgians confirmed their criticisms of the French proposal of 3 January. As Adenauer had promised Erhard headed the German delegation while Blank was his first technical adviser. Erhard submitted the German memorandum which welcomed the standardization and rationalization of armaments production but rejected supranational dirigism, discrimination, or any special status for armaments production. Only a few days later, the atmosphere of the conference was described as follows by a member of the American Embassy.

"No one has, of course, openly formulated at (the) conference (the) tactic of dragging out discussions and avoiding major disagreements. Hence there is a certain air of unreality. In (an) atmosphere of mutual exchange of bouquets, (the) real objectives remain unstated. Tempo so far has been that of a stately pavane, with each delegation going through (the) set motions. Only (the) Dutch and (the) Germans have gotten slightly out of step, but this did not seriously interfere with (the) basic rhythm.(...) Such queasiness as exists arises largely from (the) fact that no one can be quite sure just who is fooling who, or whether anybody is being fooled at all. (The) hope of (the) members of (the) conference apparently is that at least the members of the Council of the Republic will be fooled, to whom an Armaments Pool with teeth is important, either as a symbol of supra-nationality or as an instrument of further control of (the) Germans."72

The meeting's first round ended on 29 January with the decision to establish two sub-groups on standardization and production which was interpreted in some quarters as a way to slow down negotiations until after the debate in the Conseil de la République. Upon leaving Paris on 2 February, Erhard declared that the negotiations on armaments had lost their political content and would, in fact, continue for a long time owing to their technical complexity without disrupting the course of the Paris Agreements.74

70. According to Coignard, on the eve of the conference Blank delivered to Adenauer and Erhard a memorandum urging moderation, in order to reach agreement rapidly and start armaments production: AMAE, Wormser, 87, Note d'information, no.231/HC/OMS/COM/S, 4 February 1955.
73. E.g. NA, RG59, 3114, 740.5/2-355, tel. Dumbrow (Rome), no.2809, 3 February 1955.
74. AMRE, Wormser, 87, Haut Commissariat de la République française en Allemagne, Note d'information sur certaines réactions allemandes à propos des négociations sur un pool des armements, Coblenze, 4 February 1955, no.231/HC/OMS/COM/S.
By early February the French delegation acknowledged the difficulties assailing the negotiations under way. However, it found reason for satisfaction in the development of the Franco-German partnership. In response to a German initiative a bilateral Franco-German dialogue had been started up within the conference. Although no change of heart on supranationalism was forthcoming the French delegate, Pierre Baraduc, was confident that the technical reasons behind the French proposals in the shape of the need for large-scale production, the peculiarity of armaments production etc. would become clear as discussions went ahead in the technical sub-groups and that Erhard's "ideological" opposition to regulation would weaken. In addition to the Paris meetings contacts fanned out at both official and private level on the subject of economic cooperation. Discussions about cooperation between French and German aircraft firms had progressed too. To what extent did Germany's Economics ministry encourage it in order to further the German position in the negotiations and offer a sop to French parliamentary and public opinion with an eye to the debate within the Conseil de la République? In early March, François Poncet reported upon Erhard's and Sacher's disillusionment with the initial approach, their criticism of the inconsistency of French projects for joint enterprises in Africa and the continuing attempt to manipulate the principle of the division of labour in order to leave key sectors of production to France. However, the seeds for economic cooperation sown in the autumn of 1954 were germinating. And so it came to pass that, by the spring of 1955 the Paris conversations were being accompanied by a steady flow of other initiatives.

The Centre d'études de politique étrangère was once more actively involved and its Comité d'études franco-allemandes hosted meetings of representatives of both countries' industrial unions. From Germany, French officers dispatched accounts of ideas and initiatives in German industrial and financial circles, among them plans for the joint development of France's overseas territories which ranked first. German industry's sudden awareness of the charms of international collaboration whose powerful and overwhelming influence on Europe's renaissance in 1955 can here be hinted at only indirectly was not confined to France. Neither were the French government and industrialists alone in Europe in their view of just how profitable Germany's fully restored market would be and how necessary it was to seek an accommodation with German industry. What the French did was to stress the value of their plan for joint production which stood in sharp contrast to, for

75. In his report Baraduc made a reference to a suggestion advanced at the beginning of the conference by the Benelux ministers to base the armaments agency on the ECSC, it was not followed up: AMAE, Wormser, 24, P. Baraduc, 28 February 1955, Annexe B, Note remise le 4 février au Président Edgar Faure.
77. AMAE, Wormser, 86, A. François Poncet (Bad Godesberg), no. 704, 5 March 1955.
78. AMAE, Wormser, 87, no.622 HC/OMS/COM/S, Note d'information, 26 March 1955; Coignard remarked that "en fin de compte les Allemands paraissent estimer que le temps des promesses et des idées générales est révolu, et attendent que leur soit présenté un plan précis, assorti de garanties véritables."
example, the almost offensive British offers to German industry to manufacture under licence. In the end, on 15 April, the BDI submitted a new counter proposal to the armaments pool plan. They watered down the fiercely free market philosophy of earlier positions and called for "harmonization of programmes" leading gradually to specialization in armaments manufacture while recommending a clearing house in order to bring about balance in the share out of orders among the West European countries. The memorandum also suggested new institutional solutions, namely, the establishment in NATO of a regional sub-committee for the Six and in the WEU a Coordinating Committee to deal with specialization and the division of labour.79

What actually happened was that the French joined in the general tendency to slow down the Paris negotiations. Their commitment to the pool faded. One delegate indicated that the "provisional" period was now seen as a period of probation which would be abandoned if the results were not positive. The Secretary General himself was reported to be in tacit support of avoiding any breakdown prior to the debate within the Conseil de la République. In fact, the only part of the original proposals to which Paris remained strongly and actively committed was the role of the WEU in the distribution of external armaments supplies. This meant that Mendès France kept asking the Americans to channel military aid through the WEU but was unsuccessful.80 On 5 February the government of Mendès France fell. He was to be replaced, but not until 23 February, by Edgar Faure. The new Cabinet included leading figures in the supranational school, Antoine Pinay at the Quai d'Orsay, Robert Schuman, Garde des Sceaux, Pierre-Henri Teitgen and Pierre Pfimlin together with Gaullist ministers. In his inaugural address, Faure spoke at length on European subjects but did not mention the armaments pool.81

Unsurprisingly, in early February, the British government decided the time was ripe for it to intervene and Sir Christopher Steel submitted British counter proposals. They expunged supranational features and proposed only a regime of voluntary cooperation similar to the provisional regime in the French draft, to be complemented only by close association between the WEU organs and NATO's standardization agency. The British proposals recommended the establishment of a permanent committee and two sub-committees on standardization and the coordination of production, to be based in Paris, and work on a voluntary basis. Joint production agreements could include all or some WEU members as well as non WEU states.82

81. L'Année politique, 1955; see also Faure's memoirs, E. FAURE, Mémoires II. Si tel doit être mon destin ce soir..., Paris 1984; in his memoirs he does not even mention the Paris conference and ignores the French paternity of the Armaments Pool's project, see p. 148.
82. NA, RG59, 3114, 740.5/2-255, tel. Aldrich (London), no.3414, 2 February 1955.
As soon as the Faure government was in place Baraduc called for a radical rethink of French policy in the working group conversations. Arguing that the criticisms of France’s partners against the plan were shared in France herself, he suggested two possible courses, namely, to join in the British counter proposal the aspirations of which he implicitly underwrote, or to formulate new proposals for a genuine supranational body, excluding Britain and possibly in liaison with the ECSC. What really mattered, however, was the prospect for Franco-German entente and he concluded as follows:

"(...)que le Gouvernement s'oriente dans l'une ou dans l'autre voie, il semble indispensable que les contacts les plus étroits soient maintenus et développés avec le Gouvernement Fédéral, ses services et ses experts. La délégation s'y est employée. Des contacts ont été également pris par les industriels intéressés des deux pays, mais il y aurait le plus grand avantage à ce que les conversations entre les services de l'AMT Blank et ceux de notre Défense Nationale, très heureusement engagés en octobre et depuis lors interrompus, soient repris et activement poussés en liaison avec les industries intéressées."83

Coignard emphatically voiced the same opinion. In detailed reports monitoring initiatives and opinions in Germany's industrial and ministerial circles he detected a lasting and unyielding rejection of supranational solutions and centralizing measures at one and the same time as increasing interest in international cooperation and industrial investment in the French overseas territories and blooming contacts between French and German firms. Coignard confirmed that a loose and flexible arrangement, similar to the one governing standardization activities in the Atlantic Alliance, would foster the French task. The studies and recommendations produced by the Agency in which all members would participate should be separate from implementation of the recommendations which would remain voluntary. Any further development should be entrusted to the WEU Council of Ministers.84

When the working group meetings started up again discussions focused on the British counter proposals. Supranationalism was not on the agenda.

Towards a new European Order

In mid March the Conseil de la République started debating the Paris Agreements. During the session in the Foreign Affairs Committee Pinay faced considerable criticism. Four amendments were proposed – the most risky stemmed from the Commission on Industrial Production – all asking to postpone ratification until agreement on the subject of the Agency had been reached.85

84. DDF, 1955, no.127, Coignard (Coblence) to F. Seydoux, March 9, 1955, pp. 303-308.
In response the Foreign Minister consistently sought to convince Washington about channelling armaments flows through the WEU organs, but these attempts were once again foiled.86

The final debate began in council on 23 March. The amendments were withdrawn following Faure's declaration confirming the government's commitment to establish an armaments pool with a common budget and real powers in the fields of research, production and the distribution of foreign aid.87 On 28 March the Council ratified the Paris Agreements and the path was clear for German rearmament.

The WEU working group continued to meet in Paris until the end of April. Its first report endorsed the principle of non-compulsory coordination of production and the least possible independence for the WEU from the NATO Standardization Agency. At its first session, on 7 May, the WEU Council approved the working group's report and established the Standing Armaments Committee (SAC) whose task it defined as "promoting cooperation". The Committee was to work in close contact with NATO and the national representatives on the Committee were the same who served on the NATO standardization group so any attempt to endow the WEU with effective powers in armaments production would be condemned to fail. Armaments production remained a national concern and NATO retained the competence for standardization and armaments cooperation.88

Charles Cristofini was appointed to head the Committee and assume the functions of WEU Assistant Secretary General. There was no doubt that he would seek to use Agency powers to satisfy the aims he had pursued in the autumn of 1954 when setting up relations with the German military authorities and fostering the use of French weaponry by the Continent's armed forces. However, so limited was the range of action of the Commissariat and so consistent the stone walling by his partners – Britain above all –, Belgian and Dutch fears that he might attempt to broaden the Commissariat's activities and develop "dangerous" bonds with the WEU Armaments Control Agency,89 appear somewhat excessive.

And indeed Paris worries about future German policy had not vanished entirely. For some time Pinay had been nurturing the idea of increasing the powers and functions of the WEU. It must be possible to "recreate some parts of the EDC within the framework of the WEU" to bind Germany to Western Europe through economic and military agreements negotiated under the provisions of the seven power treaty.90 By the spring of 1955, however, the dual track for France's German policy had been laid. The Adenauer-Pinay meeting in the spring of 1955 confirmed the case for Franco-German cooperation in armaments production. After the Four

88. Low NATO's effectiveness in this field had already been recognized in 1953. The Finebel group had been established to foster standardization among continental armies.
89. Such worries were reported to the US authorities, see NA, RG59, 3118, 740.5/5-2355, 23 May 1955; 3119, 740.5/6-655, 6 June 1955.
Power Geneva conference in July had shown that the scope for negotiation with 
Russia was very slight, no obstacles stood in the way of cooperation rapidly unfol-
ding within the comprehensive context established at the Messina meeting of the 
Six.

Conclusions

The history of the aborted project for an Armaments Pool reveals forces and inte-
rests moving behind the diplomatic scene of the European integration process. 
Indeed, at first sight, those who are familiar with the story of the European Defence 
Community will find it difficult to escape feelings of *déjà vu*. Deeper analysis, 
however, makes it clear that such forces, interests and reasoning belong to a suc-
cessive phase of West European history.

After the London conference in October 1954 had left no doubt that France 
could not overcome the general opposition to a move towards supranational control 
over armaments production in Western Europe, the armaments agency played a 
dual role in French policy. Initially and until March 1955 the French leaders kept it 
on the agenda for domestic consumption. Hereby they stuck to extremist positions 
that were clearly unacceptable for their partners, putting forward supranationalism 
as the extreme guarantee against the German "threat" and involving renowned 
European activists such as Lapie. On the international plane, however, the plan 
and the Paris negotiations helped foster the move towards *de facto* integration of 
French and German armaments production which it had not been possible to 
impose by treaty. When Mendès France visited Adenauer at Baden-Baden in early 
January, on the eve of the *ad hoc* conference, he readily conceded that what really 
mattered was not the agency itself but rather economic cooperation the case for 
which should be stressed.

By the time the WEU came into life the spectre of a sudden, massive and 
uncontrolled shift of Germany's industrial capacity towards armaments production 
had become a receding nightmare in Paris. Ironically, in a few weeks' time, the 
French were to start showing a measure of impatience at Germany's reluctance to 
embark upon armaments production.

Unsurprisingly all the West European countries, strongly backed by Washington 
and seconded by London, resisted what they considered to be a naked French 
ttempt to secure a privileged position in armaments production through diplo-
matic means or technical devices. Germany successfully fought her battle for equality. 
Britain defended not just her insularity but above all her commercial interests while 
Italy and the Benelux escaped being overwhelmed by the Franco-German initia-
tive. The match was simply postponed.

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BÖHLAU VERLAG WIEN KÖLN WEIMAR
The Bomb and Europe
Britain, France, and the EEC Entry Negotiations
1961-1963

Wolfram Kaiser

"De Gaulle is trying to dominate Europe", a downcast Macmillan wrote in his diary at the end of January 1963. "It is the end – or at least a temporary bar – to everything for which I have worked for many years (...). All our policies at home and abroad are in ruins."1 A fortnight earlier the British Prime Minister's residual hopes for a European settlement had been dashed when de Gaulle finally rejected Britain's application to join the European Economic Community (EEC), issuing his harshly worded veto during the weekly press conference at the Elysée. Answering a question from a journalist, the French President suggested that Britain was not yet fit to join the Community because her political interests, economic needs and cultural traditions were still incompatible with those of the core continental European countries. "It is predictable", the French President concluded with a view to an enlarged Community, "that the cohesion of all its members (...) would not last for very long and that, in fact, it would seem like a colossal Atlantic community under American dependence and direction, and that is not at all what France wanted to do and is doing, which is a strictly European construction."2

De Gaulle's veto abruptly ended the protracted entry negotiations in Brussels which followed the British decision of July 1961 to apply for membership, but which only began in earnest in Spring 1962 after the Six had agreed on the future shape of a large section of their Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). These negotiations were only very superficially concerned primarily with transitional periods for British horticulture or special arrangements for New Zealand butter. Although very substantial economic interests were at stake, particularly in respect of the future of British agriculture and of the European Economic Community's trading relationships with the countries of the Commonwealth, the British government's internal deliberations both before and during the negotiations show that it was prepared to pay a high economic price for securing the expected political benefits of being in the "inner circles of the Six".3 At the same time, it was always likely that for de Gaulle the economic benefits which the French could negotiate in Brussels would not suffice. In order to bring the General around to accepting British membership of an enlarged Community, which could be expected to be substantially less French in character, political incentives were needed. From the very beginning

3. PRO CAB 129/102/1/07 (6 July 1960). For the reasoning behind the decision to apply for EEC membership see W. KAISER, "To join, or not to join: the «Appeasement» policy of Britain's first EEC application", in: B. BRIVATI and H. JONES (eds.), From Reconstruction to Integration. Britain and Europe since 1945, Leicester 1993, pp. 144-156.

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the decisive question was thus whether Britain and France would be able to reach an informal understanding about a mutually advantageous division of political leadership within Western Europe as well as about the future direction of European integration and the Community's role in the world.

Most interpretations of de Gaulle's foreign and European policy which emphasize its ideological nature have stressed the basic incompatibility between British membership of the EEC and de Gaulle's aim of establishing the Community, strengthened by the envisaged political cooperation between its members, as an economically and politically cohesive organisation led by France which would eventually be capable of acting as a third force on the same level as the United States and the Soviet Union. This would suggest that the successful conclusion of the entry negotiations between 1961 and 1963 was at least unlikely, but perhaps even impossible, whatever concessions the British decided to make. More recently, however, it has been argued that while de Gaulle's policies may have been influenced to some extent by une certaine idée not just of France but also of Europe's role in world affairs, the French President was essentially pragmatic and may have been prepared to contemplate British membership of the EEC in exchange for a British offer for close Anglo-French cooperation in security matters including a "nuclear condominium". Much has been made in this context of the failure by Macmillan and de Gaulle to come to an agreement during their encounter at Rambouillet in December 1962 and of the subsequent Anglo-American summit meeting at Nassau at which, after the cancellation of the Skybolt project, Macmillan successfully persuaded Kennedy to supply Britain with Polaris missiles instead.

This analysis of Anglo-French relations during the entry negotiations is not primarily concerned with the ongoing historiographical debate about de Gaulle's political philosophy and European policy. Instead, in the light of the British government records now available a fresh look will be taken at the bilateral relationship up until the Rambouillet meeting by analysing the evolution of the British perception of de Gaulle's aims and policies, the development of British thinking on a possible package deal with the French President involving either the inclusion of France into a trilateral special relationship with the US or the formation of an Anglo-French deterrent, and finally whether any such arrangement was ever overtly or implicitly offered. It is hoped that this may help to explain why a broader European settlement was not arrived at in 1962/63 and British accession to the EEC delayed by almost ten years.

Only after de Gaulle's rejection of the British plan for a Free Trade Area in December 1958 did the government in London begin to appreciate the full significance of the evolving bilateral alliance between Paris and Bonn for any future attempt to secure British economic and political interests in Western Europe. When Macmillan first started to think about a possible solution to the problem of the economic split of Western Europe into Sixes (EEC) and Sevens (European Free Trade Association – EFTA) at the end of 1959 he wrote to his Foreign Secretary Lloyd that it was the governments of these two countries that had to be influenced in order to reach an economic settlement between the two groups, which at that stage was still British policy. Of the two, because of the Federal Republic's generally weak strategic position in connection with the latent Berlin crisis, the Bonn government was considered to be in a weak position politically. Macmillan thus believed that Adenauer could probably be forced to support British policy over Europe by applying pressure which would range from hinting at the possibility of further sharp cuts in the strength of the British Army on the Rhine (BAOR) to threatening that Britain might even decide to leave NATO if the continental Europeans "declared economic war upon her".

However ill-conceived this policy may have been, de Gaulle's veto against the creation of a Free Trade Area the year before had illustrated that the key to a satisfactory settlement in Europe lay in Paris. Macmillan and the Foreign Office rightly thought that contrary to Adenauer, de Gaulle would be able to negotiate from a position of strength, and that essentially for three reasons. Firstly, his domestic political position was considered to be increasingly secure. In 1958 France had appeared to be on the brink of civil war. Despite the explosive Algerian question, which was only resolved in 1962 with the Evian agreement, the Fifth Republic now already enjoyed a comparatively high degree of internal stability following the introduction of the new constitution in October 1958. This in turn allowed the ever more self-assertive de Gaulle to shift his attention to foreign policy issues, particularly to the idea of a reorganisation of the Atlantic Alliance, which he began to develop with his 1958 memorandum on tripartism, and to the establishment of political cooperation among the Six, whose foreign ministers began to meet regularly at the end of 1959. On both issues, the British government was in a very awkward position, as it expected to lose much of its own influence both in Europe as well as vis-à-vis the United States as a result of any change in the status quo.

Secondly, by 1959 France had experienced several years of comparatively strong economic expansion. The introduction of full convertibility of the Franc at the end of 1958 signalled that the internal economic modernization was progres-

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sing well. Moreover, the EEC's development was beginning to be perceived as an unparalleled success story and French membership as the key to continued economic progress. The arrangements of the Rome Treaties could hardly have been more favourable. Not only had the French secured substantial financial support for their agriculture and overseas territories, the small customs union also provided an apparently ideal route to modernization through limited competition, which was practically largely restricted to Germany and the Benelux countries and would only increase gradually. As a result, the economic status quo in Western Europe seemed entirely satisfactory to the French, particularly after the 1962 CAP agreement. The British government, on the other hand, increasingly felt pressed for time. In London Britain's meagre economic performance during the 1950s was now increasingly beginning to be perceived as the result of deeper structural problems and as a sign of long-term relative decline, which accentuated an underlying nervousness within both government and industry about the potential loss of expanding continental markets to German competition.

The third reason why Macmillan believed that de Gaulle was in a very strong political position over Sixes and Sevens was that within the EEC, French interests were also institutionally ideally secured. The Free Trade Area negotiations had already vividly illustrated the extent to which the EEC's institutional arrangements encouraged the progressive development of a new *esprit communautaire* with a high premium on internal consensus in external affairs. As the other Five, but particularly the Bonn government, would not allow the marginalisation of France, it was clear that neither an economic arrangement between the EEC and EFTA nor British EEC membership could be achieved without explicit French consent.

Thus, as early as October 1959 Macmillan came to the conclusion that if Britain wanted to secure her European economic and political interests, the latter now clearly beginning to dominate the internal debate about Britain's future relationship with the EEC, de Gaulle would have to be bribed into accepting a European settlement.\(^\text{10}\) The Prime Minister became increasingly preoccupied with the idea of a strategic trade-off between Britain's European interests and France's ambitions in the field of defence and security. If unwelcome from the point of view of Britain's NATO policy, de Gaulle's memorandum on tripartism at least seemed to leave this diplomatic avenue to a mutually advantageous overall solution open. Initially, Macmillan hoped that to offer somewhat closer trilateral cooperation among France, the United States and Britain could suffice. More formal mechanisms for consultation, the Foreign Office agreed, would not do much harm if the Americans could be brought to accept the idea.\(^\text{11}\) The much treasured "special relationship" with the US government would continue unimpaired because it was primarily based on the habit of continuous *informal* bilateral consultation on the political and administrative levels. However, when Macmillan appealed to President Eisenhower in a personal letter in February 1960 to agree to the introduction of formalized trilateral talks, this was flatly rejected.\(^\text{12}\) It was still regarded by the US government

\(^{10}\) Macmillan to Lloyd: PRO PREM 11/2679 (22 October 1959).
\(^{11}\) Lloyd to Macmillan: PRO PREM 11/2998 (15 February 1960).
as incompatible with the wider American policy for NATO which did not provide for a special formal status for any partner, including Britain. The Prime Minister later brought up the idea again in his first talks with President Kennedy in April 1961, but by then he had long come to the conclusion that what was really necessary to persuade de Gaulle to accept a European settlement was a substantial nuclear offer which would sharply accelerate the development of the force de frappe.

The French nuclear programme, dating back to the early 1950s, had almost immediately been given top priority by de Gaulle when he came to power in 1958, and the French successfully exploded their first nuclear bomb in February 1960. By that time French interest in nuclear cooperation had shifted to the long-term aim of acquiring a missile capability that would eventually replace the planned Mirage IV bombers. These could not reach their targets without refuelling and would be increasingly vulnerable to modern systems of air defence. However, the missile development presented considerable technical problems, and a purely national programme would also be very costly. The initial French approach to the US government for technical assistance had already been turned down when the French President met the British Prime Minister at Rambouillet in March 1960. This was the first and only occasion until the breakdown of the EEC entry negotiations in January 1963 on which de Gaulle asked Macmillan head-on whether he was interested in a joint Anglo-French missile project. Thereafter a more low-key approach was chosen by the French. In early 1961, for example, British and French experts discussed whether to resume the Blue Streak missile project which the British government had abandoned the year before and which was now envisaged for use as a satellite launcher. During these talks the French left the British in no doubt that they were primarily interested in its potential military use, and more particularly in the American guidance system.

At Rambouillet in March 1960 Macmillan politely declined, referring to the restrictions on bilateral cooperation with third countries under the contractual obligations of the joint Anglo-American nuclear partnership which had been re-established in 1957/58. The same line was taken by the British experts at Strasbourg in early 1961. Macmillan was not interested in Anglo-French nuclear cooperation as such, so long as the bilateral arrangements with the US seemed satisfactory. It was true, of course, that after the cancellation of Blue Streak and the subsequent American promise to supply them with Skybolt air-to-surface missiles for their Vulcan bombers, the British were totally dependent on the US for modern means of delivery, but at least it still seemed justified to speak of an independent deterrent in the sense of national control over its use, and it was also by far the least expensive option available. Macmillan was only prepared to consider a nuclear offer as a clear quid pro

15. Dixon to Foreign Office: PRO PREM 11/3322 (21 January 1961). The then French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville has since hinted in his memoirs that these talks had been intended as a platform for a possible Anglo-French nuclear programme. See M. COUVE de MURVILLE, Une Politique Étrangère 1958-1969, Paris 1971, p. 397.
quo for French concessions over Europe, but until Spring 1961 he was not entirely sure what to ask for, as his government had no agreed European policy. At the time of the Rambouillet meeting of March 1960 and thereafter a new initiative to overcome the economic division into Sixes and Sevens had seemed inadvisable because of the developing confrontation between the EEC and EFTA over the acceleration of tariff reductions. When the two leaders next met for bilateral talks in January 1961 the Prime Minister was still waiting for the outcome of the expert discussions between British and German, Italian and French officials which, he expected, would show that a purely economic arrangement was now neither available nor desirable and that Britain had to apply for full EEC membership.

It must be emphasized that neither de Gaulle nor any French government minister or official ever confirmed explicitly before or after the British EEC application that a nexus existed between Europe and "the bomb", as Macmillan used to say. Nonetheless, the Prime Minister firmly believed that although British cooperation on nuclear matters would perhaps not of itself bring about a satisfactory European settlement, it was clearly the indispensable precondition for it. At the turn of the year 1960/61, having himself decided in favour of EEC membership, he wrote in his "Grand Design" memorandum on Britain's future role in the world: "De Gaulle's second – and to him vital – ambition is the nuclear weapon. Can we give him our techniques, or our bombs, or any share of our nuclear power on any terms which i) (...) are publicly defensible (...) and ii) the United States will agree to? At first this seems hopeless. But since I think it is the one thing which will persuade de Gaulle to accept a European settlement (...) – I think it is worth serious examination." Immediately after the summit meeting with de Gaulle four weeks later he noted down in his diary that everything now depended on whether a nuclear deal could be struck.

Sometime later, after the US government had expressed its own interest in Britain joining the Community to offset the eccentricities of Adenauer and de Gaulle, Macmillan concentrated on organizing a trilateral package deal. Perhaps Kennedy could be brought to accept de Gaulle's nuclear ambitions and to elevate France to a status vis-à-vis the US similar to that enjoyed by Britain. Even though he certainly could not expect the US government to be enthusiastic about assistance to de Gaulle, Macmillan, as always in Anglo-American relations, hoped that his personal influence might make the decisive difference. In this spirit he approached Kennedy during their summit meeting in April 1961, explaining the perceived link between European and nuclear matters. Although at that stage Macmillan

had no idea what would satisfy de Gaulle, he made it plain to Kennedy that if the Americans decided to help with nuclear know-how or weapons systems, this ought not to be made dependent on any conditions, such as the assignment of the French deterrent to NATO. The Prime Minister rightly believed that such an offer would probably be refused outright by de Gaulle who, as Macmillan explained to Kennedy, wanted a national nuclear force which enjoyed at least the same degree of independence as the British government had over its force.

There was probably never much chance that the Americans would be willing to cooperate. Almost immediately after Kennedy's inauguration Rusk, the new Secretary of State, had already indicated to the British ambassador to Washington, Caccia, that the British government might feel the need to appease de Gaulle over Sixes and Sevens, but that his government was under no such pressure. By the time Macmillan received Kennedy's official response to his proposals which, on the President's request, he had put down in a personal memorandum, nothing much had changed. The Americans were prepared to make some highly symbolic gestures, such as to concede the position of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to a French general, if only in return for a more cooperative French NATO policy, but they rejected any assistance whatsoever for the French nuclear programme. This would not only have flatly contradicted American non-proliferation policy and appeared as an undeserved reward for de Gaulle's obstruction policy within NATO; Kennedy also feared that it could entail an increased German desire for nuclear weapons. Finally, there was one very important domestic political reason which Macmillan had completely overlooked: as Kennedy's national security adviser Bundy explained to Caccia, because of the strongly anti-Gaullist mood there, Kennedy could anyway not expect to get the necessary consent of Congress. After Kennedy's initial negative reply Macmillan decided to make a final effort. Although Caccia had reported that the Americans had made it absolutely plain to him that nothing could alter their position, the Prime Minister wrote a second personal letter, almost begging the President to help him out with de Gaulle. Predictably, Kennedy just reiterated his arguments. In Macmillan's own logic, this reply meant that the planned EEC application, which at that stage had not yet even been agreed upon by the cabinet, was already practically dead. Even though Macmillan always had a marked weakness for wishful thinking, there are clear signs that he was aware of this. After Kennedy's first letter he wrote to Caccia that "in order to bring the General around, the President may be able to offer something on tripartism and some review of NATO. This may be enough (but) he may well make his general cooperation conditional on some satisfaction for his nuclear ambitions, I should be very glad if I were wrong about this, but I do not think that I am."
Very shortly after Kennedy's second letter he even referred to the European problem as "obviously insoluble" in his diaries.28

After the Prime Minister's return from his Washington talks with Kennedy in April 1961 the cabinet had at first agreed the compromise formula that no new approach should be made to the EEC unless a clear signal could be obtained from de Gaulle that Britain was actually welcome.29 As the French President always spoke highly elliptically about Britain and Europe to Macmillan and the British ambassador to Paris, Dixon, it was hoped in London that Kennedy could perhaps elicit a more illuminating response from de Gaulle during his state visit to France at the beginning of June. But the result of Kennedy's approach was not exactly encouraging. In a very matter-of-fact tone he reported back that apparently de Gaulle still "had no particular wish to see the United Kingdom join the Six".30

In the end the British government went ahead with the EEC application regardless. Macmillan thought that this would at least prove to the US government that Britain was finally prepared to play a full and constructive role within the EEC, and that the French were to blame for the economic division of Western Europe and the resulting lack of political cohesion. At a time when a very unpredictable American administration was reconsidering its foreign policy options, every effort had to be made to appease it diplomatically in order to save as much as possible of the bilateral "special relationship". In addition, the application also served a useful party political purpose, as it would help to give the ruling Conservatives a modern image after one decade in government, split the Labour Party and steal the Liberals' clothes. Successful negotiations could perhaps win him the forthcoming general election, Macmillan hoped, probably wrongly as this considerably exaggerated the importance of foreign policy issues in British politics. On the other hand, a failed application would still be useful as it appeared to be the best way of keeping his own party together while still splitting the main opposition party. And finally, by July 1961 the debate about Britain's future role in Europe both within the cabinet, the parliamentary party and the public had moved forward so dynamically that the British EEC application only seemed a question of time. Macmillan could now hardly put the brakes on his own policy initiative by pointing to the negative result of his entirely secret contacts with the American President to find a suitable nuclear bribe for de Gaulle.31

However, even if the US government had been prepared to cooperate in 1961, it is highly questionable whether this would have led to the successful conclusion of the EEC entry negotiations in 1962/63 as Macmillan and de Gaulle had two entirely different concepts of what constituted an "independent" national deterrent. Arguably, the most Macmillan could ever hope to get from the US government was the offer which Kennedy finally made after the Anglo-American summit at Nassau.

in December 1962, namely to sell Polaris missiles also to the French provided that once operational, their force de frappe would be fully integrated into a multilateral NATO nuclear force and only withdrawn and used independently when "supreme national interests" were at stake, as it was put in the Anglo-American agreement. Macmillan was content with theoretical sovereignty over the use of the British deterrent. As a symbol of independence and influence, it was primarily intended for domestic political consumption; or, as Kennedy once remarked to Bundy, "a political necessity but a piece of military foolishness". Only in the wake of McNamara's speech of June 1962, in which the American Defence Secretary had appeared to condemn the existence of any non-American independent nuclear force within the Atlantic Alliance, did Macmillan find out that even though he was legally entitled under the bilateral arrangements with the US to press the button, no serious operational plans whatsoever existed for a possible independent use of the British deterrent. This was more than five years into Macmillan's premiership, and it was highly typical of the British approach.

De Gaulle, on the other hand, was increasingly aiming at full independence not just over the use of the future French deterrent, but also over its technical development and production. The "qualified independence", which the British enjoyed vis-à-vis the Americans, was not acceptable to France, as the French Armed Forces Minister Messmer explained to the British Defence Secretary Thorneycroft during a bilateral meeting in October 1962. Although this did not exclude the possibility of cooperation with the Americans and the British on targeting or early warning systems, for example, the force de frappe had to be "fully independent for all time", meaning that it should never be dependent on any other government's strategic planning or goodwill to provide successor weapons systems. In this respect at least, the French made their position very clear during numerous bilateral Anglo-French meetings at ministerial and official levels in 1961/62. When he left for his Nassau talks with Kennedy, hoping to secure the survival of the British deterrent, Macmillan must thus have known that the solution he sought for Britain would inevitably be rejected by de Gaulle, if it was offered to him by the US government. To fight for it nonetheless merely helped the Prime Minister to deceive Kennedy into believing that the Polaris agreement with Britain would not shut the door on the enlargement of the Community.

There is a second reason why it was unlikely that American concessions on the nuclear front would have enabled Britain to join the EEC, and that is that from the British perspective, support for assistance to the French within the Kennedy administration came from the wrong side for the wrong reasons. While the State Department was strictly opposed and had basically determined the line taken by Kennedy in May 1961, the Pentagon, rightly believing that the French would acquire a nuclear deterrent anyway, came out more and more in favour of cooperation during

33. JFKL Orals, Bundy, quoted in HORNE, Macmillan II, p. 439.
36. PRO FO 371/163516/23 (17 October 1962).
1962. However, what they were looking for as a suitable quid pro quo from de Gaulle was not British EEC membership, but a more constructive French defence and security policy within NATO.

American economic self-interest was another problem. If there was going to be cooperation with the French, then the Americans would of course prefer to deal with de Gaulle directly in order to sell their own weapons. This became abundantly clear in 1962 when the French government placed an order for a heat exchanger for use in a future French nuclear submarine with the British firm Foster Wheeler. Even though this device did not even contain classified information under the Anglo-American nuclear agreement, the British government still preferred to obtain American consent before allowing the sale to go ahead which, however, was not forthcoming during the summer. At that stage Macmillan's Private Secretary and adviser on foreign policy, de Zulueta, already bitterly complained that "there is a marked contrast between the high principles which the Americans express when they are dealing with our interests and the brutal self-interest with which they deal with their own". Then, only one month after the Americans had declared the planned Foster Wheeler sale undesirable, the British heard rumours, later confirmed to Thorneycroft by Messmer, that the US government was itself now offering not a heat exchanger, but complete nuclear hunter submarines of the Nautilus class to the French, and had of course decided to do so without consulting the British government.

II

Even though during 1961/62 Macmillan continued to flirt with his initial plan for a trilateral nuclear deal in the hope that a fundamental change in the American attitude to de Gaulle might occur, it became progressively clearer after his consultations with Kennedy in Spring 1961 that this preferred option could never form a suitable basis for successful EEC entry negotiations, if only because of de Gaulle's resolute determination to increase French independence from the United States. This still left the obvious alternative strategy to be explored, i.e. the possible pooling of British and French resources in order to develop some kind of common deterrent. Arguably, such an offer, representing a general "reorientation of British security policy towards Europe", was what de Gaulle was waiting for and might have accepted as the British contribution to a package deal over Europe.

38. Accordingly, Kennedy explained to the British ambassador to Washington, Ormsby-Gore, that if his government was to assist the French, "something really spectacular" had to be obtained in return, meaning not just British EEC membership. See Ormsby-Gore to Macmillan: PRO PREM 11/3712 (17 May 1962).
Anglo-French consultations during 1961/62 provide ample evidence of the fact that de Gaulle was definitely interested in establishing a bilateral nuclear partnership with the British. In this context the meeting between Macmillan and de Gaulle at Champs in June 1962 now turns out to have been much more important than their subsequent encounter at Rambouillet in December. In April the British Prime Minister had sent up a ballon d'essai. In speaking about the subject of Britain and Europe to the outgoing French ambassador to London, Chauvel, he had suggested that in his opinion "the best solution would be for France and England to reach an understanding with a view to making the nuclear armament".  

Very shortly afterwards, in a meeting with the new ambassador de Courcel, the former secretary general of the Elysée, he again stressed the need to develop "some political and even defence aspects" for the EEC, and that Britain and France ought "to hold their nuclear power as trustees for Europe".  

No concrete offer was made, but Macmillan's comments led to a remarkably more forthcoming attitude by de Gaulle at Champs than he admits in his memoirs. During one of the meetings de Gaulle suggested that "an Anglo-French plan agreed with others" could perhaps be developed to form the basis for what he rather loosely described as "a European deterrent".  

At this stage the French President would not define his ideas more precisely than this. He merely tested the ground, as he had done so often before since 1958, without having any long-term plan. However, the French did subsequently approach the British with a very concrete proposal for bilateral collaboration in the nuclear field. Only one month later, during a meeting with the British Defence Secretary Watkinson, who was then about to be replaced by Thorneycroft, Messmer enquired whether the British would be interested in the joint development of an underwater missile deterrent for the 1970s, a kind of Anglo-French Polaris. The French, having made progress with their national project, would concentrate on the development of the missile system, while the British, who had considerable expertise in this particular field, would construct the nuclear submarine.  

Such a proposal for bilateral nuclear collaboration could most certainly never have been made without de Gaulle's explicit consent, if not, as seems much more likely, at his own initiative.

In fact, this French plan was entirely in line with all of de Gaulle's previous overtures to the Americans and British since 1958 which were primarily aimed at receiving advanced scientific know-how in order to technically and financially facilitate the development of the force de frappe. As de Gaulle's 1962 offer was strictly limited to the joint development of a modern nuclear weapons system, it is difficult to see how this could possibly have been presented as a project for a "European" deterrent. After all, as long as both partners separately retained full control over the scientific know-how involved and over the use of the weapons, the envisaged bilateral cooperation would have left two independent national deterrents intact. It would not in the least have affected the national French nuclear doctrine as explai-
ned to Thorneycroft by Messmer. Of course, de Gaulle seems to have believed that any deterrent which was not under direct or indirect US control would automatically be "European" at least in purpose, even if France or Britain exercised control over its use. But from the German point of view, for example, an American nuclear force designed to deter the Russians from crossing the Elbe always qualified more easily for the much strained "European" label than a French force de frappe with the operational task of deterring the Russians from crossing the Rhine, which de Gaulle privately defined as constituting an attack on France justifying the use of nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{48}

The possible establishment of an Anglo-French nuclear partnership, as suggested by de Gaulle after the Champs summit, had been discussed on and off within the British government ever since the Suez débâcle had shown the full extent of dependence on the United States. In January 1957 the then Foreign Secretary Lloyd, assuming that a "friendly rivalry" would develop between Western Europe and the US, had first advocated this option in his memorandum on a "Grand Design" for Europe. It spoke of the need "for a closer political association and (...) a military association between the WEU (Western European Union). Powers within NATO (which) should stop short of federation". Western Europe, Lloyd argued, would have to become a third world power with a common WEU nuclear force built around close Anglo-French collaboration.\textsuperscript{49} This suggested reorientation of British defence and security policy towards Europe could have ideally complemented the Free Trade Area proposal and would certainly have increased its chances of success dramatically, but was immediately rejected by the cabinet.\textsuperscript{50} Instead of closer integration with Western Europe, under Macmillan's new leadership priority was immediately given to rebuilding the "special relationship" with the US which alone seemed to guarantee the continuation of a world power status for Britain.

This internal assessment had not much changed when the question of a nuclear bribe for de Gaulle began to be discussed within a very small circle of a few government ministers and leading civil servants from November 1959 onwards. On the one hand there was some support within Whitehall for Anglo-French cooperation on the basis that both forces should be assigned to the multilateral NATO nuclear force (MLF) envisaged by the Americans.\textsuperscript{51} But even in 1960/61 this was too obviously unattractive for de Gaulle. Moreover, the MLF solution would have involved the complete loss of theoretical sovereignty which the British enjoyed over the use of their weapons and which was still widely perceived to be at least politically highly important. Echoing Macmillan's strong reservations against the MLF project, de Zulueta commented laconically at the beginning of January 1961 that even if this turned out to be the right policy, or at least the only practicable one, he would be inclined to emigrate.\textsuperscript{52}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{48} In a conversation with Walter Lippmann. Cf. UK Washington Embassy to Lee: PRO PREM 11/3775 (15 March 1962).
\item \textsuperscript{49} PRO CAB 129/84/6 (5 January 1957).
\item \textsuperscript{50} PRO CAB 128/30/II/3rd meeting (8 January 1957).
\item \textsuperscript{51} Cf. Shuckburgh to Macmillan: PRO PREM 11/3325 (26 December 1960).
\item \textsuperscript{52} De Zulueta to Macmillan: PRO PREM 11/3325 (17 January 1961).
\end{itemize}
On the other hand there was also some support within the government for replacing the close cooperation with the US in nuclear and defence matters with a new "special relationship" with France.\textsuperscript{53} This view had already been advanced in 1958 in connection with the Free Trade Area negotiations by Julian Amery who believed that only as a result of close Anglo-French cooperation could Britain hope to reconcile her European and Commonwealth interests.\textsuperscript{54} Another influential minister who at the time of the EEC entry negotiations advocated a substantial commitment to a new British role in Europe was Thorneycroft. In fact, the Defence Secretary would eventually have executed the final break with the Americans over Skybolt and Polaris during the tense Nassau summit, if it had not been for Macmillan.\textsuperscript{55} By 1962 a greater degree of independence from the United States also seemed desirable to many British defence experts who were becoming increasingly anxious about the future direction of American strategic thinking. The concept of flexible response would involve higher expenditure on conventional forces which the British government desperately wanted to avoid, but it also indicated that the US government, because of the new threat of retaliation involving American cities, could no longer be relied upon to the same extent as in the past to be prepared, if necessary, to respond with nuclear weapons to a limited Soviet aggression in Western Europe.\textsuperscript{56} As de Gaulle put it to Macmillan at Champs, nobody could possibly know how the Americans would react in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack on, for example, Hamburg (or, for that matter, Birmingham or Marseille), in order to blackmail Western Europe.\textsuperscript{57}

Nonetheless, the protagonists within the government of a reorientation of British security and nuclear policy towards Europe and, more particularly, towards France remained in a clear minority between 1960 and 1963. For most ministers, including Macmillan and Foreign Secretary Home, and for the majority of leading officials it was never more than the option of last resort should the US decide to put an end to the existing bilateral nuclear partnership with Britain. As a result of a joint approach by Europeanists and Multilateralists within the administration in Washington this had been a distinct possibility ever since Kennedy was elected in November 1960. It then developed into a more acute threat to the established British defence and security policy when Kennedy himself told Macmillan privately in February 1962 that the continuation of an independent British force was undesirable in that it tended to encourage the French to speed up their plans for the force de frappe further and increased the nuclear temptation for the Germans.\textsuperscript{58} The Bri-

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{54. Amery was the first to suggest a nuclear bribe for de Gaulle: Amery to Macmillan: PRO PREM 11/2695 (December 1958).}
\footnote{57. PRO PREM 11/3775 (3 June 1962).}
\end{footnotesize}
lish now also began to receive hints from the Americans that Skybolt might eventually have to be cancelled for technical and financial reasons which would have left them without a credible nuclear deterrent, if no alternative, such as Polaris, was offered. Macmillan's tentative advances to de Gaulle during 1962 should primarily be seen against this changing background in Anglo-American relations.

In fact, a decision by the British government to replace the Anglo-American nuclear partnership with close cooperation with France in order to gain entry to the EEC would have flatly contradicted the dominant objective of the British decision of 1961 to apply for membership. This was not the economic modernization of Britain, or the unity of Western Europe or the Atlantic Alliance, but the rescue of the bilateral "special relationship" with the United States which still seemed to guarantee a disproportionately high influence for Britain in world affairs in relation to her rapidly declining economic and military strength. By 1960/61 only British leadership of the Community rather than of the Commonwealth and the dissolving Empire, which after the "winds of change" had blown through it, had largely lost its political usefulness, seemed to justify this special role vis-à-vis the US, including the highly valued nuclear partnership. Continued exclusion from the EEC, on the other hand, could very easily destroy it. This train of thought is perhaps best expressed in an early internal memorandum by the Foreign Office Planning Section. It explains that

"politically, such isolation would weaken us significantly. Our exclusion from an integrated Western Europe would reduce the influence we can bring to bear on the member countries and consequently our importance in NATO and the OEEC. Emotionally the United States is attracted by the concept of a united Europe, rationally she wishes to see a strong one: if faced with the choice between a failing United Kingdom which they suspect of opposing or, at the best, remaining aloof from this ideal of unity and a resurgent Western Europe which is eagerly embracing it they will no longer regard us as their principal ally in Europe. At the best we should remain a minor power in an alliance dominated by the United States and the countries of the EEC; at worst we should sit helplessly in the middle while the two power blocs drifted gradually apart."

This analysis was subsequently reinforced by a further change in US policy on European integration which was largely the result of increased American anxiety over a mounting balance of payments deficit. For the first time the then Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Dillon, made it abundantly clear to the British at the end of 1959 that his government would never accept a purely economic settlement between the EEC and EFTA at the expense of the US and without the wider benefits of closer political integration. When Kennedy then urged Macmillan to join the EEC in 1961, the dominant transatlantic calculation made the
application inevitable. In addition, the Six had now begun to discuss de Gaulle's ideas for closer political cooperation. While the economic consequences of further exclusion from the EEC were regarded as potentially very grave but bearable, non-participation in political cooperation among the Six was seen by Macmillan as disastrous in terms of the future Anglo-American relationship. From this point of view Britain had to be part of any new emerging structure, or was bound to lose what was still widely perceived as a world power status.

It has been argued that the British were not prepared during the EEC entry negotiations to exchange "more Europe" for "less America". In fact, the majority of the British government, including Macmillan, wanted more Europe mainly in order to have more America. From this perspective it is not at all surprising that the British government never made a concrete proposal for bilateral Anglo-French nuclear cooperation during 1961/62 which would have put an end to the existing arrangements with the US, or responded in a constructive way to de Gaulle's approach through Messmer in July 1962. The option of making a direct offer to the French regardless of the American attitude, having been considered within the government, had already been deliberately ignored by Macmillan after Kennedy's initial refusal to cooperate. His highly elliptical allusions to the possibility of an Anglo-French nuclear deal when talking to de Gaulle at Champs in June 1962 were a curiously ineffective diplomatic bait as it had to be withdrawn whenever the General came too near to it; or, as the Prime Minister put it to Kennedy in April 1962, he was prepared to leave the "carrot" of Anglo-French nuclear cooperation "dangling in front of de Gaulle", but would not let him have a bite. Unless, that is, the Americans suddenly decided to support a solution by which an Anglo-French force would form the European pillar within NATO, and it was guaranteed that the Anglo-American nuclear partnership could continue unimpaired. For Macmillan this had been the absolute precondition for any cooperation with the French ever since he had brought up the idea of a nuclear bribe.

However, even if such a constellation had materialized by December 1962, Macmillan would still not have made any substantial offer to de Gaulle at Rambouillet, as his government had altogether dropped the idea of a package deal before the Champs summit. Earlier in 1962 Macmillan had already begun to doubt whether, if de Gaulle got what he wanted in terms of nuclear assistance or cooperation, he would then deliver over Europe; or, in other words, whether British EEC entry on reasonable terms would be guaranteed. Initially, Macmillan may have been influenced by Kennedy who told him at their meeting in April that the State Department had always believed that de Gaulle would grab whatever he possibly could without making the slightest move over Europe or NATO in return. More important, however, even when pressed hard, neither de Gaulle nor any French government minister or high official ever admitted that a direct link existed be-

66. Ibid.
ween Europe and the bomb. Prime Minister Debré, for example, indicated to Heath that de Gaulle would certainly "want to take a broader view (which) would involve questions of European defence, a common policy in Africa etc.", but when then asked bluntly by the Deputy Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, Shuckburgh, whether this meant that Anglo-French nuclear cooperation would form part of the "final bargaining" in the Brussels negotiations, he answered evasively.67

Political consideration for the other five members of the Community would certainly have made any open negotiation of a bilateral package deal a very awkward balancing act for the French government, but it would by no means have been impossible. Instead, talking to Dixon less than a fortnight before the Champs summit, de Gaulle, in responding to newspaper reports, actually took the step of positively denying the existence of a nexus between the European and nuclear questions.68 On becoming ambassador to Paris in 1960 Dixon had been surprisingly confident of being able to read de Gaulle diplomatically. By the time of this meeting with the General, however, he was at a complete loss how to interpret his utterances and almost said as much when, writing to Home and Macmillan, he admitted that there was always the possibility that de Gaulle had meant the exact opposite of what was said. In the end though, Dixon, the Foreign Office and Macmillan concluded that the French leader was really not prepared to accept British EEC membership as the agreed quid pro quo for a nuclear offer and that as a result, none should be made before the entry negotiations were successfully brought to an end.69 Shortly before Macmillan left for Rambouillet six months later, however, a small group of leading civil servants finally concluded that even then, Anglo-French nuclear cooperation, particularly in the development of a delivery system for the post-bomber period, would be undesirable, if only because the massive extra costs could never possibly justify the "theoretically greater degree of independence which we should secure for the British deterrent".70

III

As Macmillan had never been able to come up with any other reason than a nuclear deal, why de Gaulle should possibly wish to give his consent to British accession to the EEC, the prospects of the Brussels negotiations looked even gloomier after the

68. Dixon to Home and Macmillan: PRO PREM 11/3775 (22 May 1962). Previously, relating to the idea of a package deal including nuclear matters, the leading French negotiator in Brussels, Clappier, had already warned his British counterparts that he doubted very much "whether the General's mind worked in this sort of way". Cf. Roll to Lee: PRO PREM 11/3775 (10 May 1962).
70. De Zulueta to Macmillan: PRO PREM 11/3712 (7 December 1962); cf. the attached report on "Considerations affecting possible Anglo-French nuclear collaboration in the military field".
French leader had preemptively rejected any bribe than after Kennedy's refusal to offer one in 1961. "He is part visionary, part calculator", Dixon had characterized de Gaulle in November 1961 in an internal analysis for Macmillan and the Foreign Office, warning that "people often see one side of his personality and neglect the other. But both are important". Among others, Macmillan made this very mistake. Initially he had thought of de Gaulle as more of a pragmatist, who would welcome any attractive opportunity for a trade-off of interests, than perhaps he really was. Later on, as the bitterness within the British government about his apparent refusal to play according to the diplomatic rules increased, de Gaulle began to be perceived as a much more stubborn dogmatist, determined from the very beginning to exclude Britain from the process of European integration, than he had arguably ever been. But at least, particularly after his remarks at Champs, ministers and officials in London began to understand the previously neglected underlying ideological reasons for de Gaulle's scepticism in relation to British EEC membership much better than had been the case hitherto. Quite apart from the potentially adverse effects on the future shape of the CAP, in which the French had an intense economic interest, three possible results of EEC enlargement especially worried de Gaulle: that the EEC might become "spiritually diluted", that French political leadership within it could be weakened, and that a larger, less tightly-knit Community would be too closely linked to the US.

De Gaulle put much emphasis on the first of these arguments in his press conference of 14 January 1963, portraying Britain as not being sufficiently "European" in political, economic and cultural terms, to join Europe. This could hitherto perhaps be dismissed as largely a convenient public excuse to distract from the real reasons for the veto, such as the lack of an attractive nuclear offer. However, at Champs de Gaulle had already spoken to Macmillan about Britain and Europe along much the same lines, using the same arguments and sometimes even identical phrases which indicates that they reflected more deeply rooted convictions. "Was it possible for Britain to adopt a genuinely European approach?", de Gaulle asked Macmillan, or was Britain not psychologically separated from the continental countries by the channel. Did she not have many world-wide interests, and was she not much too closely linked by political and cultural ties with America to join a Community which, according to de Gaulle, had to keep and further develop a separate European identity. "Europe must be Europe", he demanded much more forcefully at Champs than he could convincingly explain. In any case, King Alfred did not easily fit in with Clovis and Charlemagne, Dixon had already observed after the Birch Grove meeting. Furthermore, de Gaulle was also clearly afraid that enlargement would take the remaining dynamism out of the integration process and render the EEC institutions and particularly the envisaged political cooperation ineffective. At Champs he complained to Macmillan that without a French-Ger-

72. PRO FO 371/164832/2 (12 December 1961).
73. PRO PREM 11/3775 (2-3 June 1962).
man-British directorate which, however, was probably impossible to bring about, an enlarged EEC including several more EFTA states would inevitably degenerate into "a new United Nations".  

The second reason for de Gaulle's scepticism in relation to British EEC membership was, of course, never touched upon in Anglo-French discussions. However, after they had launched their EEC application in 1961 the British increasingly realized that de Gaulle's fear of a loss of French influence within the Community as a result of enlargement combined with his alleged deeply rooted anti-British feelings could present a major stumbling block on the route to a European settlement. After his summit meeting with de Gaulle in November 1961, for example, Macmillan noted in his diary: "His pride, his inherited hatred of England (since Joan of Arc), his bitter memories of the last war; above all his intense ‘vanity’ for France – she must dominate – make him half welcome, half repel us, with a strange ‘love-hate’ complex. Sometimes, when I am with him, I feel I have overcome it. But he goes back to his distrust and dislike, like a dog to his vomit." Six months later, during a preparatory meeting for the Champs summit at Chequers, Macmillan, Home and Heath reached the conclusion that British EEC membership was perhaps altogether incompatible with de Gaulle's "dream of domination".

The more difficult the French President seemed to be, the more the British perhaps underestimated his flexibility. After all, the partnership between Paris and Bonn was built on a mutually lucrative division of leadership into the political and economic spheres. But the British government never gave any attention to the crucial question, if and how a comparable Anglo-French arrangement could be devised. There were two main reasons for this: for once, the foreign policy process was still dominated by a deeply rooted aversion against entering into any long-term bilateral relationship in Europe, as this would have put an abrupt end to the traditional British balance-of-power policy which under the conditions of the post-war bipolar world, had ceased to be a global strategy and was now limited to Western Europe. And secondly, the transatlantic logic of the EEC application necessitated the acquisition of more than just an equal share of political leadership of the Community, as this could hardly justify the continuation of a special role vis-à-vis the US. Indeed, Macmillan just assumed that Britain, once inside, would automatically take over. Between the EEC application and de Gaulle's veto the British never thought about where they wanted to lead Europe, but lead, they certainly would. Perhaps more than the similarly immodest French ambitions did this implicit British claim kindle the bilateral Anglo-French confrontation over Europe, culminating in de Gaulle's veto. Besides, it was also characteristic of a foreign policy which was largely based on unquestioned historical assumptions and did not take sufficient account of the harsh economic and political realities of the post-war world.

Probably as important as this bilateral leadership conflict was de Gaulle's third fear which he later stressed in his memoirs, that an enlarged EEC could easily

75. PRO PREM 11/3775 (2-3 June 1962).
77. PRO PREM 11/3775 (19 May 1962).
develop into a "system atlantique" as opposed to his plan for an "Europe européenne". The transatlantic motivation of the British EEC application had not escaped the French. It was all too obvious that the British government had acted, if not under pressure from the US, then at least with their strong encouragement. And once inside the EEC, Britain could "draw Europe closer to America", as Macmillan himself once put it to Kennedy. The British Prime Minister seemed to volunteer to act as the Americans' Trojan horse in Europe, as, indeed, he did in order to save the "special relationship", and this clearly greatly annoyed de Gaulle who was aiming at the greatest possible independence from the US within the limits imposed by the East-West conflict. He frequently indicated to the British that, if they really wished to be part of the Community, they would have to make their choice: it had to be either Europe or America, and not both. But "Britain does not yet seem ready politically speaking to prefer Europe to the United States", as he bluntly told Macmillan during their meeting at Champs.

The French President was right in the sense that the British government did not want to make this choice and, if forced, would still prefer the US, as Nassau was to show symbolically in the politically highly sensitive nuclear field. There was also considerably more truth in his critical assessment of Macmillan's belief in his "power of leadership with the Americans" than the British dared to admit. On the other hand, he underestimated the extent to which the British transatlantic perspective, instead of being perceived as awkward, was widely shared among his partners within the Community who could see no inconsistency between the development of a European identity and a very close defence and security relationship with the US. The break-down of the Fouchet negotiations and the Bundestag preamble to the Elysée Treaty, which emphasized the continued importance of German-American relations and of NATO, provided ample evidence of this. Perhaps de Gaulle's "European Europe" was "a splendid plan", but, as Lacouture has rightly added, "its major fault was to presuppose that France was the heart, the soul, the kernel of Europe; that the shared hope of Europeans, French and non-French, lay in independence rather than in security; and that the influence of France seemed less of a threat to their liberty than the hegemony of the United States". In addition, it also grossly over-estimated the degree of autonomy which the West Europeans could possibly acquire even after the beginning of détente which would see the replacement of the former confrontation between the two superpowers with a new US-Soviet bilateralism. What really stood in the way of greater political independence of Western Europe from America was not Britain or the Cold War, but the division of the continent. Somewhat ironically, since 1989 this division has been shown to have been the very basis of French political leadership of the Community.

82. For the Nassau talks cf. PRO PREM 11/4229 (18-22 December 1962).
83. PRO PREM 11/3775 (2-3 June 1962).
84. J. LACOUTURE, p. 345.
Anglo-French differences over the future direction of European integration, which were often played up for domestic political reasons, seem to have been much less significant in the early 1960s than at least the existing studies on British European policy suggest.\footnote{For a good example of this historiographical school see ST. GEORGE, Britain and European Integration since 1945, Oxford 1991.} In many respects British and French views on European integration issues were actually very similar. This is certainly true for the question of the EEC’s future institutional development. "Federalist ideas", de Gaulle told Dixon before the summit at Champs, "do not correspond to reality and are fit only for school boys and political theorists".\footnote{Dixon to Home and Macmillan: PRO PREM 11/3775 (22 May 1962).} To this view, frequently repeated between 1961 and 1963, Macmillan could easily subscribe. Arguably, the British were even slightly more flexible in this respect after the executive had resolutely thrown the traditional constitutional definition of sovereignty overboard during the internal deliberations about possible EEC membership in Spring 1961.\footnote{W. KAISER, “Appeasement”, p. 148. Cf. PRO CAB 134/1821/6 (26 April 1961), and already PRO CAB 129/102/1/107 (6 July 1960), questions 19-21 and annex F.} More surprisingly perhaps, the analysis of the British policy making process in 1960/61 also reveals an increasing government interest in participation in a European system of agricultural protection. It was initially hoped that Britain could accede to the Community early enough to influence the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and that the switch from the system of deficiency payments could be made almost entirely at the expense of third countries, such as the US, and those Commonwealth producers who were not so dependent on the British market. As a result, the scope for imports from within the EEC, particularly from France, would increase without necessarily damaging British farming.\footnote{See in connection PRO MAF 155/430 (6 February 1961); PRO CAB 128/35/1/24th meeting (26 April 1961); PRO CAB 134/1821/13–14 (12 May 1961); PRO MAF 255/961 (15 May, 5 June 1961); Soames to Butler (31 July 1961): R.A. Butler’s Papers F 123.} These expectations later proved to be largely unrealistic, but it does exemplify that the British government, far from following a coherent global approach, was definitely beginning to think and act communautaire in a way largely compatible with the evolving and sometimes rather narrow West European regionalism.

The Anglo-French conflict in the early 1960s reflected less differences over important policy issues, and much more a national rivalry about the political leadership of Western Europe which by then seemed to both sides to be the most suitable institutional vehicle to recover or secure a prominent role in world affairs. It is in this context that the EEC entry negotiations between 1961 and 1963 have been looked at from the perspective of the evolving British thinking and policy on a possible bilateral package deal in order to establish whether and under what conditions a wider European settlement involving British accession to the EEC could have been reached at that stage and why it did not materialize.

The analysis of Anglo-French relations in this period seems to substantiate the more traditional interpretation of de Gaulle’s European policy which emphasizes his
ideological objections to British accession to the EEC and suggests that there was never much room for a bilateral deal: from the very beginning de Gaulle's private remarks to Macmillan and others were discouraging. In mid-July 1961 he said to Dixon that although British EEC membership was perhaps desirable in principle, it would take "a very long time".89 At that stage de Gaulle still seems to have hoped that a British application for full membership, because of the political problems over home agriculture and the Commonwealth, would not be forthcoming for some time to come. After he had then been informed of the planned British initiative less than two weeks later, he let it be known to Macmillan through ambassador Chauvel that it came as "an unpleasant surprise".90 De Gaulle clearly does not seem to have looked forward to a British EEC application in order to negotiate a wider package deal. Despite his evident interest in Anglo-French nuclear cooperation to speed-up the development of the force de frappe nothing in the British sources suggests that he was prepared to accept British EEC membership as the inevitable quid pro quo. On the contrary, on several occasions during 1962 de Gaulle actually indicated to Macmillan through Dixon that the best solution would be for the British to withdraw their application.91 This does not exclude the possibility that de Gaulle may eventually have granted EEC membership under certain conditions, but he never gave the British the impression that he would ever feel under any obligation to do so.

However, even if de Gaulle was prepared to accept a trade-off between the British government's European interests and his nuclear ambitions -- and at least in 1960/61 Macmillan strongly believed that he would --, it is now abundantly clear that no basis for such a package deal ever existed either before or during the EEC entry negotiations. The British Prime Minister had initially thought in terms of a trilateral nuclear deal, involving US assistance for the force de frappe without any preconditions attached to it. However, as a result of Kennedy's refusal to cooperate, this plan collapsed even before the British EEC application which was then launched nonetheless largely in order to appease the Americans into continuing the "special relationship" as well as for domestic political reasons. Thereafter, anything the Americans would be prepared to do, such as the Polaris offer after Nassau, was always unlikely to be of interest to de Gaulle, who was aiming to increase French independence from the US, and equally unlikely to result in his consent to British EEC membership. On the other hand, the alternative option, involving bilateral Anglo-French nuclear cooperation, was only advocated by a small minority within the British government. No such offer to de Gaulle was ever seriously considered during 1961/62. The Anglo-American nuclear partnership, re-established in 1957/58, was still sacrosanct. Whatever de Gaulle's intentions, therefore, the conclusion is inevitable that because of its intrinsic transatlantic character the British EEC application of 1961 was doomed to failure from the very beginning.

Wolfram Kaiser

The sixth Research Conference of the European Community Liaison Committee in Oxford

The European Union Liaison Committee of Historians has organised five research conferences since its inception in 1982. They have been on key themes relating to the development of the European communities in the postwar period. The proceedings of each conference have been published in a major joint venture by Bruylant (Brussels), Giuffrè (Milan), Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence (Paris) and Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft (Baden-Baden). These publications provide valuable multilingual research tools for scholars and also provide new insights and perspectives upon the history of postwar European integration efforts.

The sixth research conference will take place in the University of Oxford, United Kingdom, in 1996. The theme of this conference will be the enlargement, deepening and completion debates that took place between 1957 and 1963. It will cover the major national perspectives towards these questions, as well as particular economic, agricultural, political (Fouchet Plan) and enlargement questions that dominated the Community history of these years. The interest and perceptions of the United States and of the Soviet Union in the Europe of the Six will also be discussed, as these were years of considerable international tension and change, marked, for example, by the second Berlin crisis, by technological advances in East and West; and by Cuban missile crisis.

Such research conferences enable historians to make full use of the archival sources now available in many European countries, as well as of the Community’s own historical archive. The commitment of the European Commission to a dispassionate and full understanding of postwar European developments has underpinned the ability of successive teams of historians to organise these conferences.

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Les hauts fonctionnaires français et le processus d'unité en Europe occidentale d'Alger à Rome (1943-1958)

Gérard Bossuat

A travers le comportement de la haute fonction publique française, il est possible de mieux percevoir les intentions des dirigeants français sur l'Europe. Au service de l'Etat, les hauts fonctionnaires sont le reflet des choix gouvernementaux. Mais ils savent aussi proposer des solutions ou développer des doctrines originales. On peut donc mesurer leur influence sur les formes de l'unité européenne. Il est possible de dire quels projets de construction européenne sont d'origine française, d'en préciser les auteurs et ainsi de comprendre ce qui, dans l'aventure européenne revient aux partenaires européens, aux responsables politiques français et aux services de l'Etat.

Nous avons retenu au Quai d'Orsay la direction des Affaires économiques et financières (DAEF) (Hervé Alphand, François Valéry, Olivier Wormser) et la direction d'Europe; au ministère des Finances, la direction des Finances extérieures (DFE) (Guillaume Guindey, Jean Sadrin), la direction du Trésor et la direction des Relations économiques extérieures (DREE), (Alexandre Kojève); à la présidence du conseil, le SGCI ou Secrétariat général du comité interministériel pour les questions de coopération économique européenne; au Commissariat général du plan, Monnet et son équipe. Pour comprendre leur action nous les avons confrontés à la plupart des grands événements de la construction européenne: l'avenir de l'Europe d'après-guerre, l'Organisation européenne de coopération économique (OECE), le plan Schuman, l'Union européenne des paiements (UEP), la Communauté européenne de défense (CED) et l'Autorité politique européenne (APE), la conférence de Messine et les Traités de Rome.

I

Le Gouvernement provisoire de la République Française (GPRF) a suscité à partir de 1943 une réflexion sur les formes d'entente ou de coopération intereuropéennes.

Hervé Alphand, haut fonctionnaire, révoqué par Vichy en 1941, était devenu directeur des Affaires économiques au commissariat des Affaires étrangères à


Dieses Dokument wurde erstellt mit FrameMaker 4.0.4.

Un document du Comité national français (CNF) de de Gaulle, fin 1942, évoque une régionalisation économique européenne, de grands travaux européens et un "Federal Reserve System" européen. Il demande une "collaboration entre égaux, entre pairs, acceptant dans l'intérêt commun une règle commune".

Jean Monnet, commissaire à l'approvisionnement du CFLN (Comité français de la libération nationale), présenta un projet de marché commun européen de l'industrie lourde européenne contrôlé par les États. Il s'élève contre la renaissance des souverainetés économiques nationales. Il plaide pour une entité politique européenne capable de créer "une unité économique commune". Il ouvre le débat sur la supranationalité. Dans cette "entité européenne" ou "fédération", la France aurait une place essentielle. Monnet imagine encore pour le monde un destin plus noble, "l'état de bonheur et de paix", née des abandons de souveraineté et du dépassement
des systèmes capitaliste et communiste. L'Europe, "partie libre" de notre monde, était chargée de répondre à cet idéal.

René Mayer, commissaire aux Communications et à la Marine du CFLN, proposait une fédération économique de l'Europe de l'ouest comprenant France, Belgique, Pays-Bas, Luxembourg, un État rhénan et peut-être l'Italie et l'Espagne, dotée d'une monnaie commune.

Les débats s'accélèrent au CFLN en octobre 1943, mais les travaux de Monnet, Alphand ou Mayer se heurtèrent aux banalités de la diplomatie traditionnelle, telle une entente franco-anglo-russe contre l'Allemagne.

Au cours d'un déjeuner réunissant de Gaulle, Diethelm, Mayer, Alphand et Monnet le 17 octobre 1943, Alphand présenta ses idées sur des secteurs d'échanges libres en Europe, "plus étendus que les territoires nationaux". Monnet accepta la partition de l'Allemagne, mais il insista sur la participation des nouveaux États allemands à un "ensemble européen" à égalité de droit. Il proposa encore de créer un "pays industriel européen composé notamment de la Ruhr, de la Sarre, de la Rhénanie, du Luxembourg".


9. AME 56/1/1, document non daté, document manuscrit de Monnet; le 56/1/2 est le dactylogramme de la note précédente.
11. AME 56/2/1, lettre à Monnet, Alger 27/10/43.
à Morawsky en avril 1944\textsuperscript{16}. Mais les Anglais n'imaginaient pas de fédération en Europe continentale sans y intéresser les États-Unis. En conséquence Massigli demanda de suspendre les études sur un "groupement occidental" pour se limiter à des ententes particulières sur des problèmes économiques et financiers\textsuperscript{17}.

Cet échec redonna un espoir aux partisans d'un démembrement de l'Allemagne. Le Quai d'Orsay imagina de créer un cordon douanier autour de la Rhénanie (60.000 km\textsuperscript{2} et 16 millions d'habitants). L'ouest de la zone serait administré par la France et l'est (la Ruhr) par une commission internationale. Le projet de démantèlement fut soumis à une commission de géographes et de politologues connus (de Martonne, Sorre, Siegfried)\textsuperscript{18}. En septembre 1945, de Gaulle expliquait aux lecteurs du \textit{Times} que la Ruhr et le Rhin devaient être internationalisés. Le couple franco-anglais tiendrait une place de choix dans l'organisation européenne. Il réfutait la fusion des souverainetés en Europe.


\textbf{II}

La reconstruction politique et économique du pays s'effectue sous le signe de l'effort national. Or ce mouvement est remis en cause par l'aide américaine en 1947. Quelle fut la réaction des hauts fonctionnaires français à la création de l'OECE et surtout quelle part y ont-ils pris?

Le débat sur l'ouverture mondiale et européenne avait été mené par les responsables français au moment de Bretton Woods. Il était entendu, qu'un jour, l'Europe serait ouverte aux échanges. Le grand large, id est Bretton-Woods, avait été accepté par l'Assemblée constituante en décembre 1945. Mais elle n'était pas sans conditions. Les services de l'Etat réclamaient une longue transition pour réussir la modernisation et accepter la libération des échanges. Les fonctionnaires des


\textsuperscript{18} AME 58/1/11, direction des Affaires économiques; a/s du problème rhénan, très secret, date non précisée mais postérieure à août 1944.
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finances savaient pourtant qu'il faudrait briser le protectionnisme pour obtenir les crédits américains\(^\text{19}\). Le gouvernement décida de défendre une protection douanière moyenne pour faciliter l'adaptation de l'économie aux échanges mondiaux\(^\text{20}\). Elle était un préalable à un appel aux États-Unis.

La conférence de Paris en juin-juillet 1947 (France, Grande-Bretagne, URSS) sur l'offre de Marshall devait préparer des formes de coopération économiques communes que Molotov refusa\(^\text{21}\). Dans l'été la conférence des seize pays européens du plan Marshall décida que l'économie allemande devait "s'intégrer dans l'économie européenne". Monnet proposa de faire de la Ruhr "un actif européen", dont la France profiterait, contre l'abandon de sa politique de méfiance\(^\text{22}\). Cependant la conférence ne réussit pas à imaginer une forme d'unité européenne opérationnelle. Les fonctionnaires français aux États-Unis conseillaient d'amorcer "des projets d'économie combinée et d'aide inter européenne". William Clayton exigeait durement "un élargissement des frontières économiques par l'établissement d'une union douanière". Alphand poussa le gouvernement Ramadier à accepter l'union douanière européenne. Mais seule l'Italie manifesta de l'intérêt\(^\text{23}\).

Les Seize ne réussirent pas davantage à rendre transférables les monnaies européennes. Les Belges pilotèrent les premiers projets\(^\text{24}\). Seuls la France, le Bénélux et l'Italie adoptèrent (novembre 1947) un système de compensation imparfait. Un projet ambitieux de "Fonds commun des monnaies européennes" échoua en 1948\(^\text{25}\).

Deux initiatives sur trois venaient des services français: l'organisation internationale de la Ruhr (Monnet) et l'union douanière européenne (Alphand et les Américains); l'accord de compensation monétaire européen (Ansiaux), soutenu par Guillaume Guindey, directeur des Finances extérieures (FINEX), était d'origine belge.

Mais les projets d'unité en Europe occidentale, si ardemment exposés par les Américains, butaient sur la place de l'Allemagne en Europe. Il n'était plus question de détruire l'Allemagne mais de la relever. Les Américains furent maladroits en parlant de remettre aux Allemands la gestion des mines, d'augmenter la production d'acier et de réduire les démantèlements d'usines interdites (loi 75) applicable à la

20. CE 14, AL.DAEF, 16 mai 1946, note d'information pour la délégation française au Conseil économique et social, a/s préparation à la Conférence mondiale du commerce et de l'emploi. CE 14, au MAE, bureau d'Alphand, avec la participation de l'Economie nationale, de la Production industrielle, de la direction des Douanes, préparation à la Conférence mondiale du commerce et de l'emploi.
22. AMF 14/1/3 et 14/1/4,22 juillet 1947,"Mémorandum de Jean Monnet pour G.Bidault, sur la conférence de Paris, sur les causes du refus de l'URSS et sur la coopération avec la Grande-Bretagne et les États-Unis face aux problèmes allemands".
25. B 25434, 9 juillet 1948, s.o. probablement DFE, Guindey, 3 pp. fait suite à des notes de la DFE. F 60 ter, 382, 15 mai 1948, note (de qui ?) "Conversations Harriman, Tomlinson, ECA Paris".
bizone. Alphand se sentit trompé: "La France doit s'y opposer pour des raisons évidentes de sécurité." Monnet fut stupéfait. La direction Europe du Quai condamna le fait accompli. L'intégration économique européenne était-elle possible?

Bevin, le ministre anglais des Affaires étrangères, parla le 22 janvier 1948 d'une Western Union. Les Français voulurent en faire une union douanière. Mais les Cinq signèrent le Pacte de Bruxelles qui ne fut ni une union douanière, ni le cadre de la coopération économique entre les pays du plan Marshall.


L'OECE pouvait évoluer dans sa pratique et intégrer les économies européennes. Monnet et le gouvernement français proposèrent à l'organisation le modèle du plan français de modernisation et d'équipements. Ils voulaient bâtir l'intégration économique de l'Europe par la cartellisation et la spécialisation des industries, la libération partielle des échanges, la création d'un marché intérieur, l'organisation commune des exportations, la signature de contrats collectifs à long terme.

Le succès de ces projets dépendait de la puissante Angleterre. Or les conversations franco-britanniques de la mi-février 1949 furent un échec cuisant. Les Anglais manifestèrent une évidente répugnance pour la spécialisation et l'harmonisation. Les Français, Monnet le premier, se firent des illusions sur l'entente franco-britannique à l'OECE. Lord Plowden, interlocuteur de Monnet en avril 1949, estimait que l'alliance française était de peu de valeur pour la sécurité britannique. L'échec réactiva les conflits internes en France. Certains recommandaient un repli national. Neuf mois de discussions firent apparaître l'impossibilité de

27. AMF 14/1/2, "Note de Jean Monnet au Président", 17 juillet 1947.
30. 457 AP 21 (Archives nationales, Archives privées de Georges Bidault) PB, 24 mars 1948, DAEF, "Note pour le Président, Négociations des 16".
34. F 60 ter 389, PPS, SGCI, 18 janvier 1949, n° 487, "Note préparatoire pour les conversations avec sir Stafford Cripps, note sur les positions françaises et britanniques sur les PLT". F 60 391, note source SGCI?, "Remarques sur le télégramme de M. Bonnet du 21 décembre 1948", de Washington. CE 64, note de VL. Coopération économique, 18 janvier 1949, "Note".
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construire un programme de relèvement européen (PRE) par carence des deux grands États membres. L'Europe avait échoué dans son effort d'unité.

Cependant la haute fonction publique française, tout en étant partagée, s'était faite à l'idée d'une ouverture commerciale de la France et d'une spécialisation économique, sur la base d'une direction franco-britannique de l'Europe de l'OECE. Jamais les Français n'avaient été aussi proches d'accepter une direction britannique de l'Europe.


L'European Cooperation Administration (ECA) exigeait une multilatéralisation totale et immédiate des droits de tirage, premiers pas vers la convertibilité mondiale. Les Anglais, peu disposés à perdre de l'or ou des dollars, proposèrent la libération des échanges en Europe contre une accumulation de sterling. Mais l'empire britannique n'offrait pas autant d'opportunités que la zone dollar. Finalement l'OECE décida de multilatéraliser 25% des droits de tirage, c'est-à-dire de leur donner la possibilité d'être utilisés sur n'importe quel pays européen. L'accord fut signé le 7 septembre 1949. Ce système manquait de souplesse. Le problème de la convertibilité des monnaies européennes n'était pas résolu.

Les services du ministère des Finances voulaient la libération des échanges en Europe. Petsche, le ministre des Finances, et Kojève, un haut fonctionnaire de la DREE, proposèrent de supprimer les obstacles quantitatifs aux échanges grâce à une liste unique de libération sous le contrôle d'une banque européenne. Kojève imagina même une monnaie commune établie sur l'or, et un tarif extérieur commun. En échange la France ouvrirait les Territoires d’outre-mer (TOM) au commerce européen. Des contrats collectifs à long terme seraient conclus sur les matières premières. La contradiction des néo-libéraux était de faire confiance au

37. F 60 ter 471.(Archives Nationales, fonds du SGCI) OECE, PC(48)38,7 octobre 1948, comité des paiements. F 60 ter 470, OECE, 7 octobre 1948.
38. CE 71 JPB, CE, le 22 avril 1949, note "as accord de compensation et de paiements pour l'année 1949-50".
39. F 60 ter 411, OECE, secret, CGM(49) 12, le 2 juin 1949, groupe consultatif des ministres, délégation française, commerce et paiements intra-européens, "Mémorandum du ministre des Finances et des Affaires économiques".
40. F 60 ter 411, note pour M. Filippi le 4 novembre 1949, AK/SL, "Objet mémorandum français".
41. F 60 ter 411, voir différentes notes de Kojève.
Marché et de l'organiser. Cette ambiguïté illustrait un dilemme: comment faire confiance au marché européen sans bouleverser le fragile tissu économique français?

L'administration française abritait deux groupes, les résistants à la libération des échanges et les croyants. Les croyants l'emportèrent, mais leur foi était modérée. En effet les Britanniques venaient de proposer une libération immédiate de 50% des échanges privés, pour faire échouer la contractualisation à la française (novembre 1949). La logique française de l'organisation concertée des marchés avait échoué devant la logique plus libérale de la Grande-Bretagne.

En 1950 les progrès de l'intégration européenne étaient nuls. Le Finebel relança la réflexion sur l'intégration. La Direction des Finances extérieures du ministère des Finances (Guillaume Guindey) lança un projet de libération commerciale et financière en Europe (mai 1949). Guindey pensait à une Europe à deux étages. Guindey répondait aux difficultés des échanges commerciaux en Europe et à l'impatience américaine. Il voulait supprimer le contrôle des changes, mais pas les barrières douanières. Les taux de change varieraient librement. Alexandre Kojève tenta de réintroduire les accords de spécialisation industrielle et agricole, chers aux Français. Le SGCI demanda une Banque des investissements. Les Américains furent enchantés sur le moment parce que Finebel marquait une étape "sur la voie d'une intégration des pays de l'Europe occidentale".

La négociation démarrera en octobre 1949 avec le Benelux et l'Italie qui demandèrent une participation allemande et anglaise. L'innovation était remarquable. Or fait extraordinaire et inconnu jusqu'alors, le mémorandum français du 14 novembre 1949 acceptait l'hypothèse d'une participation allemande. Robert Schuman, ministre des Affaires Étrangères, admettait pour la première fois de parler d'une entente avec l'Allemagne dans le cadre d'une négociation internationale. Mais les Français reculèrent.

La Grande-Bretagne contre-attaqua avec un projet "d'entente financière et économique", Uniskan, proposé aux trois pays scandinaves. Guindey ne réussit pas à faire de son projet un acte politique majeur. Le projet d'UEP de Bissell était plus attractif. La France apparut comme le pion des Américains. Elle aurait pu se tailler une influence tout autre si elle avait accepté immédiatement l'Allemagne.

Les Français jouèrent un faible rôle dans l'UEP. Tout partit des États-Unis et des Britanniques. Le ministère des Finances considérait comme malsain que des crédits financent des déséquilibres permanents. Il souhaitait, avec les Belges, que l'or soit

43. F 60 ter 469, Paris, le 13 mai 1949, s.o. semble être une note, reçue par le SGCI ou confectionnée par lui.
44. CE 56 M. des Finances et des Affaires économiques, DREE AK n° 7875/s, 25 novembre 1949; CE 56 TCT 23, novembre 1949 à H. Alphand.
45. CE 03, Bonnet, 3268-72 DET, 182, 3 septembre 1949, "Conversation avec Kennan"; "idem", AMF 12/7/1.
47. F 60 ter 469, HA MAE, 14 novembre 1949, "Mémorandum", secret.
48. CE 56 Garnier, La Haye, 2 décembre 1949, 12h 50, n° 680-81.
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un régulateur des positions49. L’UEP fut une réussite et une grande victoire américaine.


Dans l’été 1950, l’OECE entra en crise car elle fut invitée par les États-Unis à se préoccuper du réarmement. L’OECE serait-elle le bras économique de l’Alliance?

49. CE 71, G. Guindey à Alphand, le 5 juin 1950, "Note pour le ministre pour le C. des Ministres du 7 juin 1950".
52. F 60 ter 384, note pour le ministre 31 juillet 1950, DREE, "Conditions et modalités de la prochaine étape de la libération des échanges"; B 17395, "Discours de Petsche à l’OECE le 3 juillet 1950"; F 60 ter 384, note de M. de Montrémy, DREE, à B. de M. 3 juillet 1950, "Note sur la deuxième étape de la libération des échanges".
53. F 60 ter 517, "Plan Stikker, Pella, Petsche"; sd, s o.
54. CE 89 Ministères des Finances et des Affaires économiques, SE aux Finances, 5 décembre 1950, à MAE (Wormser); "Propositions françaises concernant les mesures à prendre en 1951 en vue de l’intégration économique de l’Europe occidentale", Paris le 1er décembre 1950; S A 22, SGCEI, "Communication du SE aux Affaires économiques sur le projet d’intégration européenne: plan Stikker, Pella, Petsche, 8 décembre 1950".
55. CE 19, "Note Larre sur les mesures envisagées en matière tarifaire", juillet 1950.
56. Z Europe, Italie 1949-1955, 31, DGAEF, CE, 1er février 1951, "Note pour M. Boegner, le plan français d’intégration économique et les propositions Pella".
57. CE 68, SG OECE à Charpentier, chef de la délégation française à l’OECE, "Liste commune 19 septembre 1950", SGD(50) 81.
Les Français résistèrent. Les neutres (Suisses, Suédois) refusaient une OECE "ota-
nisée". Le gouvernement français décida de défendre l'OECE. Une fusion du
Conseil de l'Europe et de l'OECE fut même envisagée. Une nouvelle organisation
européenne, plus politique, risquait de mettre la France en difficulté à propos de la
Sarre ou des marchés en rapport avec le réarmement.

L'OECE prit la décision de définir un objectif d'augmentation de la production
des pays membres de 5% par an pendant 5 ans, pour satisfaire les opinions publiques
agacées par le réarmement. Jean-Marie Soutou comprit que l'objectif n'avait
plus de rapport avec l'unité européenne. Il conseilla de chercher une entente avec
les Britanniques et de marquer l'interdépendance des économies européennes et
américaines. Le Quai d'Orsay joua la carte anglaise, proposa un plan commun de
développement économique européen que la Grande-Bretagne refusa. Le réarme-
ment étouffait les imaginations. L'esprit européen s'effondrait. Monnet fut sarcasti-
que à la lecture de la déclaration de Robert Marjolin: "Ce document frise le
scandale", il est "d'une pauvreté affligeante".

A partir de 1952, l'OECE était en sursis. Les services et le ministre la défendi-
rent encore: "L'OECE est la seule organisation économique où se rencontrent les
pays atlantiques avec des neutres et avec l'Allemagne", écrit Robert Schuman.
Bientôt les difficultés de paiements mirent la France à "l'index". Certes, en janvier
1952 la Grande-Bretagne avait ramené son pourcentage de libération à 46%, mais
la France revenait sur toutes les libérations le 19 février 1952. L'OECE éclatait
puisque les autres pays poursuivaient le processus de libération. Bientôt le soupçon
des partenaires de la France se transformait en accusation de complaisance pour un
protectionnisme honteux. Un cycle de repli crispé s'annonçait pour la France. La
dérive libérale était en marche en Europe. L'OECE ne serait jamais cette organisa-
tion de concertation intereuropéenne que Petsche, un homme de la droite modérée,
désirait tant qu'elle fut.

Que faire? Les services exigèrent de Georges Bidault une clarification. Kojève
présenta une formule idéale. A défaut d'une dévaluation honteuse ou d'une impossi-
ble augmentation des droits de douanes, il imagina une taxe temporaire de compen-
sation de 15% sur les transactions commerciales en devises étrangères. Bidault

58. CE 83, Charpentier, p.o. OW 16 septembre 1950 à Berne, "Rapport OECE/ Pacte atlantique".
59. F 60 ter 384, B de M à Grefh, 27 janvier 1951 SGCI 1951, n° 88.
60. CE 79, DGAEF CE, JMS 24 avril 1951, note pour le Président, "a/s relations avec le Conseil de
l'Europe".
61. CE 79, PH 2 juin 1951, note, DGA politique du MAE (Europe); CE 79, CE 27 juin 1951, note pour
la direction d'Europe, "a/s contrôle des cartels internationaux".
62. Europe généralités, 1949-55, 64; FS 4 août 1951, note, "Manifeste relatif à l'augmentation de la
production".
63. F 60 ter 468, JMS, CE, MAE, 17 août 1951, "Note".
64. CE 04 Charpentier, 1er septembre 1951, circul. n° 172.
65. F 60 ter 468, document du CGP, pas de signature, mais document annexe de Monnet du 28 août
1951.
66. CE 05, CE 07, Schuman, JMS, coop économique, 29 janvier 1952 14h 50 à Londres 2213/20; et
CE 70, "Aide-mémoire de Schuman à Eden", remis le 31 janvier 1952.
choisit la taxe et promit de libérer. La médication douce du gouvernement Mendès France prépara le retour à la loi de l’OECE après deux ans et demi de ratés.

Malgré les ratés français à l’OECE à partir de 1952, gouvernants comme hauts fonctionnaires avaient travaillé à l’effort de libération des échanges en vue d’une coordination harmonieuse des économies sous la houlette d’une BEI. Ils avaient apporté une contribution originale à l’intégration économique européenne.

III

Le jeu de l’OECE signifiait le relèvement de l’Allemagne. La politique allemande de la France en fut nécessairement modifiée.

De hauts fonctionnaires français s’employèrent dès 1948 à tenir compte du relèvement allemand. Ils sentirent l’intérêt d’une entente franco-allemande dans le domaine des exportations agricoles tout en mesurant les risques de la concurrence industrielle allemande. Ils imaginèrent une nouvelle politique. La direction travailla sur une entente sidérurgique Ruhr-Lorraine-Luxembourg, à égalité de droits. Monnet proposa l’intégration des "bassins occidentaux" sidérurgiques. Un fonctionnaire recommanda de "poser les bases d’une association économique et politique franco-allemande qui viendrait s’intégrer dans le cadre de l’organisation occidentale en lente gestation". Un vent nouveau soufflait sur certains services.

Mais les résistances à la nouvelle donne furent les plus fortes. L’activisme pro allemand de Clay suscita une protestation de Koenig. Le Président de la République Vincent Auriol prononça un discours d’alerte à Rethondes le 11 novembre 1948. Il y avait bien deux politiques françaises pour l’Allemagne à l’automne 1948. La nouvelle politique ne put s’épanouir. La peur dominait toujours. La France voulait contenir la puissance économique allemande pour sa sécurité. Les difficultés de mise en œuvre de l’Autorité internationale de la Ruhr (AIR), les problèmes des réparations et des industries interdites, l’échec d’une direction franco-britannique de l’OECE, bloquaient le

68. CE 68, Bidault, 12 mars 1954, à M. des Finances et des Affaires économiques, "Problème de la libération des échanges".
69. F 60 ter 466, BEI, 29 août 1952, s.o. F 60 ter 474, M. des Finances, DFE, 21 mai 1953, Guinéy et PPS, TCT, Clappier, approuvé par Buron et Bourgès-Maunoury, note pour le ministre des Finances et le ministre des Affaires économiques.
71. YI 1944-49,399, D.Europe, 12 juin 1948, "Note".
73. Z. E, 1944-49, Allemagne 83, "Note", 24 juillet 1948. Note du Quai?
74. YI 1944-49,372, DAEP, FV, 8 octobre 1948, "Note pour le Président".
76. ZE 1944-49, Allemagne 83, MAE, 12 novembre 1948, circ. 304 IP, Discours d’Auriol à Rethondes.
processus de confiance. La signature du Pacte Atlantique et des accords sur l'Allemagne en avril 1949 fut l'occasion d'arrêter à trois un règlement allemand qui ne dut rien à l'esprit européen.


Les questions de sécurité ont compté. La conférence de Londres du 10 mai 1950 risquait de dissoudre le groupe de contrôle du charbon et de l'acier, de pérenniser la loi 75, de démanteler l'Autorité internationale de la Ruhr. Le temps de tous les dangers était revenu pour la France. Avec la Haute Autorité, Monnet fournit à Schuman un projet opératoire, adapté à la conjoncture.

Les réactions à la Déclaration du 9 mai furent vives dans l'administration française. Alexandre Kojève (DREE) demanda à son ministre "sinon d'écarter, du moins de surveiller les agissements de M. Monnet". Il remplaça dans le texte de Schuman "France et Allemagne" par "pays de l'OECE", et "Haute Autorité" par BEI. Il tenta de récupérer le projet Schuman au profit de la politique française à l'OECE. Le ministre des Finances, Maurice Petsche, prit contact secrètement avec

78. 4 AU 55, dr 5, (Archives nationales, fonds Auriol) 17 mars 1950, "Note pour M. le Président", Jean Forgeot, JFcb, Présidence de la République, le secrétaire général.
79. B 33887, S Meyer, Bad-Godesberg, 11 janvier 1950, "Note sur le rapprochement économique franco-allemand".
80. 4 AU 39 Dr 2 sdj, Paris le 22 décembre 1949, 24h très urgent, DAFF, Schuman à Londres, Washington et Bonn, Dusseldorf.
82. CE 89 OW 1 mai 1950, CE Note pour la DE, "a/s compagnies européennes".
85. F 60 ter 474, 19 mai 1950, Kojève, Finances, note pour M. Filippi objet: "le combinat" et l'OECE.
Stafford Cripps pour créer un front commun des partisans de la coopération à l'OECE. Ainsi se développait un débat entre ceux qui voulaient poursuivre l'effort français à l'OECE et ceux qui comme Monnet estimait l'institution dépassée.

Kojève recueillit le soutien de hauts fonctionnaires du SGCI. Il trouva un appui à la DFE (Guindey). Bernard de Margerie proposa de remplacer la Haute Autorité par un bureau international composé d'entreprises privées et contrôlé par les États. Robert Buron comme Olivier Wormser, au Quai d'Orsay, voulaient assimiler le Fonds européen d'intégration du plan Stikker avec la Haute Autorité du Plan Schuman. Le 3 juillet 1950, Petsche présenta un plan de libération des échanges. Il salua sans plus le Plan Schuman mais insista sur la Banque européenne d'investissement (BEI). On peut parler d'un contre-plan Schuman qui fit long feu. René Massigli, ambassadeur français à Londres, demandait à Paris la participation anglaise au prix "de quelques sacrifices de doctrine" qui parurent inacceptables à Schuman et Monnet.


Des politiques, au contraire, forçaient la marche vers l'intégration. Pierre Pflimlin, ministre de l'Agriculture, fit une proposition de pool agricole européen, rejetée immédiatement par Monnet car "il ne faut pas essayer de tout faire à la fois" dit-il. Le projet servait trop les thèses des agriculteurs et ne s'inspirait pas assez de la déclaration du 9 mai. C'était tout dire! Mais le Quai d'Orsay refusa une seconde Haute Autorité. Pourtant le gouvernement entérina le projet.

Les services du ministère de l'Agriculture définirent une organisation commune et progressive des marchés agricoles avec une autorité commune de type CECA. Le ton du document rappelait le langage de la Révolution nationale pétainiste; les

86. F 60 ter 474, ''Combinat'', texte amendé de la déclaration de M. Schuman du 9 mai 1950, le 19 mai 1950, texte Kojève; CE 89 AK, Paris le 16 mai 1950, note pour M. Filippi, "La proposition Schuman et l'OECE".
89. CE 89, OW CE, 14 juin 1950, "Note pour le Président".
90. 4 AU 57 dr 3 . Alphand, Paris 30 mai 1950, 22h à Londres n° 4448-54, 4 AU 57 dr 4 Londres, 9 juin 1950, 19h 50, 2117-20; idem ou papiers Massigli, n° 2061-71, Londres, le 6 juin 1950 à 16h.
91. AMG 5/1/6, note du 29 juin 1950.
92. AMG 26/1/46, Monnet à Pflimlin, 28 décembre 1950, et AMG 26/2/47, Monnet à Pflimlin, 12 février 1951.
93. CE 89 LBN, 31 juillet 1950, note pour M. Charpentier, "a/s projet d'organisation européenne des marchés agricoles".
94. 457 AP 41, "Note du gouvernement français du 29 mars 1951, mémorandum".
paysans conservent "les valeurs fondamentales de la civilisation occidentale et l'équilibre du corps social"95.

Un nouveau ministre de l'Agriculture, Camille Laurens, était déterminé à renier les principes du Plan Schuman, ce qui réjouit les Anglais96. Une conférence préparatoire des quinze pays du Conseil de l'Europe plus l'Autriche et la Suisse, réunie à Paris en mars 1952, exprima des doutes sur une telle autorité97. Le gouvernement s'empêtrait dans ce projet comme dans celui de la CED et de l'APE. Olivier Wormser, bon observateur, expliquait que "le gouvernement n'avait pas (...) de vues bien précises en ce qui concerne le système qu'il voulait voir adopter"98. Il suggéra, avec Paul Delouvrier, de confier ces négociations inopportunes à l'OEEC99. Cette position "sage" illustrait la méfiance de toute une partie de l'administration française pour la petite Europe des Six et les hautes autorités supranationales. L'OEEC s'en saisit pour l'enterrer.

Dans la foulée de la guerre de Corée, Monnet et Pleven inventèrent l'armée européenne pour empêcher les Américains de réarmer l'Allemagne. Pour sauver l'idéal d'intégration européenne, Monnet proposa à Pleven, Président du Conseil, une organisation fédérale de la Défense avec participation allemande100. Le projet fut annoncé à l'Assemblée nationale le 24 octobre 1950.

Le 13 septembre 1952 les Six de la Communauté européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier (CECA) décidèrent de réfléchir à une Communauté politique européenne (CPE). Des thèses maximalistes préconisèrent des transferts de pouvoirs "pratiquement illimités" en politique étrangère et financière. Les conseillers français redoutèrent que la France soit étouffée par la supranationalité, dépouillée de sa puissance mondiale et coloniale, inondée de produits allemands101. De plus Beyen, le ministre hollandais des Affaires étrangères, présenta un projet de marché commun et de monnaie commune102. Les services français s'opposèrent à une extension des pouvoirs de l'Autorité européenne. Ils remarquèrent que la CPE exercerait un dangereux pouvoir sur l'Outre-mer103. La direction des Affaires économiques du Quai d'Orsay s'interrogeait sur l'élargissement des compétences économiques de la CPE104. Le projet Beyen leur semblait dirigé contre la politique française à l'OEEC. Les services

95.  F 60 ter 475, "Note du gouvernement français, 15 février 1951 de la part de Maestracci", secret.
96.  CE 07, CE 11, OW à Londres 5717, "Pool vert 27 mars 1952".
97.  CE 07, OW, DGAEF, CE, 29 mars 1952, 20h 30 , circ. n° 40; 457 AP 41, "Réunion préparatoire sur l'organisation européenne des marchés agricoles", AG/prep/ doc 1, 1er séance, 25 mars 1952.
98.  457 AP 38, OW, 14 février 1953, DGAEF, CE, "Note Wormser", note pour le Président.
99.  457 AP 38, "Note rédigée par un haut fonctionnaire du M. des Aff. économ. le 11 février 1953 à la demande de Delouvrier pour Merveilleux du Vignaux; CE 84 DAEF, CE 14, février 1953, "Note pour le Président".
101.  CE 84 FS, 15 janvier 1953, DG politique Europe, Note, "a.s. CPE".
103. Europe généralités, 1949-55, 32, Jurgensen, 26 décembre 1952, DGAEF, "Europe/Union française".
104. Europe généralités, 1949-55, 32 AF, 29 décembre 1952, DGAEF, "a/s attribution économique de la CPE".
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refusaient une CPE à trois pieds (CECA, CED et marché commun) qui ferait chavirer la barque.

L'articulation entre communauté européenne et responsabilités mondiales de la France devint le point central de la contestation. Le jurisconsulte du Quai, le professeur André Gros, s'enflamma: "Si la notion d'extension des pouvoirs était adoptée on peut se demander si les historiens, plus tard, ne rechercheraient pas avec étonnement comment la France a elle-même ouvert le problème de sa succession". Bidault était fort embarrassé des projets de l'Assemblée ad hoc et de la CED. Alphand se contraignit à accepter la CED: "Aucune autre voie n'était ouverte. Aujourd'hui même le gouvernement français considère que la mise en vigueur de la CED est la dernière chance d'imposer à l'Allemagne un régime comportant des garanties à l'encontre du militarisme allemand". L'Allemagne était-elle un réel problème ou un prétexte pour repousser l'unité européenne? La DAEF jugeait que le plan Beyen était le fourrier de la "pastoralisation de la France, une des idées dominantes du nazisme". Le Quai conseillait de refuser l'intégration économique supranationale et de revenir à la coopération intergouvernementale.

Les Finances étaient plus contrastées. Clappier, Guiné, Clermont-Tonnerre et de Lavergne acceptaient "un embryon d'autorité politique" en vue d'une intégration économique progressive mais sans unité monétaire. Bidault, tiraillé entre l'Europe et la troïka occidentale, décida qu'il fallait réunir la CECA et la CED sous un toit commun, la CPE, avec une assemblée élue au suffrage universel, "sinon pour le minimum, du moins contre le maximum". Il n'était pas question d'aller vers un marché commun ou un élargissement des pouvoirs de l'autorité politique européenne. La CPE disparut avec le naufrage de la CED.

La question de la perte de souveraineté était au coeur des réactions négatives des hauts fonctionnaires de l'Etat. Wormser proposait un moyen terme: libérer les échanges de la France, recalcer les prix et la parité du franc, abaisser les droits de douane entre les Six. Ainsi la France trouverait les moyens d'un "renouveau économique, politique et moral qui [...] contribuerait à réaffirmer notre influence et à consolider les liens de la métropole avec l'Union Française".

105. 457 AP 38 MAE, DGAEF, 24 janvier 1953, Europe FS Note, "Conférence des 6 MAE et du Comité des ministres du Conseil de l'Europe".
106. 457 AP 38, A. Gros jurisconsulte du Quai, 17 janvier 1953, note pour le SG, "a/s bilan des engagements du gouvernement français en matière de CPE".
109. CE 89, MAE, DGAEF, CE, 9 février 1953, note, "a/s intégration économiques entretiens Beyen et conférence de Rome".
110. CE 84, PAC, 11 février 1953, DAEF, DG, "a.s. plan Beyen, note, bureau de Charpentier, le 9 février".
111. CE 63, OW, 10 décembre 1953, DGAEF, CE, note, "a/s politique économique et financière extérieure de la France".
L'esprit du 9 mai 1950 avait été un feu de paille. Monnet avait perdu son combat pour l'Europe unie et fédérale, ce qui fut sanctionné pathétiquement par le vote négatif sur la CED en août 1954.

IV

L'idée européenne n'était pas morte en France, mais les services français n'eurent rien à voir avec la relance de Messine. L'initiative vint de Paul Henri Spaak et de son ami Jean Monnet. Toutefois le Quai d'Orsay (François Valéry) travaillait sur de nouvelles hypothèses de coopération en Europe. Le Plan Pinay de "conseil confédéral européen" proposé en avril 1955 à Adenauer, prévoyait seulement des rencontres régulières de diplomates européens. Le Quai d'Orsay était intéressé par le développement de l'énergie atomique. Le Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique (CEA) espérait construire en commun une usine de séparation isotopique, très onéreuse. La problématique européenne de la France était donc utilitaire et prudente en avril 1955.


Olivier Wormser, directeur des Affaires économiques au Quai d'Orsay, manifesta ses réticences pour le Marché commun libéral. Il repoussait l'intégration économique totale et n'acceptait qu'une coopération dans le domaine des transports et
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de l'énergie atomique. A la conférence de Messine, Antoine Pinay, ministre des Affaires étrangères, exprima seulement son "intention de contracter" un accord. Il posa avant tout la question de l'organisation atomique européenne. Néanmoins, le gouvernement français accepta de s'engager dans la première étape de quatre ans d'un Marché commun à de multiples conditions. Il demandait des harmonisations sociales, un fonds de réadaptation, l'abaissement des droits de douanes par grandes catégories de produits, un tarif extérieur commun, un régime spécial pour l'agriculture. Félix Gaillard, chef de la délégation française, sut rassurer ses partenaires.


L'avis des services sur le rapport Spaak fut sollicité à la veille de la conférence de Venise en mai 1956.

Jean Sadrin, le puissant directeur des Finances extérieures, expliqua que le projet de Marché commun était révolutionnaire par son ampleur et ses implications politiques. Mais il croyait aux biens de la nouvelle construction. Sadrin était un adonné pour les "européens".


Le ministre des Finances lui-même, Paul Ramadier (SFIO), redoutait la fin de l'économie planifiée. Il conseillait donc une dévaluation et une période d'adaptation de 20 ou 30 ans, assortie d'une possibilité de retrait. Alors que les négociations allaient aboutir, Ramadier demanda des contreparties financières sérieuses à l'ouverture des TOM aux Européens, le maintien de l'autonomie monétaire, bancaire et des changes des Etats, la règle de l'unanimité pour les budgets du fonds de réadaptation de la main-d'œuvre et pour celui d'Euratom.

François Valéry, au Quai d'Orsay, remarquait que le rapport Spaak amorçait "un véritable gouvernement économique supranational". François Gutmann annonçait que la France ne pourrait réaliser un Marché commun en raison des évolutions politiques dans l'Union française et des traditions protectionnistes françaises. Voilà pourquoi le Quai d'Orsay marqua la plus grande prudence sur le calendrier de mise en route du Marché commun. Les services n'étaient pas prêts à s'engager au-

126. 52 J 114, 17 mai 1956, Direction du trésor, PPS/dp, n° CD 280, "Note pour le ministre, objet: projet de Marché commun européen".
127. 52 J 114, note de Cépède, n.d.
128. 52 J 114, note du budget, 7 mai 1956.
129. 52 J 114, Jean Masson, 18 mai 1956, SE AE, à Président du Conseil, n° 1559 CAB, a/s Marché commun.
130. 52 J 115, note pour Plescoff, 24 septembre 1956, note de Prate.
131. 52 J 114, MAEF, le ministre, 24 mai 1956, note sur le Marché commun.
132. 52 J 115, "Le ministre des Affaires économiques et financières, à M. le ministre des Affaires étrangères, objet: Négociations sur le Marché commun".
133. 52 J 114, note de F. Valéry, 7 mai 1956, historique du marché commun.
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delà d'une première étape\textsuperscript{135}. Le comité Verret marqua sa prudence sur les formules institutionnelles supranationales.


Si la volonté compte en politique, les négociations du Marché commun en furent un exemple. Elles aboutirent en mars 1957. Les institutions ne furent pas aussi supranationales que celles de la CECA, la transition fut fixée entre 12 et 15 ans, le flou persista sur le tarif extérieur commun, une clause de sauvegarde gérée par l’Europe fut introduite. L’harmonisation des charges sociales fut limitée, mais une BEI au capital d’un milliard de dollars fut créée. Le principe d’un marché commun agricole fut accepté\textsuperscript{139}. Après un large débat préalable devant les Assemblées parlementaires françaises, les Traités de Rome furent signés le 25 mars 1957. Il fallut à Guy Mollet une volonté politique puisée au plus profond de ses convictions européennes pour défendre auprès des services l’adhésion de la France au Marché commun. La conjoncture était défavorable\textsuperscript{140}.

Le débat sur le Marché commun posait la question de la petite et de la grande Europe. La Grande-Bretagne, opposée au Marché commun, tenta de contre-attaquer sur le thème de la grande Europe. Elle proposa une zone de libre-échange. L’intérêt des Britanniques pour une zone de libre échange réactiva le combat dans les services entre les partisans de l’OECE et ceux de l’Europe des Six. Pour manifester son intérêt pour l’OECE, le gouvernement fit passer le taux de libération de 79\% à 82\% en avril 1956. Mais Paul Ramadier, ministre des Finances protesta\textsuperscript{141}. L'aggravation du déficit des comptes extérieurs s'accrût alors que Guy Mollet s'opposait à une dévaluation. Clappier, directeur des Relations économiques

\textsuperscript{135} 52 J 115, MAE, 4 septembre 1956, mémorandum sur les instructions à donner à la délégation française à la conférence internationale pour le marché commun.

\textsuperscript{136} 52 J 115, MAE, SE Affaires Maroc et Tunisie, cab 30 août 1956 J/B/cp 385 à MAE et F Tunisie/ Maroc et Marché commun.

\textsuperscript{137} 52 J 114, "Le ministre de la FOM, direction des Affaires économiques et du Plan, à M. le Président du Conseil, 17 mai 1956, objet: Problèmes posés par la France d'Outre-mer par le projet de Marché commun européen".

\textsuperscript{138} 52 J 115, G. Plescoff à Président, 18 octobre 1956, Marché commun et POM.

\textsuperscript{139} 52 J 115, note pour le Président , 16 janvier 1957, DFE, Négociations sur le Marché commun.

\textsuperscript{140} Entretiens avec Maurice Faure, par Gérard Bossuat, 17 décembre 1986.
extérieures, conseilla d'invoquer à l'OECE les clauses de sauvegarde. Le gouvernement se tourna vers l'étranger. Les États-Unis se dérobèrent. Ils sanctionnaient la politique algérienne de la France, ses ambitions commerciales et peut-être la visite de Christian Pineau et de Guy Mollet à Moscou le 15 mai 1956. Le gouvernement sauvegarda tant bien que mal la coopération à l'OECE car il lui était impossible d'accepter l'abaissement des droits de douane et la suppression des contingents dans le Marché commun et de les refuser à l'OECE.


Les Français et Monnet ont beaucoup travaillé sur Euratom. Les services du Quai d'Orsay posaient le problème du nucléaire dans le cadre du choix suivant: rester une puissance mondiale ou faire l'Europe qui deviendra le quatrième grand. John Forster Dulles donna son appui au projet supranational pour arrimer l'Allemagne à l'Ouest et éviter la dissémination nucléaire. Monnet souhaitait une renonciation de l'Europe aux armes nucléaires, choix que Guy Mollet avait antérieurement approuvé. Mais la France pouvait-elle abandonner ses ambitions nucléaires militaires?

L'ambassadeur américain à Paris, Douglas Dillon, n'était pas dupe. "Les Français ont déjà ou sont sur le point d'avoir la capacité de fabriquer des armes atomiques", écrivait-il en février 1956. Billotte, le ministre des Armées, exigeait que

141. 52 J 113, note manuscrite de Paul Ramadier sur les efforts de libération des échanges. 52 J 113, 26 mai 1956, C(56)109, rapport du comité de direction des échanges de l'OECE, Mesures d'aide aux exportations, réactions de Ramadier. 90-52 J 94, CGP, rapport Hirsch, étude en vue de la recherche d'un concours extérieur, 44 pages.

142. 52 J 113, Clappier, DREE, 5 juillet 1956, note sur les questions d'échanges qui seront traitées à la prochaine réunion du Conseil des ministres des l'OECE.

143. 52 J 113, G. Plescoff, note pour le Président, 17 juillet 1956.

144. 52 J 190. Notes de Ramadier.

145. 52 J 92, cab/SP, 24 avril 1957, à Jean Masson SEAEF.


147. 540.00/12-2755, (National Archives, Washington (DC)), D. of S. to Paris 2401, 12/27/55.

la France puisse posséder des armes atomiques. Christian Pineau approuva. Le Département d'État comprit que Monnet était isolé.

Le Conseil des ministres des Six réuni à Bruxelles en février 1956 décida de ne pas renoncer aux armes atomiques. Guy Mollet fit un geste d'apaisement. Quatre ans s'écouleraient avant de procéder à une expérimentation d'armes nucléaires dans l'attente d'un accord général de désarmement. Il trancha en faveur d'un programme atomique mixte, civil et militaire. Sa droite (Chaban-Delmas) comme sa gauche mendésiste le pressaient de ne rien abandonner. En janvier 1957, d'après le général Ailleret, la décision de construire une bombe avait été prise et une coopération franco-allemande dans le domaine des armements, y compris les armes interdites, était engagée.

L'entente franco-allemande, réalisée lors de la rencontre entre Mollet et Adenauer le 6 novembre 1956, ouvrit la voie à la rédaction des traités européens. La France eut le droit de développer des armes atomiques sous le contrôle de la Communauté européenne. Un accord sur la politique sociale dans la future CEE fut trouvé. A l'automne 1956, l'Europe se construisait sur le couple franco-allemand, une Europe peut-être dotée d'armes nucléaires européennes. Monnet n'y croyait pas. Il assura péremptoirement Dulles "que le programme militaire atomique français est un mythe". La France n'obtint pas le financement européen d'une usine de séparation isotopique.

150. RG 469, Office of African and European Operations, Regional Organizations Staff, Subject Files 1948-57, Box 67, ou 840.1901/2-356, Dillon to Secretary of State, n° 3467, February 3, 2 pm.
151. RG 469, Office of African and European Operations, Regional Organizations Staff, Subject Files 1948-57, Box 67, Summary of Official minutes, ECSC Foreign Ministers' Meeting, Bruxelles, Feb 11-12, 1956, colux D 20, March 9, 56.
156. RG 469, Office of African and European Operations, Regional Organizations staff, Subject Files 1953-57, Box 68, ou 840.1901/7-1856, Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. Monnet on European Integration, Embassy, The Hague, July 18, 1956.
157. J. VAN HELMONT, Options européennes, p. 65.
pour produire de l'uranium 235. Les cinq partenaires de la France préférèrent acheter du combustible enrichi aux États-Unis. Euratom aurait le monopole d'achat des matières fissiles produites ou importées par les Six. Elle les répartirait et les contrôlerait "jusqu'au moment où elles entrent dans des ateliers qui les façonnent en armes". Mais pendant dix ans chaque pays garderait le droit d'acheter sa production nationale. L'organisation prévoyait de mettre en commun les ressources nucléaires pacifiques. La mise à mal d'Euratom fut le fait de de Gaulle soutenu par certains corps de l'État comme le CEA.

**Conclusion**

L'action des hauts fonctionnaires dans la définition de la politique européenne de la France est bien réelle. De grands fonctionnaires comme Massigli, Monnet au Plan, Alphand, Guinney, Clappier, Wormser, furent en prise directe avec la décision.

L'Europe de ces hauts fonctionnaires était une Europe influencée par la France, amicale et autonome dans les échanges internationaux. Kojève ou Wormser ont défendu à l'OECE une Europe organisée, spécialisée économiquement, dirigée avec bienveillance en vue du bien-être social et économique des citoyens français et européens. Ils ont réfuté l'arbitrage suprême d'une Haute Autorité supranationale. Les Français rêvaient d'une BEI répartissant harmonieusement les investissements. Ils repoussaient l'Europe de Monnet, des Britanniques, du libéralisme, de l'abandon de l'Empire, celle de la poterne européenne où l'originalité française aurait disparu.


Les Traités de Rome représentaient une synthèse des deux tendances. C'est pourquoi ils ont été acceptés. Euratom servait les intérêts du premier groupe. Les traités de Rome étaient une tentative pour bâtir une Europe réaliste comme le second groupe l'espérait. Les hommes de la relance de Messine dans les cabinets de

160. 52 J 104, MAEF, DFE, n° 18 cd, 16 janvier 1957, note pour le Président, négociations sur l'Euratom.
161. J. VAN HELMONT, Options européennes, op. cit., p. 64.
Guy Mollet ou de Maurice Faure ont vu dans le Marché commun le point de départ d'une nouvelle aventure pour l'Europe: le développement des pays pauvres\textsuperscript{164}, la lutte contre le communisme, la sécurité économique et politique du monde libre, la création d'une Troisième force internationale, le renforcement de l'Europe dans l'Alliance Atlantique et de la France dans l'Europe. Ces grands choix stratégiques venaient davantage des équipes politiques ou de personnalités d'exception que des hauts fonctionnaires.

Les constructions européennes depuis 1943 jusqu'en 1957 sont-elles dues aux hauts fonctionnaires? Les idées sont nées dans les bureaux, mais aussi dans les partis, les syndicats ou les mouvements d'opinion. Les idées européennes du GPRF ont été élaborées par des Résistants, fonctionnaires, diplomates ou politiques. La nouvelle politique allemande de la France entre 1948 et 1950 est venue du réseau Monnet-Alphand, minoritaire dans les services. Les services ont eu un rôle positif dans la politique de la France à l'OECE. Ils ont joué un rôle dans la mise à mal des 3 grands projets européens de Monnet: le Plan Schuman, la CED et l'APE. Mais ce sont les politiques qui ont fait le succès de la CECA ou l'échec de l'APE et de la CED. Ce sont les cabinets ministériels qui au temps de Mendès France puis de Guy Mollet ont élaboré de nouvelles perspectives européennes (UEO, Marché commun et Euratom). Les hauts fonctionnaires semblent voués à prêcher la prudence aux équipes politiques, à révéler les contradictions des princes et à conserver les droits souverains traditionnels de l'État.

\textit{Gérard Bosseau}

Le rapport sur les archives européennes, objet de cette publication, fait suite à une résolution conjointe du Conseil des ministres de la Communauté européenne et des ministres de la Culture des Etats-membres adoptée le 14 novembre 1991.

La résolution entendaient promouvoir des formes plus structurées et volontaristes de coordination et de coopération entre les services d’archives des Etats-membres de l’Union européenne ainsi qu’entre ces services et les institutions qui président à celle-ci. Le rapport est issu des travaux d’un groupe composé de quelques trente experts nationaux. La Commission a jugé utile d’y associer des représentants des institutions communautaires ainsi que de l’Institut universitaire européen de Florence (IUEF – Archives historiques).

Les archives dans l’Union européenne comportent un large éventail de propositions, qui orientent la réflexion sur les objectifs précis d’intérêt commun, sans porter atteinte à l’autonomie des services nationaux au-delà de ce qui est utile. Par souci d’efficacité, les experts ont choisi de sélectionner un certain nombre de sujets et de les assembler en un programme d’action prioritaire. Les actions retenues concernent les cinq thèmes suivants: la conservation matérielle, les bâtiments d’archives, l’accès aux archives, la formation des archivistes, les archives électroniques. Sur ces différents points, le rapport a le mérite de formuler des propositions de réalisation à court terme, en demandant leur approfondissement et leur mise en oeuvre dans un cadre communautaire d’appui.

Les historiens et chercheurs seront sans doute heureux d’y voir figurer des recommandations sur la conservation matérielle du patrimoine européen qui rejoignent leurs préoccupations. En matière d’accès, ils pourront sans doute se féliciter de la décision de préparer un guide du lecteur, destiné à familiariser les utilisateurs avec les procédures et conditions pratiques d’accès en vigueur dans les principaux dépôts d’archives dans chaque pays de l’Union européenne. Cette brochure factuelle, traduite dans les neuf langues officielles facilitera, sur le plan pratique, la consultation par de nombreux utilisateurs d’archives. Sans doute regretteront-ils que d’autres desiderata ne figurent pas dans les conclusions du conseil Culture tenu suite à ce rapport. On citera le problème de l’harmonisation des délais de communication, qui rencontrait des préoccupations déjà exprimées par les historiens et par le Conseil international des Archives, celui de l’encouragement au rapprochement en cours des procédures d’agrément pour la consultation ou celui de la modélisation à terme des procédures d’élimination et de tri, tant nationale qu’européenne.

Mais on peut espérer que ce programme, bien que d’une amplitude limitée, ne constitue qu’un exorde: une directive recommandant d’adopter ses points de vue contribuerait à la réalisation d’un espace européen de la recherche en créant des conditions de travail similaires dans toute l’Europe. Il constituerait une étape de l’unité du monde scientifique européen.

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This publication on archives in the European Union is available in French, English, German and Spanish.

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The Beginnings of the Court of Justice and its Role as a driving Force in European Integration

Christian Pennera(*)

To date, the Court of Justice of the European Communities has delivered nearly four thousand judgments. The entire collection of the Court's case-law occupies a shelf space of nearly six linear metres in the specialist libraries1.

As an administrative jurisdiction and then a constitutional one for the Communities but also the supreme instance for all the national courts in their implementation of Community law, the Court of Justice has shown itself to be, over the years, a powerful driving force for European integration. The informed observer will see this discreet seat of jurisdiction as in fact the most powerful of the Community institutions whose firm determination to ensure that the treaties are implemented, whether this calls forth praise or opprobrium, has done most to make the Community into a day-to-day reality.

Writings, articles or commentaries on the Court of Justice and its case-law, its practice and procedure are legion. This is as good as saying that a jurist who has been steeped in Community law will not learn a great deal from perusing this article. Here and there, however, a few details about how the Court came into being may perhaps catch the eye of such people.

These lines are intended for historians, who are often put off by legal vocabulary and techniques. For their benefit the author, who is a practitioner of the law in a Community institution but who also has a grounding in scientific historical research, will try to explain how decisive the Court's role was in the early stages of the Community's history. It has been assumed, therefore, that the general historical context may be taken as read2. No reference will be made to specialist publications unless they directly touch upon matters affecting the Court's history.

Grosso modo, this article covers the period up to the mid-sixties. Among the two hundred-odd decisions up to 1965 only those will be mentioned which, from the author's personal point of view but also in the opinion of most commentators, are of key interest.

(*) The opinions expressed by the author, who is an official of the European Parliament and a former official of the Court of Justice, are strictly personal.

1. Reports of Cases before the Court, Volume 1954 to 1956 and following volumes, published in each of the official languages. In certain languages there is a selective translation only for the period preceding the accessions.


Dieses Dokument wurde erstellt mit FrameMaker 4.0.4.
The Court's deliberations shall be and shall remain secret – the papers and documents relating to cases coming before the Court are not open to public scrutiny. However the judgments, comprising the statement of the facts, the summary of the arguments by both sides, the judgment proper and also the opinions of the Advocates General are published and easy to consult in all the official languages. This complete public access to the decisions and the reasons on which they are based make a major contribution towards the spread of Community law and, as such, are a factor making for integration.

The Court of Justice, from its Origins to the Start of its Operations

The Court in the Minds of the Founding Fathers

Although, as we know, neither the Assembly nor the Council of Ministers appeared anywhere in the institutional structure designed by the authors of the Schuman Plan, there was a Court of Justice, or at least an independent control body, supposed from the start to watch over and make sure that what the High Authority did was legal. And so, on 9 May 1950, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs mentioned first the High Authority's autonomy of operations and then went on to say: "There shall be suitable provisions guaranteeing the necessary channels for any appeals against the High Authority's decisions".

It is quite true that thinking on the subject was not yet very clear. It was not clear what the functions of such a body should be, its nature, its composition, the scope of its decisions or the procedures applicable ... Should it be an arbitration committee or a court?

As the negotiations wore on it soon became apparent that, institutionally, the concern of a number of delegations was to add to the guarantees against the powers, considered to be excessive, that it was intended to grant the High Authority.

Hence, by way of a counterweight, there appeared on the scene an Assembly with a watchdog function and then a Council of Ministers as a mouthpiece for the governments and, finally, a court in order to protect, first and foremost, the interests of the Member States and private individuals affected by the doings of the High Authority.

4. In addition to the Reports of Cases before the Court the reader may consult, for example, the work by BOULOUIS-CHEVALLIER, Grands arrêts de la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes, Paris, of which there are numerous editions; EVERSEN-SPERL, Europäische Rechtsprechung, Cologne, in many volumes.
In the context of this Treaty, whose specific nature and originality had now become abundantly obvious, it was seen to be necessary to build up from scratch a legal entity which did not exist, in this particular shape, in any system of law, national or international.

There were very few international courts and their powers, by comparison with what it was proposed to grant the Court of the European Coal and Steel Company (ECSC), were puny. The International Court of Justice in the Hague, set up within the UN framework as the successor to the League of Nations' Permanent International Court of Justice, may well have come to the minds of some, but it was only and is still only competent for disputes between sovereign states brought before it by the states, assuming that they had voluntarily accepted the jurisdiction of such a Court\(^6\).

Within the ECSC framework the situation was entirely different. The signatories had delegated sovereign powers to the ECSC. This meant that disputes were no longer between states, which had been the classical model for international public law, but related essentially to decisions on the part of one of the Community's bodies, first and foremost the High Authority.

By taking the place of the national authorities, albeit only partially, in the exercise of public power, the High Authority was acting on subjects of domestic law – in this case, the undertakings concerned – which could now find themselves facing the judges at the new Court. And so Community law had become, as it were, the domestic law of the freshly created sovereign body.

The model which started henceforth to become obvious, as far as powers and legal proceedings were concerned, was not so much the model of an international court but rather that of a domestic court of an administrative nature, the principles of which were familiar to the six partner countries. It was mainly the model of French administrative law, embodied by the case-law of the French Conseil d'Etat, which served as a guide to the new law's authors headed by Professor Paul Reuter and the Conseiller d'Etat, Maurice Lagrange, who was to become one of the Court's Advocates General\(^7\). This model was all the more suited to all the partners since, from many points of view, it was not basically different from the administrative regimes of the other States concerned. This would most certainly not have been the case if that common law country, the United Kingdom, had been a party to the proceedings from the start.

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The Powers of the Court of Justice in the ECSC Treaty

Article 31 of the ECSC Treaty expresses the Court's overall mandate—, the form of words employed has remained more or less unchanged to this day—as follows:

"The Court shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty, and of rules laid down for the implementation thereof, the law is observed".

First and foremost the Court has to check the legality of the High Authority's decisions and recommendations, whether immediate or with delayed effect. The Court does this by declaring a decision or recommendation null and void, under Articles 33 and 34. Review is likewise available in cases where the High Authority, called upon to act and to take a decision for which the Treaty rendered it responsible, fails to do so within a reasonable period of time, under Article 35.

Annulment may be asked for by the Member States, the Council of Ministers or third parties amenable to the Court's jurisdiction, namely undertakings and associations of undertakings concerned by binding acts adopted by the High Authority.

Action of this kind is a perfect illustration of what French law terms "recours pour excès de pouvoir" (action for excess of power). This action is possible whenever the High Authority exceeds its powers or acts in a field not covered by the Treaty, infringes an essential procedural requirement, such as the conditions laying down the proper majority, violates a provision clearly stated in the Treaty or legal measures implementing the Treaty.

Annulment may also be invoked where there is a misuse of powers, that is to say if the Authority, while acting within the limits of its competence, was nevertheless pursuing an aim which had nothing to do with the case in point. An important detail here is that this argument, or more precisely this ground of annulment, is the only one at the disposal of undertakings and associations of undertakings.

An act of the Council or the Assembly may also be declared null and void on application by a Member State or the High Authority, under Article 38.

In exercising its power to declare something null and void—a typical prerogative of continental administrative courts—the Court becomes the watchdog of private individuals affected by what the public administration, in this case the High Authority, is doing. However, it is also a regulatory body for the respective powers of the protagonists in the internal decision-making process.

Whenever the High Authority imposes fines, an appeal may be brought under Article 36; and whenever it causes injury to a third party, either directly or via its departments, the party concerned may ask for reparation under Article 40. The Court then decides in its own discretion and in effect substitutes its assessment for that of the authority at fault. French law calls this "recours de pleine juridiction" where the Court has unlimited jurisdiction.

Over and beyond these two major functions the ECSC Court has another. It may be asked, through the good offices of a national judge, to interpret a decision by the High Authority. Under the Treaty of Rome, the action for interpretation was to become the Court's major weapon for integration. Although known in French legal terminology, it is peculiar to legal systems with a federal structure and can be
The Court of Justice and its Role as a driving Force in European Integration

traced back not to French law but rather to German law, which establishes the principle in Article 100 of the Grundgesetz (Basic Law).

The Court of Justice of the ECSC drew its inspiration very much – as regards the extent of its powers and its modus operandi – from French administrative justice and yet, in its general concepts, it was not so far removed either from the administrative law of the other Member States. When the Treaty was signed, the ECSC Court of Justice was brand new within a legal system that was itself new and – this is fundamental for any jurisdiction – had no body of case law by which it was bound. So it is hardly surprising that it was able to exert such a strong influence on its own role within the Community system.

Setting up the Court

In exactly the same way as the members of the High Authority, the Court's judges are appointed by the governments acting upon common accord and for a renewable term of six years.

In order to guarantee the independence of the Court's judges, it was decided not to follow the example of the International Court of Justice, whose members are elected for a period of nine years by the General Assembly and the Council, after a delicate procedure for proposals has been gone through. What prevailed was rather the model for domestic administrative courts. Hence, the judges of the ECSC court were appointed by the executive "from among persons whose independence was beyond doubt" (Article 32).

This goes to show that, in the minds of the negotiators, the Court had most certainly not yet been assigned the role of constitutional court that it gradually acquired in the course of the thirty-odd years which followed. If this had been the case, there is no doubt at all that at least the German and Italian delegations would have raised the issue of appointing judges by agreement with a representative assembly. However, in 1951, it was still early days, and some countries, headed by France, were far from taking such a step.

The judges were required to possess all the requisite qualifications. It was not until the advent of the Rome treaties that this concept was defined further, whereby the form of words in Article 2 of the Statutes of the International Court of Justice was taken over almost word for word.

The Court is made up of seven judges, an uneven number intended to make it possible to take majority decisions. However in reality, the Court, like the High

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8. At that time already the system whereby supreme court judges are appointed by a parliamentary authority was known, the judges at the constitutional Court in Karlsruhe being appointed by the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. Without going so far as to follow the example of the US Supreme Court whose members are life-time appointees, Germany’s constitutional judges are appointed for a period of twelve years, not renewable, while in Italy one third of the Constitutional Court’s judges are appointed by Parliament for a period of nine years, not renewable.
Authority, had nine members. Indeed, Article 10 of the Protocol of the Statute of the Court, which was signed together with the Treaty proper, provided for the presence of two Advocates General who, while they were not party to the judgments reached, nevertheless had "acting with complete impartiality and independence, to make, in open court, reasoned submissions on cases brought before the Court, in order to assist the Court in the performance of its task". Thus the "commissaire du gouvernement" known only in French courts now appeared on the scene at the Court of Justice. It was expected of these two persons, who spoke in public and before the judges deliberated, that they should have the same influence which the "commissaires du gouvernement" had exerted in the evolution of domestic administrative law in France.

At the Paris Conference in July 1952, the holders of office were appointed initially and their final appointment did not take place until 2 December 1952. The judges appointed were the Belgian lawyer, Delvaux, the Luxembourg judge, Hammes, the Dutch diplomat and specialist in economic affairs, Van Kleffens, together with his colleague the Christian trade union leader, Serrarens, the French economist, Rueff and the German professor and member of Germany's Bundesverfassungsgericht, Riese.

The office of President went to the Italian lawyer Pilotti who, like Monnet, was a one-time member of the General Secretariat of the League of Nations. Maurice Lagrange and Karl Roemer were appointed Advocates General, so the Court

9. "persons (...) whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the qualifications required for appointment to the highest judicial offices in their respective countries or who are jurisconsults of recognized competence (...)", is a form of words employed from 1958 onwards in Article 32 b of the ECSC Treaty and subsequently in Article 167 of the EC Treaty.

10. After the first enlargement the figure was raised to nine, which was the exact number of Member States, then to eleven with the accession of Greece, the tenth Member State, and finally to thirteen. Contrary to the case for members of the High Authority there was no nationality requirement and we do not know why. The parallel advanced by some, see above in Note 6, with members of the International Court of Justice who are elected without regard to their nationality is not convincing, because the aim in this last-mentioned case is not to guarantee as it were eclectic recruitment but rather to avoid such and such a post going to a particular nationality in a body consisting of fifteen members, a figure less than that of the number of signatory states to the UN Charter. In fact, no person not a national of one of the Member States has ever sat on the Communities' Court of Justice and all the Member States have always been represented on it.

11. The provisions relating to the Advocates General and the Registrar were to be incorporated into the text of the Treaty proper in 1957.


13. Official Journal of the ECSC, 10.2.1953, No. 1 p. 16. The name of the personality put forward in July to represent France was not Jacques Rueff but René Mayer. Germany had not announced any name; the Advocate general, Roemer, was not even appointed, in reality, until 16 January 1953 but the appointment became effective, as was the case for the other members, as of 4 December 1952. Regarding the negotiations that went on concerning some of the persons involved, reference is made to two letters, J. Monnet to R. Schuman, 22 July 1952 in J. Monnet – R. Schuman, Correspondance 1947-1952, Fondation J. Monnet pour l'Europe, Lausanne 1986, pp. 150-153. For a general view see N. CONDORELLI BRAUN, Commissaires et juges dans les Communautés européennes, Paris 1972, 232 pp.
counted among its members two Frenchmen and two Germans. The Netherlands were granted a second judge, thus keeping the panel to an uneven number. Italy was represented by only one judge, but he was the president\textsuperscript{14}.

In Paris it was then decided that, in the same way as the High Authority, the Court should start work in Luxembourg pending the establishment of a provisional seat for the Institutions.

The Court settled rather precariously into unsuitable but sumptuously decorated quarters in the museum which the Villa Vauban had already become. At the same time its courtrooms were installed at the Cercle Municipal in the centre of town, a few hundred metres away from the offices of the members of the Court and its staff\textsuperscript{15}.

Just before the treaties of Rome came into force the President of the Court, consulted as were the other heads of institutions on the matter of the seat of the institutions, made it known that as long as the working hypothesis of having several seats continued, the Court's geographical separation from the other Community bodies did not present any major drawbacks\textsuperscript{16}. In other words, the Court liked Luxembourg.

The single Court of Justice for the three Communities continued to sit in Luxembourg, and this situation was confirmed by the governments in a decision which they reached in April 1965 at the same time as the merger treaty.

Upon the occasion of the Community's first enlargement the Court moved to the "Plateau du Kirchberg", Luxembourg's European headquarters. It occupies the same quarters today; and its seat in Luxembourg is no longer provisional, because with effect from December 1992, it was decided definitively that the Court should sit in Luxembourg\textsuperscript{17}.

The Court started operations on 4 December 1952 when its members were sworn in. Subsequently, it appointed its registrar in the person of the Belgian, Albert Van Houtte. The administrative personnel and the judges' direct assistants were quickly recruited\textsuperscript{18}. The staff increased from just under sixty to eighty in

\textsuperscript{14} In the end, in the overall calculation for major posts, the Netherlands found itself "level pegging" with Belgium since the coopted member of the High Authority, Paul Finet, had raised the number of Belgians on that body to two. The Germans and French, for their part, were in any case initially represented in greater numbers in the two institutions mentioned.

\textsuperscript{15} See A. VAN HOUTTE, Registrar of the Court for some thirty-odd years in XXXV Anni, 1952-1987 (brochure published upon the occasion of the 35th Anniversary of the Court, Curia, Luxembourg, 1987 252 pp.).


\textsuperscript{17} Decision on the location of the seats of the institutions and of certain bodies and departments of the European Communities dealt with in parallel with the Edinburgh Council, OJ C 341, 23 December 1992.

\textsuperscript{18} Article 16 of the Statutes of the ECSC Court also provided for the presence, alongside officials and employees, of assistant rapporteurs whose task it was to "participate in preparatory inquiries in cases pending before the Court and to cooperate with the Judge who acts as Rapporteur". These posts, which it was up to the Council to create acting upon a proposal by the Court, have never seen the light of day although such functions are still been envisaged under Article 12 of the Statute of the European Community's Court. The judges' direct assistants who were at first called "attachés" ended up by being called "référendaires" or "legal secretaries".
1958, but grew only moderately after that, hitting the hundred mark at the end of the sixties\(^{19}\).

On 4 March 1953 the Court drew up its Rules of Procedure which were based partly on the model supplied by the International Court of Justice\(^{20}\). There was confusion at the time about the languages of the new Europe, and the Court felt bound to point out in its Rules that it had four official languages (Article 27).

It also determined the language which would govern all written and oral pleadings in each case. However, the Court specified that "the language in which the draft decision is drawn up shall be determined by the Court". In reality, from the start French was chosen as the "working language" for all internal work, a practice which has continued almost without exception until today\(^{21}\).

**The Court's Work under the AEGIS of the ECSC**

In the early months the Court's role was not an onerous one. So true was this that, when the registrar recorded the first cases which, unfortunately, were settled out of court, champagne was drunk in celebration, so it is said. The serious business started with proceedings initiated by France, followed a few days later by Italy, against the decisions of the High Authority marking the start of a long series of cases referred to today as the "scrap cases".

In its first two rulings, rendered on the same day\(^{22}\), the Court threw into sharp relief a fundamental rule which was invariably to dictate the stance it took, namely, that the treaty must be interpreted and applied in the light of its fundamental aims. Indeed, Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Treaty, which lay down its aims and means of action, constituted "the fundamental provisions establishing the Common Market and common objectives of the Community (...) the Treaty shall oblige the High Authority to take into account all the aims" laid down therein in the definition, for example, of practices which are not allowed.

In going about its affairs the High Authority was required to bear in mind, over and beyond the immediate aims pursued, the Community's task and general objectives. Apart from that, the Court called the High Authority to order: if a provision in the Treaty applying to the High Authority used the verb "must", the High Autho-

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19. Meanwhile, with accessions succeeding one another and a growing number of cases, these figures have increased noticeably. The number of posts recorded in the Court's budget for 1994, including the Court of First Instance which was added to the Court in October 1988, is well over eight hundred persons.


rity had no discretionary power of appraisal and was obliged to act as the Treaty demanded it to do.

A few years later and still under the aegis of the ECSC, the Court was to call this judgment back to mind when it made the first few articles of the Treaty into a collection of binding standards for the implementation of the Treaty. The Court said "The express reference made to Article 3 does not release the High Authority from its duty to observe the other articles of the Treaty and in particular Articles 2, 4 and 5 which, together with Article 3, must always be observed because they establish the fundamental objectives of the Community. Those provisions are binding and must be read together if they are to be properly applied."

The first two decisions of 1955 offered the particular characteristic that the initiators or applicants were two legal persons, i.e. Italian firms. It so happens that, although the Treaty does allow proceedings for annulment to be started by private persons, they are permitted to rely only on a very uncertain ground of annulment known as "misuse of powers" - a narrow interpretation of which would have meant, in effect, that the Court was barring private individuals from access to Community justice and reducing the scope of the remedy almost to zero.

However, brushing aside the view expressed by the Advocate General who had been exhorting it to "resist the temptation for any court, especially if it is of last instance, to make law accord with equity" the Court decided that for proceedings to be admissible, it would suffice if the applicant could formally "allege misuse of powers". To be allowed to plead, the plaintiff did not have to prove that there had been misuse of powers, which was left for appraisal by the Court of the merits of the case. It was clearly the Court's intention to make sure that a private applicant would be able to take individual action effectively and easily, which was far from clear on the basis of the text of the Treaty on its own.

In 1956, in the first case of the year, there surfaced the capital concept of direct applicability. After noting that certain trading practices were banned both by Article 4 and by other articles in the Treaty, such as Article 67, the Court declared that provisions relating to one and the same measure should be considered together, for the sake of proper application upon the same occasion. In pursuit of its judgments for the year 1954 the Court declared that "the provisions of Article 4 are sufficient of themselves and are directly applicable when they are not restated in any part of the Treaty". In practice, therefore, the "special charges imposed by the Member States in any form whatsoever" referred to in Article 4 (c) of the Treaty were henceforth banned.

That is how the fundamental principle of the direct applicability of Community law came to be laid down and, consequently, the primacy of Community law over conflicting domestic law. The potential for this principle, of course, was not to be

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24. Cases 3 and 4/54, 11 February 1955, [1954 to 1956] ECR 63 and 91. The text of the corresponding article in the EEC Treaty (173) proved ultimately to be much more restrictive towards the individual, and the Court was unable to interpret it extensively; in which respect see, for example, Cases 16 and 17/62, 14 December 1962, [1962] ECR 471.
made use of until a few years later with, as we shall be seeing, the appearance on
the scene of actions for interpretation provided for by the Treaty of Rome.25

Meanwhile, the Court had seen submitted to it the first "staff cases" which were
to continue increasing in number but which made it possible to forge administrative
case-law that was as complete as it was consistent.26 It was to a staff case, for
instance, that we owe the Court’s first stance on the subject of withdrawal or can-
cellation of an illegal act by the administration and the effects resulting therefrom.
It was upon this point, more particularly, that the Court was to have recourse to the
method of comparative law in order to hammer out its doctrine. Since it was seen
that the Treaty did not give any clues in this respect, the Court saw itself obliged
unless it was to deny justice "to solve the problem by reference to the rules ack-
nowledged by the legislation, the learned writing and the case-law of the member
countries".27 Subsequently, as the Court’s case-law gradually became consolida-
ted, the comparative law method lost some of its importance on account of the
specific nature of Community law.28

The closing months of the Court’s activities under the aegis of the ECSC proper
witnessed a number of decisions reached by the Court which were all favourable to
applicants.

We have already mentioned the judicial interpretation which widely opened up
the way for action on the part of private individuals. In a case judged on 13 June
1958 a firm asked for a decision which had damaged its interests to be annulled,
invoking to this end the irregularity of a preceding general decision which it had
been impossible to attack at the time because the time limit to bring an action had
already expired. Interestingly enough the ECSC Treaty says nothing, except in a
restrictive sense in Article 36, on the subject of this machinery which in administra-
tive law is referred to as the "objection on the grounds of illegality".

As always with the intention of making it easier for private individuals to start
proceedings, the Court began by saying that, in reality, Article 36, paragraph 3, of
the ECSC Treaty constituted a general principle. Indeed, if it were not possible to
claim that earlier general decisions were irregular, it would be almost impossible
for individual firms to exercise their right to take proceedings. Otherwise they

25. Cases 7 and 9/54, 23 April 1956, [1954 to 1956] ECR 175. This case is the first example of the
application of Article 35 of the ECSC Treaty, the predecessor of the action for failure to act on the
part of an institution under Article 175 of the EC Treaty. Two years later, the Court was to confirm
this decision and extend it to the group of rules consisting of Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Treaty : 
Case 8/57, cited in Note 23.
institutions lost these first two cases brought against them by their staff.
the existence of a “principle generally accepted in the legal systems of the Member States [ accor-
ding to which ] equality of treatment in the matter of economic rules does not prevent different
prices being fixed in accordance with the particular situation of consumers” : Case 8/57, cited in 
Note 23.
28. The opinions of the Advocates General were best suited to such exercises of comparative law.
Advocate General Lagrange excelled in these : see, for example, his study of the concept of
"misuse of powers" in the case mentioned in Note 23 above.
would be forced, whenever a general decision was published, to seek out in it all such provisions as might subsequently cause them injury. Here, the Court clearly added to the body of judge-made law by having recourse to the concept of a provision's meaning and effectiveness ("effet utile"), which was to prove one of the cornerstones of its future case-law.

This same decision lays down yet another constitutional principle which heralds major case-law of the eighties. Indeed, in relation to a delegation of powers which the High Authority had granted within the framework of Article 53 of the Treaty and the exercise of which could jeopardize the competence of the other institutions, the Court pointed to the place occupied by the High Authority in the task which Article 3 entrusts to all the Community institutions "within the limits of their respective powers in the common interest". The Court said that through this provision "there can be seen in the balance of powers, which is characteristic of the institutional structure of the Community, a fundamental guarantee granted by the Treaty".

Institutional matters continued to occupy the Court's attention. It declared, for example, that in the quest for a "common interest" within the meaning of Article 3, the High Authority must act with circumspection and care in its appraisal of the various interests at stake; under that proviso, it was at liberty to employ its regulatory powers as circumstances dictated, even to the detriment of certain private interests.

After a marathon hearing on 26 June 1958 at which four long judgments were delivered the ECSC Court formally terminated its functions pending its official replacement by the single Court, the Treaty of Rome having come into force in the meantime.

29. On the concept of effectiveness, which was to facilitate considerably the interpretation of the texts in a sense favourable to integration, the Court expressed the following view, as early as 1956: "The Court considers that without having recourse to a wide interpretation it is possible to apply a rule of interpretation generally accepted in both international and national law, according to which the rules laid down by an international treaty or a law presuppose the rules without which that treaty or law would have no meaning or could not be reasonably and usefully applied. Furthermore, under the terms of Article 8 of the Treaty it shall be the duty of the High Authority to ensure that the objectives set out in that Treaty are attained in accordance with the provisions thereof. It must be concluded from that provision, which is the guiding principle for the powers of the High Authority defined in Chapter I of the Treaty, that it enjoys a certain independence in determining the implementing measures necessary for the attainment of the objectives referred to in the Treaty or in the Convention which forms an integral part thereof." (Case 8/55, 26 November 1956, [1954 to 1956] ECR 292).

30. Cases 9 and 10/56, 13 June 1958, [1957 and 1958] ECR 133 and 157. The impression of daring which this decision gives is to be explained perhaps by the fact that the EEC Treaty, which was already in force on the day that the judgment was passed, expressly provides in Article 184 for the device of the plea of illegality. What is said about the balance of powers reflects the concept of the attribution of competence laid down in Article 4 of the EC Treaty.

In its Opinion of 17 December 1959 on the "minor revision" of Article 95, the Court was to come back to the concept of the balance of powers but, this time, in the relations between the Institutions and the Member States. [1959] ECR 260.

From December 1954 to June 1958 the Court passed twenty-seven judgments, although the number of cases brought before it was about twice that figure. The difference is explained by the fact that either litigants took the initiative of withdrawing actions, or a number of related cases were joined in one and the same decision.

Twenty cases were brought by individuals against the High Authority, while three were initiated by Member States and four others by Community officials.

With the exception of one set of proceedings for interpretation of an earlier decision and litigation relating more particularly to officials, all the cases brought before the Court sought to annul decisions under Article 33 or Article 35 of the ECSC Treaty.

The lessons already to be learned at that stage from the Court's case-law were not inconsiderable. The principle of effectiveness ("effet utile") had been asserted and associated with the concept of the preponderance of fundamental objectives in any general interpretation of the Treaty. Certain provisions had been declared directly applicable, and the concept of institutional balance and respect for the competence of the various institutions had likewise been established. There was a marked resolve to make access to the Court easy, via a very liberal interpretation of the formal conditions and by enlarging the concept of the "objection on the grounds of illegality".

The Beginnings of the European Communities' single Court

Setting up the Single Court and the major Innovations of the Rome Treaties

Both the Rome treaties were supplemented by two protocols on the Statutes of their respective Court of Justice, since each contained as did the ECSC Treaty provisions that were peculiar to its own system of jurisdiction.

As opposed to the case for those institutions described as "executive" and which were not brought together until the Merger Treaty of 1965, the Assembly and the Court resulting from the three treaties were, immediately in 1957, declared to be 'single' institutions. This meant in fact setting up one court only which, with the same staff and the same administration, would be called upon to pass judgment, depending upon the litigation, in the fields of competence of the ECSC Treaty, the

32. At that time decisions were read in their entirety including both facts and legal arguments and, finally, the judgment proper. The same applied to the opinions of the Advocates General. This could take hours. Today, this practice has disappeared: the public pronouncement of the judgment is reduced to the reading out of its operative part, for example the decision to annul or not to annul, and the order for costs. A similar procedure applies to the opinions of the Advocates General.

33. The protocols on the Statutes of the Court of Justice of the EEC on the one hand and of EURATOM on the other, were signed in Brussels on 17 April 1957. As is well known, the EURATOM Treaty was not at the heart of Community activities, and no mention will be made of it here. The remedies which it instituted are similar to those laid down by the EEC Treaty.
The Court of Justice and its Role as a driving Force in European Integration

European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) Treaty. Hence the new Court's title, which has remained unchanged ever since, of the Court of Justice of the European Communities.34

In the coming into force of the Rome treaties on 1 January 1958 the single Court had not yet been constituted. It started operations, as laid down in Article 244 of the EEC Treaty, with the appointment of its seven judges and two advocates general, on 6 October 1958. As well as the two Advocates General of the ECSC Court, the terms of office of the judges, Delvaux, Hammes, Riese and Rueff were renewed for a further six years. The office of President went to a young Dutch professor, Andreas Donner. Henceforth Italy was to have two posts, one of which went to a judge, Nino Rossi, and the other to a former ECSC lawyer and adviser to the Italian delegation for the Rome negotiations, Nicola Catalano.35

In its first years of operation the Single Court of Justice dealt for the main part with cases coming under the ECSC Treaty. In March 1961, the first case concerning the EEC Treaty came before it, and the decision in favour of the Commission and against Italy was rendered at the end of that same year, 1961.36

In broad outline the system for actions under the ECSC Treaty remained, albeit subject to various modifications.

This was the case, in particular, of applications for annulment which were now open, indistinctly, in respect of both Commission and Council measures, reflecting the changes which had taken place in the decision-making power (Article 173 of the EEC Treaty).37

Henceforth, not only undertakings but any natural or legal person directly and individually concerned by such measures could take proceedings. However, it was

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34. According to the Convention on certain institutions common to the European Communities, signed in Rome alongside with the treaties, the jurisdiction which the EEC Treaty and the Euratom Treaty confer upon the Court of Justice shall be exercised, in accordance with those Treaties, by a single Court of Justice. This single Court of Justice thus replaced the Court established under the ECSC Treaty: hence the need, under the same Convention, to render uniform the provisions concerning the ECSC court. It had only one set of Rules of procedure (OJ No 18 of 21 March 1959).

35. Delvaux, Hammes, Roemer and Catalano were subject to the rule of three-yearly replacement in October 1961, but all were confirmed in office. Catalano resigned a few days later and was replaced by the Italian professor, Trabucchi. In October 1962 professor Riese retired, having lost the chance of becoming president of the Single Court so that the chances of Halstein heading the EEC Commission would not be spoiled. He was succeeded by a senior civil servant, Walter Strauss. Jacques Rueff, whose exercise of judicial duties had been characterized by a number of vicissitudes (in which respect, see the work by N. CONDORELLI BRAUN cited above in Note 13, p. 187), was replaced, after resigning in May 1962, by Robert Lecourt who in 1967 acceded to the post of President of a Court on which he left his mark. On the subject of the Single Court's early years, the article by President Donner in the work XXXV Anni cited above in Note 15, is pleasant reading.


37. Unlike the position under Article 38 of the ECSC Treaty, it was not possible to apply for the annulment of acts of the Parliament. In the eighties, this gave rise to a considerable judicial battle involving a number of decisions and a reversal of the case-law. The rule worked out by the judges was officially enshrined in the Treaty of Maastricht.
quickly realized that in reality the EEC Treaty, despite the advantageous form of words it employed, actually restricted access to the courts by individuals.\(^{38}\)

The action for failure to act (Article 35 of the ECSC Treaty) was reinforced and slightly modified from the point of view of the technique used under Article 175 of the EEC Treaty, the same being true of the action for damages enshrined in Article 178 of the EEC Treaty.

Two types of action, the embryo of which existed already in the ECSC Treaty, were taken a lot further with the intention of strengthening the authority of Community law in national legal systems. They were soon to prove of redoubtable effectiveness in the hands of the judges of the single Court.

The ECSC Treaty had dealt only in its tailpiece (namely, Article 88 in the General Provisions) with failure on the part of a Member State to fulfil its obligations. The EEC Treaty brought this action to the forefront of the judicial arsenal, in Articles 169 and 170. Under the ECSC rules the High Authority had been the sole party to take the initiative of noting that there had been a failure to fulfil obligations.

From now on, however, it was up to the Court to do so at the request either of the Commission or of another Member State, while the Member State at fault was obliged to remedy matters.

The other development, whose potential had probably not been suspected by the authors of the Treaty, concerned requests for interpretation, known as preliminary rulings, under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty. Article 41 of the ECSC Treaty already contained the embryo of this mechanism, and the Community court developed its scope in a decisive way, as we shall now see.

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Famous Decisions of the early Sixties

In substance, what Article 177 of the EEC Treaty does is to lay down that when a national court is confronted with a question of interpretation of Community law, it shall suspend judgment and ask the Court of Justice of the Communities to provide the solution. The latter Court then pronounces an interpretative judgment which it sends to the national judge, who is obliged to take account of it in his judgment on the actual case. This is referred to as proceedings for a preliminary ruling.

It was by means of this same procedure that in February 1963 and July 1964 the Court of Justice was to pronounce two of its most celebrated judgments which laid down the fundamental rules for the further development of European integration.

A Dutch manufacturer of glue, the firm of Van Gend & Loos, had imported chemical products from Germany. Whereas on 1 January 1958, the date when the Treaty came into force, the customs duty had still been three percent, it had subsequently been raised to eight per cent. The Dutch courts, to whom the litigation had

\(^{38}\) Cases 16 and 17/62, 14 December 1962, \([1962] \text{ECR} \ 471\). The authors of the Treaty thus took it on themselves to put an end to the very broad interpretation which the ECSC judges had given to actions by private persons, examples of which have been given above.
been submitted, asked the Court for an interpretation of Article 12 of the Treaty according to which "the Member States shall refrain from introducing between themselves any new customs duties".

In law, the question could be summed up as follows. May private individuals who are subject to national law, directly invoke Community law? Are they then able, before the national courts, to oppose Community law to their national law which appears to be in conflict with the Community rule?

While three Member States, as is their prerogative, joined in the proceedings to oppose such an interpretation, the Court of Justice, acting against the advice of its Advocate General, pronounced a judgment which was so clear that it will suffice here to reproduce the main passages only:

"(...) this Treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates obligations between the contracting states;

(...)

(...) the task assigned to the Court of Justice under Article 177, the object of which is to secure uniform interpretation of the Treaty by national courts and tribunals, confirms that the states have acknowledged that Community law has an authority which can be invoked by their nationals before those courts and tribunals.

The Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals. Independently of the legislation of Member States, Community law therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage.

These rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by the Treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as upon the Member States and upon the institutions of the Community."

The Court continued, rejecting the argument of the Member States based on the existence of actions for annulment:

"(...) the fact that [Articles 169 and 170] of the Treaty enable the Commission and the Member States to bring before the Court a State which has not fulfilled its obligations does not mean that individuals cannot plead these obligations, should the occasion arise, before a national court, any more than the fact that the Treaty places at the disposal of the Commission ways of ensuring that obligations imposed upon those subject to the Treaty are observed, precludes the possibility, in actions between individuals before a national court, of pleading infringements of these obligations.

A restriction of the guarantees against an infringement of Article 12 by Member States to the procedures under Article 169 and 170 would remove all direct legal protection of the individual rights of their nationals."

This basic judgment establishes the principle of the direct effect of Community law, namely numerous articles in the Treaty proper, regulations and, to a certain

extent, directives. When this principle first appeared in the case-law of the ECSC Court, it applied to the Member States; but now, with the advent of the Van Gend & Loos judgment, it applied directly to individuals.

Individuals, therefore, may not only rely directly on Community rules against other private individuals with regard, for example, to agreements, employment and free movement, but may also plead subjective rights deriving from Community rules and which have henceforth become "part of their legal heritage", as the Court put it, against the Member States of which they are nationals.

Henceforth, and this is the second major contribution from this body of case-law, the national judge was to become, as it were, the common law judge for Community matters with instructions to address the Court of Justice whenever interpretation was called for.

None other than President Lecourt, an ardent defender of the principle of direct effect, was to sum up the consequences of the judgment of February 1963 and, indeed, who could have done so better? Here is what he says in his book "L'Europe des juges":

"The mechanism of direct effect thus played a primordial role in the execution of the Treaty. It is because individuals put it into effect before their judges, that Community law implanted itself in such record time. If there existed a Community Order of Merit it ought to be awarded to such individuals (...)."

When a private individual goes to court for recognition of the rights accruing to him under the treaties, it is not only in his own interest; he becomes as it were a kind of auxiliary servant of the Community. In taking up the common rule and calling upon his judge to apply it to him, he is giving the judge the opportunity to introduce the rule into the domestic legal order.

(...) In opening up the courts to individuals, direct effect has been a key factor for legal interpenetration throughout all the Member States.

However, what is more, this principle has also demonstrated its effectiveness as a kind of supplementary instrument for the implementation of the Treaties by the Member States themselves. If the Community had had to wait for judgments of the Court for failure on the part of the Member States to fulfil their obligations, where would the Community stand today?

This judgment was to be followed a year later by another milestone of Community case-law, likewise the fruit of an application for a preliminary ruling.

An Italian consumer, Mr Costa, contested a bill drawn up by an electricity company which had recently been nationalized, namely, ENEL. Before the Italian judge, Mr Costa claimed that there was a conflict between the nationalization law and the Treaty of Rome. In the face of Italy's argument to the effect that the Italian judge was bound to apply domestic law without reference to Community law, the Court of Justice, to which the case had been submitted for interpretation, replied:

"The executive force of Community law cannot vary from one State to another in
derference to subsequent domestic laws. (...) the law stemming from the Treaty, an
independent source of law, cannot, because of its special and original nature, be
overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being deprived of
its character as Community law and without the legal basis of the Community itself
being called into question. The transfer by the States from their domestic legal
system to the Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising under the
Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights, against which
a subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the concept of the Community cannot
prevail.

Consequently Article 177 is to be applied regardless of any domestic law, whenever
questions relating to the interpretation of the Treaty arise."\(^\text{41}\)

In this way, the primacy of Community law was expressed in a form of words
which dissipated any doubts which may have persisted among the Member States
in their reading of the judgment Van Gend & Loos.

A few years after assuming office the seven judges of the Court of Justice of the
European Communities had laid down an interpretation which must have surprised
more than one of the negotiators of the Rome treaties.

The "control body" mentioned by Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950 had turned,
to the great discomfiture of certain commentators\(^\text{42}\), into a powerful driving force
for European integration.

\textit{Christian Pennera}

\(^{42}\) See, for example, J.P. COLIN, \textit{Le gouvernement des juges dans les Communautés européennes},
Historiens de l’Europe contemporaine
Historians of contemporary Europe

Lettre d’Information du Groupe de Liaison des professeurs d’histoire auprès de la Commission Européenne et du réseau des Chaires Jean Monnet en Histoire de l’intégration européenne

Newsletter of the European Community Liaison Committee of Historians and of the Jean Monnet Chairs in History of European Integration

Publié deux fois par an depuis 1986, Historiens de l’Europe contemporaine – Historians of Contemporary Europe publie, à côté d’articles, résultats de recherches en cours, une importante bibliographie courante des thèses et mémoires, livres et articles consacrés à la construction européenne au XXᵉ siècle. D’autres rubriques rendent compte de colloques et conférences, présentent l’état de la documentation, les programmes des instituts et centres de recherche et annoncent les recherches en cours.


Les abonnés du Journal of European Integration History reçoivent automatiquement, à titre gratuit, la Newsletter of the European Community Liaison Committee.
La première institution supranationale: du nouveau sur l'histoire de la Haute Autorité de la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l’acier

*Marie-ThérèseBitsch*

La Haute Autorité de la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l’acier (CECA) vient de faire l'objet d'une étude aussi originale qu'approfondie publiée en langue française aux éditions Bruylant (Bruxelles, 1993, 919 pages) et en version anglaise chez Weidenfeld and Nicolson (Londres, 1994, 686 pages). Fruit d'une coopération étroite entre un historien français spécialiste de relations internationales, Raymond Poidevin, et un acteur, le diplomate néerlandais Dirk Spierenburg, membre de la Haute Autorité pendant dix ans, de sa création à 1962 (et vice-président pendant les cinq dernières années) ce livre évoque non seulement la mise en place, la composition et le fonctionnement de la première institution supranationale mais aussi ses interventions dans les secteurs du charbon et de l'acier ainsi que ses relations avec les autres organisations européennes, avec les Etats membres de la CECA ou les pays tiers. C'est dire la richesse et la complexité de cet ouvrage où certains chapitres relativement techniques et d'un abord quelque peu ardu traduisent bien la gestation parfois laborieuse de l'action menée par la Haute Autorité dans des conditions souvent difficiles.


*La question de la "genèse" du Plan Schuman, déjà bien connue notamment par les travaux de Pierre Gerbet et plusieurs articles de Raymond Poidevin, est évoquée succinctement en introduction. Si l'idée d'une organisation internationale pour les industries de base est dans l'air du temps, le projet de pool charbon-acier élaboré au printemps 1950 par une petite équipe autour de Jean Monnet, alors Commissaire général au Plan, et pris en charge, politiquement, par le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Robert Schuman, présente une double originalité: il veut constituer la première étape vers une intégration européenne plus vaste en préparant une union économique générale susceptible de déboucher sur une véritable fédération; il veut y parvenir en mettant sur pied une institution supranationale, dotée de "pouvoirs limités mais réels", la Haute Autorité. Invention incontestablement française, le*
Plan Schuman a aussi des "origines américaines" en raison des pressions exercées par le Département d'Etat en faveur d'un rapprochement franco-allemand dans le cadre d'une union européenne, voire des origines allemandes puisque bon nombre de dirigeants d'outre-Rhin appellent de leurs vœux une internationalisation de la sidérurgie afin d'échapper aux mesures discriminatoires liées à la défaite de 1945.

L'attitude favorable de Bonn et de Washington est de bon augure pour le plan français mais les négociations de Paris ne sont pas faciles pour autant. Les premiers contacts entre les Six, avant même l'ouverture de la conférence le 20 juin, montrent que les discussions seront serrées sur les aspects institutionnels comme sur les questions techniques. Les trois États du Benelux en particulier n'entendent pas se laisser imposer par Paris – ou par un couple franco-allemand – des solutions contraires à leurs intérêts. Le premier chapitre de l'ouvrage contribue à démolir une légende tenace faisant des pays du Benelux des partisans depuis toujours inconditionnels de l'idée européenne, y compris supranationale. Il montre comment les délégués des trois États se concertent pour mieux défendre leurs positions et obtenir un traité leur donnant toutes garanties. Benelux veut éviter une ingérence trop forte de la Haute Autorité dans les politiques économiques nationales, donc fixer ses pouvoirs et ses missions de manière claire et l'encadrer par des garde-fous, notamment un contre-pouvoir intergouvernemental, le Conseil des ministres, où chacun des États membres aura son représentant et qui devra donner son avis conforme à certaines décisions de la Haute Autorité. Fruit de compromis, le traité du 18 avril 1951 est bien plus précis et contraignant que le traité-cadre que Jean Monnet envisageait au départ.

Il faut attendre encore plus d'un an pour voir naître effectivement la Haute Autorité. La ratification finalement acquise dans les six pays s'est heurtée à l'hostilité des milieux d'affaires – surtout en Belgique et en France – qui dénoncent le danger de dirigisme international systématique et à l'opposition de presque toutes les forces politiques de gauche qui s'abstiennent (socialistes du Benelux) ou votent contre le traité (partis communistes, sociaux-démocrates allemands, socialistes nenniens en Italie). Il faut aussi se mettre d'accord à Six pour savoir où installer la nouvelle organisation. La première "bataille du siège" illustre bien les divergences d'intérêt. Paris, "grande" capitale d'où était venue l'initiative de créer la CECA, suscite la méfiance des partenaires de la France et n'a pratiquement aucune chance. Mais le choix n'est pas évident entre les candidats potentiels: Liège, Luxembourg, Sarrebruck, La Haye, Turin, Strasbourg. Sous-jacent au débat se profile l'alternative entre une capitale unique et une dispersion des principales institutions entre plusieurs villes. C'est en désespoir de cause, après une nuit blanche et une négociation à rebondissements multiples, que les Six décident, sur la proposition de Joseph Bech qui avait très bien préparé le dossier, de "commencer à travailler" à Luxembourg. C'est donc dans une ville qui, au départ, ne se déclare même pas siège provisoire que s'installent la Haute Autorité et les autres institutions de la CECA à l'exception de l'Assemblée commune qui se réunit à Strasbourg.

Telle qu'elle est prévue par le Traité de Paris, la Haute Autorité forme un collège de neuf membres, dont huit choisis d'un commun accord par les gouvernements des
Six, le neuvième étant coopté par ses pairs. C'est dans l'espoir d'éviter une hégémonie franco-allemande que les quatre autres pays et notamment le Benelux ont souhaité cette Haute Autorité relativement large – neuf membres et non cinq comme le proposait Monnet – afin que chaque pays puisse y avoir un représentant au moins, même si, une fois nommés, ils s'engagent à exercer leur activité en toute indépendance, y compris à l'égard des gouvernements qui les ont désignés.

Le collège qui entre en fonction le 10 août 1952 constitue une équipe prestigieuse mais hétérogène par l'âge, l'expérience professionnelle, la sensibilité politique, la culture économique, interventionniste ou libérale... Elle comprend des politiques: le Belge Albert Coppé, économiste de formation, ancien député chrétien-social de Flandre et ancien ministre; l'Allemand Franz Etzel, député CDU (démocrate-chrétien) influent et proche d'Adenauer; l'Italien Enzo Giacchero, démocrate-chrétien mais aussi proche d'Altiero Spinelli; des syndicalistes: le Belge Paul Finet, coopté par la Haute Autorité, qui a été secrétaire général de la Fédération générale du travail de Belgique (FGTB), l'Allemand Heinz Potthoff, influent dans la grande centrale syndicale Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) et chef de la délégation allemande à l'Autorité internationale de la Ruhr (AIR); des diplomates comme le Luxembourgeois Albert Wehrer ou le Néerlandais Dirk Spierenburg, depuis 1947 chef de la mission permanente auprès de l'Organisation européenne de coopération économique (OECE), ainsi qu'un patron de la sidérurgie, le Français Léon Daum. La Haute Autorité est présidée par Jean Monnet qui en a été l'initiateur – même si l'institution, y compris son nom, a été imaginée par son ami le juriste Paul Reuter – et qui, avec son imagination, sa ténacité, sa grande puissance de travail, va continuer à en être le promoteur pendant près de trois ans. Cette première équipe reste en place jusqu'en 1959 à l'exception de Monnet qui démissionne après l'échec de la Communauté européenne de défense (CED). Après des mois de tractations, les démarches d'Adenauer et de Spaak pour faire revenir sur sa décision un Monnet qui tergiverse, les manœuvres de Paris hostile à son maintien, les Six finissent par désigner comme successeur, un autre Français, René Mayer, député radical de Constantine, ancien ministre et ancien président du Conseil, partisan de la CECA dès la première heure. Démissionnaire lui-même fin 1957, il est remplacé à la présidence par Paul Finet.

Après le renouvellement général du collège en 1959, la présidence de la Haute Autorité revient à un Italien, d'abord au démocrate-chrétien Piero Malvestiti, membre de la Commission de la CEE depuis 1958, puis à une autre personnalité de la démocratie-chrétienne Dino Del Bo qui se maintient jusqu'en 1967. Dans la nouvelle équipe, à côté de quelques anciens qui restent (Spierenburg et Potthoff jusqu'en 1962, Finet, Coppé), arrivent des hommes qui, en dehors du socialiste français Pierre-Olivier Lapie et de l'Allemand Fritz Hellwig député CDU lié aux milieux industriels, ont sensiblement moins de poids et de prestige, ce qui contribue alors, dans les années 1960, à un certain affaiblissement de l'institution.

Le collège des neuf est secondé par une administration qui est l'objet d'une investigation très minutieuse de la part des deux auteurs. Ils montrent qu'elle devient rapidement une machine beaucoup plus lourde que ne le voulait Jean Monnet et qui compte neuf cent cinquante agents au début des années 1960. Créée de toutes
pièces, non sans beaucoup de tâtonnements, cette première fonction publique euro-
pièce adopte quelques règles plus ou moins explicites: respect d'un certain équi-
libre entre nationalités surtout pour les postes à responsabilité, priorité à la
compétence étant entendu qu'on espère attirer les meilleurs grâce aux salaires élé-
vés. Le statut du personnel, arrêté seulement en décembre 1955 lorsque René
Mayer cherche à insuffler une plus grande rigueur dans cette administration,
n'exclut pas une certaine souplesse dans la pratique.

L'organigramme de cette administration n'est pas, lui non plus, très rigide. Très
vite, à l'automne 1952, se mettent en place un certain nombre de services ou "divi-
sions": production, investissement, marché, questions sociales, transport, statisti-
que, service financier... et surtout service juridique qui est consulté par tous et joue
rapidement un rôle essentiel. Afin de faciliter la préparation des décisions de la
Haute Autorité sont créés aussi des groupes de travail, présidés chacun par un
membre du collège et comprenant une ou plusieurs divisions. Ces groupes sont au
nombre de six au départ: Marché-Entente-Transport, Investissements-Production,
Travail, Relations extérieures, Objectifs généraux, Questions administratives. Mais
les compétences n'étant pas toujours clairement réparties, la révision de l'organi-
gramme est presque constamment à l'ordre du jour. Chaque nouveau président
cherche à améliorer le fonctionnement de l'administration, à éviter les double
emplois, à obtenir plus d'efficacité. Parvenir à une organisation plus rationnelle
devient un véritable leitmotiv mais le résultat ne paraît jamais tout à fait satis-
faisant. René Mayer, fermement déterminé à remodeler les groupes de travail n’a
pas le temps d'appliquer ses idées. La scission envisagée du gigantesque groupe
Marché-Entente-Transport n'intervient qu'à l'ére Finet qui réalise une réorganisa-
tion générale autour de huit groupes de travail. Avec Malvestiti, de nouveaux
aménagements ramènent le nombre de groupes à sept. Mais l'enjeu essentiel est
alors surtout de limiter le nombre de services et de directions générales pour per-
mettre une économie de personnel, surtout de rang élevé.

Si l'organigramme paraît très mouvant, il existe par contre une grande perma-
nence des hommes. Présents dès 1952, Pierre Uri, à la tête de la division économi-
que, et Michel Gaudet, codirecteur du service juridique, restent jusqu'à leur départ
à Bruxelles en 1958. La division financière est dirigée pendant plusieurs années par
Paul Delouvrier (nommé ensuite délégué général en Algérie par de Gaulle) puis par
son adjoint Hans Skribanowitz. Pendant des années, les mêmes responsables
s'occupent du charbon (Hermann Dehnen), de l'acier (Tony Rollmann), des problè-
mes sociaux (François Vinck). Le secrétariat général confié à Max Kohnstamm par
Monnet passe, à l'époque Mayer, à Edmond Wellenstein qui s'occupe aussi des
relations extérieures et de l'information. Ces "grands commis" de l'Europe sont
aussi compétents que dévoués à l'institution et étroitement associés à l'élaboration
des décisions puisque les chefs de services participent habituellement aux séances
de la Haute Autorité lorsqu'une question de leur ressort est en discussion.

A la lecture de l'ouvrage se dégage l'impression que la vie de la Haute Autorité est,
dans les premiers temps du moins, une invention de tous les jours. Sans autres réfé-
rences qu'un traité de cent articles et quelques textes annexes, elle doit définir ses
relations avec les autres institutions de la CECA, avec les États membres, les tiers, les organisations internationales tout en développant une action multiforme dans les secteurs du charbon et de l'acier.

Le système institutionnel de la CECA qui, en 1957, sert à la fois de modèle aux Traités de Rome qui reprennent l'architecture quadripartite – Commission, Conseil des ministres, Assemblée, Cour de Justice – et de contre-modèle dans la mesure où les éléments supranationaux sont atténués, fonctionne un peu différemment de l'Union européenne. La Haute Autorité est un véritable exécutif qui peut non seulement donner des avis et des recommandations mais aussi prendre des décisions et ses présidents entendent bien lui faire jouer ce rôle sans trop se laisser freiner ou influencer par les gouvernements. Monnet voudrait régler les conflits de compétence en établissant la suprématie de la Haute Autorité par rapport au Conseil des ministres qu'il traite avec désinvolture, le faisant attendre lors de ses sessions, l'informant au dernier moment de certaines propositions, essayant d'intimider son secrétaire pour modifier des procès-verbaux... Mais la Haute Autorité a besoin de l'avis conforme du Conseil des ministres pour prendre certaines décisions et, à la longue, il apparaît que très souvent la Haute Autorité consulte le Conseil, même quand elle n'y est pas obligée, comme pour partager le fardeau ou pour faire émerger une solution qui ne s'impose pas toujours d'emblée au sein d'un collège parfois divisé. Ainsi s'établissent entre les deux exécutifs des relations complexes du type coopération-rivalité-affrontement. En cas de désaccord, les gouvernements peuvent aussi laisser planer la menace d'un recours auprès de la Cour de Justice – ou la saisir effectivement – afin de faire annuler une décision de la Haute Autorité.

Avec l'Assemblée commune, la Haute Autorité entretient des rapports à la fois plus distants et moins conflictuels. Pourtant l'Assemblée, qui ne détient aucune parcelle de pouvoir législatif ou budgétaire, apparaît comme un organe de contrôle par excellence. Elle discute et approuve le rapport annuel de la Haute Autorité, pose des questions écrites ou orales et peut censurer la Haute Autorité en réunissant la majorité des deux tiers de voix exprimées et la majorité absolue des membres. En fait, les deux instances n'en sont jamais venues à une confrontation dure. La Haute Autorité traite l'Assemblée avec égards; son président – ou l'un de ses membres – vient volontiers à Strasbourg expliquer sa politique en cherchant à trouver un appui dans l'Assemblée qui, tout en n'épargnant pas les critiques, joue plutôt le rôle d'aiguillon, notamment dans la politique sociale, que celui de censeur.

La Haute Autorité doit aussi définir la nature de ses relations avec les six gouvernements. N'étant pas une organisation internationale de type classique, la Haute Autorité – supranationale – n'est pas extérieure aux États membres. Monnet estime, par conséquent, qu'il n'y a pas lieu d'établir de représentations permanentes des États membres auprès de la CECA. Il veut au contraire pouvoir contacter directement les gouvernements et les administrations. Mais qui (quel ministère ?) doit être alors l'intermédiaire privilégié de la Haute Autorité ? A cette question, chacun des six États donne une réponse qui lui est propre. A Paris, un comité interministériel chargé des questions concernant la CECA devient l'interlocuteur privilégié de Luxembourg. En République fédérale d'Allemagne (RFA), face à la rivalité entre
les Affaires étrangères et les Affaires économiques, le chancelier Adenauer arbitre en faveur du ministère de l'Économie comme maître d'oeuvre pour les problèmes de la CECA mais Etzel, le vice-président allemand de la Haute Autorité, préfère traiter avec le ministère des Affaires étrangères si bien que l'ambiguïté demeure. De même en Belgique, la Haute Autorité est en liaison à la fois avec les Affaires étrangères et les ministères économiques. Au Pays-Bas, par contre, la coordination est assurée par un service du ministère des Affaires économiques, la Direction générale des relations économiques extérieures. Seule l'Italie, prétextant de son éloignement, parvient à imposer un représentant permanent auprès de la Haute Autorité qui n'est autre que son ambassadeur à Luxembourg.

Vis-à-vis des tiers, la position est toute autre: la Haute Autorité souhaite au contraire l'installation de délégations auprès d'elle car c'est pour elle un moyen de s'affirmer sur la scène internationale. Dès le 2 septembre 1952, répondant au voeu de Monnet, les États-Unis installent une petite mission à Luxembourg en attendant de renforcer encore les liens, début 1953, avec l'arrivée de l'administration républicaine. En 1960, onze pays ont déjà établi une représentation diplomatique auprès de la CECA: outre les États-Unis, le Canada, le Royaume-Uni, l'Autriche, la Suisse, le Danemark, la Norvège, la Suède, la Grèce, le Portugal, le Japon. Dans les années suivantes, une dizaine d'autres États vont suivre cet exemple.

L'ouvrage souligne avec force combien les relations extérieures constituent un objectif majeur pour la Haute Autorité. Il paraît clair que c'est elle qui représente la CECA dans la vie internationale. Dans les négociations avec les tiers, c'est elle qui intervient comme mandataire des gouvernements des États membres même si elle agit presque toujours sur la base d'instructions délibérées en Conseil à l'unanimité. Ainsi, c'est elle qui intervient auprès du GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) pour obtenir la dérogation nécessaire à la suite de la création du marché commun du charbon et de l'acier afin que les autres pays ne puissent pas réclamer le bénéfice de la clause de la nation la plus favorisée. En 1956, elle se fait donner un mandat pour négocier, toujours au sein du GATT, divers arrangements tarifaires. Dans les années 1960, elle participe au Kennedy-round. La Haute Autorité établit aussi des relations avec les autres organisations européennes: minimales et difficiles au début avec le Conseil de l'Europe, plus confiantes et fondées surtout sur une volonté d'information réciproque avec l'OECE. Mais la grande affaire à l'époque Monnet est l'accord d'association avec le Royaume-Uni accepté de part et d'autre pour des raisons politiques plutôt que souhaité par intérêt économique. Les vicissitudes des négociations puis du fonctionnement de l'association sont expliquées longuement, avec minutie et nuances. De même, les pourparlers entamés avec la Suisse ou l'Autriche pour des accords douaniers ou ferroviaires illustrent à merveille la méthode de négociation de la Haute Autorité, faite de patience, de ténacité, de marchandages, de compromis.

Plus encore que ses relations extérieures, sa politique financière constitue l'un des grands succès de la Haute Autorité. Elle est à la fois le garant de son indépendance, le symbole de sa crédibilité et la force de frappe qui lui permet d'intervenir dans la vie économique et sociale. Ses ressources proviennent principalement d'un préève-
ment sur la production de charbon et d'acier prévu par le traité et d'emprunts placés sur les marchés financiers.

Le prélèvement, premier impôt européen, constitue un atout essentiel. Il permet de financer les dépenses de fonctionnement et de constituer un fonds de garantie. Plafonné par le traité à 1 %, le prélèvement n'est, en fait, jamais fixé à un niveau aussi élevé. Dès la fin de l'année 1952, les entreprises, relayées par les gouvernements, se démènent pour qu'il soit fixé à un taux nettement inférieur mais Monnet estime que la Haute Autorité a toute liberté de décision dans ce domaine et qu'il est nécessaire de constituer rapidement le fonds de garantie de cent millions d'unités de compte (dollars). Ce point de vue s'impose et le collège retient le taux de 0,9 %. Ce n'est qu'en mai 1955, alors que le fonds de garantie est presque constitué (les cent millions sont atteints en avril 1956) et que les membres allemands et luxembourgeois plaident eux-mêmes pour une forte réduction, que la Haute Autorité décide de ramener le taux à 0,7 % le 1er juillet et à 0,45 % à partir du 1er janvier 1956. Par la suite, il est encore réduit à plusieurs reprises, à 0,35 % le 1er juillet 1957 sur la proposition de René Mayer, puis à 0,30 % en 1961 et même à 0,20 % à compter du 1er juillet 1962. Malgré ce faible taux et la crise charbonnière qui en limite la rentabilité, des surplus peuvent être dégagés qui, placés dans des institutions bancaires, rapportent des intérêts affectés à un fonds de réserve. Mais, vers le milieu des années 1960, les besoins financiers de la Haute Autorité augmentent – notamment pour les dépenses de reconversion – alors que les possibilités d'emprunts se réduisent. Soumise à des pressions contradictoires, celles des entreprises hostiles à un relèvement du taux, celles des organisations syndicales et de l'Assemblée commune soucieuses de préserver les possibilités d'investissements, la Haute Autorité fait remonter le prélèvement à 0,25 % en 1965 et à 0,30 % pour l'exercice 1967/1968 (le premier après la fusion des exécutifs).

Les emprunts fournissent également d'importantes ressources. Mais dans un premier temps, si la Haute Autorité cherche à obtenir des prêts extérieurs, c'est autant pour affirmer sa crédibilité que pour avoir des liquidités pour sa politique d'investissement. C'est pourquoi Jean Monnet se tourne vers les États-Unis car, si les Américains acceptent d'accorder un emprunt, ils montrent aux yeux de tous – et notamment des Britanniques qui négocient alors l'association – qu'ils donnent leur confiance et leur soutien à la CECA et plus généralement à l'ensemble du processus d'intégration européenne. Monnet, accompagné d'autres personnalités de la Haute Autorité, effectue deux voyages aux États-Unis, le premier dès mai-juin 1953 pour préparer, le second en mars-avril 1954 pour conclure un gros emprunt de cent millions de dollars, à 4 % sur 25 ans. Si le montant est moins élevé qu'espéré, les conditions sont avantageuses pour la Haute Autorité qui dispose ainsi de ressources à long terme. Par la suite, plusieurs autres emprunts sont placés aux États-Unis, toujours par le même consortium comprenant une cinquantaine de banques: trente-cinq millions de dollars en avril 1957, cinquante millions en juin 1958, trente-cinq millions en octobre 1960, vingt-cinq millions en mai 1962. Si ces emprunts sont faciles à placer – la souscription est en général couverte le jour même de son ouverture – les conditions deviennent de moins en moins intéressantes dans les années 1960 quand les États-Unis cherchent à ne pas

Cet afflux de capitaux donne à la Haute Autorité de larges capacités d'investissement. Une règle, toujours respectée, s'établit d'emblée: quelle que soit la nature de l'opération, l'apport de la Haute Autorité ne doit constituer qu'une fraction -en général la moitié au maximum- de l'ensemble du financement d'un programme. Les fonds provenant d'emprunts étant affectés, les prêts américains servent essentiellement à moderniser la production, améliorer les rendements, ou créer de nouvelles installations, dans les premières années surtout dans le secteur charbonnier, par la suite, surtout au bénéfice de la sidérurgie. Les emprunts "intérieurs" servent à financer aussi bien des opérations de modernisation ou de reconversion que des programmes à objectifs sociaux plus marqués comme les constructions de maisons ouvrières. L'ouvrage décrit presque année par année, les nombreuses opérations qui ont profité de la manne de la Haute Autorité. Il est clair que l'Allemagne a été le principal bénéficiaire assez loin devant la France qui précède les quatre autres partenaires. Mais il est vrai aussi que la RFA fournit la plus grande partie du prélèvement (environ la moitié), la France seulement un peu moins du quart, la Belgique environ 10% et les autres pays nettement moins.

Les financements à but social constituent constamment une priorité pour la Haute Autorité: aides non remboursables à la réadaptation des ouvriers licenciés (d'abord surtout des mineurs, puis aussi des ouvriers de la sidérurgie), aides à la recherche dans le domaine de la sécurité, de l'hygiène et de la médecine du travail (lutte contre les poussières silicogènes, programme sur les affections cardio-pulmonaires ou sur la pollution atmosphérique par les émissions sidérurgiques...). Mais, incontestablement, le fleuron de la politique sociale de la Haute Autorité réside dans la construction de logements ouvriers. Plusieurs programmes se succèdent à un rythme rapide avec des prêts à 1% financés par le fonds de réserve ou d'autres financés grâce aux emprunts "intérieurs", un peu plus onéreux mais encore très intéressants. Le premier programme d'environ quinze mille logements lancé en 1954 n'est pas encore entièrement réalisé quand le deuxième est mis en route en 1956/1957, bientôt suivi d'un troisième décidé en 1958 puis d'un quatrième en 1961. L'année suivante, la Haute Autorité estime que deux cent quatre-vingt mille logements sont encore nécessaires pour remplacer les baraques provisoires ou les logements insalubres. Elle lance donc un cinquième programme qui, plus que les précédents, se préoccupe de la qualité de la vie (insonorisation, équipements collectifs...). Avec un sixième programme (1965/1968) la Haute Autorité a contribué à la construction de plus de cent mille logements au total qui ont obtenu une aide globale d'environ deux cent quarante millions d'unités de compte. L'Allemagne se place à nouveau au premier rang des bénéficiaires (trois cinquièmes de l'aide) devant la France (12%), la Belgique (11%), l'Italie (7%), les Pays-Bas (5%).

Dans d'autres domaines où la Haute Autorité se heurte aux entreprises et aux gouvernements son action s'avère beaucoup plus aléatoire. Au fil des pages, l'ouvrage
expose de nombreux exemples flagrants qui illustrent parfaitement les tâtonnements et le manque d'emprise de la Haute Autorité sur les problèmes économiques. Si la Haute Autorité parvient à mettre en route rapidement le marché commun du charbon, du minerai de fer et de la ferraille (10 février 1953) et de l'acier (1er mai 1953) avec comme objectif final un marché libre et concurrentiel où les prix seraient relativement faibles, elle s'interroge sur les mesures à adopter dans l'immédiat pour y parvenir dans les meilleures conditions. Comme les prix charbonniers ont d'abord tendance à augmenter légèrement, elle use de son pouvoir de fixer des prix maxima (par catégories de charbon) mais, du coup, elle semble légitimer le maintien de prix élevés. D'ailleurs, il semble pratiquement impossible d'instaurer la liberté des prix en raison de l'existence de cartels de vente comme COBECHAR (Comptoir belge des charbons) en Belgique, et surtout le GEORG (Gemeinschaftsorganisation Ruhrkohle) dans la Ruhr. Pour l'acier, la Haute Autorité n'a pas l'intention de fixer des prix maxima mais elle voudrait arriver à la transparence des prix par la publicité des barèmes qui limiterait les discriminations. Mais si certains pays comme la France ou l'Italie sont prêts à publier et à respecter des barèmes, la RFA y est hostile et accuse Monnet de vouloir mettre en place une politique des prix dictatoriale. D'ailleurs beaucoup d'entreprises pratiquent des prix inférieurs à leurs barèmes, si bien que la Haute Autorité en vient à fixer des règles qui autorisent des écarts de prix par rapport aux barèmes, au grand mécontentement de la France et de l'Italie qui veulent alors faire annuler ces décisions par la Cour de justice. Pour les ferrailles qui connaissent de fortes disparités de prix d'un pays à l'autre, la Haute Autorité – qui ne peut pas intervenir directement dans ce domaine – cherche à trouver une solution en accord avec les sidérurgistes qui, eux, préféreraient garder complètement le contrôle de ce marché. Après de longues discussions avec les entreprises et le conseil des ministres, la Haute Autorité en arrive à mettre sur pied – pour un temps – une caisse de péréquation financée par des taxes sur les consommateurs de ferrailles de la CECA qui permet de subventionner des importations. Mais la Haute Autorité n'a pas beaucoup de prise sur ce système qui est géré par un Office des consommateurs de ferrailles qu'elle doit se contenter de "surveiller" en vérifiant les comptes. Il est donc clair que la mise en route du marché commun s'avère être une opération bien délicate et bien décevante pour la Haute Autorité.

Dans le domaine des transports, où la Haute Autorité dispose de peu de pouvoirs (la politique des transports relève des États), elle dépense beaucoup d'énergie et de patience pour essayer d'éliminer les discriminations et disparités de tarifs pour les produits charbonniers et sidérurgiques. L'harmonisation des tarifs est en effet une préoccupation importante car elle doit favoriser l'harmonisation des prix et donc la libre concurrence. Mais l'action de la Haute Autorité se heurte au double obstacle des difficultés techniques et des intérêts nationaux. Dans un premier temps elle accorde l'essentiel de son attention aux tarifs des chemins de fer. Après avoir réussi dès 1953 à éliminer quelques discriminations criantes, elle cherche à établir des tarifs directs internationaux afin de diminuer les prix, plus élevés, à distance égale, que ceux des transports intérieurs. Il s'agit en fait de supprimer les taxes aux frontières et de pratiquer sur les tarifs une dégressivité sur l'ensemble du parcours. Mais la Haute Autorité se heurte à l'opposition de la RFA, qui redoute une réper-
cussion sur ses tarifs intérieurs et une perte de ressources, et surtout à celle des Pays-Bas. Les chemins de fer néerlandais qui ont une situation très particulière – ils sont les seuls parmi les Six à ne pas être subventionnés et à ne pas publier leurs tarifs – voudraient maintenir un système qui leur assure la prospérité. Seule la France soutient à fond le projet de tarifs directs qui devraient être avantageux pour les charbons de la Ruhr importés par la sidérurgie lorraine. Il faudra près d'un an de patientes négociations pour arriver à bout de l'obstruction néerlandaise et adopter en 1955 un accord prévoyant l'introduction très progressive des tarifs directs.

L'année suivante, la Haute Autorité s'intéresse à la navigation rhénane qui transporte beaucoup de produits CECA. Là aussi existe une discrimination entre les frets intérieurs, réglementés et élevés, et les frets internationaux dont la libre formation garantie par l'Acte de Mannheim (1868) assure un niveau plus bas. Lorsque la Haute Autorité cherche à éliminer ces disparités, elle peut, dans ce cas, compter sur le ferme appui des Pays-Bas favorables à la liberté des deux tarifs et désireux d'empêcher une hégémonie allemande. Bonn voudrait en effet aligner les frets internationaux sur les tarifs pratiqués par les bateliers allemands qui sont largement influencés par le GEORG, gros fournisseur de frets. Pour sortir du guêpier, la Haute Autorité propose dans un premier temps de constituer une commission internationale au sein de laquelle chargeurs et transporteurs pourraient établir les tarifs. Mais ce projet est mis en pièces par l'opposition des bateliers rhénans qui veulent réglementer les tarifs au sein d'un pool, véritable entrave à la libre concurrence. Une issue partiellement satisfaisante est trouvée en 1957 : à la suite d'une proposition de la Haute Autorité, le conseil des ministres prévoit que – sur le Rhin – les frets intérieurs devront s'aligner sur les frets internationaux librement établis. Mais, de la décision à l'application, il y a une marge car les réticences restent grandes en Allemagne, aussi bien à Bonn que chez les bateliers rhénans.

En 1958, à la fin de la période transitoire de cinq ans, la Haute Autorité se trouve confrontée au défi le plus grave depuis sa création, la crise charbonnière qui se manifeste brusquement par un gonflement important des stocks, en Allemagne et en Belgique. La situation est particulièrement difficile dans ce dernier pays qui n'a pas réussi à assainir son industrie charbonnière depuis 1953 en dépit des subventions exceptionnelles – environ deux cent millions de DM – qui lui ont été accordées dans le cadre de la CECA. Face à cette crise, la Haute Autorité réagit d'abord par une action indirecte : elle finance la constitution de stocks, incite les États importateurs de charbon (Pays-Bas, Italie) à limiter leurs achats dans les pays tiers au bénéfice d'une préférence communautaire et augmente son aide aux mineurs touchés par le chômage à la suite de fermetures de puits. Mais début 1959, la crise s'aggrave encore et plusieurs pays – notamment l'Allemagne – adoptent des mesures de protection unilatérales, ce qui est contraire à l'esprit et à la lettre du traité CECA. La Haute Autorité estime alors qu'elle doit intervenir de manière plus énergique. Elle se demande si le moment n'est pas venu d'agir directement, au titre de l'article 58, en proclamant l'état de "crise manifeste" qui lui permet d'instaurer des quotas de production et de réduire les importations en provenance de pays tiers. Une majorité se dégage au sein du collège en faveur de cette solution malgré l'hostilité des membres allemands, italien et luxembourgeois. Mais la déclaration de la crise manifeste doit obtenir un avis conforme du conseil des ministres.
(à la majorité simple mais comprenant la France et l'Allemagne) que la Haute Autorité ne parvient pas à arracher. Pourtant, pendant trois mois, de mars à mai 1959, elle a multiplié les contacts et réaménagé plusieurs fois son projet d'intervention fondé sur le principe d'une forte réduction des importations de pays tiers et d'une légère diminution de la production dans les six pays de la CECA. Si les trois du Benelux sont ralliés à cette proposition, Paris, Rome et Bonn sont irréductiblement hostiles. L'Italie n'est pas prête à renoncer aux importations de charbons américains moins coûteux; l'Allemagne déclare les mesures insuffisantes: en fait, à l'instar du gouvernement français, Bonn ne veut pas accepter que la Haute Autorité joue un rôle majeur pour résoudre la crise. Le couperet tombe le 14 mai: le Conseil des ministres rejette la déclaration de la crise manifeste, par trois voix contre trois. C'est l'avertissement que les Etats sont décidés à rognner les ailes de l'institution supranationale. Face à cet échec grave, la Haute Autorité envisage un moment de démissionner mais le collège reste finalement en place en attendant le renouvellement général.

La lutte engagée contre les cartels et les concentrations se termine également sans gloire pour la Haute Autorité. Il y a, en fait, deux problématiques différentes. D'une part, en ce qui concerne les concentrations, la Haute Autorité n'a pas à intervenir contre les entreprises qui existent au moment de sa création; elle doit seulement empêcher, en vertu de l'article 66, les nouvelles concentrations qui gêneraient la concurrence. D'autre part, la Haute Autorité se trouve confrontée aux cartels du charbon qui de toute évidence empêchent la liberté du marché; les principaux sont des cartels de vente: COBECAR fixe les prix de pratiquement tous les charbonnages belges, l'OKU (Oberreinische Kohlenunion) contrôle les ventes en Allemagne du Sud et le GEORG règne en maître dans la Ruhr. En France l'ATIC (Association technique de l'importation charbonnière) détient le monopole des importations de charbon. D'après le traité, la Haute Autorité a l'obligation de démanteler ces cartels mais elle sait qu'il ne sera pas facile d'y parvenir et que le premier et le plus difficile à abattre doit être le GEORG.

L'action contre le cartel de la Ruhr est, pour la Haute Autorité, un véritable combat de Sisyphe. C'est dès 1954 qu'elle engage des négociations en vue d'une réforme du GEORG qui paraît d'autant plus urgente que la liaison charbon-sidérurgie se développe à nouveau dans la Ruhr après les déconcentrations de l'après-guerre. La Haute Autorité envisage d'abord de donner l'autonomie aux six comptoirs constitutifs du GEORG mais, face à l'obstruction des milieux d'affaires de la Ruhr fortement soutenus par Bonn, elle accepte d'étudier en détail de nombreuses variantes en vue d'une réforme, pourvu qu'elle permette d'introduire un minimum de concurrence. Après de pénibles marchandages, un nouveau système prévoyant trois comptoirs de vente avec un bureau commun est mis en route le 1er avril 1956 pour trois ans. En fait, l'accord n'est pas respecté dans son esprit, les trois comptoirs s'arrangent pour fixer des prix identiques et fonctionnent comme un cartel unique. Au sein de la Haute Autorité, Spielenburg – qui est le principal artisan de la politique anticartel – et quelques autres dénoncent cette mascarade mais le collège, divisé, proroge le système à plusieurs reprises faute de trouver un accord pour une meilleure solution.

Malgré un combat d'arrière-garde à épisodes multiples, la Haute Autorité ne peut empêcher la survie d'une organisation centralisée de ventes. Dès décembre
1959 d'ailleurs, la Ruhr dépose une demande d'autorisation de cartel unique défendue par les deux membres allemands du collège et envisagée d'un œil favorable par les Français. La Haute Autorité en vient à imaginer la révision du traité (article 65) pour pouvoir autoriser un cartel unique mais l'entreprise avorte car la Cour de justice rejette le projet de révision en décembre 1961. Si la Ruhr a gagné du temps, elle a perdu l'espoir de légaliser le cartel unique. De guerre lasse, pour sortir de l'impasse, on se résume de part et d'autre, en mars 1963, à accepter un système de deux comptoirs. Sensé introduire une concurrence véritable, il fonctionne comme un seul cartel et ne trompe personne.

Etant donnée la résistance allemande, le gouvernement français ne se sent guère tenu de renoncer à l'ATIC. Paris tergiverse, cherche constamment à repousser les échéances, y compris par un recours contre les décisions de la Haute Autorité. On finit par trouver quelques aménagements qui limitent la mainmise de l'ATIC sur les importations et, avec le temps et la crise charbonnière, la Haute Autorité se fait moins intransigeante.

Dans le cas de concentrations nouvelles, les conflits sont moins âpres et la Haute Autorité est pratiquement toujours amenée à donner son autorisation. Pourtant certaines demandes ont provoqué des hésitations et de longs débats au sein du collège, par exemple lorsqu'il se trouve face à des sociétés à interopérations d'intérêts multiples comme dans le groupe Sacilor créé par Sidelor et de Wendel, et surtout lorsqu'il est confronté à la reconstitution de la sidérurgie allemande. Tout en estimant qu'elle ne doit pas agir de manière discriminatoire à l'encontre de ces konzerns, la Haute Autorité se montre prudente. Exceptionnellement elle préfère décourager certaines demandes ou donner des autorisations conditionnelles – notamment en imposant un contrôle des investissements – plutôt que d'interdire les concentrations.


Le "déclin" de la Haute Autorité commence vers la fin de la période transitoire qui coïncide avec la mise en place des deux nouvelles Communautés. Dès la phase de la relance européenne des années 1955-1956, elle est confinée au second rôle. Certes, lorsque le comité Spaak créé par la conférence de Messine se réunit à Bruxelles, un membre de la Haute Autorité (Spierenburg) participe au comité directeur et plusieurs de ses experts (Regul, Uri) sont appelés à collaborer. Mais lorsque l’Angleterre quitte le comité en novembre 1955, les représentants des organisations internationales sont invités, eux-aussi, à se retirer et si un homme comme Pierre Uri continue à exercer une grande influence, notamment dans la rédaction du rapport Spaak, c’est plutôt à titre personnel. En 1956, la Haute Autorité n'est pas invitée à la conférence de Venise qui approuve le rapport Spaak et met en route la conférence intergouvernementale chargée d'élaborer les Traités de Rome. Au cours de ce processus, si elle est sollicitée
pour faire des propositions concernant la politique énergétique, elle est en fait tenue à l'écart des principales décisions. De plus, elle ne sert pas vraiment de modèle pour les institutions prévues par les Traités de Rome car les gouvernements, Paris surtout, veulent éviter toute nouvelle organisation supranationale.

Alors que les nouvelles Communautés installées à Bruxelles deviennent le principal centre d'intérêt de la politique européenne, la Haute Autorité doit affronter de multiples difficultés: un contexte économique de plus en plus menaçant lorsqu’à la crise charbonnière s’ajoute une crise sidérurgique, les déceptions d’une coopération jugée insuffisante avec Bruxelles, les tirailllements au sein de sa propre administration dont le fonctionnement est perpétuellement remis en question et qui se trouve confrontée à un phénomène de "sauve qui peut" commencé avec la mise en place de la CEE et accéléré par le projet de fusion des exécutifs. Le malaise de la Haute Autorité se transforme alors en véritable crise d’identité. Lorsque le principe d’une fusion réclamée par l’Assemblée européenne est accepté par le Conseil des ministres en septembre 1963, la Haute Autorité va s’efforcer d’éviter l’alignement sur les Traités de Rome. Elle cherche à sauvegarder les éléments qui avaient fait sa spécificité, son autonomie budgétaire grâce au prélèvement, sa méthode de travail avec le principe de la collégialité, l'originalité de son mode de désignation avec la coopération d’un membre au moins. Mais le Traité de fusion des exécutifs signé le 8 avril 1965 – et qui entrera en vigueur le 1er juillet 1967 – ne lui donne que très partiellement satisfaction. Elle n’a pas réussi à imposer ses idées du point de vue institutionnel. Si le prélèvement est maintenu, il doit contribuer au budget unique qui englobe les dépenses administratives des trois Communautés, le reste pouvant servir à financer les investissements propres à la CECA. Par ailleurs, la Commission unique s’installe à Bruxelles; seul le service d’intervention financière de la CECA reste à Luxembourg qui accueille aussi la Banque européenne d’investissement et garde le secrétariat du Parlement ainsi que la Cour de justice.

Ainsi, l’héritage de la Haute Autorité semble dispersé. Pourtant son expérience de quinze ans est loin d’être perdue comme le souligne Jacques Delors dans la préface du livre de Raymond Poidevin et de Dirk Spierenburg. Institution supranationale aux compétences soigneusement définies par un traité et limitées par trois instruments de contrôle – Conseil des ministres, Cour de justice, Assemblée – la Haute Autorité apparaît d’abord comme une formidable force de proposition. Confrontée à des situations inédites, elle a dû imaginer des solutions possibles ou acceptables mais forcément pionnières. A suivre dans cette Histoire son action au quotidien, on a l’impression qu’il existe entre la Haute Autorité et la Commission une parenté plus étroite qu’il ne semble à la lecture des textes constitutifs. La Haute Autorité a légué une méthode de travail faite de sérieux et de technicité, d’ambition et de prudence. Elle a aussi constitué autour d’elle une administration européenne, creuset et modèle de celle qui s’installe un peu plus tard à Bruxelles. Enfin, ce livre décrit à longueur de pages les jeux subtils entre intérêts privés, priorités nationales et options communes qui se perpétuent dans l’Union européenne.

Marie-Thérèse Bitsch
**Etat général des fonds d'archives**, Genève, Fondation Archives Européennes, 1994, xii-33 p., 5.-FS

*‘Pan-Europe' (1923) et le mouvement paneuropéen: Richard de Coudenhove-Kalergi entre l'Empire d'Autriche-Hongrie et une Europe gaullienne*, Guide de recherche, Genève, Fondation Archives Européennes, 1994, 52 p., 12.-FS

La Fondation Archives Européennes, constituée à Genève en 1984, pour mettre en valeur des documents relatifs à l'histoire de l'Europe contemporaine et aux efforts entrepris depuis la Première Guerre mondiale pour l'unité européenne, vient d'éditer deux brochures rendant compte de l'état de ses fonds d'archives.

L'Etat général des fonds d'archives présente l'ensemble des fonds déposés à ce jour à la Fondation: archives d'associations, d'institutions et de mouvements, archives de personnes, imprimés et photocopies, périodiques, recherches et travaux inédits. Cet aperçu est utilement complété par la présentation des activités de la Fondation, des conditions d'accès et de dépôt, ainsi que par des annexes indiquant
- les fonds d'archives de personnalités fédéralistes, internationalistes et pacifistes déposés en Suisse,
- les fonds d'archives de quelques associations et protagonistes du débat fédéraliste déposés dans les pays de l'Union européenne.
L'ouvrage comprend des index de personnes, des matières, d'associations, d'institutions et de mouvements.
Les fonds d'archives conservés à la Fondation ont, chacun, fait l'objet d'un inventaire particulier. Tout chercheur intéressé peut obtenir, avant consultation sur place, l'inventaire de son choix en s'adressant à la Fondation.

Le Guide de recherche, *‘Pan-Europe' (1923) et le mouvement paneuropéen*, présente les sources disponibles relatives aux idées de Coudenhove-Kalergi et aux mouvements qu'il avait inspirés. Le Guide comprend
- un inventaire sommaire du fonds "Paneuropäische Union, 1923-1938", déposé à Moscou où il avait été transféré en 1945 par l'armée soviétique et dont la Fondation a tiré récemment un nombre important de photocopies,
- un inventaire sommaire du fonds "Union paneuropéenne, 1917-1972" qui comprend, outre quelques pièces remontant jusqu'en 1917, la totalité de la documentation produite ou rassemblée par Coudenhove à partir de son départ en exil, en mars 1938; l'inventaire est complété par une liste alphabétique des correspondants de Coudenhove,
- une liste des sources publiées avec mention des bibliothèques de Suisses romande possédant le texte,
- enfin une bibliographie des travaux relatifs à Coudenhove et aux mouvements européens.

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Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen


In the second of his trilogy on the origins of European integration, Milward expands his earlier work concerning the inability of many traditional approaches to explain the origins and development of the European Communities. In a persuasive and thought-provoking first chapter, he makes three broad assertions concerning these origins. First, and most crucially, that the prevailing political and public debate about the subject has been side-tracked by the illusory notion, that the institutions of integration and the nation-states of Western Europe have been engaged in a zero-sum game, whereby the advance of one necessarily implies the retreat of the other. Second, that the "true origins of the EC are economic and social". Finally, that the only way to discern these truths is through detailed, historical analysis. Hence the juxtaposition of history and theory in the title of the first chapter, and the caustic comment, that much "of the theorising about interdependence and integration tends to be a piquant but watery soup through which the historian hunts in vain for solid scraps of nutriment" (p. 20).

His desire to rectify this lattermost failing is the most apparent. The enormity of the effort that went into the writing of the book is impressive. Based on research, we are proudly informed in the preface, in the archives of eight countries, as well as of the EC itself, it provides a huge mass of primary evidence. This in itself represents a useful and necessary palliative to the tendency (especially amongst North American scholars) to base theoretical observations on European integration on insubstantial, if not non-existent, empirical evidence.

From this detailed empirical investigation emerges a view of integration far more subtle than those arrived at by more abstract studies. Particularly interesting is the way in which the book reveals profound and important differences not only between the countries directly or indirectly involved in the early years of the integrative project, but also the different natures of the various economic sectors affected by the move towards supranationalism. This marks a timely counter-attack against those writers who have tended to lump together "functional" economic sectors as equally ripe for integration, or to assume that the same integrative pressures are at work on all states. Thus, Milward highlights the importance of the fact that farming lobbies were both institutionalised and entrenched by the time it came to negotiate the Common Agricultural Policy; that national attitudes towards the issue of subsidies for coal corresponded to a country's position as a net importer or exporter of that commodity; that the influential position of the City helps to explain British emphasis on currency issues rather than on trade and industry. Milward thus realises what many theories have not – that domestic politics and domestic policy preferences play a huge role in shaping the integrative project.

An emphasis on the detail of national bargaining positions based on particular interests in particular sectors also helps to dispel the notion, that high-minded idealism lay at the root of the moves towards integration. Milward underlines the fact that governments bargained on the basis of perceived national interests. In a stimulating chapter on the much-admired "fathers" of integration, he makes the valid point that even (indeed especially) figures such as Monnet were as preoccupied with the notion of national reconstruction as with that of supranational institution building. When addressing the origins and functioning of the European Coal and Steel Community, he underlines that even the much-revered High Authority acted as a body within which its members could argue in favour of the national interests of their own state.

Yet whilst historical analysis reveals much about the true origins of integration, the detailed empirical style employed ruins the book for me. History is not simply about providing information, yet this is what the empirical chapters do, with the result that they are far too dense and impenetrable. No indication is given at the beginning of each of these chapters as to how their individual arguments are put together, or indeed as to what they are. Even given the laying-out of the overall argument in Chapter One, it remains difficult to piece together the threads of that argument in the empirical material that follows. In many instances, detail is provided apparently for its own sake, a mistake not uncommon in student theses, but one which has no place in a published work. Who really cares, for instance, that Pleven was a keen angler? This is especially disappointing given Milward's expressed wish to put an end to the falsehoods perpetrated about integration in the public domain: even specialists will struggle to read this book, and it is a pity that the author's Herculean efforts in carrying out his research are spoiled by his failure to make his empirical case in a comprehensible and, above all, interesting way. Chapters two, four, five and seven confuse and bore as much as they clarify. All this stands in stark contrast to the clarity of the persuasively presented argument in the more "theoretical" sections. It is ironic that although he claims historical research conquers theoretical myths (p. 18), within the European Rescue theory triumphs over history.

The weaknesses of the book, however, are not merely stylistic, these being symptomatic of more deep-seated problems. Whilst it is undeniable that the detailed negotiations, leading to the first institutional expression of integration, were economic and social in character, it must surely also be the case that diplomatic and political considerations of a wider nature also played their part. Milward, somewhat disingenuously, concentrates on small countries such as the Netherlands and Belgium in much of his analysis, countries which had no hope of defending themselves, and for whom military security was an issue that had to be left to others (hence the Dutch, for instance, could concentrate on notions of economic security). Yet, West European statesmen were more at liberty to discuss the finer details of economic and social issues precisely because the central issue of the time -guaranteeing security against possible Soviet aggression – had been taken care of by the Americans. This explains the ability of states such as France (which were, after all, obsessed by military security), to participate in integration. The importance of the broader foreign policy and security debate, relative to questions of pure economics, is hinted at in the Chapter on Britain, when Milward states, that sections of the British government complained that broad foreign priorities were taking precedence over considerations of future economic welfare in defining policy towards Germany (p. 403). Yet, this is a minor concession: one finds within his index not a single mention of neither the Cold War nor the Soviet Union. This weakness (one which is all the more surprising given the author's relative sensitivity to the importance of political and military questions in The Reconstruction of Western Europe) exposes the limitations of Milward's incipient economic determinism.

Turning finally to the central argument of the book, that integration was an integral part of the "rescue" of the West European nation-state, there is much to commend this claim. Yet, two major reservations can be advanced. First, the argument is not as original as Milward seems to think. Stanley Hoffmann, writing in 1982 (indeed, in an article that Milward refers to in another context), had already made this very assertion, and thereby helped to redirect the attention of serious scholars of integration away from the "integration versus sovereignty" debate.

Second, it seems paradoxical, at the very least, to assert, on the one hand, that the nation-state was successfully "rescued" whilst, on the other hand, admitting that "irreversible" commitments based on "enforceable" law were entered into by those same states (p. 439). The book does provide evidence that the internal autonomy of the nation-state was enhanced by the integration process, allowing national governments to impose decisions on powerful national interests which otherwise would have proved costly to make. In external terms, however, nothing of the sort occurred. The nation-state lost the capacity to act alone
in key economic sectors. A new international constraint was created. In short, external sovereignty was compromised in a way never before experienced. Milward should have stressed more clearly that if, indeed, the nation-state was "rescued", by integration, this rescue had its price. As a result, the grasp of his bold theoretical generalisations exceeds the reach of his accumulated evidence.

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In this volume – second of the series «Fonti e studi di Storia del Federalismo e dell’Unità europea» – a young Italian scholar has reconstructed with patience and skill the complex negotiations that led in 1950-1952 from the presentation of the Pleven Plan to the signature of the Treaty for the creation of the European Defence Community (EDC) and the assignment of the constituent mandate to the \textit{ad hoc} Assembly. Ivan Matteo Lombardo became president of the Italian delegation at the EDC conference in Paris from 6 October, 1951 onwards: in this book wise use is made of his papers, which may be examined in Turin, at the Fondazione europea Luciano Bolis. The author exploits this unpublished material and a wide range of other sources in order to offer a well-detailed picture of the events. She tries, in particular, to discuss the different interpretative variants of the Italian choices, looking for reciprocal influences between federalist movements and government circles.

In the first section of the volume, the French initiative of 1950 is examined. Daniela Preda analyses international reactions and does not forget to record Altiero Spinelli’s pessimism on the subject (page 43). The central body of the text follows then the chronological order throughout 1951, from the convocation of the Paris Conference to the draft of the \textit{Rapport intermédiaire} – approved in July – and to what the author does not hesitate to define as a decisive turning point: the new impulse given in October by an \textit{Aide-mémoire} of the Italian delegation to the supranational goals of the negotiations. In that document, the importance of a representative European Assembly elected by universal suffrage was stressed, in particular, as a substantial question of debate. Daniela Preda then studies the subsequent developments of the conference in their juridical, military and financial aspects, and focuses once more her attention – as already done when discussing the turning point of October – on Altiero Spinelli’s and the federalists’ – as well as Alcide De Gasperi’s convergent itineraries at the end of the year. On 10 December, in fact, the Italian minister intervened incisively at the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe as well as the day after at the Six Foreign Ministers’ meeting, again in Strasbourg. On this subject, without disregarding other kinds of motivations – and in \textit{primis} the American factor – Daniela Preda suggests, that the federalist determination shown by Alcide De Gasperi in that occasion should also be explained by his perception of the nature of the European problem and by the federalists’ action and pressure. The Italian politician – as the author emphasizes – saw «the ineluctable connection between common defence and European political institutions»; he «accepted and chose» it, and followed consistently this path (pages 183-184).

In the final section of the book, once examined the renewal of negotiations at the Conference after the Strasbourg interlude, two interesting chapters are dedicated to the signature of the Treaty – on 27 May, 1952 – and the assignment of the constituent mandate to the \textit{ad hoc} Assembly – on 10 September. This last one was an enormous task, as Altiero Spinelli remarked in his diary, and Daniela Preda concludes: «Here is "the hope" that the EDC car-
ried hidden within itself. Hence moved what has been defined the first concrete attempt at building the European federation» (page 251).

Fond of her subject – as witnessed by the fact that the scholar is going to publish a forthcoming volume just on the European Political Community project – Daniela Preda never lacks critical rigour and always combines the study of technical sources with the protagonists’ passionate reports in her interpretative efforts. A minute attention to the details of the negotiations does not disturb the readers’ enjoyment, stimulated by frequent documentary and bibliographic quotations. Altiero Spinelli’s and federalists’ constant criticism – now political or idealistic, now technical – of the Italian representatives’ action in Paris or, more generally, of the attitude and praxis of the national governments involved in the Conference, is followed by the author with interest. Evident is her constant research of reciprocal influences: she works for a historiographical synthesis that will include and grasp the stages of European integration from the point of view of the functional construction of Community organisms as well as of the idealistic incentive conveyed by the movements. A good example of this approach may be considered the thesis supported at page 112, where Altiero Spinelli’s relationship with Alcide De Gasperi and the former’s contribution – by means of a memorandum – to the new attitude of the Italian delegation in October 1951 are particularly emphasized. The book is rich in such useful suggestions of hypotheses as this one, bound to share in a debate that is already very lively.

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Einleitend schildert Florian Weiss (München) die diplomatische Gratwanderung der österreichischen Regierung bis zum Abschluß des Staatsvertrages, die staatliche Integrität unter Rücksichtnahme auf die sicherheitspolitischen Interessen der Sowjetunion zu wahren, ohne dabei auf eine weitreichende wirtschaftliche Westintegration zu verzichten. Die große
Koalition aus Christdemokraten (ÖVP) und Sozialdemokraten (SPÖ) schloß zwar die Vollmitgliedschaft in kleineuropäischen Organisationen wie Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl (EGKS) und Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (EWG) aus, beteiligte sich jedoch am Marshall-Plan und trat dann 1956, abweichend von dem neutralitätspolitischen Vorbild Schweiz, auch dem Europarat bei. Die Aussicht auf die Teilnahme an einer europäischen Freihandelszone (FHZ), gegen die die Moskauer Regierung keine neutralitätsrechtlichen Einwände erhob, schien dann 1957/58 vorübergehend zu garantieren, daß die ökonomischen Interessen des außenwirtschaftlich über die Bundesrepublik Deutschland sehr eng mit der EWG verflochtenden Landes dauerhaft gewahrt werden konnten.


Von den Beiträgen, die sich mit den bilateralen Beziehungen Österreichs zu den wichtigsten Partnern im Westen befassen, betont Jürgen Nautz (Kassel), daß die enge wirtschaftliche Verflechtung mit der Bundesrepublik, mit der Österreich etwa 40 Prozent seines Außenhandels abwickelte, für die Wiener Regierungen ein wichtiges Motiv darstellte, ein umfassendes Arrangement mit der EWG anzustreben. Thomas Angerer (Wien) verdeutlicht, in welchem Maße die französische Österreich-Politik bis 1955 deutschlandpolitisch bestimmt war, nämlich von der Befürchtung, nach einer möglichen Teilung des Landes könnten sich die Westzonen einseitig an die Bundesrepublik anlehnen. Vor allem um die staatliche Integrität des Landes zu schützen, wirkten die französischen Regierungen daher dem österreichischen Interesse an einem frühen Beitritt zum Europarat und an einer substantiellen Assoziation mit der EGKS entgegen. Nach dem EFTA (Europäische Freihandelsgemeinschaft)-Beitritt Österreichs sah de Gaulle dann die Wiener Politik zunehmend einseitig unter dem Blickwinkel des Konflikts mit Großbritannien.


Günter Bischof (New Orleans/München) schließlich untersucht die Politik der Amerikaner in den fünfziger Jahren, für die nur eine bewaffnete Neutralität Österreichs in Frage kam. Solange eine militär- und sicherheitspolitische de facto-Westorientierung des Landes garantiert war, galten andere Fragen, wie diejenige nach der wirtschaftlichen Integration, als nebensächlich oder wurden von der Supermacht USA ohnehin im Kontext ihrer breiteren europapolitischen Strategie bewertet, die primär die Stärkung der Sechsergemeinschaft zum Ziel hatte.

Wenngleich weitgehend auf die fünfziger Jahre beschränkt, werden auch die europapolitischen Vorstellungen der Parteien berücksichtigt. Dabei zeichnet Michael Gehler (Innsbruck) nach, daß einzelne christdemokratische Politiker, etwa der ÖVP-Generalsekretär Felix Hurdes, in der unmittelbaren Nachkriegszeit eine aktive Rolle vor allem bei der Eingliederung der deutschen Christdemokraten in die transnationale Parteienkooperation im Rahmen der Nouvelles Equipes Internationales spielten. Allerdings gaben sie dem Abschluß eines Staatsvertrages Priorität und setzten sich nicht zuletzt deshalb für eine internationale Ausrichtung einer christdemokratischen Parteienkooperation anstelle einer einseitigen Beto-
nung der inner-westeuropäischen Bindungen ein. Martin Hehemann (Wien), der die Europapolitik der Sozialdemokraten behandelt, konstatiert u.a. einen im Vergleich mit der ÖVP ausgeprägteren Bereitschaft, auf sowjetische Sicherheitsinteressen Rücksicht zu nehmen, und eine daraus resultierende größere diplomatische Vorsicht in der Europapolitik; und Lothar Höbelt (Wien/Chicago) widmet sich der Politik der nationalliberalen Freiheitlichen, die sich mit ihrer besonders integrationsfreundlichen Haltung dem Verdacht aussetzten, indirekt einen "Anschluß" an die Bundesrepublik Deutschland zu betreiben.

Ergänzt wird der Sammelband durch weitere Aufsätze, etwa zu Fragen der wirtschaftlichen und wissenschaftlichen Kooperation mit den Westeuropäern, die ein differenziertes Bild der österreichischen Europapolitik in der Nachkriegszeit vermitteln. Bedauerlich ist lediglich, daß die Beiträge weder in bezug auf den jeweiligen Untersuchungszeitraum aufeinander abgestimmt sind, noch gemeinsam entwickelten Leitfragen nachgehen, so daß die noch dazu äußerst knappe zusammenfassende Interpretation in der Einleitung eher oberflächlich bleibt. Allerdings weisen die Herausgeber zu Recht darauf hin, daß es sich lediglich um eine "erste Bestandsaufnahme" handelt, und als solche vermittelt der Sammelband in der Tat einen ausgezeichneten Überblick über den erreichten Forschungsstand genauso wie über noch bestehende Forschungslücken, die zumindest teilweise auf eine schlechte Aktenüberlieferung oder fehlenden Archivzugang zurückzuführen sind.


Besonders ausführlich widmet sich Schwendimann der Neutralitätsproblematik, wobei die verfassungsrechtlichen Unterschiede zwischen der aktiven Neutralitätspolitik Österreichs und der passiven, die Pflichten der Neutralität extensiv auslegenden Neutralitätspolitik der Schweiz akribisch herausgearbeitet werden. Bedauerlicherweise werden jedoch andere Aspekte der Neutralitätspolitik, etwa deren identitätsstiftende Wirkung, nicht behandelt, obwohl sich – jedenfalls im Fall Österreichs – deren indirekte Folgen in einer Zeit als langfristig bedeutender erwiesen, in der sich in Europa die klassische Neutralitätspolitik zunehmend als anachronistisches, wirtschaftlich und sicherheitspolitisch parasitäres Verhalten von Kleinstaaten darstellt.


Und die Schweiz? Möglicherweise wäre es interessant zu wissen, wie sich die Berner Regierung eine Existenz innerhalb der Mauer vorstellt, die die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung mit der Ablehnung des EWR-Abkommens (Europäischer Wirtschaftsraum) 1992 um Max Frischs Andorra gezogen hat. Vielleicht ist diese aber inzwischen auch schon hoch genug, um den auf eine kritische Analyse bedachten Nachbarn nicht viel mehr als den durchaus ansprechenden Blick auf die schneebedeckten Berggipfel freizugeben.

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Essen
Jean-Baptiste Duroselle
1917-1994

«L’histoire engagée c’est-à-dire celle qui manipule l’histoire pour servir une cause, je l’ai toujours détestée. Cela ne m’empêche pas, en tant que citoyen, de penser pour diverses raisons, que nous pourrons analyser ultérieurement, qu’il est très important pour l’avenir de nos pays et pour le bonheur des citoyens de créer une sorte d’unité européenne dont la forme reste encore à trouver. Et, en conséquence, j’espère que mon oeuvre historique permettra de montrer que grâce aux racines très profondes de notre Europe, l’oeuvre de création qui a commencé, peut être continuée et peut, personne n’en est encore certain, mais je l’espère, aboutir aux résultats efficaces que je souhaite».

Entretien avec Jean-Baptiste Duroselle,
revue Historiens et Géographes, N° 330, janvier 1991, p. 257

En novembre 1990, Jean-Baptiste Duroselle publiait un fort ouvrage "L’Europe, histoire de ses peuples" (Perrin éd.), fruit d’un long travail de plusieurs années. Interviewé alors par la rédaction de la revue Historiens et Géographes, il marquait parfaitement comment et pourquoi une bonne partie de son oeuvre avait l’histoire de l’Europe pour principal sujet. Cet homme d’une vaste culture "classique" était en effet fasciné par l’oeuvre créatrice des Européens à travers les siècles, tout en ayant "vécu" dans sa jeunesse les dramatiques affrontements de la seconde guerre mondiale, période de "décadence" non seulement pour la France, mais pour l’Europe toute entière.

Professeur d’Histoire contemporaine, spécialiste incontesté de l’histoire des Relations internationales, Jean-Baptiste Duroselle ne pouvait pas rester étranger à l’histoire de l’Europe contemporaine et en particulier à l’histoire de la construction européenne. Dès 1963, il avait publié un livre de réflexion sur "L’idée d’Europe dans l’histoire" (Denoël éd.), rapidement suivi d’un autre livre "L’Europe de 1815 à nos jours, vie politique et relations internationales" (PUF, collection Nouvelle Clio) qui, pendant de nombreuses années, allait servir d’introduction à la recherche sur l’histoire européenne.

Toutefois, Jean-Baptiste Duroselle devait jouer un rôle plus important encore dans l’histoire de l’histoire de la construction européenne en étant l’un des rédacteurs – pas à un niveau secondaire ou passager – des Mémoires de Jean Monnet. Directeur du Centre d’études des Relations internationales à l’Institut d’études politiques de Paris de 1958 à 1964 (il est alors élu à la Sorbonne dans la chaire qu’occupait Pierre Renouvin), très orienté vers l’histoire nord-américaine (il enseigne à de nombreuses reprises dans des universités américaines), il rencontrait à de nombreuses reprises Jean Monnet; le "bonhomme Monnet" l’avait frappé plus que fasciné, tant pour ses qualités d’organisateur que pour ses défauts de "dureté" en affaires. C’est que Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, savant remarquable, professeur talentueux, était très sensible aux relations humaines: chaleureux, affable, proche de ses élèves, sachant les mettre en confiance, il acceptait volontiers des opinions distinctes des siennes pourvu qu’elles fussent défendues avec le respect des autres; le sectarisme, l’esprit de chapelle lui étaient étrangers, d’où un certain recul vis-à-vis des engagements partisans, furent-ils au service de la construction européenne. Pour autant, il ne cessa jamais de suivre les travaux des historiens sur l’histoire de l’Europe. C’est que cette histoire était aussi l’histoire de sa vie, celle d’un homme né pendant la première guerre mondiale, mobilisé pendant la seconde guerre mondiale, marqué par la fin de l’antagonisme franco-allemand, par le déc-
lin européen face aux nouveaux géants, mais convaincu de la capacité des Européens à se redresser.

René Girault

"Identité et conscience européenne au XXe siècle":
Un chantier en cours

Lorsque ce vaste projet de recherches a été pensé et organisé, la situation de l'Europe, fin 1988, était bien différente de ce qu'elle est aujourd'hui. D'une part, "une relance de la relance européenne" (le mot est de Jacques Delors) était amorcée afin d'achever la construction du grand marché économique et d'obtenir des avancées dans les domaines monétaire et politique; d'autre part, l'Europe demeurait coupée en deux blocs antagonistes avec le symbole du mur de Berlin. Actuellement, si la coupure de l'Europe en deux a disparu, on paraît encore loin d'une réunion de tous les États européens et l'élan vers plus d'union européenne semble bien retombé. Mais les problèmes subsistent et l'explication «théorique» de leur existence doit être cherchée.

Parmi ceux-ci, une question fondamentale, à la base des travaux des dix groupes de recherches transnationaux réunissant plus d'une centaine de chercheurs: pour que l'Europe existe un jour vraiment – quels qu'en soient les contours – il faut qu'une commune identité réunisse les habitants de cette Europe et, plus important encore, que ces habitants aient pris conscience qu'ils appartiennent à ce même ensemble. Donc une première question: existe-t-il une identité européenne? Dans quelles limites géographiques? Selon quels critères politiques, sociaux, culturels? On a souvent fait une confusion entre l'histoire de l'idée européenne, élaborée, explicitée par des penseurs, des politiques, et le développement de la conscience européenne, comme s'il suffisait que des intellectuels aient pensé un concept nouveau, utile, pour que celui-ci pénètre parmi les masses; c'est aller bien vite en besogne. Toute construction européenne, quelle qu'en soit la nature, suppose pour durer l'adhésion volontaire des Européens concernés non pas seulement à un idéal théorique, mais à un sentiment profond de partager les mêmes droits et les mêmes devoirs. De la même manière que les citoyens d'un État européen se sentent solidaires de leurs compatriotes, soit pour défendre leur État, soit pour participer à la vie politique commune de cet État, il semble nécessaire que les habitants de l'Europe finissent par se sentir solidaires des autres Européens, citoyens d'autres États européens pour que l'Union européenne repose sur des fondations solides.

Peut-il un jour, exister une Nation européenne?

Les chercheurs intéressés à cette enquête sont presque tous des historiens spécialistes de la période contemporaine. Il existe une réflexion assez largement répandue selon laquelle ce qui peut unir les Européens entre eux, c'est l'existence d'un "marché commun culturel" (mot d'Edgar Morin) ou d'une "communauté de destins". On évoque alors les convergences et les analogies entre Européens sur la longue durée de l'histoire, soit depuis les fondements des civilisations antique et médiévale (sources grecque et judéo-chrétienne) jusqu'à nos jours. Notre enquête fut limitée au seul XXe siècle, mais elle couvrait un moment long pendant lequel l'Europe occidentale a connu le triomphe des États nationaux, conduisant à de sanglants affrontements, puis à un effort pour surmonter ces antagonismes suicidaires. Donc une période particulièrement révélatrice. Nous nous sommes aussi limités à l'Europe occi-

1. Voir la liste des groupes en annexe.
dentale, non de propos délibéré, mais plutôt parce qu’au départ de la recherche, il était encore difficile de mener avec les savants de l’Est européen des travaux communs, réguliers et débarrassés de formules philosophiques présupposées. À l’évidence, dans le futur, il faudra élargir les équipes de recherches à nos collègues de l’est de l'Europe. De toute manière, il faut bien prendre conscience des différences d’approche entre Européens vivant dans telle ou telle partie de l’Europe: si l’Europe est une du point de vue des géographes, nos recherches ont vite buté sur le fait que le mot Europe et ses représentations varient d’une région à l’autre. D’où un colloque particulier, tenu à Paris en mai 1992: sur ces diversités de conception quant à la réalité européenne, selon les lieux d’existence des Européens; les actes de ce colloque "Les Europe des Européens" ont été publiés en novembre 1993 (Publications de la Sorbonne, Paris, 156 p.).

La recherche s’est développée graduellement pendant cinq années. Il fallait délimiter les champs réels de l’enquête, les méthodes de travail, les moyens pratiques pour organiser des rencontres régulières; le plus ardu fut de trouver les financements indispensables à des ateliers de travail, à des colloques intermédiaires et à un congrès terminal, qui se tint à Paris en novembre 1993.

Fort heureusement des institutions nationales et européennes, en particulier la délégation à l’Information des Communautés européennes, soutinrent nos efforts. Lors du Congrès de Paris en novembre 1993, il fut possible de tirer les premiers résultats de cette vaste enquête. Soulignons dès l’abord que ceux-ci demeurent provisoires, car il faudrait encore du temps pour que nos "sondages" sur le passé, limités à des thèmes de recherches précis, soient étendus à d’autres exemples, afin d’affiner les conclusions; les problèmes méthodologiques posés par ce type de recherches sont également importants. Pourtant le livre tiré des actes du Congrès, qui vient d’être publié, "Identité et conscience européennes au XXe siècle (Paris, Hachette, novembre 1994, 234 pages), apporte la preuve que toutes ces recherches peuvent servir à mieux comprendre ce qu’il est convenu d’appeler "le déficit européen" actuel, en montrant d’où l’on vient et jusqu’où on est parvenu aujourd’hui en matière d’identité et de conscience européennes.

Il ne saurait être question de résumer, fut-ce à grands traits, les résultats obtenus tant les nuances entre certaines observations sont importantes, tant restent grandes les zones d’incertitudes. Il nous paraît plus opportun de signaler les domaines scrutés après avoir souligné que l’établissement d'une chronologie de la conscientisation européenne est primordial, faisant apparaître des temps forts (années 1925-1933 ou années 1950) et des moments de reculs (immédiat avant-seconde guerre mondiale). Le développement de la conscience européenne ne fut – n’est – ni linéaire, ni cumulatif, ni harmonieux. Ce ne fut pas seulement un phénomène de mentalités collectives réagissant à des propositions idéales venues des milieux intellectuels, mais un processus fortement lié aux vicissitudes de l’histoire politique de l'Europe, avec en particulier le rôle important des grandes guerres qui secouèrent l’Europe, voire celle de la guerre non déclarée, la guerre froide. La conscience européenne a pu naître aussi bien dans des combats que dans des débats.

Plusieurs groupes de recherches ont étudié certains milieux sociaux spécifiques; Hartmuth Kaelble a pu dégager des caractères spécifiques des sociétés européennes; en partant des travaux antérieurs et de ceux de deux groupes (1 et 7), il souligne fortement que l’Europe "vécue" par les Européens au quotidien, soit leurs similitudes si nombreuses, ne débouche pas ipso facto sur une "Europe pensée"; toutefois la comparaison des sociétés européennes avec les sociétés développées non-européennes permet d’établir certaines bases des solidarités intereuropéennes, peut-être génératrices d’une conscience européenne. Pierre Milza s'attache plus précisément aux réactions des migrants, notamment à celles des populations venues du sud de l'Europe (Latins surtout), à la suite des recherches du groupe 2. Là encore bilan nuancé: le réflexe national a souvent prévalu dans ces milieux, – souvent au profit de la nation d’accueil, – davantage que l'expression d'une solidarité européenne transnationale.
L’étude que Michel Dumoulin et Eric Bussière consacrent aux milieux économiques est très solidement fondée sur les larges travaux du groupe 8. La prise de conscience d'une certaine décadence de l’Europe face au redoutable jeune concurrent américain, bientôt devenant conquérant, a poussé des entrepreneurs européens à s’organiser à l’échelle européenne, donc à se tourner vers des solutions "européennes"; la nécessité d’élargir le marché, de se défaire des habitudes protectionnistes, alla dans le même sens. La continuité de certaines attitudes patronales ressort ici à l’évidence. Les moyens financiers dont disposaient certaines entreprises leur ont permis de contribuer à la popularisation de certains idéaux européens. Donc au total un milieu actif.

Les groupes 4 et 9 s’occupaient des élites politiques et des milieux liés aux institutions européennes. Les rapports de Gérard Bossuât et Anne Deighton, comme celui de Gilbert Trausch, soulignent les transformations intervenues avec la constitution d'institutions européennes, créant de mini-sociétés agitées de genres de vie nouveaux, vivant l’Europe en quelque sorte, tout en notant que les comportements des hommes politiques sont, au fond, plus à l’unisson des mentalités ordinaires de leurs concitoyens que fortement en avance sur ceux-ci. Deux remarques sont ici à méditer: "l'idée d'Europe chez les élites politiques n’est-elle pas fondée sur l'idée, somme toute classique, du respect des équilibres nationaux"? – "la perception des priorités ou des valeurs nationales a été omniprésente". D'où une multiplicité d'Europe dans les élites politiques.

Bien évidemment les études sur les mentalités collectives ont beaucoup retenu l'attention des chercheurs. Comme il ne pouvait être question de tout mesurer, le choix s’est porté sur ceux qui avaient eu à subir les effets directs des guerres (prisonniers, déportés, personnes déplacées, plus largement anciens combattants) – groupe 3 – ou bien sur les intellectuels ordinairement attentifs à des solutions nouvelles. Antoine Fleury et Robert Frank illustrent bien les décalages psychologiques qui peuvent exister entre la vie imposée par la guerre et l'image des autres que peut procurer une expérience extraordinaire. "Si des fragments de conscience européenne ont pu naître des guerres, pour l’essentiel la mémoire de ces guerres demeure encore très nationale". Quant aux intellectuels en Europe, en tout cas ceux des États latins étudiés par le groupe 6 et présentés par Andrée Bachoud et Manuel Espadas-Burgos, ils mêlent souvent leur "idée d'Europe à des considérations plus larges d'ordre éthique ou politique, l'Europe dont ils parlent, ayant souvent une configuration géographique variable, des principes différents, en bref une physionomie diverse. Comment ensuite unir tout cela? Finalement n'est-ce pas par opposition à d'autres peuples séparés de l'Europe par des étendues marines que les Européens finiraient par se retrouver en eux-mêmes? D'où les très intéressants travaux du groupe 10 présentés par Antonio Varsori: a-t-on affaire à une identité "atlantique", "méditerranéenne", "occidentale' ou vraiment "européenne" lorsqu'on étudie le rôle des mers dans la formation d'une conscience européenne?

Comme on le voit, cette recherche soulève au moins autant de questions nouvelles qu'elle ne présente de résultats bien acquis. Telle est et sera toute enquête qui veut partir des réalités et non obéir à des schémas présupposés. D'où la décision prise unaniment à la fin du Congrès de Paris l'an dernier: il faut continuer cette recherche, l'amplifier même tant dans l’espace couvert (est de l’Europe, pays limitrophes) que dans les secteurs sociaux encore délaissés (influence des facteurs religieux). On finira bien par savoir où en est actuellement l'identité européenne, par connaître ses points forts et ses faiblesses; on sait déjà, grâce à cette commune entreprise scientifique européenne, que l'Europe des historiens existe. Ce n'est pas le moindre résultat!

René Girault

2. Les lecteurs intéressés trouveront dans le livre "Identité et conscience européennes au XXe siècle" (Hachette, 1994) une bibliographie des livres déjà publiés ou à paraître sous peu, fruits des recherches des groupes de travail: sept livres publiés, sept autres à paraître.
Les groupes de recherche


5. * Cultures de masse et conscience européenne.* Rapporteur et responsable: Ennio Di Nolfo (Université de Florence).


8. *Cercles et milieux économiques et conscience européenne.* Rapporteurs et responsables: Michel Dumoulin (Université de Louvain-la-Neuve) et Eric Bussière (Université Paris IV).


10. *Marges maritimes et identité européenne.* Rapporteurs: Antonio Varsori (Université de Florence), Geoffrey Warner (Université de Birmingham).
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Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen

Alan S. Milward

Allegiance - The Past and the Future

The article considers the historiography of European integration in the context of the first issue of this new journal. The political and economic theory of integration, which inspired much early historical research, has been discarded. Political scientists increasingly interpret the process of integration as little more than the interaction of greater and smaller powers within the international system, the theme which diplomatic history has always regarded as central. In the belief that this is an insufficient approach to the history of the subject, the article proposes a new normative approach. This turns on the concept of allegiance and the evidence that a dual allegiance, to the nation and to the institutions of the European Union, has developed. It suggests ways in which the nation-state after 1945 won back the allegiance of its inhabitants. Some of those processes, however, depended on a parallel growth of allegiance to the institutions of the European Community, so that the question of whether the latter, secondary, allegiance will replace the former, primary, national one, remains unanswered. The article proposes a framework of research within which this serious historical question might now be tackled by measuring shifts in allegiance and estimating the reasons for them.

John Gillingham

American Monnetism and the European Coal-Steel Community in the Fifties

The European Coal and Steel Community provided a substitute for a Franco-German peace treaty after World War II, but could not effectively regulate the heavy industry of the member nations, which remained cartelized. It was not a motor of economic and political integration. Since the supranationalism of Jean Monnet, as championed and promoted by his disciples in the United States Department of State, failed to produce results in the cases of both the European Defense Community and EURATOM, the ECSC remained its most important accomplishment. The Eisenhower administration provided a generous loan to support its operations, but in the end had to accept the fact that ECSC had restored rather than reformed the coal and steel industries of Western Europe.

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Elena Calandri

In France’s post war policy, the history of the plan for a European armament agency magnified the double soul of French European integration policy and reflected the transition from the quest for security by direct controls to economic cooperation. At the London conference of September 1954, Mendès France’s plan for a supranational armament community, echoing ideas having been put forward since 1953, sounded as merely aiming at discriminating Germany and perpetuating its minority status. In November, Franco-German economic cooperation agreed upon by Mendès France and Adenauer at La-Celle-Saint Cloud, enhanced the plan’s second dimension, and led France’s allies to reconsider its economic meaning. In winter and spring 1955, Franco-German contacts for cooperation in armaments construction, which raised in the other European countries nightmares of a Franco-German cartel, paralleled the conference convened in Paris to consider the case of a WEU agency for standardisation and joint production. Although by Summer 1955 both of them had fallen short of the initial hopes, the move toward economic cooperation had been accelerated.

Wolfram Kaiser
The Bomb and Europe. Britain, France and the EEC Entry Negotiations (1961-1963)

The successful conclusion of the EEC entry negotiations between 1961 and 1963 was largely dependent on whether Britain and France would be able to reach an informal understanding about a mutually advantageous division of political leadership within Western Europe. A possible package deal could have involved close nuclear collaboration. However, after Macmillan had failed in 1961 to get US cooperation for assisting the French with building up their force de frappe, the British government subsequently never seriously contemplated making an offer for bilateral nuclear cooperation. Whatever de Gaulle’s intentions had been it is now abundantly clear that the first British EEC application was doomed to failure from the very beginning.
This article presents the plans regarding inter-European relationships from 1943 to 1957, as they had been conceived in France by high civil servants of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, the "Commissariat général du plan" and the ministerial cabinets. So far, few details had been known on the French views on European unity in the days of the provisional government of the French Republic settled in Alger. De Gaulle already had made plans in view of European unity. Jean Monnet is the key-figure of the French policy for Europe, but other important persons, perhaps less known but nonetheless as active, have marked this policy. In the name of different interests and distinct European conceptions, high civil servants, in opposition to Monnet, support the creation of the large Europe of the OEEC, that they consider being the foundation for European economic integration. Eventually, after 1952, Monnet and Schuman don't succeed any longer in promoting the creation of a supranational Europe, as proves the failure, in 1956, of the plan that should have given birth to a pacific atomic Europe. Yet, these high civil servants managed to define, more than one could have thought, doctrines and policies on behalf of the European issue, that enabled France to assume a part that fitted its ambitions and brought about world-wide influence and economic prosperity for Europe and its peoples.

Christian Pennera

The Beginnings of the Court of Justice and its Role as a driving Force in European Integration

The Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Community has been conceived by main reference to a national administrative high jurisdiction, the French Conseil d'Etat. It rapidly formulates a courageous and voluntarist jurisprudence. From its first judgements, it claims that first be ensured the aims and fundamental objectives of the Treaty of Paris and proclaims the immediately applicable character for the member States, of certain clauses. It already brings up to date the principle of the balance of power, characteristic of the community institutional structure, that will be at the centre of an important jurisprudential work in the 80ies. With the Treaties of Rome, the Court became the unique juridical organ of the three communities; in the beginning of the sixties, a first judgement lays down the fundamental principle of the direct effect of community law and decides that the treaties create responsibilities as well as rights that enter directly into the juridical heritage of private individuals, citizens of the member States. These can thus directly refer to them before their national judge, who somehow becomes the judge of common law in community matter. This jurisprudence will rapidly be completed by assertion of the principle of the primacy of community law that means a limitation of the sovereign rights of the member States in behalf of the Communities. Ten years of activities have been sufficient to make out of the Court a powerful driving force behind European integration.

La Cour de justice de la CECA a été conçue par référence principale à une haute juridiction administrative nationale, le Conseil d’État français. Elle formule rapidement une jurisprudence courageuse et

Marie-Thérèse Bitsch
La première institution supranationale: du nouveau sur l’histoire de la Haute Autorité de la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l’acier

This article presents the main contributory elements of Dirk Spierenburg’s and Raymond Poidevin’s book on the High Authority of the ECSC published in French (1993) and in English (1994). The competences of the High Authority - a supranational institution, conceived by Jean Monnet and his team - are meticulously defined in the Treaty of Paris, a law-making treaty resulting from a compromise between the six founding states. The nine-member college, residing in Luxembourg, is responsible on a day to day basis for developing the appropriate forms of cooperation in the coal and steel sectors. The college is assisted by competent and committed high-ranking civil servants, some of whom hold that position over years. Thanks to its financial independence, the High Authority develops an active social policy, one of its biggest successes being the construction of workers’ housing. Diverse external relations are established with third countries and international organisations. The difficulties of the High Authority’s action and the limits of its power come to light through the handling of several dossiers, such as the setting up of the common market, the harmonization of transportation rates and costs, the anti-cartel policy, or the attempt to overcome the coal crisis which leads to the beginning of the High Authority’s decline, made complete in 1967 by the merging of the executives of the three original communities.

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